Third World Quarterly

Review: The End of Fundamentalism? Author(s): Amr G. E. Sabet Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5 (Oct., 2000), pp. 891-902 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993624 . Accessed: 13/06/2011 07:11
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Third World Quarterly,Vol 21, No 5, pp 891-902, 2000

FEATUREREVIEW The end of fundamentalism?

Amr G E Sabet
Islamic Fundamentalism, Lawrence Davidson London: Greenwood Press, 1998 pp 186 Islamic Fundamentalism: Myths & Realities Ahmad S Moussalli (ed) Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998 pp 348 Davidson's work Islamic Fundamentalism part of a series publicationwhich attempts is to present 'interpretive histories' of some of the most significantevents of the twentieth century (p ix). Its purpose is to invite considerationof how and why certain historical occurrences have defined the past and present, and of the extent to which they are expected to chart the political, social, intellectual,culturaland economic routes into the twenty-firstcentury(p xii). The book, clearly and lucidly written,comprises five chapters and a conclusion, followed by short biographicalprofiles of 17 leading historical and currentIslamist figures, a selection of 10 primarydocuments, ranging from the Quran and Prophetictraditions,to the intellectualworks and statementsmade by some of those figures, a useful glossary of unfamiliar terms, and a helpful annotated bibliography which refers to books, videos and intemet sources. Chapter 1 presents an historicalnarrativeof Islam. It briefly discusses the impact the rise and decline of Islamic civilization have had on Muslims' consciousness, and on their perceptions of that glorious history in contrast to their present predicamentand crisis. The introductorychapter is followed by discussion of the founding of the Society of Muslim Brotherhood,described by the author as the 'first successful modem Islamic fundamentalistorganization'(p xiii). Its relative success lasted as a source of guidance to many subsequentfundamentalist groups, not only inspirationally,but also as practical experience. It provided lessons on what can be expected when Islamic commitment comes up against a hostile and repressive state. Chapters3 and 4 examine the case studies of Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which are designated as Islamic states with different forms of governance, distinctive application of Islamic values and contrastingpolicies toward the West. Iran is described as a revolutionaryform of Islamic fundamentalism,while Saudi Arabia is depicted as a non-revolutionary counterpart. Finally, Chapter5 presents a review of Westem attitudes toward 'fundamentalism'and of the West's perceptions of such a phenomenon as both violent and undemocratic.It examines the reasons underlyingtrepidationsarising from
Amr G E Sabet is Jean MonnetFellow at the RobertSchumanCenterfor AdvancedStudies European University Institute,Florence, Italy. E-mail: sabet@datacomm.iue.it. ISSN 0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/00/050891-12 ?3 2000 Third WorldQuarterly

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perceived incompatibilitiesbetween Islamic and Western values (p xiv). Much of these apprehensions, according to Davidson, are rooted in secular philosophy and a USWestern view of Islam which lacks historical context or cultural insight (p 80). Depending on whetherthey are perpetuated amended,they could have serious policy or implications affecting mutual relations. However, Davidson concludes that Islamic 'fundamentalism'is 'not a monolithic affair' (p xiv) and that, given the convergence of economic and strategic interests,both the West and the Muslim world will probablyeven if only in the long run-find ways to accommodate each other rather than necessarily embarkingon a 'clash of civilizations' (p 86). In contrastto the historical-narrative approachof Davidson, Moussalli's edited book from a sociopolitical and contexobserves the phenomenonof Islamic 'fundamentalism' tual perspective. The book is divided into two parts. The first part (four articles) examines the theoretical,philosophicaland political foundationsof the 'fundamentalist' discourses, and the epistemological basis of their ideological orientations.The second part(articles 5-11) provides case studies of Islamic experiences in Algeria, Jordan,Gaza strip, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Both parts attempt to evaluate the Islamic fundamentalists'performance,and to locate their thought and movements within the international,regional and local context. The introduction by Moussalli provides the broad framework within which the subsequentchapters analyse specific theoreticaland ideological issues. Partly a survey and partly a critical analysis, Moussalli strikes a sympatheticand apologetic chord. In a typically defensive attitude,increasinglyprevalentamong many scholarsconcernedwith Islamic activism, he attemptsto underminethe arguments-epitomised by the works of Samuel Huntingtonand others such as MartinKramer,BernardLewis, JudithMiller and George Well and above all Israel-which predict an inevitable 'clash of civilizations'. He does so along two parallellines: first,by citing otherWesternfigures, such as Edward Djerjian,John Esposito, James Piscatori, Augustus Norton and William Zartman,who harbourcontrastingviews; second, by capitalisingon their intellectualpositions to assert the compatibilityof Islam with Western values, and to criticise existing regimes in the Arab World while calling for democraticpluralisticalternativeswhich would incorporate Islamic currents into the political process. Based on the latter, 'fundamentalism'is depicted as a political and socioeconomic, ratherthan a religious phenomenon (p 25). Essentially, it is a manifestaionof a much broadermalaise engulfing the Arab World, namely the lack of participatorydemocracy, an encapsulating term that has become almost synonymous with Western values. This conceptual framework determines the basic thrust of the rest of the book. In the following article, 'New new orientalism:political Islam and social movement theory', Kristin Wolff observes that knowledge, including social theory, is contextually and historically produced.As such it can make no claim to objectivity and instead is a source of power and domination, its clearest manifestationbeing the colonisation and objectificationof the Muslim other (p 26). Ignoringthe agent-structureand knowledgepower connections, social theory overlooked the role of global structuresand prejudice in shaping scholarly views of and public policies regarding Islam. The associated scientific method accordingto Wolff 'tends to be more effective in revealing how actors act than how they are acted uipon' (p 49). As a result, Islam has been relegated to a marginalstatus in the 'scientific' community,while the study of political activism in the Muslim world was undertaken as a particular social theorypoint of view but as being not Islamic, something beyond rational analysis. Social theory, then, has failed to theorise the 'spiritual'(p 63). Unable to live up to its own standards empathyand detachment, of 'scientific' objectivity as an alleged form of contextual independence has effectively been underminedby its very own theoretical foundation (p 48). Wolff thus calls for 892

