Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
30 32
For detailed studies of these passages, see Allison 1989, Ameriks (“Kant Kant even claims that satisfaction and dissatisfaction (though not pleasure
on Moral Motivation”), Beck 1960, McCarty 1993 and 1994, and Reath 1989. and displeasure) play a role in divine motivation (cf. 28:1061-2), and Kant di-
31
This point is emphasized by Beck (1960: 222-3) and McCarty (1993: rectly compares God’s motivation by satisfaction to the motivation of a person
425). McCarty in particular makes use of this point to defend an “affectivist” to perform “a benevolent deed ... when this being from whom I receive the be-
reading of respect for the moral law that is consonant with the account I defend nevolence is happy and has no need of me” (28:1065). For more on divine mo-
here. tivation, cf. Kain “Kant’s Account of Divine Freedom.”
12
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
tion rather than pleasure.33 action, this paper focuses on giving a causal account of hu-
Within this picture, feelings of satisfaction and dissatis- man action in terms of the connections between cognitions
faction function as transitions from cognitions to desires and desires. Throughout, these connections are mediated by
(and thereby to actions). Jeanine Grenberg has described the feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. And these desires
connection between these “practical pleasures” and desire in all reflect a subjective commitment to action in a particular
detail (Grenberg 2001: 160-3).34 As she explains, 35 case. These desires lead to action except in cases of further
[P]ractical pleasure is itself necessarily related to and is
(and not fundamentally psychological) interference, as when
indeed the very vehicle for the expression of the status a sudden accident or unforeseen complication prevents one
of an agent’s faculty of desire. Technically ... there is a from following through on one’s volitional commitment.
distinction to be made between feeling and desire: feel- Thus outlining how cognitions cause desires reflects the
ing, an element of the agent’s sensible nature ... ,“de-
termines” (bestimmt) the faculty of desire ... . For the
most important psychological component of a causal ac-
purposes of describing action, there is, however, little count of human action. This task is complicated, however,
distinction to be made between the possession of a prac- because not all cognitions lead to desire or aversion. Even
tical pleasure and that of a desire. [Grenberg 2001: 163] within those cognitions that do affect desire, some lead to de-
sire and others lead to aversion. Thus Kant needs some ac-
In the rest of this paper, I follow Grenberg in downplaying
count of why the series goes through in some cases and not
the distinction between pleasure and desire. Given a practi-
cal pleasure, a desire will follow simply because of the na- others, and why it leads to the conative state that it does. In
ture of practical pleasures. The challenge for giving a causal order to provide the framework for Kant’s account of how
account of human action is to explain the origin of those cognitions affect desires, the rest of this section lays out req-
practical pleasures/desires. uisite details from Kant’s faculty psychology. In the next
Given the close connections between feeling, desire, and several sections (3 through 5), I explain the role of predispo-
33 sitions as causal bases of connections between specific cogni-
One further refinement of this model that is important vis a vis pleasure is
that Kant, especially in his later accounts of motivation, emphasizes the role of tions and desires.
displeasure [Unlust] and even pain [Schmerz] rather than pleasure as a primary In his empirical psychology, Kant’s approach to both the
motivational force. On this model, then, it is not so much pleasure and desire
that lead to action as pain and aversion. For the purposes of this paper, I am origin of cognitions and their connection with desire in-
treating desire and aversion as functioning similarly in motivation, but it is volves further distinguishing between different faculties of
worth noting that Kant emphasizes the latter, especially after his reading of Pie- soul. I have already noted the important distinction between
tro Verri’s del piacere e del dolore in 1777. Susan Meld Shell has discussed this
in detail in Shell 2003. the faculties of cognition, feeling, and desire, which forms
34
For further discussions of Kant’s theory of pleasure in action, which make the background for Kant’s overall account of human action.
some important distinctions that Grenberg ignores, see Zuckert 2001 and Morri- Cutting across this threefold distinction, however, is a fur-
son 2004.
