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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-28643 March 19, 1928

NICOLAS JUAREZ, Plaintiff-Appellant , vs. RAMONA D. TURON, DefendantAppellee. STATEMENT


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After the formal pleas, plaintiff's complaint filed on February 10, 1927, alleges: 1. That the plaintiff and the defendant are of age, the former residing at No. 104 Calle Zurbaran and the latter at No. 132 Calle Castaos, both within the jurisdiction of this City of Manila;
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2. That the plaintiff and the defendant are husband and wife, having contracted marriage on October 28, 1921;
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3. That during the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant a daughter was born of it, known as Lourdes Juarez, who is a minor and who is at present in the possession of the defendant;
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4. That after legal proceedings, the defendant was convicted of adultery committed with Gregorio Ramos in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, in criminal case No. 32005 of this court, the offended party in said case being the plaintiff above named;
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5. That the judgment for adultery mentioned in the preceding paragraph has become final and was executed;
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6. That the plaintiff and the defendant have no conjugal property; and 7. That the plaintiff has also no private property. And plaintiff prays that he be decreed a divorce and have judgment for costs. August 11, 1927, the complaint was amended as follows:

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After paragraph 5 and before 6 let the following new paragraphs be inserted which shall be called 5A, 5B, and 5C and which shall read as follows:
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5A. That the plaintiff, one year before the filing of this complaint, was domiciled and residing at the City of Manila, Philippine Islands.
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5B. That the adultery committed by the herein defendant has never been consented to nor pardoned by the plaintiff.
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5C. That this action is filed within one year following the date when the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the cause. The defendant made a default. For the purpose of proving his case, the plaintiff offered in evidence the record in and by which his wife was convicted of adultery, and was called

and testified as a witness in his own behalf. The lower court denied plaintiff any relief, and dismissed the complaint, from which he appeals and assigns the following errors: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING: 1. That the document Exhibit B, which is a certified copy of the judgment of conviction rendered in criminal case No. 32005 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the crime of adultery instituted against the defendant, is not an evidence that she had committed said crime.
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2. That this action was commenced out of the time in which it should have been brought according to the provisions of Act No. 2710; and
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3. In refusing to decree the divorce prayed for in the complaint that initiated this action.
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JOHNS, J.:

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The decision of the lower court is as follows: This is a complaint for divorce wherein it is alleged by the plaintiff among other things:
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That the defendant, after legal proceedings, was convicted of adultery committed with Gregorio Ramos in the City of Manila, P. I., in criminal case No. 32005 of this court, the offended party in said case being the plaintiff, himself above named; and
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That the judgment for adultery mentioned in the preceding paragraph has become final and was executed.
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The defendant having been summoned, she was later declared in default at the instance of the plaintiff whose evidence was received by the court in the absence of the defendant. The plaintiff, however, has not presented any evidence upon the adultery committed by the defendant and which can be the only ground for the action herein brought. He did present the judgment render in the aforesaid criminal case for adultery against the same defendant, proving, moreover, that said judgment has become final; but this being a civil action, completely different from the criminal one for adultery against the same defendant, and in which the parties are also different, although in fact and substance the cause of action is the same in the two cases, in the one now before the court for divorce evidence must have been presented that adultery was committed by the defendant, the judgment of conviction rendered in the criminal case against the same defendant not being sufficient, since as evidence it has no effect in this action other than to show that the guilt of the defendant was proven in a final judgment rendered in a criminal case, which is a condition required by section 8 of Act No. 2710 before divorce can be granted. Where it not for this requirement said judgment would be inadmissible as evidence in this case, except for the purpose of impeaching the veracity of the defendant as witness, if she had appeared and testified. Upon this point the following doctrine is well known: "Upon the foregoing principle, it is obvious that, as a general rule, a verdict and judgment in a criminal case, though admissible to establish the fact of the mere rendition of the judgment, cannot be given in evidence in a civil action, to establish the facts on which it was rendered." Vol. 1, Greenleaf on Evidence, par. 537. Which doctrine was cited and

approved by the Supreme Court of these Islands in the case of "Ocampo vs. Jenkins 14 Phil., pp. 681, 689."
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On the other hand, the law requires that the action for divorce be brought within one year from the date when the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the cause of action brought by him, but the herein complaint was filed on February 10, 1927, notwithstanding that according to plaintiff himself, he acquired knowledge of the adultery of the defendant about August, 1924.
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For the foregoing, the court overrules the complaint, holding that judgment cannot be rendered for divorce as prayed for by the plaintiff. Without special pronouncement as to costs.
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So ordered. The finding of the lower court, that the plaintiff knew of the alleged adultery in August, 1924, is well sustained by his own evidence, and the complaint in this action was filed on February 10, 1927, about two and a half years after the plaintiff knew of the adultery, for which he now seeks a divorce.
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All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered. Malcolm, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions JOHNSON, J., concurring:


