The Top Manager-Adviser Relationship in Strategic Decision Making

during Executive Life Cycle: Exploring the Impediments to Strategic

Change

Masato Suzuki
Department of Business Administration, Meiji University, 1-1 Kanda Surugadai
Chiyodaku Tokyo 101-8301, Japan
msuzuki0107@gmail.com

Motokazu Udagawa
Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University, 4-2-1 Katafuchi Nagasaki 850-8506,
Japan
udagawa@nagasaki-u.ac.jp

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine how strategy persistence would be induced
from top manager-adviser relationships in strategic decision making during executive
life cycle. Prior studies have shown that a top manager’s tenure is
characterized as inverted U-shaped relationship between a top manager’s
tenure and organizational performance that a top manager is effective during
initial time in office, but as a span of top manager’s tenure become long,
organizational performance is decline. However, little has been known about
the reason of the inverted U-shaped relationship. To investigate this question, we
apply the concept of the decision maker-adviser model to the argument. Upper
echelons theorists have found that the top executives are critical to shaping the
characteristics of the firm. However, since this research stream has emphasized on the
decision making of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Top Management Team (TMT),
relational aspects of strategic decision making between top managers and adviser have
not been sufficiently argued. In response to this theoretical gap, we will discuss the
relational aspect of strategic decision making between top managers and advisers.

Keywords: Upper echelons theory, executive life cycle, decision maker-adviser

model.

1
 INTRODUCTION

Over the past 20 years, growing evidence has indicated that top managers
affect organizational performance (Carpenter, Gletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Certo,
Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). Upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984)
suggests that senior executives serve as an interface that helps an alignment between
organization and its environment, and thus their decisions and actions are likely to
impact the organization (Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). In the face of a
given situation, no two executives will identify the same opportunity and option for
their firm in that their values, experiences, and other human aspect of top managers
affect their strategic decision making. Consequently, if we examine why firms do the
things, it will not be avoidable to scrutinize the people at the top (Hambrick & Mason,
1984).
According to upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), a top
manager’s tenure is described as inverted U-shaped relationship
between top managers’ tenure and organizational performance. To
be more specifically, a top manager’s effectiveness in organizational
performance is upward until middle of his/her tenure, whereas
organizational performance declines along passage of his/her
tenure, so-called executive life cycle (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991).
However, we do not really know the reason of the inverted U-shaped relationship
(Hambrick, 2007:337). Hambrick (2007) argued that by examining the actual
information processing behaviors of top managers, we could improve the theory. To
investigate this question, we apply the concept of decision maker-adviser
model (Arendt Priem & Ndofor, 2005; Roberto, 2003; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995;
Sniezek & Van Swal, 2001) and discuss the relational aspect of strategic decision
making. Since this research streams have emphasized on the decision making of Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) and Top Management Team (TMT), the relational aspect of
strategic decision making between top managers and advisers has not been
sufficiently argued (Arendt Priem & Ndofor, 2005; Roberto, 2003). Authors showed
that a strategic decision making consists of many individuals (Arendt Priem &
Ndofor, 2005; Roberto, 2003; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995; Sniezek & Van Swal, 2001),
who may or may not be senior hierarchical managers (Roberto, 2003). We believe that
applying the decision maker-adviser model to the upper echelons theory may help
better understand the top managers-organizational performance linkage.

Top Managers’ Impact on Organization

2
Traditional Polar View of Organizational Leadership
Throughout the 20-21 century, prominent scholars have considered the
managerial leadership has substantial impacts on an organization (Andrews, 1971;
Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957) However, effects of leadership on organization have
been inconsistent among scholars in organization theory. Particularly, these
viewpoints have followed two research streams. One is strategic choice school (Child,
1972) in which leaders have a substantial impact on organizational performance. At
other end, criticism school claims that leaders are constrained by their environment
more than the power their strategic choice has (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).
Strategic choice theorists contend that leaders have enormous impacts on
organizational performance, by deciding on strategy and structure (Child, 1972).
Similarly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) said that since organizational leaders seek to
personal interest, leader’s concerns affect organizations which in turn lead to
organizational performance. On that ground, strategic choice school claims that
idiosyncratic strategic choice, which is employed by leaders, has greater impact on
strategy, structure and organizational performance.
On the other hand, criticism school states that both the internal and external
force impose constraints on leaders. Because these constraints induce inertial forces,
leaders are alienated from having effect on the firms. Population ecologist (e.g.,
Hannan & Freeman, 1989) argues that internal and external environment cause
organizational inertia which prevents appropriate organizational changes. As a result,
individual managers do not matter to explain the difference of organizational
characteristics. Furthermore, institutionalized forces stimulate organizational
isomorphism and, consequently, hinder organizational change (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In addition, some empirical studies support this view
(e.g., Lieberson & O’Connor, 1972; Weiner, 1978; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981;
Thomas, 1988). In sum, some criticism of leadership effects presents a point of view
against the strategic choice school.