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removing disciplinaryboundariesin order to gain insights from different social science to paradigmas more appropriate studying theories, and suggests an identity-orientated actors in different contexts. She furtheremploys some basic concepts such as contestation, globalisation and empowerment.These concepts relate to the process of meaningmaking, convergence between religious and social movements in their challenge to the internationalworld-orderparadigm, and empowerment through collective action, respectively (p 52). Finally, Wolff takes social movements in Algeria as a case study and as a means of understanding, looking at actors' identity as well as history. by In the same vein as Wolff s call, Armando Salvatore's (article 3), 'Discursive contentions in Islamic terms:fundamentalism versus liberalism', adopts both an identity and a hermeneuticalapproach.He utilises these to examine and analyse the discursive polarisationbetween those whom he calls conflationistsolutionists on the one hand, and deconflationist neutralists on the other. The former, represented by the intellectual follower of Sayyed Qutb, Yusuf al-Qaradawi,see Islam as both religion and state (din wa dawla). The latter, representedby the intellectual follower of Ali Abd al-Raziq, MuhammadKhalafallah,perceive Islam solely as a religious and ethical code (din wa dunya) (p 77). Despite their polarisedpositions, Salvatoreargues that both are grounded in the Arab-Islamic 'frameworkof universal reference', or a common identity structure (p 76). Hermeneutically,however, both interpretiveschemes originate from the same discursive formationwhich he terms 'intellectualizedIslamic 'ilm". This refers to 'the terrain of activity of modernized 'ulama' seeking influence within the public arena'. From a 'tendentiallyhomogeneous frameworkof universal reference these two separate and polarizing kinds of dynamics unfold and consolidate for the obvious constraintof 'closing a circle' (p 77). The conflationists' closed circle pertains to their discursive belief in the state as a religious and metaphysical concern. The deconflationists' counterpartsubcribes to the discursive view that the state relates to the human and historical. Thus, while these discursive contentions are conducted in Islamic terms and are dependenton an intellectual rationalitywhich is similar in many ways to Western correspondingcategories, they are by no means reducible to their parameters(p 75). Having identified such hermeneuticdisticntions, Salvatore then proceeds to examine and analyse some of the logical inconsistencies associated with each of those polar positions (pp 89-90, 94-97). The problem with the solutionists' call for an Islamic state is that their contention is based on 'logical and ideological evidence and not through juridical argumentation'(p 89), whereas the neutralists' pitfall is their failure to be detached with regard to the vertical dimension of organisation (state-society), just as they could not be impartialwhen referenceis made to the horizontaldimension (society). In the final analysis, they had to admit that the Quran necessarily provides the basis of an 'order' or 'system' (nizam), An assertion which echoes a central Qutbian, and therefore, solutionist, motif (p 97). In article 4, 'Islamiyya and the constructionof the human being', Ronald A T Judy argues that Islam could be included in the sources of a practicalphilosophy of the New World Ordercurrentlyundergoinga process of reformulation.In particular,he attempts to emphasise points of convergence, especially with regard to human rights and civil society, between Western conceptions, as envisioned by some of their strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski, and 'Islamism' as advocatedby Hassan A al-Turabi.Both figures seek to endow non-materialand non-nationalisticfactors a role in the formulation of civilisational politics. The point of convergence between their views, according to Judy, is the complex question of 'what really is the human being'. More to the point, is: 'What is the status of the complex question of human being in relation to the concept of civil society for Islamism?' (p 107). This inquiry attempts to go beyond the conventional political 893

