Asian Philosophy Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2005, pp.

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Is Svasamvitti Transcendental? E A Tentative Reconstruction  Following Santaraksita E

Dan Arnold

Introduction1 There has emerged in recent years the recognition that the characteristically Buddhist doctrine of svasamvitti2 (apperception, as I will render it for reasons to become E clear presently) was variously understood and developed in the Indian Buddhist tradition. Thus, in his illuminating study particularly of some Tibetan debates regarding this doctrine, Paul Williams identifies two principal understandings of svasamvitti that grow out of the Indian scholastic tradition. For some thinkers, E it seems to denote a special kind of (intentional) cognitionthat kind, specifically, whose object is other cognitions. When this claim is combined with the claim that all cognitions must, in order to count as cognitions, be the objects of svasamvitti E thus understood, the doctrine is clearly vulnerable to the charge of infinite regressthat is (we will see), vulnerable to precisely the kind of critique against svasamvitti characteristically developed by the M dhyamika thinkers Candrakrti and a i E  Santideva.3 But svasamvitti was taken by other thinkers to denote whatever it isand I will E suggest, as a plausible candidate, intentionalitythat is constitutive of subjectivity. In that case, to say of any cognition that it must involve svasamvitti is just to say that it E exemplifies the feature in virtue of which sentient4 beings are to be distinguished as such, apart from things like rocks. As Williams notes, this understanding of  svasamvitti seems particularly to be the innovation of Santaraksita.5 Recognizing this, E E Williams is in a position to argue that the Tibetan thinker Miphamwho understood the characteristically M dhyamika critiques of svasamvitti as undera E mining only the claim that this is an ultimately existent phenomenon (while allowing it to stand as conventionally real)advanced the interpretation he did largely owing

Correspondence to: Dan Arnold, University of Chicago Divinity School, 1025 E. 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA. Email: d-arnold@uchicago.edu.
ISSN 0955-2367 print/ISSN 1469-2961 online/05/010077-111 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0955236052000341050

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 to his having presupposed the doctrine of Santaraksita; for as we will see, critiques E such as that developed by Candrakrti do not have any purchase against svasamvitti to i E the extent that it is thus understood. What I would like to suggest is that on the view that can be developed following  Santaraksita, svasamvitti is usefully understood as something very much like Kants E E  transcendental unity of apperception. Understanding the idea that Santaraksita E identifies as a specifically transcendental one can help more precisely to distinguish his formulation from that of Dign ga (to whom the doctrine of svasamvitti can be a E antaraksitas view can also (more importantly) give us traced). Thus reconstructing S  E the conceptual tools to appreciate why the critique of svasamvitti advanced by E Candrakrti does notindeed, cannotcoherently be thought to undermine i   Santaraksitas version.6 So characterizing Santaraksitas innovation also has the E E advantage that it can help us appreciate the extent to which Indian debates concerning svasamvitti quite closely parallel similar discussions in post-Kantian E philosophy; for Kants own statements of his doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception were susceptible of comparably divergent interpretationsa further indication that we are on something like the same conceptual ground here. Accordingly, I will begin to develop this proposal by first considering the various ways in which Kant expressed his understanding of the transcendental unity of apperception, and by indicating the two chiefly divergent understandings of it that emerged in the course of subsequent philosophical discussion. I will then sketch Dign gas initial statement and defense of the doctrine of svasamvitti, identifying a E some ways in which that maps onto one of the attested interpretations of Kant. We will then consider the critique of Dign ga developed by Candrakrti, noting where a i this critique may hit its target.  I will then introduce Santaraksitas statement of the doctrine. Given the brevity of E antaraksitas expressions on the matter (regarding which he does not advance an S E argument so much as he stipulates a definition), it will be useful to develop this statement with reference to philosophical developments of Dign gas trajectory of a thought particularly in the hands of Dharmottaraand with reference, as well, to the   later figure of Moksakaragupta, who interestingly combines Santaraksita and E E Dharmottara at the point where he adduces the formers doctrine of svasamvitti as E authoritative. This trajectory of thought will, further, be reconstructed with reference to the other principal interpretation of Kants doctrinethe more properly transcendental one. We will see, in concluding, that Candrakrtis arguments fail to undermine the i  understanding of svasamvitti that can be developed following Santaraksitawith the E E antaraksitas view now expressed as a function of its being a invulnerability of S  E basically transcendental idea. More precisely, while Candrakrtis critique targets the i view on which svasamvitti is considered a particular kind of intentional cognition E  (considered, that is, to display intentionality), Santaraksitas is more like the view that E svasamvitti is itself intentionality. Among other things, this difference has farE reaching implications with respect to conceptions of truth and objectivity; for it is precisely to the extent that thinkers like Dign ga take svasamvitti as an example of a E

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perception (and indeed, as the uniquely indubitable kind) that they cannot finally take it as capable of being involved with what Kant considered to be objective  judgments. On Santaraksitas understanding, in contrast, the way is (at least in E principle) open to entertaining something other than subjective occurrences as the  locus of truththough whether that is how Santaraksita deployed the idea is another E question. Kants Transcendental Unity of Apperception Kants notion of the transcendental unity of apperceptionor, as he also referred to this idea, pure apperception, original apperception, and the synthetic original unity of apperceptionis foundational for the entire Kantian edifice.7 This idea is pivotal for Kants Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding; for it is the basis for the claim that all experience is demonstrably structured in terms of the basic categories that Kant enumerates. It is, indeed, the transcendental unity of apperception from which these categories are deduced. These categories, in turn, represent the basis of Kants entire claim to have developed a philosophical project that can be taken to concern the objective validity of knowledge. Thus, while Kants Copernican Revolution famously turned attention away from objects in the world (things-in-themselves) and towards the knowing subjectby emphasizing that we could never have immediate cognitive acquaintance with things-in-themselves, but only with things-as-they-appear-to-usit was because Kant thought he could show that how things appear to us is necessarily structured in certain ways that he nevertheless claimed to trade in objectively valid judgments. All of this is because the categories could, Kant argued, be derived from one irreducibly primitive fact: that having any experience at all necessarily presupposes the imposition of some perspectival unity on the relatively discrete data of perception or (Kants term) intuitionsubjectivity must, that is, consist in the ordering or synthesis of the various causally efficacious impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities, in John McDowells phrase (1996, p. xv). Kants table of categories then represents simply the various ways in which this basic fact can be expressed. This is why Kant could say that the transcendental unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself (1965, B134, note). Clearly stating the role this plays in the grounding of objectively valid judgments, Kant emphasized that [o]nly the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, upon which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity (B140). While it is thus pivotal for his project, though, Kant had a hard time expressing clearly just what the transcendental unity of apperception isa fact reflected not only in the variety of terms he uses for it, but in his having developed the idea rather

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differently in the second edition of the first Critique. This is, indeed, among the points regarding which the two editions of the Critique most significantly differ. In the first edition, Kant develops the point in ways, I think, that clearly respond to Humes account of personal identity. Hume had famously argued that there was nothing more to a person than a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. For Hume, our misleading convictions regarding the continuity and unity of such events were a function only of recognition or memoryof those causally produced states, that is, whose phenomenological content in some way resembled that of other such states:
For as such a succession answers evidently to our notion of diversity, it can only be by mistake we ascribe to it an identity; and as the relation of parts, which leads us into this mistake, is really nothing but a quality, which produces an association of ideas, and an easy transition of the imagination from one to another, it can only be from the resemblance, which this act of the mind bears to that, by which we contemplate one continud object, that the error arises.8

Kant rejoins by elaborating a compelling question: how could we even recognize two moments as similar without already presupposing the very continuity putatively explained by this recognition? Thus,
If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. The manifold of the representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it. (1965, A103)

Kants strategy here displays the constitutively transcendental logic that is his preoccupation throughout. That is, he can thus argue that Humes own account (his own denial of a point like Kants) necessarily presupposes Kants point. There must be something, Kant says, which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible . . . . For experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances (A100101). But Kant states his point in ways that clearly invite various readings. Thus, for example,
This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible experiences, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. (A108)

This way of putting the point raises the question: just what sort of thing is it that is thus the locus (the agent) of such apparent actions as synthetically combining, becoming conscious, and forming of experiences? The problem, then, is that this way of expressing the matter seems to imply an empirical locus of these actions, something for which criteria of identity could be

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adducedwhich is to say, the problem is how this putatively transcendental condition relates to (or whether indeed it must in some sense be) the empirical self.9 In this regard, Strawson helpfully characterizes most likely objections to Kants point as thus turning on the point that the ascription of states to a subject require[s] the subject itself to be an intuitable object for which there exist empirically applicable criteria of identity (Strawson, 1966, p. 107). It is, I think, something like this problem that Kant has in mind in restating the argument in the second edition of the Critique, where the emphasis is rather more on a strictly logical condition of the possibility of experience. Thus:
It must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition.10 All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility.11 I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation I think . . . cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. (B131132)

Despite this emphasis simply on its necessarily being possible that all experiences (if they are to count as such) be expressed as the object of some subjects judgment, Kants restatement of the doctrine retains expressions that invite questions about criteria of identityas, for example, when he says that the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness (B132). The subsequent course particularly of German philosophy can arguably be understood in terms of the divergent interpretations of which Kants statements here will admit. This is nicely brought out by Robert Pippin, who argues that the ` philosophical project of Hegel is usefully understood as framed vis-a-vis Kants transcendental unity of apperception (and this despite the relative paucity of clear discussions of Kant in Hegels corpus). Contextualizing this project, Pippin distinguishes what he calls the logical condition reading of Kants point from a much different, Cartesian reading. On the former, Kant is clearly referring to apperception as a logical condition, that it must be logically possible for me to ascribe my representations to myself . . . (Pippin, 1989, p. 20). On the latter reading, in contrast, all consciousness, including what Kant is calling experience, is a species of self-consciousness, representing objects is at the same time attending to the minds activities and objects (ibid.). As we will see, the latter claim might just as well express the view of svasamvitti E advanced by Dign ga. We can anticipate this point by noting that at least some a developments of this reading of Kant turn out to be vulnerable to the same kind of  a critique that the M dhyamikas Candrakrti and Santideva will direct at Dign ga and a i his successors. Thus, for example, some of Fichtes formulations of the Kantian

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doctrine seem to take that as claiming that all episodes of intentional consciousness are necessarily accompanied by an additional intentional consciousness. In these formulations, the claim seems to be (in Pippins words) that in thinking a thought, two mental events occur, or two two-place relations, between my thinking and its thought, and between me and my thinking a thought. But if that is the right reading, then this doctrine is clearly vulnerable to what Pippin calls the iteration problem:
If consciousness and self-consciousness are treated as separate aspects of any consciousness, then the arguments that showed why consciousness of X must be accompanied by consciousness of consciousness of X would all apply to the latter too, since self-consciousness, at least as suggested by this version of Fichte, would also be an instance of consciousness and so subject to its conditions. (Pippin, 1989, pp. 4647)