35
Grenberg’s account of the connection between pleasure and desire is sup- ther distinction—adopted from Baumgarten—between
ported in the passages in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals from which she draws “higher” and “lower” faculties of cognition, feeling, and de-
her account. There, as Grenberg points out, Kant simply defines practical pleas- sire. The “lower” faculties are primarily receptive. The
ure as “that pleasure which is necessarily connected with a desire (for an object
... )” (6: 212). higher faculties are “self-active” or “spontaneous” (28:228,
13
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
29:880, 28:584). In these contexts, Kant generally36 uses the When Kant talks about freedom in the context of his empiri-
terms “self-activity” or “spontaneity” to describe an empiri- cal psychology, it is this empirical freedom to which he re-
cal or comparative freedom of the higher faculties, a freedom fers, and this leaves room for Kant to give a causal account
that is consistent with the view that even those higher facul- of even the higher faculty of desire, as we will see in section
ties are causally determined.37 This spontaneity is the kind 5. Thus we can broadly outline six different “faculties” in
of spontaneity that Kant describes as a “comparative concept Kant’s empirical psychology: higher and lower cognition,
of freedom” in the Critique of Practical Reason, the freedom higher and lower feeling, and higher and lower desire.
that comes from that fact that “actions are caused from With respect to cognition, the lower faculty is referred to
within, by representations produced by our own powers, broadly as “sensibility” (Sinnlichkeit) and includes the senses
whereby desires are evoked on occasion of circumstances (Sinne) and the imagination, each of which is further subdi-
and hence actions are produced at our own discretion” vided (cf. 7:140-1, 153ff.; 25:29f., 269f.; 28:59f., 230f., 585,
(5:96). This inner determination amounts to “psychological 672f., 869f., 737f.; and 29:882f.). The senses include the five
freedom ... but nevertheless natural necessity” (5:97).38 outer senses as well as inner sense, and the imagination in-
36 cludes memory, anticipation of future events, and the “pro-
In some cases, Kant associates the spontaneity of the higher faculty with
that transcendental freedom that is a condition of possibility of moral responsi- ductive” or “fictive” imagination. The higher faculty of cog-
bility. Strictly speaking, describing the higher faculty of desire as free in that nition is often referred to by the general term “understand-
sense is inconsistent with empirical psychology. Insofar as one studies human
action empirically, such action is, as Kant insists in his first Critique, causally ing” (Verstand) and includes three specific cognitive powers:
necessitated in accordance with natural laws. But Kant does hold that the pres- reason, the understanding (Verstand) in a narrow sense, and
ence of a higher faculty of desire is an indication of moral responsibility and the power of judgment.39
hence transcendental freedom. (See Frierson, “Kant’s Empirical Markers of
Moral Responsibility.”) Thus he sometimes slips into these properly transcen- Kant’s distinction between higher and lower applies to
dental discussions in lectures on empirical psychology. This effort to discuss desire as well as cognition. Just as “there is a higher and a
the Critical philosophy in lectures on empirical psychology is not particularly
surprising, of course. As a teacher, Kant found an opportunity within the sylla- lower cognitive faculty[,] so there is also a rational and a
bus prescribed by Baumgarten’s text for explaining some of Kant’s own more sensible feeling of pleasure or displeasure (and so it is also
important philosophical ideas, a temptation to which he can hardly be blamed with the faculty of desire)” (29:877).40 As with the cognitive
for succumbing.
37
A full defense of this claim requires showing in what ways the higher
39
faculties, though spontaneous, are nonetheless susceptible to explanation in Cf. e.g. 7:196, where Kant explains the differences between these facul-
terms of empirical causes. This is the task of the rest of this paper. For a helpful ties, and related sections of lectures in empirical psychology (28:73-5, 242-3,
account of this sort of empirical freedom, see Beck 1987: 35-6. This compara- 863-5; 29: 888-90) and anthropology (25: 537, 773-4, 1032f., 1296, 1476).
tive freedom is the freedom that Kant refers to in the second Critique as the Kant’s placement of the power of judgment (Urteilskraft) in the higher cognitive
“freedom of a turnspit” (5:97). Brian Jacobs puts the point well in the context of faculty is a notable departure from Baumgarten, who places it in the lower cog-
discussing the nature of freedom of the higher faculty of desire (the “will”) in nitive faculty (see Metaphysica §§ 606-9). A detailed comparison of Baumgar-
Kant’s anthropology: “the ‘arbitrium liberum’ that Kant posits against the ani- ten and Kant on the nature of judgment would reward further study but is be-
malistic ‘arbirtium brutum’ ... is a practical empirical concept and one that is ob- yond the scope of the present paper.
