REVIEW ARTICLE: LINGUISTIC CONTEXTUALISM AND MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT: QUENTIN SKINNER ON MARSILIUS OF PADUA Vasileios Syros1,2

Abstract: This article discusses hitherto unexplored aspects of Quentin Skinners work on the history of political thought by offering a critical appraisal of the medieval section of Skinners Foundations of Modern Political Thought. The article investigates and critically assesses Skinners study of the medieval classics with a specific focus on his interpretation of the fourteenth-century political thinker Marsilius of Padua. In particular, the paper demonstrates that Skinners analysis of Marsilius political ideas is at odds with his own methodology. It also contends that Skinners emphasis on the intellectual-linguistic context as a starting point for the interpretation of major political writers of the past downplays the normative value of Marsilius political theory and is, in the end, a narrow interpretation of the overall scope of Marsilius Defensor pacis.

One of the largely unstudied aspects of Quentin Skinners work on the history of political thought is the medieval part of his Foundations of Modern Political Thought.3 The failure of scholarship on Skinners methodology to offer a critical appraisal of the medieval foundations of Skinners Foundations, that is, Skinners application of his methodology in his study of medieval political thought, can be attributed to a number of reasons. The bulk of scholarship on Skinners work on methodology, and especially the papers collected in the Meaning and Context4 and Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought5 volumes do not look at Skinners application of his own methodological precepts in his interpretation of certain classic

1 The Martin Marty Center for the Advanced Study of Religion, The University of Chicago, 1025 E. 58th St., Swift Hall, Chicago, IL 606371509, USA. Email: vsyros1@ uchicago.edu 2 I would like to thank Bernardo Bayona Aznar, Janet Coleman, Jeong-soo Kim, Evan Kuehn, Cary Nederman, Kari Palonen, Paul Rahe and Gary Shaw for valuable suggestions and criticisms. Thanks are also due to Nathan Tarcov for earlier discussions and for sharing his unpublished manuscript, Quentin Skinners Method, Machiavelli and Thomas More, with me. 3 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The Renaissance (Cambridge, 1978). 4 Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. J. Tully (Princeton, NJ, 1988). 5 Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, ed. Annabel Brett and James Tully (Cambridge and New York, 2006).

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT. Vol. XXXI. No. 4. Winter 2010

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

692

V. SYROS

thinkers and texts.6 In addition, no attempt has been made so far to examine how Skinners methodological programme relates to his study of major figures in the history of medieval Western political thought. As a result, there remains a genuine need to explore the potential and limits of Skinners methodology with regard to the study of medieval political ideas. Though the largest part of Skinners work is focused on modern political thought, he clearly intended the medieval and Renaissance section of his Foundations as a propaedeutic to his survey of modern political thought. The objective of this article is to explore Skinners study of medieval classics with a specific focus on his interpretation of the late-medieval political thinker Marsilius of Padua (1270/12901342). I do not purport to offer a detailed study of the medieval component of Skinners Foundations; instead, I use Skinners discussion of Marsilius to evaluate Skinners methodological programme. I will demonstrate that Skinners study of Marsilius ideas contradicts his own methodology. I will also suggest that Skinners emphasis on the intellectual-linguistic context as a starting point for the interpretation of classic political thinkers downplays the prescriptive dimensions of Marsilius political theory. Anachronisms In his discussion of the appropriate procedures to follow in approaching and understanding classic texts,7 Skinner challenges the idea that the text itself should form the self-sufficient object of inquiry and understanding. He quotes William Bluhm, who claims that the goal must be to provide a reappraisal of the classic writings, quite apart from the context of historical development, as perennially important attempts to set down universal propositions about political reality.8 The historians or interpreters tantalizing dilemma of whether he should concentrate simply on the text in itself amounts essentially to saying that it will never in fact be possible simply to study what any given classic writer has said (especially in an alien culture)

6 Notable exceptions are P.A. Rahe, Situating Machiavelli, in Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections, ed. J. Hankins (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 270308; N. Tarcov, Quentin Skinners Method and Machiavellis Prince, Ethics, 92 (1982), pp. 692709, excerpted in Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, pp. 194203; N. Tarcov, Political Thought in Early Modern Europe II: The Age of Reformation, Journal of Modern History, 54 (1982), pp. 5665. For an intellectual portrait of Quentin Skinner, see K. Palonen, Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric (Cambridge, 2003). 7 Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, p. 30. 8 Ibid.; William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought & Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1965), p. v.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

693

without bringing to bear some of ones expectations about what he must have been saying.9 Skinner rightly calls attention to the hazards linked to projecting a particular idea or doctrine onto a thinker of the past. For instance, he cautions against ascribing to Marsilius a doctrine of separation of powers and against assuming that he could have meant to contribute to a debate the terms of which were unavailable to him, and the point of which would have been lost on him.10 However, Skinner seems to elide the difference between the concept of separation of powers as formulated by Montesquieu and other modern political thinkers and the notion that portions of authority can be assigned to various organs and agents within a political entity.11 Marsilius in his Defensor pacis (Defender of Peace, 1324)12 looks upon the legislator humanus, i.e. the entire body of the citizens or their valentior pars (weightier part) as the fountain and ultimate repository of political power within the political community.13 He thereby advocates the supreme and undivided sovereignty of the legislator humanus over the process of framing the laws and appointing, monitoring and correcting the ruler/government and the officeholders.14 Though he does not subscribe to the modern concept of separation of powers, he does entertain the notion that power can be divided among parts and organs when it comes to the administration of a political entity, without compromising the absolute authority (or sovereignty) of the legislator humanus. Marsilius scholarship is divided on this issue: for Cary Nederman, any kind of representative system and the idea of entrusting of power to a representative body are at odds with Marsilius idea of citizenship.15 In Hwa-Yong Lees reading, in contrast, Marsilius acknowledges that the body of the citizens can delegate authority to representatives without
Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, p. 31. Ibid., p. 33. 11 See also B. Bayona Aznar, Religin y poder: Marsilio de Padua: La primera teora laica del poder? (Madrid, 2007), pp. 1712. 12 References to the Defensor pacis are to the edition Marsilius von Padua, Defensor pacis, ed. Richard Scholz (= Fontes iuris germanici antiqui in usum scholarum ex monumentis germanicae historicis, separatim editi; 7) (Hanover, 1932/33) (henceforth cited as Defensor pacis). Citations will be to discourse, chapter and paragraph. I have also consulted the following English translations: Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of Peace, Vol. 2: The Defensor pacis, trans. A. Gewirth (New York 1956; repr. 2001); Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace, ed. and trans. A. Brett (Cambridge 2005). 13 Defensor pacis I.xii. 14 Ibid., I.xv. 15 C.J. Nederman, Knowledge, Consent and the Critique of Political Representation in Marsiglio of Paduas Defensor Pacis, Political Studies, 39 (1991), pp. 1935; C.J. Nederman, The Theory of Political Representation: Medieval Reprsentatio and Modern Transformations, in Reprsentatio: Mapping a Key Word for Churches and Governance, ed. Alberto Melloni and M. Faggioli (Mnster, 2006), pp. 4159, esp. pp. 4851.
10 9