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I concur in the dispositive part of the majority decision. I prefer to leave the discussion of the incongruities of section 4 of Act No. 2710 until the question is squarely presented, hoping that in the meantime the Legislature may have time to make it more plain if that seems necessary. Section 4 contains three periods of prescription or limitation of action for divorce:
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(a) Under said section an action for divorce cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the complaint became cognizant of the cause; (b) an action for divorce must be filed within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred; and (c) when the cause occurred prior to the date on which this Act took effect (March 11, 1917), then the action for divorce must be commenced within one year from and after such date.
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It is difficult to harmonize the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) above, said section 4. They must mean, first, that the party aggrieved must bring his action for divorce within one year after he had knowledge of the cause and, second, that such action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five years from the date when such cause occurred, whether the complaint was cognizant of the cause or not. In other words, an action for divorce under said Act must be commenced within a period of one year from the time the complainant has become cognizant of the causes justifying his divorce, but such action cannot be maintained after the lapse of five years from and after the date when the cause for divorce occurred. That, in my judgment, must be the interpretation of that section as to the two causes of prescription or limitation of action. However, that conclusion leaves much yet to be explained.
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In the present case the action was not begun within one year from and after the date on which the complainant became cognizant of the causes justifying his divorce. His action is theretofore clearly barred.

VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:

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The preceding decision affirms the judgment of the lower court with costs.

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The lower court's decision is here reproduced in its entirety, and this court, in affirming it, makes the following comment: "The finding of the lower court, that the plaintiff knew of the alleged adultery in August, 1924 is well sustained by his own evidence, and the complaint in this action was filed on February 10, 1927, about two and a half years after the plaintiff knew of the adultery, for which he now seeks a divorce."
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I vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from, on the grounds hereinafter briefly set forth.
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The judgment appealed from dismissed the herein complaint for divorce for two reasons: (1) Because the action was instituted out of time; and (2) because the final judgment in a criminal action for adultery is sufficient evidence in a civil action for divorce. Both reasons are, in my opinion, untenable.
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According to the evidence, the plaintiff learned of his wife's adultery in August, 1924; or, more correctly, the adultery took place on August 1, 1924. The information for adultery was filed on January 21, 1926, and judgment was rendered in the criminal case on March 2, 1926. This judgment became final and subject to execution. The complaint for divorce was filed on February 10, 1927, and the judgment dismissing it was rendered on August 17, 1927. Such are the facts proved at the trial. Has the plaintiff's action to divorce his legitimate wife prescribed? What does the law provide with respect to the prescription of the action for divorce?
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Section 4 of Act No. 2710 provides: An action for divorce cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred; but if such cause occurred prior to the date on which this Act takes effect, then only within one year from and after such date. This law took effect on March 11, 1917.
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As may be seen, the law establishes two prescriptive periods, according to whether the cause of the divorce occurred before or after said law went into operation. If before, the prescriptive period of the action is one year, that is, within the first year and after the law became effective; if after, as in the present case, the prescriptive period is five years, to be reckoned from the year following the date on which the plaintiff learned of the cause for divorce, namely, his wife's adultery.
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As August 1, 1924, was the date on which the plaintiff learned of the adultery, the action divorce does not arise said date, but from August 1, 1925, or one year from August 1, 1924. The year from August, 1924 to August, 1925, is not to be counted for the purposes of prescription; it is the year of grace which the law grants the spouses for their reconciliation, because the State is more interested in the continuance of the conjugal union than in the separation of the spouses, for the welfare of the family and of society. If according to the law, the plaintiff's action lasts five years from August 1, 1925, he may