40
servable when a human being resists acting solely according to the ‘pathologi- Here I focus on Kant’s account of the higher and lower faculties of desire,
cal’ necessity that characterizes animal will” (Jacobs 2003: 120). as these are tied to action most directly, but most of Kant’s account of higher
38
Kant carefully distinguishes this empirical freedom from that “transcen- and lower desire applies to feeling as well, although, as already noted, Kant’s
dental freedom” which is a condition of possibility of moral responsibility, and account of the difference between higher and lower faculties of feeling is com-
which involves “independence from everything empirical and so from nature plicated by his efforts to distinguish between intellectual and sensible feelings
generally” (5:97). for moral purposes.
14
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
faculty, the distinction between the higher and lower facul- erate quite differently depending on whether they belong to
ties of desire is based on the distinction between the senses the higher or lower faculty. Although both faculties are de-
and the understanding: “all desires are ... [either] intellectual termined by “impelling causes” or “incentives” (29:895), and
or sensitive” (29:894). But in the case of desire, what is rele- in both cases these impelling causes operate by means of
vant is not the nature of the desire itself but the cognitive feelings43 of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the higher fac-
state that produces the desire.41 “The representations which ulty is determined by “motives” which proceed from the
produce determinations [of desire] are either sensible or in- understanding, and the lower faculty is determined by
tellectual” (28: 674-5). Insofar as a desire is the direct result “stimuli” that proceed from the senses (29:885; cf. 29:1015,
of the senses or unmediated imagination, it is part of the 27:257). As we will see in sections 4 and 5, the difference be-
“lower” faculty of desire. Insofar as it proceeds from the tween higher and lower faculties of desire is reflected in dif-
understanding or reason, a desire falls under the “higher” ferent predispositions that underlie Kant’s causal accounts of
faculty of desire. The key difference here is between motiva- each faculty.
tion by immediate intuitions and motivation by principles or Before moving on to the next section, it is worth drawing
concepts. As Kant explains, every desire42 attention to one further distinction within Kant’s account of
the higher faculty of desire. “Higher” desires are caused by
has an impelling cause. The impelling causes are either
one or more kinds of higher cognition, but these desires
sensitive or intellectual. The sensitive are stimuli <stim-
uli> or motive causes [Bewegungsursache], impulses. The need not be purely rational. Although all “higher” desires
intellectual are motives [Motive] or motive grounds have “grounds of determination ... [that] lie . . . in the under-
[Bewegungsgrunde] ... . If the impelling causes are repre- standing,” these desires can be “either pure or affected”
sentations of satisfaction and dissatisfaction which de-
pend on the manner in which we are [sensibly] affected
(29:1014-5). Kant explains this distinction as follows:
by objects, then they are stimuli. But if the impelling
causes are representations of satisfaction or dissatisfac- The intellectual impelling cause is either purely intellec-
tion which depend on the manner in which we cognize tual without qualification <simpliciter ...>, or in some re-
the objects through concepts, through the understand- spect <secundum quid>. When the impelling cause is
ing, then they are motives. [28:254, cf. 29:895] represented by the pure understanding, it is purely intel-
lectual, but if it rests on sensibility, and if merely the means
for arriving at the end are presented by the understanding,
The distinction between higher and lower faculties of desire
then it is said to be in some respect. [28:589, emphasis
is critically important for Kant’s overall account of human added; contrast 25:579-80]
action because the causal mechanisms governing desire op-
For a desire to be purely intellectual, it must be caused by the
41
Kant makes the same claim in the context of pleasure, but there Kant is pure understanding, or pure reason (recall that the under-
careful to insist that while there is still a lower and higher faculty of pleasure, all
pleasure is sensitive in itself (hence lower).