That is, if it is thought that any act of consciousness must, in order to count as such, be accompanied by a further act of consciousness, then the latteragain, if it is to count as suchmust in turn be accompanied by a yet further act. We will see that this could serve just as well as a concise statement of the characteristically M dhyamika argument against Dign gas idea of svasamvitti. a a E But Kant seems to have had it in mind to head off precisely this sort of regress; as (we saw) he says, his point in distinguishing transcendental from empirical apperception was to emphasize that the former is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation I think . . . cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. More compellingly, if Kants doctrine is interpreted in the way that Pippin finds reflected in Fichte, then we undermine our ability to distinguish, in the way that Kant very clearly wanted to, Kants point from the Cartesian appeal to the I think. Indeed, the distinctiveness of Kants constitutively transcendental approach is perhaps most evident in his critique of Descartes, whose famous argument Kant adduced as a paradigm case of a Paralogismthat is, an argument that trades on an equivocation concerning the key term.12 It is, then, precisely against Descartes that Kant urged: In the synthetic original unity of apperception I am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition.13 In such passages, Kant emphasizes not only that he does not mean (as Descartes arguably did) to adduce a putatively foundational sort of epistemic certainty,14 but also (and therefore) that we cannot draw any inferences from this fact about, say, the empirical existence of a soul; rather, as transcendental, Kants is the strictly formal point that a condition of the possibility of our having any experience at all is that our experiences (sensations, memories, fantasies) are unfailingly experienced from some perspective, and that they be expressible as judgments. We can develop Pippins other alternativethe logical condition reading of Kants doctrinewith reference to Strawson, who lucidly reconstructs Kants basic argument. Strawson is particularly concerned to jettison Kants reference to the action of synthesis (which, as an action, would seem to require an empirical agent), instead developing the point that the thesis of the necessary unity of consciousness can itself

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be represented as resting on a yet more fundamental premiseon nothing more than the necessity, for any experience at all to be possible, of the original duality of intuition and concept (1966, p. 97). From the way that Strawson develops this reading, I think it becomes clear that he does not thus have it in mind to argue (contra Sellars) that we can have unmediated cognitive access to uninterpreted data; rather, the point is (in Robert Brandoms phrase) to urge that we necessarily presuppose a difference between what is said or thought and what it is said or thought about (Brandom, 2000, p. 163)with this reference to aboutness suggesting that we may be talking here about intentionality. To begin with, Strawson nicely states (as we have already seen) the recurrent line of objection to Kant. Again, then, Kant speaks of the abiding self of transcendental apperception; but he certainly does not mean by this the (at least relatively) abiding man . . . . Yet if he rejects this interpretation of the abiding self , does he not evacuate the notion of ascription of experiences to a subject of its ordinary meaning, without producing anything to fill the vacuum? (pp. 102103). Strawson rejoins, though, that the main point of this objection can be conceded without detriment to the Kantian position. It is not essential for Kant to maintain that his provisions are sufficient to explain the actual occurrence of self-ascription of experiences. It is enough if they are necessary to its possibility (p. 103). And what is thus necessary is simply that subjective experience be constitutively perspectival:
The more fundamental point of the Kantian provisions is that the experiences of such a subject must themselves be so conceptualized as to determine a distinction between the subjective route of his experiences and the objective world through which it is a route. The history of a man, we might way, isamong much elsean embodiment of a temporally extended point of view on the world. (p. 104)

And again:
What is necessary is that there be a distinction, though not (usually) an opposition, implicit in the concepts employed in experience, between how things are in the world which experience is of and how they are experienced as being, between the order of the world and the order of experience. This necessary doubleness is the real point of connexion between what Kant refers to as original (or transcendental) self-consciousness on the one hand and the objectivity-condition on the other. (pp. 107108)

This point has the considerable advantage of facilitating an appreciation of the constitutively transcendental logic that Kant is here using against, say, Humeof facilitating, that is, an understanding of why Kant can think that even Humes denial of his point necessarily presupposes precisely that point. Thus, against the objection that the notion of ascribing experiences to a subject presupposes (empirical) criteria of identity for such a subject, the answer is that if subjects must be conceived of as perceptibly belonging to a common world, they must also be conceived of as each having his own experience of that world. Properly understood, the objectors point does not contradict the Kantian point; it includes it (p. 105). Strawson concludes by summarizing the extent to which he

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has here reconstructed a point that he takes Kant only dimly and inadequately to have developed:
. . . the simple-seeming notion of a unitary consciousness to which diverse experiences belong appears less and less adequate to express the fundamental thought on which the argument rests. It yields its place, first, to that of the possibility of empirical (personal) self-consciousness, then to that profounder notion of transcendental self-consciousness, the necessary reflexiveness of experience, which appears as the basic condition of the possibility of empirical self-consciousness. And it must do so; for it only expresses a coherent thought when interpreted in these terms. (p. 111)

But Strawsons last pointthat only on this reading does Kants insight reflect a coherent thoughtis, I think, one that Strawson better develops elsewhere. In particular, Strawsons Individualshis 1959 Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics develops a transcendental argument with clear affinities to the one he reconstructs in the foregoing consideration of Kant. Here, though, his approach is more characteristic of those analytic philosophers who would defer particularly to ordinary  language. This is worth noting, since, as I have indicated, Santaraksita does not really E argue for the interpretation of svasamvitti he advances; rather, his understanding of E the matter is stated more in the form of a stipulated definition. Strawsons alternative statement of the basically Kantian argument, then, can give us a way to reconstruct  particularly Santaraksitas way of proceeding. E It is clear that the point Strawson develops in this way is recognizably the same point he judges Kant to have grasped. Thus, Strawson here targets what he characterizes as the no-ownership view of subjective statesthat is, the view (arguably held by Hume) that mental events can coherently be thought not to be constitutively perspectival. Against this, Strawson argues that experiences are necessarily individuated with reference to their subjects, if it is to be experiences that are being picked out at all: It is not coherent [to deny this], in that one who holds [the contrary view] is forced to make use of that sense of possession of which he denies the existence, in pressing his case for the denial. This is because the defining characteristic of the class of experiences is that they are my experiences or the experiences of some person, where the idea of possession expressed by my and of is the one [the no-ownership theorist] calls into question (1959, p. 97). He elaborates:
States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identities as particulars to the identity of the person whose states or experiences they are. From this it follows immediately that if they can be identified as particular states or experiences at all, they must be possessed or abscribable in just that way which the no-ownership theorist ridicules . . . . (Ibid.)

Here, then, we have what amounts to an interesting unpacking of Strawsons claim that Kants transcendental unity of apperception can only express a coherent thought when it is interpreted in the way he suggested specifically with reference to Kant. The point is that experience is constitutively perspectival, such that it must always be at least intelligible to distinguish any particular example of such from what

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it is that is putatively experienced; and (the point we have now developed) this cannot coherently be denied insofar as, most basically, this is just what we mean by experience. That is, there is no way to individuate even those experiences of which this would be denied except with reference to some subject whose experiences they are. It is literally nonsensical, then, to deny that feelings of, say, hot or cold must always be someones feelings of such; our subjective states, by definition, are not freefloating and unassigned, but are invariably experienced as ours. Any ostensibly designated phenomena that are not so identified are, ipso facto, not experiences, not what it is that we are here talking about. But again, this point (as both Strawson and Kant stress) is not such as to warrant any inferences regarding empirically identifiable existentsnot, for example, such as to warrant the conclusion that there must therefore exist souls as the loci of perspectival unity. This, then, is why Kant could say that the phenomenon he meant to identify is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation I think . . . cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. This point becomes clear if (as I think we are entitled to do) we take Kants transcendental unity of apperception, as here understood, to thematize something like the idea of intentionality.15 That is, the idea that subjectivity is a constitutively perspectival phenomenonthat, in Strawsons words, the history of a person just is an embodiment of a temporally extended point of view on the worldamounts to the idea that conscious states are about their contents. This is the claim, to put the point conversely, that the objective world through which any subject is a route is what that subjects experience is of (or about). If that is right, then the reason it makes sense for Kant to say that this phenomenon cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation is that he here means to identify precisely that phenomenon which is displayed in any act of representing precisely that phenomenon, that is, in virtue of which any act could count as an act of representing. Thus, if we call the phenomenon thus picked out intentionality, the point is the deceptively straightforward one that the fact of intentionality is not itself intentional. That is, insofar as Kant has here given us simply the criterion for individuating tokens of the type experience (viz., that they be ascribable to some subject), the point is simply that this criterion for thus individuating these is not individuated by itself. Depending, then, on how we read Kants claims regarding the transcendental unity of apperception, the point is either (with Fichte) that all intentional cognitions are themselves at the same time intended by (are the objects of ) an additional intentional cognitionone of the type apperception; or (with Strawson and, I think, with Kant) simply that the criterion for individuating experiences as such is that they be intentionalthat they be, that is, some subjects experiences of some object. The former reading has the distinct disadvantage not only of failing to account for Kants own attempts to distinguish his view from that of Descartes, but of entailing the iteration problem. This is, I have said in anticipation, precisely what Candrakrti will i argue with respect to Dign ga. On the alternative reading, in contrast, we are not only a in a position to appreciate how Kant could think he differed from Descartes, but also

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(and more importantly) in a position to appreciate the claim that this unity of apperception is properly transcendentalthat is, in the sense that it is necessarily presupposed even in the very act of denying it. If, in contrast to Dign gas, a antaraksitas account of svasamvitti can usefully be reconstructed as making S E E something like the same point, then we will be in a good position to appreciate its invulnerability to Candrakrtis critique. Let us turn, then, first to Dign ga. i a

Svasamvitti in the Thought of Dign ga a E It is well known that Dign ga (c. 480540 CE)and following him, Dharmakrti a i (c. 600660 CE)developed a spartan epistemology that admitted only two E irreducible criteria of knowledge or justification, two reliable warrants ( pramana):  sensation or perception ( pratyaksa), and inference (anumana). The former E constitutively has as its object uniquely particular events or sensations (svalaksana), E E   while the object of the latter is universals or abstractions (samanyalaksanas). E E Thus, for example, a perceptual cognition of a fire would be the kind of bare cognitive occurrence that is produced by (again in McDowells phrase) impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacitiesthat is, this kind of cognition would be distinguished by its being causally precipitated, under conditions not necessarily of the subjects choosing, by a really existent thing that, as it were, presents itself to the subject, causally producing a certain representation. The resultant phenomenological content of such a cognition, then, would necessarily be a function of the size and color and shape of just this particular fire. An inferential cognition of a fire, in contrast, would have as its content the kind of image of a fire that appears before the minds eye whenever (say) one hears the word firesomething, that is, that may very well appear the same way to a subject regardless of her circumstances (and that may, indeed, present itself even in the absence of any particular fire).16 While this may seem an intuitively plausible development of the insight that Strawson characterized in terms of the original duality of intuition and concept, that we are dealing with something different is clear when it is further urged (as it is by Dign ga) that the only really occurrent sort of perception has (in a sense that can be a a variously specified) other mental events as its objects.17 Dign ga says as much in developing a claim characteristically associated with all of the Buddhist thinkers in the tradition of thought that he initiatedspecifically, the claim that the word E pramana should finally be understood as referring not (as for most Indian philosophers) primarily to such cognitive instruments as perception and inference, but rather, to those cognitions that result from the exercise thereof. In the terms first stated by Dign ga, and associated with his tradition thereafter, a E E this is the claim that the word pramana chiefly denotes the pramanaphala, the result   E or fruit of a pramanaand that it is therefore only figuratively (upacarat) that we E take the word pramana also to denote our cognitive instruments. As the second half of E Pramanasamuccaya 1.8 puts it (in characteristically laconic terms), Because of [its]

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E being comprehended along with its action, a pramana is real only as a result.18 Dign gas auto-commentary explains: a
E In this regard, it is not the case, as for proponents of external objects, that a pramana is something other than its result; rather, there arises a cognition, existing as the result, containing the representation of an object; and this very [cognition] is E understood as comprising the action [of a putatively instrumental pramana]. E Hence, the action is figuratively designated as being the pramana, though [the latter is in fact] devoid of activity.19