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

694

V. SYROS

necessarily relinquishing their fundamental civil and political rights. In this sense, Lee argues, Marsilius articulates an instrumental notion of political representation as indispensable for appointing the organs entrusted with the enforcement of the laws and the establishment and coordination of the other parts of the political community.16 Likewise, Bernardo Bayona Aznar suggests that the Marsilian scheme of governmental organization is founded on the principle that the power of the legislator humanus is perpetual and irrevocable and that the legislator humanus can assign authority to one or several persons, but remains the ultimate source and holder of authority within the political community.17 Marsilius proposes a general model of political organization as the common feature of all legitimate constitutional forms (kingship, aristocracy and polity). This model is meant to apply to various political entities, and Marsilius does not indicate a preference for one specific form of government. Just once in the Defensor pacis does Marsilius suggest that kingship is perhaps the best form of government.18 He is adamant that the only legitimate lawgiver, the primary and proper efficient cause of the laws, is the whole body of the citizens (universitas civium) or its weightier part (pars valentior), regardless of whether it makes the laws directly by itself or it assigns the task of making the laws to a person or persons who are not and cannot be the legislator in the absolute sense (simpliciter), but only in a certain aspect (ad aliquid) and for a specific period and in accordance with the authority of the primary legislator.19 When it comes to the actual workings of governance and the lawmaking process, Marsilius envisages a representative scheme that involves vesting the organs and officeholders of the political community with a certain amount

16 H.-Y. Lee, Political Representation in the Later Middle Ages: Marsilius in Context (New York, 2008), pp. 1312. 17 Bayona, Religin y poder, p. 191. See also J. Coleman Marsilius of Padua, ch. 4, pp.13468, in A History of Political Thought, Vol. 2: From the Middle Ages to the Renaissance (Oxford and Malden, MA, 2000), pp. 1538. 18 Defensor pacis I.ix.5. 19 Nos autem dicamus secundum veritatem atque consilium Aristotelis 30 Politice, capitulo 60, legislatorem seu causam legis effectivam primam et propriam esse populum seu civium universitatem aut eius valenciorem partem, per suam eleccionem seu voluntatem in generali civium congregacione per sermonem expressam precipientem seu determinantem aliquid fieri vel omitti circa civiles actus humanos sub pena vel supplicio temporali: valenciorem inquam partem, considerata quantitate personarum et qualitate in communitate illa super quam lex fertur, sive id fecerit universitas predicta civium aut eius pars valencior per seipsam immediate, sive id alicui vel aliquibus commiserit faciendum, qui legislator simpliciter non sunt nec esse possunt, sed solum ad aliquid et quandoque, ac secundum primi legislatoris auctoritatem. (Defensor pacis I.xii.3).

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

695

of power or coercive force that is necessary for them to perform their duties.20 As Marsilius phrases it, the legislator humanus is the primary and proper efficient cause (prima et appropriata causa effectiva) and the ruler functions as the secondary or executive efficient cause (secundaria vero quasi instrumentalis seu executiva causa effectiva) and exercises the authority given to him in conformity with the laws.21 Although Marsilius political theory does not involve an irrevocable transfer of power to the ruler or the governing part (pars principans), it does propose a pattern of political organization in which the government is vested with a certain amount of power to set up the other parts of the political community and enforce the laws.22 In Skinners account,
the particular danger with intellectual biography is that of sheer anachronism. A given writer may be discovered to have held a view, on the strength of some chance similarity of terminology, on some subject to which he cannot in principle have meant to contribute. Marsilius of Padua, for example, at one point in his Defender of the Peace offers some typically Aristotelian remarks on the executive role of the ruler, compared with the legislative role of a sovereign people. The modern commentator who comes upon this passage will of course be familiar with the doctrine, important in constitutional theory and practice since the American Revolution, that one of the conditions of political freedom is the separation of executive from legislative power. The historical origins of the doctrine itself can be traced to the historiographical suggestion (first canvassed some two centuries after Marsilius death) that the development of the Roman Republic into an Empire demonstrated the danger to the liberty of subjects inherent in entrusting any single authority with centralized political power.23

