Jülide Karakoç "The Impact of The Kurdish Identity On Turkey's Foreign Policy From The 1980s To 2008" Middle Eastern Studies Volume 46, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 919 - 942

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Middle Eastern Studies
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The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkey's Foreign Policy from the 1980s to 2008
Jlide Karako
Online publication date: 13 December 2010
To cite this Article Karako, Jlide(2010) 'The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkey's Foreign Policy from the 1980s to
2008', Middle Eastern Studies, 46: 6, 919 942 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2010.520423 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2010.520423
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Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 6, 919942, November 2010
The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkeys Foreign Policy from the 1980s to 2008
JULIDE KARAKOC
Kurdish identity, being salient especially with the armed actions of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers Party) in the 1980s, has become a determinant agent (actor) in Turkeys foreign policy. Because of the coexistence of the states policy rejecting Kurdish identity and the request of the Kurds to maintain their identity, the Kurdish question has remained unresolved. By challenging Turkish national identity, it has become a factor which cannot be ignored in the construction process of foreign policy. Until now, the constructivist studies which examine the impact of identity on Turkeys foreign policy regard Turkish national identity as a main determining agent of foreign policy. In this context, there are in general two tendencies. On the one hand, Turkish national identity is treated as an aggregate concept which has a western character and as the only principal factor constructing foreign policy. According to this scheme, even if there is sometimes a contest between national identities which are the western Turkish identity, the nationalist identity and the Islamic identity this contest does not last long. The western Turkish identity is always the winner and constructs Turkeys foreign policy according to its rules.1 But this approach, based on Alexander Wendts soft constructivism, overlooks dierent identities and risks oversimplication. On the other hand there are some objections to this restrictive framework. It is accepted that Turkish national identity needs to be problematized as a contested space. National identity is not constructed by state-tostate interactions as Wendt says and aected by sub-national identities. However, these contesting sub-national identities are only the Kemalist and the Islamic identities. This claim is based on the fact that in Turkey there is a lack of a sense of belonging to a geographical location.2 In this context again, the Kurdish identity, which always challenges the existence of the Turkish national identity, has no place. Nevertheless, a closer look at Turkeys foreign policy reveals a less consistent design. Since the 1980s, Kurdish identity has been aecting Turkeys foreign policy in three dierent ways. First, it leads to the construction of a collective identity. And from time to time, this identity constitutes the reason for cooperation or dispute between Turkey and other states. Yet it provides the continuity of relations. Second, as a subject of a human rights question, it causes a negative identication concerning Turkey by western institutions and states. Thus Turkey is faced with problems with
ISSN 0026-3206 Print/1743-7881 Online/10/060919-24 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/00263206.2010.520423
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the western world of which it declared itself to be a part. Third, Kurdish identity as a long-term question changes the Turkish national identity. Dialectically aecting and exciting Turkish nationalist discourse (speech act),3 it becomes an important factor which shapes Turkeys foreign policy and decisions. As constructivism focuses on the role of ideational factors (such as rules, speech acts and culture), not simply material ones, and handles international relations as social relations, it serves to examine the role of identities in foreign policy. This approach argues that structure (international system) and agents (actors) coconstitute each other. Ideational factors are important in this mutual constitution.4 And socially constructed identities (as agents) inuence foreign policy decisions of a state. This approach oers a useful framework for examining the impact of Kurdish identity on Turkeys foreign policy. The concept of collective identity which is constructed around collective demands and interests is used in this study for understanding Turkeys relations. This concept has an important place in Wendts soft constructivism. Wendt argues that collective identity does not mean that collective demands replace individual interests. It includes an identication along which agents fall between the extremes, motivated by both egoistic and solidaristic loyalties. According to him, domestic values can lead to the construction of a social collective identity in a state and states can constitute collective identities and interests by interaction with other states.5 Nevertheless, he overlooks the role of domestic factors like ethnic identities in the construction process of collective identity among states. Yet, ethnic identities can be important factors in the construction of a collective identity among states. It is possible to see this eectiveness in the example of Kurdish identity. I assert that Kurdish identity as a source of a collective identity between Turkey and its neighbours governs Turkeys relations. This study values Nicholas Onufs rule-oriented constructivism more than Wendts soft constructivism. There are several reasons for this preference: First, Wendts constructivism accepts only states as agents and does not give a place to other agents. In this framework, construction of a states identity is limited to interactions with other states; state represents an aggregate concept and a pre-social given agent.6 Far from this mainstream constructivist approach, Onufs rule-oriented constructivism views various identities as agents.7 Thus this approach makes it possible to treat ethnic identities like the Kurdish identity. Second, unlike Wendt, Onuf includes rules in agentstructure relations. Rules become ontological elements as important as agent and structure. Therefore rules function as a kind of canal in this co-constitution process amid agents and structures. Agents are dependent on conditions oered by rules. However, rules may highlight some agents rather than others.8 Third, while Wendt ignores the role of language in the mutual constitutions of agents and structures, Onuf regards language as an important factor in the social construction process. According to Onuf, agents make rules by means of speech acts. He formulates this idea as saying is doing and argues that saying is an action which has normative consequences. And dierent speech acts construct dierent rules.9 Given these particularities, rule-oriented constructivism oers many useful tools for analyzing the impact of Kurdish identity on Turkeys foreign policy. Regarding Kurdish identity as an important agent in the construction process of foreign policy, I will attempt to demonstrate the ways it is eective in almost every area of Turkeys
The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkeys Foreign Policy
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foreign policy using the concepts such as rules, speech acts, agents, and collective identity.