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definitionof humanrights,which was partand parcelof supposedly 'bygone' ideological conflicts (pp 103, 105, 107). According to Turabi,Islamism, or the Islamic awakening, is the developmentof a mixtureof differentcivilisations and a movement of unification led by intellectuals, many of whom were educated in the West and influenced by its intellectual culture. In a similar vein to that of Salvatore, they have come to perceive themselves as representativesof an intellectualised Islamic 'ilm. Islamism seeks to address the 'quandryof the historical subject-what is really the human being-by displacing historical understanding[as ontology] with a new practical philosophy [as epistemology]' (p 107). Within this framework,Turabiseeks to dispose of the axiomatic correlationof sunna and shari'a so that ijma' can be reinscribedas the collective process of reading instead of the productof reading(p 115). It is based on the freedom of individualsto submit to the divine law in light of objective possibilities (pragmatism?) 111). In other words, (p him, attemptsto think of Islam as an epistemology and to Turabi,as Judy understands understand as a logic of culture in which everythingis a sign to be properlyread. He it seeks to develop a metahistoricalnarrative,while linking Islam epistemologically to modernity.Consequently,all historical phenomena,including sharia"s marginalisation by the colonial and postcolonial Muslim state, can be read as signs of Islam's development (p 116). What colonialism and modernityhave emphaticallydemonstrated is that sharia is an historical constructthat has reached its limits, and the result is not the projected individual of civilisation. The alternative is an Islamic discourse of individualrights based on sunna that, while adheringto the foundationalbeliefs of Islam (ontology?), is sweeping enough to accommodatenon-Muslimsas well (p 111). As such, civil society becomes a categorical necessity, as the sphere of difference in which heterogeneoussystems of identity interact.In this respect, the function of an 'Islamic' government is limited and not total (p 117). Civil society is no longer identified with cultureor civilisation, but as the possibility of exchange itself. This exchange designates civilisation as the 'agency of value', enabling one to distinguish values and to observe them in everyday conduct (p 110). In Turbi's view, it is both local and global. The former relates to the civilisational question regarding the nature of the freedom of non-Muslimswithin the Islamist sphere.The latterpertainsto the condition of mediation by economic interests and to how Muslims can participatein transnationalcapital as Muslims. According to this understanding, capitalism is included in the modern understanding of Islam. Hence, Judy concludes that Islamism is no threatto the New World Order (NWO) 118). (p Part two of the book proceeds to examine case studies. In 'State, civil society and the question of radical fundamentalismin Algeria' (article 5), Yahia Zoubir attributesthe currentviolent condition of that country to the failure of state institutions credibly to replace civil groups functionally and theoretically. The result has been a serious disruptionbetween the state and civil society. The early period of post-independence euphoriaand hope, togetherwith the ability of the revolutionaryleadershipof President Houari Boumedienneto mobilise the people arounda strategyof development that was essentially egalitarianand had relatively low levels of corruptionand clientelism, had served to transcendthis problem.Chadli Benjedid,his successor, lacked any such vision, and corruption and patronage during his period and beyond reached unprecedented levels. This, together with the fact that the successive regimes had always sought to legitimise themselves through Islamic credentials bolstered Islamic opposition to a system which, by the time of the 1988 riots, had lost all measure of legitimacy. Zoubirdetails the history and developmentof Islamic movementsthroughthe thought and activities of figures such as Malek Bennabi, Abbasi Madani, Ali Benhadj and MahfoudhNahnah.In the intellectual backgroundof course are influentialfigures such 894