42 43
Kant actually says “act of the faculty of choice” here, but this occurs im- Although Kant says “by representations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction,”
mediately after he has explained that the faculty of choice is simply the faculty for Kant “representation” is a general term, which can refer to any kind of men-
of desire insofar as it operates in a context where its activity can bring about its tal state. In the context, it is clear that he is not referring to cognitive states here,
object (28:254). but to states of feeling.
15
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
standing in the broad sense includes reason). But a desire The faculties (and powers) of the soul
can be caused by higher cognition directly without being
Cognition Feeling Desire
caused by pure reason when someone acts on the basis of a (representations) (satisfaction and (incentives, impel-
principle of the understanding that is directed towards ful- dissatisfaction) ling grounds)
filling some sensible desire (or inclination). Such impure Higher Understanding “satisfactions or Motives, motive
higher desires proceed from representing to oneself hypo- (intellectual, (including the dis- dissatisfactions grounds (including
active, spon- tinct powers of which depend on both pure and im-
thetical imperatives as principles for action. These impure taneous) judgment, under- the manner in pure motives)
desires are still “higher” desires, however, because they are standing, and rea- which we cognize
caused not solely by sensible desires but by principles or con- son) the objects through
cepts of the understanding directed towards satisfying such concepts”
Lower Sensibility Pleasure and dis- Stimuli, motive
desires.44 The pure higher faculty of desire, because it in- (sensible, pas- (including the dis- pleasure, “satisfac- causes, impulses
volves desires that follow from purely rational considera- sive, recep- tinct powers of tions and dissatis-
tions, issues from the representation of categorical impera- tive) the senses and factions which de-
tives.45 imagination) pend on the manner
in which we are
We can now summarize the results of this section by fill- [sensibly] affected
ing in Kant’s taxonomy of faculties of the soul: by objects”
(28:254)
44
One way of putting this is that higher desires are those for which Alli- For Kant, this taxonomy is the first step in giving causal laws
son’s incorporation thesis holds (Allison 1990). For Kant, contra Allison, hu-
man beings can, sometimes, act purely from instinct or inclination, without in- for mental phenomena because each distinct mental power
corporating such instincts or inclinations into any principle of the understanding. will be governed by its own causal laws (28:564), and human
Kant’s language to describe such “actions” fits the lack of true agency implied actions will be the result of the operation of the faculty of
by their failure to fit Allison’s account of incorporation. He refers to them as ac-
tions proceeding from “stimuli” or “impulse.” Most actions, even those that are desire, which operation depends on prior operations of cog-
not guided by morality, are free in the sense that they are associated with the nition and feeling. Thus a complete empirical account of
higher faculty of desire, where one acts on principles or maxims, even if these human action46 depends upon explaining the causes of each
maxims take the satisfaction of inclination as their end. But one can also “act”
directly from lower desires. This may help explain both the role of affects in kind of cognitive state47 as well as the grounds for connect-
Kant’s philosophy and Kant’s treatment of weakness of will. ing those cognitive states to the states of feeling and desire to
45
This discussion differs from Kant’s distinction between higher and lower which they give rise.
faculties in the Critique of Practical Reason. There Kant discusses the distinc-
tion in the context of arguing against heteronomous ethical theories, and he
downplays the difference between pure and affected higher desires. In the ac-
count in the second Critique, he argues against those who describe the higher
46
faculty of desire as one within which intellectual cognitions cause pleasure and By “complete empirical account of human action,” I mean only an ac-
thereby move the will. By contrast, he insists upon a higher faculty of desire as count that is as complete as any empirical account can be. Cf. footnote 5 on the
the ability for “pure reason ... to determine the will without some feeling being limits of empirical explanation in general.
47
presupposed” (5:24). Here Kant is not necessarily departing from his empirical In “Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Cognition,” I discuss Kant’s
model within which feelings connect cognitions and desires; he can be read as causal account of the origin of cognitions. For the purposes of this paper, I take
simply arguing that from a practical perspective, one must not require feelings these cognitions as given and explain their connections to human action (via
as “determining grounds” of one’s choice to obey the moral law. feeling and desire).