Skinner holds that the historian of political thought can easily fall prey to the tendency for the paradigms applied to the history of ideas to cause its subject matter to mutate into a mythology of doctrines.24 He elaborates: the characteristic point of departure in such histories is to set out an ideal type of the given doctrine whether it is the doctrine of equality, progress, Machiavellism, the social contract, the great chain of being, the separation of powers and so on.25 The reification of doctrines in this way gives rise in turn to two kinds of historical absurdity, both of which are not merely prevalent in this type of history, but seem more or less inescapable when its methodology is
For a similar point, see D.R. Carr, The Prince and the City: Ideology and Reality in the Thought of Marsilius of Padua, Medioevo, 5 (1979), pp. 27991, p. 285. 21 Defensor pacis I.xiv.8; xv.4. 22 Ibid., I.xv. 23 Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, pp. 323. 24 Ibid., p. 34. 25 Ibid.
20

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

696

V. SYROS

employed.26 In this connection, Skinner then denounces the tendency to search for approximations to the ideal type, which yields a form of nonhistory which is almost entirely given over to pointing out earlier anticipations of later doctrines, and to crediting each writer in terms of clairvoyance. So Marsilius is notable for his remarkable anticipation of Machiavelli; Machiavelli is notable because he lays the foundation for Marx.27 Nonetheless, certain questions and ideas are, in fact, universal, that is, they are common to humans regardless of geographical location or chronological differences. These questions and ideas emerge as central themes in various traditions of political theorizing. Accordingly, one of the primary tasks of the historian of political thought is to chart the genesis and evolution of a particular idea or concept and its cross-pollination and vicissitudes across different contexts. The idea of the birth of the state on a contractual basis, for instance, is essentially as old as the history of political thought itself: it has been a persistent feature of ancient Chinese, Indian and classical political thought and has often been deployed as a device to explain the rise and growth of human civilization or to illustrate the raison dtre of political authority. Tracing the trajectories of this idea across various traditions of political theorizing does not amount to understating the novelty of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau as progenitors of modern social contract theories, nor does it devalue their contribution to the formation of the notion of social contract as a response to specific questions and events of their time. However, it can help to dispel a certain mythology that has sprung up whereby certain concepts have been reckoned as distinctly modern or Western/European. The Mahabharata and Kautilyas (Indian statesman and philosopher, fourth century BC) Arthasastra, for example, speak of a primordial condition that was characterized by anarchy in which the large fish devoured the smaller one. At some stage, people decided to appoint Manu as their ruler to protect them and uphold social order.28 Likewise, in the narrative Elevating Uniformity (or Conforming Upwards, Shang tong) Mo Zi (Chinese philosopher, c.460390 BC) sketches the stages through which the state came into being in terms very similar to those employed in early modern contractarian conceptions of the state: at the beginning there were neither punishments nor government, and each man had a different standard of right and wrong. The diversity of standards generated friction and conflict. At some point, the most virtuous and most able among them was chosen and anointed as the Son of Heaven.
Ibid., p. 35. Ibid. 28 See the discussions in S. Collins, The Lions Roar on the Wheel-Turning King: A Response to Andrew Huxleys The Buddha and the Social Contract , Journal of Indian Philosophy, 24 (1996), pp. 42146; L.R. Smith, The Social Contract in Kautilyas Arthasastra and the Mauryan Empire of Ancient India, Indian Journal of Economics & Business, 4 (2005), pp. 32544; M. Sicker, The Genesis of the State (New York, 1991), pp. 268, 80.
27 26

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

697

The Son of Heaven chose and appointed the most virtuous and most able men as the Three Dukes. However, Son of Heaven and the Three Dukes realized that the world is huge and divided it into several states and designated leaders and rulers for each region and state.29 The aforementioned instances might seem of little relevance to the evolution of the European tradition of social contract. But early modern social contract theorists participated in a discourse in which ideas such as social pact, state of nature and pact of subjects had been prefigured and constituted common currency already in the Middle Ages. The historian of political thought can set himself the task of illuminating the classical or medieval substratum of ideas while being mindful of the danger that the doctrine to be investigated so readily becomes hypostatized into an entity.30 In the Republic (358e359b), for example, Glaucon puts forth the view that justice originates from a pact among members of the political community: when men had perpetrated and suffered from injustice, they deemed it expedient to enter into a mutual agreement that would prevent both. Hence, they agreed to lay down laws and concluded covenants.31 Along similar lines, Cicero in various of his writings formulates a theory of the rise and evolution of the commonwealth on a contractual basis that had an enduring impact on medieval debates on the genesis of social life and the justification of rulership: the idea that a commonwealth (res publica) is the property of the people (populus) but that a people is not any conglomeration of individuals joined together in any manner but a multitude of men united by an agreement on justice and a share in the common utility. Drawing on Cicero, a number of medieval political writers such as John Duns Scotus (c.1265 1308), John of Paris (Quidort) (c.12551306) and Engelbert of Admont (c.12501332), posit that men lived scattered in a pre-social condition, but they had various wants and thus needed to associate with others in order to sustain themselves and secure a sufficient life; they subsequently formed communities based on agreement as to what is just and in the community
29 Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsn Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, trans. B. Watson (New York and London, 1967), pp. 345; Y. Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era (Honolulu, 2009), pp. 312; Y. Pines and G. Shelach, Using the Past to Serve the Present: Comparative Perspectives on Chinese and Western Theories of the Origins of the State, in Genesis and Regeneration: Essays on Conceptions of Origins, ed. S. Shaked (Jerusalem, 2005), pp. 12763 (on Mo Zi pp. 1313); A. Black, A World History of Ancient Political Thought (Oxford, 2009), pp. 10810. For comparisons with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, see C. Liang, History of Chinese Political Thought during the Early Tsin Period, trans. L.T. Chen (New York and London, 1930), pp. 1067. 30 Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, p. 34. 31 See in general C.H. Kahn, The Origins of Social Contract Theory in the Fifth Century B.C., in The Sophists and Their Legacy, ed. G.B. Kerferd (Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 92108.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

