the fuss about Kelly? (Part one).

To Harish and Koshila, at Mobil.

To be, or not to be: that is the question: Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, And by opposing end them? 1 _____________

Persons are still surprised that Dr Kelly took his own life in July of 2003, and so much so that an inquest is still being called for. That which would have the authority to call any person it pleased, which could require any person so called to give evidence under oath, which could then tease out any strand it pleased after that, which could then make any call pleased, which could then come out with any recommendation if seen called for also, an age old and respected process. That rather, also, than the inquiry into Dr Kelly's death that the British government did at that time decide to initiate instead. And so that with the limited remit of all inquiries then. And that because, we might imagine, that if these inquiries weren't limited in some way, then we could suppose that 'questions' could go on forever. And that, paradoxically, has been the case anyway. And this because of this inquiry really. For that didn't satisfy all, of course. And so one could even wonder about that now? If inquiries are ever even meant to achieve that then also? That because it is intrinsic in the nature of inquiries that succour often remains for those that will never be totally satisfied anyway. And that because of these limits. And perhaps we even have fallen into a trap such as that, if such a trap exists that is... Still, given that, and that we might have fallen into that trap or any other trap there is, a gap always exists, doesn't it, somewhere in between. There where all judges, real judges even no doubt, try in all conscience to always sit..? That might of course seem a tad toady to some; to others, of course, not so much so then. Ah the gap then, there it is: to mine it, or mind it, then? Ah that is another question, entirely. _____________ As in our first work we start off with some form of introduction, not our own, again. Something to give us some feel for our subject, again, to begin with at least. And as with our first work, while feeling finally that the introduction had been somewhat starchy, it did at least get us going, we gave our self that. This might be starchy also then, can't be helped. For as we will be applying, essentially, the same modus as before, this is how we must start again then. This sort of approach works. We'd allow, of course, that there were significant others who didn't think much of our approach first time round though. That an outcome, actually, that was very near our being put off off continuing. Perhaps a good thing? Once more then, into the breach, we will
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From William Shakespeare's play, Hamlet: Act 3, scene 1. 'To be, or not to be,' is the famous opening phrase of a soliloquy in William Shakespeare's play, Hamlet. In the soliloquy Hamlet wanders about the stage questioning the meaning of life, and whether or not it is worthwhile to stay alive, when life contains so many hardships. He comes to the conclusion that the main reason people stay alive is due to a fear of death and uncertainty at what lies beyond life.' Wikipedia: On, 'To be, or not to be...''' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/To_be,_or_not_to_be 'A soliloquy, from Latin ("talking by oneself" like writing), a device often used in drama to enable a character to speak to himself or herself, relating their thoughts and feelings, sharing them with the audience. Other characters, however, are not aware of what is being said, of what is going on in anothers mind? _____________ 1

see In this work we are going to recount from Tony Blair's biography, Tony Blair: A Journey (2010), his version of events concerning the opening of the war in Iraq, as he saw them looking back later on: The wars tenuous legitimacy to begin with; hence his great concern to get the war on to a legal footing. Of his frustrations then, as events like this played out on the side-lines, he did not escape any of it. _____________:
'The absence of international unity in the original decision [to invade Iraq], and the vested interests of many to prove that it was a mistake counted heavily against us. I got a taste of this during a visit to Russia at the end of April Vladimir Putin...convinced the US was on a unilateralist course, not for a good practical purpose...the British surrogates... There was also another more pressing and more embarrassing issue for us. We were actively searching for the WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. We were sure we would find them. This was the moment I was waiting for. It would draw a line under one major issue...my attention soon got diverted... On 29 May, the BBC's Today programme contained as its top story revelations from its defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan. In it, he focussed on the forty-five minute claim in the September 2002 dossier. As I've said, this claim was in the dossier, it was highlighted by some papers the next day in a form we should, in retrospect, have corrected. But it then disappeared off the radar. The claim turned out to be wrong. Also, unknown to me, or to the secretary of state, or indeed to the JIC [Joint Intelligence Committee], there had been internal ministry of defence debate of it. One of those taking part in that debate, although not directly responsible for the dossier, was a Dr David Kelly, a Ministry of Defence intelligence expert of about twenty years' experience. The BBC broadcast did not claim, simply, that the intelligence was wrong on the forty-five minutes. What Gilligan said was: What we've been told by one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that actually the government probably knew that that forty-five minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in...Downing Street, our source says, a week before publication ordered it to be sexed up to be made more exciting and ordered more facts to be discovered. There could hardly have been a more inflammatory or severe charge. Mistaken intelligence is one thing. Intelligence known to be mistaken but nonetheless still published as accurate is a wholly different matter. That is not a mistake but misconduct. What's more, directly attributed to Number 10. In view of five separate inquiries into this and the vast quantities of ink, time and energy expended on it, it would be tedious to go back over every fact, every argument, every subargument and all the very painful personal grief that it caused. Dr Kelly, a decent and honourable man, took his own life. The top two people at the BBC, Greg Dyke and Gavyn Davies, resigned. Alistair [Campbell] and numerous officials went through several months of absolute hell over an allegation that was untrue. Probably my own integrity never recovered from it. Quite a consequence really. As a result of it, something else happened: the division over the war became not a disagreement but a rather vicious dispute about the honesty of those involved. A difficult situation became and remains an ugly one. Of course, as I have said, the blunt and inescapable truth is that though Saddam definitely had WMD, since he used them, we never found them. The intelligence turned out to be wrong. But here is where the relationship between politics and the modern media plays such a crucial role. The intelligence was wrong. We admitted it. We apologised for it. We explained it, even. But it was never enough, in today's media, for there to have been a mistake. The mistake is serious;
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but it is an error. Humans make errors. And, given Saddam's history, it was an understandable error. But it leads to a headline that doesn't satisfy today's craving for scandal. A mistake doesn't hit the register high enough. So the search goes on for a lie, a deception, an act not of error but of malfeasance. And the problem is, if one can't be found, one is contrived or even invented. I'm not saying we handled the allegation well. But it was a global firecracker that set blazing a whole series of conspiracy theories that in turn, at the very moment when we needed to unify people, divided them in the sharpest way possible. Before it, we were in error; after, we were liars. The basic facts are, actually, straightforward. As each inquiry in turn found - and on the evidence there was no other finding possible each of the points in the original broadcast was wrong. The forty-five minutes claim was not put in the dossier by anyone in Downing Street or anyone in government, but by the JIC. We didn't 'probably know it was wrong' and neither did anyone else. We never ordered the dossier to be 'sexed up'. Dr Kelly was not one of the officials involved in drawing it up. Worse, Gilligan then went on in an article in the Mail on Sunday to allege that Alistair was the author of the whole claim, i.e. invented it, a charge that brought Alistair into the forefront of all the anti-war protest and was just an unbelievable thing to write, unless you were really sure it was true; which, of course, manifestly it wasn't, and by then both ourselves and the JIC had denied it. It was never clear if Dr Kelly, who though he admitted talking to Gilligan denied making the allegation, really did brief him in terms that justify that story. But what followed set the pattern for the interaction between ourselves and the media in the years that followed. Relations between myself and the BBC never really recovered; and parts of the media were pretty off-limits after it. The problem was that the BBC hierarchy couldn't see that it wasn't an allegation we could let pass. Look, if political leaders had to chase up every false or distorted story about their motives, they would be full-time press fact checkers. But this was qualitatively different. People were giving their lives in Iraq. They could forgive an error. They couldn't forgive a deception. Besides anything else, it meant I had deliberately misled the House of Commons. That in itself, if true, would mean resignation and disgrace. From the outset, I tried to get Greg and Gavyn to see it. Here's where my friendship with both was a hindrance not a help. The Mail had been running a campaign attacking them as stooges. They wanted to prove their independence. Greg had also been personally anti-war and couldn't really see that as Director General off the BBC he had to remain neutral. All I needed was for them to accept that the story was untrue. They could attack the government al they liked, but the allegation of impropriety should be withdrawn. They wouldn't. Gavyn kept saying it wasn't the function of the BBC governors to investigate the truth of the allegation a bizarre position since that was precisely what they should have done. Greg he could be very obstinate tried to maintain that the broadcast was accurate because the forty-five-minutes claim was wrong, which, as I constantly said, was not the point. Anyway, I could bore you to tears with my side of the issue and no doubt they could with theirs. What happened subsequently was more serious and tragic. The Gilligan allegation led to a rash of others. The Foreign Affairs Committee decided it should investigate, and we were slap bang into what turned into a six-month battle of immensely timeconsuming, wearing, dispiriting and draining efforts to clear our collective name. It became apparent in early July who the source was for the Gilligan story. Dr Kelly offered himself up. He admitted that he had also talked to Susan Watts on Newsnight, but her report had been a lot milder and less inflammatory, though even those had the quite wrong allegation that there had been a dispute over the forty-five-minutes claim the intelligence services and
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Downing Street, which was not the case. There had never been a discussion of it, since we never knew of it until the JIC put it in the dossier. I will never know precisely what made Dr Kelly take his own life. Who can ever know the reason behind such things? It was so sad, unnecessary and terrible. He had given such good and loyal service over so many years, probably, unused to the intensity of the pressure which the Gilligan broadcast generated, he felt hemmed in and possibly vulnerable to internal discipline if his role emerged. I don't know and shouldn't really speculate. I met his family later at Chequers, at my request, and very dignified and sensible people they were. The awful irony was that for all the controversy caused, Dr Kelly himself had long been an advocate of getting rid of Saddam. How Dr Kelly's name came out was the subject of a significant part of the Hutton Inquiry. That too was the subject of Brutal media allegations, particularly against Alistair. It was suggested that he had leaked the name in breach of instructions from the Ministry of Defence. He hadn't. It was simply that once we knew it was Dr Kelly, and since the Foreign Affairs Committee was engaged in investigating the forty-five-minutes claim and broadcast, we would have been at risk of a charge of concealment from them had we known the source of the leak and refused to say. In fact, the whole thing was handled by Dr Kelly's line management, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Kevin Tebbit, and by Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office, at my insistence. His name was released on 10 July, and surprisingly the Foreign Affairs Committee said they would interview him. On 15 July he was interviewed. He denied he could have been the source of the Gilligan story since he disputed it. In particular, he said he had never thought or said that Alistair was responsible for inserting stuff into the dossier. The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) was also conducting its own inquiry. He had to give evidence to them as well; and in the course of it said he thought the dossier was 'a fair reflection of the intelligence that was available and presented [in] a very sober and factual way'. I had a rough PMQs [Prime Minister Question session] on the back of it all on 16 July [so had Dr Kelly the day before, 15 July, and in front of not just that committee then [Nick Cohen, et all al2]. The BBC were refusing to say whether Dr Kelly was their source. The Foreign affairs
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' when he appeared before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 15 July 2003, Kelly appeared to be under severe stress, which was probably increased by the televising of the proceedings. He spoke with a voice so soft that the air-conditioning equipment had to be turned off, even though it was one of the hottest days of the year. His evidence to the committee was that he had not said the things Gilligan had reported his source as saying, and members of the committee came to the conclusion that he had not been the source. Some of the questioning was very precise. The Labour MP Andrew MacKinlay, in particular, used a forceful tone in his cross-examination. For example, when asked to simply list the journalists that he met, Kelly declined to answer and requested that such a list be sought from the MoD, which triggered a response: "...This is the high court of Parliament and I want you to tell the Committee who you met... You are under an obligation to reply". The Chairman of the Committee (Donald Anderson) underscored the validity of MacKinlay's question telling Kelly: "It is a proper question... If you have met journalists there is nothing sinister in itself about meeting journalists, save in an unauthorised way." Mackinlay offered his opinion that Kelly had been used by Gilligan telling Kelly: "I reckon you are chaff; you have been thrown up to divert our probing. Have you ever felt like a fall-guy? You have been set up, have you not?" Kelly was deeply upset by his treatment before the Committee and privately described MacKinlay as an 'utter bastard.' During the hearing, he was closely questioned about several quotes given to Susan Watts, another BBC journalist working on Newsnight, who had reported a similar story. It later emerged that Gilligan had himself told members of the committee that Watts' source was also Kelly. Kelly denied any knowledge of the quotes, and must have realised that he would have serious problems if the Ministry of Defence believed he had been the source of them. On the following day, (16 July 2003), Kelly gave evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee. He told them that he liaised with Operation Rockingham within the Defence Intelligence Staff.' Wikipedia: On, Dr Kelly's appearance before House of Commons committees... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Kelly_(weapons_expert)#Appearance_before_House_of_Commons_com mittees __________ From Nick Cohen: In this version the question put to Dr Kelly by MP Andrew Mackinlay, went like this: Have you ever felt 4

Committee had decided that he wasn't and reprimanded the government. I was outraged by The BBC position. It was all very well for them to hold to the traditional journalistic practice of not revealing their source, but this was patently an exceptional case. Here someone was being described as a source. They could confirm or deny his involvement. They didn't need to name who it was, if it wasn't Dr Kelly. Just say that there was someone else. But, of course, they didn't dare, since if they admitted it was only Dr Kelly and since he had denied saying what they alleged, they would have had to withdraw the story as originally broadcast. This, they were damned if they were going to do. That evening I flew to the US. The next day I was due to address both Houses of Congress. It was a big moment. I wrote the speech on the way over and the next morning. It was one of the most important and, in my judgement, best speeches I made... This is the battle that can't be fought or won only by armies. We are so much more powerful in all conventional ways than the terrorist, yet even in all our might, we are taught humility. In the end, it is not our power alone that will defeat this evil. Our ultimate weapon is not our guns, but our beliefs. There is a myth that though we love freedom, others don't; that our attachment to freedom is a product of our culture; that freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law are American values, or Western values; that Afghan women were content under the lash of the Taliban; that Saddam was somehow beloved by his people; that Victimise was Serbia's saviour. Members of Congress, ours are not Western values, they are the universal values of the human spirit. And everywhere, any time ordinary people are given the chance to choose, the choice is the same: freedom, not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law; not the rule of the secret police. The spread of freedom is the best security for the free. It is our last line of defence and our first line of attack. And just as the terrorist seeks to divide humanity in hate, so we have to unify it around an idea. And the idea is liberty. We must find the strength to fight for this idea and the compassion to make it universal. Abraham Lincoln said, 'Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves.' And it is this sense of justice that makes moral the love of liberty. In some cases where our security is under direct threat, we will have recourse to arms. In others, it will be by force of reason. But in all cases, to the same end: that the liberty we seek is not for some but for all, for that is the only true path to victory in this struggle... And this is not a war of civilisations, because each civilisation has a unique capacity to enrich the stock of human heritage. We are fighting for the inalienable right of mankind black or white, Christian or not, left, right, or a million different to be free, free to raise a family in love and hope, free to earn a living and be rewarded by you efforts, free not to bend your knee to any man in fear, free to be you so long as being you does not impair the freedom of others. That's what we're fighting for. And it's a battle worth fighting. And I know it's hard on America, and in some small corner of this vast country, out in Nevada or Idaho or these places I've never been to, but always wanted to go, I know out there there's a guy getting on with his life, perfectly happily, minding his own business, saying to you, the political leaders of this country, 'Why me? And why us? And why America? And the only answer is, 'Because destiny put you in this place in history, in this moment in time, and the task is yours to do.' And our job, my nation that watched you grow, that you fought alongside and now fights
like you are a Patsy? You have been put up as chaff? Said one Parliamentarian...' That actually put, redacted or what, we don't know, but Cohen has it as fact, in quotation marks? Cohen, Nick (2010). London, England. Columnist, Blogger: http://nickcohen.net/2010/08/22/who-killeddavid-kelly-part-2/ _____________ 5

alongside you, that takes enormous pride in our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be there with you. You are not going to be alone. We will be with you in this fight for liberty. And if our spirit is right and our courage firm, the world will be with us. The reception was ecstatic. They got up and applauded throughout, a total of thirty-five times. But then they have always been generous to their speakers. In later times, congressmen and senators have frequently mentioned it to me. That thing is: it did have an argument to it, and though the Republicans loved the tough security stuff, the Democrats could agree on the broader agenda in the speech involving climate change, Middle East peace, Africa and social justice. The problem was that this, in a way, describes my political weakness. The right agreed partly; the left, partly. But very few in whole! After the speech Cherie and I went back for diner with George and Laura, who were, as ever, gracious and welcoming. I think he was genuinely impressed with the speech and it was a relaxed and generally happy evening. At that point, we had won. Saddam had gone. From George's perspective, the regime had been changed and with relative ease. From mine, the UN was now back in the mix and there was a prospect of the international community coming together again. It was the last easy going evening contemplating Iraq. We left reasonably early. Alistair had gone back to the UK. I was due to fly to Japan and South Korea for a long promised visit. Cherie and I drove to the Andrew's Air Force Base outside Washington. It would be a long flight. We changed into BA sleeper suits and went to sleep. In the middle of the night, Sir David Manning woke me. 'Very bad news,' he said. David was calm, matter-of-fact, and a brilliant advisor, someone of deep integrity, great loyalty and not insignificant courage. He has been a massive support throughout the whole Iraq business. He was due to leave soon and go to Washington as ambassador. 'David Kelly has been found dead,' he said, 'suspected suicide.' It was a truly ghastly moment. Of course, in a rational world, it would be a personal tragedy. It would be explained by the pressure on him. It would be treated as an isolated event. I knew there was not the slightest chance of that happening in our media climate. It would be treated as a Watergate-style killing. It would provoke every manner of conspiracy theory [it did! 3]. It would give permission for any and every fabrication of context, background and narrative. The media would declare it was a scandal. They were absolutely capable of ensuring there was one. I often go over the decision to hold the inquiry into Dr Kelly's death, taken in those early hours, exhausted, on the flight across the Pacific, by means of the unsecured plane phone. I spoke to Charlie Falconer, who had succeeded Derry as Lord Chancellor. He agreed to find a judge. It had to be someone utterly impeccable, impartial, someone whom no one could allege was New Labour or even knew us. If necessary, we would do it in public, though I had no idea just how much there would be and how long it would take. Eventually, Charlie came back with the suggestion of Lord Hutton, the former Northern Ireland judge, a law lord, someone who definitely fitted the description. He was indeed, by all accounts, of unimpeachable integrity. We appointed him then and there. Maybe I should just have slogged it out. Maybe I should have just refused to be overwhelmed by the ferocity of the onslaught. But, though, naturally, I was wanting to clear my name, that wasn't the main motivation. From the outset, deprived of a real policy attack on New Labour, this alternative attack of being a government of 'spin', of 'deceit', of me as a 'liar', had taken root. It was part of what modern politics was becoming: personal attack, not political debate. In normal circumstances, in debates over the run-of-the-mill type of political issue, such brutal exchanges didn't go far. It was in the 2001 election that the Tories had first called me 'Bliar'. However, this was about a decision to go to war. In this instance, could we really tough it out? Weren't we obliged to have it investigated? Maybe. Maybe not. But at that time, I felt enough is enough. Let it all be brought out in the open. Let us be utterly transparent. Let the truth be told. The surely, with an objective judgement by a professional judge, people will accept the
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Prescience: New York Times (2003). '...Blair Calls Weapons Expert's Suicide a Tragedy.' http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/20/world/after-the-war-london-blair-calls-weapons-expert-s-suicide-atragedy.html 6

ruling. Surely? On balance, I still think it was worth it. Maybe, in time, it will be seen for what it is; but back then, after six diverting months, it was hard to see the positives. I won't go through each and every point of the evidence. Read the report, I recommend. It was unprecedented for the prime minister and all senior officials to give evidence like this. There had never been anything like it. It was due to conclude in October. Lord Hutton finally published the report at the end of January 2004. it went over the dossier, it's compilation, the role of Alistair, the activities of each minute section of the Ministry of Defence and Downing Street, what Dr Kelly did, and went over it all exhaustively. This was part of the conclusion: The dossier was prepared and drafted by a small team of the assessment staff of the JIC. Mr John Scarlett, the chairman of the JIC, had the overall responsibility for the drafting of the dossier. The 45-minutes claim was based on a report which was received by the SIS from a source which that service regarded as reliable. Therefore, whether or not at some time in the future the report on which the 45-minute claim was based on is shown to be unreliable, the allegation reported by Mr Gilligan on 29 May 2003 that the government probably knew that the 45-minute claim was wrong before the government decided to put it in the dossier was an allegation which was unfounded... As the dossier was one to be presented to, and read by, Parliament, and the public, and was not an intelligence assessment to be considered only by the government, I do not consider that it was improper for Mr Scarlett and the JIC to take into account suggestions as to drafting made by 10 Downing Street and to adopt these suggestions if they were consistent with the intelligence available to the JIC... The BBC management was at fault in the following respects in failing to investigate properly the government's complaints that the report in the 6.07 a.m. broadcast was false [and] that the government probably knew that the 45-minute claim was wrong even before it decided to put it in the dossier...There was [though] no dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous strategy by the government covertly to leak Dr Kelly's name to the media. What the judge found was all he could find, really, on the evidence. But it was a seminal moment in the way the media behaved. The judge, of course, had come under intense media pressure. He had stood up to it well, but in the days preceding publication I was worried, not about the facts, but about whether he really would feel able to judge on them. Up to that point, the media had been egging him on: he was a man of Ulster granite; he would put the government spin doctors in their place; he would be unafraid to call a lie a lie, etc. When I was his pupil, Derry [Irvine] used to tell me that there were two types of judges: those who made up their minds, but left loose ends, something for the losing side to cling to, something that expressed the judge's own inner hesitation about making a clear decision; and those who made up their mind, and once of that view, delivered the decision complete, unadulterated and unvarnished, with every allegation covered and every doubt answered. Lord Hutton was of the latter kind. It was a comprehensive judgement, comprehensively delivered. Michael Howard, responding to it in the House, stupidly tried to carry on as if the judge hadn't found as he had, a bad mistake and one which heightened the sense of him as an opportunist who supported the war and, now it was tough, wanted to access some of the anti-war sentiment. For us, it was a huge relief, but in our relief, we made our own mistake, a serious one with serious consequences. I had been having private conversations with Gavyn Davies throughout, keeping lines open and ensuring our entire relationship with the BBC was not jeopardized. After all, they were the main news outlet of the nation. We had agreed in the course of these discussions that in the event of the judgement finding fault, we should try to keep the temperature down on both sides. The last of these conversations took place just before Hutton declared his verdict and I reassured Gavyn that we
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would not be asking for anyone's head if any in the BBC were criticised. The day the report was published 28 January was hugely busy for us. The close team sat in the Cabinet Room with trepidation and anticipation, awaiting copies which Cedric Smith, who had been Alistair's number two, brought in. I joined them and we scoured the conclusions hungrily and there was an audible collective sigh of relief as we realised he had found in our favour; and then genuine amazement that he had had the courage not to dress it up for the BBC, but to call it as it was. I then had to prepare my statement to the Commons. It was only the day after we had narrowly survived the tuition-fee vote and both events had taken it out of me. I just wanted to go back to my den and write my statement. Alistair said he also wanted to do a statement. He had left Downing Street by then, but had come back to receive the report, as one of the main actors in the drama. We were still very close. Reluctantly, I agreed. In fact, I think he would have insisted. He wrote some words out. The statement included a passage about how if he or someone under him had been found guilty of such a thing the judge had essentially found that the BBC broadcast was not just wrong, but they had known it was heads would have rolled. I took it out, much to his dismay, and he protested vigorously. He couldn't understand why. As I had agreed with Gavyn, I had told no one about our conversations, apart from Anji [secretary]. So, Alistair didnt know why I was so vehement that the passage had to come out. I had, insensitively and foolishly, not quite appreciated the strain Alistair was under. He is, as I have said, a highly strung character. Believe it or not, I only really understood this to its full extent when I read his diaries. I hadn't realised that the months since he had left had been lived in agony about the verdict. Of course, having left Downing Street he didn't have the allembracing nature of the job to distract him. His life had been on hold. Meanwhile, he was still regularly accosted in the street and accused of murdering Dr Kelly, and receiving hate mail, often with bloodstains on it, at his family home. So for him, this was a moment of enormous emotional release. But all the anger bottled up inside and Alistair had a lot of that in him also erupted. He wasn't thinking, he was lashing out. When he came to make his statement, which he did with an emotion I could see was inspired by sadness about the whole business, but others would see as revenge on the media he had come to hate, he had put the passage about 'heads rolling' back in, in milder form but still there. Even then, I could have rescued the situation. But I was insufficiently focussed on the BBC; rather I was preparing my House of Commons statement, clearing my name and whacking Michael Howard for his opportunism. In any event, I thought Gavyn would call me before doing anything. I made my statement. It went well. I then went on a visit to a college. As I did a doorstep afterwards, I was still unsure exactly what the BBC had decided to do. I should, however, have said there and then that I didn't want anyone dismissed over it. Instead, I just concentrated on saying all I ever wanted was the withdrawal of a wrong story that reflected on my integrity. It was a mistake. Gavyn, I think, assumed I had rescinded my side of the bargain, given the severity of the judgement. He and Greg both resigned. I really didn't want that. Greg was just Greg and was never really suited to the BBC, but Gavyn was a decent and honourable guy and I felt I had let him down. It also provoked the media into a fightback. For about twelve hours, they were stunned. Then, with the Mail Group and the BBC again in alliance one of the most sorry aspects of the whole affair they decided to pit their strength against ours. 'WHITEWASH' screamed the Daily Mail headline the next day. The others took it up. Suddenly the man of Ulster granite was a Downing Street lackey, the BBC were victims of the most awful conspiracy and cover-up, and actually didn't everyone know we were liars anyway? It was wall-to-wall for several days and then topped off with polls showing the public did indeed believe it was a 'whitewash'. So what should have been a way of lancing the boil of mistrust simply reinforced it and made it more poisonous.

When allegations that we were a government of 'spin' are made and I ask for examples, the dossier is always the one that figures. But, I point out, there was an inquiry (one of four) lasting six months that found the opposite. Yes, but it was a 'whitewash', as we all know. The basic problem is that the manner of conducting the political debate does not lend itself to reasonable disagreement between reasonable people. The Gilligan broadcast led the news because it alleged misconduct, a lie, in effect. He thought he had a source, but an allegation that serious should at least, you would have thought, be put to the people against whom it was made. We were never contacted before it was broadcast. In any event, a mere mistake was never going to lead the news. Now, in actual fact, it should do. The intelligence was wrong and we should have, and I have [as has Bush] apologised for it. So the real story is a story and a true one. But in today's environment, it doesn't have that sensational, outrage-provoking 'wow' factor of scandal. Hence an error is made into a deception. And it is in this relationship between politics and media which then defines the political debate. The opposition feel obliged to join in, otherwise they look like patsies. Instead of the debate being between one view of the country and another, it becomes a battle as to who is 'more honest' or 'less deceitful' than the other...' (Pp. 452-464).

:_____________4 All that then, on that, from Prime Minister Blair, that from 29 May, 2003 till the end of January, 2004; till when the outcome of his Hutton Inquiry was reported back; its findings rubbished after that of course (though Blair would deep down have expected no less, relieved nonetheless), published to claims of 'whitewash', but out... Of course Blair would not exactly have wanted to use that word again (sexed-up), he didn't. But what he meant at the end of that was that ordinary decent news wasn't 'sexy' enough anymore either now. There had to be something else thrown in, to hold attention. Nor did the media play with a straight bat either. And that's as 'maybe' also, but harking back to when then were they obliged to anyway? Well certainly no further back in time to that of Edmund Burke (1729-1797), another Englishman, who argued, along with the French at the time of la guillotine, for the recognition of the fourth estate,5 la media, as an institution on its own, an instrument to effect transparency as much as was possible, of the dealings of office, not just to be left alone that they might spin how they might prefer, and so on... _____________ Hear hear: As background reading for this work the report of the inquiry, the Hutton Report, hasn't been overly gone into yet. Otherwise, had we read all of that first up, we could have run the risk of being overly 'satisfied' with that. And then, what's the fuss? Why, even Blair's words almost do it for us. Why there should be less satisfaction though (to get us going again), was perhaps best (we thought so anyway), summed up in a short letter, from Michael Bath of Rochester, Kent, printed in the Observer newspaper in the UK, 29 August, 2010:
'...Dr Kelly's death was in circumstances so odd they are unique and the case for an inquest should be simply that there has not been one.'6
4 5

Blair, Tony. A Journey. London, Hutchinson, Random Press (2010). The concept of the fourth estate is of a societal or political force or institution, its influence not consistently or officially recognized. It now most commonly refers to the news media, especially print journalism. The origin of the term has been attributed to Edmund Burke, who used it in a parliamentary debate in 1787, on the opening up of press reporting of the House of Commons, England. Schultz, Julianne. Reviving the fourth estate. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press (1998). P. 49. 6 Bath, Michael (2010). Letter, comment, posted on the Observer newspaper website - leading item 9

_____________

And well said, that man also! That is precisely so. And it is precisely this sort of sentiment and reasoning that has led to all the fuss still evident, over this, still. And first off (some other ideas on this now), what seemed so odd about Dr Kelly's 'suicide' that day was that there seemed no sign, on that day, that he wasn't coping (our more general reading of this anyway). He was keeping up with his correspondence and confirming future commitments, which, co-incidentally or not, included going out to Iraq again, from whence he had returned from just a month, thereabouts, before then! Then, at about 3pm, he took a walk after telling his wife he was going to do so, and as he often did also. And then, somewhere along the way, or where he was found instead, he ingested at least a few painkillers (co-proxamol), and then, in a wooded area, either leaning against a tree, or not (?), he cut his wrist (and not very well), with a knife then. Then, shortly after midnight, his wife becoming more and more worried, reported him missing. After that he was found early the next morning. He wasn't alive, nor was there a lot of blood apparent on him, or even near him, either? And from that moment on there has also been concern over that, that lack of sign (as above the same?). Over not just the apparent lack of sign that he was going to do this, now, but over the apparent lack of sign that he had done this where he was found also then? And so it has even been suggested that Dr Kelly's body might have been placed there since, and moved after that, also, then, after he was first found. And on that - not just moved a little either but from a sitting up, to a lying 'flat out', position then? And that due to witness accounts now, given at the Hutton inquiry, into this? Some side-line issue this. Worse, items now, that were said to have been there with his body when he was found, now might, it has been said, have been placed there and so displayed there also then? And that due to the first witnesses before the Hutton inquiry, giving their evidence first, not being asked then, about the placement of any objects near to Dr Kelly, nor commenting about any such thing when they might have also, given some lead in..? Of course, an inquest may well have cleared some of this up. That as witnesses can be called back, more witnesses can even be called, as a coroner might see fit. Conversely though, more witnesses still might not have been able to clear this up... and then, well, what after that? More like this? There still could have been. Trust given to one office, not always given to any other officer, the same? And so we are not the first then, certainly won't be the last either, to draw some of this out again. And although it could be asked, how this matters to us, anyway, still we are not on our own. One in early on (just one month after the Hutton Report was published, 28 Jan, 2004), who was waiting for this then, then put this out there, one Renan Talieva, who in this item, sub, sub-entitled ' Questions for the coroner's inquest' ,
having been by, Andrew Gilligan: 'I did not betray David Kelly or reveal him as my source: Andrew Gilligan disputes Nick Cohen's comment on the politics behind the death of the government scientist caught up in the Iraq inquiry...' http://www.guardian.co.uk/theobserver/2010/aug/29/david-kelly-nick-cohen-andrewgilligan Cohen's comment, 'belief' as Gilligan put it: had been that he and the BBC had 'revealed' Dr Kelly as their source? - Rather, Gilligan says this: 'It was his employer, the Ministry of Defence, that effectively leaked his name after he came forward, having been promised anonymity to his bosses [or] as Alastair Campbell put it in his diary (same item, url): "The biggest thing needed was the source out", in order to "f..k Gilligan"...' 10

gives us a taster then, of just one of some of the objections about to be raised following this (whitewash?):
'Did Kelly bleed to death? Medical specialists have questioned whether the incised wounds as described by Dr Hunt could have led to fatal haemorrhage. Only the small ulnar artery was cut which, having been completely transected, would have defensively retracted and clotted while blood pressure slowed, thereby greatly inhibiting the flow of blood. And if one were to accept a verdict of death by exsanguination [as an outcome of being bereft of blood not Hutton's only finding as to cause of death, but] why was there not more blood found in the vicinity? It has been estimated that for a person of Dr Kelly's size to die of haemorrhage, he would need to lose about five pints of blood. But witness accounts did not indicate anything near that amount at the scene. Paramedic Vanessa Hunt volunteered [at the inquiry] the observation that there was 'no obvious arterial bleeding. There was no spraying of blood or huge blood loss or any obvious loss on the clothing.... As to on the ground, I do not remember seeing a sort of huge puddle or anything like that.' [HI] This was seconded by ambulance technician David Bartlett, who commented 'we was [sic] surprised there was not more blood on the body if it was an arterial bleed.' [HI*] In rebuttal to these comments, the forensic biologist referred to 'a fair bit of blood' [HI] around the body and surmised that much of it had probably been absorbed by leaf litter covering the ground. He does not appear from the evidence to have tested the premise. The pathologist's conclusion that '[t]he arterial injury had resulted in the loss of a significant volume of blood,' [HI] seemed to derive from the fact that the artery had been cut rather than from specific evidence at the scene or the post mortem examination. He did not offer an assessment of the amount of blood remaining in the heart and large vessels to support a conclusion of haemorrhage...'7 [HI*], above, stands for Hutton Inquiry, as does [HR*] stand for Hutton Report. _____________

We could suppose that Renan Talieva might be a bit of an alarmist here? For this is a blog posting after all, and an early one at that, and he is, after that, a freelance writer living in the west of the US... But it does turn out that this point about blood loss the point is what it is could have been addressed before then had anybody thought ahead a little bit, allowed for a bit of this also then But that would only have been done, apparently, had Dr Kelly's death been deemed so odd at the time he was found dead also. And the lack of blood, we might add to that (others have), may even, ordinarily, have made that seem so then. But not, apparently, then. And alarmed by that, or not, or by others after that, we have this, recently, on that. And this is from a former coroner also, a Dr Michael J Powers QC (a barrister specialising in medical causation, a Fellow of the Faculty of Forensic and Legal Medicine of the Royal College of Physicians also), who now has this to say also, in the Mail on Sunday, 15 August, 2010:
'Hutton focused on the so-called dodgy dossier and the conflict between the Government and the BBC which, at that time, was more in the public eye. Because it was taken from granted Dr Kelly had killed himself, the medical evidence was
7

Talieva, Renan (2004). USA. Blog: 'Dead Scientists:

THE STRANGE "SUICIDE" OF DAVID KELLY:

Questions for the coroner's inquest.'

http://deadscientists.blogspot.com/ 11

insufficiently explored. In the absence of any bleeding tendency from a clotting deficiency (and there was no evidence of this) fatal haemorrhage from a severed ulnar artery is so improbable that more evidence was essential before such a conclusion could be reached. If you want to know how much beer has gone from a full pint glass, it is easy. You can either measure how much has been poured out or measure how much remains. To be confident, you would measure both. The same approach should have been adopted in this case. As it was not, there is no evidence as to whether there was sufficient haemorrhage from the ulnar artery to cause death. The inquiry fell into the trap of the circular argument: Dr Kelly died, therefore he must have lost sufficient blood. 'In my work as a barrister I meet many medics but I have never met a single doctor who has disagreed with the proposition that is extremely improbable that haemorrhage from a single, severed ulnar artery would ever be a primary cause of death. Yet this extreme unlikelihood was never explored with Dr Hunt. Whatever the reason, this was a serious failure of the Hutton Inquiry. It has understandably led to a suspicion of cover-up. This could not have been the cause of death, the argument goes. If it were not the cause, then what did cause his death? Was it something Dr Kelly did to himself, intending to cause his own death, which has not yet been discovered? Was it part of some elaborate plan by others to end his life? The only way to stop the many theories which abound is for there now to be a thorough and open investigation by way of a fresh inquest. Surely the Government realises that the way to foster conspiracy theories is to be secretive and to resist calls to disclose all the medical evidence.'8 _____________

And perhaps because of this, alarmed by this sort of talk, this medical evidence has been released now, the pathologist's report (released by the new government, 22 October 2010), in which blood loss is not reported as the sole cause of the death of Dr Kelly anyway. This report says, that:
'25. In summary it is my opinion that the main factor involved in bringing about the death of David Kelly is the bleeding from the incised wounds to his left wrist. Had this not occurred he may well not have died at this time. Furthermore, on the balance of probabilities, it is likely that the ingestion of an excess number of co-proxamol tablets coupled with apparently clinically silent coronary artery disease would both have played a part in bringing about death more certainly and more rapidly than would have otherwise been the case. Therefore I give as the cause of deathla. Haemorrhage [from the flow of blood from a ruptured blood vessel] lb. Incised Wounds to the Left Wrist 2. Co-proxamol ingestion and coronary artery atherosclerosis [CENSORED - signature] Dr Nicholas Charles Alexander HUNT BSc, MB, BS, MRCPath, DipRCPath (Forensic).'9 _____________

Hutton's conclusion, near seven years before then had, of course, been similar (Hunt was his witness on this, then, after all). But he concluded more clearly then, that blood loss may not have been such a factor in the death of Dr Kelly, his way now:
'467. I am satisfied that Dr Kelly took his own life and that the principal cause of death was
8

Power's, Dr. Michael J. (2010): Mail on Sunday, lead item: 'Michael Howard [Conservative Party Leader] leads MPs' call for full inquest into the death of weapons inspector Dr David Kelly,' Simon Walters and Glen Owen. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1303190/Michael-Howard-leads-MPs-Dr-David-Kellyinquest.html 9 The Telegraph, London (2010).''Pathologist report, David Kelly.'' http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8079821/David-Kelly-pathology-report.html 12

bleeding from incised wounds to his left wrist which Dr Kelly had inflicted on himself with the knife found beside his body. It is probable that the ingestion of an excess amount of Coproxamol tablets coupled with apparently clinically silent coronary artery disease would have played a part in bringing about death more certainly and more rapidly than it would have otherwise been the case. I am further satisfied that no other person was involved in the death of Dr Kelly and that Dr Kelly was not suffering from any significant mental illness at the time he took his own life.'10 _____________