Kurdish identity leading to the construction of a collective identity has become a very important factor in Turkeys relations. This collective identity based on Kurdish identity sometimes unies Turkey and its neighbours around common interests and sometimes may be an issue of dispute amid the same agents. However, it contributes continuity of reciprocal relations among agents. It is possible to demonstrate this argument focusing on Turkeys relationship with its neighbours and near environment. I will try to examine the impact of this collective identity on Turkeys relations with its neighbours, in particular Syria, Iran, Iraq, and its repercussions on relations with other agents. In relations between Syria and Turkey, the Kurdish problem has never been the principal issue for Syria. Nevertheless, Syria preferred to use this issue, which is the principal one for Turkey, in bilateral relations. However, Kurdish identity in general has become a source of worry in the Middle East region for states having a Kurdish population. Syria has always come into this category. Though supporting the PKK, it has always participated in meetings related to the Kurdish identity with Turkey and Iran. The rst contact between Syria and Turkeys Kurds took place just after the 12 September 1980 military coup in Turkey. As this military regime pressed down on Kurdish political movements, many Kurds took refuge in Syria. Turkey reacted to this situation and demanded surrender of these Kurdish refugees called terrorists. But Syria did not accept this demand claiming that these people were political refugees, not terrorists.10 Since this period, tension based on dierent points of view ` vis-a-vis Kurdish identity has become the main determinant of bilateral relations. On the one hand, Syria continued to support the Kurdish PKK movement until the late 1990s, and used this factor as a bargaining tool for other problems with Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey has also seen these common problems with Syria as a result of the relationship between the PKK and Syria. It refused to negotiate other problems without Syria breaking relations with the PKK. However, Syrias support for the PKK continued; many PKK congresses were held in Syria.11 Turkey made numerous unsuccessful visits to Syria in order to try to stop this support. The Kurdish question has been involved in all other problems between Syria and Turkey. Thus without progress on the PKK issue, it has become impossible to realize negotiations in any area. The water question between two agents also evolved in such a context. While Syria used Turkeys Kurdish question to gain an advantage, Turkey refused to negotiate in this matter without movement concerning Syrias support for the PKK. Therefore, the water issue and the Kurdish question have become interdependent. The water issue which took over in the 1980s among Turkey, Syria and Iraq is active between Syria and Turkey by virtue of Iraqs war with Iran. Under the inuence of the Kurdish question, this problem has become not only a technical and economic problem but also a political one.12 This dimension was expressed by Deniz Baykal, who was Minister of Foreign Aairs of Turkey in that period. He said that if Syria continued to be a centre for the PKK, it was useless to expect an augmentation
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of the water level of the River Tigris.13 Thus he reminded Syria of Turkeys conditions on this matter. On the other hand, in all mutual visits, the two problems were handled at the same time and in the same context. This situation also continued in the 1990s when Turkey began to organize regular meetings with Syria and Iran because of developments relating to Kurdish identity in Iraq. During these years, the PKKs actions were also intensive. Thus, Turkey often held meetings with Syria and Iraq. At one of these meetings, in November 1992, Hikmet C etin, Minister of Foreign Aairs, asserted that Syria was using a terrorist organization against the water issue and warned Syria against this stance.14 In another meeting of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey held in Damascus in July 1994, Turkey repeated the conditions regarding the water issue: Syria should not push for progress on the water issue without withdrawing support for the PKK.15 Nevertheless, in 1994, as soon as the PKK expanded its inuence to Hatay (a border city between Turkey and Syria), Prime Minister Tansu C iller said that Turkey was ready to sign an agreement with Syria, which proposed giving Syria 500 cubic metres of water per second.16 After the meeting in Paris, in July 1994, which brought together Iraqs Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Turkey and Syria met with Iran. In fact, the territorial integrity of Iraq was not cited at this meeting and then these three agents with a Kurdish population were worried. As in the case of relations with Syria, Kurdish identity has been a determining factor in Turkeys relations with Iran. Kurdish identity has always been one of the two most important problems (another is an ideological problem) between Iran and Turkey. Even though the latter has been secondary since the death of Khomeini, the Kurdish issue always remained the principal question. Because of this problem, Turkey always had to follow Irans relations with the USA and the Soviet Union, which were important agents in the construction of regional rules.17 The atmosphere which was constructed by the beginning of PKK actions in 1984 has become a major factor in relations between the two states. On the one hand, Turkey began to accuse Iran of not taking enough care to prevent PKK members from using the border. On the other hand, Iran was concerned by Turkeys operations in Northern Iraq and therefore cooperated with Iraqs Kurds in retaliation. Nevertheless, despite these disagreements, the two states, under the inuence of a collective identity based on Kurdish identity, could sign a security agreement in 1984 in which Iran promised non-authorization of the PKK in Iranian territory.18 In general, Iran has remained faithful to this agreement. But Kurdish identity continued to be a cause of disagreement until the early 2000s between the two agents, while at the same time being a reason for the continuity of bilateral relations. Following the onset of the Gulf War in August 1990, Kurdish identity became more prominent than at any other time. In the construction process of regional rules, Kurdish identity became a determining agent by virtue of some developments at the end of the war, such as the revolt of Iraqs Kurds against the Iraqi government, the intervention of the Iraqi military, the Kurds dicult situation and Operation Provide Comfort organized by the USA and its allies to provide a safe region for Iraqs Kurds, with the unwilling participation of Turkey. All these developments worried Iran. This was because political and military interventions endangered Irans rules concerning Kurdish identity.19 Iran met with Syria and Turkey to hinder the
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foundation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. In spite of other problems among them, they signed a series of protocols with Iraq related to this issue.20 Whereas Iran participated in tripartite meetings related to Kurdish identity with Syria and Iraq from the beginning of the Gulf War, Iran began to feel anxious about Turkeys relationship with the USA. Furthermore, Turkeys military intervention in Northern Iraq also disturbed Iran. These meetings and protocols which unied them did not stop Iran supporting the PKK. Meanwhile, this support did not impede Turkey from meeting with Iran over the Kurdish question. This situation can be appraised as a consequence of collective identity. As far as relations with Iraq are concerned, TurkeyIraq negotiations were heavily inuenced by Kurdish identity from the 1980s until 2003. Iraq and Turkey have always been the states which are the most vulnerable agents of Kurdish identity in the region. They had always cooperated on this issue and never had major mutual problems. The impact of collective identity between the two neighbours had always been positive until Iraqs invasion. Between 1980 and 1988, Iraq had to deal with its southern border because of its war with Iran. Hence Iraq authorized Turkeys intervention in Northern Iraq by reaching an agreement for 1983 until 1988. After 1988 Turkey continued its military operations without Iraqs agreement. Iraq reacted strongly to these operations, which violated its territorial integrity.21 Nevertheless, in spite of these problems, bilateral relations continued until the USAs occupation of Iraq: Turkey and Iraq reached agreement on the PKK issue and met with Syria and Iran to sustain Iraqs territorial integrity. As can be seen in the following pages, it was after 2003 that this balance in relations changed. However, this well-balanced relationship was not the case with other neighbouring states. Iran and Syria had long supported the PKK against Turkey. This situation led Greece to cooperate with them on this matter. Greece, having several problems with Turkey (such as the Aegean Sea, and the Cyprus issue), had begun to sign cooperation agreements with these Middle Eastern countries. Thus it aimed to obtain advantages regarding problems with Turkey. In this context, besides constructing a kind of collective identity with these states, Greece also supported (materially and logistically) the PKK movement. Support for the PKK by neighbouring states such as Greece, Iran and Syria had two consequences with regard to Turkeys foreign policy: on the one hand, this situation of conict with its neighbours led Turkey to cooperate with Israel. In this context, in February 1996, Turkey signed an agreement which included military education and cooperation. Furthermore the agreement projected cooperation against terrorism, and the education of Turkish personnel by Israeli intelligence units on the borders of Syria, Iran and Iraq which had PKK camps or a relationship with the PKK. Therefore, by means of this agreement, Turkey aimed to prot from the experience of Israel, which constructed a safety zone in the south of Lebanon, and thereby gain eective force against the PKK camps.22 In August 1996, another agreement was realized between the two states in spite of a coalition government called Refahyol which had Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan advocating the rule of Islamic identity in foreign policy. This point refers to the fact that Kurdish identity can aect Turkeys foreign relations more than any other identity. By this agreement, modernization of Turkeys F-4 phantom planes was agreed and the plan was to force Syria to step back from its support for the PKK. In April 1997, Turhan
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Tayan, Minister of Defence, visited Israel. In the negotiations, it is explicitly stated that the agreements made between Turkey and Israel were against Iran and Syria which support terrorists. Tayan asserted that the terrorists threatening Israel and Turkey took shelter in Syria and that Iran supported the PKK and Hamas. He concluded that Israel and Turkey were in a close relationship and were sharing intelligence.23 Furthermore, starting from 1998, common military exercises have been executed, sometimes with the participation of the USA. IsraeliTurkish cooperation on the PKK issue was conrmed by various sources: rstly, at the end of December 1996, Cemil Bayk, the commandant of the PKKs military wing ARGK (Artesa Rzgariya Gele Kurdistan Peoples Liberation Army of Kurdistan) put forward the view that one of the main targets of IsraeliTurkish cooperation was the PKK. He explained that Israel provided weapons and security materials for the TurkeyIraq border. Furthermore, he claimed that Israel helped Turkey in its grand operation, realized in March 1995.24 Secondly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained in his speech, in May 1997, that Israel evik Bir, retired supported Turkey on the PKK issue.25 Thirdly, in December 1999 C former Chief of the General Sta, in his speech at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Aairs, asserted that the crisis between Syria and Turkey in 1998 over the PKK issue was resolved in favour of Turkey thanks to IsraeliTurkish cooperation.26 On the other hand, this situation of conict between Turkey and regional states over the Kurdish question pushed Turkey to negotiate with Russia for its energy needs (in particular natural gas). Turkey chose Russia because Russia, having fewer Kurds in its territory and being far from the conict region, was considered a safe supplier for energy importation.27 With this perception, on the one hand, Turkey gave importance to cooperation with Russia and made eorts to sign agreements on this matter. On the other hand, Turkey had to follow Russias relations with other agents. Given these worries, in December 1997 Turkey came to an agreement called Mavi Akm with Russia, planned to end in 2001 with 16 milliard cubic metres of gas importation over 25 years.28 Nevertheless, this project was inuenced by developments related to the Kurdish question: Russias support for the PKK was an obstacle to the economic partnership. Yet this support was because of Turkeys support for the Chechens with whom Russia was ghting.29 In 1999, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit visited Russia to negotiate the Mavi Akm project. He signed a protocol with Russia for cooperation against the Chechens and the PKK. It was after this agreement, in July 2000, that the draft of the project was conrmed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT). These agreements made Turkey too dependent on Russia for energy.30 In August 2008, Russias intervention in Georgia called into question the perception that Russia oered a secure energy source for Turkey. Moreover, the news implying Russias contact with Iraqs Kurds in the media concerned Turkey. However, it revealed one fact: unless the Kurdish question is resolved by Turkey, Kurdish identity will always be a determinant in Russia Turkey relations.