Upper Echelons Theory

Unlike these deterministic views, upper echelons theorist (e.g., Hambrick &
Mason, 1984) 　 has argued that top managers can play 　 significant roles in
determining organizational performance, even if　environment constraints the scope
of their discretions. If environment determines organizational performance, the
variance among　firms operating in a similar environment should be small. However,
this is not the case in the real business world. This offers the evidence that top
managers play important role in achieving organizational performance. Consequently,

3
last two decades have witnessed again growing interests of executive leadership. Most
studies on influences of top management on organizational performance are based on
the upper echelons theory or strategic leadership perspective. For example, Hambrick
and Mason (1984) highlight both strategic choice and organizational performance are
associated with the characteristics of the top managers in a firm, assuming that top
managers structure strategic decision making to fit their view of the world. One of the
traditional models of upper echelons theory is depicted in Figure 1. As shown in
Figure 1, the principle of upper echelons theory is that top managers’ different
characteristics such as age or career experiences affect their decisions on strategy and
structure, based on the assumption those characteristics are proxy for their
psychological properties （ e.g., cognitive base and values ） among the TMT
members. Following the upper echelons theory, TMT’s strategic decision making
could have critical impacts on organizational health and survival (Eisenhardt &
Zbracki, 1992).

4
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Top Managers’ Tenure-Strategy and Organizational Performance: the Executive
Life Cycle

The most intriguing question in upper echelons studies is the relationship

among top managers’ tenure, strategy, and firm performance (Hambrick, 2007).
Studies on upper echelons theory have supported the inverted U-shaped relationship
between managers’ tenure and performance (figure2). For instance, Eitzen and
Yetman (1972) found that during the tenure of college basketball coach, the longer the
coaching tenure, the greater the team success, but after the passing of certain period,
team performance is decline. In a similar vein, Miller (1991) found that the alignment
of environment-organization fit and high organizational performance are achieved by
firms whose CEO tenures are relatively short. Similarly, Miller and Shamsie (2001)
showed that CEOs experimentally search in the beginning of their tenures and gain
high organizational performance at the appropriate point of tenures. On the other
hand, CEOs exploitatively search along passage of their tenures, and organizational
performance decline. Furthermore, Henderson, Miller, and Hambrick (2006) indicated
that inverted U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance was
moderated by industry dynamism. They reported that a peak of firm performance
would appear earlier stage in CEO’s tenures in dynamic industry rather than in stable
industry. Investigating psychological aspect of top managers, Hambrick and Fukutomi
(1991) attempted to explain why inverted U-shaped relationship occurs. They divided
executives’ tenures into the five seasons, including response to mandate,
experimentation, selection of enduring them, convergence and dysfunction based on
the concept of executives’ paradigm, which means executives’ schema as well as
repertoire and their way of thinking about how the organizations should be run (Miller
& Droge, 1986), This model suggested that executives’ psychological and cognitive
factors are likely to be changed at the beginning of their tenures but unchanged at the
long tenure.
TMT tenures have substantial effects on strategy. Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1990) studied how TMT tenure affects strategy persistence as well as organizational
outcomes. They found that long tenured TMT is to be following more persistence
strategy than short tenures. Grimm and Smith’s (1991) study indicated that in firm’s
reaction to post-deregulation, the scope and intensity of firm’s reaction vary inversely
with tenures. Wiersema and Bantel (1992), moreover, pointed out that top managers
in the earlier stage of their tenures feel free to change the level of the firm’s
diversification, while they are constrained by precedents and traditions along the
passage of their tenures. As set out above, as tenure increase, strategic change
becomes rare and less dramatic (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1996:86-89) (Figure 3).