Not quite being able to let this pass from Hutton without comment here, we must say here that when Hutton says that he is satisfied that it is - 'probable that the ingestion of an excess amount of Coproxamol tablets coupled with apparently clinically silent coronary artery disease would have played a part in bringing about death more certainly and more rapidly than it would have otherwise been the case' - he is not just, we would say, settling for the opinion of Dr Hunt then. Rather he is also, we would say, allowing for the discrepancies as regards how much blood loss there seemed to have been at the scene. And he also, at that point, didn't actually have to add that last line either: that he was, 'further satisfied that no other person was involved in the death of Dr Kelly' either. That as he hadn't yet got in his report by then to the evidence of the expert psychological witness either, and whose opinion came last (after the BBC had been dealt with), and whose opinion it then was that Dr Kelly had indeed taken his own life. But there you are? And we might be reminded here of the expression, 'head them off at the pass', which Hutton would have known was impossible by then anyway. Alternately, this could have been his conclusion up till then also then? That, as there was no sign that pointed directly towards any unknown party being involved in Dr Kelly's death, then there was, therefore, no other person involved then. This very much in keeping with the type of judge that Blair ended up thinking he was also (above, p. 6), the no nonsense type and we would agree that he is likely that type. _____________ Knowing just how much blood loss there had been may not have been of any help then anyway. Not such an oversight then. He was dead after all. But the actual reason for this question, outside of the inquiry, was not so much to determine just how much blood loss there had been, rather it was to question instead whether or not Dr Kelly had died where he was found also. And added to that there had been speculation then about whether or not objects were arranged near to Dr Kelly after he was found also? Obviously, in order to draw more of this out (and go further now as there is a little more), we need to look at the moment Dr Kelly was first 'found' also then. And there is a good record of this from the inquiry. And we also need to keep looking at the scene for some time after that. And so allowing, that as Dr Hunt arrived at the scene near three hours after Dr Kelly was found (the scene well cordoned then), this seems a fair amount of time to allow for our purposes now then. And of some useful record, and worth including here, is this from Dr Hunt about that moment and from his report recently released also then:
'At approximately mid-day on the 18th July 2003, at the request of Thames Valley Police, I attended the scene of a suspicious death near Longworth, Oxfordshire. I was logged into the outer cordon of the scene at 12.00 hrs. I approached the inner cordon via a farm track and field. I was logged into this cordon at 12 04 hrs. by PC [CENSORED] On arrival I was met by DI
10

Hutton, Lord (2004). Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr David Kelly C.M.G: Summary of Conclusions. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/report/chapter12.htm#a90 13

Ashleigh Smith, Acting Principal SOCO, Mark Schollar and Senior SOCO, John Sharpley [NFS] At this stage I was given brief background information by Mr Schollar, these being that the deceased was believed to be Dr David Christopher Kelly, date of birth 14.5.44. I understand that the deceased, a Ministry of Defence adviser, had been reported missing by relatives. He was apparently seen heading for a walk at approximately 15.00 hrs. on the 17th July 2003. He was subsequently seen at 15.30 hrs. walking northwards. That, I understand, was the last known sighting of him (at this stage). I understand that he was reported missing sometime between 23.00 hrs. and midnight [NFS]. At approximately 09.15 hrs. on the morning of the 18th July 2003, a body was discovered [sic] the relevant location by a search team. Paramedics attended and on the basis of their examination declared that life was extinct at 10.07 hrs.'11 _____________

As noted above (p. 10), Mrs Kelly became concerned for her husband's welfare later on the day of 17 July, 2003, and reported her concerns to police. A search was conducted proceeding from then and Sebev (a search and rescue organisation), volunteers, Louise Holmes and then Paul Chapman, sighted his body early the next morning, at approximately 09.15. The last persons reported as seeing Dr Kelly alive were neighbours the first being Ruth Absalom, who described him as '[j]ust his normal self, no different to any other time when I have met him.' [HI]. Farmer Paul Weaver, as reported by The Observer, 20 July, 2003, also saw Dr Kelly walking through farmland that afternoon. Weaver commented that Kelly 'seemed happy enough' and had smiled at him.' 12 _____________ From here before we add to this now, we would like to include the evidence verbatim given before the Hutton inquiry as regards that morning also beginning with Absalom first (Weaver was missed out); then, on, through the others called after that, up until Dr Hunt (the pathologist), on another day, who arguably saw him last, still. And so as to get through this preamble as quick as we can, we are going to leave one out ourselves now, PC Franklin, because we also think we can. All this evidence, given only some six weeks after Dr Kelly was found in the way he was, you'd have thought that all this 'evidence' would have been fairly uniform then also, considering the short time frame we mean. But uniform it was not quite, actually, leaving Lord Hutton with a moderate sized hurdle or two, to clear as best he could then also. He did well, but it is from bloggers, the odd newspaper article, that we know that there is still plenty left to get out of this story yet. _____________
'1 Tuesday, 2nd September 2003 2 (10.30 am) 3 MS RUTH ABSALOM (called) 4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS 5 LORD HUTTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. 6 Mr Dingemans, I understand Ms Absalom is going to 7 give evidence on the video link. 8 Good morning Ms Absalom. Thank you very much for 9 agreeing to give evidence to this Inquiry. I will ask 10 Mr Dingemans, the senior counsel, to take you through 11 your evidence. 12 MR DINGEMANS: Ms Absalom, can you hear me?
11

The Telegraph, London (2010).''Pathologist report, David Kelly.'' http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8079821/David-Kelly-pathology-report.html 12 Talieva, Renan (2004). USA. Blog: 'Dead Scientists: THE STRANGE "SUICIDE" OF DAVID KELLY: Questions for the coroner's inquest.' http://deadscientists.blogspot.com/ (As above, p 10). 14

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

A. Yes. Q. Where are you at the moment? A. Where am I? Sorry. Q. You are in Oxford, are you? What village do you live in? A. Southmoor. Q. Did you know Dr Kelly? A. Yes. Q. How long had you known him for? A. Well, from the time he came into the village, I suppose. I do not know how long that was, but a good many years -- several years. Q. What were you doing on 17th July? Do you remember the

1 1 17th July? 2 A. Is that the day I met David? 3 Q. Yes. 4 A. Just walking the dog. 5 Q. And how far is your house from Dr Kelly's house? 6 A. The width of a road, a main road. I do not know how 7 many yards. 8 Q. How many minutes walk? 9 A. A couple. 10 Q. A couple of minutes walk. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. On 17th July, what time did you walk your dog? 13 A. Well, I usually go about 3 but I went earlier that day, 14 I suppose about quarter past 2. 15 Q. Quarter past 2? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Did you see anyone while you were walking the dog? 18 A. Not until I met Dr Kelly. 19 Q. And when did you meet Dr Kelly? What time was that? 20 A. Round about 3 o'clock. I could not tell you for sure, 21 I did not bother to look at my watch but I was taking 22 the dog for a walk and -23 Q. Where did you meet him? 24 A. The top of Harris's Lane, which is in Longworth, the 25 next village. It is about roughly about a mile from 2 1 my home. 2 Q. How far from his home is that? 3 A. Well, he is only a matter of yards across the road from 4 me. 5 Q. So about just under a mile from his home; is that right? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. How was he dressed? 8 A. Normally. I did not take that much notice. 9 Q. Do you remember whether he was wearing a jacket or...? 10 A. Well, he had obviously got a jacket on but whether it 11 was a suit or an odd jacket and odd trousers I have no 12 idea. We just stopped, said hello, had a chat about 13 nothing in particular -14 Q. What did you say to him? 15 A. He said, "Hello Ruth" and I said, "Oh hello David, how 16 are things?" He said, "Not too bad". We stood there 17 for a few minutes then Buster, my dog, was pulling on 18 the lead, he wanted to get going. I said, "I will have 19 to go, David". He said, "See you again then, Ruth" and 20 that was it, we parted.
15

21 22 23 24 25

Q. How did he seem to you? A. Just his normal self, no different to any other time when I have met him. Q. Did you see whether he was carrying anything? A. No, I do not think he was.

3 1 Q. And do you remember how long you spoke to him for? 2 A. Five minutes at the most. 3 Q. And did you see what direction he left in? 4 A. Well, he was going for his walk. I suppose he went to 5 my right, along the road towards Kingston Bagpuize 6 I suppose in the end, if he had gone round that way, but 7 obviously he was going down to the fields down the road 8 or down to the fields down the back. 9 Q. Was that the last time you saw Dr Kelly? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And is there anything else surrounding the circumstances 12 of Dr Kelly's death that you can help his Lordship with? 13 A. None whatsoever. I am sorry, I wish I could, but that 14 is all I can tell you. I met him at the top of the road 15 there and we had a few minutes' chat and then Buster was 16 pulling his lead and David said, well, he said, "I must 17 get going" and that was it. We parted and he said, 18 "Cheerio Ruth", I said "Bye David". That was it. 19 LORD HUTTON: Thanks very much indeed for giving your 20 evidence. That is very helpful. 21 A. All right.13 22 23 24 25 LORD HUTTON: Now would you like me to rise? MR DINGEMANS: Just for a few minutes, my Lord. (10.35 am) (Short Break)...

6 3 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Ms Holmes, please. 4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you. 5 MS LOUISE HOLMES (called) 6 Examined by MR KNOX 7 Q. Ms Holmes, could you tell the Inquiry your full name? 8 A. It is Louise Holmes. 9 Q. And your occupation? 10 A. I am a hearing dog trainer. 11 Q. Sorry? 12 A. I am a hearing dog trainer. 13 Q. For how long have you done that? 14 A. The past two years. 15 Q. And who are you employed by to do that job? 16 A. I am employed by the charity Hearing Dogs for Deaf 17 People. 18 Q. How much experience do you have of foot searches for 19 missing persons? 20 A. I have been a member of my local search and rescue team 21 for nearly two years now. 22 Q. On Friday 18th July did you go to Abingdon police 23 station? 24 A. I did, yes. 25 Q. At what sort of time did you go?
13

Absalom, Ruth (2003). Neighbour: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans26.htm 16

7 1 A. I arrived there around quarter past/half past 7. 2 Q. When you got there, what were you told? 3 A. I was given a briefing, the name of the person that we 4 were looking for, a description of what he was wearing 5 when he was last seen and I was given an area to go and 6 search. 7 Q. And who gave you this briefing? 8 A. It was done by a police officer and SEBEVs Control 9 manager, Neil Knight. 10 Q. Were you given a photograph of the person you were 11 looking for? 12 A. Yes, we were given a photograph and an A4 piece of paper 13 with the name and a description of the missing person on 14 it. 15 Q. Were you told anything about the person you were looking 16 for, in particular? 17 A. Nothing other than what we were told. We were not given 18 any other details. It was made -- it was mentioned it 19 would probably become clearer during the day that it was 20 somebody who was fairly important, but other than that 21 we were not -- I had no idea of who he was. 22 Q. And you were given the name, Dr Kelly; is that right? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And were you in fact aware of Dr Kelly, who he was, 25 before this or had you read about it in the press? 8 1 A. Not until after the search when somebody said: who is 2 this guy? And then I went: oh yes. 3 Q. Who was assisting you when you went on this search? 4 A. I had Paul Chapman with me and then my search dog, 5 because I was out searching with my dog. 6 Q. Your search dog was called Brock, I understand? 7 A. Brock, yes. 8 Q. What sort of a dog was he? 9 A. He is a border collie crossed with an Australian 10 shepherd. 11 Q. You were at the police station initially, then where do 12 you drive to? 13 A. We drove to the start of our search area, which was at 14 the bottom of Common Lane in Longworth. 15 Q. That is where you had been told to go by the police 16 initially? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. You parked and got out of the car? 19 A. We parked the car at the bottom of the search area and 20 then started our search from where we had parked. 21 Q. About what time did you arrive at the search area? 22 A. It was about 8 o'clock. 23 Q. And what type of search was it that you were going to 24 do? Could you describe the method you were going to 25 have to adopt for this search? 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A. Well, I was working with the search dog, so it was a search with the dog and we did it purely as an air scent exercise, so the dog is trained to pick up on particles of human scent and then follow them to their source. Q. Who was on this search? A. Me, the dog and Paul.
17

8 Q. No-one else had joined you? 9 A. No. 10 Q. And where did you initially go, after you got out of the 11 car? Can you remember? 12 A. We walked up the track that runs north, I am told, on my 13 map of Common Lane up towards the River Thames. 14 Q. Can you describe, generally, how the search went 15 initially? Where did you go? 16 A. We were given the track to search north up to the 17 River Thames as our boundary and the area of wood to the 18 left of the track. So we did the bottom half of the 19 track, the south boundary of the woods before we were 20 forced to turn back because of a bashed wire fence. So 21 we then searched through the bottom half of the woods 22 which the fence ran all the way through. We then came 23 back out on to the track, continued up the track to 24 the -- to where our boundary was, came back down the 25 track and did the north perimeter of the wood, and then 10 1 went into the wood from the north. 2 Q. Did you at any point go along the River Thames? 3 A. We went up to where we -- where our boundary of our 4 search area was on the Thames and spoke to some people 5 there who were just moored on a boat on the Thames. 6 Q. What did you say to them? 7 A. Well, Brock had found them because he obviously is just 8 trained to pick up on human scent, so he went off and 9 indicated on them and so I had a game with him as 10 a reward. They just said: what are you doing? We said 11 we were assisting the police in the search for a missing 12 male person and if they saw anything to contact the 13 police. 14 Q. Did they say they already had seen anything? 15 A. They said they had seen the helicopter up the previous 16 night but they had not seen anybody or anything other 17 than that. 18 Q. Did you eventually manage to get into the wooded area? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Can you remember roughly what point that was? Was that 21 from the north or the south? 22 A. We did the north boundary of the wood. The wind was 23 blowing south to north and Brock was scenting in towards 24 the woods. So we came around and came in from the east 25 side of the wood. 11 1 Q. Then are you still with Mr Chapman at that point? 2 A. Yes, Paul was with me. 3 Q. What happened once you got into the wood? 4 A. We went into the woods a little way and Brock started to 5 pick up -- he gets quite excited when he gets on to 6 something. And he went off at a quicker pace so 7 I quickened to try to keep up with him, and I just 8 carried on following him and letting him work the area 9 and followed on until he went so that he was nearly 10 almost completely out of my vision, but I could see his 11 tail wagging and he went into the bottom of a tree and 12 then came running back at me barking to indicate that he 13 had found something. 14 Q. How far into the wood, roughly, was this from the point 15 that you had actually mentioned to get in, a mile or
18

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

less than that? A. No, probably only about 200 metres. Q. Before Brock had found this person, had you noticed anything unusual in the woods? Was there anything in particular you had spotted? A. No. Q. Had Brock identified anything before that? A. Nothing, no. Q. When Brock comes running back towards you, what do you then do?

12 1 A. He is trained that when he comes back when he has found 2 something he will come back and bark at me, and then 3 I just say: show me. He is trained he will turn round 4 and go back and lead me straight back into what it is 5 that he has found. But he came back and he was barking, 6 so I just said: good boy, where is it? He just sort of 7 laid down and looked at me, at which point I thought: oh 8 okay, he has found something but there is something 9 obviously not quite the same as a normal search or 10 a normal training exercise. So I just went from the 11 direction of which he had come until I got first visual 12 on the body. 13 Q. So in other words you walked ahead in that case? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Presumably Brock followed along afterwards? 16 A. He did not actually, he stayed sitting where he was. 17 Q. What did you see? 18 A. I could see a body slumped against the bottom of a tree, 19 so I turned around and shouted to Paul to ring Control 20 and tell them that we had found something and then went 21 closer to just see whether there was any first aid that 22 I needed to administer. 23 Q. And how close up to the body did you go? 24 A. Within sort of a few feet of the body. 25 Q. And did you notice anything about the position of the 13 1 body? 2 A. He was at the base of the tree with almost his head and 3 his shoulders just slumped back against the tree. 4 Q. And what about his legs and arms? Where were they? 5 A. His legs were straight in front of him. His right arm 6 was to the side of him. His left arm had a lot of blood 7 on it and was bent back in a funny position. 8 Q. Did you see any blood anywhere else? 9 A. Just on the left arm and the left side. 10 Q. Could you tell whether or not this was the person you 11 had been asked to look for? 12 A. Yes, the person matched the description that we had been 13 given. 14 Q. And could you tell whether he was alive or dead? 15 A. As far as I -- I was happy in my own mind that he was 16 dead and that there was nothing that I could do to help 17 him. 18 Q. What about Mr Chapman, he was obviously with you at this 19 point, I take it? 20 A. He was further back than I was. 21 Q. He was further back when you first saw the body? 22 A. Yes, and he stayed there to ring Control while I went to 23 check whether there was...
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24 Q. How long did you spend looking at the body before you 25 went back? 14 1 A. Probably only a couple of minutes, if even that. Just 2 enough to check for any signs of life, make myself happy 3 that there was none and that there was nothing I could 4 do; and then I went to go and reward my dog for his 5 find. 6 Q. I take it you did not actually go up to the body itself 7 and feel the pulse? 8 A. I did not touch it, no. 9 Q. And when you went back to Mr Chapman, which path did you 10 take? 11 A. I walked as best as I could back out the path I walked 12 in. 13 Q. I take it from that there was a specific path you had 14 walked in; was it actually a track? 15 A. No, there were no tracks in the wooded area we were 16 searching, no definite tracks anyway. 17 Q. Were there any tracks, as it were, around the wooded 18 area you were able to see, where the body was, or had 19 the person obviously walked in through the woods? 20 A. Not that I remember seeing, but... 21 Q. When you got back to Mr Chapman, what happened next? 22 A. Paul had tried to ring Control but had been unable to 23 get to them on the number we had for Control so we 24 decided to ring through to ask to speak to Abingdon off 25 a 999 call. So Paul rang the 999 and said we had some 15 1 information relating to that search, and somebody from 2 Abingdon rang us back and we arranged to walk back to 3 the car to meet the police officer to take them and show 4 them where the body was. 5 Q. When you say someone from Abingdon, would that be 6 Abingdon hospital? 7 A. Abingdon police station. 8 Q. And what did you then do? 9 A. We walked back towards the car. On the way to the car 10 we met three police officers and Paul took them back to 11 show them where the body was, and I went back to the 12 car. 13 Q. Did you meet the police officers in the woods or after 14 you got out of the woods? 15 A. No, on the track, just between the woods and the car. 16 Q. What did you tell the police officers? 17 A. They identified to us who they were. We said who we 18 were and we were involved in the search and we had found 19 the body, and they went with Paul to see. 20 Q. So in other words, Paul Chapman goes back with the 21 police to show them where the body is? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. What did you do? 24 A. I went back to the car to sort the dog out and then when 25 I got to the car further police officers and personnel 16 1 came up to the car to take over, take over the scene. 2 Q. Did you then go back to the scene at all? 3 A. No. 4 Q. So you presumably drove back?
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5 A. Yes, I was around about my car and car area for a while; 6 and then I was taken back to Abingdon police station to 7 give a statement. 8 Q. Did you have to wear any special clothes or special 9 shoes or anything? 10 A. I just wore my normal walking shoes, trousers. 11 Q. Did you hand in any of your clothes or shoes? 12 A. A print was taken of my shoes but they did not retain my 13 shoes, they just took a copy of the soles. 14 Q. The print was taken by the police, I take it? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Is there anything else you would like to tell this 17 Inquiry about the circumstances of Dr Kelly's death or 18 indeed the circumstances in which you found his body? 19 A. No, I do not think so. 20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Ms Holmes. Thank 21 you.14 22 23 24 25 Mr Dingemans, I understand that Mr Chapman is going to give evidence. Would he like to give evidence from where he is sitting? MR DINGEMANS: I think Mr Chapman wants to go into the

17 1 witness box, my Lord, but he has broken his leg so it 2 will take a bit of time to get there. 3 LORD HUTTON: Very well, I will just rise. 4 (11.00 am) 5 (Short Break) 6 (11.02 am) 7 MR PAUL CHAPMAN (called) 8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS. 9 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 10 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name. 11 A. Paul Philip Sam Chapman. 12 Q. What is your occupation? 13 A. I work for Prudential in Reading. 14 Q. Do you take part in any other voluntary activities? 15 A. Yes, I am a member of the Scouts Association and a 16 search controller and team leader for SEBEV Search and 17 Rescue. 18 Q. We can see you have a broken leg; did that have anything 19 to do with what you are about to give evidence about? 20 A. No, none whatsoever. I dislocated my knee falling down 21 some stairs. 22 Q. Were you called to assist in the search for Dr Kelly? 23 A. I was. 24 Q. When did you get that call? 25 A. I got an initial page soon after 5 o'clock on the 18th. 18 1 Q. In the morning or evening? 2 A. In the morning. And then a further text message to 3 indicate we had a call out. 4 Q. What did you do as a result of those messages? 5 A. I replied to the text message to say I was available for 6 the search and could attend at any time that day. 7 Q. What did you do? Did you attend anywhere? 8 A. Yes. Once the call out went live I got my kit together
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Holmes, Louise (2003). Search team: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans26.htm 21

9 and attended Abingdon police station, where the RV point 10 was. 11 Q. What does your kit consist of? 12 A. Carried in there is standard walking equipment, walking 13 boots, waterproofs, torch and an initial supply of food 14 and water for 24 hours. 15 Q. Have you received training for these tasks? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. What form does the training take? 18 A. It is a weekend course called a basic search technicians 19 course run by SEBEVs, which is one of the leading 20 training establishments in the country for search and 21 rescue, one of only three. Then ongoing training on 22 a weekly basis through the group. 23 Q. So where did you go for your briefing? 24 A. Abingdon police station. 25 Q. How many other people were at the briefing? 19 1 A. There were a couple of police officers, my search 2 manager, Neil Knight and Louise Holmes. 3 Q. Who gave the briefing itself? 4 A. The search manager, Neil Knight gave me details of our 5 search. 6 Q. What were you told? 7 A. I was told the missing person's name, we were given 8 a photo of him, description of what he was wearing. 9 Q. The name you were given? 10 A. David Kelly. 11 Q. What were you told he was wearing? 12 A. As far as I remember it was a jacket, a shirt and 13 trousers. I cannot remember the -- the colours were 14 written on the sheet, the descriptions. 15 Q. After the briefing, where did you go? 16 A. We were tasked initially with a search area of 17 Harrowdown Hill and the pathway running alongside it to 18 the river. 19 Q. Who were you searching with? 20 A. I was searching with Lou Holmes and her dog Brock. 21 Q. How long did it take to get from Abingdon to the search 22 area? 23 A. 10 or 15 minutes. 24 Q. You drove? 25 A. No, Lou drove. 20 1 Q. Where did you park up? 2 A. At the southern end of the path of our search area, just 3 north of Longworth. 4 Q. When you arrived was anyone else in the area? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Passed any cars on the way? 7 A. A few in the village on the way. 8 Q. Did you see any other search teams around? 9 A. No. 10 Q. Did you hear a helicopter or anything? 11 A. No, there was no helicopter at all. 12 Q. Where did you go on your search? 13 A. Initial search was we progressed north up the path, 14 Brock ahead of us searching and us searching, checking 15 the ditches either side and the pathway, until we 16 reached the southern perimeter of Harrowdown Hill wood.
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17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

We then entered the field by the wood, did a search of the southern perimeter of the wood until we reached a barrier, the barbed wire fence halfway round the other side. Q. Did you climb over the fence? A. No, we decided not to. We decided to retrace our steps round the wood back to the main path so we knew on the map where we were and what areas we had covered. Q. While you were searching up to the barrier, had you seen

21 1 anyone at this stage? 2 A. No. 3 Q. Or heard anything? 4 A. No, nothing at all. 5 Q. You hit the barrier then retrace your steps. 6 A. We retraced our steps and entered the southern side of 7 the wood and had a look through the inside of the wood, 8 where it was slightly more open. 9 Q. Could you see anything? 10 A. Could not see anything. There was the barbed wire fence 11 running the whole way through the woods, so that formed 12 our natural barrier within the wood. 13 Q. How large was the wood? 14 A. 50 to 100 metres across, roughly. 15 Q. Did you walk into the wood? 16 A. We did, yes. 17 Q. Up to the barbed wire in the wood? 18 A. Up to the barbed wire, yes. 19 Q. Where was the dog at this stage? 20 A. The dog was ranging from 5, 10, 15 metres ahead of us, 21 running in and out of the bushes and the areas. We were 22 just following that. There were no paths or anything so 23 we were having to climb across trees and go round all 24 the bushes and things. 25 Q. Did you come across anything? 22 1 A. Nothing in the southern area, no. 2 Q. Having searched the southern area of the wood, what did 3 you do then? 4 A. We returned to the main path, consulted with each other, 5 looked at the map and decided we would do the rest of 6 the pathway down to the river and get that eliminated, 7 and then come back and do the rest of the wood. 8 Q. Did you do the rest of the pathway down to the river? 9 A. Yes, we walked all the way down the pathway, which came 10 out to a gate just by the River Thames. 11 Q. Did you see anyone on that search? 12 A. Not until we reached the river and we met the people on 13 the boat. 14 Q. How many people were on the boat? 15 A. Either three or four, I cannot remember. 16 Q. Did you speak to them? 17 A. Yes, we did. 18 Q. What did you say to them? 19 A. They enquired what we were doing. We explained a search 20 team assisting the police, looking for a missing person, 21 and gave them a rough description of his age and said if 22 they saw anything could they contact the police. 23 Q. Had they seen anything? 24 A. They had heard the helicopter and seen some police
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25 officers at some point previously. 23 1 Q. Right. What, police officers on an earlier part of the 2 search? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. But they had not seen Dr Kelly at all? 5 A. No. 6 Q. After you had gone down to the river, spoken to them, 7 where do you go next? 8 A. We retraced our steps back up the pathway until we 9 reached the wood, came off the pathway and did the 10 northern perimeter of the wood until we came to the 11 other side of the barbed wire fence. 12 Q. You went back into the wood itself? 13 A. Initially no, we did the outside of the wood. 14 Q. Looking into the wood? 15 A. Looking into the wood. But it was quite dense 16 undergrowth so a lot of places you could not actually 17 get in through the perimeter there, but we were checking 18 the wood. 19 Q. When you could get through a gap did you get into the 20 wood itself? 21 A. We did not enter the wood there until we returned back 22 to the main path. 23 Q. Where was the dog at this stage? 24 A. The dog was running around, like I say, just ahead of 25 us. We were keeping back so we do not affect its scent 24 1 and smell. 2 Q. How long did it take to do the northern part of the 3 wood? 4 A. A guess, about 10 or 15 minutes. 5 Q. Did anything happen while you were doing the northern 6 part of the wood? 7 A. Nothing. Did not find anything. There were no 8 indications from the dog either. 9 Q. Where do you go after that? 10 A. Once we reached the barbed wire fence we retraced our 11 steps to the main path, again walking down the side of 12 the wood where it is much more open. We then entered 13 the wood after another 10 or 15 metres, and walked into 14 the wood from there. 15 Q. What part of the wood are you now looking at? 16 A. We are in the northern sector of the wood. 17 Q. Right. And does anything happen here? 18 A. After about five minutes the dog indicates a find and 19 Louise -20 Q. Where were you? Were you on the outside of the wood? 21 A. I was in the wood about five metres behind Louise. 22 Q. What happened to the dog? 23 A. The dog was ahead, I could hardly see the dog at that 24 point. I was just following up the hill and Louise then 25 said -- indicated -- said he had found something and she 25 1 went forward to investigate, whereas I waited there. 2 Q. So you did not move at this stage? 3 A. No, I waited there, as we are trained to do in case it 4 is a scenes of crime or anything, so we do not 5 contaminate it.
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6 Q. To avoid trampling down? 7 A. Yes, in case there is evidence or anything like that. 8 Q. Louise went up and looked. She came back? 9 A. She came back towards me. 10 Q. What did she say? 11 A. Yes, she told me we had found the missing person and at 12 that point I tried to contact our Control to let them 13 know. 14 Q. Did you get through to Control? 15 A. We did not on the mobiles, no, because the mobiles were 16 all to answerphone. 17 Q. So how did you contact anyone? 18 A. I then rang 999 and asked to be put through to Abingdon 19 police station. They could not transfer me so I asked 20 them to get someone at Abingdon police station to call 21 me urgently. 22 Q. On your mobile? 23 A. On my mobile, yes. 24 Q. Did they call back? 25 A. They called back within a couple of minutes, yes. 26 1 Q. Do you remember who you spoke to? 2 A. I do not. He just said it was a sergeant at Abingdon 3 police station. 4 Q. What did you report to him? 5 A. I reported who I was, a member of the search team, and 6 we had found the missing person, could they please then 7 speak to the search manager and the search police 8 officers there and get them to give me a ring. 9 Q. Did they? 10 A. Yes, they did. They called me back straight after that. 11 Q. What arrangements did you make? 12 A. At that point we were walking back down the path towards 13 the car and they said: keep going there and we will send 14 some police officers out to meet you there, back at your 15 car, Louise's car. 16 Q. Were you standing still in the wood all this time? 17 A. Initially, yes, but then we began walking out of the 18 wood back to the path because we realised that we would 19 have to go and meet the officers, and it was about 20 a 10 minute walk back to the car down the path so we 21 thought it is easiest to get going. 22 Q. Did you see what Brock the dog had found? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And what was that? 25 A. The body of a gentleman sitting up against a tree. 27 1 Q. And can you recall what he was wearing? 2 A. All I could see from the distance I got was he was 3 wearing a dark jacket and light coloured shirt. 4 Q. And how close did you get to the body? 5 A. I probably reached about 15 to 20 metres from it. 6 Q. Could you see anything at all? 7 A. He was sitting with his back up against a tree and there 8 was an obvious injury to his left arm. 9 Q. An obvious injury to his left arm. What was that 10 injury? 11 A. In as far as it was all covered in blood. 12 Q. Right. After you had seen that, where did you go next? 13 A. We retraced our steps back down to the main path and
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

then walked back south along the path to where the car was parked. Q. Did the police attend? A. Yes, they did. Q. And did you help them when they had arrived? A. Yes. As we were going down the path we met three police officers coming the other way that were from CID. We identified ourselves to them. They were not actually aware that (a) the body had been found or we were out searching this area. They I think had just come out on their own initiative to look at the area. I informed them we had found the body and they asked me to take

28 1 them back to indicate where it was. 2 Q. So these were not the people you had arranged to meet, 3 as it were? 4 A. No, because this was only 2 or 3 minutes after I had 5 made the phone call. 6 Q. How did you know they were police officers? 7 A. Because they showed me their Thames Valley Police 8 identification. 9 Q. Do you recall their names? 10 A. Only one of them was DC Coe. 11 Q. Did you show them the body? 12 A. Yes. We walked back up the hill with the three of them 13 and then they decided as they got a bit closer to the 14 edge of the wood that I needed only to take one of the 15 officers in, so I took DC Coe in to show him where the 16 body was. 17 Q. What were you wearing at the time? 18 A. I was wearing my standard search kit, walking boots, 19 outdoor trousers, our uniform polo shirts. 20 Q. Did you need to give anything to the police? 21 A. All they did was take a copy of the soles of my boots. 22 Q. Right. After that, what happened? 23 A. Once we had shown them where the body was, we returned 24 to the car. More police officers had arrived there. We 25 waited around a while until we were released from the 29 1 scene, where we went back with one of the police 2 officers to Abingdon police station where we made our 3 statements. 4 Q. You made your statement and then go off to work? 5 A. It was mid afternoon by the time we had finished there. 6 I actually had a day off as I was going away to cub camp 7 for the weekend. 8 Q. Do you know of anything else surrounding the 9 circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist 10 his Lordship with? 11 A. No, I do not. 12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Chapman. Just 13 take your time, please, to leave and do not rush at all. 14 Thank you very much15... 43... 13 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Mr Sawyer. 14 POLICE CONSTABLE MARTYN SAWYER (called)
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Chapman, Paul (2003). Search team: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans26.htm 26

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Examined by MR KNOX Q. Mr Sawyer, what is your full name? A. Jonathan Martyn Sawyer. Q. Your occupation? A. I am a police constable with the Thames Valley Police, stationed on the police search team the same as PC Franklin. Q. Which station? A. That would be from the Royal Lodge in Windsor Great Park. Q. What are your qualifications?