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as Hasan al-Banna, Sayid Qutb, Muhammadal-Ghazali and al-Mawdudi.According to Zoubir,there were many reasons for the rise and radicalisationof political Islam and the with the world' fragmentation the Algerian state. They ranged from 'disenchantment of and anarchic modernity,to the failure of social, economic and cultural modernisation, identity crisis, the defeat of Arab nationalism versus Israel, and the Iranian Islamic revolution (pp 131-133). He concludes that democratisationhas failed because it was initiatedin an undemocraticfashion and because of the absence of a democraticculture or the at all levels. Furthermore, transitionwas not of the protracted negotiatedtype: the within a set framework.In short, 'the state did not seek to integratethe 'fundamentalists' terrorthat has pervadedAlgerian society, the incredibleintoleranceof the 'fundamentalists,' the harsh state repressionand the intolerablesocio-economic conditions', have all converged to render the development of democracy or an autonomous civil society unviable (pp 157-158). Zoubir suggests that the concept of civil society should be restrictedto the emergence of a consensus on norms defining a 'civil sphere' where, similar to what Turabihad suggested, the activity of 'exchange' could exist, ratherthan concentratingsolely on its political and/or ideological aspects (pp 153-154). This is the best that one can hope for given Algeria's conditions and stalemate. In contrastto the Algerian case, Jordanpresents a relatively 'successful' experience. In 'Islamists under liberalization in Jordan' (article 6), Glenn Robinson examines the performanceof the Muslim Brotherhoodand its Islamic Action Front, both having been placed within what Zoubir had called 'a set framework'. The main question that he addresses is whether an Islamist movement, usually considered as the greatest threatto democraticvalues, can in fact be a force for democratisation.The JordanianIslamists, accordingto Robinson, have been respectfulof the 'democratic'process and the existing regime. The King was viewed as 'above all differences and disputes', and any criticism of him constituted 'a red line'. This reflectedthe long history of close relations with the Hashemite monarchyand the movement's privileged position in society (pp 181-182). Despite the fact that some real problems and tensions have emerged between the two, as a result of the regime's rapprochmentwith Israel, 'fundamentalists' continue to oppose Jordanianpolicies from within the system. The monarchic regime has largely been able to co-opt the Islamic movement. However, Robinson points to factors which could serve to radicaliseJordan'sIslamic movement and to the worsening of mutualrelations: 1) the decline of a common enemy as had been personified in the figure of President Nasser of Egypt and the Arab nationalist tide; 2) the nature of the democratisationprocess itself, which allowed for new and less controlledmedia and institutionalplatformsfrom which to voice opposing opinions, particularlywith respect to the Jordanianpolicy towards Israel; the very process made political control more difficult for the regime; and 3) the changing demographicsupportof the Islamist movement. Increasingly,it has become Palestinianbased, appealling more to the younger, poorer population (pp 185-186). Should a radicalisationoccur, according to Robinson, this will have serious consequences for the Jordanianmonarchy and the liberalisationof the political process. Much of what may or may not happen in Jordan is perceived to be strongly intertwinedwith developments in the occupied Palestinian territories.In his 'Islamism and civil society in the Gaza Strip' (article7), Michael I Jensen traces the modernhistory of the major Islamic social institutions in that area, and investigates a specific item on the agenda of Islamists, namely an Islamic sports club. He tries to show that these institutions are an integral part of Palestinian civil society and constitute a buffer between the state and the citizen (pp 197-198). Such institutions are considered by Jensen to be a double-edgedsword. They do provide services which Arafat's Palestinian Authority(PA) would like to see rendered,yet they may gain significant ground among 895

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the populace so as ultimatelyto delegitimise the PA. Moreover,despite the fact that there are currently no clear indications of radicalisation, the young members of these institutionscould eventuallybe mobilised for political purposes(p 216). Like Robinson, Jensen seems to be well aware of the inherentmobilising and radicalisingpotential of Islam and Islamic movements. Articles 8 and 9 deal with the Islamist movement in Lebanon. In 'The development programmes of Islamic fundamentalistgroups in Lebanon as a source of popular legitimation' by Hilal Khashanand 'The futureof Islamic movement in Lebanon' by A Nizar Hamzeh,both authorsanalyse the reasonsbehindthe increasingpopularityof these groups. In an empiricalstudy, Khashanobserves that 'there is little evidence to support the surge of militantIslam in terms of organic attachmentbetween religious belief and political action' (p 223). Rather, his main hypothesis is that the provision of public services plays a decisive role in the extension of political legitimacy by the beneficiaries to the agency providing the service. Lebanese Muslims thus perceive 'fundamentalists' as more legitimate than the national government (pp 221, 223). Khashan further discusses the ideological affinities of two major 'fundamentalist' groups in Lebanon,the Sunni al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and the Shi'ite Hizbullah. He finds that, while the percentageof Sunnis who support 'fundamentalist'groups is higher, the Shi'ites show more ideological commitment(p 241). Khashanexplains this in terms of the emergence of Shi'ite groups as protest movements, as opposed to Sunnis who essentially wish to restore the Islamic caliphate. Shi'ite groups in other words have greater sociopolitical impact. And whereas they have so far vented their 'militaryanger' at Israeli occupation, should the conflict be resolved Islamists' potentialfor insurgencymight shift to the arena of local politics (p 245). Hamzeh concurs with the main thrust of Khashan's argument. He agrees that socioeconomic factors,relatedto the failureof the state in providingservices, to political instabilityand bureaucratic corruptionare the main causes of such a condition. Hamzeh adds, however, Lebanon'srelationswith Syria and Iran, and the Arab-Israeliconflict as determiningfactors in the futuredevelopmentof the Movement in that country.He does not preclude the possibility of a clash with Syria should a peace agreementbe reached and radicalismneed to be contained. The latter, however, depends largely on regional developments. A post-Asad Islamist takeover in Syria, for instance, would heavily influence Lebanese Islamic groups. So would the shifting currentsin Iranianpolitics, depending on whether 'radicals' or 'moderates' have the upper hand (apparently this article was written during Rafsanjani's incumbency and before Khatami's presidency). In the final analysis Hamzeh agrees with Khashan that, unless the Lebanese government is able to provide the services which the Islamist groups are in fact delivering, it will have to deal with radicalism long after any peace agreements have been signed (p 266). Within the same frameworkof socioeconomic analysis Michel Nehme's (article 10) 'The Islamic-capitalist state of Saudi Arabia: surfacing of fundamentalism'looks at pertinentdevelopments in that country. The article analyses the position of the Saudi state with respect to two main contendingforces in society: the religious 'fundamentalists' who insist on the strict applicationof the shari'a, and the Westemised liberals who are materialisticin outlook and who are entrenchedin the capitalist mode of economic behaviour.While the former demand continuity, the latter call for change. In between, the state treads a precariouspath in its attemptto balance the foundationsof Wahhabi ideology with the necessities of modernisation.Although no imminent takeover threat faces the royal family, there are higher expectationsamong various religious factions of in increasedparticipation the decision-makingprocess, particularly after the second Gulf war and the exposed vulnerabilities of the Saudi state (pp 285-286). Nevertheless, 896