6
 Organizational
Performance

Top
Figure2.Inverted U-shaped relationship between executives�tenure
Managers�Tenures and organizational
performance

Long Exploitation
Top Managers’ Tenures

Learning

Exploration
Short

Low High
Strategy Persistence

Figure3. Top Managers’ Tenure and Strategy Persistence

Although prior studies have indicated that the relationship between top
managers’ tenure and organizational performance has been described as an inverted
U-shap, we do not really know why (Hambrick, 2007:337). Hambrick (2007) argued
that by examining the actual information processing behaviors of top managers, we
could improve the theory. To investigate this question, we apply judge-adviser model
of decision-making (Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). Although the main stream in the
upper echelons theory has focused on either CEO or TMT as decision maker, under
uncertainty multiple people indeed participate in decision making (Sniezek & Van
Swal, 2001). Thus, alternative explanation of information processing in strategic
decision making is needed (Arendt Priem & Ndofor, 2005; Robert, 2003). In the next
section, we discuss top manager-adviser relationships in strategic decision making
during executive life cycle.

The Top Manager-Adviser Relationship in Strategic Decision Making during

Executive Life Cycle
According to Sniezek and Buckley (1995), a number of the decision making
studies have focused on an individual decision making or groups whose members’
roles are undifferentiated. Nevertheless, because role differentiations can be observed
in organization, group members will begin to decide members’ roles that regulate the
timing, nature, and level of their participation in the decision process (Sniezek &

7
Buckley, 1995). Hence, decision making will not be made in either an individual or a
group. As a result, Sniezek and Buckley’s (1995) “judge-adviser model” of decision
making consists of one or more person who formulate judge or recommend
alternatives and communicate to the person in the role of decision making. In a
similar vein, Robert (2003) proposed “stable core and dynamic periphery model” at
the level of strategic decision making. He argues that the firm’s dominant coalition is
fluid, typically consisting of a “stable core group” combined with a “dynamic
periphery”-i.e. a changing set of individuals who work together closely with the core
group to address particular strategic challenge (Roberto, 2003: 123). Similarly, “CEO-
Adviser model” (Arendt, Priem & Ndfor, 2005) is also relied on CEO-adviser
relationship in strategic decision making. Given those argument, we expect that top
managers have differential adviser network or participants, who may or may not be
senior hierarchical managers, regardless of their length of tenure (Roberto, 2003).
Furthermore, we expect differential adviser network affects strategy persistence.
Short-tenured top managers attempt to learn how they are influential in
organizational performance. For example, they tend to aggressively gather
information and conduct experimentations in organization more than long-tenured top
managers do (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). As tenure increases, top managers
acquire affluent knowledge of the firm and environment (Hambrick & Fukutomi,
1991) and are hung up on their knowledge (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Hence, long-
tenured top managers feel less need to experiment with tactics (Miller, 1991; Miller &
Shamsie, 2001). Finally, at the end of long tenures, many top managers become “stale
in the saddle” (Miller, 1991): they become rigid of their paradigm and compel the
firm to antiquated strategy (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006; Miller, 1991;
Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Walsh, 1995). In short, top managers in the beginning of
their tenure struggle to learn, and then top managers’ competencies increase through
the learning progresses. When leaders stay long enough, they culminate in
complacency and organizational performance decline.
Although prior upper echelons theory has focused only on CEO or TMT
factors (i.e., TMT’s demographic factors), it would be reasonable to expect that top
managers may have an adviser network to deal with strategic decision making and an
adviser who may or may not be senior hierarchical managers (Roberto, 2003). Since
the strategic decision making entails uncertainties (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001), a
decision maker may rely on information provided by another individuals (Sniezek &
Van Swol, 2001). At the strategic decision making, the decision making involvement
is the form of advice and consultation between top managers and advisers (Robert,
2003).
Top managers seek different information depends on the length of their

8
tenure. That is, short-tenured top managers tend to acquire knowledge from a diverse
set of information sources (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991:730), while long-tenured top
managers are apt to receive more filtered information (Hambrick & Fukutomi,
1991:731). This implies the differences of adviser network between short-tenured and
long-tenured top managers in strategic decision making. Therefore, we can expect that
because of the top managers’ complacency and convince of existing knowledge, long-
tenured top managers relatively have narrow adviser network characteristics or
restricted participants and inertly gather information in strategic decision making than
short-tenured top managers. Thus:

Proposition 1: Long-tenured top managers relatively have narrow adviser network

characteristics or restricted participants and inertly gather information in strategic
decision making than do short-tenured top managers.