Returning to Turkeys relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran since the late 1990s, it is possible to see the ecacy of Kurdish identity, but in a slightly dierent context. In this period, the USA, as a determining agent in the Middle East, revealed its
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intention to overthrow Saddam Husseins regime and construct a Kurdish state in Iraq. Since the USA wanted to obtain Turkeys support in this matter, it began to assist Turkey with the PKK issue. Even though Turkey continued to meet with Syria and Iran regarding Iraqs territorial integrity, it accepted this support by agreeing with the USA. Hence Turkey obtained the ability to force the states, by means of speech acts, to cease supporting the PKK. In September 1998, the Chief of the Land Forces Command of Turkey, Atilla Ates , in his speech in Hatay, laid out Turkeys rules concerning TurkeySyria ` relations. He stated that Turkey would not tolerate Syrias attitude vis-a-vis the g PKK.31 Then, Chief of the General Sta Huseyin Kvrkolu expressed the view that there was an undeclared war between Syria and Turkey. Therefore, Turkeys attitude, supported by the USA, forced Syria to withdraw and the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was deported from Syria.32 Following these developments, and a sign of Ocalans upcoming capture, negotiations between Syria and Turkey which would conclude the Adana Agreement began. In Adana, two states signed a protocol indicating bilateral engagements. The protocol text marked by the Kurdish question included that Syria had banned all PKK actions in its territory. After this agreement, relations between the two parties improved. In June 2000, with Besar Esads presidency, several agreements on economic and security cooperation were signed between them. There had also been positive developments on other issues between the two countries. In this positive atmosphere, Turkey decided to include Syrian experts in the GAPs (Guneydou g Anadolu Projesi South Eastern Anatolia Project) international training programmes. Syrian Minister of Foreign Aairs Faruk El Sara declared that even the Hatay issue between Syria and Turkey could be resolved.33 Nevertheless, the only diculty in relations occurred again because of the Kurdish question. In January 2002, there had been intelligence reports that Syria ignored the PKKs activities and thus the revival of the PKK in Syria was possible, which caused a little tension in relations.34 Yet with Syrias determined stand against the PKK the problem was overcome. However, Kurdish identity continued to inuence this relationship with Syria and others. Developments after Iraqs occupation in March 2003 contributed saliency to Kurdish identity. In this context, the Kurdistan Regional Government was established and Iraqs new president was a Kurd, Celal Talabani. The inuence of Kurdish identity over bilateral relations has thereby continued. In 2004, there were mutual visits which were marked by Kurdish identity. The two parties strained to ` develop a common attitude vis-a-vis developments in Iraq. Syria continued to press the PKK in its territory and said all the time that Syria was with Turkey.35 Ocalans capture did not immediately inuence Turkeys relations with Iran. This could be explained by two factors. First of all, the PKK organized several demonstrations protesting against Ocalans capture in Iran. Secondly, Iran could not manage to control its border, thus the PKK beneted from this situation by crossing into Turkey.36 However, collective identity functioned well: in January 2000, the two states realized an agreement which included the setting up of a common study group for reviewing regional and international developments. Yet Turkeys complaints about Iran regarding the PKK issue continued. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Iran in June 2002 and asserted that Turkeys main problem with Iran was its
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support for the PKK.37 Since this period there have been few problems with Iran. In particular, after the constitution of the Kurdish armed organization PJAK (Partiya Jiyana Azadiya Kurdistane Party for Free Life in Kurdistan), which is seen as the Iran branch of the PKK, relations between Turkey and Iran very much improved. The PJAK, defending federal democracy in Iran, has begun to conict with Iran. In the media, these conicts have been declared as conicts with the PKK. The PJAK has been a cooperative factor supporting collective identity between Iran and Turkey. Therefore, Irans attitude towards the PJAK has been important for Turkey. In this context, Irans operations against the PJAK have pleased Turkey. In July 2004, the two states decided to conduct common military operations against the PKK and the PJAK and to share intelligence.38 This positive framework was supported by the President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmedinejads visit to Turkey in August 2008. During this visit, the two parties signed a cooperation agreement against terrorism, organized crime, and illegal drug tracking.39 Even though these good relations do not please the USA, struggling for hegemony of its rules, Iran Turkey relations continue to be inuenced by Kurdish identity. As already noted, developments after Iraqs occupation contributed to Kurdish identity becoming a signicant agent in the region. The USAs plans to establish a Kurdish state and the Kurdistan Regional Government relations with other regional agents had begun to harm Turkeys relations based on collective identity. Turkey made some eorts to prevent these developments. In this context, it put forward the idea of a meeting called the Initiative of Iraqs Neighbours in January 2003, two months before Iraqs occupation by the USA. And in spite of the USAs opposition, the rst meeting was held on 23 January in Istanbul with the participation of Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.40 And since then many meetings have been held. In these meetings, in general, the participating states explained their purpose as protecting Iraqs independence and territorial integrity. They conrmed that stability needs to be provided in Iraq. All parties were invited to ght against every kind of terrorist activity in Iraq. Nevertheless, these meetings were considered interference in Iraqs internal aairs and prompted protest from the Iraqi government. Therefore, in his inaugural speech of the Baghdad meeting in March 2007, Iraqs Prime Minister, Nuri El Maliki, warned neighbouring states about interference in Iraqs domestic aairs by supporting certain groups in Iraq.41 These meetings also caused reactions from the USA. Given these reactions, starting from the fth meeting held in Egypt, Iraq, the United Nations Security Councils permanent members, the European Commission, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Arab League were included in the Initiative of Iraqs Neighbours.42 In November 2007, during the period when Turkeys military was conducting operations in Northern Iraq, the second meeting of this enlarged version was held in Istanbul. At this meeting, Iraqs territorial integrity was particularly emphasized. However, the meeting continued to discuss Turkeys PKK issue rather than the situation in Iraq. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, in the inaugural speech of the meeting, put forward the need for g immediate precautions against terrorism.43 Turkeys eorts to repair the damaged collective identity continued in the context of these meetings. Nonetheless, Turkey had so far been unable to get the result it wanted from the enlarged meetings. The variety of participants and the dierent points of view impeded the construction of an eective framework. Though
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participants seemed to agree with the protection of Iraqs territorial integrity, they attached importance to the dierent parties and groups in Iraq. Turkeys worries about Kurdish identity are not shared by all of the other agents: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are worried about any repercussions of the SunniShiite conict on their countries; Jordan is worried about radical Islamist groups in Iraq.44 Turkeys ethnic-based politics in Northern Iraq over Turkmens and Kirkuk damage its relations with the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Because of the unstable situation after the occupation and eorts at stabilization in the country, its neighbours politics have become an important issue for Iraq. In this context, Turkeys politics towards Iraq and some groups in Iraq also are an important factor which inuences relations. In such a situation, Turkey has chosen to ignore the issue of Kurdish identity and to follow a Turkmen-oriented politics. Turkeys attitude stems from its Kurdish question, because Turkey worries about the possibility of its own Kurds orientation towards Iraqi Kurdistan. Hence Turkey has begun to use the Turkmens in its politics towards Iraq, as Turkey wants to be a determining agent in the construction of new rules following the Gulf War of 1991. This strategy was put into practice for the rst time during the meetings called the Ankara Process. Turkey included the Turkmens as an agent in this framework. This attempt by Turkey caused reaction from the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party).45 