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despite the establishmentof the ConsultativeCouncil and its associated Basic System of Rule in 1992 as modem trappings,the power of the king remains absolute. The political, economic and social implications of modernisation are becoming increasingly difficult and complex for the Saudi dynasty to cope with, however. 'Fundamentalist' demands have come to pose serious threats to the development strategies of the state. The monarchyis seen to have failed to live up to the principles it supposedly espoused, particularlyin terms of its relations with the USA, and by association Israel, and of the introductionof Western values into the Saudi economic sector. The capitalist mode of productionand the disruptionit caused to tribal ties has alienated many. A strong sense of insecurityamong the Saudis coupled with alienation has served to strengthenreligious symbolism and affiliations, a condition which could potentiallytranslateinto Islamic revolutionary activities.The most serious incidentof the kind occurredin 1979, when a group of militants led by Juhaimanal-Utaibi seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca and demanded withdrawalof allegiance to the royal family because of its corruptionand deviation from the path of Islam (pp 281-282). This was perhapsa harbingerof the crisis that the Saudi dynasty is likely to face in the future:the contradictionbetween sources of religious legitimacy and the requirementsof capitalist modeemisation. Finally, the Egyptian case is dealt with. In 'Causes for fundamentalistpopularity in Egypt', Mirna Hammoud traces the factors which have contributed to the rise and increased momentum of Islamist activism. As in preceding articles the explanation is found mainly in socioeconomic factors in additionto confessional, religious and political considerations.Hammoud identifies four main causes: 1) the economic retreat of the to state, which allowed fundamentalists proliferateand affirmtheir existence at the social level; 2) the Coptic issue as it relates to copts' increased assertiveness, militancy, and new alliances with secular Egyptian political forces; 3) the rhetorical power of the Islamic fundamentalistdiscourse, which is directed at an increasingly delegitimised secularstate, and which expresses concern for the socioeconomic burdensof society; and 4) the repressive nature of the Egyptian political system, which served to radicalise opposition (pp 304ff). As is the case in Saudi Arabia nevertheless, the state is not perceived to be in immediatejeopardy thanks to the coercive powers at its disposal, its adoption of a policy of patronageand co-optation, which guaranteesthe loyalty of the army and police, and its manipulationand exploitation of divisions within the Islamic movement itself (pp 332-333). Much of what is being written about political Islam (fundamentalism)as a relatively new recurrencein the sociopolitical landscapeof the Muslim World continues to reflect the alien parametersof an iron clad frameworkof analysis embedded in Western social theory. Even supposedly sympatheticand/or apologetic representationsof the phenomenon, unless distinctly aware of the risks of being subject to such constraints and purposelyand methodically willing to breakout of their confines, can only obey its iron law of discursive imperatives. The result is an Islamic contemporaryexperience that ratherthan 'self'-represented.Inevitably,the outcome continuesto be 'other'-represented is a degree and level of comprehensiondelineated and delimited by reductive, non-Islamic and biased, if not prejudiced and stereotypical,judgments. Defence or apologia simply end up as an exhausting exercise in theoreticalfutility. Both Davidson and Moussalli's efforts at describing the Islamist phenomenon in an historical fashion (Davidson) and at analysing it sociologically in accordance with social theory's investigative tools (Moussalli) unfortunatelyrun into this same brick wall. Much of the reason for this has to do with their theoretical vantage point. The foreword to Davidson's book for instance clearly indicates that it is written not only in full deference to an American readership,but even more so in full respect for US 897