The complexity of strategic decision making forces the involvement of many

participants who possess different information and expertise (Arendt, Priem & Ndfor,
2005; Roberto, 2003; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). The diversity of information and
perception improves strategic capacity in terms of different perceptions of the
environment and the diverse range of possible strategic option (Jarzabkowski &
Searle, 2004). On the top of that, a heterogeneousness in a decision making group
allows top managers to access new knowledge (Kraatz, 1998) and generate a novel
ideas (Granovetter, 1983). However, Garg, Walters and Priem (2003) pointed out that
top managers tend to acquire information or knowledge from individuals who hold
relevant knowledge of sources of core competence for their firm. Therefore, if
strategic decision making involvement is restricted to some specific individuals, they
may rely on a dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), which in tern leads to
“competency trap” (Levitt & March, 1988: 322) or “success trap”(Levinthal & March,
1996: 106). In other words, top managers may become less open to new experience or
learning and less prepared for strategic change. Similarly, Miller & Shamsie (2001)
indicated that more top managers learn business, less they feel need to explore
(March, 1991).
As above discussion reviled, long-tenured top managers tend to relatively
have narrower adviser network characteristics and inertly gather information in
strategic decision making. Hence, we can predict that top managers’ tenures affect
adviser network or participants’ characteristics, which are associated with learning as
well as strategic change. In sum, the diversity of advisers or participants and

9
aggressiveness of information seeking in strategic decision making drive in part
explorative learning and strategic change (Miller & Shamsie, 2001). On the other
hand, narrow adviser network as well as restricted participants and inert information
seeking cause in part exploitative learning and strategy persistence (Levinthal &
March, 1996; Levitt & March, 1988;). Thus, we offer the following propositions:

Proposition 2-a: Short-tenured top managers’ diverse adviser network characteristics

and aggressiveness of information gathering in strategic decision making will trigger
explorative learning as well as strategic change.

Proposition 2-b: Long-tenured top managers’ narrow adviser network characteristics

and inertly gathering information in strategic decision making will trigger exploitative
learning as well as strategy persistence.

Conclusion

We addressed a gap in the upper echelons theory about how top managers’
tenure and organizational performance are related with the goal of contributing to the
explanation to unpack the how these two are linked. Particularly, we focused on top
manager-adviser relationships in strategic decision making during executive life
cycle, applying the concept of decision maker-adviser model to the argument. First,
we argued that top managers’ tenure is associated with the adviser diversity and
aggressiveness of information seeking of top managers’ strategic decision making.
Second, we showed how adviser diversity and aggressiveness of information seeking
of top managers are related to learning as well as strategy persistence.
However, there are some limitations that should be investigated in future
studies. First, other factors in addition to top manager-adviser relationships that may
affect the inverted U-shaped relationship should be considered. In addition, since the
relationship among variables proposed by this paper has not yet been subject to
empirical test, empirical study would be fruitful area of exploration. Furthermore,
empirical study in international context would be interesting extension of the current
study. Some studies have showed top managers’ effects on organizational changes and
performance significantly differ between the countries (e.g.,Crossland & Hambrick,
2007; Sakano & Lewin, 1999). Sakano and Lewin’s (1999) study represented that the
effect of CEO succession were different between U.S. firms and Japanese firms (e.g.,
Boeker, 1997;Beverly, Tushman & Romanelli, 1992;Wiersema, 1992). Additionally,
Crossland and Hambrick (2007) found the effect of CEO on organizational

10
performance is greater in U.S firms than in German and Japanese firms. These studies
imply that our discussion and its empirical results will be varied among countries.
Therefore, there is a need for empirical study and we encourage scholars to consider
for their future work of the above future directions.
The purpose of this study was to explore how strategy persistence would be
induced from top manager-adviser relationships in strategic decision making during
executive life cycle. Although the road ahead appears long and coarsely chartered in
this paper, it is our hope that analysis presented above can offer at least starting point
for future explorations and may facilitate fine-grained investigation into how
executive life cycle is characterized.

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