698

V. SYROS

interest; but internecine strife and dissension soon broke out; therefore men decided to appoint a ruler to protect themselves from those driven by greed and to safeguard domestic unity and stability.32 These classical and medieval accounts of the creation and growth of human communities exhibit intriguing affinities to early modern theories of social contract, as developed by Hobbes and Locke, which depict a state of nature, a condition characterized by the absence of any type of social organization, which was then followed by the creation of a human community on the basis of a social contract. The second stage was initiated by a pact of government: a voluntary agreement to establish a constitution or conclude a pact with a sovereign or to exchange oaths that detailed the specific terms whereby the people were expected to obey and the ruler ought to operate. Classics and the Classics It is baffling that, notwithstanding his strictures against anachronism, Skinner often contradicts himself and ends up falling into serious anachronisms: for example, in his Foundations he contends that Marsilius arguments culminate, to speak anachronistically, in a remarkably Lutheran vision of the powers and jurisdictions which Marsiglio thinks it legitimate to claim on behalf of the clergy and the Church.33 Even though, as noted before, Skinner cautions against crediting Marsilius with a theory of separation of powers, he still employs the concept of popular sovereignty, a concept introduced by Jean Bodin in the sixteenth century that is equally or even more problematic than the separation of powers idea. As Skinner phrases it,
the theory of popular sovereignty developed by Marsilius and Bartolus [of Saxoferrato (131357)] was destined to play a major role in shaping the
32 For further discussion and references, see V. Syros, Founders and Kings versus Orators: Medieval and Early Modern Views on the Origins of Social Life, Viator, 42 (1) (2011) (forthcoming); M. Kempshall, De Re Publica I.39 in Medieval and Renaissance Political Thought, in Ciceros Republic, ed. J.G.F. Powell and J.A. North (London 2001), pp. 99135. On Ciceros reception in medieval political writing, see C.J. Nederman, The Union of Wisdom and Eloquence Before the Renaissance: The Ciceronian Orator in Medieval Political Thought, The Journal of Medieval History, 18 (1992), pp. 7595; C.J. Nederman, Nature, Sin and the Origins of Society: The Ciceronian Tradition in Medieval Political Thought, Journal of the History of Ideas, 49 (1988), pp. 326; both reprinted in C.J. Nederman, Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits: Classical Traditions in Moral and Political Philosophy, 12th15th Centuries (London, 1997), nos. XII and XI, respectively. 33 Skinner, Foundations, p. 19. For a closer discussion of the affinities between Marsilius and Luther, see J. Heckel, Marsilius von Padua und Martin Luther: Ein Vergleich ihrer Rechts- und Soziallehre, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fr Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonische Abteilung, 44 (1958), pp. 268336 reprinted in J. Heckel, Das blinde, undeutliche Wort Kirche: Gesammelte Aufstze, ed. S. Grundmann (Cologne and Graz, 1964), pp. 49110.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

699

most radical version of early modern constitutionalism. Already they are prepared to argue that sovereignty lies with the people, that they only delegate and never alienate it, and thus no legitimate ruler can ever enjoy a higher status than that of an official appointed by, and capable of being dismissed by, his own subjects.34

Skinners application of the popular sovereignty concept is problematic for a number of reasons: Marsilius is concerned not so much with the status of the ruler (in the case of monarchy) or rulers (in the case of aristocracy and polity), as Skinner believes, but rather with the mechanics of power and the creation of an efficient system for monitoring the activity of the officeholders, including the ruler(s). In essence, even if the ruler is assigned a status lower than that of an official appointed by, and capable of being dismissed by, his own subjects, he still can accumulate power and act against the will of the people or the existing laws. Even more striking is the fact that, although Skinner looks upon the political lexicon and language of a writer as the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem,35 he in effect obfuscates the conceptual terms available to Marsilius precisely because he does not trouble to explore the ways in which a medieval classic (Marsilius) read an ancient classic (Aristotle). This is certainly not to overlook or deny that the student or translator of political texts is compelled to cater to the needs of the particular audience he seeks to address while trying to be true to the genuine content of the work. Likewise, the student of the classics perforce needs to strike a balance and to choose from a panoply of terms and concepts available in modern parlance when constructing a narrative and engaging in an analysis of a particular work. Inevitably, there is always a gulf between the genuine content of a text and its translation or interpretation, given that a translator or an interpreter must operate in terms that are available to him/her but not the author of the original text, no matter how hard she tries to avoid the fallacy of supposing that he [Marsilius] could have meant to contribute to a debate the terms of which were unavailable to him.36 By labelling Marsilius an apologist for the idea of popular sovereignty, Skinner risks the very danger of crediting a writer with a meaning he could not have intended to convey, since that meaning was not available to him, and of too readily reading in a doctrine which a given writer might in principle have meant to state, but in fact had no intention to convey.37 In doing so Skinner actually undermines his own enterprise of eliciting a writers intention as a starting point for an adequate understanding of his work by elucidating the concepts and the linguistic conventions available to him and his
34 35 36 37

Skinner, Foundations, p. 65. Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, p. 65. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