44 1 A. I am a qualified EOD searcher, which is explosive 2 ordnance searcher. We have to be licensed by the Home 3 Office and we retrain on a periodic basis. We also 4 train to search major crime scenes, murder scenes and 5 any major event. We search events like Royal Ascot, 6 which we call a defensive search, to make sure there are 7 no explosive devices left. We also do offensive 8 searches or crime scene searches, as the Dr David Kelly 9 search. 10 Q. I understand you are a search team leader? 11 A. I am a search team leader, which means I have done 12 a further course which enables me to actually run 13 a search. Police Constable Franklin, being the police 14 search adviser, will liaise with the senior 15 investigating officer. They will decide on the 16 parameters of the search, what they want searched. It 17 is then turned over to me to organise the logistics of 18 it, to plan the search, do the cordons, to set the 19 searchers going and supervise them while they are 20 searching. 21 Q. You were on duty on the morning of 18th July? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. What happened when you first turned up? 24 A. I was called out, I believe, about 6 o'clock in the 25 morning to attend Abingdon police station for 8, where 45 1 I was informed by PC Franklin we had a high risk missing 2 person. We had a missing person who was identified to 3 me as Dr Kelly. 4 Q. Just pause there for a moment. A high risk missing 5 person, meaning what? 6 A. "High risk" means that there is a possibility that 7 because of the length of time they have been missing 8 there is a possibility that he might have done himself 9 harm. 10 Q. So Police Constable Franklin tells you that. Then what 11 happens? 12 A. Then we are in the briefing that 13 Police Constable Franklin has already described. 14 We are just about to leave to perform our first 15 searches, which would have been in the village and the 16 surrounding areas of the route he was thought to have 17 taken, when information came in that a body had been 18 found. I then left with Police Constable Franklin to 19 attend the scene. 20 Q. Can you remember what time it was that that information 21 came in? 22 A. It would have been about 9 o'clock, I believe.
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23 Q. So you then leave with Police Constable Franklin? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And anyone else? 46 1 A. We had three other officers in the back who we took from 2 the search team to act as the cordons, because obviously 3 we do not want members of the public or members of the 4 press approaching the scene until it has been obviously 5 searched and declared sterile. 6 Q. And where did you then go? 7 A. We then went to the track that leads up to 8 Harrowdown Hill, I do not know the name of the track, 9 but when we arrived we saw a vehicle parked which 10 belonged to Louise. We started walking up the track. 11 We also had with us two paramedics who had arrived, 12 which we took up with us to make sure that the person we 13 were going to see did not require any medical 14 assistance. 15 Q. Those two paramedics had obviously arrived separately 16 from you? 17 A. They had arrived more or less at the same time we did. 18 So the five of us went up because we were with 19 Sergeant Alan Dadd as well. 20 Q. Where did you stop the cars? 21 A. Stopped the cars -- I believe it at is the top, I have 22 not seen the map but I believe it is at the top of 23 Common Lane. Then we turned left and right up to the 24 track which leads up to Harrowdown Hill. 25 Q. You go along the track, where do you then go to? 47 1 A. We met Paul from SEBEV walking down the hill. 2 Q. Paul Chapman? 3 A. He told us basically the body was further up in the 4 woods. We continued walking up the hill, where I saw 5 DC Coe and two uniformed officers. I said, you know: 6 whereabouts is the body? He pointed the path he had 7 taken. I asked him if he had approached the body. He 8 said he had. I asked him to point out where he had 9 entered the woods and PC Franklin and myself entered the 10 woods at the same point, taking with us a dozen or 15 11 aluminium poles we use when we are moving towards 12 a scene to establish a common approach path. 13 Q. Were the paramedics with you at the time? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. The other three officers? 16 A. They remained down on the path. 17 Q. So it is you, PC Franklin and two paramedics, then the 18 other three officers you have met; is that right? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. You go down further into the woods, is that right? 21 A. The three officers -- DC Coe and the two uniformed 22 officers -- stayed on the path which leads through the 23 woods. We branched off to the left about 50 or 24 70 metres up into the woods, where the body was. 25 Q. So it is just the four of you; is that right? 48 1 A. Just the four of us went up there. 2 Q. Did you see anything on the way? Did you notice 3 anything on the way?
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4 A. No, no. As we walked through the woods we were leaving 5 our aluminium poles, which have a fluorescent marker on 6 the top, so we could establish the route we had taken 7 into the woods. As we crested the slight rise, I saw 8 the body lying at the base of a tree. I then said to 9 PC Franklin and the paramedics to stop while I got my 10 digital camera because I wanted to take a record of the 11 scene before it was -- before we actually approached it 12 at all. So I took a number of pictures as we approached 13 the body, and of the body and the surrounding area; and 14 then the paramedics asked if they could do their job, to 15 which we said: yes. 16 They tried to -- they used the paddles of the 17 electrocardiogram machine to try to see if there was 18 a sign of life through Dr Kelly's shirt. They were 19 unable to do so and said: could they undo the shirt? 20 I said: yes. I asked them to wait for a second. I took 21 another two more reference pictures. They then undid 22 the shirt, put the electrodes on and got a graph from 23 the machine which showed there were no signs of life. 24 I then -- they disconnected their equipment from the 25 machine, leaving the electrodes in place; I asked them 49 1 to do that. I then took a further reference shot to 2 show the electrodes in place. 3 Q. Before the paramedics approached Dr Kelly's body, can 4 you remember what position it was in? 5 A. Lying on its back with its head at the base of a tree, 6 a large tree. The head was tilted to the left. The 7 right arm was by the side. The left arm was palm down. 8 There was a large amount of blood on the back of the 9 left arm. There was a watch and a curved knife by that 10 wrist. 11 Q. And you say a curved knife. Was it open? Was it a pen 12 knife? 13 A. It was open. I have seen gardening pruning knives which 14 look identical. I would have called it a pruning knife. 15 Q. Did you see a bottle of water? 16 A. I did, by Dr Kelly's head. There was an open bottle of 17 Evian, 500 ml or 300 ml bottle, with the cap by the side 18 of it, by his head. 19 Q. Was it upright? 20 A. It was leaning slightly. It had been propped but it was 21 upright. There was still some water in it. 22 Q. What injuries did you see on the body itself? 23 A. I could not see any actual injuries because the 24 injuries, I believe, were hidden by the wrist being 25 turned down. But there was a large amount of blood 50 1 there, and also from the mouth, the corner of -- the 2 right-hand corner of the mouth to the ear there was 3 a dark stain where I took it that Dr Kelly had vomited 4 and it had run down the side of his face. 5 Q. What about on his face, were there any marks or stains 6 on his clothes? 7 A. His jeans -- he was wearing jeans, they were pulled up 8 slightly, exposing the lower half of his leg or his 9 ankle. It looked as if he had slid down and his 10 trousers had ridden up. I believe on the right-hand 11 knee there was a patch of what I took to be blood, but
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12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

I do not know what it was, but it had the appearance of blood. Q. Did he still have his jacket on? A. Yes. Q. Were there any marks on the jacket, as far as you could see? A. No, only the blood from his wrist. Q. Now, after you had taken the photographs and seen the body, did you carry out any further searches? A. Yes. On the way back -- once we had finished with the body, once the paramedics had finished, we went back down the common approach path to the path where DC Coe and the two uniformed officers were. We then walked, leaving them there to guard the scene so nobody else

51 1 could approach it, we then walked back to the truck, our 2 Land Rover, and drove that up where we got some more 3 metal poles. We extended the common approach path from 4 one pole to two poles to about a 2 foot 6 gap, so people 5 could walk up and down. We then had a quick look on 6 that path, a search, just to check there were no major 7 items there. And then we waited for the senior 8 investigating officer to arrive and liaise with 9 Police Constable Franklin. 10 Q. The senior investigating officer was? 11 A. DCI Young. 12 Q. I think we heard from PC Franklin earlier a further 13 search was then carried out. 14 A. Yes. It was decided a search of the woods 10 metres 15 either side of the body, on the approach up the hill to 16 the body, would be carried out. I was tasked by 17 Police Constable Franklin to organise that. I had 18 a number of searchers at my disposal. Because of my 19 number of searchers I decided to split it into three 20 5 metre wide approaches up to the body. 21 Q. This involves searching what you call the common 22 approach path? 23 A. Yes. The first search would include the common approach 24 path. So my team of -- if I may refer to my notes. 25 Q. Yes. 52 1 A. I had a team of seven searchers initially, so I put 2 those into a 5 metre grid pattern which works up towards 3 the body, and that would include the common approach 4 path. So the first sweep, the first 5 metre search 5 included the fingertip search of the common approach 6 path. 7 Q. And that was carried out at what time? 8 A. That was carried out at -- sorry, we have an awful lot 9 of paperwork when we are doing this job. It was started 10 at 13.08 that first sweep. 11 Q. How many sweeps do you do? You talk about the first 12 sweep. 13 A. Right. My plan shows there were six zones eventually 14 which we searched. The first zone, zone 1, was to the 15 right-hand side of the common approach path to include 16 the common approach path. The second zone was 5 metres 17 beyond that, which took us up to level with the area 18 that we had taped off surrounding the body. Zone 3 was 19 the zone to the left of the common approach path.
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20 21 22 23 24 25

Zone 4, 5 metres further on from that. Zone 5 was the 10 metre radius round the back of the area where the body had been found, which was really dense brambles and overgrown trees. And zone 6 was the area where the body itself had been lying. Q. We do not have a photograph here at the moment but what

53 1 was the nature of the woods around the common approach 2 path and then where the body was found? 3 A. Up the common approach path to where the -- the common 4 approach path was the easiest route in, and either side 5 of that the undergrowth was reasonably light. But as 6 you moved away each side, left and right, the 7 undergrowth became extremely heavy. Zone 5, which went 8 round the back of the scene, was almost impenetrable and 9 the searchers had a really hard job getting through the 10 brambles and the undergrowth to check the ground. 11 Q. Obviously Dr Kelly had managed to get to where he was, 12 but in the searches you did were you able to identify 13 any footprints at all which would have explained how he 14 got there? 15 A. He had moved up through the woods to the last area, 16 where there was clear access. If I was walking into 17 those woods myself I would have walked up as far as he 18 had before deciding it was impossible to go any further, 19 because there were footpaths apparently which led 20 through that but they were so overgrown nobody had been 21 through them for a number of months. 22 Q. In other words, it was possible to walk to where 23 Dr Kelly's body was found without much difficulty? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. If you wanted to go any further you would have to go 54 1 through very dense -2 A. You would struggle, really struggle, yes. 3 Q. How long was the common approach path? 4 A. Estimate between 50 and 70 metres. 5 Q. When did that search finish, can you recall? 6 A. The final search finished at 19.45. We had to wait 7 until Dr Kelly's body was removed before we could search 8 zone 6, which is where the body had been lying. 9 Q. You were involved in all these searches? 10 A. Yes, I team led the team searches. When you are a team 11 leader and you are assigned to this, you see it all the 12 way through from beginning to end. 13 Q. At the end of the search, did you collect all the suits 14 you had been wearing? 15 A. Yes, I collected all the suits from both search teams. 16 As PC Franklin has said, halfway through or towards the 17 end the search teams were changed through fatigue, and 18 all the teams' suits and all the gloves were collected 19 and produced as an exhibit. 20 Q. They were taken back to the police station? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. On the next day were you on duty as well, Saturday 23 19th July? 24 A. Yes, I was. I returned to duty the following day again 25 to work with PC Franklin as he wanted me to team lead 55
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1 a search of Dr Kelly's house. 2 Q. And what did you do once you got there? 3 A. Whenever we search a premise the first thing we do is 4 walk through with the search adviser and we, again, just 5 check the parameters of the search. The search was to 6 include the house, any out-buildings, garages, cars and 7 the grounds, which were extensive in this particular 8 case. The house itself is a very large house. 9 Q. What were the results of the search of the grounds of 10 the house? Was there anything noticed? 11 A. The grounds there was nothing found. 12 Q. And what about in the house itself? 13 A. The house itself there were a number of exhibits. Do 14 you want me to go through them all? 15 Q. I do not think you need you to go through all the 16 exhibits themselves. Was there anything particular, 17 apart from documents and so forth that you found in the 18 house? 19 A. No. Basically there were documents that were taken 20 away. I believe there was a photograph found in his 21 study which has envisaged a little interest, but when 22 I am team leading the search, the officers who find the 23 exhibits will take them straight to the exhibits 24 officer, who books them in to the exhibits. They then 25 tell me so I can log them in my records, but I am not 56 1 looking over their shoulder the whole time although I do 2 travel round and supervise. 3 Q. Can you remember when the search of the premises began 4 on the 19th? 5 A. The search began at 11.05. 6 Q. And when did it finish on that day? 7 A. It finished at 20.50, 10 to 9 that evening. The search 8 of the study was concluded, and that was the last place 9 to be finished. 10 Q. I should have asked you this a moment ago, but while you 11 were searching in the woods did you find anything at all 12 which indicated that any other people had been there? 13 A. No, nothing. Normally when we search wooded areas there 14 is a fair amount of detritus, crisp packets, bottles, 15 cans, cigarette ends. This area itself was remarkable 16 for its complete lack of human interference. 17 Q. I take it you did not find any footprints? 18 A. No. 19 Q. Would that be normal? Obviously Dr Kelly had got in 20 there, but you would not have expected to see his 21 footprints there? 22 A. I would not have expected to find any footprints in that 23 area because of the undergrowth itself. There was not 24 a lot of bare earth for footprints to be recorded on; 25 and when I first saw Dr Kelly I was very aware of the 57 1 serious nature of the search and I was looking for signs 2 of perhaps a struggle; but all the vegetation that was 3 surrounding Dr Kelly's body was standing upright and 4 there were no signs of any form of struggle at all. 5 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say which you 6 think might cast some light on the circumstances -7 A. I can think of nothing else which will help the Inquiry. 8 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Constable.
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9 A. My Lord.16 10 MR DINGEMANS: Detective Sergeant Webb, please. 11 DETECTIVE SERGEANT GEOFFREY HUGH WEBB (called) 12 Examined by MR DINGEMANS 13 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name? 14 A. Yes, my name is Geoffrey Hugh Webb. 15 Q. What is your occupation? 16 A. I am a Detective Sergeant of the Thames Valley Police 17 currently stationed at Didcot. 18 Q. Were you involved in the search for Dr Kelly? 19 A. No, I was not. 20 Q. What was your role in relation to this? 21 A. I was called in to work on that day -22 Q. That is 18th July? 23 A. That is right -- at 4 am in the morning; and I was 24 tasked, at that time, to go and meet Mrs Kelly and to 25 chat with her and basically to debrief her on the 58 1 circumstances of Dr Kelly's disappearance. 2 Q. Who had called you? 3 A. I was called in by my detective inspector at that time. 4 Q. And what time did you arrive at work? 5 A. Quarter to 5. 6 Q. Quarter to 5. Where was that? 7 A. At Abingdon police station. 8 Q. How long did you stay at Abingdon police station? 9 A. For approximately an hour and a quarter, and then I went 10 to Southmore. 11 Q. What were you doing while you were at Abingdon police 12 station? 13 A. I was briefed on what had gone on previously. 14 Q. Who by? 15 A. By various people, including a uniformed sergeant who 16 had been -- who had spent the night with the 17 Kelly family and who had originally taken the report of 18 Dr Kelly's disappearance. 19 Q. Do you remember who that was? 20 A. His name was Sergeant Simon Morris. 21 Q. He had come back to the police station? 22 A. He returned to Abingdon police station and briefed those 23 present of what had gone on during the night. 24 Q. What had gone on during the night? 25 A. As I understand it, they had done some searching of the 59 1 area, as much as they could possibly do in the dark. 2 Q. Who had done that? 3 A. Uniformed police officers. 4 Q. Do you remember how many? 5 A. I could not say at the moment. 6 Q. Were you told about a helicopter that had been used? 7 A. I understand the helicopter had been used in an attempt 8 to find any sort of zones of heat, I believe they call 9 that. 10 Q. What had been the result of those night-time searches? 11 A. They were all negative. 12 Q. So Sergeant Morris had come back to Abingdon police 13 station. How many officers were in Abingdon police
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

station at this time in the morning? A. Who had been called in? Q. Yes. A. I should imagine about 10 of us. Q. What were you told? A. Basically that Dr Kelly had left his home the previous afternoon and had not been seen; the fact that the family had made some attempt to try to find him themselves but, again, this had proved fruitless and that they had called the police, I believe slightly prior to midnight the evening before. Q. And Sergeant Morris had taken that call?

60 1 A. Whether he took the call or not is a different matter, 2 but he certainly went to the Kellys home. I do not 3 know whether he actually took the call; I would imagine 4 he did not. 5 Q. Did he tell you what had happened in relation to his 6 attempts to search that night? 7 A. Not specifically, no. He basically gave us the 8 background in relation -- or the background prior to 9 Dr Kelly's disappearance, what he had done during the 10 day. 11 Q. And as a result of all that information that you had 12 received, where did you go? 13 A. I then went back to Dr Kelly's home. 14 Q. What time did you arrive? 15 A. 7.15 in the morning; and I sat there then and I spoke at 16 length with Mrs Kelly and the two daughters, Rachel and 17 Sian. 18 Q. And what was the aim of that? 19 A. Really to see if any clue could be attained as to (1) 20 why Dr Kelly should absent himself in such 21 circumstances; and (2) where he would go having absented 22 himself. 23 Q. Were you given any information which assisted in 24 relation to that? 25 A. To be honest, not really, no. I mean, the Kelly family 61 1 were very upbeat at that time. They were very hopeful 2 that no harm had come to Dr Kelly. In fact, they 3 genuinely believed I think that perhaps he had become 4 ill somewhere. 5 Q. Were you joined by anyone? 6 A. I was joined by WPC Karen Roberts, yes, slightly later 7 that same morning. 8 Q. What was her role? 9 A. She was going to take on the role of being a family 10 liaison officer and really to look after the 11 Kelly family, you know, during the following inquiry. 12 Q. How long did you stay at the house for? 13 A. I left the house at about 8 am to return to Abingdon 14 police station, at that time to tell -- it was Assistant 15 Chief Constable Page at that particular time, what the 16 result of my inquiries were. I mean Dr Kelly's mood, 17 the exact circumstances of his disappearance et cetera. 18 Q. How many police were searching at this stage, were you 19 aware? 20 A. I could not say sir, I do not know. 21 Q. What time did you brief Assistant Chief Constable Page?
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A. I got back to Abingdon I suppose about 8.30, immediately spoke to him for about 15 or 20 minutes, until really the news came in that a body had been found. Q. What did you do as a result of that?

62 1 A. I was then tasked to go back to the Kelly family and to 2 give them the news that it would seem that Dr Kelly had 3 been found and that he was dead. 4 Q. How long did you stay at the house? 5 A. I remained there then for the majority of the day. 6 Q. While you were at the house, did you carry out any 7 searches? 8 A. Whilst I was there, I carried out a very cursory search 9 of Dr Kelly's study. 10 Q. And did you find anything in the study? 11 A. I did and I took possession of certain items, yes. 12 Q. Right. What did you find there? 13 A. May I refer to my note? 14 LORD HUTTON: Yes, please do. 15 A. The search that I carried out, as I said, was a very 16 cursory search and really only encompassed things that 17 were within view. And the first thing that I looked 18 through was Dr Kelly's briefcase, which was closed. On 19 opening it I found firstly a letter dated 9th July 2003 20 addressed to Dr Kelly from a Richard Hatfield headed 21 "Discussions with the media". 22 MR DINGEMANS: Was that an opened letter? 23 A. No, that letter was in an envelope which was sealed, and 24 I opened it. 25 Q. So you were the first person to open it? 63 1 A. I was, sir, yes. 2 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/69? You should see a document 3 appearing shortly on the screen. Do you recognise this 4 document if we scroll down it? 5 A. That would appear to be the same document, yes, sir. 6 Q. You found it in a sealed envelope? 7 A. That was in a sealed envelope addressed to Dr Kelly. 8 Q. Handwritten? 9 A. I seem to recall it being a handwritten envelope, but I 10 cannot swear to that. 11 Q. Did you find anything else? 12 A. I did. There was a letter dated 10th July 2003 13 addressed to Dr Kelly from someone called 14 Steve Priestley. 15 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/74? What do we see here? 16 A. Yes, that is the document that I saw. 17 Q. Was that in an envelope? 18 A. No, that was just open. 19 Q. Right. 20 LORD HUTTON: So there was no envelope at all you saw in 21 respect of that? 22 A. Not for the letter from Stephen Priestley, no. 23 MR DINGEMANS: Then another document. 24 A. A handwritten note entitled "Gabriel's concerns." 25 Q. That appeared to relate to Iraq and weapons of mass 64 1 destruction? 2 A. That is correct, yes.
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3 Q. Anything else? 4 A. An e-mail message dated 14th July 2003 attached to 5 several papers entitled "The House of Commons Defence 6 Committee oral evidence sessions. Notes for guidance". 7 Q. Did you find anything else in your search that day? 8 A. I did. I then checked Dr Kelly's desk, where his 9 computer had been installed, and the first thing 10 I notice were a number of business cards which had 11 apparently originated from journalists. 12 Q. Right. And you took those? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Anything else? 15 A. A year 2003 diary. 16 Q. And we have, in fact, seen extracts from that. So you 17 obviously took that as well, did you? 18 A. Yes. I then also took a Sainsbury's notebook which 19 contained handwritten notes, together with four loose 20 sheets of A4 paper also containing handwritten notes. 21 On briefly scanning that notebook, the last page seemed 22 to contain a list of journalists. 23 Q. And I think we have seen extracts from that handwritten 24 note, including Dr Kelly's note of his meeting on 25 14th July. Did you recover anything else? 65 1 A. Yes, there were Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs 2 documentation concerning Dr Kelly's involvement with 3 journalists. 4 Q. And you produced and identified all of that? 5 A. I did, yes. 6 Q. What else did you search? 7 A. In his office he had a low coffee table; and on that 8 there was a copy of a letter dated 30th June 2003 from 9 Dr Kelly to Dr Bryan Wells, Director of Proliferation 10 and Arms Control Secretariat, headed "Andrew Gilligan 11 and his single anonymous source". 12 Q. If we go to MoD/1/19, and scroll down the page, is this 13 the document? 14 A. That is the document, sir, yes. 15 LORD HUTTON: "Dear Bryan", was that name written on it? 16 A. That is correct, yes. 17 LORD HUTTON: Thank you. 18 MR DINGEMANS: It was a photocopy rather than an original. 19 A. There were other copies of this letter, if I recall 20 correctly, but that one did have "Bryan" written on it. 21 Q. It was a photocopy rather than an original? 22 A. I believe so, yes. 23 Q. Anything else? 24 A. There was also Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs 25 documentation concerning Dr Kelly's involvement with 66 1 journalists, including a transcript of the Foreign 2 Affairs Committee examination of Andrew Gilligan. 3 Q. Printed out from a web page? 4 A. I could not say. It was printed out certainly. Whether 5 it came from a web page I would not know. 6 Q. What else was on the coffee table? 7 A. There was a purple file containing a signed copy of 8 a letter mentioned at (1) above. I should clarify there 9 of course that the original letter was not signed, but 10 the one in the file was; there was a press statement,
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

handwritten notes in pencil and other documentation concerning Dr Kelly's appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Q. And anything else that you recovered from the coffee table? A. A number of booklets, one entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction", "The Decision To Go To War In Iraq, Volumes 1 and 2" and another booklet entitled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction". Q. And you retrieved all those documents? A. I took possession of all those items, yes. Q. What did you do with those items? A. I subsequently placed them in the property holding store at Abingdon police station and then subsequently got them back and handed them on to

67 1 Detective Constable Boshell who was acting as exhibit 2 officer for the investigation into Dr Kelly's 3 unexplained death at that time. 4 Q. What time did you leave Dr Kelly's house? 5 A. On that day I left at 1520, that is 20 past 3 in the 6 afternoon, although I was required to return for two 7 brief visits at 11 minutes past 4 and 3 minutes to 5. 8 Q. What was the purpose of those visits? 9 A. The first visit I am not sure of, but the second visit 10 was we had been asked to return because the MoD welfare 11 officer wished to visit Mrs Kelly to inform her that she 12 was to receive a letter that evening which was to be 13 delivered by courier. 14 Q. Right. And did you have any other involvement in the 15 investigation? 16 A. None at all, sir. 17 Q. Is there anything else that you know of relating to the 18 circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you can 19 assist his Lordship with? 20 A. Not that I can think of. 21 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed.17 22 23 24 25 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, Detective Coe, we have not been able to get him here this morning.* That, in fact, would then complete this morning's witnesses. We have finished now, I am sorry it is a wee bit early.

68 1 LORD HUTTON: When would you like to sit again? 2 MR DINGEMANS: 2 o'clock. 3 LORD HUTTON: Very well. I will rise until 2 o'clock. 4 (12.05 pm) 5 (The short adjournment) 6 (2.00 pm) 7 POLICE CONSTABLE JONATHAN MARTYN SAWYER (recalled) 8 Examined by MR KNOX (continued) 9 LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Knox. 10 MR KNOX: My Lord, I propose to recall Mr Sawyer to briefly 11 deal with one point. 12 LORD HUTTON: Yes, come back please. 13 MR KNOX: Mr Sawyer, you will recall that this morning you
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

said that amongst Dr Kelly's things that had been found on the search of the premises was a photograph which I think you said might have aroused some interest. I wonder if you could tell us something about the photograph that was found. A. Certainly. It was found in the study of Dr Kelly at 11.45 by one of my searchers, PC Slyfield. It was seized because, at the time, it showed Dr Kelly and another person standing outside the Parliament building in Moscow. It was after the coup in Moscow and the Parliament building showed a certain amount of damage. The photograph was in fact dated 11th of the 8th 1993.

69 1 PC Slyfield showed it to DC Burton who was the Special 2 Branch officer with him and they both agreed the second 3 person in the photograph bore a very striking 4 resemblance to Andrew Gilligan. The photograph was then 5 seized and produced as an exhibit. That is what I was 6 referring to in my statement. 7 Q. What have subsequent inquiries revealed about that 8 photograph? 9 A. Subsequent inquiries, I have spoken to PC Slyfield on 10 the phone, and I have also spoken to a DS McGuire at the 11 Long Hanborough incident room. PC Slyfield states that, 12 in his opinion, the person has a resemblance to 13 Andrew Gilligan. DS McGuire is of the opposite opinion, 14 that it does not look like Andrew Gilligan; and, as a 15 consequence, the photograph is being brought up tomorrow 16 by ACC Page for the Inquiry to actually look at. 17 Q. Your current understanding of the position is that it is 18 or is not Mr Gilligan? 19 A. On the -- I saw the photograph but very, very briefly. 20 I can form no opinion either way. 21 LORD HUTTON: So it was really seized by the police because 22 it was thought it bore a resemblance to Andrew Gilligan, 23 that is as far as it goes? 24 A. Yes, and the date on the photograph being 1993 which is 25 some 11 years ago when it was. 70 1 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Very well. Thank you very much. 2 MR KNOX: Mr Sawyer can I ask you this: as far as you are 3 aware, what is the current view of the police force 4 about this photograph? 5 A. The current view of the police force is it has been 6 retained as an exhibit to be produced before this 7 Inquiry. As to the identity of the second person in the 8 photograph, that is a matter for the Inquiry to make its 9 mind up. 10 I must say that DS McGuire has also said he has been 11 unable to actually speak to Mr Gilligan to verify the 12 veracity of the photograph in question up to this point. 13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much Mr Sawyer. 14 A. Thank you my Lord.18 15 MR DINGEMANS: Ms Hunt, please. 16 MS VANESSA ELIZABETH HUNT (called) 17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
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Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name? A. Vanessa Elizabeth Hunt. Q. What is your occupation? A. I am a paramedic. Q. Were you on duty on 18th July? A. Yes I was. Q. What time did you start work? A. 0700 hours.

71 1 Q. And where were you based at the time? 2 A. At Abingdon ambulance station. 3 Q. Did you have any calls that morning? 4 A. Yes, we did. 5 Q. Did you have any call relating to Dr Kelly? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. What time did you get that call? 8 A. At 0940 hours to the ambulance station. 9 Q. What were you asked to do? 10 A. We were asked to mobilise towards Southmoor for a male 11 patient but we were given no more details at that time. 12 Q. So, did you set off? 13 A. Yes, we did. 14 Q. In an ambulance? 15 A. In an ambulance with my colleague Dave Bartlett. 16 Q. And you drove to Southmoor? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Did anyone meet you there? 19 A. On the way we were given some more information on our 20 data screens. 21 Q. What did that say? 22 A. It just said that we were attending the address -23 Harrowdown Hill in Longworth for a male believed to be 24 a kilo 1 which is actually deceased, and the Thames 25 Valley Police were on the scene. 72 1 Q. When you arrived on the scene was anyone there? 2 A. Yes, there were a number of police officers. 3 Q. Do you remember how many? 4 A. Just lots and there was police vehicles there as well. 5 Q. Did you drive off the public road? 6 A. We parked up at the end of the public road, I do not 7 know the name of the road. 8 Q. And you proceeded on foot? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Who had met you? 11 A. There was an officer in regulation clothing who directed 12 us to two or three other officers in combat trousers and 13 black polo shirts and we followed them along the track. 14 Q. You followed them along the track? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. And where did that lead to? 17 A. To a wooded area that was on the left of the track. 18 Q. And once you got to the wooded area did you stay on the 19 outside of the wood? 20 A. Initially there were three people on the track, what 21 I now know to be detective constable, one was the search 22 and rescue and there was another gentleman there. The 23 police officers that we had followed stopped and spoke 24 to them and then we followed the two chaps up into the 25 wooded area.
39

73 1 Q. And when you got into the wooded area, what did you see? 2 A. There was a male on his back, feet towards us. 3 Q. Yes. 4 A. And no obvious signs of life. 5 Q. Was there anything marking your route in to the body? 6 A. As we walked into the wooded area the police officers 7 were marking a route off with metal posts. We just 8 walked behind them. 9 Q. And can you describe what was being worn by the man? 10 A. It was -- it looked like a wax type jacket, dark colour. 11 Q. Yes. 12 A. A shirt and I believe jeans, but I cannot be certain of 13 the lower clothing. He also had a pair of boots or 14 trainer cross type footwear on. 15 Q. Could you see anything on the body itself? 16 A. On his left arm, which was outstretched to the left of 17 him, there was some dry blood. 18 Q. Did you go towards the body? 19 A. We stood behind the police officers while they took 20 photographs. Then once they had taken the photographs 21 I went to the right side of the body and my colleague 22 went to the left side. 23 Q. And what was done to check for signs of life? 24 A. My colleague lifted the eyelids to check for pupil 25 reaction, also felt the gentleman's neck for a carotid 74 1 pulse and I initially placed the heart monitor paddles 2 on to the chest over the top of his shirt. 3 Q. Did you get any reading at all? 4 A. There was some artefact reading I believed to be from 5 myself as opposed to the body, so we said to the police 6 officers would it be possible to place four sticky 7 electrodes on to the chest, to verify that life was 8 extinct. 9 Q. What did the police say to you? 10 A. Could they just take some more photographs before we 11 undid the shirt, which they then did. My colleague 12 unbuttoned the shirt and I placed the four electrodes on 13 to the chest, two on the upper part of the chest and two 14 underneath the rib cage area. 15 Q. Did you connect those electrodes to anything? 16 A. To the heart monitor. 17 Q. What did that show? 18 A. That showed asystole which is a flat line. 19 Q. What does that mean? 20 A. It means there is no cardiac output and life is extinct. 21 Q. Did you declare life extinct? 22 A. We pronounced we were unable to certify but we said, 23 yes, that, you know... 24 Q. What did you do with the strips from the machine? 25 A. Took three strips and handed them all to the police 75 1 officer. 2 Q. And what did the strips show? 3 A. Just a flat line. 4 Q. And having carried out those activities, what did you do 5 then? 6 A. I said would they like us to leave the electrodes in
40

7 situ, they requested that we did, remove the leads from 8 the chest and left the shirt unbuttoned. 9 Q. Did you yourself move the body at all? 10 A. The only part of the body we moved was Dr Kelly's right 11 arm, which was over the chest, to facilitate us to place 12 the fourth lead on to the chest. It was just lifted 13 slightly from the body. 14 Q. Right. And do you recall, now, what Dr Kelly was 15 wearing? 16 A. As I say, a dark coloured wax jacket, a shirt and 17 I believe it to be jeans, but I am not certain. 18 Q. Right. And anything on his feet? 19 A. Trainers or cross trainer/boot type footwear. 20 Q. Right. And did you see anything on the ground? 21 A. There was a silver bladed knife, a wristwatch, which was 22 off of the wrist. 23 Q. Yes. 24 A. And, oh, a water bottle, a small water bottle stood up 25 to the left side of Dr Kelly's head. 76 1 Q. And did you note whether or not he had a mobile phone? 2 A. There was a mobile phone pouch clipped to his belt on 3 his front but slightly to the right side, but you could 4 not see if there was a phone within the pouch or not. 5 Q. Right. And what were you wearing while you were 6 carrying out this? 7 A. My green squad suit and black boots. 8 Q. And is there anything else that you know of about the 9 circumstances of Dr Kelly's death that you can assist 10 his Lordship with? 11 A. Only that the amount of blood that was around the scene 12 seemed relatively minimal and there was a small patch on 13 his right knee, but no obvious arterial bleeding. There 14 was no spraying of blood or huge blood loss or any 15 obvious loss on the clothing. 16 Q. On the clothing? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. One of the police officers or someone this morning said 19 there appeared to be some blood on the ground. Did you 20 see that? 21 A. I could see some on -- there were some stinging nettles 22 to the left of the body. As to on the ground, I do not 23 remember seeing a sort of huge puddle or anything like 24 that. There was dried blood on the left wrist. His 25 jacket was pulled to sort of mid forearm area and from 77 1 that area down towards the hand there was dried blood, 2 but no obvious sign of a wound or anything, it was just 3 dried blood. 4 Q. You did not see the wound? 5 A. I did not see the wound, no. 6 Q. You were not looking at the wound, then? 7 A. The hand -- from what I remember, his arm -- left arm 8 was outstretched to the left of the body. 9 Q. Yes. 10 A. Palm up or slightly on the side (indicates) and, as 11 I say, there was dried blood from the edge of the jacket 12 down towards the hand but no gaping wound or anything 13 obvious that I could see from the position I was in. 14 Q. Were you examining the wrist for -41

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

A. No, I was not. No. Q. And were you examining the ground for blood or blood loss? A. No. MR DINGEMANS: Right. Thank you. LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much Ms Hunt. Thank you.19 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Mr Bartlett. LORD HUTTON: Yes. MR DAVID IAN BARTLETT (called) Examined by MR KNOX Q. Mr Bartlett, what is your full name?

78 1 A. David Ian Bartlett. 2 Q. And what is your occupation? 3 A. Ambulance technician. 4 Q. And who are you employed by? 5 A. Oxford Ambulance. 6 Q. And you are based at? 7 A. Abingdon. 8 Q. Abingdon ambulance station? 9 A. Yes. 10 Q. Were you on duty on the early morning of 18th July? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. And what time did you get in? 13 A. 0700 hours. 14 Q. What is the number of the ambulance you were working in 15 that day; can you remember? 16 A. I cannot remember to be honest without going back to the 17 computer readouts. We use so many different ones. 18 Q. If I say number 934, does that sound right? 19 A. Could be, yes. 20 Q. Do you remember what happened about 20 to 10? 21 A. Yes, we had a call to attend the Longworth area and on 22 the way there -- excuse me, I have a bad cold -23 LORD HUTTON: Yes, do you have a glass of water there? That 24 might help. 25 A. Yes. We got an update saying it was a male query kilo 1 79 1 which as my colleague explained is a person presumed 2 dead. 3 MR KNOX: You say you got an update, was that? 4 A. On the computer readout in the ambulance. 5 Q. That meant what? 6 A. They had come across a body or a body had been reported 7 and had not been certified but presumed dead. 8 Q. Can you remember when you arrived at the place you were 9 going to? 10 A. The time? 11 Q. Yes, the time. 12 A. 9.55. 13 Q. That was at Harrowdown Hill, is that right? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Off Tucks Lane? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. What happened when you arrived? 18 A. We parked at the end of the lane where there were some
19

Hunt, Vanessa (2003). Ambulance, Paramedic: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans27.htm 42

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

cars already parked, a lot of police officers there. We asked one police officer who directed us to the police that were in the combat uniforms and they asked us to bring some equipment and follow them down into the woods. Q. And you did that? A. Yes. We took a defib monitor with us and our own

80 1 personal kit. 2 Q. You walked down into the woods, is that right? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. What did you eventually come across? 5 A. We got to the end of the lane, there were some more 6 police officers there. I think it was two or three, 7 I cannot remember, I think it was two, took us up into 8 the woods which was like right angles to the track. As 9 we walked up they were in front of us putting the marker 10 posts in and told us to stay between the two posts. 11 Q. So you stayed between the two posts and carried on 12 presumably? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. What did you then come across? 15 A. They led us up to where the body was laid, feet facing 16 us, laid on its back, left arm out to one side 17 (indicates) and the right arm across the chest. 18 Q. What about the hands? Did you notice anything about the 19 position of the hands? 20 A. It was slightly wrist up, more wrist up than down. 21 Q. What about the right arm? 22 A. That was across the chest, palm down. 23 Q. Did you notice any injuries? 24 A. Just some dried blood across the wrist. 25 Q. Which wrist would that be? 81 1 A. The left wrist. 2 Q. What about the face? Did you notice anything about the 3 face? 4 A. Yes, going from the corners of the mouth were two 5 stains, one slightly longer than the other. 6 Q. Where did the stains go to from the mouth? 7 A. Towards the bottom of the ears. 8 Q. Did you check for a pulse? 9 A. Yes, checked the carotid pulse, also pupil reaction. 10 Q. The pupils of the eyes that is? 11 A. Yes, and then my colleague placed the two paddles across 12 the chest and in between times the police were taking 13 photographs. 14 Q. Can I just check, did the police take photographs before 15 or after -16 A. Before. Every time we did something they took another 17 photograph. 18 Q. Your colleague was Ms Hunt who we have just heard? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Did you feel the skin of the body at all? 21 A. Yes, it was pale and clammy. 22 Q. You mentioned the injury to the wrist. You saw some 23 blood, did you? 24 A. There was dried blood across the top, yes. 25 Q. Was that congealed or not?