16
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
3. Human predispositions and the grounds of empirical causal between two modes of study in the physical sciences in a
connections way that points out the danger of allowing the demand for
So far, we have seen that Kant develops his empirical ac- simplicity to govern scientific explanation:
count of action in the context of a faculty psychology. Kant
There are ... two physical modes of explanation: (1) me-
traces the sources of particular desires to their connection
chanical philosophy, which explains all phenomena
with other mental states. But Kant also offers a more general from the shape and the general motive power of bodies
account of the bases for these connections. Human beings ... .
desire some things rather than others, and this is not simply (2) The dynamical mode of explanation, when cer-
because we cognize some things rather than others. We tain basic powers are assumed from which the phenom-
have cognitions that do not give rise to feelings, and feelings ena are derived. This was first discovered by Newton
that do not give rise to desires.48 To flesh out his naturalistic and is more satisfactory and complete than the former.
Thus to explain something mechanically means to ex-
explanation of human action, Kant explains why some cog- plain something according to the laws of motion, dy-
nitions but not others give rise to desires. namically, from the powers of bodies. With either ex-
Kant deals with this problem in a way that is determinist planation one never comes to an end. The correct mode
in the sense that every connection between a cognition and a of explanation is dynamical physics, which includes
desire is a causal connection in accordance with a natural both in itself. That is the mode of explanation of the pre-
law. At the same time, Kant’s account is not reductive, in sent time. The first is the mode of explanation of Des-
that he sides with Crusius49 against Wolff in arguing that the cartes, the second that of the chemists. [29:935-6; cf.
A649-50/B677-8]
variety of human mental states cannot be reduced to a single
kind of power governed by a single kind of law. While Kant Descartes errs, according to Kant, because he overempha-
continues to insist that reducing powers to as few as possible sizes the reduction of phenomenal explanation to a single
is a regulative ideal (cf. 28:210, 564; 29:773-822; A648-9/B676- power (the “general motive power”). By contrast, Newton
7), he also insists upon a kind of scientific modesty when it and the chemists rightly postulate additional basic powers
comes to causal explanations of phenomena.50 In a revealing when these are necessary to explain diverse phenomena.
comparison of Descartes and Newton, Kant distinguishes What is more, Kant highlights here that both kinds of expla-
48
As noted above, feelings that do not give rise to desire or aversion are nation take for granted certain causal powers, and these are
particularly important for Kant’s aesthetics.
49
left unexplained. Kant’s psychology follows the example of
Cf. Crusius 1745, §§73 and 444; Watkins 2005:91; Hatfield 1990. the chemists—and Crusius51—rather than strictly mechanist
50
This modesty is epistemic. Kant elsewhere argues that as a metaphysical
matter, “it is obvious that there is only one basic power in the soul ... . But this physics. His focus is on not overly reducing powers to a sin-
is a wholly other question: whether we are capable of deriving all the actions of gle basic one. As he says, “there must be several [basic pow-
the soul, and its various powers and faculties, from one basic power. This we ers] because we cannot reduce everything to one” (29:773-
are in no way in the position to do” (28:262; cf. 29: 773-822). Although Kant
does not emphasize this point in other lectures, there is nothing in his later 822).52
claims that precludes the possibility of all human powers in fact being reducible
51
to a single one. But when it comes to empirical psychology, we are not justified Cf. Crusius 1745, §§73 and 444; Watkins 2005:91; Hatfield 1990.
52
in trying to effect this reduction. For more on the important difference between Here again (recall footnote 50), Kant leaves open the metaphysical possi-
limits on human explanation and limits on metaphysical possibility, see Ameriks bility that “the unity of each substance requires that there be only one basic
2003, Watkins 2005:264-5. power” (29:822).