Nevertheless, Turkey continued a policy that is supported by and based on the Iraqi Turkmen Front which represents only a party of Iraqs Turkmens and aims to unify all Turkmens in Iraq.46 Therefore, Turkeys speech acts began to include negative statements towards Kurdish identity in Iraq, but a discourse in favour of Turkmens has continued. Given this policy, Kirkuk as a place where the Turkmen population lives has also become an issue in Turkeys foreign policy with regard to its government and status. In this context, Turkey opposes Kirkuks participation in the Kurdistan Regional Government and wants it to be given a special status. Moreover, Turkey wants Kirkuk to have equal representation for Arabs and Kurds.47 Turkeys demands caused reaction from the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Turkeys policy of refusing contact with the Kurds in Iraq resulted in negative developments between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Turkey. The crisis of January 2007 occurred in this framework. The crisis started when the Iraq National Petroleum Enterprise (SOMO) wanted Turkish rms to apply to the Kurdistan Regional Government to renew their contracts. Turkey reacted by opposing these rules: the only interlocutor for Turkey in Iraq is the Iraqi central government, not the Kurds. It is in this context that Minister of State Kursat Tuzmen reminded them of Turkeys rule and expressed the view that Turkey recognizes an undivided Iraq. In response to this, the Baghdad government asserted that good commercial relations with Iraq depend on the construction of dialogue with the Kurdish President of Iraq, Celal Talabani, and the Kurdish President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Mesud Barzani.48 Though this crisis was resolved by a mutual security guarantee, it is evident that such a policy always has potential to cause a new crisis. On the other hand, in June 2008, the Vice-President of the Iraqi Parliament, Arif Tayfur, claimed that Turkey, by means of its Iraqi Special Representative Murat Ozcelik, interfered in Iraqs internal aairs. Tayfur claimed that Ozcelik, calling
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attention to the Kirkuk issue, explicitly opposed the Kurdish position and worked to convince the deputies of the Kurdistan Parliament with respect to this issue. In conclusion, Turkeys ethnic-based policy in favour of Iraqs Turkmens became contradictory regarding its policy towards the Kurds.
Western Turkish national identity is not the sole determinant of Turkeys foreign policy as other constructivist studies maintain. If that were the case, a national identity called western would not have been a problem with western states and institutions. The following context reveals that Turkey has many problems with western agents. I argue that this situation cannot be understood without accepting Kurdish identity as a determining agent of Turkeys foreign policy. With a westernization target in the foreign policy area, Turkey entered the 1980s with the 12 September military coup. Meanwhile, human rights became very important for western states and a framework of international law was constituted by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and regional institutions. Within the framework of the 12 September three-year military regime, Kurdish organizations, as other leftist organizations, were shut down and their members jailed. In prison, all kinds of ill-treatment were meted out to the Kurds, whose existence was not even recognized. At that period, the Kurdish question became a live issue in the European Parliament (EP). In 1985, the EP took a decision against Turkey.49 Consequently, Kurdish identity has inuenced Turkeys identication process. On the one hand, against this background Turkeys relations with western states and institutions have developed in a negative context. Human rights organizations have begun to include the Kurdish question on the agenda. On the other hand, it produced the establishment of many organizations based on the Kurdish question. Thus Turkeys relations with western states and institutions remained problematic. Since the 1990s, Turkeys conictive relations with Kurdish identity have become more signicant in the context of the violation of human rights. Two developments aected this. First, international institutions such as the EP and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) gave importance to Kurdish identity and made several decisions on the Kurdish question. Second, with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the hegemony of the capitalist system by means of its superstructure (besides its infrastructure), western states accepted the Charter of Paris, also declaring human rights a principle of international order, in the context of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Consequently, Turkey, reducing the Kurdish question to a struggle with the PKK and accused of many human rights violations, began to have trouble with western states and institutions. In 1987, just before the application to the European Union for membership, as a tactical step, Turkey accepted the individual right of application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). However, with this step, since the 1990s, Turkeys Kurds have applied many times to the ECHR. Until now, there have been many cases regarding the Kurdish question in Turkey and many judgments have been delivered against Turkey. Actions leading to the condemnation of Turkey in the ECHR are in general based within three contexts. First, SSC (State Security Court Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemeleri) decisions based on actions or speeches against the indivisible integrity of territory and nation are interpreted as a violation of human
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rights by the ECHR. Second, the human rights violations of prefects and other ocials by their actions, exempt from juridical control in the context of the state of emergency, also played an important role in the decisions of the ECHR condemning Turkey. In fact, since 1987, Turkeys south-east has always been governed by a state of emergency. Third, the Anti-Terror Law (ATL Terorle Mucadele Kanunu), which came into force in 1991, having a wide denition of terror, enables every kind of statement to be reconsidered in this context.50 In particular Article 8 of this law has often been used for condemnation of statements concerning the Kurdish question. This article interdicts every activity, whatever its intention, under the pretext of harming the national and territorial integrity of Turkey. In 1995, because of international pressure, this article was narrowed and thus interdiction was reduced to oral and written propaganda against Turkeys territorial and national integrity. In addition, prison sentences in this context became convertible to a monetary penalty.51 Even though Article 8 of the ATL was abolished in July 2003, problems in the context of the ATL continue to be an issue in the ECHR. Turkeys problematic relationship with Kurdish identity also creates problems in relations with the EU, to which Turkey applied for membership. Turkeys politics towards Kurdish identity led to a negative identication of Turkey by the EU. However, a similar negative identication has come into question by some nationalist sectors of Turkey as the EU wants Turkey to recognize Kurdish identity through political and cultural rights. In particular, those, such as military and nationalist agents, which are not favourable towards giving rights to the Kurds dene the EU as an outside agent aiming to divide Turkey. In the reports of the European Commission on Turkeys progress towards accession, published since December 1999, when Turkeys candidature was accepted, the Kurdish question has played a prominent role. The Kurdish question is in particular considered under the separate rubric of Human Rights and Protection of Minorities. In general, Turkey is criticized because of disrespect for the Copenhagen Political Criteria and its disrespect is in general based on Kurdish identity problems. It is evident that the Kurdish question is handled in particular as an issue of political representation and cultural rights.52 First, with regard to the political representation problem of Kurdish identity in the GNAT (Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi Grand National Assembly of Turkey) and in the context of the political party system, Turkeys political and legal structure comes into question as a critical issue. On the one hand, the 10 per cent threshold is cited as an obstacle to Kurds accessing the GNAT. On the other hand, closure of the Kurdish political parties or their being under threat of closure is interpreted as a problematic situation for Turkeys adhesion to the EU. The rst conict was seen in the 1990s, when the closure of HEP (Halkn Emek Partisi Peoples Labour Party) was declared in July 1993 by the Turkish Constitutional Court owing to swearing oaths of allegiance in Kurdish in the GNAT. After this development, the Kurds continued their political activities within another political party the DEP (Demokrasi Partisi Democracy Party/ Democratic Labour Party). Nevertheless, in March 1994, immunity for Kurdish deputies was lifted and arrests began. Therefore, given these measures against the Kurds, Turkey experienced one of the biggest foreign policy crises of the 1990s. The EP and the PACE, in April 1994, made the decision to demand that Turkey release the DEP deputies immediately. However, the DEP deputies had been tried by