43

82 1 A. I did not touch it. It was dried, it started to crack 2 like when it goes dry. 3 Q. Did you see any items next to the body? 4 A. Yes, to the left side above just where the arm was, 5 there was a wristwatch, a silver knife with a curved 6 blade and a bottle of water. 7 Q. And the bottle of water, was that empty or full or -8 A. I think it was empty. 9 Q. Was it upright or can you remember? 10 A. Yes, it was upright. 11 Q. What type of a knife was it? 12 A. I think it was one of those silver quite flat ones with 13 like a curved blade, more like a pruning knife. 14 Q. What clothes was the man wearing? 15 A. It was a dark coloured jacket, sort of a wax type 16 jacket, striped shirt, blue and white striped shirt, and 17 I think it was jeans. 18 Q. And was the top button done up on the shirt or undone? 19 A. No, I think the top one was undone. 20 Q. Did you notice any other items of clothing nearby? 21 A. There was a cap...(Pause). Yes, there was a flat cap 22 on the left of the body, near the head end. 23 Q. And were there any stains on the clothes? 24 A. Not that I could see apart from on the deceased's right 25 knee, there was a bloodstain about 25 mm across. 83 1 Q. When you say on the right knee, you mean on the 2 trousers? 3 A. Yes, on the right knee of the trousers. 4 Q. Did you yourself do anything to the body? 5 A. I unbuttoned the shirt as my colleague was putting the 6 electrodes on, and moved the right arm up so we could 7 get the electrode down the bottom. 8 Q. And once the electrodes had been put on was any activity 9 noticed? 10 A. No, no. It was just -- no output or anything. 11 Q. And what about -- was there any heart activity or 12 anything like that? 13 A. No, nothing. 14 Q. Did you have the ability to print out the results on the 15 spot? 16 A. Yes, I believe my colleague printed three strips out and 17 gave those to the police. 18 Q. And were any alterations made to the printouts? 19 A. Yes, the time that is printed on the machine because 20 they are the never the right time. We always write the 21 time across the top of them. 22 Q. What was the time that the printout showed before you 23 made the alteration? 24 A. I cannot remember because the colleague made the time. 25 It is usually an hour out. 84 1 Q. So you put it back or forward an hour to get the right 2 time? 3 A. Yes, one or the other. 4 Q. You checked that against what? How did you know you 5 were putting the right time on? 6 A. Against our watches. 7 Q. Can you remember at what time death was pronounced?
44

8 A. (Pause). No, I did not actually make a note of the 9 time. It would have been what was wrote on the strips. 10 Q. It was noted on the strips? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. How long were you at the scene altogether? 13 A. 5 to 10 minutes. 14 Q. Once the printouts had been done, what did you do with 15 them? 16 A. The police officer took some more pictures and then they 17 told us to go back down through the marker posts to the 18 main track. 19 Q. Sorry, through the same track you had come up? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Then you go back there to the ambulance; is that right? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. When you left were the electrodes still on the body or 24 had they been taken off? 25 A. No, we left the electrodes on, just removed the wires. 85 1 Q. Was there any reason for that? 2 A. We just -- we always just leave them on. 3 Q. And then what did you do after that? You went to the 4 ambulance, did you? 5 A. We went back up to the ambulance and the police just 6 asked us to check the young lady who had actually found 7 the body but she was fine. They said she was a bit 8 shaken but we had a chat with her and she was fine. 9 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say about the 10 circumstances leading to Dr Kelly's death? 11 A. Just the same as my colleague actually, we was surprised 12 there was not more blood on the body if it was an 13 arterial bleed. 14 MR KNOX: Thank you very much. 15 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Mr Bartlett...' 20

_____________ *This business (marked* above, p. 38), regarding DC Coe not being present on that day (2 Sept, 2003), relates, in part at least, to a mix-up in the list for that day. In that PC Jonathan Martyn, scheduled to appear before Vanessa Hunt was actually, in person, PC Jonathan Martyn Sawyer scheduled to appear during the morning after PC Franklin (his evidence left out of this now as he doesn't appear of any interest any more), and before PC Webb (of some interest, his find, still), which he did. Coe, called late perhaps, to fill in that spot, obviously couldn't make it. Sawyer was called back then (below). Some, this is out there, have said that DC Coe even wished to avoid giving evidence until after he knew the outline of Hunt's and Chapman's testimony hoping theirs wouldn't contradict his? But the evidence he gave when he did attend finally did contradict theirs anyway. So maybe that one will go away? Subsequently Sawyer was recalled (above, p. 39), to discuss the photograph, of Gilligan, possibly, with Dr Kelly in Moscow after the coup (of 1991) there the photograph 'dated 11th of the 8th 1993...' (above, 68: 25, p. 38) - buildings obviously damaged from the fighting the background there. This had come up in Sawyer's evidence before (part 1, 55: 20, p. 33), the existence of this photograph, as of interest, perhaps?
20

Bartlett, David (2003). Ambulance, technician: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans27.htm 45

And this is just one of those things that is just as likely to be so, as not, of interest, we think (the inclusion of Gilligan or likeness of him in that photo), and could point to an intelligence aspect at play concerning their relationship then. Our evidence for this? This seems common sense. At the Hutton inquiry this is left at that (if it was Gilligan with him then), and why wouldn't it be, left at that, that is? Still it has often been suggested that the so-called leak that Kelly is said to have been the author of actually came from the intelligence community anyway, though it still had to appear as if it hadn't come from there, and so Gilligan reported this, with Kelly the fall back source (this sort of thing might help make some sense of that?):
'It began with an informal chat over a Coke and a bottle of Appletise. When BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan and his contact, the government scientist Dr David Kelly, met for a drink in the bar of London's Charing Cross Hotel, neither man could have imagined the fateful consequences their talk would have. Even today what exactly was said remains a matter of dispute with Dr Kelly's family refusing to accept Mr Gilligan's account of their conversation... His comments chimed with other media reports at the time suggesting that the intelligence services were unhappy at the way the Government had used their material in the run up to the invasion of Iraq...'21 _____________

Still, that aside, perhaps quite some story still in there somewhere, DC Coe's big day did arrive, as did the pathologist's, Dr Hunt, also, after Coe, the morning of 16 Sept, 2003. Big day we could say also say, for discrepancies appeared from this as if at fancy?
'1 Tuesday, 16th September 2003 2 (10.30 am) 3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 4 Yes, Mr Knox. 5 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Graham Coe. 6 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Come and take a seat please. 7 DETECTIVE CONSTABLE GRAHAM PETER COE (called) 8 Examined by MR KNOX 9 Q. Mr Coe, could you tell the Inquiry your full name? 10 A. It is Graham Peter Coe. 11 Q. Your occupation? 12 A. I am a police officer. 13 Q. At which station are you stationed? 14 A. I am stationed at Wantage in Thames Valley. 15 Q. On Tuesday 18th July in the early morning were you on 16 duty? 17 A. I was called out at 6 in the morning. 18 Q. Where did you go? 19 A. I went over to Longworth. 20 Q. Longworth police station? 21 A. Abingdon police station. I went out to the Longworth 22 area. 23 Q. When you got to the police station, what were you asked 24 to do? 25 A. Go and make some house to house inquiries in the area 1 1 where Dr Kelly lived. 2 Q. Where did you then go?
21

Daily Mail, London (2004). The Dr David Kelly affair. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article206836/The-Dr-David-Kelly-affair.html

46

3 A. We spoke to a witness who lived more or less opposite, 4 who had seen Dr Kelly on the afternoon, the Thursday 5 afternoon, and myself and a colleague went to the area 6 where she had last seen him and made a sort of search 7 towards the river. 8 Q. And could you be more precise as to where this river is? 9 A. It is the River Thames. We decided -- from what we were 10 told, since the previous afternoon Dr Kelly was missing 11 we decided to try to find the shortest route to the 12 River Thames. 13 LORD HUTTON: Do you remember the name of the person who had 14 seen Dr Kelly? 15 A. Mrs Ruth Absalom, I believe, my Lord. 16 Q. So did you make a search of the River Thames in that 17 area? 18 A. We did not get so far as the river. 19 Q. What happened before you got there? 20 A. On the route to Harrowdown Hill I met the two people 21 from the volunteer search team, a female and Mr Chapman. 22 Q. And what did they say to you? 23 A. Mr Chapman told me that they had found a body in the 24 woods. 25 Q. Who were you with at this time? 2 1 A. Detective Constable Shields. 2 Q. It is just the two of you? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. What did you then do, once you had met Mr Chapman? 5 A. I went with Mr Chapman to Harrowdown Hill to the woods 6 where approximately 75 yards into the set of woods he 7 showed me a body. 8 Q. And how was the body positioned? 9 A. It was laying on its back -- the body was laying on its 10 back by a large tree, the head towards the trunk of the 11 tree. 12 Q. Did you notice anything about the body? 13 A. I did. 14 Q. What did you notice? 15 A. I noticed that there was blood round the left wrist. 16 I saw a knife, like a pruning knife, and a watch. 17 Q. And was the body lying on its front or on its back? 18 A. On its back. 19 Q. Where was the watch? 20 A. If I remember rightly, just on top of the knife. 21 Q. And where was the knife? 22 A. Near to the left wrist, left side of the body. 23 Q. Did you see a bottle? 24 A. I did, a water -- a small water bottle. I think that 25 was the left-hand side of the body as well, towards the 3 1 top left-hand shoulder. 2 Q. Was there any water in the bottle? 3 A. I could not tell you. 4 Q. Did this person have any clothes on? 5 A. He did. He was fully dressed. 6 Q. Could you be more particular as to what the clothes you 7 saw were? 8 A. He was wearing a Barbour jacket. There was a cap, 9 a pair of trousers and think walking boots, but I cannot 10 be certain on that.
47

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Q. Was the cap on the head or was the cap apart from the body? A. That I cannot remember -- I have a feeling the cap was off, but I cannot be sure. Q. Did you notice if there were any stains on the clothes? A. I saw blood around the left wrist area. Q. Anywhere else? How close an examination did you yourself make? A. Just standing upright, I did not go over the body. I made a thing -- I observed the scene. Q. How far away from the body did you actually go? A. 7 or 8 feet. Q. How long did you spend at the scene? A. Until other officers came to tape off the area. I would think somewhere in the region of about 25 or 30 minutes.

4 1 Q. Did anyone then arrive after that time? 2 A. Yes, two other police officers arrived, I took them to 3 where the body was laying and then they made a taped off 4 area, what we call a common approach path for everybody 5 to attend along this one path. 6 Q. Did any ambulance people arrive? 7 A. They did, yes. 8 Q. Can you remember what time they arrived? 9 A. I can, if I use my pocket book. Can I? 10 Q. Of course. 11 A. I have 10.07 here. 12 Q. 10.07 being the time at which the ambulance arrived? 13 A. Pronounced death, but they might have arrived just prior 14 to that. 15 Q. It is they who pronounced death; is that right? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. After the ambulance crew arrived, did you do anything on 18 the scene? 19 A. No, I left and left the other officers there, and I left 20 the actual area of the scene. 21 Q. Did you have any further involvement in the search of 22 the scene that day? 23 A. I did not. 24 Q. What about on the following day? We know the following 25 morning there was a search made of Dr Kelly's premises. 5 1 Were you at all involved in that? 2 A. Yes, I was. I went to the premises and at that time 3 I had an attachment with me who acted as an exhibits 4 officer at the house and I oversaw what he did. I made 5 no search whatsoever of the premise. 6 Q. And is there anything else you would like to say about 7 the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly? 8 A. Nothing whatsoever. 9 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Coe. 10 A. Thank you, my Lord.'22 _____________

After DC Coe came Dr Hunt also then, at last, who would say what follows about the placement of blood, the level of co-proxamol in Dr Kelly's blood, and his wrist injuries
22

Coe, Graham (2003). Police Officer, Detective Constable: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans33.htm 48

also. And in his testimony it becomes evident that there is a discrepancy between the evidence DC Coe and Dr Hunt also then. And as there already is a discrepancy over the number of persons accompanying DC Coe up till when he met the searchers who'd found Dr Kelly now (from Coe, before this Hunt); all discrepancies become evidence now suggesting to interested parties that something else may have happened out there, then, on that hill? And all these add up, we will see, become more, in that there has been comment on this now also since then to the effect that these 'differences' (between these two witnesses), came despite Dr Hunt having heard Coe's evidence on this just before his own turn to give evidence next, and so is that meant to suggest, now, that Hunt may not have wished to contradict Coe in turn also? Here, anyway, now, Hunt will have it that Dr Kelly's watch was lying face down next to a knife; while DC Coe has already had it (before him, above, 2: 19, p. 49), that the watch was placed on top of the knife instead (which would raise another unlikely question for later this, that it would have been unlikely, wouldn't it, that the knife would have been used before the watch had been taken off, then?). _____________
'5 cont: 11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 12 MR KNOX: My Lord, the next witness is Dr Hunt. 13 LORD HUTTON: Thank you. 14 MR NICHOLAS HUNT (called) 15 Examined by MR KNOX 16 Q. Dr Hunt, could you tell the Inquiry your full name? 17 A. Certainly. Nicholas Charles Alexander Hunt. 18 Q. Occupation? 19 A. I am a Home Office accredited forensic pathologist. 20 Q. For how long have you been a Home Office accredited 21 forensic pathologist? 22 A. I have been on the Home Office list since 2001. I have 23 been practising full time pathology since 1994. 24 Q. What was your first involvement in the death of 25 Dr Kelly? 6 1 A. I received a telephone call on the morning of the day in 2 question and was asked if I could attend the scene by 3 officers of the Thames Valley Police. 4 Q. What time did you arrive at the scene? 5 A. Approximately midday. 6 Q. Could you describe how the scene was when you arrived? 7 A. Yes. Initially I was taken to the outer cordon at the 8 edge of the copse or the woods where Dr Kelly's body was 9 found. I was then escorted, having seen the scene 10 video, up to the immediate scene where his body was 11 located. He was lying on his back fully clothed with 12 his boots on. His left arm was towards his side and his 13 right arm was over his chest area. 14 Q. You mentioned before entering the scene you were shown a 15 video. 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Can you say briefly what that video revealed? 18 A. Yes, it showed the approach path to the body. It showed 19 a deceased man lying on his back, with visible 20 bloodstaining around his left wrist. 21 LORD HUTTON: What time did you arrive, Dr Hunt? 22 A. I arrived and was logged into the outer cordon, my Lord,
49

23 at 12.00 hours; and then approximately 10 minutes later 24 went up to the body. 25 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you. 7 1 MR KNOX: When you went up to the body did you begin to 2 examine it straightaway? 3 A. Yes, from the point of view of looking at the body 4 rather than touching anything at that stage. 5 Q. And were you able to confirm that the body was dead? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. Can you recall at what time you did that? 8 A. 12.35 hours is the time I noted as having confirmed the 9 fact of death. 10 Q. And after that, did anything happen at the scene 11 immediately after that? 12 A. Yes, after that there was a fingertip search conducted 13 by police of the common approach path, and the view 14 taken was that we would await the arrival of the 15 scientist, the biologist and his assistant from the 16 laboratory. 17 Q. Did you then carry out a more thorough investigation of 18 the body? 19 A. Yes, I did. 20 Q. At what time did that more thorough investigation begin? 21 A. I was logged back into the scene at about 10 minutes 22 past 2 that afternoon, to begin the definitive scene 23 examination. 24 Q. Was anything over the body by that stage? 25 A. Yes, a scene tent had been erected over the body. 8 1 Although it was in very dense woodland there were 2 obvious concerns to preserve the dignity of the 3 deceased. 4 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you, was there a tent erected 5 anywhere else in the vicinity? 6 A. Yes, there was indeed, my Lord. 7 LORD HUTTON: Where was that? 8 A. That was on the edge of the woods and is a tent that has 9 become familiar, I think, through the reporting of the 10 incident. It is the large white tent on the outside of 11 the woods. 12 LORD HUTTON: I appreciate it probably does not fall into 13 your particular sphere, but do you know why that tent 14 was erected on the outside of the copse? 15 A. It was erected really to give us protection from the 16 elements. It was felt that rain may be on its way and 17 we needed somewhere, as the people dealing with the 18 scene, to have a base where we could complete paperwork 19 and the like. 20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much. 21 MR KNOX: Could you describe the position of the body at the 22 scene? 23 A. Yes, certainly. He was laying on his back near a tree. 24 The left arm was extended out from the body slightly, 25 closer to shoulder level, his right arm was laying 9 1 across his chest area and his legs were extended out 2 straight in front of him. 3 Q. I take it from what you just said he was laying on his
50

4 back? 5 A. He was, yes. 6 Q. Was any part of his body actually touching the tree; can 7 you recall? 8 A. I recall that his head was quite close to branches and 9 so forth, but not actually over the tree. 10 Q. And when you initially looked at the body, did Dr Kelly 11 have his glasses on or had they been taken off? 12 A. No, they were not on his face. 13 Q. What did you notice about the clothing? 14 A. He was wearing a green Barbour type wax jacket and the 15 zip and the buttons at the front had been undone. 16 Within the bellows pocket on the lower part of the 17 jacket there was a mobile telephone and a pair of 18 bi-focal spectacles. There was a key fob and, perhaps 19 more significantly, a total of three blister packs of 20 a drug called Coproxamol. Each of those packs would 21 originally have contained 10 tablets, a total of 30 22 potentially available. 23 Q. And how many tablets were left in those packs? 24 A. There was one left. 25 LORD HUTTON: Did you actually take those blister packs out? 10 1 Did you discover them in the pocket yourself? 2 A. Yes, as part of the search, my Lord. 3 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. 4 MR KNOX: What about the shirt? 5 A. He was wearing a striped shirt. The upper four buttons 6 of that were undone but there was no sign of them having 7 been ripped apart or damaged in any way. 8 Q. Were there any ECG electric pads on the shirt or body? 9 A. Yes, there was one visible at that stage over the left 10 upper chest area. 11 Q. We have heard about that having been placed on by one of 12 the ambulance crew. 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. What about the trousers? What did you notice about 15 them? 16 A. He was wearing a pair of blue denim jeans; they were 17 done up. There was a belt in place in the belt loops 18 and again the buckle was done up. 19 Q. Socks or boots. Did you notice anything about those? 20 A. Yes, a pair of beige socks, and he was wearing a pair of 21 walking boots and the laces had been done up in double 22 bows. 23 Q. Once you looked at the body -24 A. Yes. 25 Q. -- did you do anything to the body? 11 1 A. Yes. The procedure we adopted was to retrieve as much 2 what I would call trace evidence as possible, potential 3 trace evidence, any looking for fibres, looking for 4 DNA contamination by a third party. That sort of 5 evidence was obtained at that stage. 6 Q. Did you undress the body? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. What about the bloodstains on the clothes, did you 9 notice any of them? 10 A. Yes, there were a number of areas of bloodstaining on 11 the clothes, including over the front of the shirt, over
51

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

the Barbour jacket itself, including in the sleeve of the Barbour jacket on the left. Q. And what about around the trousers or the legs? A. Yes, there was some bloodstaining over the trousers; and, in particular, there was a patch of bloodstaining over the right knee. Q. What about around the arms? A. There was some staining, as I have said, over the left arm. That was the heaviest staining, really, including within the sleeve of the jacket. And there was some bloodstaining over the back of the left elbow. Q. What about bloodstains on the exposed body surfaces; what did you notice about that? A. The most obvious area of bloodstaining was around the

12 1 left wrist, where it was relatively heavy. 2 Q. Did you notice any other bloodstaining around the hands? 3 A. Yes. Over the palm of the right hand and the fingers of 4 the right hand there was further bloodstaining. 5 Q. Did you notice anything about the face? 6 A. His face appeared, firstly, rather pale but there was 7 also what looked like vomit running from the right 8 corner of the mouth and also from the left corner of the 9 mouth and streaking the face. 10 Q. What would that appear to indicate? 11 A. It suggested that he had tried to vomit whilst he was 12 lying on his back and it had trickled down. 13 Q. Was there any vomit found on the scene itself? 14 A. Yes, there was some vomit. There was some vomit 15 staining over the left shoulder of the jacket and also 16 on the ground in the region of his left shoulder. 17 Q. Were any other bloodstains noted on the body? 18 A. There was a small bloodstain over the right side of his 19 neck, which we sampled at the scene. And two further 20 smaller areas of bloodstaining over the right side of 21 his face; again, they were sampled at the scene. 22 Q. Did you investigate the scene next to the body? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. And what did that show? 25 A. There was a Barbour flat-type cap with some blood on the 13 1 lining and the peak near his left shoulder and upper 2 arm. In the region of his left hand lying on the grass 3 there was a black resin strapped wristwatch, a digital 4 watch, which was also bloodstained. 5 Q. Was the watch face up or face down? 6 A. It was face down. 7 Q. What about next to the watch? 8 A. Lying next to that was a pruning knife or gardener's 9 knife. 10 Q. Can you describe what type of pruning knife it was? 11 A. The make was a Sandvig knife. It was one with a little 12 hook or lip towards the tip of the blade. It is 13 a fairly standard gardeners' type knife. 14 Q. Were there any bloodstains on that knife? 15 A. Yes, over both the handle and the blade. 16 Q. Was there any blood beneath the knife? 17 A. Yes, there was. There was blood around the area of the 18 knife. 19 Q. How close to the knife was the blood?
52

20 21 22 23 24 25

A. It was around the knife and underneath it. Q. Did you notice a bottle of water? A. Yes, there was a bottle of Evian water, half a litre. Q. Was there any water in that bottle? A. Yes, there was some remaining water. I do not recall what volume exactly.

14 1 Q. Can you remember precisely where the bottle was in 2 relation to the bottle? 3 A. Yes, it was lying propped against some broken branches 4 to the left and about a foot away from his left elbow. 5 Q. And did you notice anything in particular about the 6 bottle? 7 A. Yes, there was some smeared blood over both the bottle 8 itself and the bottle top. 9 Q. Did that indicate anything to you? 10 A. It indicated that he had been bleeding whilst at least 11 placing the bottle in its final position. He may 12 already have been bleeding whilst he was drinking from 13 it, but that is less certain. 14 Q. Was there any other bloodstaining that you noticed in 15 the area? 16 A. There was. There was an area of bloodstaining to his 17 left side running across the undergrowth and the soil, 18 and I estimated it was over an area of 2 to 3 feet in 19 maximum length. 20 Q. Did you carry out any particular tests of the scene? 21 A. Yes. In addition to the trace evidence gathering 22 I also, having completed that, carried out a rectal 23 temperature assessment. 24 Q. What time did you carry that out? 25 A. That reading was made at 19.15 hours or quarter past 7 15 1 in the evening. 2 Q. What was the temperature recorded on that? 3 A. His rectal temperature was 24 degrees Celsius. 4 Q. You yourself presumably had protective clothing on while 5 you did this examination? 6 A. Yes, from the very first moment I entered the scene to 7 the end. The protective clothing is a standard hooded 8 scene suit, protective over-shoes, protective latex 9 gloves and a mask. 10 Q. At what time did your examination conclude? 11 A. I left the scene at about 19.19 hours or nearly 12 20 minutes past 7. 13 Q. Did you notice any signs of visible injury to the body 14 while you were there? 15 A. Yes. At the scene I could see that there were at least 16 five what I would call incised wounds or cuts to his 17 left wrist over the what is anatomically the front of 18 the wrist, but that is the creased area of the wrist. 19 Q. Were there any other visible signs of injury to the 20 body? 21 A. No, there was nothing at the scene. 22 Q. Presumably various exhibits were handed over to the 23 police at the scene? 24 A. Yes, they were. 25 Q. I am not going to ask you to read those out. 16
53

1 A. Thank you. 2 Q. Did you carry out a post-mortem examination? 3 A. I did, yes. 4 Q. At what time did you begin to do that? 5 A. The examination started at 21.20 hours or 20 minutes 6 past 9 that evening. 7 Q. Where did you carry out that examination? 8 A. That was in the mortuary at the John Radcliffe hospital 9 in Oxford. 10 Q. There were various police officers present at the time? 11 A. There were, yes. 12 Q. Was there anything of significance you found on the 13 outer surface of the body in the course of the 14 post-mortem examination? 15 A. He appeared to be a relatively well-nourished man of 16 average height and weight; and there was nothing to 17 suggest that he was particularly ill from the external 18 examination or anything of that nature. 19 Q. Were there any significant post-mortem changes, that is 20 to say changes which had take place since death? 21 A. Yes, he showed cooling of blood really over the back of 22 the body, that is referred to as hypostasis medically. 23 The significance of that is really that it was 24 consistent with the position that his body was found in, 25 in other words lying on his back. 17 1 Q. On this further examination, did you find any signs of 2 injury to the body that you have not already mentioned? 3 A. I did. I was able to note in detail the injuries over 4 his left wrist in particular. 5 Q. You have made a report, a post-mortem examination 6 report? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. Would you just like to read from the significant parts 9 of that in relation to the injuries you found? 10 A. Certainly. There was a series of incised wounds, cuts, 11 of varying depth over the front of the left wrist and 12 they extended in total over about 8 by 5 centimetres on 13 the front of the wrist. The largest of the wounds and 14 the deepest lay towards the top end or the elbow end of 15 that complex of injuries and it showed a series of 16 notches and some crushing of its edges. That wound had 17 actually severed an artery on the little finger aspect 18 of the front of the wrist, called the ulnar artery. The 19 other main artery on the wrist on the thumb aspect was 20 intact. 21 There were a number of other incisions of varying 22 depth and many smaller scratch-like injuries over the 23 wrist. The appearance that they gave was of what are 24 called tentative or hesitation marks, which are commonly 25 seen prior to a deep cut being made into somebody's skin 18 1 if they are making the incision themselves. 2 Q. Did you see any other signs of injury or marks on the 3 body? 4 A. I did. Over the left side of his head there were three 5 minor abrasions or grazes to his scalp, and of course 6 that part of his head was relatively close to 7 undergrowth. 8 In addition to that -54

9 LORD HUTTON: Were those abrasions consistent with having 10 been in contact with the undergrowth? 11 A. They were entirely, my Lord; particularly branches, 12 pebbles and the like. There was no bruising deep to 13 those, I should add, at this stage. 14 MR KNOX: Were there any other injuries or bruises? 15 A. Yes. Those were only revealed during the dissection 16 part of the examination. There was a bruise below the 17 left knee. There were two bruises below the right knee 18 over the shin and there were two bruises over the left 19 side of his chest. All of these were small and affected 20 the skin but not the deeper tissues. 21 Q. Would you be able to say how those bruises or injuries 22 could have occurred? 23 A. They would have occurred following a blunt impact 24 against any firm object and it would not have to be 25 a particularly heavy impact. They may be caused -- some 19 1 of them may have been caused as Dr Kelly was stumbling, 2 if you like, at the scene. They may have been caused 3 well before he got to the woods. It is not possible to 4 age them so precisely. 5 Q. Did you see any signs of what are called defensive 6 injuries? 7 A. No, there were no signs of defensive injuries; and by 8 that I mean injuries that occur as a result of somebody 9 trying to parry blows from a weapon or trying to grasp 10 a weapon. 11 Q. What injuries would you normally expect to see of that 12 type? 13 A. If somebody is being attacked with a bladed weapon, like 14 a knife, then cuts on the palm of the hand or over the 15 fingers where they are trying to grasp the knife, or 16 cuts or even stabs on the outer part of the arm as they 17 try to parry a blow. 18 Q. You carried out an internal examination, presumably? 19 A. I did. 20 Q. I am not going to ask you to run through all the various 21 things you examined. 22 A. Yes, thank you. 23 Q. Can you say what significant findings you made on the 24 internal examination? 25 A. Yes, in terms of significant positive findings, there 20 1 was evidence that at the time of his death Dr Kelly had 2 a significant amount of narrowing of the arteries to his 3 heart, his coronary arteries by a process called 4 atherosclerosis or, colloquially, hardening of the 5 arteries. 6 That was the only positive evidence of natural 7 disease, but I could not find evidence that he had had 8 a heart attack as a consequence of that. 9 Q. Did you notice anything about the mouth? 10 A. Yes, in the mouth there was a small abrasion on the 11 lower lip. This was of the order of 0.6 by 12 0.3 centimetres, so very small; and there was no 13 significant reaction to it. 14 Q. How could that abrasion have occurred? 15 A. With the particular appearance and location of this 16 abrasion then it may have been caused by contact with
55

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

the teeth, in other words biting. Q. What about the stomach contents? Did you notice or not notice anything about them? A. When I examine the stomach contents my examination is relatively cursory compared to the detailed examination that the toxicologist would undertake. But I could see no obvious signs of tablet residue. So in other words, there was not a great volume of tablet material in the stomach.

21 1 Q. At what time did the post-mortem conclude? 2 A. The examination concluded actually at quarter past 3 midnight on the morning of Saturday 19th July. 4 Q. Presumably various exhibits were taken from the 5 examination. They were handed over to 6 Detective Constable Bowsher, I understand? 7 A. They were, yes. 8 Q. Were you handed a toxicology report at any time? 9 A. Yes, I was. It was the report of Dr Alexander Allen. 10 Q. Did you have this report before or after your 11 examination? 12 A. After the examination. 13 Q. In summary what did it show? 14 A. It showed the presence of two compounds in particular. 15 One of them is a drug called dextropropoxyphene. That 16 is an opiate-type drug, it is a mild painkiller, and 17 that was present at a concentration of one microgramme 18 per millilitre in the blood. 19 Q. Did it show anything, this report, in summary? 20 A. Yes, it did. It showed the presence of paracetamol. 21 Q. The concentration of that? 22 A. 97 milligrammes per millilitre. 23 Q. Where was that present in the body? 24 A. It was also present in the stomach contents, as well as 25 the blood. 22 1 Q. Did you carry out an histology? 2 A. Yes, I did. I examined small samples of all the major 3 organs under the microscope. 4 Q. Did that show anything significant? 5 A. No, it did not. It showed minor changes in his lungs 6 and brain, which would be consistent with the way in 7 which he died. 8 Q. Were you able to estimate the time of death? 9 A. Yes, within certain limits, using a particular technique 10 based upon the rectal temperature. 11 Q. What time of death did you estimate as a result of that? 12 A. The estimate is that death is likely to have occurred 13 some 18 to 27 hours prior to taking the rectal 14 temperature, and that that time range was somewhere 15 between quarter past 4 on 17th July and quarter past 1 16 on the morning of the 18th July. 17 Q. You took the rectal temperature at what time? 18 A. That was taken at quarter past 7 in the evening of the 19 18th. 20 Q. Would you just like to summarise what your conclusions 21 were as a result of your examinations? 22 A. Yes, certainly. I found that Dr Kelly was an apparently 23 adequately nourished man in whom there was no evidence 24 of natural disease that could of itself have caused
56

25 death directly at the macroscopic or naked eye level. 23 1 He had evidence of a significant incised wound to his 2 left wrist, in the depths of which his left ulnar artery 3 had been completely severed. That wound was in the 4 context of multiple incised wounds over the front of his 5 left wrist of varying length and depth. 6 The arterial injury had resulted in the loss of 7 a significant volume of blood, as noted at the scene. 8 The complex of incised wounds over the left wrist is 9 entirely consistent with having been inflicted by 10 a bladed weapon, most likely candidate for which would 11 have been a knife. Furthermore, the knife present at 12 the scene would be a suitable candidate for causing such 13 injuries. 14 The orientation and arrangement of the wounds over 15 the left wrist are typical of self inflicted injury. 16 Also typical of this was the presence of small so-called 17 tentative or hesitation marks. The fact that his watch 18 appeared to have been removed whilst blood was already 19 flowing suggests that it had been removed deliberately 20 in order to facilitate access to the wrist. The removal 21 of the watch in that way and indeed the removal of the 22 spectacles are features pointing towards this being an 23 act of self harm. 24 Other features at the scene which would tend to 25 support this impression include the relatively passive 24 1 distribution of the blood, the neat way in which the 2 water bottle and its top were placed, the lack of 3 obvious signs of trampling of the undergrowth or damage 4 to the clothing. To my mind, the location of the death 5 is also of interest in this respect because it was 6 clearly a very pleasant and relatively private spot of 7 the type that is sometimes chosen by people intent upon 8 self harm. 9 Q. Is that something you have found from your past 10 experience? 11 A. Yes, and knowledge of the literature. 12 Many of the injuries over the left wrist show 13 evidence of a well developed vital reaction which 14 suggests that they had been inflicted over a reasonable 15 period of time, minutes, though, rather than seconds or 16 many hours before death. 17 LORD HUTTON: What do you mean by a "vital reaction"? 18 A. A vital reaction, my Lord, is the body's response to an 19 area of damage. It manifests itself chiefly in the form 20 of reddening and swelling around the area. 21 LORD HUTTON: I interrupted you. You were at 9 and you are 22 coming on to 10, I think. 23 A. Thank you, my Lord. There is a total lack of classical 24 defence wounds against sharp weapon attack. Such wounds 25 are typically seen in the palm aspects of the hands or 25 1 over the outer aspects of the forearms. 2 It was noted that he has a significant degree of 3 coronary artery disease and this may have played some 4 small part in the rapidity of death but not the major 5 part in the cause of death.
57

6 Given the finding of blister packs of Coproxamol 7 tablets within the coat pocket and the vomitus around 8 the ground, it is an entirely reasonable supposition 9 that he may have consumed a quantity of these tablets 10 either on the way to or at the scene itself. 11 Q. What did the toxicology report suggest? 12 A. That he had consumed a significant quantity of the 13 tablets. 14 Q. I am not going to trouble you with the details of the 15 toxicology report. Was there anything else in addition 16 to the toxicology samples that you noticed? 17 A. (Pause). Really the only other thing in addition to 18 that was the coronary artery disease that could have had 19 a part in the rapidity of death in these circumstances. 20 Q. You have mentioned the minor injury to the inner aspect 21 of the lip. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Moving on from that, you mentioned the abrasions to the 24 head. Would you like to resume your summary at that 25 point? 26 1 A. Yes. The minor injuries or abrasions over the head are 2 entirely consistent with scraping against rough 3 undergrowth such as small twigs, branches and stones 4 which were present at the scene. 5 LORD HUTTON: Did you give any consideration or do anything 6 in relation to the possibility of Dr Kelly having been 7 overpowered by any substance? 8 A. Yes, indeed, my Lord. The substances which one thinks 9 of, as a pathologist, in these terms are volatile 10 chemicals. Perhaps chloroform is a classic example. So 11 in order to investigate that -12 LORD HUTTON: You need not go into the detail but if you 13 state it in a general way. 14 A. I retained a lung and also blood samples until the 15 toxicology was complete. 16 LORD HUTTON: And the purpose of that toxicology being? 17 A. To examine for any signs of a volatile chemical in the 18 blood or, failing that, in the lungs. 19 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you. 20 Yes, Mr Knox. 21 MR KNOX: If you move on to conclusion 18. 22 A. Certainly. The minor reddened lesions on the lower 23 limbs are typical of areas of minor hair follicle 24 irritation or skin irritation, so they were not injuries 25 in particular. They were not puncture wounds. 27 1 Q. Conclusion 19? 2 A. I had undertaken subcutaneous dissection of the arms and 3 the legs and there is no positive evidence of 4 restraint-type injury. 5 Q. Conclusion 20? 6 A. There is no positive pathological evidence that this man 7 had been subjected to a sustained violent assault prior 8 to his death. 9 LORD HUTTON: Just going back to your previous observation, 10 a restraint-type injury of someone who has been held by 11 the arms and the legs. 12 A. Yes, my Lord. Yes, particularly around the areas of the 13 ankles and the wrists.
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14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. Thank you. MR KNOX: Conclusion 21? A. There was no positive pathological evidence to indicate that he has been subjected to compression of the neck, such as by manual strangulation, ligature strangulation or the use of an arm hold. Q. And next? A. There is no evidence from the post-mortem examination or my observations at the scene to indicate that the deceased had been dragged or otherwise transported to the location where his body was found. Q. Did you retain samples for histological examination?

28 1 A. I did, yes. 2 Q. Were there any significant conclusions you drew from 3 that? 4 A. There were no significant findings. 5 Q. And in summary, what is your opinion as to the major 6 factor involved in Dr Kelly's death? 7 A. It is the haemorrhage as a result of the incised wounds 8 to his left wrist. 9 Q. If that had not occurred, would Dr Kelly have died? 10 A. He may not have done at this time, with that level of 11 dextropropoxyphene. 12 Q. What role, if any, did the coronary disease play? 13 A. As with the drug dextropropoxyphene, it would have 14 hastened death rather than caused it, as such. 15 Q. So how would you summarise, in brief, your conclusions 16 as to the cause of death? 17 A. In the formulation, the cause of death is given as 1(a) 18 haemorrhage due to 1(b) incised wounds of the left 19 wrist. Under part 2 of the formulation of the medical 20 cause of death, Coproxamol ingestion and coronary artery 21 atherosclerosis. 22 Q. You have already dealt with this, I think, but could you 23 confirm whether, as far as you could tell on the 24 examination, there was any sign of third party 25 involvement in Dr Kelly's death? 29 1 A. No, there was no pathological evidence to indicate the 2 involvement of a third party in Dr Kelly's death. 3 Rather, the features are quite typical, I would say, of 4 self inflicted injury if one ignores all the other 5 features of the case. 6 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say concerning 7 the circumstances leading to Dr Kelly's death? 8 A. Nothing I could say as a pathologist, no. 9 LORD HUTTON: Thank you for your very clear evidence, 10 Dr Hunt...'23

From Absalom to Dr Hunt then, we have got as far as that now anyway! All that evidence is in. _____________ Anything that can be put in a nutshell should remain there [if it can].
23

Hunt, Dr Nicholas (2003). Forensic Pathologist, Home Office accredited: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans33.htm 59

Bertrand Russell.24

Following on from the above, detail from now on will be of what has been gone over time and time again since then, on this. And here if we miss footnoting some of this it is all over the internet, everywhere, oft repeated since, anyway. Dr Kelly's body moved or not? The first person to sight Dr Kelly's body (Louise Holmes with her dog Brock), gave evidence at the inquiry that, 'I could see a body slumped against the bottom of a tree [12:18, p. 19, above]... He was at the base of the tree with almost his head on his shoulders, just slumped back against the *tree [13:2, p. 19, again].' And since the inquiry Holmes has reiterated this, but only in 2004 so far as we know up till now... The second searcher (Paul Chapman, searching with Holmes), said he saw, 'the body of a gentleman sitting up against a tree [26:25, p. 26, above]... This was from '15 to 20 metres [27:5, p. 26]... He was sitting with his back up against a tree and there was an obvious injury to his left arm [27:7, p. 26].' Since then Chapman has not retracted this either. And if he had that would likely be the end of quite a bit of this fuss also then, ever since. DC Coe next then, the next to see Dr Kelly's body, after Holmes and Chapman bumped into him while returning to the parking area, and after Chapman then returned with DC Coe to show him where Dr Kelly was (a time lapse, we believe, of approximately six minutes plus, but not minus from all the evidence given and included before), said to the inquiry initially, that Dr Kelly was lying flat out: 'It was laying on its back -- the body was laying on its back by a large tree, the head towards the trunk of the tree [2:9, p. 49]... On its back [2:18, p. 49].' And this is meant to be from when Coe first saw Dr Kelly then, with Chapman having led him in. Here, this not strictly our own observation this, they would have seen the same thing, it couldn't have been any different just then. And Chapman, since then, has not said anything different, unlike Coe on this and on other matters we know a little of now? The main differences, on this body position then, are between Chapman and Coe since then then. Holmes was never so emphatic. Hutton, in his report, his findings, would get round these differences saying this, similar to Holmes (just above, see '*tree', p. 62), not that far away:
'I have seen a photograph of Dr Kelly's body in the wood which shows that most of his body was lying on the ground but that his head was slumped against the base of the tree - therefore a witness could say either that the body was lying on the ground or slumped against the tree.' (HR*)

Since then, lately, DC Coe has recanted a little over this, over what he saw then. And about this aspect of this 'affair' he has since said, in the Mail on Sunday, 8 August, 2010, that he thought, 'the head and part of the shoulders were leaning against the tree.'25 Similar to Hutton, in part. And it could be here, couldnt it, that DC Coe was finally taking his lead from Hutton's explication of these differences then also, but now? And in so doing he might also be trying to dampen down some of the fuss which in part he may feel responsible for
24 25

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970), author, mathematician & philosopher, pensioner... Mail on Sunday, London (2010). 'There wasn't much blood about. Detective who found weapons expert David Kelly's body raises questions over his death . http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1301210/Detective-Dr-David-Kellys-body-raises-questions-death.html (Photo of DC Coe there). 60

now? Maybe not. Blair thought it would go on anyway (Blair's prescience 26). And he was right, quite. That aside, enough pats, a criticism of explications (explanations that are meant to help you out of something), like that though, since, has been that Chapman (the second searcher, above, Pp. 21-), twice used the term 'sitting' to denote body position then (to the inquiry). And so that should not to be confused with 'laying' down then, by Coe (just above, before, p. 63), nor 'slumped,' head bent up, how Hutton has described this as well. We have those differences, yes, but now we have subsequent witnesses also, the ambulance crew, Vanessa Hunt and David Bartlett, saying more, or less, than that, and with some consequence to that from then on as well? And we have to, sometime, get the meaning of this? For the ambulance crew were not asked about body positioning, anything like that, at the inquiry at all. And, you could almost think, be forgiven for this, for thinking that counsel didn't dare after Chapman and Coe now, after their differences? But yet, Coe (as was Hunt the pathologist), were asked near last about any of this (p. 48, before). Vanessa Hunt (medic one, to the inquiry), said as little as this, anyway, on what she'd seen, asked about that, left at this, then:
'Q... when you got into the wooded area, what did you see? A. There was a male on his back, feet towards us. Q. Yes. A. And no obvious signs of life [73:1, p. 41].'

And Bartlett (medic two), after Hunt, didn't differ on this:

'They led us up to where the body was laid, feet facing us, laid on its back, left arm out to one side...[80:15, p. 44].'