17
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
In his biology, especially in the Critique of Teleological This dependence on unexplained natural predispositions
Judgment, Kant explains at least certain basic powers—those or basic powers puts Kant in good company with other
most relevant to biology and psychology—in terms of the naturalist explanations of human beings. Hume, for exam-
fundamental notion of a “natural predisposition” (Naturan- ple, argues,
lage).53 Kant does not give many causal accounts of the ori-
gins of these predispositions, and in that sense they are basic When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent
of human reason, we sit down contented ... . But if this
powers that can be classified but not (easily) reduced to any impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be
more basic level of explanation in terms of efficient causes.54 esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to
As he explains in his “Conjectures on the Beginning of Hu- affirm, that ‘tis a defect common to it with all the sci-
man History,” “we must begin with something that human ences ... . [Hume 1740: Introduction ¶9, p. xviii]
reason cannot derive from prior natural causes—that is, with
the existence of human beings,” including all of their natural If Kant’s dependence on stipulated principles of human ac-
predispositions (8:110). tion without further explanation rules him out of the ranks
of determinist empirical psychologists, then Hume must also
53
A natural predisposition “indicate[s] what can be made of a man” by na- be ruled out of those ranks. 55 Unlike Hume, Kant is willing
ture, as opposed to “what man is prepared to make of himself” (7:285). The to make use of the notions of predisposition and power to
concept is closely related, for Kant, to the notion of a “germ” (Keime). For more
on Kant’s account of Anlagen, as well as the relationship between Anlagen and
explain the regularities of human behavior,56 but his willing-
Keime, see Munzel 1999 and Sloan 2002. ness to leave this aspect of his account without a further
54
Kant does argue that these predispositions can be explained by reference
55
to final causes, that is, in terms of the ends that they promote. As a “heuristic With respect to biological (and psychological) predispositions, Kant de-
principle for researching the particular laws of nature” (5:411), one can add to velops distinctive reasons for questioning the attempt to reduce all explanations
the principle of efficient causation a “principle of final causes” (5:387) “in order to simple mechanistic ones. Kant’s modification of his mechanistic ambitions
to supplement the inadequacy of [explanation in terms of efficient causes] in the with respect to human psychology is incorporated into a general realization of
empirical search for particular laws of nature” (5:383). According to this heuris- the importance of non-reductive explanations of “organized beings,” including
tic principle, “nothing in [an organized product of nature] is in vain, purposeless, humans as well as birds (2:434) and even grass (5:400). Kant’s position here is
or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature” (5:376). By relegating these consistent with popular strategies of seventeenth and eighteenth century mech-
teleological-biological explanations to the status of a heuristic, a “maxim of the anists for dealing with the generation of living beings. Importantly for the pur-
reflecting power of judgment” (5:398) that “is merely subjectively valid” poses of this paper, Kant’s biological limitations on mechanical explanation do
(5:390), Kant is free to explain natural predispositions in terms of purposive not involve calling into question a fundamental commitment to explanation in
structures without compromising his overall commitment to the fundamental terms of efficient causes, even if such explanations will not always be available
principle that every event in the world in fact has efficient causes. in particular cases. As Kant insists, “the principle that everything that we as-
Thus throughout his anthropology and empirical psychology, Kant offers sume to belong to nature (phaenomenon) and to be a product of it must also be
various teleological explanations of human predispositions. With respect to the able to be conceived as connected with it in accordance with mechanical laws
natural capacity for dreaming, for example, Kant says that “dreaming seems to nonetheless remains in force” (5:422). In scientific inquiry, we have an “obliga-
be essential: unless dreams always kept the vital force active during sleep, it tion to give a mechanical explanation of all products and events in nature, even
would go out” (7:175). With respect to that “illusion” by which someone “who the most purposive, as far as our capacity to do so” allows (5:415; cf. 5:411).
is naturally lazy” mistakes “objects of imagination as real ends,” Kant avers that For a detailed examination of Kant’s biology that is broadly consonant with my
this is a means for “Nature ... [to] make us more active and prevent us from los- account here, cf. Sloan 2002. For an important discussion of different senses of
ing the feeling of life” (7:274; cf. Wood 1999:207, 215-25). These teleological “mechanism” at play in these passages (and in Kant’s Critique of Judgment
explanations of various natural endowments are not strictly a part of Kant’s em- more generally), cf. Ginsborg 2001:238-43.