The point, as Dign ga proceeds to make clear, is that when one has the experience of a (say) seeing a tree, all that can be said indubitably to have occurred is that a cognition     has arisen having that phenomenological aspect or representation (akara or abhasa); but that fact is explicable without reference to contact with anything external.20 Thus, Dign ga asserts, in regard to cognitions whose phenomenological content is an a E external object, that the only cognitive instrument ( pramana) in play is simply the E fact of the cognitions having that phenomenological content: The pramana, [in the sense of a cognitive instrument,] is [in this case] its being of the appearance of an a object.21 Dign ga concludes: Thus, [it should be understood that] the roles of the E means of cognition ( pramana) and of the object to be cognized ( prameya), corresponding to differences of [aspect of] the cognition, are [only] figuratively attributed to the respective [distinctive] factor in each case . . ..22 And again (in verse E form): That which appears is the object known ( prameya), while the pramana and its    result are, [respectively,] the subjective aspect of [the cognition] (grahakakara) and the cognition [itself]; hence, these three are not separated.23 This, then, is the context in which Dign ga brings into play that type of a perception ( pratyaksa) which is apperception (svasamvitti); thus, Cognition arises E E as appearing twofold: [having] the appearance of itself [as subject], and the appearance of an object. In terms of these two appearances, the one that is apperception (svasamvitti) is the one that is the result.24 To the extent, then, that E E a a pramana is real only as a result ,25 and to the extent that that result is (as Dign ga E here says) svasamvitti, it turns out that the latter is the only really occurrent pramana E in any casethat, in other words, the only indubitably immediate cognition concerns the occurrence of our own mental states. Of course, this is not typically regarded as an example of perception, as that word is generally understood in English; but it is important to recall that Dign ga has defined pratyaksa only as being definitively free a E  of conceptual elaboration (kalpanapodha).26 To say this much is not, ipso facto, to say that perception designates only sensory cognition, but simply that it denotes whatever cognition immediately (that is, without the mediation of any concepts) apprehends a uniquely particular objectwhich is as much as to say, that kind of cognition whose phenomenological content is at the same time its direct object. And we have now seen Dign ga argue that in the final analysis, svasamvitti is the only a E really occurrent type of such unmediated cognition. Richard Hayes has nicely expressed (in terms familiar from many modern versions of empiricist foundationalism) the point that is advanced by thus arguing that the

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only thing with which we are immediately acquainted is the contents of our own mental states:
At least one of the reasons that one might regard acts of awareness as sensa is that we are perfectly safe in saying that the fact of awareness itself cannot be denied . . . . It may be that Tomorrow is Friday is a false proposition at the time that it constitutes the content of a thought, but it is impossible to be in error regarding its being the content of the thought of which it seems to be the content . . . . Similarly, if one has an awareness of blue, blue is certainly the content of that particular awareness, even if there is in fact nothing blue outside the cognition for one to be aware of.27

That is, this is the one kind of cognition with respect to which, it can thus be claimed, one cannot be mistaken. The foundational status of this putatively immediate acquaintance is clear from its relation even to propositional judgments (even, that is, to those constitutively discursive cognitions that are to be characterized by Dign ga a as inferential); for insofar as all instances of cognition have an apperceptive dimension, there turns out to be a sense in which even inferential (and hence, conceptual) cognitions are (as cognitions) themselves perceivedwhich is just to say that our acquaintance even with the conceptual contents of our minds is itself alleged to be, in a sense, non-conceptual.28 Given the position so far developed, Dign ga can be taken to have developed a a basically representationalist epistemology, one with clear affinities with the project of empiricists like Locke. Thus, Locke similarly argued that [s]ince the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them (1975, p. 525). For Dign ga, too, the point in urging that svasamvitti is a E the only really occurrent sort of cognition may be that the only finally indubitable (because uniquely immediate) knowledge we can have (hence, the only finally warranted knowledge) concerns the contents of our own mental states; for while we can always doubt that the world is as it is represented in cognition, what we cannot doubt is that cognition occurs.29 There is, though, a real question here whether Dign ga may thus be seen to a uphold something more like a full-blown metaphysical idealism than simply a representationalist epistemology.30 As in many of the Western philosophical discussions where idealism seems to lurk, though, it is an exegetically complex matter which of two claims is being made: the ontological claim that mental events are all that really exist, or the strictly epistemological claim that mental events (such as representational sense data) are all that we can directly know. On either reading of the foregoing arguments from Dign ga, though, we still have to face a question a concerning, most basically, the relationships that are thought to be involved in cognitionand here, the issues start to resemble issues that arise given one reading (the Cartesian reading) of Kants doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception. Thus, even if Dign gas is understood as the strong idealist claim that mental a events are all that existand accordingly, that svasamvitti is the only finally occurrent E

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sort of perception insofar as all that exists is causally explicable mental events that have a particular sort of phenomenological contentthere is still the question of how the different aspects of these mental events are to be related to one another. How,   E that is, does whatever appears as the content of the cognition (yad abhasam prameyam) relate at once to the cognition itself (samvitti) and its subjective aspect E    (grahakakara)?31 Another way, I think, to ask this question is to ask how cognition could seem invariably perspectival (could seem invariably to be cognition of something), when there is finally nothing other than it for cognition to be about. By explaining the cognitive process with reference only to mental events, then, one has simply deferred the need to explain the subjectobject relation; for even if this relation is thought to consist only in different aspects (and not, e.g. in ontologically distinct substances), we still have two terms here. Put in terms of intentionality, then, the problem is that Dign ga still has to explain how the subjective aspect a    (grahakakara) can seem, phenomenologically, to mean somethinghow, in particular, it can (seem to) be about (what seems to be) the objective aspect    (grahyakara). If, however, Dign gas is simply the claim that only something like internal sense a data can be the direct objects of cognition,32 there is still a question concerning this putatively immediate acquaintance with these contents of our mental events; specifically, how does this (non-conceptual, perceptual) sense of our own mental states relate to the (conceptual, discursive) knowledge that we are presumably trying to explain?33 For the claim that even propositional cognitions are, qua cognitions, in a sense non-conceptual does not advance our understanding of whatever judgment is expressed in the cognition in questiondoes not, for example, explain the success (the objectivity) of discursive thought, does not provide it with sure foundations such as it would otherwise lack. Indeed, to the extent that one stresses (as, I think, Dign ga clearly means to) this aspect of (necessarily discursive) a judgmentsto the extent one stresses, that is, that all that is finally certain about any judgment is the bare fact of its occurring to some subjectwe end up forfeiting any meaningful claims to objectivity, and are consigned instead to the sort of solipsism that follows from taking subjective representations as the locus of truth or justification.34 Be that as it may, what we have on either reading of Dign gas argument involves a the idea that Pippin identified with respect to the Fichtean reading of Kants doctrine: the idea, that is, that in thinking a thought, two mental events occur, or two twoplace relations, between my thinking and its thought, and between me and my thinking a thought. Thus, if Dign gas appeal to svasamvitti advances the claim that a E only mental events finally exist, the two mental events whose co-occurrence requires relating are the subjective and objective aspects of any such moment; while if the appeal to svasamvitti advances simply a representationalist epistemology, the two E mental events to be related are (to take the case of ones entertaining a proposition) the conceptual thought one experiences oneself as having, and ones non-conceptual awareness of the bare fact of having it. And in either case, the need to establish such a relationship threatens to open up an infinite regress.35

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Candrakrtis critique of svasamvitti i E Something precisely like the foregoing criticism was developed by Dign gas a   co-religionist Candrakrti, whose Madhyamakavatara comprises an influential i critique of svasamvitti. The basic structure of that critique, though, is perhaps E  more clearly on display in the first chapter of the Prasannapada, where Candrakrti i   briefly rehearses the argument from the Madhyamakavatara. The presentation of this  argument in the Prasannapada is interesting because of the extent to which it does not have to do particularly with epistemology or ontology. Rather, in his engagement  with Dign ga in the Prasannapada, Candrakrti chiefly attacks the coherence of a i Dign gas categories of explanationand more particularly, the coherence of a Dign gas claim to offer a conventionally valid account of our epistemic practices, a while yet using words like svalaksana in something other than their ordinary sense.36 E E Here, then, the basic structure of the argument (i.e. as simply concerning relations) is most clearly on display; for Candrakrtis arguments in regard to ordinary usage turn i (as is eminently conventional in Sanskritic philosophical discourse) on the Sanskrit  grammarians karaka analysis of verbal constructionson the view, that is, that actions can invariably be analyzed on the model of semantically complete verbal constructions, which require the separate specification of (e.g.) subject, object, agent, etc. It is the normative presupposition of these relata that leads, in the course of Candrakrtis critique of Dign gas use of the term svalaksana, inexorably to a i a E E i consideration of svasamvitti. Thus, on Candrakrtis view, svalaksana means E E E (as indeed it conventionally means in Sanskrit) defining characteristic. But Dign gas understanding of svalaksanas as the uniquely particular objects of a E E perceptionas, indeed, radically distinct from the kinds of things (like defining characteristics!) that can serve as the referents of wordrequires, as Candrakrti i i recognizes, that svalaksanas neither be nor have any properties at all.37 Candrakrti E E thus attacks Dign ga on the grounds that he has, with his peculiarly technical a understanding of svalaksana, incoherently posited something that is simply selfE E characterizingon the grounds, that is, that (in the grammatical terms characteristically favored in Sanskritic philosophical discourse) the act of characterizing seemingly referred to by Dign gas use of the word svalaksana must involve an a E E instrument (laksana) that is identical with the object (laksya) characterized E E E thereby. In this context, Candrakrti anticipates that Dign ga might adduce svasamvitti as i a E the unique example of precisely such a casethat is, if Dign ga can argue that there a obtains a sort of cognition whose subject is at the same time the object thereof, he will have shown the possibility of something self-characterizing. It is, then, to this anticipated move that Candrakrti thus responds: i
Perhaps you think there exists [the faculty of] apperception (svasamvitti). Hence, E [you maintain that], given that [cognitions] being an object obtains due to [its] apprehension by apperception, [cognition] is included among warrantable objects.38 To this we respond: based on an extensive refutation of apperception

Is svasamvitti transcendental? E
  in the Madhyamakavatara, it doesnt make sense to say a svalaksana E E is characterized40 by another svalaksana, and that one by apperception. E E Moreover, this last [sort of] cognition [i.e. the one called svasamvitti] doesnt E exist at all, sincegiven that theres no subject to be characterized (laksya), owing E to the impossibility of [its] establishment by a separate svalaksanathere is no E 41 E possibility of the operation of a characteristic without a locus.
39

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  And, having thus referred the reader to his own Madhyamakavatara, Candrakrti here i E   adds a lengthy quotation from the Ratnacudapariprccha Sutra, the crucial part of E which is this:
 Thought arises when there is an intentional object (alambana). Is it, then, [the case that] the intentional object is one thing, and the thought another? Or is that which is the intentional object precisely the [same as] the thought? If, first of all, the intentional object is one thing and the thought another, then there will obtain [its] being two thoughts (dvicittata). Or if the intentional object itself is the thought,  then how does thought perceive thought? But thought does not perceive thought. Just as a sword-edge cannot be cut by that same sword-edge,42 and a finger-tip cannot be touched by that same finger-tip, in just the same way, a [moment of] thought cannot be seen by that same thought.43