And that was all, on position, asked of them, then. And that doesn't clear much up, on this, can't, even. They should have been pinned down then, but then no one was to know what would come after this. _____________ Still, a reasonable man DC Coe may also have been though (its in the Mail, page above), if indeed he did take his lead from Hutton, then? And if in so doing he was also to dampen down some of the concern over apparent differences, like that, now then? And yes, but we'd have to add to that, now (a chestnut or not?), that Chapman (the second searcher, the one who said Dr Kelly was 'sitting' up - above, top of page before), was also able to describe the clothing on Dr Kelly's upper body then, and from only '15 to 20 metres' away, he said, didn't go any closer, that not procedure, only one proceeds... And this is another's point, not our own, now, and not a bad one at that: For it might then have been quite difficult for him to be so sure of this (what Dr Kelly was wearing, above), had Dr Kelly been lying flat out on his back, then, his feet all that were towards him, flat out on his back, as 'others' after him had described the scene as they found it after then? And so Dr Kelly's body moved, again, or not, that's still the question? For Dr Kelly is plainly not 'sitting' up, seen either way, after that? And asking Holmes again, after this, might have been, might still be, asking quite a lot. And might be unnecessary anyway...
26

Footnote, p. 6. In fact he could have prefaced this. Yet he did, really. 61

For countering this, perhaps, we'd note that Chapman doesn't seem to seem to have remarked (not then, ever), that after that short time away from the 'scene', after which he took DC Coe in, showed him, left him there, alone - that the position of Dr Kelly had changed in the slightest since first he had sighted him 'sitting' up then? That being so, where all stands, all roads lead to DC Coe then don't they, and after that? And then if not him, that he moved Dr Kelly then, then to those after him (other officers), did? And all this before Dr Hunt, anyway, arrived at the end of the day, and who has not ever had the finger pointed at him, over anything, except at him over his competence now somehow? As if he arranged the whole thing, or became part of this after wards. And yet even though DC Coe's changed his mind now, on some of this, yet that hasn't calmed every one down. And probably because of this, now, his changing his mind. _____________ The third person as it stands now? Above, we have it that there is a discrepancy over the number of persons accompanying DC Coe up till when he met the searchers who'd found Dr Kelly before then? Holmes and Chapman have always said there were 'three' altogether, when they ran into DC Coe and co, while Coe in evidence said there were only 'two' (2:2, p. 49, above), including he. This leads us in the direction of 'scene changes' taking place after Coe was shown the scene by Chapman then? After he was left alone there then, until he was relieved by other officers arriving at the scene, some twenty-five minutes later then (that time decided upon due to all testimony, before). And, missing since then, has also been this third person up until recently as well now then, not that this person has been identified yet, yet we know he was a policeman now, did then really, it just wasnt made plain. And somewhat incredulous this might seem also now, but first now DC Coe has recanted a little over this, and has finally said, to the Mail on Sunday, 9 August, 2010, now (last interviewed, Mail on Sunday, 8 August, 2010), that there was a third person with him, then, when first 'they' met up with Louise Holmes and Paul Chapman on the track up Harrowdown Hill that morning. This now, as printed: 'He was a trainee police constable who is no longer with the force. He would not [though] reveal the mans name.' (In the Mail 27). _____________ Blood loss now? In the same interview, DC Coe on blood loss, has said essentially the same as everyone else always has:
'I certainly didn't see a lot of blood anywhere. There was some on his left wrist but it wasn't on his clothes. On the ground, there wasn't much blood about, if any.' 28 To the inquiry he had said: 'I saw blood around the left wrist area.' (3:16, p. 50, above).

Not much difference then, and so that not exactly a scoop that bit then, for The Mail... again. But that was probably not the main thrust anyway. There'd be another story being developed here. The question here could be then: 'How well did they do?'
27

Mail on Sunday, London (2010). 'There wasn't much blood about. Detective who found weapons expert David Kelly's body raises questions over his death . http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1301210/Detective-Dr-David-Kellys-body-raises-questions-death.html 28 Ibid. 62

Vanessa Hunt (the paramedic), was the first to set off the questions over blood loss when she expressed her reservations about this at the Hutton inquiry. She said this after being asked, after she had given the evidence asked of her, if she then had anything to add to that, to assist, to which Hunt had then replied that:
' the amount of blood that was around the scene seemed relatively minimal and there was a small patch on his right knee but no obvious arterial bleeding...no spraying of blood or huge blood loss or any obvious loss on the clothing... As to on the ground, I do not remember seeing a sort of huge puddle or anything like that.' (76:8, p. 43, above).

Asked after that, firmly, if she had been examining the ground for 'blood loss' then, was that what she was there for, she replied, of course not to that!
'77... 16 Q. And were you examining the ground for blood or blood 17 loss? 18 A. No. 19 MR DINGEMANS: Right. Thank you. 20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much Ms Hunt. Thank you.' (As above).

_____________

Since then Vanessa Hunt has expanded on this, and this due to her work experience she has also said: That 'it was incredibly unlikely that [Dr Kelly] died from the wrist wound we saw [anyway] there just wasn't a lot of blood. When someone cuts an artery, whether accidentally or intentionally, the blood pumps everywhere' 29 then. Shows there's always an afterword, isn't there, when you've been roughed up while trying to be helpful. That not helpful, still it is so that she was not called to the scene to examine it for blood, but no one else did either, apparently, think to look hard for that, at that. For most of those who attended the scene then, this probably did look like and ordinary straight forwards sort of case it probably has always been. On the surface. And which it might indeed have been also, quite plain, except for who it was that they had found there in that way (again). David Ian Bartlett, up next, at the inquiry, (after Vanessa Hunt, his colleague), said much the same on this, blood loss, as his colleague. And also that prior to them arriving at the scene they got an update by way of computer readout in the ambulance, of a 'male query kilo 1' (a person not certified, but presumed dead (78:25, p. 44, above), and that they arrived at Harrowdown Hill at 9.55 am the morning of 18 July, 2003. And from there they were accompanied to the scene by police officers and after examining Dr Kelly it was they that declared him deceased at 10.07 am also then. Bartlett, when asked if he had anything to add that might be of help to his Lordship also, said something similar to his colleague, to the inquiry then:
'Just the same as my colleague actually, we was surprised there was not more blood on the body if it was an arterial bleed.' (85:11, p. 47, above).

_____________

Neither of them, nor any of the others kneeling around Dr Kelly then, had got much
29

Scotsman.com. Scotland (2004).'Kelly ''could not have died'' from knife wound, paramedics claim.' http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/kelly-could-not-have-died-from-knife-wound-paramedics-claim-1565578 63

blood on themselves that way either? In the Mail again, later on, as did Coe, Bartlett reiterated this as well then (and perhaps this was the story being more fully developed now all along..?):
'Mr Bartlett backs up claims made by DC Graham Coe [Coe did lead this then] the first policeman on the scene about how little blood there was around the body. The paramedic said: Ive seen more blood at a nosebleed than I saw there [and] has claimed [Dr Kelly's] body had obviously been moved in the minutes after it was found [also, and] if earlier witnesses said that ['it was leaning against a tree'] then the body had obviously been moved by the time he [they] got there [that so].'30 _____________

We are moved a little further ourselves now, along the lines of the article, to get to this, and this on another unnamed person, then, for,
'...a year after the death [been] approached by a stranger in Oxford, who said he was a close friend of Dr Kelly [a] man [that] said he recognised Mr Bartlett from media coverage [and he] said to me hed known David Kelly since he was a boy. There was nothing to doubt about him [that] Dr Kelly had been a member of the Bahai faith, and that suicide was against their religion [that] theres no way in the world that guy committed suicide [this] Mr Bartlett refuses to elaborate any further or reveal the mans identity but says he has no doubt he was genuine.'31

We could stop there, comment, 'What - you mean a genuine Person, then?' But this jumps out at us now, startling us again:
As we approached the scene, it was obvious he [Dr Kelly] was dead. He was lying flat out in the clearing with his bottle of water, knife and watch in line right next to his left arm...I wasnt impressed with how it was conducted [the Hutton inquiry]. It should have been under oath, the photographs of the scene should have been released...He was lying flat out some distance from the tree. He definitely wasnt leaning against it. I remember saying to the copper, Are you sure he hasnt fallen out of the tree?32 _____________

Not all of this has been shaken out that way then? But we have moved too far away ourselves now (as indeed was Dr Kelly moved further away from the tree than ever before then, that passage), from this question of blood loss again, which we were addressing before then... There wasn't a lot about. But, counterbalancing that, or not - the cut to Dr Kelly's wrist wasn't exactly in the right place either, for that much to come out, crudely put. Comment on that has always been along the lines that Dr Kelly, with his medical background, he would of course have known where to cut better than that. And of course. Counteracting that Hutton allowed that Dr Kelly died from causes on top of that, two others, as per Dr Hunt, his conclusions before that summary (above, Hutton, p. 12). Is that the end of this then? _____________ Objects at the scene?
30

Daily Mail, London (2010). Dr David Kelly's body 'had obviously been moved': Paramedic at death scene reveals concerns over Hutton Inquiry. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1311255/Dr-David-Kellysbody-obviously-moved-Paramedic-death-scene-reveals-concerns-Hutton-Inquiry.html (Photo of Bartlett and Hunt there). 31 Ibid 32 Ibid 64

We had it above, that Dr Hunt had it, that Dr Kelly's watch was lying face down next to a knife now. While DC Coe had already had it (before him), that the watch was placed on top of the knife instead? Which we noted would raise another unlikely question for later then this now: that it would have been unlikely, wouldn't it, that the knife would have been used before the watch had been taken off... All this, the questions on blood loss, other questions, have promoted the idea that Dr Kelly was not only moved at the scene, his body arranged, but that he may indeed have been moved, deceased, to the spot where he was 'found' then? And this is not all Coe's fault either now (on objects, how they were arranged), for that suggestion also hangs on the blood evidence (the lack of it, as above, and so you could see how it would, now). And this also hangs tenuously on Chapman and Holmes (with Brock), not being asked about objects at the scene, now - and so why not, now then, this has been asked of Hutton also now, of the whole farrago... If so? Fully developed this is real conspiracy stuff now, all of this, and includes Hutton post Coe as well then. And then other establishment figures, they would have to come in also. Which would be risky, we'd say, if this didn't get past Coe, as you could never know what Coe might come out with next, following on from before, on that... _____________ At a level slightly less alarming than that, and by way of explaining what else might have happened then this slightly less alarming than having the Brits doing this to one of their own, then - perhaps an Iraqi exile group conducted an operation against Dr Kelly then, this has been believed... With them believing then, that Dr Kelly was anti-regime change in Iraq and overly influential on this matter then? Which he wasn't, actually, for starters, here (ask Blair on this, even, before, p. 4). Or perhaps others did this instead then? The 'American's' might have it has also been reasoned... And that they might even have done this on a sort of pro bono basis also though, without being formally asked to that is, and without ever informing the Brits also, of this then? Though perhaps informally later though? Left with this, the Brit establishment was obliged to cover that up after that then, the special relationship, best kept. Still not best pleased though, after that, having to do that, it might get out? Can't keep bumping people off. They'll be charging next. Further than that, some have reasoned that Dr Kelly may have been murdered because he might have been about to write a book it all now also? But, on that, this taps into other conspiracies about secret weapons and the like, and 'they' are yet to be seen about, years after that. _____________ The more featureless and commonplace a crime is, the more difficult it is to bring it home.
Arthur Conan Doyle.33

The most motivated group of course, if this was murder, would be the son's and daughters of the Iraqi regime. This is not only missed, but played down. And that says something that does, perhaps, regarding the agenda of those still dissecting this, still arguing this out... Too glib, that?

33

Conan Doyle, Sir Arthur. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, The Boscombe Valley Mystery. London, The Strand Magazine (1891). 65

It is so that Saddams son, Uday (who died in a shoot-out with American troops just a few days after Dr Kelly died), did give orders, (in May 1999 apparently 34), for the formation of female Fedayeen groups, to settle into and to operate abroad, out of Iraq, from then on, then (after the second last inspection regime, that Dr Kelly had been part of, since 1991, had left, then)? It is even so that these operations were to be codenamed, 'Blessed July' as well. And that also the month that Dr Kelly died in such 'circumstances so odd they are unique' also. (And with some force those words still resonate... 35). Motivated yes, women even, and they would indeed have liked to make a big point abroad, not just Uday. But if they had, then they would also have failed miserably then, because the suicide scenario prevailed... And so, no matter what they might also like to say now, they would still be unknown of to this day because of that also then, and so they would never have made it into the big tent then, of men... Some sentence that? But this is what is wrong with this scenario to begin with on this scenario also now! As the three or four on the list above Dr Kelly, on a list that he knew about, and the one below him (background to come), had not been assassinated up till then, nor after him either. Mind you, that might have fallen a bit flat, action like that not being acknowledged? But, likely, if any of them had been, you might allow then that Dr Kelly would never have been allowed too far out of sight of minders after that also then. And in fact, that way, he might never even have got as far as meeting with Gilligan on his own, without a minder accompanying him. Could have been a good thing Perhaps it's just that we've not heard of any of this sort of occurrence though, more murder on the railways? All this sort of thing covered up? But, well, as above, if any of these scientists, former weapons inspectors in Iraq, et al, had been got at, killed, then surely we would have heard something of that by now, by way of Renan Talieva even, his blogspot again, 'deadscientists dot com' monitoring live scientists most likely still? Here, out of that, we got something out by not even arguing with anyone over anything there. Back and forth we went a little, this brings to mind a former work, the fuss about Sutch, its preface/ method, which guided that work, to the point where it all sort of sorted itself out? The fuss over that... Continuing apace with another scenario here, like that, much the same sort of thing, much to be ruled in, and much to be ruled out, we could go at this the same way again. Just don't trip up trying to get it out. _____________ First could Dr Kelly's body have been moved when it can be said it was anyway? That we take as after Chapman and Coe parted then, when Chapman left Coe alone with Dr Kelly, for some twenty-five minutes, about that long, then? The only thing that Coe could have done, and which could lead to Dr Kelly being moved after that then, is for him, and, or, another with him (?), to have removed some less obvious form of restraint constraining him. So, we could say, that had Dr Kelly, left there, been sitting up then, then Dr Kelly's body could have slumped down, 'slid...' after he was released from this? And less
34

Daily Record, Glasgow (2000). SADDAM'S MATA HARI HIT SQUADS; Female assassins sent to Britain. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/SADDAM'S+MATA+HARI+HIT+SQUADS; +Female+assassins+sent+to+Britain.-a063767247. 35 Yes, well put first in this work by Michael Bath from Rochester, Kent, again his case for an inquest [being] simply that there has not been one...' Yet (before, p. 9), brilliant! 66

obvious this would have had to have been, because Holmes got up closer to Dr Kelly than did Chapman, who commented that he could see Dr Kelly's upper body, what he was wearing, anyway (as above), and this an example now of how we can pack the varying observations together, package them... Dr Hunt said there was no sign of any restraint though (27:4, p. 61). But interestingly, from the evidence above, before that, from Police Constable Martyn Sawyer, there was some sign he might have slid down: 'It looked as if he had slid down and his trousers had ridden up.' (50:9, p. 30). Now, if we allow that as maybe the case, just for now, even, we could, now, suggest that Dr Kelly had been detained in some way late that day before then, also then... Not that we believe it, to begin with, we just want to test it... Going on with that we could say, simply, then, that this was even more likely so because he didn't return home from a walk which he commonly took. That and this (commented on, as out of character also), in that he was expected to have met up with his daughter that evening, also, and to have then headed out on a walk with her then, to check on a foal nearby, its welfare, how it was getting on, not just to check on him. And now, most persons, fathers, would have kept an appointment like that wouldn't they, regardless of how sad or how bad they felt about almost anything else, wouldn't they, for that would make almost any fathers day... so we have good reasons to return, the walk not out of the ordinary... After Dr Kelly was detained then (this way because he would have returned, argument before), he would then have had to have been restrained. And that we could adjudge this way - by his wrist injuries as they were outlined by Dr Hunt anyway: there was at least rubbing or, 'extensive reddening around the whole injury complex...' (Gilligan for this, below). Further, back, to that, conjecture from that would also suggest then, that he was restrained by some wire or at least something made of metal, heavy, that way. For that would have had to have been of something that he simply couldn't cut away himself, though he might have tried anyway, hence the 'bluntness' then (this often remarked on), of his knife? And so then, and because he was making no head-way releasing himself that way then (by cutting or bending the wire), he would have tried to cut himself free another way then, by cutting himself. And that as he wouldn't have wanted to hang about all night especially not after he guessed what might come next, in the morning, when the light was right, he might be filmed? (And you can survive a cut like that, you can cut yourself free, if so restrained, provided you can find a way to stem the flow (see, below36). Left, then, and while attempting to circumvent further possible indignities to himself, Dr Kelly might then, have attempted to deal with the pain of trying to cut himself free, with the pills then, that he carried for his wife? Unfortunately though, this way, it would have all become too much for him, an underlying heart condition (Hutton spelled this out, cause one of three), his arm not strong enough anyway (that an old injury, made much of, later also...). And so worst possible result all round really, in the end, and there he was left, held up, so that Chapman could describe what he was wearing then, from '15 to 20 metres' (as above, p. 26).
36

It was widely reported, around then, shortly before even, in April of 2003, that in the US a climber trapped in a canyon by his arm (for 127 hours this the title a film now, about this), had cut himself free, his arm clean off at the elbow, and had stemmed the flow of blood, and had walked out for help afterwards, and made it... Source: Burrow's, Shane. Cheating Death in Bluejohn Canyon. http://www.climbutah.com/Roost/bluejohn2.htm (2003). 67

And so it is this then, that Coe, or Coe and another (?), would have had to have removed then, in order that we now find Dr Kelly, slumped, whatever way you put it, or 'slid down' then, 'and his trousers ridden up (Just above). _____________ That being our scenario then, its all in, it allows for much that is not explained so far why, now, if any of this were so, would anyone (leave Coe out of this even, for now), arrange the scene so as to suggest suicide rather than any other scenario then, this one that we have imagined, even? And hardly worthy of an answer that. But simply put together, again, the propaganda aspect, that would be something, Dr Kelly found like that, the effect could have been immense, and there would have been some celebration in some big tent somewhere you can bet, but perhaps over the border in some other country by then though. And not to mention, also, but here we are mentioning it anyway, that the security services would have slipped up big-time themselves then, with them knowing as they did, and as did Dr Kelly also (he said), that he was on some sort of list, a target for assassination, and not just him, only (and we'll get to that later also). But for now, what is wrong with this scenario also now? Well, leaving aside Coe and whoever the other (?), might have been for a little longer still, if there had been any group of assailants, anywhere, nearby, the next morning, mission to complete, then the scent of them, nearby, would have been picked up by Brock, Holmes dog searching all over near there then. And it wasn't. And well, just how good was Brock at this sort of thing, while we are stretching this scenario, testing it, now then? Well, some, apparently, as previous to Brock finding Dr Kelly, Brock had found others near the boundary area of their selected search area first thing (and not just women either, Fedayeen), and not of a threatening disposition obviously, either, as all lived to tell the tale of this encounter also (to the inquiry):
' Q: You came upon some others nearby? A: 'We went up to where... our boundary of our search area was on the Thames and spoke to some people there who were just moored on a boat on the Thames... Brock had found them because he obviously is just trained to pick up on human scent, so he went off and indicated on them...' (Evidence before, Holmes, 10:4, p. 18).

Sharp Brock was, is, that our point, pointer here -> And last seen running around at Crufts very much alive, still, not neutralised, and there is a big write up on this (here37). _____________ In short time, after that after Holmes and Chapman, and Brock, left the scene - DC Coe is led back there then, by Chapman, last at the scene with Holmes and Brock, six minutes minimum, before (p. 63). Coe, at the inquiry, asked if there was anything 'about' (around Dr Kelly), at that time then, said, then, that he remembered that he, 'saw a knife, like a pruning knife, and a watch... the watch [if] I remember rightly, just on top of the knife...the knife [near] to the left wrist, left side of the body...a small water bottle. I think that was the left-hand side of the body as well, towards the top left-hand shoulder... There was a cap...I
37

Get Reading UK (2009). Will Brock be top dog at Crufts? http://www.getreading.co.uk/news/s/2045299_will_brock_be_top_dog_at_cruft. (Photo of Brock and Lou Holmes there). 68

Uniform with Chapman and Holmes, PC Sawyer also stated on this: that when he and PC Franklin came upon DC Coe, DC Coe was part of a party of three policemen then, the other 'two uniformed' he also said then... (47:5, p. 29). cannot remember -- I have a feeling the cap was off, but I cannot be sure...' (3:13, p. 49). All this from '7 or 8 feet' also, never closer... (3:22, p. 50) And, left there, he was now around twenty-five minutes, alone, there, also. And so why wouldn't you believe him just a little on this now, at least there he was, standing there, not far off, looking down, looking about, listening out for what else, no doubt... But if you don't, if you don't think you are doing him a disservice, dismissing his service, if you think he wasnt on his own for long there then, that he sprung into action, somehow, then how then would he and any other person then have ever removed any restraint such as we surmised there might have been then, with what they would have had at hand? For to do that they would have had to have had tools with them by then... at hand. And remember, Brock's been about, there was no help out there. So any tools called for came up the same track Coe did, and so tools could only have arrived with the next lot led by PC Sawyer (the photograph man again), then. _____________ DC Coe left the area, finally, he said, after the ambulance people arrived: 'I left the actual area of the scene' after the 'ambulance people' arrived (that from DC Coe, 4:19, p. 50). After conversation with Coe, about his route in, what he had seen, Franklin and Sawyer led the medics in then (Coe and the other officers went part way in p, 29), Sawyer establishing, as they moved in, a common pathway marked with aluminium poles... (47:11, p. 29). _____________ This brings us back to our scenario type view of this again then, or to one other, actually, now. For if there were no assailants about in daylight (just policemen in uniform then), and so if then Dr Kelly had been brought to the scene (the lack of blood thing again), left there, so as to make this scenario stick, then Dr Kelly must have been transported and left there during the night then? And at night there would have been less chance of checking the scene for sign left behind then. This might have come unstuck? Conversely, if this wasn't meant to look like it did, the scene, then why would any assailants even bother to clean up the scene anyway? That aside, could this have be done at night anyway, before morning? Common sense would suggest, not completely, not that you could not be sure of, totally. And so the scene would have to be thoroughly checked, cleaned the next morning, to ensure the scenario, right? And some person would have to do this, even if to just look about. Hence the third person concern. Huge question-mark, really, for the scene to have been cleaned, checked at least, that would have had to have been done, that morning, we've said. Part of the cover up team, covering for the friendly Iraqis group, a Brit that would make that maybe then, but which, when? And it certainly wouldn't have been an American anyway, covering
69

up their help not asked for, either, not in a British policeman's uniform, anyway. And at the same time, then, other policemen would have been present. And would they have let any evidence be taken away anyway. Not likely, and if they had, someone might have said so, by now, if not Coe. And Coe then could have turned out to be a good witness. Otherwise, by some measure, this has all settled itself with Coe a long time ago, in parts. And that perhaps by believing in no more than what he saw, then, standing alone, sentient alongside Dr Kelly that morning then, a little affected by this, during those quiet moments alone, there. Next after Coe, passing him on the path, part way in again, and on the heels of PC Franklin was PC Sawyer (the photograph man again), who took photographs before the medics set to work 'around' Dr Kelly, Bartlett has said (and who has said that Dr Kelly might even have fallen out of a tree, once again). Nothing could have been moved after then anyway, pertinent to any other scenario, after the medics moved in, moving Dr Kelly about a little themselves now, with Sawyer taking shots before and after, each time, any time anything was moved at the scene. And so without that being detectable (some rearranging of the scene), in a verifiable manner now, we can add to that. The photographs, even though embargoed (and for a long time to come), have been made available for reviews though. Partial, those have led to no inquest being deemed necessary since, on their say so. It has been gone into? And impartial these reviews might have well been, even. Its just that for some, justice should still be seen to be done. And a big stick that is, hence the call for stills, still. It is unfortunate perhaps, that PC Sawyer, when giving evidence, when he had these at hand (he took them), did not mention the positioning on the watch over the knife (again), or of the knife over the watch instead. As that would become an issue later due to DC Coe giving his evidence later, after him... (As in before). No doubt the photographs still tell the same story though (whatever it was), and, on body position, as found? Hutton, his explication (above on position), was reliant on these also. And there has been no objection on Hutton's explication on this from PC Sawyer at any time since then, which might say something then, to some... Hutton had 'seen a photograph' which showed that a witness could say both about how Dr Kelly was found, both lying down and laying up (Hutton above, p. 63). _____________ So some tidying up to go, we know, Hutton likely did also. But doesn't it all draw down to the scene, really, anyway? Or, put another way, as there were no assailants, nearby, early that morning, anything, untoward, that might have happened, must have happened the night before, or, while DC Coe was present then. Ultimately, then, it is PC Sawyers credibility that is the test of anything left over then. And that as he was responsible for checking the ground for sign of any activity before they arrived in force, or even after, and before all of them present by then, and with them. And no one called out, this sir, or that, or over here, sir, after. And on the state of the scene surrounding Dr Kelly, PC Sawyer, the search leader (his responsibility), said that it was pristine, all around, completely undisturbed ground,
70

and so it
' was decided a search of the woods 10 metres either side of the body, on the approach up the hill to the body, would be carried out' as well. That is either side of that common approach path then (51:14, p. 31), also.

Working in 5 metre grid pattern, after that:

'The first sweep, the first 5 metre search included the fingertip search of the common approach path.' (52:4, p, 31). Sawyer said his plan showed 'there were six zones eventually which we searched,' as above. These first zones (beside the path), would be as far as the body: 'level with the area that we had taped off surrounding the body.' (52:16, p. 31). The nature of the ground cover beside what has been described as the common approach path was described by Sawyer, his evidence: 'The common approach path... the easiest route in... either side of that the undergrowth... reasonably light... as you moved away each side, left and right, the undergrowth became extremely heavy.' (53:4, p. 31).

Hard going either side then...

Zones not covered so far include Zone 5 - 'the 10 metre radius round the back of the area where the body had been found, and Zone 6 the area where the body itself had been lying.' (52: 20, p. 31). Zone 5, round the back of that area then, 'was almost impenetrable and the searchers had a really hard job getting through the brambles and the undergrowth to check the ground.' (Sawyer, 53:8, p. 32).

An observation by PC Sawyer after this description:

'If I was walking into those woods myself I would have walked up as far as he had before deciding it was impossible to go any further, because there were footpaths apparently which led through that but they were so overgrown nobody had been through them for a number of months.' (53:16, p. 32).

Asked (an afterthought), did he, 'while searching in the woods... find anything at all which indicated that any other people had been there? Sawyer answered:
'No, nothing. Normally when we search wooded areas there is a fair amount of detritus, crisp packets, bottles, cans, cigarette ends. This area itself was remarkable for its complete lack of human interference.' (56:13, p. 33).

Footprints? On this Sawyer said:

'I would not have expected to find any footprints in that area because of the undergrowth itself. There was not a lot of bare earth for footprints to be recorded on... when I first saw Dr Kelly I was very aware of the serious nature of the search and I was looking for signs of perhaps a struggle... the vegetation... surrounding Dr Kelly's body was standing upright... no signs of any form of struggle at all.' (56:22, p. 33).

Nothing bent out of shape near there at all then. No heels dug in anywhere (not a lot of bare earth Sawyer said, to be fair, for them to have dug into p. 33), but pictures taken, of it all, and one found in the house the next day also, the same PC, and possibly of Gilligan with Dr Kelly, in Moscow now, as in once before this, another question mark?38
38

As in Sawyers evidence, part two, here and before: Sawyer, Martyn (2003). Police Constable: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry (Pt. 2). http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-hutton71

On this, asked about his responsibilities all this time, Sawyer said this, that,
' the final search finished at 19.45.' (54:6, p. 32). 'We had to wait until Dr Kelly's body was removed before we could search zone 6, which is where the body had been lying... I team led the team searches. When you are a team leader and you are assigned to this, you see it all the way through from beginning to end... the next day... I returned to duty... again to work with PC Franklin as he wanted me to team lead a search of Dr Kelly's house...' then. (Same as before, 54:25, p. 32).

And it was then that he found the photograph Hutton became interested in and recalled Sawyer so as he could ask him about this again. A last comment here, on that could be (common sense sort of), that it would be somewhat hard to believe that Sawyer had been told to hush up about anything else no one else needs to know about, due to the fact that he just came out about even? And as for Hutton being part of a cover up, well it would be hard to believe he would ask about it then? And as for this photograph, last, there could be a story in that we might suppose, but not here, though famous last words, isn't that how that saying goes..? And here, just before we leave this, we have him in the box above (bottom, p, 71), the third person at last, another policeman, and so we could concur with Coe, now at least, at last. Though Page, Assistant Chief Constable (in charge then, and of on-going enquiries after), has never yet been able to say exactly who either, or doesn't see any reason to instead then? But to get to that, total, they 'plotted' the movements of all of them then, there were some 50 in total, leaving them eventually able to identify three of our officers (likely in black, we've added that), as noted, first seen, between, '8.30 and 9.30 in the morning, something like that...' by a local, said Page 39 (221:24). And if they weren't Coe and co then, noted, then why weren't they noted also then, by that local, Coe and co (sent there, early on, from Abingdon Police Station,40 not of that patch though, seconded), not trying to get by unnoticed, especially, well only one. And then there is Brock again, not sensing any others about, as he had on the riverbank before then, and an unfortunate term, the use of that might turn out to be, we know? And if not three others, thereabouts, then was Chapman dressed in black then, and hanging about with these other two policemen, then, Coe apart from them then, alone at the scene, Holmes heading back down the track, going... _____________ No man is great enough or wise enough for any of us to surrender our destiny to. The only way in which anyone can lead us is to restore to us the belief in our own guidance. (We tried).
Henry Miller.41
inquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans27.htm 39 Page, Michael (2003). Assistant Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans42.htm ( 40 Coe, Graham (2003). Police Officer, Detective Constable: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans33.htm 41 Henry Miller, an 'American writer (1891-1980), known for breaking with existing literary forms, developing a new sort of semi-autobiographical novel that blended character study, social criticism, philosophical reflection, surrealist free association and mysticism... said to be always distinctly about and expressive of the real-life... yet also fictional... His most characteristic works of this kind being Tropic of Cancer (1934), Black Spring (1936), Tropic of Capricorn (1939), The Rosy Crucifixion trilogy (1949-59), all of which were banned in the United States until 1964. He also wrote travel memoirs and literary criticism, 72

Of course other reasons many are still unsatisfied with the outcome of the Hutton inquiry into this, is that they want an inquest regardless of explanation or explication by any other person anyway, the process, 'due,' respected... And making that case that that is all that is sought, we note that those making just that particular case havent been involving themselves in that much conjecture as regards what else might actually have happened with Dr Kelly that day, or night before... Some wraps. In part to forestall an inquest, the cost of that and the logistics now, the full report of Dr Hunt, the pathologist, has been released, and well before it was ever meant to have been released (after 70yrs), now also. And in that report, and as you would expect from that sort of report, there is more detail there as regards the injuries to Dr Kelly's wrist. His wrist near cut through, it could be concluded from that? And this we are interested in also. For it strikes us that Dr Kelly's death was a difficult one and that it needn't have been so? And so we are struck, because of that, by the hint that there could have been something a little symbolic in this, act? Instance the co-proxamol that Dr Kelly is said to have ingested to dampen down the pain of this cutting, well that could have done it, for him, on its own? With a little forethought, and Dr Kelly needn't have ingested as much as it has been implied he might have tried to ingest also now. A mixer, some sherry from home, some port, any sort of alcohol, really, would have added to the potency of the co-proxamol. Even ground down beforehand and mixed with the water he was carrying, a combination like that, that would have simplified things also. And Professor Keith Hawton, who gave evidence to the Hutton inquiry as to what was likely playing in Dr Kelly's mind that last day, has also said that he would almost certainly have decided upon this act before he left on his walk also (below). Potent anyway, co-proxamol has been banned for some time and since then now, and this has dramatically cut suicides in the UK. On that, researchers (one even the psychiatrist, Professor Keith Hawton, himself), have had this to say about that since then:
'The controversial withdrawal of a common painkiller has dramatically cut suicides, say researchers. A gradual phase-out of co-proxamol led to 350 fewer suicides and accidental deaths in England and Wales, a study in the British Medical Journal reports. Regulators removed the drug's licence in 2007 after fears about the risk of overdose but the move proved unpopular with some patients and doctors. Arthritis Care [Dr Kelly's wife used this medication for this] says some patients now struggle to control their pain. The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency announced the withdrawal in 2005... GPs were encouraged to move patients to other painkillers before the drug's licence was revoked in 2007. After that time doctors could prescribe the drug on a "named patient basis" for those who could not manage their pain with alternatives but as it is unlicensed they did so at their own risk. Study leader Professor Keith Hawton [the psychiatrist called to give his opinion as to Dr Kelly's
and painted watercolours.' Some form! Wikipedia: On, Henry Miller. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Miller 73

state of mind to the Hutton Inquiry as well], director of the Centre for Suicide Research at Oxford University, said before the restrictions co-proxamol was responsible for a fifth of all drug-related suicides. By the 2007 deadline, prescribing of the drug had fallen by 59%, his analysis showed. Over the two-year period, deaths from co-proxamol fell by 62%. [Current rate, as a matter of interest, 8 in 100,000 a very unusual event then.] Specifically there were 295 fewer suicides and 349 fewer deaths from the drug including accidental overdoses...'42 _____________

That cut back, how effective as a method of suicide is actual cutting now then? Well not very. And not as in the case of Dr Kelly either (its not the done thing, to say more). And Dr Kelly had also been the only person in the whole of the UK in that year, apparently, to end his life in that way (that is by cutting). Not that Dr Hunt said that that was how he ended his life exactly anyway. It is unusual, anyway, as stated, hence our wondering at some sort symbolism at play (later, again)? That Dr Kelly was the only person that year, in the whole of the UK and to have managed anything like that, was pointed out to the people soon after release of this by of all people Andrew Gilligan last. And that point was made while he commented in the Sunday Telegraph about the unnecessary release of the pathologist's report (this fought for by a group of doctors the ones who want 'due' process respected), his revulsion at this, though his now fervent hope that this release should finally set the controversy over Dr Kelly's death to rest then. Some hope. And this now (Gilligan's comments in print), would kick off some more fuss of course then now, his last words on this have it why so, this: 'Too often, as perhaps last week, Dr Kelly has been used by those wanting to fit him into their cause...' (Some irony, that clause?). This now:
'David Kelly: case closed. The details of Dr David Kelly's death, made public last week, should provide a final answer to the conspiracy theorists. There was, said the pathology report, a band of vomit running from Dr David Kelly's mouth, covering part of his head and staining his green waxed jacket. His body was soiled with dirt from the process of undressing it at the scene and moving it into a bag. And it seems that, contrary to most of what we have read in the past, there was a great deal of blood. "There was bloodstaining and a pool of blood in an area running from the left arm of the deceased for a total distance in the order of two to three feet," said Dr Nicholas Hunt, the pathologist. "There was heavy bloodstaining over the left arm." There was blood on the front right side of his shirt beneath the left hand, the palm of which was bloodstained. There were bloodstains over the groin area and the tops of both thighs, the right knee, the right elbow, the right shoulder, the back of the right knee. There was blood on the left arm, the left elbow, the back of the left elbow, the back of the fingers and palm of the right hand, blood on the lining of his Barbour cap, blood on Dr Kelly's wristwatch, which he'd taken off, blood on the handles of the knife, blood smeared on the bottle of water with which he had taken 29 coproxamol pills. I, too, felt a bit soiled when I read the intimate details of Dr Kelly's death. There is no dignity in a pathology report. But all this, and a good deal more that I've spared you, was last week published officially online, for ever, for the whole world to see. Happy now, conspiracy theorists?
42

BBC News (2009). Painkiller ban 'has cut suicides.' http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8107546.stm

74

The other reason why this document makes unpleasant reading is precisely that it does say what happened. There were, it says, multiple knife wounds over a 40 sq cm area of Dr Kelly's left wrist, one of them up to a centimetre and a half deep. Some of them, it says, looked like "tentative or hesitation marks". There was "extensive reddening around the whole injury complex, indicating that they had been inflicted while the victim was alive". There was also a small abrasion "consistent with the biting of the lips". I don't know about you, but when I read those words I wished I hadn't. An instant picture of Dr Kelly in his last moments sprang into my head. The only other wounds visible at all were superficial abrasions to the head and minor bruising to the limbs consistent, says the report, with scraping against rough undergrowth (presumably as his body was removed). The report describes the various, necessarily intrusive procedures performed on Dr Kelly's body to discover any less visible signs of foul play. None was found. The brain showed no knocks to the head. The lungs gave no sign of being "overpowered by a volatile chemical". No mysterious drugs were detected in the bloodstream. Subcutaneous dissection of the arms and legs showed no "restraint-type injury". There was no evidence of "compression of the neck, such as by manual strangulation, ligature strangulation or the use of an arm hold". There was no evidence from the post-mortem, or observations at the scene, to "indicate that the deceased had been dragged or otherwise transported to the location at which his body was found". Another conspiracist claim dashed. There was, said Dr Hunt, "a total lack of classical 'defence' wounds against a sharp weapon attack", such wounds being typically to the palms or forearms. When somebody is murdered with a knife, the bloodstains left on the ground and clothing are often jagged and jerky, and spread all over the place, because the victim has been fighting for his life. But at the scene of Dr Kelly's death, the blood, though extensive, was "relatively passive" in distribution. There was no obvious trampling to the undergrowth, no damage to his clothing. The bloodstains on the removed wristwatch are significant, says the pathologist: "The fact that the watch appears to have been removed while blood was already flowing suggests that it has been removed deliberately in order to facilitate access to the wrist." The water bottle and its top, also bloodstained, were placed neatly on the ground. Dr Hunt spent seven and a quarter hours at the scene of death, then just under three hours carrying out the post-mortem. His conclusion is clear: the orientation and arrangement of the wounds on the left wrist "are typical of self-inflicted injury", as is the rest of the layout of the death scene, and there is no evidence whatever to support any other finding. As this previously "secret" pathology report is released, I'm in an unusual position. Contrary to various claims, this report was never quite "suppressed". As one of those at the centre of the David Kelly affair, and a party to the Hutton Inquiry, it was shared with my lawyers back in 2003. I could have seen it if I'd wanted to but I never wanted to. Because even without the crushing detail supplied by Dr Hunt, I had very little doubt that Dr Kelly committed suicide. Even if you believe that the British government goes round bumping off its own employees in cold blood which I do not what motive could they possibly have had for killing Dr Kelly? How could it possibly have been in their interest to murder him? By the time he died, Dr Kelly was no longer an obscure official. He had been at the centre of a national row. His death plunged the last government into the greatest crisis in its history, a crisis from which it never fully recovered. Killing him was guaranteed to create such a crisis, as anyone with an iota of sense would have known. Yes, I was both appalled and surprised when I first heard he'd died. He hadn't struck me as the suicidal type, if there is such a thing. He was well used to confrontation and pressure: he'd been a weapons inspector in Iraq, for goodness' sake. And by the day of his death, the worst of the pressure was essentially over: the battle between Downing Street and the BBC over my sexed-up dossier story, for which Dr Kelly was the source, had reached stalemate.