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interests and experiences, and through their lens and understandingof events in the twentieth century-'the American Century' (p xi). While Moussalli's edited book does not make such a bold admission, it is fairly clear neverthelesswhich audience the different authors in his work are attending to. Such explicit or implicit frames of reference underscorethe fact that what follows can only be set within the conceptual limits of the other ratherthan the full horizons of the self. Whereasthe formerprovides an argument for intelligibility, the absence of the latter mis/disinforms. Intentionally or otherwise, Western values have been considered from the outset as necessary, while those of Islam as contingent; this is a premise that can only determine the outcome. This projection of a secular understandingsuperimposes an alien framework of universal reference on Islam, which is unrelated to Islam's concerns. In very broad terms, any regime that seeks to apply the shari'a is designated by both books as 'fundamentalist'.Nowhere is the label precisely defined. Nor is it clear why these regimes or groups are simply not called Islamic. If a politicised Islam needs to be qualified by a label, this implies that politics is an intrusion into Islam ratherthan an inherentand organic componentof it. The implicationis that religion should or could be separatedfrom politics. From the start, an ideological statement is made. However, if Islam is din wa dunya, as the deconflationistsagree, by extension this begs the question: is there a dunya without politics, and politics without a state, the state being the leading manifestationof politics (din wa dawla)? If the answer is in the negative, there can be no separation of religion and politics. If in the affirmative then Islam is merely an ethico-moral system where the nature of the Prophetic mission would be no different from that of Nazarene Jesus. Until such controversiesare resolved there is no point in conceiving of conflationist/ deconflationisthermeneuticbifurcations,as Salvatorehas done. The dichotomousdevising of the question as to whether Islam is either din wa dunya or din wa dawla is questionableto say the least. If Islam in its unity is din (stem) wa dunya (branch) wa dawla (sub-branch),the matter is no longer of one or the other, but a relationship between components of a unity. The issue formulation should thus be one which investigatesthe natureof the symbioticconnectionbetween an independentcontent (din), an intervening context (dunya) and a dependent form (dawla). The absence of this frameworkis perhaps one reason why Salvatore has observed inconsistencies in both hermeneutic positions. They emanate from his own analytical investigation, which underminesthe comprehensive view that an Islamic frameworkof universal reference would have provided. Such methodological limitations extend to attemptsat theoreticalgeneralisations.At one level, it is justifiable to relate the Islamic condition to the imperativesof contexts and the global scene, as Wolff has attempted to do. Yet this risks contradicting Salvatore's sound observationthat Islamic categories are not reducible to their Western counterparts. Perceiving Islamic 'fundamentalism' a reactive social movement whose as manifestationsand characteristicsare common to all religions, while partially true, is reductively so. It 'sociologises' a religio-political phenomenon at the expense of its religious dimension and its Islamic specificities. All religious movements according to this frameworkof reference are the same in terms of the functions they perform,while the dimension of 'Truth' is totally ignored as falling outside its purview. This risks the perpetrating same omissions that the sociology of religion and its 'structural-functional' derivatives have committed. This is not to minimise the importance and significance of such an approach,nor is it a justification for observing Islamic activism from a purely religious vantagepoint, ignoringcontext and contingencies.After all, both propositions are partial:the former is concrete and reified, the latter is normativeand 898

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abstract. Rather it is to emphasise that an Islamic framework of universal reference requiresthatboth be componentsof a unity. The alternativeis reductiveand problematic. This alternativecolours Judy's understanding Turabi's thought and action. In the of vein of non-foundational social theory, he presentsboth as deconstructivereinscriptions which favour epistemology over ontology. In so doing, Judy hopes to situate Islam in an 'intelligible' framework of reference from which he can make a claim for harmony between Islam and the NWO.Yet to what extent is it legitimate to think of Islam in purely epistemological terms separate from ontology? An essentially foundational system of values can not disengage both components. Otherwise, pure epistemology could very easily unleash a centrifugaldynamic that would undermineits own base. It is unlikely that Turabi is unaware of this. His concern with Islamising Africa, with its myriad of religions and tribes, however, required him to reactivate the epistemological branch. Turabi'sepistemology in effect becomes the very process of making Islam an individual choice, ultimately in the service of its ontology (together they constitute the Islamic frame of reference).The purposeis to introducean element of dynamism and flexibility which a mere ontological systemic approachcould not provide on its own. It is not clear to what extent Judy has been successful in readingTurabi,nor does Judy's presentation would be willing to accept the spread of Islam in explain why proponentsof the NWO Africa. After all, if there are imperialdesigns regardingthat continentincorporated the in very natureof the NWO, Islam would present a serious obstacle. Claims about common or overlappingvalues become irrelevantas far as the bitter reality is concerned. Unless of course one is to make the naive assumptionthat this orderis based solely on altruistic humanistic considerationsinstead of selfish interests. Judy's article actually serves the opposite of its declared purpose. These limitations in the theoreticalsection of Moussalli's book cast their shadow on the second part.As would be expected, the emphasis is on how to bring democracy and civil society to the Arab world. Standardsof failure and success are then determinedon there terms. While space does not allow for a detailed critique of those two concepts, it remains unclear as to what their actual and real impact on Arab Muslim societies may be. The same input in a different context or environmentdoes not necessarily produce the same output.If this premise stands the testing then the crucial point is to search for justifications of the universal adoption of Western values. For instance, the same modernity which has brought 'progress' to the West is the same modernity which broughtcalamitous effects on Muslim societies. It is also possible to establish a strong link between liberaldemocracyand the technological society. This society has succeeded in controlling the human mind and perceptions,and in all but eliminating privacy (see The Economist, 1-7 May 1999, pp 19-23 heraldingthe end of privacy and celebrating the rise of the surveillance society). Essentially, even if at an advanced stage, liberal democracyhas collapsed into the most efficient and insidious totalitarian system in world history. The question then is why should such a system, which eliminates the space between the public and private spheres, become a 'Muslim' choice? Of course, it could be countered that by democracy is meant popular participation, tolerance and respect for pluralism and opposing opinions. Guilefully, democracy attempts to monopolise certain basic values, such as freedom among others, while divesting the Islamic matrix from such virtues. After all, if democracy is freedom then what is Islam? As a defining principle democracy does not stand on its own as an independentconstruct. Nor is it accurate to reduce it simply to a voting mechanism; voting in itself does not make a democracy,even if it is an integralpartof it. Democracy is a conceptual productof a secular Weltanschauung.To put it forwardas a competing vision in Muslim societies is inevitably to argue for their subservience to the discursive and epistemological foundationsof the Western world-view which underlies this struc899