At the end of the full passage, Candrakrti concludes: Thus, there is no [faculty of] i apperception; [and] since it is non-existent, what is characterized by what?44 This makes clear, again, that the discussion of svasamvitti has in this context been chiefly E meant to address the possibility of there being something essentially selfcharacterizingof there being, that is, at least one example of a characteristic (laksana) that is not the characteristic of anything (which is how Dign ga must a E E understand svalaksanas)or rather, of there being one example of a characteristic E E which is at the same time the thing characterized (laksya) thereby.45 Against this, E Candrakrti has argued that this idea opens an infinite regressand in this way (as I i have already intimated), his point is much like the one that (Pippin noted) could be leveled at the Fichtean version of Kant: If consciousness and self-consciousness are treated as separate aspects of any consciousness, then the arguments that showed why consciousness of X must be accompanied by consciousness of consciousness of X would all apply to the latter too, since self-consciousness, at least as suggested by this version of Fichte, would also be an instance of consciousness and so subject to its conditions. That is, Candrakrtis argument is, then, simply a statement of the extent to which i svasamvitti can be thought to entail the iteration problemas indeed is the case E on either of the interpretations that I have said can be gleaned from Dign gas a elaboration of the doctrine. It is important to note, though, the extent to which Candrakrtis version of that argument is informed particularly by Sanskritic i grammatical analyses; for not only does this tell us something distinctive about characteristically Sanskritic philosophical discourse, but it shows as well that Candrakrti takes Dign gas svasamvitti as an actionthat is, as some kind or episode i a E of cognition that will admit of the sort of agentinstrumentobject analysis that can necessarily be given for anything involving a verb.46 As we will now see, this is

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 precisely the point that Santaraksita denies with respect to svasamvitti as he E E understands it.  Santaraksitas innovation: Svasamvitti as a defining characteristic, not an action E E  In attempting to reconstruct Santaraksitas distinctive reading of svasamvitti, it is E E useful to begin with the figure of Dharmottara (c. 740800); for even if we grant (with Krasser, 1992) that Dharmottaras dates make him a likely respondent to  Santaraksita (725788), it is, in my view, Dharmottaras significant revisions in the E  trajectory of thought initiated by Dign ga47 that best make Santaraksitas innovation a E intelligiblea point we can appreciate by seeing how the much later figure of  Moksakaragupta (fl. 12th century) combines the thought of Dharmottara and  E Santaraksita. E To begin, then, with Dharmottara: chief among his revisions is his attempt to qualify Dharmakrtis exhaustively causal account of perception. Dharmottara wants, i that is, to urge that useful knowledge consists in something more than being the E effect produced by specifiable causal factorsthat, in other words, any pramana worth the name must involve some judgment.48 This is, of course, difficult for him to allow, since, as a purportedly faithful interpreter of Dharmakrti, Dharmottara must i explain the outputs of perceptual cognition as being constitutively unsuitable for association with discourse.49 Nevertheless, this seems to be precisely what Dharmottara allows in the course of revising Dharmakrtis account of perception. i This emerges clearly when Dharmottara explains why (as for Dign ga and a E Dharmakrti before him) the word pramana ought to be understood as referring i principally to the cognitive outputs of our epistemic practices. As we saw, Dign gas a point in pressing this claim was to urge that it is finally only apperception E (svasamvitti) that counts as a pramana. Dharmottara, though, has different reasons E E for endorsing this characteristically Buddhist view that the word pramana really E denotes only the pramanaphala. His point is that only the result of the completed process of cognition represents the kind of knowledge that can be thought E pragmatically to further human ends (and that should therefore count as pramana). Thus:
 E  E It is intentional cognition that is a reliable warrant ( prapakam jnanam pramanam). E And the capacity for intentionality is not based only on invariable concomitance with the [causally efficacious] object [that produced the cognition]; for things like sprouts are not intentional even though [their production is] invariably concomitant with [causes] like seeds. Therefore, even given its arising [causally]  from some object to be intended ( prapya), a cognition still has some intentional    function ( prapakavyapara) necessarily to be performed, by doing which the goal is obtained. And that [function] just is the [final stage of the cognitive process, i.e. the] result which is the reliable warrant, because of the exercise of which a cognition becomes intentional.50

My translation of Dharmottaras argument as involving intentionality   (prapakatva) is, I think, warranted by a couple of points here. The word prapaka has, first of all, the sense of leading to, conveying, procuring51and surely it is not

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unreasonable to think that this semantic range overlaps with the idea of the directedness or aboutness of cognition. More suggestively, note that Dharmottara here invokes the idea as specifically distinctive of cognition or consciousness; for the whole point of his counter-example (things like sprouts are not intentional even though their production is invariably concomitant with causes like seeds) is that  whatever we mean by prapaka is (a) not to be understood as exhaustively explicable in causal terms, and (b) not to be understood as exemplified by insentient things like sprouts. What he would thus seem to be proposing, then, is something like a hallmark of the mental;52 and his whole point here is that this criterion is to be distinguished particularly from those insentient phenomena that can be exhaustively described in causal terms. Thus, Dharmottara here argues, in effect, that what distinguishes our epistemic practices as (in a word) epistemic is the fact of their involving something more than causally efficacious impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities. E On Dharmottaras reading, then, the point in urging that the word pramana E primarily denotes the cognitive outputs ( pramanphala) of (say) perception is not, as it was for Dign ga, that only apperception (svasamvitti) is finally indubitable; rather, a E the point is the very different one that only judgments count as epistemically useful E and hence, only judgments count as reliable warrants ( pramanas).53 As I have indicated, though, this is a difficult reading to reconcile with the basic commitments of the philosophical program initiated by Dign ga and Dharmakrti, for whom any a i propositional content at all would seem to be excluded from the kind of perception E that they admit as a pramana. Accordingly, Dharmottara is at pains to make his point, and it is not clear that he finally succeeds at framing that point as a nonquestion-begging alternative to the view he is resisting. This is particularly clear in the passage that I will now adduce as a bridge to  the view of Santaraksita. Thus, again urging that the idea he has in mind will not E admit of an exhaustively causal description, Dharmottara tries to argue that the phenomenological content of a perception (e.g. the appearing sense datum blue) is causally related to the object perceivedand that the resultant judgment (that is blue) consists no longer in the bare sensing of immediately present content, but rather in the recollection of a similarity between the currently sensed object, and other things like it.54 And what he needs to argue is that while that judgment is not directly caused by the same thing that causes the bare perception, it is nevertheless in some sort of relation thereto. The question is: what kind of relation? Dharmottara:
In this case, the relation between the thing known and the way we know    it (sadhyasadhanabhava) is not based on the relation of produced and producer, according to which there would be a contradiction within a single thing; rather, [these are related] as being intended and intentional (vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena).55   

The challenge here, of course, is to understand Dharmottaras alternative terms   (vyavasthapya and vyavasthapaka) in such a way as to avoid attributing to him

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precisely the sort of contradiction he has here set out to avoid. Whether or not he can do so, it is clear at least that Dharmottara means to argue that the relation between these two terms of a perception is to be understood as something other than a causal relation (something, he says, other than a janyajanaka relation)which is precisely why, I think, we can read him as again having in mind the relation between the object   intended (vyavasthapya), and an intending (vyavasthapaka) subject. Whatever Dharmottara has in mind here, though, the later thinker  Moksakaragupta suggestively adduces precisely the same formulation: With respect E to cognition, the property of knower in relation to what is known is not explained as being an objectagent [relation]; rather, [it is explained] as being an intended and     intentional [relation] (vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena).56 Moksakaragupta, E though, deploys Dharmottaras formulation in a slightly different context specifically, in order to meet precisely the kind of objection leveled at the doctrine of svasamvitti by Candrakrti: viz. that this doctrine leads to an infinite regress if it is i E understood as the claim that a cognition must, in order to count as such, itself be the object of an additional cognition (one of the svasamvitti type).57 E  For Moksakaragupta, though, that is not how svasamvitti is to be understood; E E rather, it is to be understood as characterizing (in the phrase he borrows from Dharmottara) the relation of intended and intentional. The point is that this  relation does noton Moksakaraguptas reading as on Dharmottarasadmit of E the kind of agentactionobject analysis that can be brought to bear, he seems to  allow, on any action. Interestingly, though, Moksakaragupta (in characteristically E Sanskritic fashion) argues this point, too, by appeal to essentially grammatical presuppositionsspecifically, presuppositions concerning the adjectival relation of qualification (visesana). Thus, he says: E E
. . . if cognition were not apperceptive, then it would be impossible to say an object is cognized, because of the axiom that a thought by which the qualification has not been comprehended does not engage the thing to be qualified. In this case, an object is the thing to be qualified; it is cognized is the qualification, where cognized means qualified by cognition. If cognition were not intrinsically (svayam) understood in the form of this idea, then how could it be understood that E an object is qualified by cognition?58

 The point, then, would seem to turn simply on the definitions of cognition (jnana)  ta). That is (if I understand the passage correctly), if cognized and cognized (jna   (jnata) just means qualified by cognition (jnanena visesita), then it must, according E  to the axiom here cited, alreadyintrinsically (svayam), Moksakaragupta says59 E E  be known what the qualifier (visesana, i.e. jnana) consists in; otherwise, ordinary E E expressions involving this qualification (an object is cognized) would be unintelligible. While the characteristically Sanskritic way of making it here is perhaps not  compellingly self-evident, Moksakaraguptas point becomes more clear if we attend, E finally, to the key passage that he adduces in between the immediately foregoing passage, and the phrase borrowed from Dharmottara. It is here, then, that   Moksakaragupta approvingly quotes Santaraksita on svasamvittiand the passage E E E

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that he thus adduces as authoritative does indeed represent a compelling rejoinder to i the standard objection to svasamvitti (hence, to Candrakrtis critique thereof), and a E  compelling clarification of the force of Moksakaraguptas own grammatical argument E   against the agentobjectaction analysis. Thus, Santaraksita (whom Moksakaragupta E E here quotes) takes svasamvitti to denote simply the subjective aspect that defines E cognition as subjective: Cognition is distinct from insentient forms; it is just this  apperception (atmasamvitti)60 which is its [cognitions] not being an insentient E form.61 That is, apperception (svasamvitti) refers simply to whatever it is in virtue of E  which a cognition (vijnana) is constitutively to be distinguished from insentient    objects (jadarupa). Turning to Santaraksitas text, though, we find that Santaraksita E E E does not tell us much (beyond the fact of its warranting the word svasamvitti) about E just what it might be in virtue of which this is so. Indeed, as I indicated at the beginning, his statements on the subject really amount simply to his stipulating a definition; all he here says, then, is that what he understands by svasamvitti is E (we might say) simply the defining feature of cognition. We do not, I think, get  much help regarding this from consideration of the context in which Santaraksita E says this, though it is important to note that this statement is ventured in the course of his consideration of external objects (bahirarthaparksa)that is, in chapter 23 of i E a a the Tattvasamgraha, which develops the argument that the characteristically Yog c ra E analysis of our epistemic situation represents the best account of our conventional intuitions.62  Thus, Santaraksita had argued that cognition does not perceptually cognize E   (vijanati) any external object whatsoever.63 In this context, the foregoing passage  i from Santaraksita is introduced by his commentator Kamalasla as answering the E following question: But why do these various conceptions not apply as well in the  case of apperception?64 The answer, we have already seen Santaraksita say, is that E cognition is distinct from insentient forms; it is just this apperception which is its i [cognitions] not being an insentient form. Kamalasla elaborates: For apperception  is not admitted as being intentional (grahaka); rather, [it is admitted] as intrinsically (svayam)that is, naturallybeing itself luminous, like the light in the atmoE i sphere.65 This claim then raises the question (made explicit by Kamalasla): Then  why is it not accepted as being intentional?66 Santaraksita answers: E
Its [cognitions] apperception [does not exist] as being in an action-agent relation, since the threefoldness of [cognition],67 whose form is partless, does not make sense. Thus, because of its being of the nature of intellect, it makes sense that there be apperception. But how could there be cognition of something distinct, having the nature of an object?68