75

But on the day of his dying, I knew nothing of how badly Dr Kelly had been treated. After learning what he went through at the hands of his employers, it is easier to understand the road that led him to that Oxfordshire hillside. Alastair Campbell's determination to use Dr Kelly to, in his words, "f---" me saw him placed under great pressure. Having come forward to his bosses under a promise that his identity would be kept secret, he was effectively surrendered to the world after Campbell decided that "the biggest thing needed was the source out". Ministry of Defence press officers gave journalists a series of clues which enabled anyone with Google to guess who he was. They kindly confirmed Dr Kelly's name to anyone who guessed right. One newspaper was allowed to put more than 20 names to the MoD before it got to Dr Kelly's. Once outed, Dr Kelly was openly belittled by Jack Straw. He was intensively interviewed, forced into televised interrogation, coached in what to say, then blurted an untruth in the blaze of publicity an untruth which, on the morning of his death, his bosses told him they would investigate. Dr Kelly defined himself by his work and his reputation for integrity. The fear of losing that work, and that reputation, must have been terrifying to him, even if it was almost certainly unfounded. What this week's report does do, however, is show the murder theory to be even more absurd and fantastic than it already was. For Dr Kelly to be killed, it would have needed someone to force 29 pills down his throat, making him swallow them without protest. Then they would have had to get him to sit on the ground without any restraint, making no attempt to defend himself, while they sawed away at his wrist with a knife. That knife, by the way, came from the desk drawer in Dr Kelly's study, so they would also have had to burgle his house to get it. This week's publication has also demolished several of the Kelly conspiracy theory's most treasured pillars: the "lack" of blood, the "movement" of the body, and the "suppression" of the report itself. Will it silence the conspiracy theorists? I rather doubt it. Several of them were still in full flow yesterday. There are, to be fair, a number of questions the report does not address. Dr Hunt himself subsequently changed one of the conclusions shown in it. The cause of death was rare Dr Kelly was reportedly the only person in England to die in that way the whole of that year. Operation Mason, the police investigation into his death, started nine hours before he was even reported missing. Yet most of these facts, too, turn out to have seemingly plausible explanations. The pathologist did change his view of the precise cause of Dr Kelly's death, but still ruled out the possibility that foul play was involved. Thames Valley police have said that the start time of Op Mason was chosen in retrospect to reflect the period of interest. The fact that a cause of death is rare does not mean that it is unheard of, or impossible. Various doctors have questioned whether Dr Kelly could have bled to death from cutting the ulnar, one of the smaller arteries. But the actual cause of death is the combination of the severed artery with two other things: Dr Kelly's long-standing heart condition of coronary artery atherosclerosis, and his swallowing of the tablets. There are just as many, if not more, experts who state that this cause is entirely plausible. The conspiracy wants Dr Kelly to have been murdered but the reality, his suicide, is more than scandal enough. And if you seek the hand of the British government in deliberate killing, the deaths of 150,000 Iraqis would seem, to me, rather more to the point than the death of one scientist. Too often, as perhaps last week, Dr Kelly has been used by those wanting to fit him into their cause. Could we all please now leave him in peace?' Sunday Telegraph Andrew Gilligan 24 October 2010.43
43

Sunday Telegraph, London (2010).''David Kelly: 'Case closed: The details of Dr David Kelly's death, 76

_____________

There was soon a response to this, then, and that by this group of doctors, well above average 'conspiracy theorists' they would be then. And quite prepared to put their own hands into their own pockets over this by now also (and still). Complicated this, but, this group, not best pleased over the general release of material they had wished sight of solely to begin with, they would now seek to publicise their letter, its outline even, its complaint, sent by them to the Attorney General before that (reply of sorts to that), and which had (its argument had), then led to the complete report by Dr Hunt, the pathologist, being released then, and then as commented on by Gilligan in the Sunday Telegraph now then, and in a disparaging manner even! Now, seeking right of reply, also enshrined (it is accustomed), this 'group' now sought that the Sunday Telegraph print this letter (sent by them to the Attorney-General, Grieve44), and that had led to this release then, with some opening remarks added by now also, those which had brought out that sort of response from Gilligan towards, they must have felt, them? Nevertheless, some opening remarks added, the Sunday Telegraph wouldn't engage in any of this any further now anyway printing, it seems, only these opening remarks, now:
'SIR The David Kelly case is far from closed (News Review, [the above item] October 24), not least because no inquest has taken place... The Government, by publishing the highly-sensitive post-mortem and toxicology reports, hoped to draw a line under the whole affair. It will do no such thing... The continued refusal to hold an inquest into his death, which is required by the laws of this country and of Europe, constitutes a blatant subversion of due process of the law. Dr Stephen Frost Colwyn Bay, Conwy ...'45 _____________

Following this, this letter/complaint was then sent in to the S unday telegraph (by them), and this was published by said Telegraph as is form, usually, also:
'[Dear sir] 'A letter was submitted to the Sunday Telegraph in response to Andrew Gilligan's article re Dr David Kelly published on 24 October 2010 in the same newspaper. After much prompting and discussion, the Sunday Telegraph finally agreed to publish a decimated version of our letter. This in our view constitutes refusal or neglect to publish a reasonable and accurate response to Andrew Gilligan's article. The right of reply, enshrined in editorial guidelines, has been denied to us [by the Sunday Telegraph then].' Dr. Stephen Frost, November 5, 2010'46

A line drawn there that would lead this off now, this sort of thing: about cover up, rights of interest (e.g. Gilligan was hardly an uninterested party...), etc., as before also, the Hutton report, its unintended ending... 47
made public last week, should provide a final answer to the conspiracy theorists.''' http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8083520/David-Kelly-case-closed.html 44 See at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/03_03_11_kellyinquest.pdf 45 Frost, Dr Stephen (2010): 'Who was Behind the Death of Dr. David Kelly? The Case is far from Closed.' Posted, hosted now, by Global Research, USA: http://www.globalresearch.ca/who-was-behind-the-death-ofdr-david-kelly-the-case-is-far-from-closed/21797 46 Ibid: 47 There are other postings, odd sites here and there on to this, instance: The Truth Seeker, online, USA (2010). Who Was Behind the Death of Dr David Kelly? http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/? p=13878... 77

The letter in full, anyway, that this group wished the Sunday Telegraph to publish (in response, then, to Gilligan), publicised somewhat by that spat also, published somewhere else of course, on the fringes, you could say, and not only disparagingly:
'Dear Sir, Andrew Gilligan's article of 24 October has as its headline "David Kelly inquest: Case closed" followed by "The details of Dr David Kellys death, made public last week, should provide a final answer to the conspiracy theorists, says Andrew Gilligan" The truth is that the case is far from closed, not least perhaps because no inquest has taken place. The continued refusal or neglect to hold an inquest into this important death, which is required by the laws of this country and of Europe, constitutes a blatant subversion of due process of the law. In January of this year the well known London lawyers Leigh Day & Co., representing five doctors, formally requested that the Ministry of Justice allow the doctors and lawyers sight of all the medical and scientific documents/evidence relating to Dr David Kelly's death which had been secretly classified (at some time unknown in 2004/2005) for 70 years following the publication of the Hutton Report. Despite repeated questions, both before and after the General Election, the Ministry of Justice has been unable to tell us the exact date on which the documents were classified, nor indeed to enlighten us as to the legal basis for classifying the documents, nor for continuing to keep them secret. It is strongly suspected that no such legal basis exists. It seems to us that this Government, by publishing these two highly sensitive reports, hoped to draw a line under the whole affair. On 22 October 2010 our lawyers finally received a reply from Ken Clarke, Secretary of State for Justice, in which he sought to justify not granting our request for sight of all the medical and scientific documents relating to the death. He also informed us that he intended to publish the post-mortem report and the toxicology report on the Internet that very same day. In a long rambling letter he attempted to justify his failure to comply with our lawyers' request by quoting exemptions to disclosure allowed under the Freedom of Information Act. But, we did not seek disclosure under the terms of that Act and that had been made very clear by our lawyers in January of this year. Further, it seemed extraordinary to us that medical in confidence documents should be published on the Internet for all to see, particularly the post mortem report and the toxicology report, especially in view of the previous governments and this government's oft claimed desire to avoid unnecessary upset to the Kelly family. It seems to us that this Government, by publishing these two highly sensitive reports, hoped to draw a line under the whole affair. However, it will do no such thing. Some weeks ago a 35 page legal document, known as the Memorial,48 was submitted to the Attorney General Dominic Grieve by our lawyers outlining the formal legal reasons why we think an inquest should take place. Under Section 13 of the 1988 Coroners Act the Attorney General can grant us permission to apply to the High Court (or he can apply himself) for an inquest to be ordered. In order to do this he has only to be satisfied that, were an inquest to take place, the verdict MIGHT be different NOT that it WOULD be different. Section 13 requires that any ONE of six reasons be satisfied for the Attorney General to allow a formal application to the High Court for an inquest into a death. The six reasons are: 1) insufficiency of inquiry 2) irregularity of proceedings 3) rejection of evidence
48

ADDENDUM TO THE HUMBLE MEMORIAL OF DR STEPHEN FROST DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 201O. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/03_03_11_kellyinquest.pdf 78

4) new facts or evidence 5) fraud (in this context deception) 6) refusal or neglect by a coroner to hold an inquest which ought to be held We need to provide evidence to satisfy ONE reason but the Memorial contains convincing evidence for ALL SIX reasons. Notwithstanding the extremely strong case for an inquest which has been submitted to the Attorney General in the form of the Memorial, we intend as a matter of urgency to set up a fund so that we are in a position to contest vigorously any refusal by the Attorney General for us to proceed to the High Court by judicially reviewing any such decision. It is essential in any democracy that due process of law is followed with the utmost rigour. Yours faithfully, Dr. Stephen Frost.'49 _____________

Hoping 'to draw a line over the whole affair' by the release of ' two highly sensitive
reports [as above] - the post-mortem report and the toxicology report [and] on the Internet [both] that very same day' (a bit new this, itself), this release of these two reports had not

ensured this. Rather, this was/ is, out there as another issue now - as showing, now, a lack of sensitivity, this a sensitive matter, and so why wouldn't it be treated so? One of the ways (trying to keep this on the same page), in which Attorney General Dominic Grieve had responded to this sort of thing before then, had been by saying that, people who have expressed concerns about why Lord Hutton did not tie up every loose end may [well] have a valid point (but [that] he could not order a new probe on a hunch.50 Of course it was never a probe that was being asked for here, essentially, that point missed by Grieve? Or maybe not, as it may be? (And who are we to comment also, we know, but still). When Grieve did order a probe though, finally (well he had to really do something), some hundred and something points were covered then. Keep calm, the suggestion made after that (well gone into), still has not quite cut though this though governments, we might suppose, known to have form also... _____________ There were other reactions to this sort of thing, of course (by well fed up sort of sorts), before this point, stand-off, was reached, such as this, a blast from online blogger, journalist, Spike (Brendan ONeill, though), and quick off the mark is Spike also, we note here. And in this piece (all of his work, his articles, are available for syndication, for sale), Spike/Brendan refers to the likes of our above average conspiracy theorists (he means these doctors), as essentially members of the 'chattering classes' anyway, and so to be dismissed that way now? And can they be so easily now, we'd still add that though?
'The chattering classes favourite conspiracy theory The idea that David Kelly was murdered is as baseless as the idea that Bush crashed planes
49

Frost, Dr Stephen (2010). 'Who was Behind the Death of Dr. David Kelly? The Case is far from Closed.' Posted, hosted now, by Global Research, USA. http://www.globalresearch.ca/who-was-behind-the-death-ofdr-david-kelly-the-case-is-far-from-closed/21797 50 This comment edited out now, was included here, originally @ BBC News, UK Politics (2010). 'Kelly wounds ''self-inflicted, says pathology report.' http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11603539. The line under our own. 79

into the Twin Towers. So why is it so respectable? There are some people who think conspiracy theories spring from the caliginous minds of tabloid-reading Diana fans or gun-wielding American rednecks. These people must be confused by the David Kelly conspiracy theory. Here we have a chattering-class conspiracy theory, indulged and promoted not by ill-educated grunts, but by politicians, medics and the Guardian as well as the Daily Mail. The respectability of the ramblings of the Kelly cult, the seriousness with which they are treated, reveals much about the origins and nature of contemporary conspiracism. Kelly was the British weapons inspector who committed suicide in a forest in Oxfordshire in July 2003 by overdosing on pills and slitting his wrists (YES HE DID)51. He did this after he was exposed as the source for journalist Andrew Gilligans claim that the New Labour government had sexed up its dossier on Saddams WMD. But some question the circumstances surrounding Kellys suicide, and then make a fantastic leap without the benefit of anything resembling evidence to other theories. Namely that he was murdered, by Blairite assassins or by anti-Saddam Iraqi forces annoyed that he was playing down Saddams threat. In common with all other conspiracy theories, it is 1% scepticism and 99% demented speculation. Only this conspiracy theory comes from the dinner-party circuit rather than the David Icke one. Every year or so, some of Britains top medical experts write a letter to a newspaper demanding a full inquest into Kellys death, because it is extremely unlikely that he would have haemorrhaged from cutting his ulnar artery in his wrist. And every time, their letter opens the floodgates to more furious tale-peddling about what might really have happened. (Might really - every conspiracy theorists favourite two words.) And so it has been over the past week, where first a group of profs wrote a letter to The Times on 13 August questioning the conclusion about Kellys suicide, and less than a week later we have headlines about murderous MI5, anti-Saddamites sneaking through Oxfordshire forests, and the claim that KELLY COUSIN SAYS HE WAS ASSASSINATED. The social breeding of the Kelly cult is impeccable. These are not bedsit weirdos they are professors (boffins to the tabloids), MPs, TV producers, serious journalists and poshos. This week, former Tory leader Michael Howard joined the chorus of respectable people calling for a full inquest into Kellys death on the basis that new statements by doctors raise serious questions. Howard didnt say I think Kelly was murdered, but he didnt need to his demand instantaneously threw petrol on the flames of the Kelly conspiracy theories (and he must have known it would). One Lib-Con Cabinet minister is calling on justice secretary Kenneth Clarke to scrap the 70-year embargo on releasing Kellys medical records so that we can find out the truth. This is the equivalent of dangling a bright red rag in front of the internets battalion of conspiracists. The Kelly conspiracy theory has most famously and fatuously been promoted by Norman Baker, Liberal Democrat MP no less. Once the shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and now a junior member of the Lib-Con government, Baker wrote a book in 2007 called The Strange Death of David Kelly52 in which he said the weapons inspector was possibly murdered by an anti-Saddam group. This led the serious journalist Melanie Phillips to run the risk of being branded a conspiracy theorist by announcing that she was not convinced David Kelly had taken his own life at all. This is a recurring theme in the chattering-class conspiracy theory about Kelly: the attempt to distance themselves from those actual conspiracy theorists, who believe Di was murdered and 9/11 was executed by Dick Cheney, by presenting their Kelly conspiracy theory as evidence-based. Er, just like the 9/11 and Diana nutters do. And while it is mainly the Mail that is propagating Kelly conspiracy theories this week, more respectable papers have also entertained this baseless rubbish. In 2007, under the headline Was David Kelly murdered? (another favoured tactic of the conspiracy theorist: turn your crazy theory into a question in order to make it sound a little less crazy), a Guardian writer said: Im not usually one for conspiracy theories but the death of David Kelly struck me at the time as distinctly odd, sinister even. This was written in response to a TV programme exploring whether Kelly was murdered, which was shown not on Five or Bravo but on the erudite BBC2. The well-to-do mythmakers are protesting way too much when they say were not like the Diana brigade or the 9/11 loons. For the Kelly murder story has all the classic ingredients of the conspiracy theory. It ignores evidence, in this case that Kelly severed a key artery (primary
51 52

Capitals mean shouting, that form, usually. Baker, Norman. The Strange Death of David Kelly. London, Methuen (2007). 80

cause of death) and also took 29 co-proxamol tablets and was suffering from an undiagnosed artery condition (contributory factors in death). Ive got no doubt that the cause of David Kellys death was a combination of blood loss, heart disease and overdose of co-proxamol, says no less an authority than Professor Robert Forrest, president of the Forensic Science Society. The key insight of the Kelly cult that some cops didnt see much blood at the death scene is also easily explained. As top pathologists have pointed out, its not unusual in deaths by bleeding in the outdoors, where the leafy, muddy earth is far more absorbing than a hospital floor, to see little blood. And like all conspiracy theories, the David Kelly one moves swiftly from asking questions about an incident to speculating about other possible incidents. Scepticism about the cause of death gives rise to speculation about assassination. The Kelly cult is deeply concerned about the holes in The Official Story, such as the alleged bluntness of the knife Kelly used to sever an artery but it is not at all concerned about the holes in its own story, such as the absence of murderers footprints, the dearth of witnesses, the question of whether the killers force-fed Kelly 29 of his own tablets as well as murdering him in a way that was not spotted by pathologists. Such is the way of the conspiracy theorist: a seeming lack of evidence to back up the official version of events transmogrifies into hard evidence for their own nutty version of events. Lack of evidence becomes evidence in a crazy pro-mo war between relativism and reality. Too often, conspiracy theories are written off as the work of the dumb lower orders. The Kelly conspiracy theory shows that theres far more to them than that. The conspiracy theory emerges at a time when people feel that society has spun beyond their control. These theories become a way of making sense of seemingly senseless events, of putting forward clear, blackand-white, frequently moralistic tales in an effort to explain the workings of the world and our place within it. So 9/11 conspiracy theories emerged amongst those who feel most cut-off in modern-day America working-class, often Southern whites and were later made respectable by Democratic-leaning celebs and thinkers. The Diana conspiracy theory is most tightly clung to by those who feel estranged from both traditional Britain (those evil royals) and modern Britain (those backbone-lacking Blairites), though it too was made respectable by the bizarre decision in 2004 to hold an official investigation into whether Dis death was more than a straightforward road traffic accident. And in the Kelly conspiracy theory, we effectively have a middle-class screech of rage [hardly] against a political system that the middle classes believe no longer represents their interests, an extreme expression of disgruntlement with the Blair government for not living up to our expectations. Thats why Kelly is idolised as an unimpeachable truth-teller (when he was no such thing: he was a warmongerer par excellence and was providing that NYT hack Judith Miller with BS about Iraq right up to the end of 2002), while Blair and his people are depicted as dark, possibly murderous forces because this is a fanciful morality tale designed to satisfy a feeling of estrangement [hmm] amongst sections of the middle classes. David Kelly was like all of our dads, said one journalist this week: he was conscientious, private, decent and ordinary in contrast to the macho game in the political/media beltway. In peddling this simplistic story in a desperate bid to make sense of their own feelings of isolation from the Blairite era, the chattering classes have committed GBH [English, East-end chat, grievous bodily harm by mouth], against the truth every bit as much as those 9/11 nuts have done.'53

Spike might have made a few points, but he missed some, the main one, also. And that has some of the feeling of Gilligan that, we note Still they might not have dined together, over that... _____________ Men fear death as children fear to go in the dark; and as that natural fear in children is increased with tales, so is the other.
Francis Bacon.

Another piece of evidence heard at the Hutton inquiry, meant to be interpreted (allowed in so to speak), so as to suggest that Dr Kelly may have had suicidal intent
53

O'Neill, Brendan, aka Spike, (2010), London, England. Blog: Spiked: Down with determinism! In defence of free will: 'The chattering classes favourite conspiracy theory.' http://www.spikedonline.com/index.php/site/article/9437/ 81

that final day, was that given by Gerald Broucher, then the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Diplomat and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, a friend or at least a colleague, obviously, of Dr Kellys. Broucher, attending the inquiry, said that he had met with Dr Kelly in Geneva a little before Dr Kelly's death, and at that meeting Dr Kelly had related to him that as 'he had assured his Iraqi sources that there would be no war if they co-operated...that a war would put him in an "ambiguous" moral position.' Further to that when asked by Broucher what might happen to him if Iraq were invaded, Dr 'Kelly had replied to that, that, "I will probably be found dead in the woods [also]."'54 To the inquiry Broucher then, 'quoted from an email he had sent [to some other person] just after Kelly's death.' It said:
"I did not think much of this at the time, taking it to be a hint that the Iraqis might try to take revenge against him, something that did not seem at all fanciful then. I now see that he may have been thinking on rather different lines."

That not the line the inquiry was going along though. That aside, this is another hangover, yet left over... _____________ According though, to an entry in one of Dr Kellys diaries, discovered after the inquiry by his daughter Rachel at his home, this meeting did not take place in February 2003, but in February 2002 instead. And according to Dr Kellys half-sister, Sarah Pape, Dr Kelly did not, the day after his daughter Ellens wedding on Saturday 22 February 2003, fly directly then to New York that put by Pape, after Broucher, to the inquiry, then:
"He certainly did not mention he was going to be flying almost straight back to visit Geneva [from whence he had obviously, then, just returned from]." 55 _____________

We first included the date mix-up there because that throwaway remark of Dr Kelly's could also be seen, had it been made nearer to the time of his death, as suggestive, also, of some growing morbidity within him nearer the time of his death then? Therefore more supportive of the suicide scenario also then. As was intended we could add, minds made up, only that sort of evidence, of 'help' with that then? There is further context available for those remarks of Dr Kelly's to Broucher now also though. That is, actual first mention of 'this idea' and in what circumstance then also. And that provided now by Mai Pederson, an American army intelligence officer, assigned to Dr Kelly to assist him as an interpreter during his work in Iraq late in the peace. This could have come out at the inquiry, but did not, as Pederson was not pressed to give evidence to the inquiry. She was interviewed though, at the behest of Assistant Chief Constable Page before the inquiry, that though in America. Pressed (she wasn't), to appear before the inquiry, Pederson could have related that Dr Kelly could not swallow pills, she knew that, nor could he even cut steak with his right arm either...

54

Broucher, Gerald (2003). Friend/ Colleague of Dr Kelly: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://www.the-hutton-inquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans17.htm 55 Pape, Sarah (2003). Family of Dr Kelly: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans24.htm 82

And that would have been quite some testimony, of course - as Dr Kelly is said to have managed both (both swallowing pills, and cutting his left wrist with that arm?). But interesting, also, is this account, documented by the Daily Mail now, which recounts Pederson's chilling account of a night out walking with Dr Kelly in Baghdad late in 1998 also, supportive of the murder scenario, this has always been so:
'One night in 1998, five years before the U.S. and Britain invaded, the pair shared a life-ordeath experience on a stroll around the Iraqi capital. Suddenly, a red laser dot appeared on the British scientist's clothes over his heart: an unseen sniper had him in his sights. The laser beam moved slowly upwards until it was trained on the centre of Kelly's forehead. Amid unbearable tension, the red dot remained there for what seemed like an age. The sniper didn't pull the trigger it was simply a warning. Iraqi officials brushed off the incident, sniggering that it was just 'kids playing around'. But Kelly knew his life was in grave danger, informing his younger companion that he had been told by intelligence sources that he was number three on a Saddam Hussein death list as a result of his work.'56

Dr Kelly also told Pederson some time after that (she has also said), that she had been on this sort of list also, and back then that he said to her that he didn't believe his life would end there anyway (that he would never be killed there). Rather, if it was to be, his life would end in the woods near his home in England instead. Same hand.
_____________

Pederson was also, interesting now, the person who moved Dr Kelly towards becoming a member of the Baha'i faith at some time also (and this he did not tell his wife about either, or even discuss this with her, it seems?). And so we find this interesting also (and that not just because of that), but also because the Bahai faith frowns not only on alcohol, but also on suicide... the frowned on alcohol being the one ingredient that would actually have assisted Dr Kelly to commit the frowned on suicide also then? Not much of a point, we don't think now. Having included the date mix-up over this conversation with Broucher as had it been made nearer to the time of his death (February 2003), it could have been suggestive of a growing morbidity within himself then, some general foreboding (invasion beginning March 20, 2003). We now also end up wondering what else might become apparent if we insisted on Brouchers version as regards when that meeting in Geneva took place then? Something, we note, Broucher also hasn't done. Not much of a point again. Parting with that, after that, we could ask straight off why Dr Kelly would have to, or want to, return to Geneva directly after his daughter's wedding then anyway? For if he had just returned from there, and if he was meant to be heading for New York (Pape just above, p. 84), this was hardly a direct route from England, normally a short trip, then? Also any business that remained unfinished from his very recent trip to Geneva (Pape again), could surely have been sorted out by any ordinary means of communication? Even by any unordinary means also? And so, we might suppose, that if he did go there, it was to meet up with someone other than Broucher then?
_____________
56

Daily Mail, London (2010). Pederson, Mai. Friend/ Colleague of Dr Kelly: 'Why I'm certain my friend Dr Kelly was murdered.' http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1293568/Why-Im-certain-friend-Dr-Kellymurdered.html. (Photo of Pederson here). 83

There is something else that seems to overhang here now then, after that. For, if Dr Kelly foresaw such danger for himself, some moral peril even, and this related to his work, then why didn't he just quit ahead of time then, claim a health reason, which there was even, had he got himself better checked out? That instead of appearing a leaker, then, then check out directly after, or near directly? This moral ambiguity again? For the family, on this, they probably just wanted to get straight, for themselves, as much as for any other, the facts over this, on that. Still, face saving occurs here (all round even), if it was not that, this moral ambiguity, that got him, put him in a bad place, psychologically? For let's say again that perhaps Broucher is right about when that meeting took place, and that those remarks made were actually indicative of some actual growing morbidity within Dr Kelly, some developing depression then. And so then, that being how he already and ordinarily felt at that time, what else might have pushed him past some point known to ourselves more generally only if we were to reach that point also then? And then only if we could but ride it out, make sense of it to someone else after that, then, write it out, leave it behind that way then? As embarrassing as anything for Dr Kelly, we might, not just us, suggest (and this with reference to Gilligan's piece above, starting p. 76), would have been his being caught out telling an 'untruth' and publicly also, this also two days before he went missing, before he was found in that way. The background to this, to that happening, was that Dr Kelly (scheduled to appear before two committees as the 'get Gilligan' 57 programme got under-way this idea of Gilligan's, that he had to look out for himself, save face also then, somehow?), was caught out by one of these committees then, the first then, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, this in the full glare of the media also, televised proceedings even, the glare of it all, obviously taking its toll, as read. And some untruth this was also, on the part of Dr Kelly then. For while he continued to deny that he had been Gilligan's source for Gilligan's claim, and while the Committee apparently accepted this also, the committee also got on to his contact with another BBC journalist then, Susan Watts, whose programme Newsnight had reported a similar though more 'toned' down story (Tony Blair's expression for this, and so that was more acceptable to him then, no more than ordinary rough and tumble then), to Gilligan's, after his. This Dr Kelly denied having anything to do with also! But he was made to feel even more uncomfortable then, in that it turned out that Gilligan had already told members of the committee that Watt's source was also Dr Kelly, before then. And so members of the committee, it could be said, were leading him then, and he would only have become aware of this as the trap was sprung shut on him, at that time then, and then from the looks on the faces of those all around him, looking at him, after that then? Sobering yes... Climactic? _____________ With any recovery from morbidity there must go a certain healthy humiliation.
Gilbert (G. K.) Chesterton.58
57 58

Gilligan's idea this: See footnote 6, before, p. 9. The English novelist, Graham Greene (a part-time British spy himself), was of the opinion that Gilbert (G.K) Chesterton, was one of the two greatest journalists of the twentieth century. The other, he thought, was Claude Cockburn, who ran his weekly periodical, The Week, around London to begin with - then, when it caught on, to Capitals farther afield. This may well have been a sort of Wikileaks prototype, more waved about than worried about though, as now, is that so? 84

Some treated like that would have laughed of course. Not that many probably though, more thought given to that. But there might have been in this just the hint, we'd say, of Dr Kelly then, as having being seen as a somewhat unhappy servant after that also then? And indeed he may have been a little also. And further to that he was going to be asked formally, now, following that, what other 'media contacts' he had then? The sub-text, we might imagine, what other stories might be traced back, to him, then? Accusatory? More indignity? Something else here though, and that strikes a little! This, that without persons like Dr Kelly being prepared to talk a little off the record, there would be no media to speak of, anyway, nowadays, nor much for the media to speak about also then. And they the gay politico (ironically they rely on this also), are never appreciative, are they, of being questioned about anything they are unprepared for themselves, having leaked a little (its common), before the inevitable questioning, coming their way... _____________
This, in Cockburns words (from his, In Time of Trouble, 1956), even has the same shake, rattle and roll about it: If you go on like this, said Mr. John Wheeler-Bennett, then Head of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, you will soon, I should think, be either quite famous or in gaol. Lots of people, I said, have been both. That, he said, turning upon me his luminous smile, and beaming as though an awkward question had now been satisfactorily resolved, is so... How often we really infringed the Official secrets Act, or were suspected by the authorities of espionage or improper relations with public servants for the purpose of extracting state secrets, I have no idea. For the first eighteen months or so, at any rate, we were highly suspect naturally, and for the same reason that I had been suspect in Berlin, namely that we had no easily recognisable fancy dress and the authorities were somewhat in the position of the drunken Dutchman in the musical comedy who gets by accident into the middle of a fancy-dress ball and runs frantically from person to person imploring them, Do please tell me once and for each what are you as? Obviously the authorities would much rather deal with people who are visibly members of some recognised political organisation, and I had a lot of evidence that they were considerably worried by not knowing what I was as... So far as The Weeks news gathering operations were concerned they were conducted for the most part on a barter basis with a group of what were then the best-informed and most live-minded correspondents in London. They included Mr. Farson, correspondent of the Chicago Daily News; Mr Stefan Litauer, correspondent of the Polish News Agency; Mr. Paul Scheffer, correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt, and a varying group of French correspondents. Two or three times a week we met around noon in Mr. Farsons office at Bush House and pooled our information. And on the days we did not meet we pooled information over the telephone. To describe this pool as a group would be to use too formal a word, but owing, I think, to Mr. Farsons guidance we all of us came to realise that there was something to be said for regular exchanges even when there seemed to be no news at all. The mere fact of each in turn going through a kind of total recall of what had been said by informants diplomats, financiers and others during the course of the past forty-eight hours was clarifactory and often produced a piece of the great jigsaw which otherwise could have been overlooked or forgotten. Usually of course there was plenty of news. There was news which for example Mr. Farson could not handle for his paper but which was exactly suited to The Week. Everyone had something to contribute, everyone picked from the bag what suited his own requirements. Apart from what The Week could directly contribute to the pool, it had a special role to play, a special utility. There were innumerable stories which, for example, Mr. Farson or Mr. Litauer could not venture to send directly to their papers or news agencies but which they could send if they had just appeared in The Week and could thus be quoted instead of being sent on the responsibility of the correspondents... The savage tensions of the 1930s naturally produced a situation favourable to this type of development. Under the frightful overhanging menace of Hitlerism, there roamed the capitals of Western Europe people who were half saint and half bandit the sort of people who would commit a murder for twenty pounds and suicide for a good idea...' Cockburn, Claude. In time of trouble. London, Hart-Davis (1956). See McIvor, Mark. the fuss about Sutch @ http://www.mcivor.me/ for more on this rag, from before. 85

Still, there was rather a reaction to Gilligan's story first broadcast at 6.07 am, by those just up 29 May, 2003, and settling onto their glide path for that day! An explication if you like, it was, a forceful voice-over, regarding a situation that the Blair government didn't exactly want to wake up to quite yet then either, some hope left, of something... some find, some WMD, some of that, that rather than some proof that said September 2002 dossier, widely disseminated, was 'sexed-up', that dreadful term again... Proof also, really, that there had been an intelligence let down, or was that only of interpretation then, for obviously little had been gathered from on the ground in Iraq about any of this then, speaks for itself that. And so were (we might as well ask?), persons running for, or turning towards cover, well before then, or after then, instead then? And so after then, this seems so as well, judging from the 'surprise' at Gilligan's story, was Gilligan's story a turning point also then? Not a favoured point we know, but inevitable, tabled. Some recovery. _____________ Mentioned in evidence at the Hutton inquiry were some points of contact Dr Kelly had had with the media, even mention of one of the last. That this can even be mentioned still came about due to one of his last acts the day being that he emailed Judith Miller of the New York Times, and included in that email were the now famous last lines mentioned perhaps out of context, but perhaps not, again, here: 'I will wait until the end of the week before judging...' What?
'Weapons expert Dr David Kelly told of many dark actors playing games in an e-mail to a journalist hours before his suicide, it was reported today. The words [according to Janice Kelly] appeared to refer to officials at the Ministry of Defence and UK intelligence agencies with whom he had sparred over interpretations of weapons reports, according to the New York Times.59 The message gave no indication that he was depressed and said he was waiting "until the end of the week" before judging how his appearance before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee had gone. The newspaper did not name the recipient of the e-mail [it was Miller]. It said another associate had received a "combative" message from Dr Kelly shortly before he left his Oxfordshire home for the last time on Thursday. [Wing Commander John Clark, mention of Clark to come...]. The scientist said in the e-mail that he was determined to overcome the scandal surrounding him and was enthusiastic about the possibility of returning to Iraq. Dr Kelly was grilled by MPs last week over his comments to reporters about the use of intelligence in the run-up to the war in Iraq. He had denied being the main source for a BBC story about claims that a dossier on Iraq had been "sexed up" to boost public support for military action. Dr Kelly's wife Janice told the New York Times her husband had worked on Thursday morning on a report he said he owed the Foreign Office and had sent some e-mails to friends [in a bunch including this one]. She said: "After lunch, he went out for a walk to stretch his legs as he usually does." Mrs Kelly said she had no indication that her husband was contemplating suicide. "But he had been under enormous stress, as we all had been."'60 ______________
59 60

*We have underlined this. Breaking News (2003). Kelly warned of 'dark actors playing games.' http://www.breakingnews.ie/world/kelly-warned-of-dark-actors-playing-games-106645.html 86

Miller at that time was, apparently, charging around Iraq as an embedded reporter. And getting into some trouble there also for bullying the search team she was embedded with to keep looking for the WMD she was so sure were there also. And threatening them she was, her team, to write about their disheartening attitude after quite some while on the job, with them, for the New York Times of course. Since then some have suggested that Miller may well have been one of those 'dark actors' herself now (and that Pederson was also, to come...). And Miller (nothing to do with that thought), did do prison time sometime after this also for not revealing a source after it had come to light that she might have been bound up in this fuss too come now, claiming her rights as a journalist not to reveal this, and in so doing as good as admitting that she may have had something to do with this then, or not? And this, story, was regarding who first fingered Valerie Plame as a covert CIA agent around then also? Plame's husband (this was her offence), ex-diplomat Joseph Wilson, had just returned from a fact finding trip to Africa, but he had been unable to report after that that Iraq had been sourcing materials for WMD from there then, that as he been sent out there to check on, as had been 'proposed' before then to or by the US State Department as well. This finding, resisted (upon his return), Wilson had then made his 'finding' more widely plain, in an article entitled "What I Didn't Find in Africa" then, published in the New York Times after that (on July 6, 2003). A following article in the New York Times eight days later (on July 14, 2003), and written by Robert Novak, and entitled "Mission to Niger" now, about this trip of Wilson's, then revealed that this ex-diplomats wife had CIA status now also, suggesting we must suppose, that this was some kind of job for the boys then? Still, that was not only classified, that further bit of information, but also career ending for Plame now then, in her chosen field. And so we might take it from that also then, that in some way Miller may also have been related to the original proposition that Iraq had been sourcing materials from Africa for WMD then? Take your pique, and from any of that, and there is a film out now, Fair Game, on this, Plame being that, 'fair game,' the film maker meant by that, in that, filim. _____________ All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players; they have their exits and their entrances.
William Shakespeare.