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the SSC from August 1994 and were condemned to a 15-year prison term in December 1994.53 The EP reacted by emphasizing its incompatibility with a plural democracy. The EP explained that work of the Joint Parliamentary Committee was suspended until a positive development was reached. Furthermore, in December 1994, it took a decision proposing suspension of custom union negotiations with Turkey. Therefore, as a reaction to Turkeys measures, due to the Kurdish identity issue, the EU made a decision that came close to cancelling the customs union which Turkey had made such eorts to achieve. The crisis was overcome by Turkeys eorts. In July 1995, Turkey accepted an amendment to the constitution which brought slight changes such as permitting the deputies of the closed party to keep their status and granting the right of audience with the head of the closed party. Nevertheless, since 1998, the situation of the DEP deputies, the lack of organizational freedom and the representational problems of the Kurds have been expressed in every progress report on Turkeys candidature. Furthermore, in the reports, Turkeys minority approach, based on the Lausanne Treaty (1923) recognizing only three non-Muslim communities as minorities, is criticized by putting forward the idea that the Kurds should be recognized in the constitution as a national, racial or ethnic minority. In fact, it is claimed that this situation creates a system in which the Kurds political demands are impeded and thus contributes to the rule of the PKK in the Kurdish region. Specically, in the 1999 progress report, there is criticism that the pro-Kurdish HADEP (Halkn Demokrasi Partisi Peoples Democracy Party) with half the votes in seven cities of the south-east did not enter the GNAT because of the national threshold of 10 per cent for political party representation.54 As in the 2001 report, the disappearance of two ocials of the HADEP was cited;55 the 2002 report, by reminding of the continued closure by the courts of the HADEP and the Kurdish HAK-PAR (Hak ve Ozgurlukler Partisi Rights and Freedom Party), indicated that the closure of political parties should not be so easy.56 The 2007 report included the accession of Kurdish deputies to the GNAT and their unication under the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi Democratic Society Party) as a positive development.57 However, recently the DTPs closure became an issue indicated in the 2008 report. In fact, in November 2007, a closure case was opened against the DTP, under the pretext that it had become a centre of activities against the indivisibility of national and territorial integrity of the state indicated in Article 68/4 of the constitution. In this context, not only the closure of the DTP, but also the abolition of deputies status and a ve-year political interdiction for 221 DTP members was demanded.58 In November 2007, the DTPs closure case came into question in a meeting between the European Union Troika and Turkey. Olli Rehn, Member of the European Commission Responsible for Enlargement, emphasizing the necessity for a civil solution to the Kurdish question, explained that they wanted the DTP to be included in the GNAT.59 Furthermore, in October 2008, the President of the PACE, Luis Maria De Puig, stated that party closure should be seen as an exceptional sanction. De Puig added that Turkey should adopt a new democratic constitution guaranteeing human rights.60 Second, the cultural rights dimension constitutes another point of the Kurdish question indicated in the progress reports. Every progress report emphasizes that Turkey should recognize Kurdish identity by granting Kurds their cultural rights. In
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this framework, broadcast and education rights in Kurdish are particularly cited. In the 1998 report, Articles 7 and 8 of the ATL and Articles 158, 159, 311 and 312 of the Criminal Code based on indivisibility of national and territorial integrity of the state were considered a barrier for publications with regard to the Kurdish question, by leading to a narrow interpretation.61 In the 1999 report, the lack of means of Kurdish citizens for using and sustaining their language and cultural traditions was emphasized by considering it a violation of the two agreements of the European Council. Even though the abolition of language forbidden by law was interpreted as a positive development, the continuity of the diculties concerning the use of Kurdish remained a problematic issue in the report.62 The amendments made in August 2002 with the third reform package were considered a positive development allowing broadcasts in dierent languages. Nevertheless, the existence of Article 42 which bans education in languages other than Turkish was criticized.63 Consequently, some progress was welcomed in the report but these changes were judged inecient. The 2003 report indicates that in spite of the four reform packages since August 2002, Kurds faced diculties in practice.64 The amendment realized in January 2004, permitting television channels other than TRT (Turkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu Turkish RadioTelevision Corporation) to broadcast in Kurdish, had positive repercussions on progress reports; but the time restrictions for TV broadcasting and the diculties in practice were criticized.65 The rst positive interpretations of Turkeys progress were made in the 2005 report. In fact, Prime Minister Erdoans meeting with several Kurdish intellectuals g in Diyarbakir created a positive atmosphere with regard to the Kurdish question. Erdoans statement of the Kurdish issue and his emphasis on the need to resolve g the Kurdish question through democratic means were interpreted as signs of his possible policies regarding Kurdish identity.66 Thus, Turkeys recognition of the existence of the Kurdish question is considered to be a committed step which could lead to the resolution of the Kurdish question. However, the 2006 progress report criticized that Erdoans commitments in Diyarbakir were not put into practice.67 g With regard to the 2007 progress report, the time restrictions on Kurdish broadcasting and the lack of educational possibilities in Kurdish were emphasized as negative points in cultural rights areas. The HAK-PARs pending closure case for having spoken Kurdish at the partys general congress was criticized as an example of restrictions on the usage of Kurdish in practice.68 In the last progress report published in 2008, similar problems were reported. In particular, the ATL and Article 215, 216 and 217 of the Criminal Code were considered as means of restriction on freedom of expression. The April 2008 amendment to Article 301 of the Criminal Code concerning freedom of expression was cited. With this amendment, the upper limit of penalty time diminished, but the permission of the Ministry of Justice was required to open the case. The latter arrangement was criticized because of the fact that it allowed political inuence on the judgment process.69 The Kurdish question was not a determinant in relations with the USA as in relations with the European Union. In fact, until the late 1990s, owing to rules of the Cold War period, the most important issue for the USA had been the existence of agents supporting the western side against the Eastern Bloc. In this context, considering Turkeys membership of NATO as sucient, the USA ignored Turkeys
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violation of human rights. In the early 1990s the USAs interest in Kurdish identity was restricted to Iraqs Kurds70 because of the fact that the USA wanted to oust Saddam Husseins regime in Iraq and for this they needed the support of Iraqs Kurdish groups. However, since the 1990s, the USAs policy and rules regarding Kurdish identity have been handled in Congress. In this context, Turkeys problematic relations with Kurdish identity also came into question. The points of view expressed in this framework have paved the way for a negative view of Turkey. Until the late 1980s, Iraqs Kurds have been in question in Congress rather than Turkeys Kurds. But since 1989, Turkeys Kurds also have been handled in Congressional meetings as victims of human rights violations by Turkey. Turkeys method of dealing with the Kurdish question has been severely criticized. Meanwhile, the measures based on the ATL and the state of emergency are regarded as violations of human rights. International human rights associations and the USA Ministry of Foreign Aairs in their Turkey reports supported this negative framework. Therefore, the deep dierence between the US governments attitude towards Iraqs Kurds and Turkeys Kurds is criticized by Congress members. In fact, the USA governments policy of constituting good relationships with Iraqs Kurds has avoided Turkeys Kurds. As Kurds suer from violations of basic human rights, the USA continues its relations with Turkey, without pressing Turkey to stop the violations. The negative view of Congress towards Turkey inuenced the USAs military and economic aid and sale of