The point of the first verse of this two-verse response appears to be that if svasamvitti referred to some action (to a particular kind of perception that can occur), E it would have to admit of the kind of agentinstrumentobject analysis that can (in the view of the Sanskrit grammarians) be given for any verbal construction; but for  Santaraksita, it simply refers to the constitutively subjective aspect that defines any E

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cognition as a cognitionwith this aspect being, it would seem, distinguished from those that can be described in strictly causal terms. With the second verse, though, we  seem to be rather closer to the thought of Dign ga. That is, Santaraksita makes the a E additional claim that insofar as cognition is constitutively distinct from putatively material objects, it makes more sense (in terms, perhaps, of ontological parsimony) for the direct objects of cognition to be of the same natureto be, that is, themselves  of the nature of intellect (bodharupa).69 Once again, it is a vexed question whether the claim thus made is that mental events are therefore all that exist, or simply the claim that the direct objects of  cognition must therefore be sense data. Be that as it may, Santaraksita here deploys E the point in a way that is not obviously different from Dign gas appeal to a  svasamvitti. Particularly Santaraksitas initial response, thoughhis definition of E E svasamvitti, that is, as simply what it is in virtue of which cognition is distinct from E insentient formsrepresents a potentially cogent rejoinder particularly to the iteration problem. For it makes sense to say that a defining characteristic is constitutively different from any act that may be defined thereby. To the extent, then, a that svasamvitti is (arguably as by Dign ga) thought to denote a special kind of E cognition that can occur (one whose object is other cognitions), it seems we would have to allow (in Sanskritic terms) that it is therefore an action that will admit of the standard analysis of a semantically complete verbal constructionthat (in a more contemporary idiom) it is therefore an intentional act whose object must be specified. And the problem is that if it is thought that intentional acts (cognitions) count as such only in virtue of their being thus intended, there is no way to stop a regress. It is therefore fitting that the perennially vexed exegetical issues that arise with respect to the trajectory of Buddhist thought centered on this claim concern the question of whether or not we are dealing with idealism; for on the Cartesian reading of Kants synthetic unity of apperception (the reading arguably advanced by Fichte), too, Kantian insights are taken in a decidedly idealist direction.  But to the extent, however, that svasamvitti denotes (as for Santaraksita) simply the E E defining feature of cognition (as opposed to insentient forms)the hallmark, that is, of the mentalwe seem rather closer to the logical condition reading of Kants  doctrine, particularly as that is elaborated by Strawson. Thus, Santaraksita has E suggested that svasamvitti is simply the criterion for individuating tokens of the type E  cognition. And the stronger claim that I am now reconstructing Santaraksita as E suggesting is that, in fact, even one who would deny this turns out necessarily to  presuppose it. This is the force of my taking Santaraksita to have intuited that this is a E basically transcendental point. That is, it is a condition of the possibility even simply of identifying what it is that we are talking about that it be identified under a  description such as Santaraksitas;70 for (per Strawsons reconstruction of Kant) even E denying of cognitions that they are subjective requires first having individuated themand it cannot be cognitions of which one denies this if they are not individuated as things that are subjective.  Of course, Santaraksita does not argue in this way,71 and it is not even clear that E this way of reading him is warranted by the two subsequent verses from his text that

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  we considered. But the verse quoted from Santaraksita by Moksakaragupta, E E understood particularly in light of Dharmottaras characteristic revision in the  trajectory of thought initiated by Dign ga, recommends the view that Santaraksita a E can be taken to have understood svasamvitti not as exemplifying intentionalitynot, E that is, as itself simply another kind of intentional cognitionbut as intentionality itselfthat is, as what it is in virtue of which any cognition could count as a token of that type.72 The reason, then, why Kant could coherently claim that pure apperception cannot (as he said) itself be accompanied by any further representationviz. because Kant means to identify simply that fact in virtue of which any act could count as an act of representing in the first placecan apply as  well to Santaraksitas idea of svasamvitti. Thus, if intentionality is the fact that E E  is picked out by Santaraksitas definition, the point to be made in response to E the M dhyamika critique of svasamvitti is the deceptively straightforward one that a E the fact of intentionality is not itself intentionaland hence, reference to the idea of svasamvitti does open up a regress. E  That is, insofar as Santaraksita has simply stated the criterion for individuating E tokens of the type cognition, the point is simply that this criterion for thus individuating these is not individuated by itselfand we cannot, therefore, suppose (as Candrakrti does with respect to Dign ga) that svasamvitti must itself instantiate i a E an intentional structure; for svasamvitti is here to be understood simply as the E intentionality that itself is displayed by any cognition (and hence, that is  presupposed by any act even of denying Santaraksitas point). And that something E like intentionality is what is thus necessarily presupposed is what I have suggested by   considering Santaraksita in light of Dharmottara and Moksakaragupta. Thus, E E Dharmottara emphasized that even specifically perceptual cognitions ( pratyaksa) E E must, if they are to count as reliable warrants ( pramana), yield some judgment and the judgment that thus completes an episode of perceptual cognition E a i as a pramana is, for Dharmottara (and contra Dign ga and Dharmakrti), not to be understood as causally produced by the perceived sense datum (not to be understood, that is, as exemplifying a janyajanaka relation); rather, it is to be   understood as exemplifying an intentional relation (vyavasthapyavyavasthapaka bhavena).  And this is just the point that Moksakaragupta borrows in introducing E antaraksitas definition of svasamvittia definition that he adduces specifically to S E E head off precisely the kinds of objections thereto developed by Candrakrti. That is, i i the reason that svasamvitti cannot (contra Candrakrti) be thought vulnerable to the E iteration problem is that it constitutively involves not causal, but intentional  relations. In the context of this reading, then, Santaraksitas concise and E underdeveloped statement on svasamvittihis claim, that is, that this denotes E simply cognitions not being an insentient formcan be reconstructed as the claim that svasamvitti denotes not a particular type of (intentional) cognition, but simply E the intentional structure that constitutively characterizes any token of the type cognition.

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Conclusion: Towards Inferentialism in Buddhist Philosophy?  Thus reconstructing Santaraksitas view gives us, I think, the conceptual tools to E i appreciate why the critique of svasamvitti advanced by Candrakrti does notindeed, E  cannotcoherently be thought to undermine Santaraksitas understanding thereof. E This is because svasamvitti, on this understanding, cannot itself coherently be E thought to require explanation; for the offering of any explanation will, as itself involving cognitive acts, necessarily presuppose precisely the point it purports to explain: viz. the constitutively subjective, intentional character of cognition. Otherwise, it cannot be cognitions that are being explained. By thus reframing the debate on svasamvitti in terms suggested by the E alternative readings of Kants transcendental unity of apperception, we are, I think, in a position to better appreciate several points. Consider, for example, the debate among Tibetan interpreters of Indian Madhyamaka, as that has been studied (specifically with respect to this issue) by Paul Williams. Much of that debate, I noted at the beginning of this essay, concerns the question of whether the kind of critique characteristically advanced by the M dhyamikas Candrakrti and a i  Santideva is to be understood (with Tibetan interpreters like Tsong-kha-pa) as refusing even the conventional validity of this ideaor whether (with Mipham, as sympathetically understood by Williams) it is to be understood as arguing only that it is not an ultimately obtaining fact, without denying its conventional utility. Jay Garfield has recently defended the characteristically venturesome claim that Tsong khapa and [his disciple and commentator] rGyal tshab are dead right, and Mipham and Williams are dead wrong (both hermeneutically and philosophically) . . ..73 Garfields parenthetical distinction here is important, and, considered along with the reconstruction I have here proposed, can help us clarify the issues at stake in such a way as to appreciate that Garfields claim is problematic. Thus, Garfield is right that it is important to consider the cogency of an interpretation such as Miphams (as with any interpretation of philosophical texts) in terms both of its exegetical adequacy to the (M dhyamika) arguments interpreted, and in terms of its a philosophical adequacythat is, both in terms of the extent to which it can plausibly  claim to restate (in this case) the arguments of Candrakrti and Santideva, and the i extent to which the interpretations inferential relations with other things we believe are defensible. In terms of the first point, the matter is not as straightforward as it may initially seem.74 I have argued elsewhere75 that, as is particularly clear in chapter one of the  Prasannapada, Candrakrti means to show that Dign gas philosophical project i a cannot coherently be said to give an account of our epistemic practices as they are conventionally describedand that it therefore cannot coherently be taken to be even conventionally valid. Indeed, Candrakrtis whole procedure is simply to argue i that Dign gas approach depends on its peculiarly technical usage of ordinary terms, a and that his usage therefore cannot make sense of ordinary usagegiven which, Dign ga cannot be thought to explain what he says he is explaining. What is a

Is svasamvitti transcendental? E

99

conventionally true, in other words, is just our conventions, and any technical redescription thereof is, ipso facto, not conventionally valid. To the extent, then, that Dign gas category of svasamvitti is among the targets of a E Candrakrtis critique, it would seem that that we are entitled (with Garfield) to judge i interpreters such as Mipham to be exegetically inadequate to Candrakrtis thought. i But this conclusion can nevertheless be qualified. For in defending the view that svasamvitti should be retained as part of our conventionally valid account of the E  world, Mipham clearly presupposed Santaraksitas understanding thereof;76 and we E have seen that Candrakrtis critique does not have any purchase against that view i  that (to put the same point less contentiously) it is not Santaraksitas view of E 77 i svasamvitti that Candrakrti targets. It would be at least defensible, then, to claim E that Candrakrti did not mean to deny the conventional reality of svasamvitti insofar i E  as one takes something like Santaraksitas view of it as the one that reflects our E conventional understandingand insofar, then, as one thus takes Candrakrti to i refuse only the version of svasamvitti that is comparable to the Cartesian version of E Kants doctrine. This point would, to be sure, depend on the (historically problematic) claim that though he had only Dign gas understanding of svasamvitti a E before him, Candrakrti nevertheless did not mean for his critique thereof to apply i  as well to the version of the doctrine that would later be developed by Santaraksita E but insofar as Candrakrtis critique clearly does not touch the latter, this nevertheless i remains a viable move. In terms of the philosophical adequacy of this alternative reading of svasamvitti, I E have already tried to develop (following Strawson on Kant) a sympathetic reading of the cogent transcendental argument to be made in its defense. We have seen, then, an argument to the effect that if svasamvitti picks out simply whatever it is in virtue of E which cognitions are to be distinguished from insentient objects (and I have  suggested, following Dharmottara and Moksakaragupta, that the criterion thus E identified is intentionality), then one cannot coherently deny its obtaining since one could only claim to deny this of cognitions if these have already been individuated as suchand it will not be cognitions of which this is denied if we have not thus individuated constitutively subjective, intentional acts. That this is a defensible  reading of Santaraksita is suggested by the fact that Mipham makes some arguments E that are very close to this.78 I would here like to conclude by briefly suggesting some additional philosophical points that recommend this reading of svasamvitti. Here, my argument dovetails, I E think, with the broadly inferentialist case against empiricist foundationalism developed, in ways that basically follow Kant, by Wilfrid Sellars and (more recently) Robert Brandom.79 Sellarss influential arguments against the myth of the given can be understood as directed particularly against the kind of representationalist epistemologies in which Dign gas svasamvitti can be said to play a pivotal role. Thus, a E we saw that the whole point in Dign gas taking svasamvitti as a type of perception a E ( pratyaksa) is to advance the claim that we are immediately acquainted with the E contents of our own mental statesthat we can know, without mastery of any prior concepts and without awareness of the inferential relations of this claim with any