Another pick? For it could be argued that the only person who ever took any real responsibility over any of this 'warmongering' ( Spike put it like this, before, p. 83) that was the September 2002 dossier (but not just that), was Dr Kelly himself of course. Of course to do that we would be making him out to be a main player then, which of course would be ridiculous? But, responsibility is a good key in? And by responsibility we don't quite mean the type as perhaps best exemplified by the Japanese officer classes during the Second World War either though Dr Kelly did take his own life in like brave (you could say), manner. And we might still wonder about the Japanese officer class of those days also now? But not the Japanese, they don't wonder, and to this day many Japanese probably still look at that 'way' out as perhaps still the real measure of a person's spirit also. And that 'way' out, not taken lightly, did promise renewal. That, as no matter what else, you finally had the stomach for
87

Seppuku or for self-cutting, a social dimension we have with that. Of course the British are known for falling on their swords also. But not in quite that sense. Though we shouldn't doubt their bravery either, over hundreds of years themselves. And their style promises renewal also. For one might simply, if one was responsible in some way for, or have committed some serious indiscretion, step down or stand aside then. And one might do a little prison time also, but after some time, shame can be admonished that way also. And of course if some shame was felt deeply enough, you might not see retirement as an option at all then. And it can be a corresponding aspect of deep down depression that you can believe that you might have done terrible things also: 'started wars' even..? 'Laughable', but this can be so. 61 And pity help you if there seems some evidence of this also then? And it could be, insofar as there might have seemed some evidence of this to Dr Kelly (that he might even, in part, have started a war), that this might have manifest itself rather dramatically as well? And that during his first and last trip to Iraq also (5 -11 June), that after war was under way, and that when our man was one able to inspect the now infamous trailer sites then? (And after that, he was one of the first, also, to concede that these were harmless vehicles, then, used, actually, to produce hydrogen for weather or artillery balloons, either, or, depending on reports then as the Iraqis had said they were also, before (below, next page). Not though, the transportable biological weapons facilities that Colin Powell (American Secretary of State then, former Head of US Armed Forces also, a four-star General), had also and rather dramatically, and in a power point presentation at the UN before then (February 5, 200362), and to world audiences also, claimed that they were instead. And uncomfortable Powell might feel about that now, that hardly the warrior look when looking back at his old self some day further down the line. A realist though, having offered this for posterity on himself that one should: 'Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position fails your ego goes with it...' Properly recorded that is probably incorporated in general manuals now? And for Blair this was not a good look either and he has said so since then also: that this brought him down. And he didn't just mean that either, but this business over Dr Kelly he meant that as well. And so it could have been (at that trailer site, or even after that trip), that Dr Kelly first began to wish that he had argued harder against the 45-minute claim of the September 2002 dossier then? For the ground war had also been a walk over, hadn't it. There he was, on the ground there, and walking about safe and unaffected by any chemical or biological agents, no one had been, the trailer sites bogies, another bogus claim, or what else, now? And the story that would begin to 'break' this (with our man involved in breaking this), would appear soon, a few days after that trip out there, in the Guardian/ Observer, 15
61

British Medical Association. Depression and its treatment. British Medical Association, BMA House, Tavistock Square, London (1986). 62 Global Security.org/ USA. Mobile Biological Weapons Facilities: "Winnebagos of Death." http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/bw-mobile.htm 88

June, 2003:
'Iraqi mobile labs nothing to do with germ warfare, report finds An official British investigation into two trailers found in northern Iraq has concluded they are not mobile germ warfare labs, as was claimed by Tony Blair and President George Bush, but were for the production of hydrogen to fill artillery balloons, as the Iraqis have continued to insist. The conclusion by biological weapons experts working for the British Government is an embarrassment for the Prime Minister, who has claimed that the discovery of the labs proved that Iraq retained weapons of mass destruction and justified the case for going to war against Saddam Hussein. Instead, a British scientist and biological weapons expert, who has examined the trailers in Iraq, told The Observer last week: 'They are not mobile germ warfare laboratories. You could not use them for making biological weapons. They do not even look like them. They are exactly what the Iraqis said they were facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill balloons.' The conclusion of the investigation ordered by the British Government and revealed by The Observer last week is hugely embarrassing for Blair, who had used the discovery of the alleged mobile labs as part of his efforts to silence criticism over the failure of Britain and the US to find any weapons of mass destruction since the invasion of Iraq. The row is expected to be re-ignited this week with Robin Cook and Clare Short, the two Cabinet Ministers who resigned over the war, both due to give evidence to a House of Commons inquiry into whether intelligence was manipulated in the run-up to the war. It will be the first time that both have been grilled by their peers on the Foreign Affairs Select Committee over what the Cabinet was told in the run-up to the war. MPs will be keen to explore Cook's explanation when he resigned that, while he believed Iraq did have some WMD capability, he did not believe it was weaponised. 63
63

There was so much more to Robin Cook: his works and deeds, misdeeds, his flying about (not a bad Foreign Secretary), he liked cars, he had an active imagination. Thought more of on his way out (for his resignation, its style), he was more a Toad he often said, about himself. His personal statement from when he resigned his post as Leader of the House of Commons, UK, on the eve of war, 17 March 2003: 'This is the first time for 20 years that I have addressed the House from the Back Benches. I must confess that I had forgotten how much better the view is from here. None of those 20 years were more enjoyable or more rewarding than the past two, in which I have had the immense privilege of serving this House as Leader of the House, which were made all the more enjoyable, Mr. Speaker, by the opportunity of working closely with you. It was frequently the necessity for me as Leader of the House to talk my way out of accusations that a statement had been preceded by a press interview. On this occasion I can say with complete confidence that no press interview has been given before this statement. I have chosen to address the House first on why I cannot support a war without international agreement or domestic support. The present Prime Minister is the most successful leader of the Labour party in my lifetime. I hope that he will continue to be the leader of our party, and I hope that he will continue to be successful. I have no sympathy with, and I will give no comfort to, those who want to use this crisis to displace him. I applaud the heroic efforts that the Prime Minister has made in trying to secure a second resolution. I do not think that anybody could have done better than the Foreign Secretary in working to get support for a second resolution within the Security Council. But the very intensity of those attempts underlines how important it was to succeed. Now that those attempts have failed, we cannot pretend that getting a second resolution was of no importance. France has been at the receiving end of bucket loads of commentary in recent days. It is not France alone that wants more time for inspections. Germany wants more time for inspections; Russia wants more time for inspections; indeed, at no time have we signed up even the minimum necessary to carry a second resolution. We delude ourselves if we think that the degree of international hostility is all the result of President Chirac. The reality is that Britain is being asked to embark on a war without agreement in any of the international bodies of which we are a leading partnernot NATO, not the European Union and, now, not the Security Council. 89

The Prime Minister and his director of strategy and communications, Alastair Campbell, are expected to decline invitations to appear. While MPs could attempt to force them, this is now thought unlikely to happen. The Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, is expected to give evidence the week after. The revelation that the mobile labs were to produce hydrogen for artillery balloons will also cause discomfort for the British authorities because the Iraqi army's original system was sold to it by the British company, Marconi Command & Control.'64 _____________

Though this 'finding' was attributed to Dr Kelly at the Hutton inquiry (he was the only
To end up in such diplomatic weakness is a serious reverse. Only a year ago, we and the United States were part of a coalition against terrorism that was wider and more diverse than I would ever have imagined possible. History will be astonished at the diplomatic miscalculations that led so quickly to the disintegration of that powerful coalition. The US can afford to go it alone, but Britain is not a superpower. Our interests are best protected not by unilateral action but by multilateral agreement and a world order governed by rules. Yet tonight the international partnerships most important to us are weakened: the European Union is divided; the Security Council is in stalemate. Those are heavy casualties of a war in which a shot has yet to be fired. I have heard some parallels between military action in these circumstances and the military action that we took in Kosovo. There was no doubt about the multilateral support that we had for the action that we took in Kosovo. It was supported by NATO; it was supported by the European Union; it was supported by every single one of the seven neighbours in the region. France and Germany were our active allies. It is precisely because we have none of that support in this case that it was all the more important to get agreement in the Security Council as the last hope of demonstrating international agreement. The legal basis for our action in Kosovo was the need to respond to an urgent and compelling humanitarian crisis. Our difficulty in getting support this time is that neither the international community nor the British public is persuaded that there is an urgent and compelling reason for this military action in Iraq. The threshold for war should always be high. None of us can predict the death toll of civilians from the forthcoming bombardment of Iraq, but the US warning of a bombing campaign that will "shock and awe" makes it likely that casualties will be numbered at least in the thousands. I am confident that British servicemen and women will acquit themselves with professionalism and with courage. I hope that they all come back. I hope that Saddam, even now, will quit Baghdad and avert war, but it is false to argue that only those who support war support our troops. It is entirely legitimate to support our troops while seeking an alternative to the conflict that will put those troops at risk. Nor is it fair to accuse those of us who want longer for inspections of not having an alternative strategy. For four years as Foreign Secretary I was partly responsible for the western strategy of containment. Over the past decade that strategy destroyed more weapons than in the Gulf war, dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons programme and halted Saddam's medium and long-range missiles programmes. Iraq's military strength is now less than half its size than at the time of the last Gulf war. Ironically, it is only because Iraq's military forces are so weak that we can even contemplate its invasion. Some advocates of conflict claim that Saddam's forces are so weak, so demoralised and so badly equipped that the war will be over in a few days. We cannot base our military strategy on the assumption that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-emptive action on the claim that he is a threat. Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target. It probably still has biological toxins and battlefield chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold Saddam anthrax agents and the then British Government approved chemical and munitions factories. Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to disarm a military capacity that has been there for 20 years, and which we helped to create? Why is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam's ambition to complete his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN inspectors? Only a couple of weeks ago, Hans Blix told the Security Council that the key remaining disarmament tasks could be completed within months. I have heard it said that Iraq has had not months but 12 years in which to complete disarmament, and that our patience is exhausted. Yet it is more than 30 years since resolution 242 called on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. We do not express the same impatience with the persistent refusal of Israel to comply. I welcome the strong personal commitment that the Prime Minister has given to middle east peace, but Britain's positive role in the middle east does not redress the strong sense of injustice throughout the Muslim world at what it sees as one rule for the allies of the US and another rule for the rest. 90

'British scientist and biological weapons expert... who... examined the trailers in Iraq,' he was, hence, the source of that), it was still not the form, his being named, so far as he was still concerned up till then, but that was close...
And that may have been made even more likely so (that he was talking out), due to his actually being named in a story before then, as well. That Dr Kelly objected to this, to his name being used like that, might even be able to be made more plain for us now, by Olivia Bosch, on good terms with Dr Kelly as was Boucher it seems also, confidants of sorts...

Bosch first worked in Iraq as a UN inspector, in the summer of 1996 (she said to the inquiry), on a destruction mission for the biological weapons facility at al-Hakim. She did not know Dr Kelly then, she said, not until the autumn of 2002.
Nor is our credibility helped by the appearance that our partners in Washington are less interested in disarmament than they are in regime change in Iraq. That explains why any evidence that inspections may be showing progress is greeted in Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation: it reduces the case for war. What has come to trouble me most over past weeks is the suspicion that if the hanging chads in Florida had gone the other way and Al Gore had been elected, we would not now be about to commit British troops. The longer that I have served in this place, the greater the respect I have for the good sense and collective wisdom of the British people. On Iraq, I believe that the prevailing mood of the British people is sound. They do not doubt that Saddam is a brutal dictator, but they are not persuaded that he is a clear and present danger to Britain. They want inspections to be given a chance, and they suspect that they are being pushed too quickly into conflict by a US Administration with an agenda of its own. Above all, they are uneasy at Britain going out on a limb on a military adventure without a broader international coalition and against the hostility of many of our traditional allies. From the start of the present crisis, I have insisted, as Leader of the House, on the right of this place to vote on whether Britain should go to war. It has been a favourite theme of commentators that this House no longer occupies a central role in British politics. Nothing could better demonstrate that they are wrong than for this House to stop the commitment of troops in a war that has neither international agreement nor domestic support. I intend to join those tomorrow night who will vote against military action now. It is for that reason, and for that reason alone, and with a heavy heart, that I resign from the Government [Applause].' UK Parliament, publications (17 March, 2003). Robin Cook: Personal statement. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030317/debtext/30317-33.htm#3031733_spnew0 _____________ More on Cook (wiki): ' studied English Literature at the University of Edinburgh, where he obtained an MA with Honours in English Literature. He studied for a PhD on Charles Dickens and Victorian serial novels, supervised by John Sutherland, but gave it up in 1970... 1971 Cook became a tutororganiser of the Workers' Educational Association for Lothian, and a local councillor in Edinburgh... gave both up when elected a member of parliament on his 28th birthday, Feb 1974... _____________ Cook also worked as a racing tipster in his spare time... introduced to horse racing by his wife, Margaret Katherine Whitmore, from Somerset, whom he met whilst at Edinburgh University... married on 15 September 1969 at St Alban's Church, Westbury Park, Bristol and had two sons, Peter and Christopher, born in February 1973 and May 1974. Between 1991 and 1998 Cook wrote a weekly tipster's column for the Glasgow Herald newspaper. Shortly after he became Foreign Secretary, Cook ended his marriage with Margaret, revealing that he had an extra-marital affair with one of his staff, Gaynor Regan. He announced his intentions to leave his wife and marry another woman via a press statement made at Heathrow on 2 August 1997. Cook was forced into a decision over his private life after a telephone conversation with Alastair Campbell as he was about to go on holiday with his first wife. Campbell explained that the press was about to break the story of his affair with Regan. His estranged wife subsequently accused him of being insensitive during their marriage, of having had several extramarital affairs and alleged he was an alcoholic. Robin married Regan in Tunbridge Wells, Kent on 9 April 1998, four weeks after his divorce was finalised... In early 2003, during a live television appearance on BBC current affairs show Question Time, he was inadvertently referred to as "Robin Cock" by David Dimbleby. Cook responded with attempted good humour with "Yes, David Bumblebee", and Dimbleby apologised twice on air for his slip. The episode also saw Cook in the uncomfortable position of defending the Government's stance over the impending 91

But of him, she told the inquiry, he was, anyway, 'involved more with the interview and discovery processes regarding Iraqi biological weapons programmes,' a different from type of mission from hers (ref. below). David Kelly, she said, was continuously going out to Iraq from 1991 to 1998 during the UNSCOM period, whereas she had had only one summer there, anyway, in 1996. Later Bosch met Dr Kelly then (autumn of 2002, late in the peace), after a conference at which Bosch introduced herself to him. Asking Dr Kelly if she might telephone him on occasion so as to seek his technical expertise for background information (that as media interviews were being sought of her also then, on WMD). As Dr Kelly agreed to
invasion of Iraq, weeks before his resignation over the issue... Cook's resignation speech in the House of Commons, received with an unprecedented standing ovation by fellow MPs, was described by the BBC's Andrew Marr as "without doubt one of the most effective, brilliant, resignation speeches in modern British politics." Most unusually for the British parliament, Cook's speech was met with growing applause from all sides of the House (beginning with Labour and Liberal Democrat critics of the war), and from the public gallery. According to The Economist's obituary, that was the first speech ever to receive a standing ovation in the history of the House... After his 2003 resignation from the Cabinet, Cook remained an active backbench Member of Parliament until his death. After leaving the Government, Cook was a leading analyst of the decision to go to war in Iraq, giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee which was later relevant during the Hutton [inquiry]... In early August 2005, Cook and his wife, Gaynor, took a two-week holiday in the Highlands of Scotland. At around 2:20 pm, on 6 August 2005, whilst walking down Ben Stack in Sutherland, Scotland, Cook suddenly suffered a severe heart attack, collapsed and lost consciousness [and died]...' Wikipedia: On, Robin Cook. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robin_Cook#Early_life _____________ From, The Free library, by Farlex (1997).''No Gaynor without pain for Cook and his lover.'' http://www.thefreelibrary.com/No+Gaynor+without+pain+for+Cook+and+his+lover.-a061110155 'Robin Cook issued a statement saying that he has behaved like an unspeakable little toad towards his wife of 28 years. The noble Margaret issued back, saying that he is a great MP and a grand Foreign Secretary. From "the other woman" Gaynor Regan, however, we have heard nothing - except that friends have said she feels relief that the affair is out in the open. I'll bet she does. I'll bet that secretly she has loved every moment of this week, since he made his choice and chose her. I'll also bet that her future with him is going to be nothing like as rosy as she thinks it will be. For a start, she can never escape the fact that he did not want to make that choice, and might never have done so had he not been exposed by a newspaper. On balance then, he picked Gaynor - but every sign is that he would have preferred to carry on as he was; having the cake and eating it too. Then Gaynor has to work out what to do to replace the frisson of forbidden fruit that would have fuelled their past relationship no end. All that stuff about her arriving secretly at his flat and waiting in the dark until her prince came...it takes little imagination to see the spark that must have added to the moment of his arrival. It won't be quite the same with all the lights blazing as she stares impatiently at the clock and frets that the dinner will be burnt. Again. But, Gaynor's biggest problem will be Robin Cook himself. I believe that he is basically a decent man, rather than a born Lothario. And most decent men, in these circumstances, never quite get over the guilt and remorse for what they have done. There is no question that he loved Margaret very much - nor that, in leaving, he has devastated her. There is no question, either, about his feelings for his two sons; friends say he seeps pride and love for them but, by his actions, nothing will ever be quite the same between them again. The lads have already made their position clear by staying protectively with Margaret for those first few, dreadful days. Gaynor may have got "her" man, but she will only have part of him. The other part will be agonising over the pain he caused, and it's a pain he will remember every time he looks at her. 92

this, a friendship of sorts developed over the telephone and this continued till right up until his death, the last morning even. Here first mention of Dr Kelly as a source of anything, his 'surprise' at this, is mentioned by Bosch:
'Hearing Transcripts 1 Thursday, 4th September 2003 2 (10.30 am) 3 MRS OLIVIA BOSCH (called) 4 Examined by MR KNOX... 24 Q. Did you work with Dr Kelly at all? 25 A. I had never worked with him. He was involved more with

I give it till Christmas for the cracks to show...' Comment: We are not sure who this was that gave it this long, one of Margaret's sister's perhaps? But these cracks were papered over actually, some remorse of course, references to his being a Toad. But those were made and had been made, before, made in other contexts also? And this author seems to model Cook on this character Toad as well - as in Toad tends to take up then give up fads quickly, that article suggesting an outcome similar. This character Toad, something like this, first surfaced in, Wind and the Willows, a popular bed-time book in England and in farther fields. _____________ (Wiki): 'The Wind in the Willows is a classic of children's literature by Kenneth Grahame, first published in 1908. Alternately slow moving and fast paced, it focuses on four anthropomorphised animal characters in a pastoral [ideal] version of England. The novel is notable for its mixture of mysticism, adventure, morality, and camaraderie and celebrated for its evocation of the nature of the Thames valley. In 1908 Grahame retired from his position as secretary of the Bank of England. He moved back to Cookham, Berkshire, where he had been brought up and spent his time by the River Thames doing much as the animal characters in his book do - namely, as one of the most famous phrases from the book says, "simply messing about in boats" - and wrote down the bed-time stories he had been telling his son Alistair...' And now here's a chiller: Alistair, nicknamed mouse, committed suicide himself at age 19, driven to it some say as well - but at least this is recorded as accidental death (he lay down on some rail-road tracks). Dr Kelly's death is not recorded either way yet, either? An odd hang-over, that? Daily Mail, London (2010). 'How the genius behind Wind In The Willows drove the son who inspired him to suicide.' http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1333189/How-genius-Wind-In-The-Willows-drove-soninspired-suicide.html _____________ Clare Short's short resignation letter 12 May, 2003. 'Dear Tony, I have decided that I must leave the government. As you know, I thought the run-up to the conflict in Iraq was mishandled, but I agreed to stay in the government to help support the reconstruction effort for the people of Iraq. I am afraid that the assurances you gave me about the need for a UN mandate to establish a legitimate Iraqi government have been breached. The security council resolution that you and Jack have so secretly negotiated contradicts the assurances I have given in the House of Commons and elsewhere about the legal authority of the occupying powers, and the need for a UN-led process to establish a legitimate Iraqi government. This makes my position impossible. It has been a great honour for me to have led the establishment and development of the Department for International Development over the past six years. I am proud of what we have achieved and much else that the government has done. I am sad and sorry that it has ended like this. Yours, Clare.' _____________ 93

1 1 the interview and discovery processes regarding Iraqi 2 biological weapons programmes. I was on a destruction 3 mission, which is a different kind of process. 4 Q. Sorry, a different kind of process from the one he was 5 on? 6 A. Right, yes. 7 Q. Which is? 8 A. He did more interviews of senior Iraqi officials and he 9 did a lot of the discovery process of what the Iraqi WMD 10 programmes were about in the early 1990s throughout to 11 the late 1990s... 5 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Q. If I can just stop you there for a moment. How often in this period, early 2003, would you speak to Dr Kelly? A. I think you can check on the telephone records, but two or three times a week, possibly more; and we spoke more on the phone, pretty much. That was the type of relationship we had. In terms of e-mails, that would be exchange of information, if there was a press article here or some kind of news item that we thought significant. We had a very interactive rapport and at one time he said he liked talking with me because I had an international security perspective; it was in

6 1 contrast to but complemented his technical background. 2 Q. What about after the conflict had finished? Did you 3 remain in touch with Dr Kelly? 4 A. During the conflict we spoke actually on a daily basis 5 at that point because we were trying to watch out for 6 the moment or at any time that weapons of mass 7 destruction might be used or found; and so we had we 8 would be assessing press coverage. In fact, that is the 9 only thing I had to go on, what was in the press 10 regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq during the 11 conflict... 20 21 22 23 24 25 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Then around May or so, mid May, the focus went back again to weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, because press and politicians were wondering where they were. Q. Did you at all discuss issues relating to the media after May 2003, when the story blew up again? A. Yes, because the media, again, and politicians were

wanting to assess where the weapons were; and we were both talking about it and we were always talking about that there was to be an emphasis on the programmes, that the press and everyone was somewhat too focused on the weapon as a smoking gun because that really was not the issue, it was the programmes. Because programmes imply intent to have a capability. And that was quite important and had not really seemed to be brought out in

Short, Clare (2003). Clare Short's resignation letter: ''Text of the international development secretary's letter to the prime minister.'' Posted in the Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/may/12/labour.voluntarysector
64

Guardian, London (2003).''Iraqi mobile labs nothing to do with germ warfare, report finds...'' http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jun/15/iraq 94

9 any of the coverage. And it was -- we would talk about 10 what trends the journalists were pursuing and what some 11 of the themes were. And there were, I guess, about 12 three occasions when he was concerned about press 13 reporting of him. 14 Q. That is to say the press reports which seemed to rely on 15 him or named him? 16 A. Well, one in particular that named him. He mentioned 17 that he did speak to journalists -- let me, if I may, 18 look to my notes on something now. 19 Q. Perhaps I can just call up BBC/4/165. You will see an 20 article appearing on the screen in front of you. 21 A. Okay. 22 Q. It is an article in the Sunday Times on 13th April. 23 A. I had not actually seen that article but what he did 24 mention, and it was about that time that David -- he 25 told me he was surprised to find that a journalist he 8 1 had known quite well had quoted his name in an article. 2 He did not tell me who that journalist was, although 3 I know from the Inquiry who it is. 4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. What was the name he mentioned? 5 A. He did not mention -- at that time he did not mention to 6 me the name of the journalist. 7 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes. 8 A. He would be very discreet often in that manner. 9 MR KNOX: It may be this. This is an article written on 10 13th April 2003 by Mr Rufford. 11 A. Right. 12 Q. You will see, in the fourth paragraph down, there is 13 a reference to: 14 "Dr David Kelly, the UN's former chief weapons 15 inspector, said al-Saadi 'knew where all the bodies were 16 buried', adding: 'He advised Saddam on what he could get 17 away with'." 18 Do you think it would have been around this type of 19 time, about April 2003, that he mentioned he was 20 surprised to find his name in an article?65 21 A. Yes, because he said it would a rather contentious 22 statement -- that it would be interpreted to be 23 contentious. He remarked to me that his understanding 24 with journalists was he would only give background 25 briefings and that his name was not to be mentioned...' 66 _____________

Bosch's evidence (like Broucher's before), we think should be taken more notice of. A big call we know, and late in the day. And while yes it is so, that we do this 'awful irony' still (Blair before), with Dr Kelly being onside, for the war (this will come out, that makes Spike right, sort of, also), albeit we do have a caveat to that, as pointed out by Broucher and unintentionally so also:

65

Sunday Times, London (2003). 'Saddam weapons chief seized: US interrogates chemical supremo as Allies battle to seal escape routes.''' http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/iraq/article1990491.ece 66 Bosch, Olivia (2003). Senior Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House, former UNSCOM inspector (period between 1991-1998): Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans30.htm 95

'A war [Dr Kelly said to Broucher, before67] would put him in an ambiguous moral position...' as he'd given assurances (during interviews as described by Bosch above also), based on co-operation. Which it seems he may have got (no WMD, meaning there was little hid from him then). Notwithstanding that, what we've got to there, we might take a little more notice of Bosch than Broucher now - for we've also got Bosch, before the Hutton inquiry, going into some detail as to how Gilligan got whatever he thought he got out of Dr Kelly also now, this idea that Alistair Campbell was directly involved in 'sexing-up' the September 2002 dossier (which Dr Kelly may have had some input into, but how would Campbell know anyway, that we might wonder just about?). On that, off that, Bosch says this came out by way of a name game anyway - with the first name put to Dr Kelly by Gilligan being Alistair Campbell then. This (if you believe Bosch), 'suggestion', then, may well have taken Dr Kelly aback, could have made it sound as if Gilligan knew something for sure about that, the compiling of the dossier even? And that 'surprise' (but which?), may well have showed on his face just long enough for Gilligan to have got what wanted from meeting now, but of minds was it? Later on. This, game (we are relying on Bosch here), seems similar, also, as to how Dr Kelly's name as the source for Gilligan's story came to be generally known to the media after that also. Names were allowed to be put, something like twenty it is bandied about, to somebody within the Ministry of Defence, with Dr Kelly's apparently being near the last put (not the first thought of then there, so close Dr Kelly might have kept his counsel then, up till then). Another blinking thing... Bosch, continued from above:
'10 4 Q. You have mentioned one occasion when Dr Kelly found his 5 name in the press, which he was upset by, which perhaps 6 is the article I took you to. Did Dr Kelly around this 7 time, April or May, around that type of time, did he 8 have any further discussion with you about his contacts 9 with the press? 10 A. Well, he mentioned in his -- I am not sure of the time 11 sequence but if I go through here. It was another time 12 towards mid May he told me he had an unauthorised 13 meeting with Andrew Gilligan, someone he had met 14 a couple of times before but did not know that well. 15 And he said he was -- he was taken aback by the way 16 Andrew Gilligan tried to elicit information from him. 17 I said: yes, but that is what journalists do. He 18 understood that, but he said he had never experienced it 19 in the way that Gilligan had tried to do so, by a name 20 game was the term. 21 Q. Just pause there for a moment. Did he explain what he 22 meant by "name game"? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Well, what did he say? 25 A. Okay, and this was with reference to the September 11 1 dossier and I do not recall exactly what aspect of it. 2 It was the name game bit was what reminded -- what 3 sticks in my mind. He said that Gilligan wanted to play 4 a name game as to who was responsible for inserting 5 information into the dossier, and that if I understand
67

Boucher, before, p. 84. 96

6 correctly Gilligan said to him: I will name you some 7 names. Apparently David had said that Gilligan very 8 quickly -- the first name he mentioned very quickly and 9 immediately was Campbell. David told me he could 10 neither confirm nor deny. David said as he was a civil 11 servant he could not provide Government names, least of 12 all to a journalist. We kind of laughed there. Nor 13 could he deny as Gilligan would continue listing names 14 or could continue listing names until the right name 15 came up. 16 Q. Did Dr Kelly then say what he had actually said to 17 Gilligan? 18 A. Yes, then he said what he actually said. Because he 19 could not confirm or deny but he thought he had to give 20 an answer so he said "maybe". 21 Q. So in other words what had happened is Gilligan had come 22 up with the name Campbell and then Dr Kelly had said: 23 maybe? 24 A. Right. 25 LORD HUTTON: Did you understand if Mr Gilligan had given 12 1 more names -- you said he came up almost immediately 2 with that name. 3 A. Right. It is part of this name game that Campbell -4 sorry, that Gilligan had quickly put up Campbell. It 5 did not give David time really to think about what was 6 going on in that way. 7 LORD HUTTON: Did you understand that was the first name? 8 A. Yes, the very first name. 9 MR KNOX: I just want to get this right: did Dr Kelly say he 10 had given Gilligan this explanation about not being able 11 to name civil servants or did Dr Kelly say: he said 12 Campbell, I said maybe, and the reason I did that is 13 because I am a civil servant. 14 A. I am not clear. He might have said to Gilligan that he 15 cannot give names but I am not clear. I cannot remember 16 exactly. 17 Q. You cannot remember precisely what he said he had said 18 to Gilligan? 19 A. Yes, right on that. In terms of this kind of process. 20 LORD HUTTON: Ms Bosch, you said Dr Kelly told you he had an 21 unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan. 22 A. Yes. 23 LORD HUTTON: Did he use the word "unauthorised"? 24 A. Yes, he did. 25 LORD HUTTON: How did he come to say that? Did he just say 13 1 to you: I had an unauthorised meeting with Mr Gilligan? 2 A. Yes, because we would just talk kind of freely about 3 journalists who you would see, whatever, and I believe 4 that he had come back -- I do not know if it was that 5 very night he mentioned it or whatever. But we had -6 he had, in previous conversations, mentioned authorised 7 and unauthorised. 8 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 9 A. And he had mentioned this was an unauthorised meeting. 10 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 11 A. So confiding, I suppose, in a way. 12 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 13 MR KNOX: Just two things on this conversation. Was this
97

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

a meeting you had or was this over the telephone? A. This was over the telephone. Q. I know it is difficult to recall dates but could you put an approximate date on this conversation? A. Some time in May. It does not really stick with me because, in a sense, this did not come to mind until after this whole -- until he died. Q. Can I just try to pin it down like this? A. Yes. Q. We know there appears to have been a meeting between Dr Kelly and Mr Gilligan on the 22nd May. A. Yes.

14 1 Q. We know also Mr Gilligan made a report on the Today 2 Programme on 29th May. 3 A. Hmm. 4 Q. Did you hear that report on 29th May? 5 A. No, I was abroad at a conference and was not back until 6 after the 31st. I heard the one on 4th June. 7 Q. When you say the one -- that would be a Susan Watts 8 broadcast on 4th June or -9 A. I understood that Gilligan also had a Today Programme on 10 4th June, right. But I remember Gilligan mentioning 11 something to the effect about -- that there were persons 12 who disagreed with the 45 minutes, that kind of -- the 13 whole issue on that. 14 Q. Just trying to get a date on this again. You said you 15 went away at the end of May? 16 A. Right. 17 Q. When did you go away at the end of May? 18 A. On the 28th. 19 Q. Do you think your conversation with Dr Kelly was while 20 you were still in England? 21 A. Yes, it would have been before that. 22 Q. In all probability it is some time between 22nd and 23 28th May? 24 A. Yes, in terms of that conversation with David, that is 25 quite possible, yes. 15 1 Q. About Mr Gilligan? 2 A. Yes. And -- yes, go ahead. 3 Q. I think you said a moment ago you did not hear the 4 broadcast of 29th May but you did hear a broadcast by 5 Mr Gilligan on 4th June, is that right? 6 A. I am assuming -- yes, yes. 7 Q. That was on the radio? 8 A. On the radio, I listened to the -9 Q. When you heard that, did you think that Dr Kelly might 10 be the source of that conversation? 11 A. No, no. 12 Q. Can I ask you this: why was that? After all, he had 13 told you he had only recently spoken to Mr Gilligan and 14 had an unauthorised conversation. Why did you assume he 15 was not the source of the report you heard on 4th June? 16 A. Because the manner of the report was one in which it 17 appeared that there was an attempt to whistle blow or to 18 reflect concerns that were against Government policy and 19 I would never have expected, in all the conversations 20 with David, that that was something he would do. Again, 21 his -- the article in The Observer that was printed last
98

22 Sunday very much captures the conversation -- the types 23 of perceptions he had and that we talked about...' 68 _____________

Did Dr Kelly have any early reservations about the war, Bosch was asked before this, twice, and so far as she knew? Rather than answer this, except to say that she had agreed with Dr Kelly (both taking and not taking sides), Bosch twice referred the questioner back to a recently published Observer article instead, which purported to show Dr Kelly's views as regards this question (and this probably did), published by another friend of Dr Kellys (another journalist), then:
'Hearing Transcripts 1 2 3 4 Thursday, 4th September 2003 (10.30 am) MRS OLIVIA BOSCH (called) Examined by MR KNOX... Q. Did Dr Kelly express any reservations about the proposition that there should be a war in Iraq shortly before it took place? A. I think his views were very well stated in The Observer article that was published this past Sunday. We had very similar views, and that while it was unfortunate

4 20 21 22 23 24 25

5 1 that war might have to be done, the use of military 2 force would seem to have been the only way for this 3 particular regime to be able to deal with its 4 obligations. 5 The Iraqi regime was not complying to its UN 6 obligations; and while the US and the UK had threatened 7 the use of force throughout the autumn and early 2003, 8 and this threat was very effective and we both thought, 9 and I particularly thought that this was the main reason 10 why the Iraqi regime had brought -- allowed the 11 inspectors to come back. And any kind of perceived 12 concession which the Iraqis were giving -- it was only 13 in process -- was due to the threat of use of military 14 force. 15 Q. If I can just stop you there for a moment. How often in 16 this period, early 2003, would you speak to Dr Kelly? 17 A. I think you can check on the telephone records, but two 18 or three times a week, possibly more; and we spoke more 19 on the phone, pretty much.69 _____________

That Dr Kelly blinked, this is likely, at something like that from Gilligan (Bosch on this, before), he likely did after the trailer site inspection after that then. And this would seem even more likely after this - if we bring in this Observer article now, mentioned by Bosch, and trailers are mentioned here as well. And so it is plain that Dr Kelly 'believed' in them before he saw them, also then (and we'll make more of
68

Bosch, Olivia (2003). Senior Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, also known as Chatham House, former UNSCOM inspector (period between 1991-1998): Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans30.htm 69 Ibid. 99

this later):
'The Observer 31 August, 2003: Only regime change will avert the threat Here we reprint Dr David Kelly's article, written days before the Iraq war, in which he assessed the threat from Saddam. In the past week Iraq has begun destroying it's stock of al-Samoud II missiles, missiles that have a range greater than the UN-mandated limit of 150 kilometres. This is presented to the international community as evidence of President Saddam Hussein's compliance with United Nations weapons inspectors. But Iraq always gave up materials once it was in it's interest to do so. Iraq has spent the past 30 years building up an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the current threat presented by Iraqi militarily is modest both in terms of conventional and unconventional weapons, it has never given up it's intent to develop and stockpile such weapons for both military and terrorist use. Today Iraq shows superficial co-operation with the inspectorates. Weapons such as 122mm rockets specific for chemical and biological use have been discovered and the destruction of proscribed missiles and associated engines, components and gyroscopes has begun. Iraq has established two commissions to search for documents and weapons under the direction of Rashid Amer, a former head of Iraq's concealment activities, and a commission has started to recover weapons from Iraq's unilateral destruction sites. (These sites, dating back to 1991, were destroyed by [sic] Iraq, illegally, without UN supervision and as part of Iraq's concealment of programmes.) Amer al-Saadi formerly [sic] responsible for conserving Iraq's WMD, now it's principal spokesman on its weapons [sic] continues to mislead the international community. It is difficult to imagine co-operation being properly established unless credible Iraqi officials are put into place by a changed Saddam. Yet some argue that inspections are working and that more time is required; that increasing the numbers of inspectors would enhance their effectiveness. Others argue that the process is inherently flawed and that disarmament by regime change is the only realistic way forward. The UN has been attempting to disarm Iraq since 1991 and has failed to do so. It is an abject failure of diplomacy with the split between France, China and Russia on the one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other, creating a lack of 'permanent five' unity and resolve. More recently Germany, a temporary yet powerful member of the Security Council, has exacerbated the diplomatic split. The threat of credible military force has forced Sadam [sic] Hussein to admit, but not co-operate with, the UN inspectorate. So-called concessions U2 overflights, the right to review were all routine between 1991 and 1998. after 12 unsuccessful years of UN supervision of disarmament, military force regrettably appears to be the only way of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq. In the years since 1991, during which UNscom and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) destroyed or rendered harmless all known weapons and capability under UN Security Council Resolution 687, Ira established an effective concealment and deception organisation which protected many undisclosed assets. In October 2002, Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to disclose his arsenal within 30 days. He admitted inspectors and, with characteristic guile, provided some concessions, but still refuses to acknowledge the extent of his chemical and biological weapons and associated military and industrial support organisations 8,500 litres of anthrax VX, 2,160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, 6,500 chemical bombs and 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents remained unaccounted for from activities up to 1991. (Even these figures, it should be noted, are based in no small part on data fabricated by Iraq.)