bring it at any time between then and August 1, 1930. And the action having been instituted on February 10, 1927, it is evident that said action was filed within the period of time authorized by the law.
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It must be noted that, as has been said the aforementioned section 4 of Act No. 2710 establishes two periods of prescription: One of one year, if the cause of action occurred before the Act No. 2710 took effect; and another of five years, if the cause arose thereafter. If the opinion of this court affirming that of the lower court were to prevail, the distinction established by the law would disappear, and the law amended by a judicial decision.
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To my mind, the reason for the two prescriptive periods of action rest on the fact that when the cause of action took place before the Divorce Law became effective, the legislator intended to limit the effects of this law, so as not to favor the institution of divorce proceedings; and when the cause of action occurred after said law had become effective, the same legislator probably took into account the precedents of several States of America, such as Arkansas, Kentucky, etc., which fix the period of five years for the commencement of the action, to be reckoned from the date of the act giving rise to it. (See Hirsh, Tabulated Digest of the Divorce Law of the United States.)
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At any rate, no matter how arbitrary the fixing of this second period may seem, the law has deemed it wise to establish a period of five years to be reckoned from the year following the date on which the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action for the filing of the action for divorce, that is, August 1, 1924. Therefore, it is contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the law to hold that the action for divorce has prescribed because it was instituted two and a half years after the plaintiff became aware of the cause of action.
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With respect to the second ground for dismissal, the judgment appealed from cites the case of Ocampo vs. Jenkins and Worcester (14 Phil., 681), wherein it was held: "The fact that an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court in a criminal case for libel, under Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission, does not prevent the prosecution of a civil action for damages under the same Act, which clearly recognizes two distinct actions, upon the theory that there are two separate and distinct injuries received from the crime, one by the State and the other by the individual damaged by the libel. In such a case, therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the prosecution of the civil suit while the criminal appeal is pending, will be denied. The general rule is that the plea of res adjudicata cannot be interposed except where the parties, the facts, and the questions involved are the same. As between civil and criminal actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the prosecution of the other. Hence, a judgment in a criminal cause cannot be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. That case dealt with the interpretation of section 11 of Act No. 277, which reads: In addition to the criminal action hereby prescribed, a right of civil action is also hereby given to any person libeled . . . against the person libeling him for damages sustained by such libel . . . And it was held that Act No. 277 recognized two distinct and independent actions on the theory that two distinct and independent injuries are caused by the crime of libel-- one to the State and another to the private individual, prejudiced by reason of the crime. The rule adopted was substantially enunciated as follows: A judgment in a criminal prosecution constitutes no bar to estoppel in a civil action based upon the same acts or transactions, and conversely of a judgment in a

civil action sought to be given in evidence in a criminal prosecution. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings are not between the same parties. Different rules as to the competency of witnesses and weight of evidence necessary to the findings in the two proceedings also exist. As between civil and criminal actions, a judgment in one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A judgment in a criminal cause cannot be pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. There is no need to amass citations in support of the general rule thus stated, since there can be no doubt that it is well founded upon justice and authority. Nevertheless, I believe that this general rule with respect to a civil action for libel and the criminal action arising therefrom, is not applicable to the instant case, wherein the civil action for divorce is so closely linked to the criminal action for adultery that the very life of the former depends upon the success of the latter. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case for libel is no bar to the institution of a civil action for damages caused by the libel, a judgment of acquittal for adultery kills the action for divorce. While, pursuant to Act No. 277, the civil action may be commenced and prosecuted until the rendering of judgment independently of the criminal action; under Act No. 2710, the action for divorce cannot be prosecuted, although it may be commenced until judgment is rendered in the criminal action for adultery or concubinage.
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And this shows the intimate relation established by the law between the civil action for divorce and the criminal action for adultery or concubinage.
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Section 3 of the Divorce Law provides: The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of a consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. Where both spouses are guilty, a divorce cannot be claimed by either of them. And section 8 of the same Act prescribes: A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action. In view of these legal provisions, I am of opinion that the judgment rendered in the action for adultery, Exhibit B, is conclusive proof of the defendant's guilt in the civil action for divorce, which is an indispensable requisite for the granting of a divorce.
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On the hypothesis that the plaintiff has proved his allegations in the complaint for divorce, and having filed his action within the period authorized by the law, I am of the to the appellant's rights in dismissing the present action; and I hold that the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and the case remanded to the court of origin with instruction to grant the divorce applied for in the complaint, in accordance with Act No. 2710, without a special pronouncement as to costs. Villa-Real, J., concurs.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-26435 March 4, 1927

JUANARIA FRANCISCO, Plaintiff-Appellant , vs. LOPE TAYAO, DefendantAppellee. MALCOLM, J.:


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As rightly stated by counsel for the appellant in his well prepared brief, the present appeal raises only a question of law, which is whether or not, under the facts, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce in accordance with the Philippine Divorce Law. The related question resolutory of the appeal is whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the husband, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the acts for which the husband was convicted of adultery may also constitute concubinage.
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Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, contracted marriage in the City of Manila in 1912. They separated in 1917. The husband then removed to Zamboanga. There he was later prosecuted for having committed adultery with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that proceeding, Lope Tayao, together with his coaccused Bernardina Medrano, was sentenced by the late Judge Ponciano Reyes to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days imprisonment prision correccional, and to pay the costs. (Exhibit A.)
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On these facts, the action of Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, against Lope Tayao, the defendant, to have the bonds of matrimony between them dissolved was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was there denied by Judge of First Instance Revilla. The trial judge based his decision principally on the point that the plaintiff was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of sections 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law. This findings, as well as the dismissal of the complaint, is challenged by the plaintiff on appeal.
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In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute. (19 C. J.,36; Benedicto vs. De la Rama [1903], 3 Phil., 34, reversed by the United States Supreme Court for other reasons). The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. (Villanueva, La Ley de Divorcio, pp. 27, 46, and 47.) The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, is emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and the conjunctive "or." The same thought is again emphasized in section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that "The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . " Later on comes section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action"-that is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in a criminal action for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No. 2716, amendatory of article 437 of the Penal Code, adds nothing to the Divorce Law except as it clarifies the meaning of concubinage.
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Counsel argues along the line that the plaintiff is here the innocent spouse and that acts for which the defendant was convicted of adultery also constitute concubinage. But the