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tural concept. Whichever way it is presented,Muslim societies may very well end up under different and embracingincapacitatingsystems of dominationand totalitarianism seemingly benign yet deceitful labels. Robinson's article is indicativein this repect.His approachis visibly influencedby his backgroundas an assistantprofessor in the Departmentof National Security Affairs at the Naval PostgraduateSchool in California.The article is in effect an exercise, made in the name of the Hashemite regime, in how to utilise democracy to co-opt Islamic movements. Robinson categorises them into cultural Islamists and political Islamists (Moussalli p 189). The former are pro-Hashemite and moderate, implicitly to be encouraged,the latter more radicaland hostile to any relations with Israel, implicitly to be discouraged. He also highlights contentions and breaches among Islamic groups, useful for a divide and conquerpolicy (pp 179-182). Reading his articleone can not help but wonder whether he is trying to make a case for the compatibility of Islam with democracy, or whether to provide a blueprintfor the creation of Islamic movements which are nothingmore thanmirror-images the client regimes they presentthemselves of as an alternative to, buttressed by a facade of Islamic legitimacy. One need not be connection between Robinson's American excessively cynical to make a circumstantial national security (democratic!)approachand the above categorisations. The same could very well apply to the notion of civil society. Both Khashan and Hamzeh agree that Islamist groups in Lebanon enjoy more legitimacy than the state (pp 221, 249-250). Writ large, the same applies to other Arab regimes which have resortedto besieging Islam in its own abode. The question then is what are the prospects of success and stability for a civil society based on and rooted in religious culture, and to which the state is hostile, with tacit and not so tacit external support,in the absence of a decisive resolution of the power and legitimacy crises? Can there be a viable civil society within a weak, deconstructed yet coercively antagonistic state? These are particularlypertinentquestions under currentcircumstancesin which decision-making centres in most Arab countries are externally penetrated and infiltratedto the very detriment of the aspired for autonomous society. For, if an Islamic society seeks to reclaim its country's and society's independenceand political will, the essential components of legitimacy, would this not set it in opposition to state policies and external regimes of domination?Could an autonomousIslamic society exist in a condition of peace and co-operation with the Jewish entity? If not, what are the implications, and what kind of a civil society may actually be envisioned by the 'state' and other regional and international actors (eg the USA)? Very likely it will be an 'exclusivist' civil society, intolerant of Islamist currents, unless divested of their essential qualities. Espousing values such as democracy and civil society thus requires in-depth understandingand meticulous excavation before arrivingat hasty conclusions. Together with their underlying methodological framework, they must be deconstructedin order to expose their so conflicting logics of sense and implication,Particularly when, in many cases, they do not say what they mean nor mean what they say. Davidson's historical exposition provides an illustrativeexample of such potentially conflictive logics. He sets both Iranand Saudi Arabiain a common Islamic 'fundamentalist' framework. In many ways, this is problematic and confusing. Structurally speaking, Saudi Arabia is a feudal dynastic and absolute monarchy,ruling by the right of conquest, as Nehme has rightlyobserved(Moussalli, pp 278, 286, 287). It bears much of the characteristics of the historical Umayyad dynasty (680-750 AD). It is no coincidence that the latter and its founding ruling figures continue to occupy a seminal position in Wahhabism. Ibn Taymiyya (13th century AD), its proclaimed spiritual father, was a staunch supporterof the Umayyads, at times even against the house of the Prophet (Al al-Bayt). The Umayyad dynasty was considered to be the 900