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other knowledge, at least that we have cognitions; and the point in taking svasamvitti E as finally the only really occurrent kind of perception is, in turn, to advance the claim that this is all that we can finally know with certainty.80 It is, then, fitting that Dign gas doctrine of svasamvitti has affinities with the Cartesian reading of Kants a E apperception; for we here have the virtually Cartesian argument that the only thing we cannot doubt is the fact that we have some experience. But to understand svasamvitti thus is not only to hold a view that (as Candrakrti i E shows with respect to Dign ga) exemplifies the iteration problem; it is also (and a perhaps, in the end, more significantly) to take this putatively foundational sort of cognition in such a way that it is finally incapable of being involved with what Kant considered to be objective judgments.81 This is, I think, a useful way to characterize the problems that are widely understood to follow given the radically sharp distinction that Dign ga and Dharmakrti posit between perception and inference.82 That is, if it a i is held (with Dign ga and Dharmakrti) that ones acquaintance with the contents of a i ones mental states is constitutively non-conceptual; and if, further, it is held (also with these thinkers) that ones acquaintance with ones own mental states is therefore constitutively unsuitable for association with discourse83that, in other words, one can know the contents of ones mind without any knowledge of the inferential relations of these with anything else that is knownthen one is led inexorably to the epistemological solipsism that is finally entailed by psychologistic conceptions of logic.84 This is clear if we consider, for example, familiar arguments to the effect that knowledge even of ones own mental states necessarily presupposes the attribution of similar states to othersarguments, that is, to the effect that recognizing the necessarily mediated character even of our awareness of our own mental states represents the most compelling basis for a refutation of solipsism.85 If, however, svasamvitti is taken to identify something like the transcendental unity E of apperception, the case is very differentwhich is precisely as Kant tried to emphasize in developing his understanding of the transcendental unity of apperception. As Kant put it,
the pure form of intuition in time, merely as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, simply through the necessary relation of the manifold of the intuition to the one I think, and so through the pure synthesis of understanding which is the a priori underlying ground of the empirical synthesis. Only the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, upon which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity. (B140)

It is, though, an interestingly complex question whether the Kantian reading of svasamvitti here proposed is finally such that it can be deployed in order to support E constitutively Buddhist doctrines. Recall, in this connection, that Kant emphasized that we are not warranted in drawing inferences from the transcendental unity of apperception to any empirically existent locus thereofand that he criticized Descartess characteristic arguments in this regard as fallacious.86 It is not necessarily the case, then, that this idea commits one to refusing the constitutively Buddhist

Is svasamvitti transcendental? 101 E

 denial of an atman. Nevertheless, there may be a real problem in reconciling characteristically Buddhist commitments in this regard even with the idea that experience is constitutively perspectival; for to the extent that Buddhists want to assert that a person is really just a causally continuous series of mental events, and that such continua are finally independent of the causally continuous series of physical events that are bodies,87 we must ask what could possibly keep all these mental continua apartwhat, as it were, channels them, such that they can represent distinct perspectives on the world? And what can they be perspectives on (what can they be about) if they alone exist? Kants transcendental unity of apperception, then, may not presuppose that empirically applicable criteria of identity can be given for the locus of synthesis (that, in other words, persons consist in the kind of selves that Buddhists are constitutively concerned to refute). To the extent, though, that Kants point concerns the constitutively perspectival character of experience, it nevertheless provides a criterion for individuating instances of such (viz. as being from different perspectives)and it is not clear to me particularly that the Yog c ra stream of Buddhist thought (in the a a  context of which Santaraksita makes the point we have here considered) is in a E position to do this. Notes
[1] This paper was fostered partly by an exchange of scholarly work and correspondence with Jay Garfield and Charles Goodman, whom I thank for the stimulation. (Cf. Garfield, 2004; Goodman, 2004.) Thanks also to Rick Nance and Rajam Raghunathan for their comments on an earlier draft. [2] Also referred to as svasamvedana (from the same verbal root). E [3] Williamss study (1998) then concerns the questionmuch debated among Tibetan interpreters of Indian Madhyamakaof whether or not these M dhyamika critiques were a meant to show that svasamvitti is (not only not ultimately, but) not even conventionally valid. E See also the review article by Kapstein (2000). [4] Or we might instead (with important implications) say sapient (cf. Brandom, 2000, p. 2, et passim). That is, if the intentionality picked on this understanding of svasamvitti is E understood as a particularly semantic phenomenonas the kind of aboutness that is particularly displayed in judgmentsthen we are talking about the distinguishing characteristic of a particularly conceptual sort of awareness. This would, of course, undermine the view (surely held by Dign ga) that svasamvitti is to be reckoned a kind of perception a E (hence, as non-conceptual)though as I will suggest in concluding, such a view might be philosophically preferable. [5] Williams (1998, pp. 1935); cf. Blumenthal (2004, pp. 220227). [6] This point cannot, perhaps, be held against Candrakrti, who had only Dign ga in his sights. i a   It may, though, count against Santidevaor at least against his commentator Prajnakaramati,  who specifically addresses Santaraksitas understanding of svasamvitti, and tries to show that it E E does not escape the M dhyamika critique. Cf. note 70, below. a [7] For these different terms, see Critique of Pure Reason, A108 (transcendental unity of apperception), B132 (pure or original apperception), B157 (synthetic original unity of apperception). [8] This and the preceding quote from Hume are from his Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Section VI (Hume, 1978, pp. 252, 255, respectively); the emphasis is mine.

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[9] In that case, Kants would be a basically Cartesian argumentthough as we will note, he clearly meant to emphasize that he did not intend for it to be read thus. [10] That is, intuition (or perception) involves (to invoke McDowells phrase again) simply causally efficacious impingements by the world on a possessor of sensory capacities. [11] That is, the synthesis of manifold intuitions represents, for Kant, the point at which deliberative freedom becomes possiblewith its arguably being the whole point of his entire project to explain how freedom is possible in a scientifically describable world. It is in this way that Kant characteristically contrasts receptivity (the mode of intuition) and spontaneity (the mode of thought, understanding, or judgment). [12] Specifically, there is an equivocation between I as grammatical subject (I think), and I as naming an ontologically distinct substance (therefore I am). Cf. A344, ff. where Kant emphasizes that [s]ince the proposition I think (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of the understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding (A348). Husserl similarly argues that Descartess argument is problematic precisely insofar as he compromises its essentially transcendental characterspecifically, by introducing the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans . . . and [the] point of departure for inferences according to the principle of causality. . . (1995, p. 24). [13] B157. Cf., A117n: . . . it must not be forgotten that the bare representation I in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty. In this and the preceding passage, Kant makes, inter alia, a point that would decisively cut particularly against Dign gas characteristically foundationalist deployment of a svasamvitti. Thus, we will see that for Dign ga, the point in characterizing svasamvitti as a a E E species of perception ( pratyaksa) is to say that the acquaintance we have with our own E mental states is constitutively immediate (that is, non-conceptual, non-discursive). Kant urges precisely the opposite in thus arguing that the content of the transcendental unity of apperception is a thought, not an intuition, and that whether it is clear or obscure is of no importance. Kants point finds expression in the 20th century in the work of Wilfrid Sellars, whose influential critique of the myth of the given (1963, pp. 127196) develops the point that even our acquaintance with our own mental states necessarily presupposes mastery of some concepts, etc. More on this point when we turn to Dign ga. a [14] Cf. Brandoms comment that the course of philosophy changed significantly with the replacement of concern with Cartesian certainty by concern with Kantian necessity (2000, p. 80; cf. pp. 163164)that is, with the replacement of a subjectively epistemic desideratum (certainty) by an arguably objective one. [15] And in fact, Kants doctrine is arguably the precursor to the idea of intentionality as that is developed by thinkers as diverse as Brentano and Husserl, Sellars and Brandom. [16] Indeed, this is as it must be if language is to be possible at all. [17] Among other things, this greatly complicates our picture of causally efficacious svalaksanas E E as what precipitates perceptual cognitions; for it is difficult to retain the view that perceptual cognitions alone are causally explicable if svalaksanas are really something like sense-data E E given which, the grounds for distinguishing these from inferential cognitions become less obvious. Consider, in this regard, Sara McClintocks (2003, pp. 1434) helpful statement  that, for Santaraksita, sense data are still causally produced, and as such they are still formed E and restricted by their causes. Even though an image of a patch of blue does not arise from a group of causally functioning external blue particulars, it does arise from a causally functioning internal particular, namely an imprint for the arisal of an image of a patch of blue. The arisal of images in perception is thus not an arbitrary affair (and to that degree it is

Is svasamvitti transcendental? 103 E

real); rather, it is rooted in karmic imprints and ignorance. But of course, moments of inferential awareness presumably could similarly be described as caused by an imprint for the arisal of suchin which case, perception would seem to lose its distinctive status.    E E The Sanskrit (as given in Hattori, 1968, note 1.55, p. 97) is: savyaparaprattatvat pramanam i phalam eva sat. Tibetan at ibid., p. 183: di la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bzhin du tshad ma las bras bu don gzhan du gyur ba ni med kyi, bras bur gyur bai shes pa de nyid yul gyi rnam pa can du skyes pa dang, bya ba dang bcas par rtog pa de nye bar blangs nas, tshad ma nyid du dogs pa ste, bya ba med par yang yin no. My translation is adapted from that of Hattori (ibid., p. 28).  Indeed, as Dign ga argues in his Alambanaparksa, cognition must be explicable without a i E reference to any external objects, must be taken to have other mental events as its direct objects; for (as he argues there) any account of external objects necessarily presupposes some version of minimal part atomism, which Dign ga argues cannot coherently be adduced to a explain our cognition of macro-objects. Tibetan at Hattori, op. cit., p. 183: yul gyi snang ba nyid de dii / tshad ma . . . ; cf. Hattoris    translation, p. 29. Dharmakrti makes the same point at Nyayabindu 1.20: arthasarupyam i E asya pramanam (Malvania, 1971, p. 81). Tibetan at Hattori, op. cit., p. 183: de ltar rnam pa du ma rig pai shes pa nye bar blangs pa de lta de ltar tshad ma dang gzhal bya nyid du nye bar dogs pa yin te . . . ; here, the translation is that of Hattori, ibid., p. 29 (though I have rendered the Tibetan equivalent of upacaryate as figuratively rather than, with Hattori, metaphorically). E   E Pramanasamuccaya 1.10. The Sanskrit (per Hattori, ibid., note 1.67, p. 107) is: yad abhasam E     E E prameyam tat pramanaphalate punah / grahakakarasamvitt trayam natah pr thak kr tam; cf., i E E E E Hattoris translation, ibid., p. 29. Tibetan at Hattori, ibid., p. 183: shes pa ni gnyis su snang bar skyes te, rang gi snang ba dang yul gyi snang bao. snang ba de gnyis la gang rang rig pa de ni bras bur gyur ro; cf. Hattoris translation, ibid., p. 28. Cf. note 18, above. E At Pramanasamuccaya 1.1. Hayes (1988, p. 136). Brentano (1973, p. 91) makes almost precisely the same point, in terms with striking affinities with Dign ga: . . . besides the fact that it has a special object, inner a perception possesses another distinguishing characteristic: its immediate, infallible selfevidence. Of all the types of knowledge of the objects of experience, inner perception alone possesses this characteristic. Consequently, when we say that mental phenomena are those which are apprehended by means of inner perception, we say that their perception is immediately evident. Moreover, inner perception is not merely the only kind of perception which is immediately evident; it is really the only perception in the strict sense of the word . . . [for] the phenomena of the so-called external perception cannot be proved true and real even by means of indirect demonstration. For this reason, anyone who in good faith has taken them for what they seem to be is being misled by the manner in which the phenomena are connected. Therefore, strictly speaking, so-called external perception is not perception. Mental phenomena, therefore, may be described as the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible.  As much is conceded by Moksakaragupta, who anticipates an objection to this effect: But if E all cognitions are [instances of the kind of] perception that is apperception, [then] how would conceptual cognitions like this is a jar not be non-conceptual, and how would the [mistaken] cognition of a yellow conch shell not be non-erroneous? We reply: even conceptual cognition is non-conceptual with respect to itself; [such cognition] conceptualizes the external object with [propositions like] this is a jar, but [it does] not    E [conceptualize] itself. (Singh (1985, p. 24): nanu sarvajnananam svasamvedanapratyaksatve E E  ghat o yam ityadivikalpajnanasya nirvikalpakatvam, ptasankhadijnanasya-abhrantatvam ca  i E    E E E   katham na bhavet? ucyate: vikalpajnanam api svatmani nirvikalpam eva / ghat o yam ity anena E