700

V. SYROS

readers and by recovering the writers mental world, the world of his empirical beliefs.38 Though one can see Marsilius as presenting theoretical grounds for a notion that adumbrated the modern theory of popular sovereignty, his conception of sovereignty is firmly inscribed within an Aristotelian framework. In addition, Janet Coleman points out that the vision of the modern state as set forth by Hobbes, Locke and Max Weber, for example, and the modern liberal notion of popular sovereignty in a secular context are very different from medieval corporation theories. Coleman is right to argue that the modern distinction between state authority and that of the entire community is foreign to medieval corporation theories which elevated the corporation to the ultimate source of authority and would dismiss a ruler or governing body with absolute authority as despotic or tyrannical.39 Skinner is by no means exceptional among students of medieval political thought in applying the concept of popular sovereignty to Marsilius, however, and perplexity over Marsilius notion of sovereignty has actually persisted since the nineteenth century.40 Recent studies have shown that the Marsilian
38 Q. Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts, New Literary History, 3 (1972), p. 393408, p. 407 revised and abbreviated version in On Literary Intention: Critical Essays, ed. D. Newton-de Molina (Edinburgh, 1976), pp. 21021; reprinted in Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, pp. 6878. 39 Coleman, Marsilius of Padua, pp. 1668; J. Coleman, Structural Realities of Power: The Theory and Practice of Monarchies and Republics in Relation to Personal and Collective Liberty, in The Propagation of Power in the Medieval West, ed. M. Gosman et al. (Groningen, 1997), pp. 20730, esp. pp. 21516. For Italy in particular, see The Origins of the State in Italy, 13001600, ed. J. Kirshner (Chicago and London, 1995). P. Schiera, Legitimacy, Discipline, and Institutions: Three Necessary Conditions for the Birth of the Modern State, in The Origins of the State in Italy, 13001600, ed. Julius Kirschner (Chicago, 1996), pp. 1133, pp. 1819) equates Marsilius concept of civitas with the Hobbesian notion of the commonwealth. A detailed comparison of Marsilius and Hobbess political ideas appears in B. Bayona Aznar, Religin y poder en Hobbes y Marsilio de Padua: similitudes y diferencias, Pensamiento, 63 (2009), pp. 22159. For a survey of medieval views on despotism, see C. Fiocchi, Dispotismo e libert nel pensiero politico medievale: Riflessioni allombra di Aristotele (sec. XIIIXIV) (Bergamo, 2007). Cf. also the discussion in Annabel Brett, Scholastic Political Thought and the Modern Concept of the State, in Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, ed. Brett and Tully, pp. 13048. 40 M. Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1963), p. 153, sees the notion of popular sovereignty as deriving from Greek and Roman sources. See also F. von Bezold, Die Lehre von der Volkssouvernitt whrend des Mittelalters, Historische Zeitschrift, 36 (1876), pp. 31367 reprinted in F. von Bezold, Aus Mittelalter und Renaissance: Kulturgeschichtliche Studien (Munich and Berlin, 1918), pp. 148; E. Crosa, La sovranit popolare dal Medioevo alla Rivoluzione Francese (Milan, 1915); E. Reibstein, Volkssouvernitt und Freiheitsrechte: Texte und Studien zur politischen Theorie des 14.18. Jahrhunderts (Freiburg i. Br. and Munich, 1972), Vol. 1, pp. 307; H. Hofmann, Reprsentation: Studien zur Wort- und

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

701

idea of the sovereignty of the multitude is rooted firmly in the doctrine of collective wisdom, that is, the ability of the citizens when coming together to combine different shares of virtues and prudence and to arrive at better decisions than a small group of experts could achieve.41 In addition, Marsilius concept of sovereignty seems much closer to the one used by Aristotle (kurion, rendered dominans) in his definition of democracy as the form of constitution in which the mass is sovereign (dominant). (Est autem politia ordo civitatis aliorum principatuum et maxime dominantis omnium. Dominans quidem enim ubique est politeuma civitatis, politeuma autem est politia. Dico autem puta in democraticis quidem dominans populus, pauci autem e contrario in oligarchiis.42) Intentions and Motives Skinners argument, that seeking out the actual intention is the quintessence of the study of political works, is fraught with serious difficulties. First, though Skinner does, on occasion, point to the distinction between the motives on the one hand, and the intentions on the other, that lay behind a certain
Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1974), pp. 191201; P. Graf Kielmansegg, Volkssouvernitt: Eine Untersuchung der Bedingungen demokratischer Legitimitt (Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 5965; J.R. Garca Cue, Teora de la ley y de la soberana popular en el Defensor pacis de Marsilio de Padua, Revista de estudios polticos, 43 (1985), pp. 10748; H. Quaritsch, Souvernitt: Entstehung und Entwicklung des Begriffs in Frankreich und Deutschland vom 13. Jahrhundert bis 1806 (Berlin, 1986); S.R. Strefling, Igreja e poder: Plenitude do Poder e Soberania Popular em Marslio de Pdua (Porto Alegre, 2002); D. Stanciu, Coercive Authority and Popular Sovereignty in Marsiglio of Paduas Defensor pacis, in New Europe College Yearbook 20012002, ed. I. Vainovski-Mihai (Bucharest, 2005), pp. 32152. 41 For further discussion and references, see V. Syros, Die Rezeption der aristotelischen politischen Philosophie bei Marsilius von Padua: Eine Untersuchung zur ersten Diktion des Defensor pacis (Leiden and Boston, 2007), pp. 199212; V. Syros, The Principle of the Sovereignty of the Multitude in the Works of Marsilius of Padua, Peter of Auvergne and Some Other Aristotelian Commentators, in The World of Marsilius of Padua, ed. G. Moreno-Riao (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 22748. 42 Aristotelis Politicorvm libri octo: cvm vetvsta translatione Gvilelmi de Moerbeka, ed. F. Susemihl (Leipzig, 1972), 1278b1014 (pp. 1734). Also consider A. Brett, Issues in Translating the Defensor pacis, in The World of Marsilius of Padua, ed. Moreno-Riao, pp. 91108, p. 105; Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pacis, trans. Gewirth (1956), pp. lxxxviiilxxxix; A. Lockyer, Aristotle: The Politics, in A Guide to the Political Classics: Plato to Rousseau, ed. M. Forsyth and M. Keens-Soper (Oxford and New York, 1988), p. 46; R.G. Mulgan, Aristotles Sovereign, Political Studies, 18 (1970), pp. 51822; R.G. Mulgan, Aristotles Political Theory: An Introduction for Students of Political Theory (Oxford and New York, 1977), pp. 5960. Further, see the discussion in D. Marocco Stuardi, Sovrano e governo nel pensiero di Marsilio da Padova, in Studi politici in onore di Luigi Firpo, ed. S. Rota Ghibaudi and F. Barcia (Milan, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 1548.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