weapons to Turkey. With regard to aid, Turkey began to have trouble with the USA in 1994. In fact, the Congress records of March 1994 included opinions claiming that Turkey was violating the most basic human rights towards Kurds in the South East region. Further, because of the measures within the framework of the state of emergency since 1987 in eight cities in the South East region, the legal rights of Kurdish citizens were violated on behalf of the struggle against terrorism. Since 1992, developments such as the killing of 70 members of the Kurdish political party DEP, the bombing of 30 party branches, the arrest of more than 300 DEP candidates during elections, DEP deputies arrests due to their speeches after elections were all given as examples of Turkeys negative attitude towards the Kurdish identity. Therefore Congress called for the USA government to apply sanctions to Turkey.71 Consequently, Congress eorts to construct new rules for relations with Turkey succeeded and in July 1994 aid to Turkey by the USA government become conditional. This aid remained dependent on its observation of international law and on developments in the area of human rights. Furthermore, the speech acts cited in Congress also inuenced the sale of weapons to Turkey, which because of its armed struggle against the PKK has been highly dependent on purchases of weapons from the USA since the 1990s. In 1995 Congress, supported by human rights associations, prevented the sale of Cobra attack helicopters to Turkey. Nevertheless, thanks to USA government support, Turkey had only 10 of 50 helicopters. In December 1997, the sale of helicopters was conditional on Turkeys progress in human rights areas. In October 2000, Congress reacted strongly to plans to sell 145 Bell-Textron attack helicopters to Turkey. In this context, it was emphasized that the Cobra helicopters previously sold to Turkey were used against Kurds.72
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Kurdish identity as a victim of human rights violations also comes into question in the agendas of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs which appeared as agents for inuencing the reconstruction process of rules have become determinant in the construction process of foreign policies of states. In such a context, dierent NGOs have begun to inuence Turkeys relations with regard to Kurdish identity. There are two kinds of NGOs in this framework. On the one hand, there are associations which are not directly established based on Kurdish identity. These associations, having the target of Turkeys membership of the EU, give place to the Kurdish question with regard to the Copenhagen Political Criteria. In this context, _ _ TUSIAD (Turk Sanayicileri ve Isadamlar Dernei Turkish Industrialists and g Businessmens Association) for Turkeys accession to the EU comes into prominence. _ TUSIAD prepares the reports concerning Turkeys path to the EU. The 1997 _ TUSIAD report, prepared by Prof. Bulent Tanor, is important in this context because it handles the Kurdish question as a multi-dimensional problem, while emphasizing its identity dimension. By analyzing every article of laws denying Kurdish identity, he _ indicated the need for an amendment.73 TUSIAD continues to publish reports on this _ SIAD, by giving a voice to the Kurdish question in its speech issue. Therefore, TU acts, aims to orient Turkeys foreign policy according to its targets. On the other hand, there are NGOs directly based on the problems of Kurdish identity. These organizations emphasize the importance of Kurdish identity in the realization of Turkeys foreign policy targets. Thereby they attempt to force a resolution of the Kurdish question by democratic means. Furthermore, they challenge governments by pointing out the problems with other states for obtaining some advantages in favour of Kurdish identity. In this context, the Kurdish Human Right Project (KHRP) established in 1992 became a prominent agent through its activities. It aims to uphold the human rights of Kurds. In this respect, it follows Kurds cases in the EHRC and encourages them to sue against violation of their rights.74 It prepares reports on the situation of human rights in Turkey and oers them to international organizations such as the OSCE. It also records situations contrary to the UN human rights agreements. Since 2003, the annual reports called the Impact Report appraising the situation of human rights in Kurdish regions have been prepared by the KHRP and books have been published on the subject. The KHRP is aware of the moves against Turkeys policy concerning the water issue with Syria and Iraq. Specically, the KHRP prepares reports indicating that Turkey violates the water rights of Syria and Iraq by means of the GAP. As Iraq and Syria claim, the construction of dams is considered to cause diminution of the water quality of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers. In addition, it is proposed that GAP, which aects Kurds life in the region, should be run with the participation of the Kurds. The KHRP also campaigned against the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline project promoted by Turkey. In this campaign, rst of all, it claimed that the proposed line of the project was not safe. Secondly, the Kurdish population had not been informed about the plan for the BTC pipeline to pass through the Kurdish region. This situation was considered a violation of the World Bank criteria by threatening the human rights of Kurds.75 The KHRP invited the member states of the EU and in particular the British government to stop this project by means of its reports. Consequently, even though the KHRP did not succeed in stopping pipeline construction (it was opened in July 2006), the petroleum companies included in the
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project began to discuss the safety of the line. Thus Turkey had to give guarantees to these companies about the amount of oil carried by the pipeline.76 Turkeys EU candidacy also constitutes an important activity area for the KHRP. It prepares reports and publishes books concerning Turkeys Kurdish question and violations of human rights. By handling the situation in Turkey in the context of the Copenhagen Political Criteria, it proposes some policies in regard to relations with Turkey. For instance, in the report of April 2002, considering Kurds as a minority, it demanded that Turkey allow Kurds their cultural rights based on the Lausanne Treaty. Furthermore, the necessary steps for adoption to the Copenhagen Criteria were indicated.77 Since the 1980s, Kurdish institutes established in some Western Europe countries and the USA have also become important agents with regard to the Kurdish question and Turkeys foreign policy. The institutes see their mission as the construction of a consciousness in Kurds regarding their cultural identity and explaining Kurdish identity problems to the public in western countries. In this respect, the institutes organize conferences, campaigns and publish reports, articles and books concerning the Kurdish question. After Turkeys candidature is accepted, Turkeys problem of adaptation to the Copenhagen Criteria will be handled by comparing its situation with other states. In this context, the conference entitled Kurds: Human Rights and Cultural Identity organized by the Paris Kurdish Institute in cooperation with the French Freedoms Foundation chaired by Danielle Mitterrand on 1415 October 1989 was important as a rst far-reaching international conference concerning the Kurdish question.78 At the end of the conference, some decisions were taken with regard to the Kurdish question such as the founding of an international committee to follow the situation of Kurdish human rights, the construction of a Kurdish organization participating in international organizations as an observer, and supporting Kurdish participation in international institutions like the EP and the European Council. In the releases published after the conference, the UN, European states and institutions were asked to force Turkey to recognize Kurds right to self-determination.79 The signature campaign of March 1994 was also an important activity of the institute. The campaign invited Turkey to resolve the Kurdish question.80 The signed text was oered to Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary-General. Finally, in May 2008, the Paris and the Washington Kurdish Institutes organized a common signature campaign. In the petition published in the leading newspapers of the USA and Europe, the demands as regards democratic and peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question are listed. Furthermore, emphasizing the negative situation of Turkey as a candidate of the EU, politicians such as Tony Blair, Marti Ahtisaari, Felipe Gonzales and Bernard Koucher, who were involved in the resolution eorts with the Catalans, Basques, and in Kosovo, were invited to resolve Turkeys Kurdish question.81 Turkeys Ministry of Foreign Aairs reacted harshly ` to this campaign, restating Turkeys rules vis-a-vis Kurdish identity.82
The Kurdish question, as an unsolved problem, caused changes in Turkish national identity. In fact, the Kurdish question, being increasingly salient, nourished Turkish nationalist discourse and thus aected Turkeys foreign policy decisions by giving them a nationalist character.