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the 'Sunni' statepar excellence. Yet it was never seen as 'fundamentalist'. Furthermore, Umayyad state is acknowledgedin significantlylarge and influentialMuslim quartersto have broughtabout the historical shift, away from Islamic governance (Khilafa), to the corruptedform of hereditarykingship (al-mulkal-Adud), it was Muslim but not Islamic in both religious understandingand contemporarydistinguishing terms. (Interestingly, Davidson makes an analogy between the Saudi monarchyand the Abbasids ratherthan the closer analogy with the Umayyads (p 53). Was he trying to hide something?) If the Saudi-Umayyad analogy stands, one may conclude that Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding its extensive ritualistic trappings,is neither 'fundamentalist'nor Islamic, both structurally and in the basic thrust of its policies and attitudes (process). This anachronismis then equated with the IranianIslamic regime, a regime based on the principal structuralcomponents of allegiance (baya'a/stem= Welayat al-faqih) and = choice (ikhtiar/branch president), and whose general religion-politicalthrust is legitimate in terms of its independence, dynamism, credible respect and preservation of Islamic dignity and values internally and vis a vis the external world, etc. If this assessment stands, why is Iran designated as 'fundamentalist'and not just as Islamic? What purpose does a 'fundamentalist' qualification serve? More importantly, what justification is there in the first place for including both regimes in a common setting? This raises serious questions about the viability of Davidson's framework,and a good measureof scepticism and cynicism. By attributing Islamic characterto both regimes, an one of which is not Islamic, and a 'fundamentalist'label to both when neither is, one can imagine the amount and extent of confusion that such a frameworkof conflicting logics may generate. For the ill-intentioned,and no insinuationis meant here regarding Davidson, this would provide a golden opportunityfor what may be termed intellectual strategic deception. The whole idea behind such deception is to dissimulate and get the opposite side to confuse his/herpurposeand/ordo what one wants, consciously, or better yet, unconsciously. In other words, essentially it is to get an opponent to lose his/her sense of conception. This would serve two main purposes. First, by subtly and deceptively equating an Islamic regime with a non-Islamic one it creates confusionthrowingthe needle into the haystackso to speak. Second, it liberatesUS policy towards Islam, separating religious from political targeting theoretically, while targeting both practically. Consequently,it allows Davidson to make the claim that US hostility to one 'variant' of Islamic interpretation not to be perceived as targeting Islam but only policy and is behaviour, or merely an 'interpretation.'US-Saudi 'friendly' relations are then introduced as an alibi and a confirmation(Davidson, pp xiii-xiv). The question then is what happens when legitimate Islamic behaviour is disapproved of by the USA? What if Iran's behaviouris Islamically legitimate versus an imperiallyperceived power whereas thatof Saudi Arabiais not? Since the book is writtenin deferenceto an Americanpublic, such questions are not raised. While this may be too much to ask from an introductory book, mainly designed for college students,the problemsassociatedwith such shortcomings are serious in terms of their political and intellectual implications.The methods of delicate matterinasmuchas they heavily efforts is a particularly interjectingintroductory influence and shape long-lasting first impressions among young Westerners. Concomitantly,Muslim intellectuals should refrain from making the claim that, as long as the shari'a is implemented,an Islamic regime could take any form. While there is room for differentiation,this is very differentfrom open-endedstatementsof the kind. The actual and sincere applicationof the shari'a would, as a matterof fact, prohibitthis. Moreover, notwithstanding variations, there must be some predominantly common features and idiosyncrasies so that a regime may be defined as Islamic, or more importantly as non-Islamic, even if it purports to apply the shari'a. This is a most 901

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importantintellectualchallenge which demandsthe setting of parameters constraints and on the instrumentalmanipulationof religion. Precise standardsof religio-intellectual falsification and affirmationare required in order to avoid capricious and uninformed judgements. After all, does not Saudi Arabia 'apply' the shari'a. Would not this therefore justify a monarchic hereditary system? From where they do not know, Islamists, including prominantfigures such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyed Qutb, have provided the intellectualcover for the above and similar frameworks. The natureand authenticityof an Islamic regime is both a structuraland processual matter which requires intellectual alertness and accuracy. There is no room for complacency or mere abstractions.The problem with the 'fundamentalism'title of both books is thus not simply related to the fact that it has been originally used to describe a Christianoutlook or that it relates to those Muslims who see themselves as adhering to the ultimate fundamentalsof Islam (Davidson, pp 16-17). Nor is it a result of the difficulty in finding a more accurate and defining term (Moussali, pp 3-4). The real problem has to do with the purposes it can be made to serve or actually is used for. In many cases it providesa justificationfor anti-Islamicpolicies, methods,frameworksand stances. It conceals much more than it depicts, or rather, in depicting it conceals. Irrespectiveof intentions,the 'fundamentalist'label remains an ideological instrument. The sooner it is exposed as such, the more likely can it be disposed of!

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