[18] [19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25] [26] [27]

[28]

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[29]

[30]

[31] [32] [33]

[34]

[35]

[36] [37]

   bahyam eva-artham vikalpayati, na tv atmanam.) This conclusion surely follows from E E Dign gas initial contention that our various cognitive instruments ( pramana) are only a figuratively so called, insofar as there is finally only the fact of occurrent cognitions having various phenomenological aspects. It is helpful, in understanding Dign gas argument, to remain mindful of what is finally at a   stake for himto remain mindful, that is, of the basically Buddhist point (viz. anatmavada) that is ultimately advanced by this epistemology; thus, Dign gas is the view that what is a finally warranted by the kind of cognition that is uniquely in contact with really existent phenomena is only the conclusion that there are sensationswhich does not also warrant the inferential belief that these must be the states of a self . This seems to be the view of Hattori; cf. inter alia, his notes1.65, 1.67 (p. 107). Alex Wayman has long opposed the idealist reading of this and cognate schools. In an article specifically addressing the relations between Dign ga and the Yog c ra school, for example, Wayman a a a writes: . . . if indeed the Yog c ra school denies the reality of an external object, it would a a hardly be possible to find its position attractive to the Buddhist logicians who were to follow, since Dign ga and his successors . . . do not deny an external object; rather they call it a a  svalaksana (the particular) and even sometimes describe it as paramartha-sat (absolute E E existence), to underscore the reality of this object of direct perception ( pratyaksa) (1979, E p. 65). It should be clear, though, that none of these points self-evidently counts in favor of Waymans conclusions; for being absolutely existent and uniquely particular can just as well describe sensations as external objects. E Here, my terms are those of Pramanasamuccaya 1.10; cf., note 23, above. And this claim, of course, is neutral with respect to the question of what might finally exist in the world.  This is the question that, I have noted, Moksakaragupta tried to address (cf., note 28, E  above)though it seems that Moksakaraguptas expression simply states what the problem is, E rather than resolving the tension; for the concession that even conceptual cognition is nonconceptual with respect to itself does not make clear what is gained by identifying that fact. Consider, in this regard, Freges notion of objectivity as consisting only in the kind of intersubjective availability that is a hallmark of language, which thus stands in contrast to the eminently private and subjective status of representations. It is in this way, Frege therefore said, that I understand objective to mean what is independent of our sensation, intuition and imagination, and of all construction of mental pictures out of memories of earlier sensations, but not what is independent of reason; for to undertake to say what things are like independent of reason, would be as much as to judge without judging, or to wash the fur without wetting it (Frege, 1959, sect. 26). Cf. Wolfgang Carls characterization (1994, pp. 192193) of Freges critique of the empiricist version of psychologism: If empirical knowledge includes or is even based on perceptual knowledge and if sense perception requires sensations, then there can be no empirical knowledge without something subjective . . . . [Thus, Frege] considers the judgment component of empirical knowledge as the real source or manifestation of its objectivity. On the former (idealist) reading, this is because if any cognition, in order to count as such, must have separable subjective and objective aspects, then either one of these aspects, as a separable component of cognition, can be thought itself to have two such aspects; in the latter (representationalist) case, this is (more straightforwardly) because if, say, a conceptual thought counts as a cognition only in virtue of ones non-conceptual awareness of the fact of having it, then it can be thought that the latter awareness, in order to count as such, must itself be the object of a further such awareness. I have developed my understanding of Candrakrtis critique of Dign ga at length in Arnold i a (forthcoming, chs 67). That is, that they are not themselves the properties of anything, nor themselves possessed of any propertiesfor in either case, we would be left with something that is analytically

Is svasamvitti transcendental? 105 E

reducible, where Dign gas project requires that sense data be (as the only ultimately a existent things) irreducible. Cf. in addition to Arnold (forthcoming), Arnold (2003). Candrakrti had just argued that only a svalaksana that is understood as an object i E E  (karmasadhanam) could be knowable ( prameyam). As throughout his engagement with Dign ga, Candrakrti then argues that this requirement cannot be reconciled with ordinary a i  uses of the word, as exemplified by the expression vijnanasvalaksana (which Candrakrti i E E would read as the defining characteristic of cognition). This familiar reference to a clearly subjective/agentive sort of svalaksana then requires that Dign ga must (if his concepts are to a E E track ordinary usage) allow that svalaksana might also be understood as the instrument of E E this action (characterizing). This absurdly entails that there are two kinds of svalaksana: E E one unique particular is warrantable (i.e. because of an object)the one thus pointed out as what is characterized; and one is not warrantablethe one by which something is characterized (kimcit svalaksanam prameyam yal laksyata ity evam vyapadisyate, kimcid E E E E E E E E aprameyam yal laksyate neneti vyapadisyata iti). If the latter, too, is then to count as E E knowable, it must at the same time be an object, and an infinite regress loomswhich is what svasamvitti has here been posited to halt. Cf. La Vallee Poussin (1970b, p. 61.39). E   The reference is to Madhyamakavatara 6.7278 (La Vallee Poussin 1970a, pp. 166174). Recall that Candrakrti is here arguing from the view according to which the verbal noun i laksana (characterizing) is to be analyzed as an action. The claim, then, that a svalaksana is E E E E characterized is chiefly to be understood as the claim that it is the object undergoing this action (the laksya)and that it therefore requires some instrument of this action. E La Vallee Poussin (1970b, pp. 61.1062.3): Atha manyase svasamvittir asti. Tatah E E   E     svasamvittya grahanat karmatayam satyam asty eva prameyantarbhava iti. Ucyate: vistarena E E E     Madhyamakavatare svasamvittinisedhat, svalaksanam [ p. 62] svalaksanantarena laksyate tad E E E E E E E E E  E    api svasamvittya iti na yujyate. Api ca, tad api nama jnanam svalaksanavyatirekenasiddher E E E E        i asambhaval laksyabhave nirasrayalaksanapravr ttyasambhavat sarvatha nastti kutah E E E E E E E svasamvittih? E E Candrakrti adduces the same image in the Madhyamakavatara; cf. La Vallee Poussin (1970a: i   pp. 168169).  La Vallee Poussin (1970b, pp. 62.563.2): Alambane sati, cittam utpadyate. Tat kim anyad E    alambanam anyac cittam, atha yad evalambanam tad eva cittam? Yadi tavad anyad E E E     alambanam anyac cittam, tada dvicittata bhavisyati. Atha yad evalambanam tad eva cittam, E E E E  tat katham cittam cittam samanupasyati? Na ca cittam cittam samanupasyati. Tadyathapi E E E E E          nama taya-evasidharaya saivasidhara na sakyate chettum. Na tenaivangulyagrena E E _ tadevangulyagram sakyate sprast um. Evam eva na tenaiva cittena tad eva cittam sakyam E EE E E drast um. EE E    Ibid., p. 63.8: Tad evam nasti svasamvittis, tadabhavat kim kena laksyate? E E E E More generally, the possibility being addressed is that of there being any action whose subject and object are identical. Consider, too, the conclusion of Candrakrtis critique as that is developed in the i   Madhyamakavatara: Thus, if svasamvitti doesnt exist, then who perceives your paratantra? E Since the agent, object, and action arent the same, its not suitable to hold that [a cognition] grasps itself. (6.76 [La Vallee Poussin (1970a, p. 172)]: dei phyir rang rig yod pa ma yin na / khyod kyi gzhan dbang gang gis dzin par gyur / byed po las dang bya ba gcig min pas / de nyid kyis de dzin par rigs ma yin // ). As reflected in this verse, Candrakrtis critique in the i   Madhyamakavatara is framed particularly against the characteristically Yog c ra doctrine a a  of the three natures (trisvabhava). To the extent, then, that Yog c ra doctrine typically a a  claims that the paratantra-svabhava alone is really existentand that the perfected nature  ( parinispanna-svabhava) consists simply in the paratantra without the imagined E ( parikalpita) fact of its being distinct from ones subjective perspective thereon Candrakrti wants to know: If the paratantra-svabhava exists as empty of both subject i  and object, then who is aware of its existence? (6.72 [La Vallee Poussin (1970a, p. 166)]: gal

[38]

[39] [40]

[41]

[42] [43]

[44] [45] [46]

106 Dan Arnold

[47] [48]

[49]

[50]

[51] [52] [53]

[54] [55]