702

V. SYROS

work,43 he seems to take little notice of it in the Foundations. Second, a writer does not necessarily always pursue a single aim; he often pursues multiple goals simultaneously or in the different phases of producing a work. Textual analysis or the study of the linguistic framework of a work can indeed help to reveal some of these goals, but there is a chance that some will remain concealed or that the one we opt to put in a privileged position was not the most decisive in the mind of an author.44 Third, given the broad spectrum of possible intentions, an interpreter of a text often needs to prefer one certain intention over the rest, while looking for an infinite number of intentions.45 Fourth, and more important, Skinner does not seem to acknowledge that there is often a conflation of motives and intentions or a constant interplay and concatenation of motives and intentions in the process of composing a work. Marsilius in particular could have set himself multiple goals while writing the Defensor pacis: his declared purpose is to expose a singular and obscure cause of the strife that generated tribulation for the Roman Empire and that neither Aristotle nor any other philosopher of his time or before had been able to foresee.46 But at the same time, he looks beyond the Italian context and hastens to point out that this cause is contagious and bound to seep into all other cities and kingdoms,47 just as happened in his contemporary Italy.48 As Marsilius puts it, the Defensor pacis is thus designed as a recipe to prevent that cause, so that in the future it would be excluded from all political communities or cities, thereby allowing virtuous rulers and subjects to live more securely in a condition of civic tranquillity.49 The foregoing statements indicate that Marsilius Defensor pacis is a multifaceted work with both Italian and universalist aspects and that Marsilius did have a broader purpose that reached beyond the politics of the Italian city-states. After all, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Defensor
43 Skinner, Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts; Quentin Skinner, Motives, Intentions and Interpretation, in Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1: Regarding Method (Cambridge and New York, 2002), pp. 90102. 44 As Bhikhu Parekh and Robert Berki point out, a piece of writing is a complex work which invariably arises out of an intricate web of concerns, desires, fears, impulses as well as more rational but often far-reaching complex purposes. One does not just sit down and compose a Leviathan or a Philosophy of Right because one has a definite intention to perform a single action to bring about a definite result. See B. Parekh and R.N. Berki, The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinners Methodology, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34 (1973), pp. 16384, p. 169. 45 For a similar argument, see L. Mulligan, J. Richards and J.K. Graham, Intentions and Conventions: A Critique of Quentin Skinners Method for the Study of the History of Ideas, Political Studies, 27 (1979), pp. 8498, esp. pp. 8790. 46 Defensor pacis I.i.3; i.7; xix.3; II.xxvi.19. 47 Ibid., I.i.3; xix.12; III.i. 48 Ibid., I.i.2; xix.4; II.xxvi.19. 49 Ibid., I.i.7.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

703

pacis is addressed to Louis of Bavaria,50 and we must seriously speculate as to whether Marsilius looked to Louis as an agent capable of counteracting papal interference in temporal affairs and implementing his political programme, even though he disputes the necessity for a world monarchy.51 In light of this, then, it is possible to identify multiple intentions in Marsilius Defensor pacis: to trace the source of the civil disturbances that ravaged his contemporary Italy; to mount a vehement polemic against the papacys pretension to plenitude of power and control of temporal affairs; to ingratiate himself with Louis; and to develop a general programme of political organization applicable not in his times only. Although the Defensor pacis can be read as a pice de circonstance intended to counter papal claims to temporal power, the fact remains that the first dictio of the work encapsulates a political theory applicable to the circumstances of various political entities, though Marsilius is aware that different people in different times and places are inclined toward different types of government.52 Given that Marsilius political thought is open to multiple readings, the recovery of Marsilius actual intentions is contingent upon which interpretation we choose to favour. A line of research that considered Marsilius views on the supremacy of the emperor over the pope and proposed an imperialist reading of the Defensor pacis found its strongest advocate in Jeannine Quillet.53 A number of scholars are inclined to look upon Marsilius as a partisan of republican ideas and interpret his political ideas against the background of the political realities that prevailed in late medieval Italy.54 Skinner himself opts for a republican reading of Marsilius theory; he declares that Marsilius, along with Bartolus, not only provided the fullest and most systematic defence of Republican liberty against the coming of the despots; they also suggested an ingenious way of arguing against the apologists for tyranny in
Ibid., I.i.6. Ibid., I.xvii.10. 52 Ibid., I.ix.10. 53 J. Quillet, La philosophie politique de Marsile de Padoue (Paris, 1970); M. Wilks, Corporation and Representation in the Defensor pacis, Studia Gratiana, 15 (1972), pp. 25192; Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages. 54 A. Gewirth; Republicanism and Absolutism in the Thought of Marsilius of Padua, Medioevo, 5 (1979), pp. 2348; A. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy (New York, 1951; 2nd edn. 1956). See also the discussion in C.J. Nederman, From Defensor pacis to Defensor minor: The Problem of Empire in Marsiglio of Padua, History of Political Thought, 16 (1995), pp. 31329. For an excellent survey of the various interpretations and scholarly approaches to Marsilius political thought since the nineteenth century, see B. Bayona Aznar, El periplo de la teora poltica de Marsilio de Padua por la historiografa moderna, Revista de Estudios Polticos, 137 (2007), pp. 11353; as well as J. Mnard, Laventure historiographique du Dfenseur de la paix de Marsile de Padoue, Science et Esprit, 41 (1989), pp. 287322.
51 50