undeniable fact remains that the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of adultery and not the crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted on the complaint of the injured husband. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage. (Albert, The Law on Crimes, pp. 406, 407; 3 Viada Codigo Penal, pp. 144 et seq.; U.S. vs. Rivera and Vitug [1914], 28 Phil., 13.)
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In its last analysis, what counsel is asking this court to do is to sit as a trial court to convict the defendant of the crime of concubinage, although no prosecution for the same has been instituted by the aggrieved wife and no hearing has been had or judgment rendered in a lower court. This the appellate court cannot do. What counsel also desires this court to do is to add a third cause for divorce to the law and to insert two words in section 1 of the Divorce Law so that it will read: "A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or husband or concubinage on the part of the husband." This likewise the court cannot do. It would amount to judicial amendment of the law.
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For somewhat different reasons but with the same result, the judgement appealed from must be affirmed without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiffappellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escao," respectively.2
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The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

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Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
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Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and gobetween, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
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Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh.

"M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
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Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
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On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
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In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
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On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
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But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
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The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
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The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following: 1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
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2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.
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3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
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4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff. That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendantappellee, Vicenta Escao, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
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The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied) The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following: SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal. The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
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Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
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It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
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For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

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From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
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From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
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The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied) Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
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True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667: The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72) The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
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However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
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There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be

charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. - The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son. Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
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In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
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With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
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Summing up, the Court rules:

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(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
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(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
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(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
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(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
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WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

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(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
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(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
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(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
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Neither party to recover costs.

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Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Endnotes:
1

The latter was substituted by her heirs when she died during the pendency of the case in the trial court.

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The original complaint included the Roman Catholic Church as a defendant, sought to be enjoined from acting on a petition for the ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao; the case against the defendant Church was dismissed on a joint motion.
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In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains (Art. 53).

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She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8 August 1958.

Juarez vs. Turon (51 Phil. 736)

Questions: 1. What are the three periods of prescription provided in Act 2710? 2. Justice Johnson states in his concurring opinion : I prefer to leave the discussion of the incongruities of Sec. 4 of Act 27 until the question is squarely presented hoping that in the meantime the legislature may have time to make it more plain if that seems necessary. What incongruities did he refer? 3. Why does Justice Villamor and Villa-Real consider the one-yr pd. from knowledge by the complainant of the cause of action as the year of grace for the parties in a divorce case? What is the basis of their argument? 4. The two Justice mentioned farther that if the majority opinion is followed, the distinction between the prescription for causes of action occurring before the passage of Act 2710 and causes of action occurring after its effectivity, will disappear. How can you explain this argument? 5. Explain how Justice Villamor justified the reversal of the decision of the lower court which he advocated.

Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil. 42) Mar 4, 1927


1. Compare the case of Juarez vs. Turon to this case. 2. Trace the laws on marriage and divorce from the extension of the operation of the Spanish Civil Code of the Philippines in 1889 to the passage of the Family Code in 1988. 3. What was the basis of the trial judge for this ruling that the plaintiff was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of Secs. 1 and 3 of the Divorce Law? Explain your answer. 4. Justice Malcolm states in his decision For somewhat different reason but with the same result, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed State those different reasons of Justice Malcolm.

Tenchavez vs. Escano

(15 SCRA 355)

1. Narrate the facts of the Tenchavez case and state the issues that had to be resolved. 2. Why did Fr. Reynes advise the Escanos to have the marriage celebrated again? 3. Why was the marriage valid even if it was not recelebrated? 4. After the effectivity of RA 386 but before the promulgation of the Family Code, was a divorce sought by a Filipino in a foreign country and decreed there valid in the Philippines? Explain. 5. The Catholic Chaplain who married Tenchavez and Escano had not obtained an authorization from both the parish priest of Cebu and from the Archbishop. Why did the Supreme Court consider that authorization irrelevant? 6. State the essential requirements of marriage then when the parties in this case were married and the requirements now. Has there been any change? Explain 7. States the errors ascribed by the appellant to the trial judge and the ruling of the Supreme Court on each of them giving the ground for each ruling.

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