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The 12 September military regime used the idea of the Turkish Islam Synthesis, which was rst launched by a nationalist right-wing association, Aydnlar Oca, g during 1970s, against leftist and Kurdish movements. According to this idea, Turkish and Islamic cultures are two main determinants of national culture. And Turkey is a country surrounded by the cultural attack of interior and exterior enemies. In this context, Islam is considered the most appropriate religion for Turks to protect their identity. Furthermore, the experience of the Ottoman Empire is reconsidered as proof of the claim that the integrity and the permanence of the state cannot be protected in a plural society. Finally, this approach argues that in a continuously changing world it is necessary not only to protect the national identity but also reconstruct it with creativity.83 This discourse was compatible with the dominant rules in the 1980s. In fact, the Green Belt project of the USA which aimed to construct a line of moderate Islam around the USSR oers a supporting context for the Turkish Islam synthesis. Therefore, the 12 September regime found a proper context to apply its approach and eorts to redene Turkish national identity began. Nevertheless, Kurdish identity has presented a challenge in this context, by struggling against the dominance of the Turkish national identity. Since the 1990s, this struggle has been supported by international rules of the period. In fact, the globalization process led to the prominence of identities. Therefore, Turkish identity went through a crisis and the reconstruction of identity came into question. Two tendencies were put forward for overcoming the crisis. On the one hand, President Turgut Ozal wanted to include Kurdish identity in the construction process of Turkish national identity. In this respect, he conducted negotiations directly with Iraqi Kurdish leaders and indirectly with the PKK leader Ocalan. On the other hand, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel and the military bureaucracy opposed to Ozals approach wanted to continue excluding the Kurdish identity. But the sudden death of Ozal led to the latter group becoming dominant. Therefore, new foreign policy was applied. Turkey tilted towards the new Turkish Republics which gained independence after the dissolution of the USSR. In this context, the eorts for the redenition of Turkishness by including the Turkish World came into question.84 With regard to the realization of this target, the government cooperated with Fethullah Gulens community, one of the most important defenders of the TurkishIslam synthesis. Turkishness, which is a distinguishing factor in Gulens approach,85 was intended to be used as a unifying factor between Turkey and the Turkic Republics. From 1991 to 1993, the PKK was very active as an agent. As a consequence of this, Turkish nationalism was also at a heightened level. Turkish and Islamic identities of new independent states were welcomed passionately under the inuence of Turkish media speculation. This enthusiasm also covered the GNAT and therefore many meetings were held concerning relations with the Turkish world. In one of these meetings, the foundation of a ministry responsible for the outside Turks was even proposed. Consequently, Turkey maintained a rm relationship with these countries. Turkish cultural centres and Turkish schools were opened in many of them. In the context of mutual visits, around 140 treaties were signed.86 Moreover, in January 1992, by a decision of the Cabinet, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency was founded in Ankara. The aim was explained in speeches by Prime Minister Demirel in February 1992. In fact, he expressed the view
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that a Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China was being constructed in the post-Soviet period.87 Since 1992, Turkey has been organizing meetings of the Summit of Presidents of Turkish Speaking States. In the last meeting held in November 2007, Prime Minister Erdoan suggested constructing a commonwealth of Turkish language states. g According to Erdoan, it would be possible to provide coordination among these g states in the area of foreign policy.88 However, this policy was constructed based on an opposition to Kurds. In March 1992, before the celebrations of Newroz, intensive propaganda emphasized that Newroz was a Turkish festival. During Newroz celebrations there were conicts between Kurds and the police.89 Since then Turkey has been celebrating Newroz as a Turkish world festival with ocial ceremonies. Turkeys foreign policy dominated by the idea of Turkishness led to rm relations with Azerbaijan, so much so that Turkey has been the only state supporting it permanently. Thus Turkey became a part of Azerbaijans problems with Armenia. Azerbaijans embargo on Armenia is supported by Turkey and this attitude was criticized by NATO, Russia, USA, Iran and other western states.90 Today, Turkeys relations with Armenia are also directed by this nationalism. However, the slogans shouted (We are all Hrant! We are all Armenians!) at the funeral ceremony of murdered Armenian journalist Hrant Dink have become a turning point in relations between Turkey and Armenia.91 It was after this event that Armenian President Serj Sarkisyan invited President of Turkey, Abdullah Gul, to Erivan to watch the TurkeyArmenia World Cup football match. In September 2008, President Gul conducted Turkeys rst ocial visit to Armenia in spite of the reactions of Azerbaijan.92 However, in October 2008 this positive atmosphere was interrupted by the PKKs Aktutun operation against Turkey. Under the inuence of rising Turkish nationalism, Turkey did not make any statements or take any actions concerning Armenia. Everything seemed to be frozen in the context of bilateral relations. It was only after the appeasement of nationalism that TurkeyArmenia relations have come into question again. In November 2008, Turkeys Minister of Foreign Aairs, Ali Babacan, met with his Armenian colleague Edvard Nalbatyan in Istanbul. At the end of the meeting, they expressed agreement regarding the normalization of bilateral relations.93 Turkeys speech acts emphasizing Turkishness also worried the Russian Federation. In this context, aected by rising nationalism, Turkeys direct and indirect support for the Chechens in 1994 became an important issue in their relations. Russia reacted to Turkey by supporting the Kurds and explained that an international conference handling the Kurdish question would be held soon. Then in January 1995 Russia met Kurdish representatives for the establishment of a Kurdish Parliament in Exile in Russia. Moreover, in Moscow, a Kurdish House was opened. All of these actions by Russia forced Turkey to sign a protocol against terrorism with Russia.94 The bilateral meetings on the Chechens and the PKK continued. Kurdish identity paves the way for the reproduction of Turkish nationalism by civil and military institutions. In fact, Kurdish identity, as a subject of an unsolved question, keeps alive the perception of threats to the permanence of the Turkish state. Therefore, some civil associations and military bureaucracy, handling Turkeys relations in the context of concern over this division, aim to orient foreign policy.