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

704

V. SYROS

their own terms,55 without considering the fact that in 1319 Marsilius joined a delegation sent by Cangrande della Scala and Matteo Visconti, the signori of Verona and Milan respectively, to Charles de la Marche (the future Charles IV of France), asking for the latters support against Robert of Naples and offering him the captaincy of the Ghibelline league.56 Time and Punishment: The Questions and Answers of the Classics Skinner contends that the classic texts cannot be concerned with our questions and answers, but only with their own.57 Following Robin Collingwoods lead, he infers that
there simply are no perennial problems in philosophy: there are only individual answers to individual questions, with as many different answers as there are questions, and as many different questions as there are questioners. There is in consequence simply no hope of seeking the point of studying the history of ideas in the attempt to learn directly from the classic authors by focusing on their attempted answers to supposedly timeless questions.58

One of Skinners genuine contributions to scholarship on Marsilius is his recognition of how much the political realities that obtained in thirteenthand fourteenth-century Italy influenced Marsilius ideas.59 In the context of the Defensor pacis, Skinner suggests that the corresponding moral of the book as well as the key to understanding its title is that anyone who aspires to be a defender of the peace in Northern Italy must above all be a sworn enemy of the alleged jurisdictional powers of the Church.60 He continues, it was obvious, however, especially to such theorists as Marsiglio of Padua, that Aristotles own preoccupations were in fact more closely related
Skinner, Foundations, p. 65. See also Bayona, Religin y poder, p. 195; Coleman, Marsilius of Padua, p. 140; C.W. Previt-Orton, Marsilius of Padua and the Visconti, English Historical Review, 44 (1929), pp. 2789. Compare also Marsilius praise of Matteo Visconti in Defensor pacis II.xxvi.17. 57 Meaning and Context, ed. Tully, p. 65. 58 Ibid. See also Q. Skinner, The Rise of, Challenge to and Prospects for a Collingwoodian Approach to the History of Political Thought, in The History of Political Thought in National Context, ed. D. Castiglione and I. Hampsher-Monk (Cambridge and New York, 2001), pp. 17588. 59 For similar interpretations see, e.g., N. Rubinstein, Marsilius of Padua and the Italian Political Thought of His Time, in Europe in the Late Middle Ages, ed. J.R. Hale et al. (Evanston, IL, 1965), pp. 4475 reprinted in N. Rubinstein, Studies in Italian History in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Vol. 1: Political Thought and the Language of Politics: Art and Politics, ed. G. Ciappelli (Rome, 2004), pp. 99130; J.K. Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval Italy: The Evolution of the Civil Life 10001350 (London, 1973), pp. 18698; J.K. Hyde, Padua in the Age of Dante (Manchester, 1968), pp. 21011. 60 Skinner, Foundations, p. 22.
56 55

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

705

to the problems of small-scale City Republics such as those of Northern Italy.61 This is one of the rare occasions on which Skinner expatiates on the possible connections between Aristotles and Marsilius political ideas. Indeed, medieval writers were aware of the similarities between the political organization of the Italian city-states and that of the ancient Greek poleis, and especially classical Athenian democracy as outlined in Aristotles Politics. Albert the Great (c.120080), for example, points to affinities between the political organization of the communes of Lombardy and Genoa and the extreme form of democracy as described by Aristotle in the Politics, and Ptolemy of Lucca (c.12361327) observes that many Italian cities in his own day resembled Athens in being ruled by the many.62 But by arguing that Aristotles and Marsilius concerns were more closely related to the particular problems of small political entities such as the Italian cities, Skinner takes little notice of the fact that the driving concerns and scope of the Politics and the Defensor pacis were very different: the Politics is based on observations on the constitutional arrangements of various ancient Greek city-states and addresses a number of questions related to the administration of the polis; Marsilius objective, in contrast, is to diagnose the cause of strife in his own day. In addition, whereas Aristotle appears disillusioned with the workings of the Athenian democracy, Marsilius does away with Aristotles fulminations against democracy and advocates a system of political organization in many respects similar to the Athenian democracy. The foregoing considerations indicate that Defensor pacis is a political treatise too complex and multifaceted to be read merely as a response to the political conditions that prevailed in late medieval Italy. Conal Condren, for instance, argues that Marsilius constructed a multivalent political theory intended to appeal to a large audience ranging from the small Italian citystates to larger political entities. Marsilius method, which Condren designates as elliptical ambiguity, uses such concepts as legislator humanus and pars valentior, which are open to various interpretations.63 Nederman makes the similar point that Marsilius articulates a generic political theory, stipu-

Ibid., p. 51. For references and further discussion, see A. Black, The Commune in Political Theory in the Late Middle Ages, in Theorien kommunaler Ordnung in Europa, ed. P. Blickle (Munich, 1996), pp. 99112, p. 107. 63 C. Condren, The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts: An Essay on Political Theory, Its Inheritance, and the History of Ideas (Princeton, NJ, 1985), pp. 18997; C.J. Nederman, Community and Consent: The Secular Political Theory of Marsiglio of Paduas Defensor pacis (Lanham, MD, 1995), pp. 1920. See also the discussions in Bayona Aznar, Religin y poder, pp. 17788; B. Bayona Aznar, La laicidad de la valentior pars en la filosofa de Marsilio de Padua, Patristica et Mediaevalia, 26 (2005), pp. 6587.
62