te bzung med dzin pa nyid bral zhing / gnyis gyis stong pai gzhan dbang dngos yod na / di yi yod par gang gis shes par gyur /. . .) This is, I think, basically a question of the same form as the one that (I indicated above) could be put to Dign ga if his account of svasamvitti is read a E as a statement of idealism; cf. note 31, above.   The main thing that Candrakrtis critique in the Madhyamakavatara adds that is not in the i  Prasannapada is a refutation of the memory argument for svasamvitti (which brings to mind E s Kants argument contra Hume in the first edition of the Critique). See the bhaEya on   Madhyamakavatara 6.73 (La Vallee Poussin, 1970a, p. 168). Candrakrtis conclusion is that i this argument is circular: Apperception is taken as the proof of memory, while at the same time memory is used as the proof of reflexive awareness. The argument is circular and therefore invalid [adapted from Huntington (1989, p. 244, note 101)]. On Dharmottara as having significantly revised the commitments of Dharmakrti, see i Dreyfus (1997, pp. 354364). E That is, in order for a pramana to count as usefully furthering human aims (which is E  how Dharmakrti defines pramana at Nyayabindu 1.1), it must (as I would put it) i be expressible as the object of some propositional attitude, some that-clause (I believe feel, sense, recognizethat . . .). This is, indeed, among the points of Kants contention that It must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations. It is to this extent that Lynne Rudder Baker (1987, p. 19) can rightly say: Mental items that cannot be identified by that-clauses at all have no claim to being beliefs or other propositional attitudes. Dharmottaras point, then, is that mental items not identifiable by that-clauses E have no claim to being pramanas. Here, I am borrowing Dharmakrtis gloss of kalpana (conception) to state precisely what it i   is that perception ( pratyaksa) is without; cf. Nyayabindu 1.5 (Malvania, 1971, p. 47): E     abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasaprattih kalpana (Kalpana is a thought whose appearance is i E E suitable for association with discourse). The criterion suitable for association with discourse could, I think, be taken as basically co-extensive with the criterion identifiable by that-clauses (note 48, above).  E   E  E Malvania (1971, p. 79) (ad. Nyayabindu 1.19): prapakam jnanam pramanam / prapanasaktis E        _    ca na kevalad arthavinabhavitvad bhavati / bjadyavinabhavino py ankurader aprapakatvat / i           tasmad prapyad arthad utpattav apy asya jnanasyasti kascidavasyakartavyah prapakavyaparo, E   E    yena kr tenarthah prapito bhavati. sa eva ca pramanaphalam, yadanust hanat prapakam E E EE E  bhavati jnanam. Cf. Apte (1992, p. 1130). More basically, the word is the agentive form of the verbal root p  pra- ap, to obtain; hence, it refers to whatever is an effector of acquisition. Which is the role that intentionality plays for Brentano and Husserl. The acuteness of the problem for Dharmottara becomes clear especially in the context of Dharmakrtis commitment to momentariness (ksanikatva); for on the view that the only i E E real existents capable of precipitating a perceptual cognition are radically fleeting moments,  even to take (what are really) different moments in a certain causal continuum (samtana) E to be moments of the same thing is already in a sense to have made a judgmentand E Dharmottara wants to allow that the latter is to be reckoned as part of the pramana. Thus, It is a single moment that is to be apprehended by perception, while it is a continuum [of such moments] that is to be ascertained by a conviction based on perception; and it is precisely a continuum that is to be intended by perception, since a [single] moment cannot be  intended [Malvania (1971, p. 71): pratyaksasya hi ksana eko grahyah, adhyavaseyas tu E E E E    Ei pratyaksabalotpannena niscayena samtana eva; santana eva ca pratyaksasya prapanyah, E E E   ksanasya prapayitum asakyatvat]. E E See Malvania (1971, p. 82.36).     Malvania (1971, p. 82.79): na ca-atra janyajanakabhavanibandhanah sadhyasadhanabhavo, E     yena-ekasmin vastuni virodhah syat; api tu vyavasthapyavyavasthapakabhavena. E

Is svasamvitti transcendental? 107 E

  [56] Singh (1985, p. 23.810): atra-ucyate: na karmakartr bhavena vedyavedakatvam jnane E E    varnyate / kim tarhi vyavasthapyavhavasthapakabhavena. E E  [57] Indeed, the foregoing statement from Moksakaragupta is immediately preceded by an E imagined interlocutors appeal to precisely the kinds of examples adduced by Candrakrti i such as that a sword cannot cut itself. Cf. Singh (1985, p. 23.38).  E    [58] Singh (1985, p. 23.2125): Api ca yadi jnanam svasamvedanam na syat, tada jnato rtha iti E E    E i    durghat ah syat, nagrhtavisesana buddhir visesye vartate iti nyayat. Tatha hy artho visesyah, E E E E E E E     E  E jnata iti visesanam, jnato jnanena visesita iti. Jnanam cet svayam na bodharupena prattam, tat i E E E E E E  katham jnanena visesito rthah pratyatam. Interestingly, the axiom here cited comes from i  E E E Mm msaka discoursein particular, from Sabaras commentary on Mmamsa Sutra 1.3.33. i aE i E   [59] In what amounts, I think, to a gloss of the sva- prefix in the word svasamvitti. Thus, the word E svasamvitti on this understanding might be said to refer not to self-reflexive cognition, but E to what is intrinsically cognition, or cognition itself . [60] The term is used interchangeably with the more common svasamvitti (and is used here, no E doubt, for metrical reasons). This term, too, will admit of the range of readings mentioned in note 59, above.  E E   E  [61] Tattvasamgraha 1999 (Shastri, 1997, p. 478): vijnanam jadarupebhyo vyavr ttam upajayate / E      iyam evatmasamvittir asya ya-ajadarupata //; for Moksakaraguptas quotation of this, see E E E Singh (1985, p. 23.1314).  [62] The passages here considered are repeated by Santaraksita in the context of the same E  E  discussion in the Madhyamakalamkara; thus, Tattvasamgraha verses 19992001 occur also as E  E  Madhyamakalamkara 1618 (cf. Ichig , 1989, pp. 194197; these verses are also translated by o Blumenthal, 2004, p. 237). Again, it is an exegetically complex question whether the characteristically Yog c ra analysis that is here advanced concerns a chiefly epistemological a a point (that sense data are the only direct objects of cognition), or a metaphysical one (that mental events are all that exist)though surely the former has a better claim to reflecting a conventional sense of the matter.  E  [63] Tattvasamgraha 1998cd (Shastri, 1997, p. 477): vijanati na ca jnanam bahyam artham   E E cana. kathan    E  [64] Shastri (1997, p. 478): nanu ca-atmasamvedane py ete nirbhasadayo vikalpah kasman E na-avataranti? The various conceptions in question (without aspect, etc.) are those denied in Tattvasamgraha 1998ab. That is, there is no kind of cognition that cognizes an external E objectnot one without a phenomenological aspect, or with such an aspect, or with a   E  different kind of aspect (anirbhasam sanirbhasam anyanirbhasam eva ca).     [65] Ibid.: na hi grahakabhavena-atmasamvedanam abhipretam, kim tarhi svayam prakr tya E E E E     prakasatmataya, nabhastalavarttyalokavat. The latter is a standard image for talking about svasamvitti. E     [66] Ibid.: Atha kasmad grahyagrahakabhavena na-isyate? (literally, as being the grasper of E something to be grasped). i [67] Kamalasla glosses: vedyavedakavittibhedena (as separate cognized, cognizer, and cognition).    [68] Tattvasamgraha 20002001 (Shastri, 1997, p. 478): kriyakarakabhavena na svasamvittir asya E E       tu / ekasya-anamsarupasya trairupyanupapattitah // tad asya bodharupatvad yuktam tavad E E E  svavedanam / parasya tv artharupasya tena samvedanam katham //. E [69] The argument of verse 2001, then, is similar not only to the basic argument of Dign gas a  Alambanaparksa, but also (fittingly, given that Dign gas own text is in turn dependent on i E a  this) similar to an argument from Vasubandhus Vimsatika. Thus, Vasubandhu had argued E that insofar as it is admitted that (a) the karma of sentient beings creates the experienced  world, and (b) karma is an essentially mental function (cetana, as it is glossed in the Abhidharmakosa), it follows that the more ontologically parsimonious account has it that  what is created by karma (viz. experienced things) is itself mental. Cf. Vimsatika 7: Its E imagined [on the account Vasubandhu is refusing] that the dispositions [originating] from

108 Dan Arnold

[70]

[71] [72]

[73] [74]

[75] [76] [77]

[78] [79] [80]

karma are here, and their result somewhere else; why [is their result] not accepted [as being]   precisely where the dispositions are? [Levi (1925, p. 5): karmano vasanany atra phalam E   E  E E anyatra kalpyate / tatraiva nesyate yatra vasana kim nu karanam //]. E  This is true, at least, to the extent (as Candrakrti would emphasize) that Santaraksita can i E plausibly claim to have identified the way in which people conventionally understand antaraksitas aim in ch. 23 of the Tattvasamgraha precisely to cognition; and of course, it is S  E E argue that this account represents the best expression of our conventional epistemic  practices. As I noted at the beginning (note 6, above), Santidevas commentator  Prajnakaramati had (unlike Candrakrti) a vantage point in history that allowed him to i explain how the characteristically M dhyamika critique of svasamvitti might apply as well to a E   Santaraksitas understanding thereof. In this regard, Prajnakaramatis most significant point E  is simply to deny that Santaraksitas definition reflects the conventional use of the word. E  Thus, having quoted Tattvasamgraha 19992000 (Vaidya, 1988, p. 196), Prajnakaramati says E antidevas critique (which is precisely like that of Candrakrti): The refutation was of S  i explained having understood the meaning of the word that is well known in ordinary usage, [i.e.] as [involving] separate action and agent, since that is the meaning expressed by the word svasamvedana. But if, because of fearing faults [in your argument], even the meaning E of words that is familiar to everyone is abandoned, then you will be in contradiction with     everybody [Vaidya (1988, p. 196): kriyakarakabhedena vyavaharaprasiddham sabdartham E s E    adhigamya duEanam uktam, svasamvedanasabdasya tadarthabhidhayakatvat. yadi punar E      dosabhayal lokaprasiddho pi sabdarthah parityajyate, tada lokata eva badha bhavato E E  bhavisyati). To be sure, Prajnakaramati then proceeds to argue (in characteristically E  M dhyamika fashion) that even if this definition is admitted, Santaraksita could not succeed a E  in demonstrating that svasamvitti obtains ultimately (Ibid.: ittham api na paramarthatah E E antaraksita did not claim thus to establish it. svasamvedanasiddhih . . .)though of course, S  E E E  Be that as it may, it is interesting that Prajnakaramati here as much as allows that the most  promising way to refute Santaraksitas point is simply to refuse that people conventionally E  understand svasamvitti as reflected in Santaraksitas stipulated definition. E E Though his Tibetan interpreter Mipham does; see Williams (1998, pp. 9196). The difference here is similar to the difference that Candrakrti, in his critique of Dign ga, i a urges between defining characteristics (svalaksana) and adjectival qualification (visesana). E E E E That is, while any instance of the latter qualifies some particular example of the kind in question, a defining characteristic is, rather, what makes something an example of that kind in the first place. This is why, for Candrakrti, it is incoherent to suppose (as Dign ga does) i a that unique particulars could be bare even of their own defining characteristics, and why we must instead allow that we invariably perceive things under a description. Cf. Arnold (forthcoming, ch. 6). Garfield (2004, p. 2). It should be said here that I am not a scholar of Mipham, and that I am not therefore speaking here of the interpretation that I know him to have upheld; rather, I am speaking simply in terms of the different possibilities that seem to me to be available for finessing the exegetical issues in question. See, though, Williams (1998): passim; and (for Miphams   interpretation particularly of Tattvasamgraha 1999 / Madhyamakalamkara 16) Doctor (2004, E E pp. 253269). Arnold (forthcoming, chs 67). Cf. Blumenthal (2004, pp. 222223); Williams (1998, p. 91, et passim).  Again, though, this point is harder to make with respect to the similar critique by Santideva,   whose commentator Prajnakaramati clearly knows the thought of Santaraksita. See, however, E Williams (1998, pp. 85106); and note 70, above. See especially Williams (1998, pp. 9196). See, as well, McDowell (1998). Cf. notes 27 and 29, above.

Is svasamvitti transcendental? 109 E

[81] Cf. B141142: . . . a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. [82] Dreyfus (1997) recurrently considers issues that follow from this. [83] Cf. note 49, above. [84] Cf. notes 13 and 34, above. [85] Cf. Inter alia, Strawson (1959, p. 98, ff.), for just such an argument. The thrust of Sellarss critique of the given, too, is that even our acquaintance with our own mental states necessarily presupposes mastery of some concepts, etc. Cf. Brandoms characterization of Sellarss critique: . . . the idea that there could be an autonomous language game, one that could be played though one played no other, consisting entirely of noninferential reports (in the case Sellars is most concerned with . . . even of the current contents of ones own mind) is a radical mistake (2000, p. 49). [86] Cf. note 12, above. [87] Cf. Inter alia, Franco (1997, pp. 67132), Hayes (1993), Taber (2003).

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