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The nationalist think tank organizations in general want to be involved in the construction of a Turkish national identity based on the ction of a homogeneous nation. Around the intention of redening Turkish identity by including a large geography, they want to construct rules for Turkeys foreign policy. They impose their own rules by means of publications and activities. In this context, ASAM (Avrasya Stratejik Arastrmalar Merkezi Eurasian Center for Strategic Research) is active. Founded in 1999, ASAM indicates that its aim is to construct a national security culture in Turkey.95 Many academics with publications in all areas of foreign policy are included in the institution in an attempt to orient foreign policy. In these publications, there is an eort to form foreign policy around the anxiety of Turkeys division, emphasizing Kurdish identity as the main threat. In this respect, Turkeys candidacy for the EU is handled in a negative context, as the Copenhagen Criteria necessitates giving some rights to Kurds. Further it is claimed that Kurds demands are beyond the Copenhagen Criteria.96 Another association in this context is TUSAM (Turkiye Ulusal Guvenlik Stratejileri Arastrma Merkezi Turkish Center for National Security Strategy Research), which also tries to orient Turkeys foreign policy, based on an opposition to Kurds. Through publications, seminars, and conferences around the theme of Turkeys national security, Kurdish identity is emphasized as a factor damaging national security. The Kurdish question being considered a terror problem, relations with other states are handled according to their attitude to the Kurdish PKK movement. In this context, the Kurdistan Regional Government and its Kurdish leaders are dened as unreliable agents.97 Western states are also considered as agents attempting to divide Turkeys territory by contributing to the foundation of the PKK. It is claimed that the EU aims to divide Turkey under the pretext of global democracy.98 Nevertheless, TUSAM, strongly opposed to giving some rights of Kurdish identity, passionately supports the recognition of wide political rights for Turks in Bulgaria. Moreover, it also supports Bulgarias membership of the EU, which would provide large political and cultural rights to Turks.99 Again paradoxically, Turkmens in Northern Iraq are supported while a distant relationship is maintained with Iraqs Kurds.100 Finally, Turk Ocaklar also can be cited as an association constructing its discourses against the EU and the USA based on Kurdish identity. The principal aim of this association is the redenition of Turkish identity by including a Turkish world. The publications of the association assert that the EU plans to extract and construct another nation from Turkey.101 In this respect, as relations with the Central Asian states and the Turkish Republics are conrmed, western countries are considered harmful agents intending to divide Turkey.102 The adoption of military struggle against the Kurdish question led to military bureaucracy becoming an important agent both domestically and in foreign policy. The military bureaucracy composed of the Turkish General Sta and the Secretariat General of the National Security Council plays a crucial role in the construction process of foreign policy rules. The military bureaucracy realizes this eectiveness by its speech acts or by pressuring decision makers. These powers were given to the military bureaucracy in the context of the constitution and governmental regulations. The reason for these powers is based on the necessary protection of the indivisible integrity of territory and nation and of national security. Within
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this framework, Kurdish identity as a separatist agent is emphasized and the military bureaucracy thereby underscores Turkish nationalism over Kurdish identity.103 Consequently, they draw a nationalist character for foreign policy. The military bureaucracy has some instruments for inuencing foreign policy. On the one hand, it imposes a policy by means of the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu NSC). Composed of military members and representatives of government, the NSC is a product of the 12 September constitution. One of the NSCs tasks is to decide the necessary precautions for the protection of the indivisible integrity of territory and nation.104 In July 2003, a reform package adopted in Parliament reduced the NSCs executive tasks to recommendatory ones.105 Nevertheless, in practice, the NSC, by means of the National Security Policy Document (Milli Guvenlik Siyaseti Belgesi NSPD) and press releases, continues to inuence foreign policy. The NSPD is a document prepared by the NSC every ve years.106 Including necessary precautions and policies regarding national security, this document is so important that once conrmed by the Cabinet it can change the whole agenda of government. Since the 1990s, the PKK has been considered a separatist terrorist movement and has been top of the threat list in the NSPD.107 The Kurds secured its rst place on the list even during the 28 February Process which was applied against the reactionist activities at the time of the Refahyol government. In this period, both the Kurdish question (dened as separatist terror) and Islamic fundamentalism (dened as irtica a reactionary ideology or movement aiming to return to a religious regime) have been the principal topic in the political agenda of the NSPD. Therefore, it is proposed to put in place economic and political sanctions against Syria and Iran which are supposed to support the PKK movement. Furthermore, these two states were threatened by the use of force. In January 1999, separatist and fundamentalist movements were equally considered as principal threats and it was advised to reinforce relations with the Turkish Republics. The NSC, by means of press releases, also tries to determine foreign policy. Within the framework of these press releases, Turkeys relations are reconsidered according to the separatist terrorist threat. A particular foreign policy is dened and imposed by the government.108 The subject of the Kurdish question refers to necessary precautions in the South East of Turkey or interior and exterior facts without citing Kurdish identity. For instance, in a press release of 1992, there have been concrete policy propositions for dierent countries which were classied as foes or friends according to their attitude towards Kurdish identity. Again, it has been proposed to strengthen relations with Turkish Republics which supposedly have a common culture with Turkey. The declaration of a Kurdish federal state in 1992 has been seen as a threat. In the 1990s, the internationalization of the Kurdish question was interpreted as a principal threat and hence the necessary precautions against it occupied the whole agenda.109 After the capture of Ocalan, developments concerning Kurdish identity have been treated in press releases. The demands for education in a language other than the ocial language, without citing Kurdish, have been called a harmful activity oriented by the PKK. The reforms in the EU membership agenda have been rejected by reason of the reforms they have implied about Kurdish identity. In a 2002 press release, these reforms were qualied as a real danger to the integrity of the nation.110
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In press releases published after the occupation of Iraq in March 2003, the continuity of Iraqs territorial integrity was dened as a priority for Turkey. In this respect, collaboration with the USA against the PKK has been emphasized. The last published press release in 2008 underlined the need for precautions against the supporters of the PKK and maintaining of Iraqs territorial integrity.111 In conclusion, even if military bureaucracy does not govern directly via a military coup, it determines the rules of foreign relations thanks to speech acts. The speech acts formulated by the military bureaucracy regarding the Kurdish question are a determinant in the construction of foreign policy. When governments try to apply a certain policy that conicts with the requirements of military bureaucracy, the military bureaucrats immediately reminds them of their rules. Sometimes, this intervention by the military bureaucracy can reach the point where some institutions and countries are threatened. In this context, the EU and some states which supposedly support Kurdish identity constitute the red light for Turkeys foreign policy.
Notes
1. Y. Bozdaloglu, Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity (London: Routledge, 2003), pp.57. g 2. H. Kosebalaban, Torn Identities and Foreign Policy, Insight Turkey, Vol.10 (2008), pp.710. 3. The concept of speech act, dierently from the concept of discourse, refers to a rule constructive power. Hence Onuf puts forward that agents make rules by means of speech acts. 4. A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.15; N. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989). 5. A. Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, American Political Science Review, Vol.88 (1994), p.387. 6. S. Smith, Foreign Policy is What States Make of It: Social Construction and International Relations Theory, in V. Kubalkova (ed.), Foreign Policy in A Constructed World (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p.52. 7. N. Onuf, Constructivism, A Users Manual, in V. Kubalkova et al. (eds.), International Relations in A Constructed World (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.60. 8. Ibid., p.59. 9. Ibid., pp.5966. 10. Common Issues Aecting Turkeys Relations with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, Ankara Papers, Vol.8 (2003), pp.538. 11. See M.M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martins, 1997), pp.4653. _ 12. M. Eder and A. C arkolu, Su Ihtilaf: Frat-Dicle Havzas, in B. Rubin and K. Kiris ci (eds.), g _ Gu muzde Turkiyenin Ds Politikas (Istanbul: Boazic Universitesi, 2002), p.352. g i nu _ 13. O. Tur, Turkiye-Suriye Ilis kileri: Su Sorunu, in M. Benli Altuns k, Tu g rkiye ve Ortadou, Tarih, _ Kimlik, Gu venlik (Istanbul: Boyut, 1999), pp.1056. 14. Ibid., p.118. 15. R. Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkeys Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq Since the Gulf War, in R. Olson (ed.), The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East (Kentucky: Kentucky University Press, 1996), pp.867. 16. Hurriyet, 11 Feb. 1995. _ _ _ 17. G. C etinsaya, Tarihsel Perspektifte TurkiyeIran Ilis kileri ve Nukleer Sorun, Iran Dosyas (Ankara: SETA, 2006), pp.34. _ _ _ 18. R. Olson, TurkiyeIran Iliskileri, 19792004: Devrim, Ideoloji, Savas, Darbeler ve Jeopolitik (Ankara: Babil, 2005), p.13. _ _ 19. A. Akdeveliolu and O. Kurkc olu, Iranla Ilis kiler, in B. Oran (ed.), Turkiyenin Ds Politikas, g u g _ _ Cilt II: 19802001 (Istanbul: Iletis im, 2002), pp.5845. _ _ kileri, 19792004, pp.212. 20. Olson, TurkiyeIran Ilis _ 21. See B. Oran, Kalkk Horoz, C Gu ve Ku Devleti (Istanbul: Bilgi, 1998), pp.2737. ekic c rt
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Jülide Karakoç "The Impact of The Kurdish Identity On Turkey's Foreign Policy From The 1980s To 2008" Middle Eastern Studies Volume 46, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 919 - 942

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The Impact of the Kurdish Identity on Turkeys Foreign Policy

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