61

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

706

V. SYROS

lating the modes and arrangements necessary to ensure a stable and lasting political order beyond specific institutional or geographic boundaries.64 As it is always possible to fathom an infinite number of intentions in the study of a particular work, so too one can adduce multiple contexts when studying a masterpiece of political literature.65 Skinners thesis that Marsilius theory derived from or responded to Italian conditions does not do justice to the overall scope of the Defensor pacis. As noted above, it always is possible to ascribe multiple intentions to a certain thinker, and it is likewise possible to situate a work in various contexts and to discern multiple factors and intellectual forces operative upon a thinker. In Marsilius case, these forces include: the Paduan pre-humanists; the Parisian milieu; the medical background of Marsilius political theory; Marsilius exposure to contemporary debates on Averroes and potential links to medieval Jewish political thought, especially Moses Maimonides; the French Publizistik; Louis of Bavarias conflict with the curia; and, above all, Aristotles political thought and the way it influenced Marsilius use of certain concepts.66 Conclusions Skinner proposes a highly selective list of medieval political writers that culminates in the plea for a new canon as an alternative to the conventional canon of great thinkers. He does not look at the reception of the classical tradition or the interaction among the medieval Arabic, Jewish and Christian political traditions; he makes no attempt to bring out the direct or subterranean influences that medieval Islamic or Jewish political thought exerted on such thinkers as Machiavelli or on the formation of the lexicon and conceptual arsenal of the Western political tradition.67 Furthermore, Skinner does not pay due attention to the factors at work in a classics use (Marsilius) and interpretation of
64 Nederman, Community and Consent, pp. 15, 20. For example, in his discussion of collective prudence, Marsilius takes over Aristotles qualifications regarding the sovereignty of the multitude: provided that a multitude is not too vile, although each of its members will be a worse judge than those who have knowledge, taken all together they will be better judges than a few experts, or at least not worse (Defensor pacis I.xiii.4.) Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1282a1516. Likewise, in his typology of the various kinds of kingship, Marsilius points out that certain monarchs in Asia are hereditary, and while they rule in conformity with the laws, their rule is like that of despots calculated to serve the rulers interests rather than the common utility. Inhabitants of these regions tolerate such rule without protest because of their barbaric and slavish nature and the influence of custom (Defensor pacis I.ix.4). Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1285a23. 65 See also J.P. Diggins, The Oyster and the Pearl: The Problem of Contextualism in Intellectual History, History and Theory, 23 (1984), pp. 15169, p. 153. 66 See the analysis of some of the intellectual influences on Marsilius thought in Coleman, Marsilius of Padua, p. 140. 67 See the discussion in P.A. Rahe, Against Throne and Altar: Machiavelli and Political Theory under the English Republic (Cambridge and New York, 2008), pp. 5983.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

REVIEW ARTICLE

707

another classic (Aristotle): namely, the goals and preconceptions that determine a writers reading of a classic and how legitimate such an interpretation is and/or how it can help us reconstruct the context within which a particular writer frames his ideas.68 Skinners concern with the ideas and meaning in a published text leaves no room for a broader range of sources, such as data and information garnered from private correspondence or diaries.69 Especially today, students of political thought have ample opportunities for interdisciplinary research and collaborative work across various disciplines. One can envisage the possibility of collaborative work among epigraphy, papyrology, numismatics, archaeology and history of science when dealing with texts of the classical period or the possibility of relying on palaeography. Most crucially, however, Skinner negates the existence of enduring questions in the history of political thought and sees no point in studying the history of ideas in an attempt to learn directly from classic authors by concentrating on their answers to supposedly timeless questions. An intricate conundrum about Skinners work concerns his understanding of the standards by which a political writer or work should qualify as classic.70 If, as Skinner assumes, works of the past are concerned with their own questions, but not ours, one needs to define or re-define the criteria for classifying a particular writer as classic if (s)he deals with questions and problems that do not concern us and which we are perhaps not able to perceive. This is not to overlook the fact that political thinkers of the past engaged with the issues or sought to come to grips with the problems of their own day. Indeed, many of the great works of political thought were motivated by the effort to theorize remedies for various kinds of political ills. Averroes uvre, for instance, abounds with oblique references to the political realities that pre-

68 See also J.J.E. Garcia, Interpretation of the Philosophical Classics: Clarification and Issues, in Uses and Abuses of the Classics: Western Interpretations of Greek Philosophy, ed. J.J.E. Garcia and J. Yu (Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2004), pp. 110, pp. 67. 69 For a similar point, see Mulligan, Richards and Graham, Intentions and Conventions, p. 96. See also J. Farr, Understanding Conceptual Change Politically, in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed. T. Ball et al. (Cambridge and New York, 1989), pp. 2449, p. 39. 70 See also J.G. Gunnel, Theory and Tradition, in Between Philosophy and Politics: The Alienation of Political Theory (Amherst, 1986), pp. 91133; D. Baumgold, Political Commentary on the History of Political Theory, American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), pp. 92840; J.B. Sanderson, The Historian and the Masters of Political Thought, Political Studies, 16 (1968), pp. 4354; and, in general, I. Calvino, Why Read the Classics?, trans. M. McLaughlin (New York, 1999), pp. 39.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction

708

V. SYROS

vailed in twelfth-century Almohad Spain,71 while Han Fei Zis (d.233 BC) political thought is a response to the phenomena of instability and dissension during the Warring States Period.72 But the very fact that seminal political thinkers of the past sought to respond to the political realities and exigencies of their time does not make their ideas less germane to the study of the questions that confront the modern world and the West in particular.73 Vasileios Syros UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

71 See, e.g., S. Stroumsa, Philosophes Almohades? Averros, Mamonide et lidologie almohade, in Los Almohades: Problemas y perspectivas, ed. P. Cressier et al. (Madrid, 2005), Vol. 2, pp. 113762, esp. pp. 114450. 72 For comparisons between Han Fei Zi and Machiavelli, see, e.g., B.-A. Scharfstein, The Machiavellian Legalism of Ancient China, chapter 2 of Amoral Politics: The Persistent Truth of Machiavellism (Albany, 1995), pp. 2153; G. Wu, Die Staatslehre des Han Fei: Ein Beitrag zur chinesischen Idee der Staatsrson (Vienna and New York, 1978). 73 See also J. Coleman, Introduction, to A History of Political Thought, Vol. 1: From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity (Oxford and Malden, MA, 2000), pp. 120, p. 15; M. Leslie, In Defence of Anachronism, Political Studies, 18 (1970), pp. 43347.

Copyright (c) Imprint Academic 2010 For personal use only -- not for reproduction