100

Less easy to determine is the extent of activity undertaken since 1991. In its 12,000-page 'disclosure' submitted to the inspectors in December 2002, Iraq failed to declare any proscribed activities. Today the truly important issues are declaring the extent and scope of the programmes in 1991 and the personalities, 'committees' and organisations involved. There are indications that the programmes continue. Iraq continues too develop missile technology, especially fuel propellants and guidance systems for long-range missiles. Iraq has recovered chemical reactors destroyed prior tp1998 for allegedly civilian activity, built biological fermenters and agent dryers, and created transportable production units for biological and chemical agents 70 and the filling of weapons. Key nuclear research and design teams remain in place, even though it is assessed that Iraq is unable to manufacture nuclear weapons unless fissile material is available. War may now be inevitable. The proportionality and intensity of the conflict will depend on whether regime change or disarmament is the true objective. The US and whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force, strength and strategy used is proportionate to the modest threat that Iraq now poses.71 Since some WMD sites have not been unambiguously identified, and may not be neutralised until war is over, a substantial hazard may be encountered. Sites with manufacturing or storage capabilities for chemical or biological weapons may present a danger and much will depend on the way that those facilities are militarily cancelled and subsequently treated. Some of the chemical and biological weapons deployed in 1991 are still available, albeit on a reduced scale. Aerial bombs and rockets are readily available to be filled with sarin and mustard or botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and smallpox. More sophisticated weaponry, such as spray devices associated with drones or missiles with separating warheads, may be limited in numbers, but would be far more devastating if used. The threat from Iraq's chemical and biological weapons is, however, unlikely too substantially affect the operational capabilities of US and British troops. Nor is it likely to create massive casualties in adjacent countries. Perhaps the real threat from Iraq today comes from covert use of such weapons against troops or by terrorists against civilian targets worldwide. The link with al-Qaeda is disputed, but is, in any case, not the principal terrorist link of concern. Iraq has long trained and supported terrorist activities and is quite capable of initiating such activity using its security services. The long-term threat, however, remains Iraq's development to military maturity of weapons of mass destruction something that only regime change will avert.'72 ______________

The trouble with taking some positions is that there can be unexpected outcomes, can't there (how to phrase that?). For this is a little jarring, though we were first jarred a little like this by Spike before now73 - claiming that Dr Kelly, 'was a warmongerer par excellence...' On what did he base this, we wondered then? Preposterous. Well, obviously, though a bit hyped up, it would seem on this now (above). And on his taking a position, after it all. But perhaps, if we add now, that Flint might quite like to have seen as much force used in another region, and not that far from Iraq, next, then this might be understandable yet, her releasing this, juxtaposition. And who's to know, Dr Kelly may have agreed with her on that also? We don't know. They were friends though. Still, understandable perhaps, her position, when you consider her considerable
70 71

Underlining, our own. Same 72 Guardian, aka the Observer, London (2003). 'Only regime change will avert the threat. Here we reprint Dr David Kelly's article, written days before the Iraq war, in which he assessed the threat from Saddam.'' http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/aug/31/huttonreport.iraq 73 P 82, on 101

interest in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa for many years herself - as a journalist, on the ground, film maker, her scrapes with war lords herself, co- author, also, of, Darfur: a short history of a long war... (2006).74 More well-intentioned, we would say, is this other piece from Flint, detailing her association with Dr Kelly now, and how she got that out of him, which is pertinent really, all round, in that she was able to ask him, due to association before then. We'd ask, why would he otherwise, no journalist has ever suggested he was paid for anything, no warmongerer, trying to rile, in that sense then:
'Julie Flint The Observer, Sunday 31 August, 2003: It was 18 July, unseasonably hot in Beirut, and I got back from the vet's just in time to catch the end of the 12 o'clock news. A body had been found in the Oxford countryside. There was no name and no context, but I knew immediately whose it was. The storm around the Today report had broken on the edge of my consciousness when I was in Iraq a few weeks earlier and I knew how distressed David Kelly, the man in the eye of the storm, would be. But I was in Baghdad, Saddam wasn't, and I didn't have David's details with me. To my shame, I made no attempt to get them. Now, too late, I did. A friend in London went to my house and located my phone book. One of David's daughters answered the phone and I asked to speak to her mother, Jan. I felt I had to say I was a journalist, but a friend too. Jan, ever generous, came to the phone and I had nothing to say. What can you say? I was, and am, brokenhearted, for you all? In the end I said something like that, something utterly inadequate. 'It's a terrible day, Julie,' she said, several times. We are both good talkers, but on this occasion we were not. 'David would be happy you called,' she said and we hung up. I don't remember when I first spoke to David Kelly, but we originally met at Didcot station in 1996 when I was making a film on Saddam for the BBC and he invited me home for the day. He had rather large glasses and a baggy sweater that looked, given his general demeanour, as if it should have a crease in it. At our last meeting he recalled what we talked about on the drive from the station. I had forgotten, and have forgotten again. What I remember is how well, and how fast, he drove. The Kelly home is beautiful, a real family home. We pottered around the garden, which David loved but neglected this year, and petted pets before demolishing a lunch prepared by Jan, who was on crutches because of arthritis. Then we got down to anthrax and botulinum toxin and the most effective ways of delivering them, the right weight and size for droplets contaminated with bacterial agents and the difficulties of aerosolisation... Getting secrets, or even soundbites, from David was like getting blood from a stone, but his knowledge was encyclopaedic. In the quicksand of reporting on Iraq, he was a completely safe house because he had no axe to grind. He was concerned with facts and facts alone. He relished what he was doing deconstructing what another UN inspector called Iraq's 'full, final and complete fairy tales' and making sense of them to others. In August 1991, David had led the first team of UN weapons inspectors to look for biological weapons in Iraq. It was his first visit to Iraq and the first no-notice inspection of that kind in a country that was hostile to being inspected. But it achieved much: Iraq was forced to concede that it had a military programme for biological agents and had deliberately lied about it. David was convinced the programme was an offensive one and believed it could be uncovered not only by swooping on suspect sites provided you could get there before the Iraqis emptied them out or barred the way but by following the paper trail the regime left and identifying the people who headed the programmes. More than 30 [37, one source says, near 40 another] visits to Iraq convinced David that Saddam was uniquely evil. He had no doubt he would never stop trying to develop weapons of
74

Flint, Julie. Guardian unlimited... comment is free: http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/julie_flint/profile.html (2007).

102

mass destruction, no matter how beleaguered. He was moved to quiet fury [hinted at above] by the divisions that plagued the UN Security Council and the way diplomatic wrangling undercut, at every turn, the work of the inspectors. Less than a month before Bush-Blair invaded Iraq in a quasi-colonial enterprise unlike anything since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, I was editing a report on the war that combined Iraqi voices with expert analysis. British and US soldiers were about to become the neighbours of millions of Arabs who disbelieved their stated reason for threatening war Saddam's WMD. Yet sensible debate over the real threat Saddam posed and the rightness or wrongness of war was lost in a frenzy of emotional grandstanding and governmental manipulation, in every country concerned. I asked David to write for me. He agreed, asking that he be identified only as a former weapons inspector. The problem of anonymity in such a piece was one of the reasons I eventually decided against publishing the article 75 [then], which appears on the right in a gently edited version that David approved in the first days of March [war three weeks away from then]. Last week the Hutton inquiry heard how Tony Blair asked top officials 'what we knew about Dr Kelly', the Ministry of Defence's chief scientific officer, 'and whether we could find out more about his views'. David's views, which surely should have been known, would not have frightened the horses. His article shows what concerned him, as opposed to the journalists who sought him out. Not Blair or Alastair Campbell, but Saddam and what he might one day be able to do. At our last meeting this year, before I returned to the Middle East at the end of February, I sensed a change in David. He had had an unexpectedly long meeting at the MoD because of an al-Qaeda alert and was tired. He worried about what to do with his briefcase: leave it at my place or take it to supper? (It came to supper.) He looked back rather than forward, reviewing his career and our friendship. He seemed to be feeling sidelined, even isolated; worried, too, that the wrong case was being made, unnecessarily, for war.76 In his years as a weapons inspector, he said, he had done the briefings. Every detail, every nuance, was correct. Now he briefed politicians who briefed the public - and didn't always get it right. David's concern was generic, methodological. There was no mention of Blair's claim that some WMD could be ready within 45-minutes of an order to use them. (That assertion, so imprecise, is one David would never have permitted himself. What mattered, I think he would have said, is how effective the WMD would be - not how quickly they could be fired. Had Iraq made any progress towards weaponising its chemical and bacterial agents? In 1996, certainly, he believed weaponisation was still rudimentary). He didn't speculate about motive or use words like spin. He told me, as he told his family, there was always someone who might know more than him. In his statement to Parliament on 24 September, Blair indulged in a soundbite David would not have tolerated. It was imprecise and potentially, if not wilfully, misleading. 'At some point, in a future not too distant,' Blair said, 'the threat [of Saddam's weapons] will turn into reality.' Then, 18 words later: 'The history and the present threat are real.' Future threat, or present? David believed Saddam's tattered weapons programme was most significantly just that a programme, a future threat that required present action. He had, regretfully, come to the belief that war was probably the only way 'of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq'. Not the war we fought, or at the time we fought it, or against the enemy we constructed but war nonetheless. In David's opinion, Saddam was less of a threat in 2003 than he had been in 1991.77 For that reason, he said, any war fought on the grounds of WMD would have to be 'limited' and 'carefully targeted'. It was January, though, and he thought there was still some life in the UN process. Two weeks later the Observer published an editorial making the case for war. I pointed it out to David. He disagreed with only one sentence: 'It is only when [the existence of WMD] is confirmed that the UN will have to decide whether to take substantive military action.' At that point, he said, it would be too late. The purpose of war would be to stop Saddam bringing his WMD to military maturity. On the day David killed himself, having earlier told Jan this was really not a world he cared to
75 76 77

Our underlining again. Same Same 103

live in, the news from Iraq was bad and sad: a young British soldier, Corporal Russell Aston, buried after a mob killing in southern Iraq... MI6 duped by another dodgy dossier, this time about alleged uranium purchases [Niger78]... a surface-to-air missile fired against Baghdad airport... refusals by Bush-Blair to allow UN inspectors, the people David most trusted, to finish the job. Jan testifies to the Hutton inquiry this week. David was so proud of her determination earlier this year when she walked unaided to a daughter's wedding. But the last month has taken its toll on her and at David's funeral she had to borrow an arm to lean on. She wants no special treatment for her husband - even though, as she said last week, 'I loved him all my life'. She wants the truth. But she also wants the spotlight returned to the mess that is Iraq, where other women's husbands are dying. David, like her, will be muttering darkly about getting on with what matters not shoring up reputations or playing politics, but making the world a better, safer place. I don't know why David killed himself. I think many things conspired to drive him to it including the fact that he briefly fell short of his own standards when cast into the limelight he never sought. One thing I do know, though: Saddam, in his bunker, will be cheering.' 79

Less personal, but more personal, this was better intentioned then... And here Flint says of Dr Kelly that he, 'seemed to be feeling side-lined, even isolated; worried, too, that the wrong case was being made, unnecessarily, for war...' Which, while it doesn't quite stack up with the item before, this does fit better with how the Kelly family felt, and with Mrs Kelly due to give her evidence to the Hutton inquiry the day following publication of the above items, this may have reinforced her somewhat, a kind word, in amongst all that. _____________ To suggest that all this aggression had always been a little one sided is not as difficult a point to sustain as you might, or any might, wish - judging from the ease with which Iraq was over run. And this would also suggest, then, that few allowances had been made for the effect of many years of sanctions on Iraq at that time also. And indeed that was a long standing complaint, of Iraqs, wherever it could find a forum. Though it could appear (from the items above), that Dr Kelly may have sensed that there wouldn't be much of a fight put up?
'The US and whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force, strength and strategy used is proportionate to the modest threat that Iraq now poses...' (Underlined above).

And in that second opinion:

'In David's opinion, Saddam was less of a threat in 2003 than he had been in 1991...' (Flint's own, underlined).

Nor had the effects of the prior inspection regimes imposed on Iraq been appreciated fully it would seem... the latter effort also (Dr Kelly mentions it above that there is, always has been he is as good as suggesting, 'superficial co-operation' 80), Saddam agreeing to let inspectors back in because he has to, now. Still, being careful not to stretch a point too finely now, we could at least add that there was no underestimation
78 79

See Niger before - leads to Plame being outed? Before, p. 89... Guardian, London (2003).'What Kelly really thought about the war in Iraq. Julie Flint, a Middle East expert and former Observer reporter, describes the UN weapons inspector she knew and respected and how he agreed to write down his thoughts on Saddam's weapons and menace.' http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/aug/31/davidkelly.iraq2 And if she'd had any dealings with Saddam, we don't know, but from within in 'his bunker' he wouldn't have been cheering that loudly by then, her choice of ending, still, dramatic... And his sons, Uday and Qusay, had got there just deserts just then month before also? CNN.Com/ USA (2003). Pentagon: 'Saddam's sons killed in raid. U.S. military might release photographs of bodies.' http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/07/22/sprj.irq.sons/index.html?_s=PM:WORLD. 80 His own doc, p, 100, top. 104

of Iraq's capability then. Why not? And on that, while we're not saying here that you should ever go to war expecting an easy run anyway, there was still this matter of this 'over estimation' as another outcome to handle now, after this far easier run than had been spoken about, leading up to all-out war next. And ironically, if there had been more coalition troops killed, there would have been less fuss over that next. That this had occurred, this over-estimation, would become apparent this way now the press guessing at it first, and within a few weeks, at that - with that thus presenting a very difficult position for some who'd been all for it, then... And for the likes of Dr Kelly as well now, with the likes of Gilligan et al, (Gilligan had actually been out there), getting at him, or asking around about what they hadn't seen out there while they had been out there themselves, now. And at that point, when Gilligan roped him in, Dr Kelly hadn't even been out there himself yet... But yet this was pretty much the case anyway, we were, they were, at that point already. With this being guessed at soon after Iraq was over run, quite quickly then. And almost being conceded but only in a half asked way, we'd say. And backing that up (because we can't be 'sure' of that, we've had to look about ourselves for this), is this from the Guardian/ Observer, anyway, again, 1 February, 2004, just after the Hutton Report had also been handed out:
'A year ago it seemed so clear. Saddam Hussein's regime, said the politicians and the spies, posed a clear and present danger. It was described most comprehensively on 5 February, 2003, by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in a presentation to the Security Council that laid out the threat in 29 sub-headings. Twelve months have passed, and now the same intelligence officials who produced the stories that scared the world to war are admitting that they got it very badly wrong. And not only do they admit that the intelligence was seriously flawed, they admit, too, that they have known there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq since the first week of May, a month after Baghdad fell, a secret that has finally lurched into the open...' 81 ______________

Obvious to some then, the 'first week of May' (2003, it says there), but being guessed at anyway back in Britain by then, for sure (if we can say it that way). And that, we would suggest, could have been the case after the first week also (end of March). And that due to the 45-minute claim, obviously, then, also... And that claim the heart of the fuss over the September 2002 dossier (as in before). A this a fuss now, created by Gilligan next, when he went ahead and broadcast what he considered his inside view of the compiling of said dossier then, a last minute insertion, it had been 'sexed-up' he said (and that as exemplified in part by that 45minute claim also then). And with that ending up with Dr Kelly finally having to answer for what had come over him also then, as much as Gilligan. Left hanging. And that over his 'maybe' now, as he said he put it, as good as (Bosch), but nothing really meant by that...intended. _____________ Not quite a 360 now, but we would have liked to have been able to have made something out of mention by Dr Kelly of these 'dark actors' by now? And to have been able to have made something out of their 'playing games' (what sort then, we'd like to know?).

81

Guardian, London (2004).'WMD: How it went wrong: Since David Kay's bombshell last week, intelligence experts are revealing the truth behind Saddam's threat to the West...' http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/01/iraq.davidkelly 105

Miller's newspaper, the New York Times, followed this email, text, up immediately, we know. And then a different type of development and one that could seem related to that, came out of that, though we suspect this would never have become a story, except for that... For Dr Kelly's file was also found to be missing from his dentist's surgery by his dentist the next day, or the day after, he was found deceased (see ACC Page's evidence, it appears to run on this82), with this leading to a story now,83 as this file also 'reappeared' a day or so after, filed, as if it was always there? 84 And there actually appears no good reason to doubt this, still? Still there's nothing of late on these 'dark actors' either now, which started that story, we'd say, did! It having always been assumed, we assume, that these were the most likely types Dr Kelly was referring to when what was sent to Miller, got out. With Miller still doing the rounds in Iraq, paranoia obviously mounting. Having nothing specific on that, no more to go on than any interested party might, we looked back for some remark like that, that might be specific to English culture then perhaps? Something staged? But there all we get are continual references to the introduction of black actors into British theatre at some period quite some time ago instead. And nothing out of Shakespeare at all? No shakes this. That aside, we might have, we know that in theatre generally, dark actors are usually the persons moving the scenery about, and they are, traditionally, dressed in black, so they cant be seen, when the lights go down. Well you can barely see them, moving, but you can only see them if you keep looking, if your eyes adjust to the light. And once the curtain is down, they are gone of course. Back to these types, now the more commonly assumed, that we assumed, he meant by that then? And we'd wonder though, now, why would any of those types have cared about what Dr Kelly might have thought or didn't think by then, anyway? It being well known (or, this has got about at least), that 'they'd' been none too keen 'themselves' to have had that 45 minute claim inserted into the September 2002 dossier last minute themselves, it being last minute intelligence, and unverified... the case for war, then, presented in such a way, so infactually! Leaving them with, at some time, some explaining to do, as if they could, their terms of service, onerous... _____________ Looking past this, that, there could have been another consequence past this point now also? Or, put it this way, another reason why that document probably shouldn't have been released after this now. And this would have been that sources for that sort of thing (for Dr Kelly wasn't working totally in the dark when he worked up his document for Flint, before), might not have much continuing usefulness if you broadcast what they give you. That a given. Looking at the document again now, then - at what was likely 'given' then, and then away, where did it come from then, and there is one sentence that stands out in particular now, and this is reference to those blessed trailers again!
'Iraq has recovered chemical reactors destroyed prior tp1998 for allegedly civilian activity, built biological fermenters and agent dryers, and created transportable production units for
82

Page, Michael (2003). Assistant Chief Constable, Thames Valley Police: Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans42.htm 83 Daily Mail, London (2003). 'Riddle of missing dental records.' http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article197292/Riddle-missing-dental-records.html 84 See bottom of evidence, of Page. 106

biological and chemical agents, and [for] the filling of weapons.' (Not all underlined, above, but as good as a nod for the 45 minute scenario in itself, that? And as above, again, Dr Kelly's item for Flint, p. 103).

Flint seems to appreciate this point, on anonymity generally, writing about this herself (as for Dr Kelly, this had come out through Powell just before this, anyway. 85
'The problem of anonymity in such a piece was one of the reasons I eventually decided against publishing the article86 [then], which appears on the right [in a column] in a gently edited version that David approved in the first days of March [war three weeks away from then].' (As this appears above, again, Flints item, beside, p, 104, before). _____________

Probably, Dr Kelly, the way he was thinking, he wouldn't have been that concerned about any anonymity for any party party to any of this now, even himself by then. For he would have thought that by then they would have had a flush, and not a busted one by then, either. But that wasn't so. And so, while we have some indication of what Dr Kelly 'believed' in then (as from above), we also now have some indication of where he went wrong there also then. And that in one just part without going further with that. And with that now, this insight, another unintended outcome, an example, on the part of Flint now. That document though, looking at it again, it does seem a little dis-jointed here and there? For a bit leads here, a bit there, that bit leads nowhere... No doubt Flint could have fixed this, and so its thanks to her that she didn't do much of that. And obviously, last here, Dr Kelly's death was an unintended consequence, outcome, of sorts, out of, due to, all this fuss also, this not over yet... ______________ Often care of the soul means not taking sides when there is a conflict at a deep level.
Thomas Moore.87

The backdrop to Dr Kelly's death was undoubtedly this war in Iraq, he'd have gone on as before, if not for that. Still that was his job, also, to keep up his interest in Iraq, and keep it up he did, in whatever way he could, and if he had to come out with, come out with something now and then, he did. And in many respects his employers were for this (Bosch, there was little censure, it was left to him), up to a point, obviously now. Still, with all his hats (more on that, next part), Dr Kelly may have got confused over whom he was serving, odd times? Some, going back further, would still suggest, did, that the root of his action, would have been his mother's suicide going back some time before then also? And while worthy of some digression that, Hawton didn't think that seriously worthy of that much of that. Thinking off the top, he was fatherless though, and from a young age? And we could imagine that that might sometimes lead to some setting some unrealistic settings for some, out of that and for others sometimes also... more idealism? That you can make mistakes, even bad ones, is not something that seems to have ever troubled Colin Powell overly now, nor Blair, nor Bush either, aside... Another
85 86

February 5, 2003. As before, p. 90. Underlining our own 87 Irish born, born 28 May (good-day), 1779, passed away, 1852. Lawyer, poet, general all round argumentative soul, a diplomat... Well remembered. 107

father figure (they say), which Dr Kelly didn't have so far as we know, can make up for all sorts of starts don't they say, even later in life. As can a good marriage also, we know, and by all accounts Dr Kelly did have a good marriage, at least that, anyway... (We'd not be wishing to wave a red rag there by the way, nor a flag). There was some 'rowing' though (and you'd expect this), during the period of his parliamentary committee appearances (just before his death), just the two of them. That, apparently, was over his defensiveness (there are suggestions of this, of him, from evidence), setting in... Here, and there, there is a suggestion that Dr Kelly wished to make a submission or two of his own, on part of himself, rather than just submit to the process, another motive, this is seen as, for murder... And taking the least line of resistance, he could have, and this not unrealistic, his currency as a lecturer, author, would have got up enormously, had he got out. Not the end of it all, at all... ______________ How had Dr Kelly got into this business anyway, or this mess now, that he couldn't step aside from? Some public service. Well, from the beginning (end of the first Gulf war, when Saddam had merely been forced out of Kuwait Pederson's birthplace incidentally), UNSCOM (the United Nations Special Commission, so called), and as it was set up then, was to be an inspection regime, and was created with the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, all that, in April 1991. This team, thus formed, was thus, then, meant to oversee Iraq's compliance with the destruction of Iraqi chemical, biological, and missile weapons facilities, after the first Gulf War, Kuwait liberated, and this amid sanctions that would continue so as to keep up the pressure on Iraq to conform. Dr Kelly, others, tasked with this, he, they, became, effectively UN employees then for that time. After some time, everything must have been going fine, inspectors were not so much withdrawn in 1998, as asked to leave really, and were kept out from then, until 2002, when the threats began to matter again. A 'problem' for the Iraqi's prior to then, this relevant now, along with unrelenting sanctions, Iraq felt, claimed in turn, was that the commission's resources, they felt, were being used to spy on their military, while doing their work there? And in any case the inspection regime had run its course, anyway, hadn't it, Iraq claimed. And could they have these sanctions ended, some day. A bit of fight left in them, over that. One claim, that the commission's mission had been compromised did seem to be the case later, and so in hindsight this case might be able to be made, as it was then. Evidence, this case makes, obtained under the UNSCOM regime, was then later used as part of the Casus belli 88(case for war), then, the latter conflict, less of a draw. This was claimed (that case), to be so by the American weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, anyway, who went on to publish Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem - Once And For All (1999), the year after the first inspection period. 89 And Ritter also added
88

Casus bellis: a Latin expression, meaning the justification for acts of war. An expression of Prime Minister Blair's, in his biography, and where he laments the lack of this, ultimately: Je de ne regrette rein, though. Nutting. 89 Ritter, William Scott. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and For All. New York, USA: Simon & 108

(pertinent or not, but so what), that Operation Rockingham (Dr Kelly had been asked about this during his second committee appearance, ISC, to which he said yes, he was part of that, group), had cherry-picked 'evidence' from the commissions documentation to back up this case as put for war also then? 90 This is a big step. We'd not seen Dr Kelly as so pro war before, just facing things...At odds with this from Ritter's, is this from John Morrison, the founder, he has claimed, of this 'tiny cell' in 1991 now though, a letter... And in this letter, to the Guardian newspaper, again (November of 2003), Morrison stated that Rockinghams, 'only aim [ever] was to provide leads for UNSCOM teams, which it did very successfully [as well] despite the problems of sanitising [flushing, not retaining] sensitive intelligence [so that it could not be used like that, he was saying there, also then!].'91 And in fact, to bring that up to date, or not, a role something like that, directing teams, the Iraqi Survey Group in fact (ISG), was to be Dr Kelly's role now then, or then, now, if he got back into Iraq. There, 'he was [to be] a principal figure in providing assistance to the ISG [as before].' (From Wing Commander Clark's evidence, colleague, and friend92). _____________ Post 1998 (before 2002, again), we'd wonder: what 'data' was there anyway, to speak of, from on the ground there (from within Iraq), and so that could be gained in any conventional way anyway? The post-conventional way then? Well, only that supplied by Hans Blix at the end of 2002 then, war not far off then, Saddam giving in a little, not giving up yet. But still we'd say (it looks this way), that that wasn't being taken notice of by then, anyway. Or wasn't going to make any difference by then, that point reached, all exasperated (well not all), but there would be no more hand wringing this way... But Robin Cook on this, again, he still had something to say, before he stepped away:
'[From before] only a couple of weeks ago [beginning of May, 2003], Hans Blix told the Security Council that the key remaining disarmament tasks could be completed within months. I have heard it said that Iraq has had not months but 12 years in which to complete disarmament, and that our patience is exhausted... [Applause, finally...].'93 ______________

Back to this 45-minute claim again now, a bit rushed wasn't that call? This must have come from assets, then, or so it must have seemed, because this hadn't been seen, up close. Nor seen, or found, from a late check by Blix's team, we've seen that he thought he was almost there, that Iraq would soon be armless, and we could keep checking he must have thought, something like that then... Mind you these things take time to build up. Hans Blix, the inspector called back from retirement (that seeming odd, as he still
Schuster (1999). 90 Wikipedia: On, Operation Rockingham...' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Rockingham 91 Morrison, John NL (2003). Letter in the Guardian, London. Section: Letters:- 'Inside the [Rockingham] Cell.' http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2003/nov/22/guardianletters1 92 Clark, Wing Commander John (2003). Evidence given the Hutton Inquiry. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090128221550/http://www.the-huttoninquiry.org.uk/content/transcripts/hearing-trans21.htm 93 Footnote, 63, before, bottom of page, 91, on... 109

seems young, now, Dr Kelly a clearer candidate for retirement then), to head the inspection/verification effort in Iraq (at the last gasp), certainly seems to have been awake to the games played, both sides, and as to how dangerous this playfulness (not a very good expression we know) might become, how this was 'hotting' up now, and so how could he get this across? Well by warning Saddam right at the start, he tried this: was said to have, 'personally admonish[ed] him for [playing] "cat and mouse" games [all along], claiming also - in his report to the UN Security Council on 14 February 2003 (about the time, perhaps, our Dr Kelly met with Broucher in Geneva even?), that: "If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of disarmament -- under resolution 687 -could have been short and a decade of sanctions could [also] have been avoided." 94 (And that telling also). And just as there was some frustration on Blix's part being displayed there, for he had as much to contend with (we shouldnt be surprised), whenever he was pulled out of Iraq, called back to the UN, in the US. And hot under the collar he must have been finally, for his book, Disarming Iraq, the irony self-apparent, was out and on the shelves in less than a year after war, not peace, broke out (by a couple of weeks95). But still, the inevitable would come, the more these arguments drag on... For Hans Blix has also been criticised himself after that last phase of inspections, this book even, and by Spike even, again - for not just for failing, again, then, but even, after that, for having in effect, 'loaded the gun' for invasion... by planting the reasons (this is not reasoning), by exaggerating the danger? 96 Where, we'd like to know? Robin Cook might not have been too impressed with that either then (more a lover that a fighter, he wouldn't mind this, we wouldn't), wouldn't have been too impressed with that, though, just mentioning him again, ' Blix [having] told the Security Council that the key remaining disarmament tasks could be completed within months [then, with that 3 weeks out from invasion]!' And an easier point, or a more difficult point, to make, we can't think of one, yet! Yet if ever we did need to make another, point, around that, we could pull this out of the hat this can easily be spiked: For it is even like saying that Bush and Blair had never really intended to topple Saddam anyway... A less cynical reading of some of this 'business' might allow that it had been the war that Dr Kelly objected to finally then, to the way it was conducted (his wife has said as much, Flint for her, before97), way too destructive? It could have been, should have been carefully targeted, it being so that he recognised (as before), that Saddam was less of a threat in 2003, than he had been in 1991, at the outset of their work there (before, pp. 105-106). But targeted at what then, apart from Saddam himself, looked at just like that? Well, that, obviously, was where the work of the inspectors did come into the equation then, for unavoidably so, they were in the know, we know. For Dr Kelly, others, having dealings with the Iraqis, it must always have been a close run affair. For inherent in any assistance given them, was intelligence also. And to a certain extent, we'd say, he would have handled that by appearing to be running alongside them also...
94

Further links to this, at, Wikipedia: On, Hans Blix. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Blix (Photo of Blix there). 95 Blix, Hans. Disarming Iraq. New York, Pantheon Books (9 March 2004). 96 O'Neill, Brendan, aka Spike (2010). London, England. Blog: 'Hans Blix's Stalinist rewriting of history: Far from being anti-war heroes, UN weapons inspectors paved the way for the bombing of the bastards and moral lepers of Iraq.' http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/9362#.Uec8Co37DVQ 97 Top of page, 104. 110

And to support that contention we could refer back to Broucher again, then to Dr Kelly telling him in Geneva (no matter when?), that as 'he had assured his Iraqi sources that there would be no war if they co-operated...a war would put him in an "ambiguous" moral position' (you know how the rest of that goes...). _____________ Seems less melodramatic put this way, now: That a game of sorts was being played, of course, albeit a deadly one, anyway, and being played by our man as well as any other, and as if he always had a full hand also, which of course he couldnt have, yet a way had to be found? And here's the thing: Some in Saddam's regime would even have been quite pleased with the 45-minute scenario as that was advanced in Britain when it was then. And mighty short-sighted also, that would have been, not reading the beans well enough to not have feared that coming out then, and from where also, they must have wondered? Back to this again, this 45-minute claim, and how, now? Which apart from us knowing it was so plain wrong now, it also seems so bizarre, now, to have claimed it even? For that, if meant to just rack things up, it would become plain, that, after day one... Assets then, it must have been, and yes there was one, living in Germany by then, having sought asylum, that granted. And it is a cardinal sin, apparently, to take the word of just one person, on this sort of thing, and yet this happened, and so out this came... With Colin Powell justifiably angry now, happier to see this out in the open, even though, this could make him seem sillier still, not a rank professional...
'Colin Powell demands answers over Curveball's WMD lies Former US secretary of state asks why CIA failed to warn him over Iraqi defector who has admitted fabricating WMD evidence [?] Colin Powell, the US secretary of state at the time of the Iraq invasion, has called on the CIA and Pentagon to explain why they failed to alert him to the unreliability of a key source behind claims of Saddam Hussein's bio-weapons capability. Responding to the Guardian's revelation [16 February, 2011] that the source, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi or "Curveball" as his US and German handlers called him, admitted fabricating evidence of Iraq's secret biological weapons programme, Powell said that questions should be put to the US agencies involved in compiling the case for war. In particular he singled out the CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency the Pentagon's military intelligence arm. Janabi, an Iraqi defector, was used as the primary source by the Bush administration to justify invading Iraq in March 2003. Doubts about his credibility circulated before the war and have been confirmed by his admission this week that he lied. Powell said that the CIA and DIA should face questions about why they failed to sound the alarm about Janabi. He demanded to know why it had not been made clear to him that Curveball was totally unreliable before false information was put into the key intelligence assessment, or NIE, put before Congress, into the president's state of the union address two months before the war and into his own speech to the UN. "It has been known for several years that the source called Curveball was totally unreliable," he told the Guardian. "The question should be put to the CIA and the DIA as to why this wasn't known before the false information was put into the NIE sent to Congress, the president's state of the union address and my 5 February presentation to the UN." On 5 February 2003, a month before the invasion, Powell went before the UN security council to make the case for war. In his speech he referred to "first hand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails The source was an eyewitness who supervised one of these facilities". It is now known that the source, Janabi, made up the story. Curveball told the Guardian he welcomed Powell's demand. "It's great," he said tonight. "The BND [German intelligence] knew in 2000 that I was lying after they talked to my former boss,
111

Dr Bassil Latif, who told them there were no mobile bioweapons factories. For 18 months after that they left me alone because they knew I was telling lies even though I never admitted it. Believe me, back then, I thought the whole thing was over for me. "Then all of a sudden [in the run up to the 2003 invasion] they came back to me and started asking for more details about what I had told them. I still don't know why the BND then passed on my information to the CIA and it ended up in Powell's speech. "I want there to be an inquiry so that people will know the truth. So many lies have been told about me over the years. I finally want the truth to come out." Powell has previously expressed regret about the role he unwittingly played in passing on false information to the UN, saying it had put a blot on his career...''' 98 _____________

And quiet this had been kept then, up till then, until this Janabi came out, complaining about how this came out himself now. Still a few interviews on the BBC later, and he seems more settled over this... Worse for him though, now apparently, this has been talked up, Janabi could even be charged with 'leading' us to war now? And apart from how (?), this a crime now, where he lives, Germany, where 'warmongering,' as it is called, is a crime now, since then, you know... Still if so charged, perhaps at least the dead will be grateful somehow?

_____________ There has always been some talk that Dr Kelly may have been a fall guy this patsy, a stand in sort of guy, himself, like al-Janabi perhaps, could become? And the fact that Dr Kelly was interviewed by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), could give some form to this idea, that he was used this way, the three security services being that committees jurisdiction, as in having an oversight role over, of...99 And so why did they wish to interview him then, we could ask?
Further with this, in the UK instance, 2003, with Dr Kelly 'involved' maybe, in something underhand, there is the suggestion that perhaps as there may have been another party (a deep throat type, a la Watergate), and whom might have provided this idea to Gilligan first off, but of course couldnt 'confirm' it, but wanted this aired, anyway, and it has been, that this claim shouldn't have been in... And so, so the story goes, the government worried about this possible character (some double dealing at its best, which needed checking at least), the government then decided, so as to buy more time for this, that as Dr Kelly had put his hand up and in writing (though he didn't think it was him that was the source of this, that is what he said), then lets have him out then for the time being?

This was laid out, anyway (sort of), by Counsel for the Kelly family at the Hutton inquiry (some idea of this then, on their part?), going up against Dr Kelly's employer, ostensibly, then, the Ministry of Defence, but 'they' were having none of it. This was put this way, though we might not be swayed by this:
'"I suggest to you that the strategy that was adopted with regard to Dr Kelly's name was both cynical and irresponsible." Jeremy Gompertz QC, Counsel for the Kelly family, to Martin Howard
98

Guardian, London (2011).'Colin Powell demands answers over Curveball's WMD lies.' http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/16/colin-powell-cia-curveball?intcmp=239 (Photo of 'curveball' aka, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, there). 99 Rimington, Stella. Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5. London Arrow Books (2002), p. 259. 112

[deputy chief of defence intelligence, then]. Asked [then] if the MoD had used a ploy to name Dr Kelly, Mr Howard replied: "Absolutely not. Q: Who made the decision that the scientist should be named. A: It is hard to say that any one person should be publicly identified. The fact that his name should be confirmed was set out in the Q&A brief and that was approved by Sir Kevin Tebbit."[100] Pressed again, Mr Howard said Sir Kevin "was certainly part of the process of agreeing that we would confirm the name if it was put to us..."'101

_____________ Not much of a case put here, we know, but that story, prior, is around. Of course, only Gilligan could confirm this idea? Though we are not sure if he has ever even denied it yet? That might say something, or he might just be tight lipped?
Put it was then, and by Tebbit, his final say so, anyway, with his Deputy, there, not prepared whole-heartedly take this upon his whole self then. And would Tebbit even, now, for this is from Blair, on this himself now:
'In fact, the whole thing was handled by Dr Kelly's line management, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, Sir Kevin Tebbit, and by Sir David Omand, the Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the Cabinet Office at my insistence. His name was released on 10 July, and surprisingly the Foreign Affairs Committee [the first committee] said they would interview him...'102

_____________
One of the slight problems with giving out a name (Dr Kellys), of course, though that may have gained more time (a la that le Carr type scenario above), is that Dr Kelly could easily have said more himself then, if he'd a mind to, blown out. And whos to know he wouldn't have then, if placed in some certain situation? But from that above, we can see, as yet, that this committee hearing clearly hadn't been anticipated either... It came as a surprise to us.103 Without that even, some assurance would still have been sought though, from Dr Kelly, and given by Dr Kelly, that he would button up anyway. Not that this would have rested upon any agreement after that, that his name could go out. In fact, it is around this, that it did go out, around which the Hutton inquiry finally swung. It found that the right was enshrined. _____________ Apposite, one of the Kelly family's biggest complaints up till then (up to the Hutton inquiry when), was that he wasn't managed adequately during this period though! Finally (well not quite), it might have been put quite well by the psychiatrist Hawton then: That Dr Kelly might have feared then that he might lose his job then, indeed. And that because he was left guessing then, somewhat in the dark, kept out, and we don't like that.
100

A senior figure, part of Dr Kelly's line management, permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence, the sitting chief (Blair above, p. 4). 101 Key moments at the Hutton inquiry, this could have been put this way, also? Source: BBC News (2003). Day 17: 'Key points: Here are the key points from evidence of witnesses on day 17 of the Hutton inquiry into the death of government scientist Dr David Kelly.' http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3112796.stm 102 Blair above, p. 4. 103 Blair again, same page. 113

Still, back to the dark if you might like it? For it wouldn't have helped Dr Kelly out one jot his then having to appear before this Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), with the press/media circulating, in attendance by arrangement there also, and so since when, we could ask? Another question? Standing procedure again, would probably be the answer... But Hawton did think this tricky for Dr Kelly also. And he would have based that on more than just talks with the family now, as much on how that might affect any of us, within reason. The next day following, Dr Kelly then appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC). This, mercifully, was an in camera session (not open to the public, the press then), some respite, a little, and it was so, apparently, for he didn't feel too put upon before that committee (Bosch). Mind you, they would have been mindful, this would likely be so, of how it had gone for him the day before, just awful, they would know. That being so our man had run with a lot rougher mob than that lot that he faced then (before then, and not that long ago (as in Iraq), according to Gilligan last also:
'He was well used to confrontation and pressure: he'd been a weapons inspector in Iraq, for goodness' sake...'104

The wake over then? And, well yes it might be, and perhaps should be, but Gilligan was hardly saying, was he there, that it must have been murder then, was he? And he added to that:
'And by the day of his death, the worst of the pressure was essentially over...' 105

Not so apparently. But, still, if we could absolve Gilligan of that (and we should remember that neither the BBC nor Gilligan had outed Dr Kelly as their primary source, so called, up till then, nor did they until after his death), what would we be dealing with then, essentially, after that? Or, what don't we know about this, as much as about all that? Getting across that line is hard? To that end we will leave it at what stands out. To get to that point we will have to develop parts of this as gone into so far, and then at these along quite different lines to how we have so far. A provisional hypothesis might be that our best and brightest should perhaps ensure that they have enough of the right type of company, or, failing that, more than just a few, as Dr Kelly certainly had some. We'll see...

104 105

Gilligan, before, p. 78. Ibid. 114