56
pirically determinist account of human action. Rather, they reflect a different For a detailed examination of the significance of this difference, cf. Wat-
kind of explanation, one for which the Critique of Judgment makes room. kins 2005:160-70, 232-7, 362-422.
18
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
causal explanation reflects a limit that he and Hume share in bracket any role for predisposition in the connections be-
common. tween feeling and desire.57
Once he allows for the use of predispositions in explain- For Kant, predispositions are not simply additional effi-
ing the development and behavior of living things, Kant cient causes. Rather, Kant seeks to rigorously explain in the
draws on predispositions to provide the background against “dynamical mode” of Newton, classifying and characteriz-
which to give his causal account of human action. Predispo- ing the bases for basic powers of the soul. In this context, the
sitions fill in the explanation for why certain cognitions lead role of predispositions will not be strictly causal in the way
to desires, others to aversions, and others to no appetitive that antecedent states are. That is, one does not simply add
response at all. Thus to explain why the smell of a particular a predisposition to a cognition in order to cause a desire,
food gives rise to a desire for it whereas other smells do not such that
give rise to any desire (8:111), or why certain kinds of social
interactions are pleasant and others are not, Kant appeals to Cognition + predisposition x Desire
basic predispositions in human nature. A full Kantian ac-
count of human action, then, must classify and give law-like Rather, predispositions for Kant play something like the role
form to the predispositions that underlie connections be- that gravity plays in Newton’s account, where it is not the
tween various faculties of the soul. case that
4. Human predispositions in Kant’s theory of action: the lower Earth’s mass + Gravity falling of apple
faculty of desire
That is, gravity is not just another cause, like the mass of the
Kant describes basic predispositions in different ways for
earth. Instead, gravity is what explains why the mass of the
each different faculty of the soul. For the purpose of ex-
earth causes the apple fall.58 I capture this different kind of
plaining human action, the most important distinction is be-
explanation with a vertical arrow (↑). Thus for Newton,
tween the predispositions related to higher and lower facul-
ties of desire, since these predispositions are most directly Earth’s mass falling of apple
involved in action. In the rest of this section, I make use of ↑
Kant’s biology and anthropology to give a fuller account of Gravity
32
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
------. 1979. Kant and the Claims of Taste. Cambridge Univer- manuscript).
sity Press. Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. Creating the Kingdom of Ends.
Guyer, Paul, ed. 1992. The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge University Press.
Cambridge University Press. ------. 1996. “From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant
Hatfield, Gary. 1990. The Natural and the Normative. Univer- and Aristotle on Morally Good Action.” In Aristotle,
sity of Notre Dame Press. Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, ed.
------. 1992. “Empirical, Rational, and Transcendental Psy- Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. Cambridge
chology.” In The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul University Press.
Guyer. Cambridge University Press. ------. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge Univer-
Henrich, Dieter. 1994. The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant’s sity Press.
Philosophy, ed. Richard Velkley. Harvard University Kuehn, Manfred. 2001. Kant: A Biography. Cambridge Uni-
Press. versity Press.
------. 1992. Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the ------. 1987. Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800: A
World. Stanford University Press. Contribution to the History of the Critical Philosophy. Mont-
------. 1957/58. “Hutcheson und Kant.” Kant-Studien 49: 49- real: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
69. Louden, Robert. 2000. Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Be-
Hilgard, Ernest. 1980. “The Trilogy of Mind: Cognition, Af- ings to Human Beings. Oxford University Press.
fection, and Conation.” The Journal of the History of the Makkreel, Rudolph A. 2000. “Kant on the Scientific Status
Behavioral Sciences. 16: 107-117. of Psychology, Anthropology, and History.” In Kant and
Hudson, Hud. 1994. Kant’s Compatibilism. Cornell Univer- the Sciences, ed. Eric Watkins. Oxford University Press.
sity Press. McCarty, Richard. 1993. “Kantian Moral Motivation and
Hume, David. 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature. (Second the Feeling of Respect.” Journal of the History of Philosophy
Oxford edition edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nid- 31: 421-435.
ditch. Oxford University Press, 1978). ------. 1994. “Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant’s Theory
Jacobs, Brian. 2003. “Kantian Character and the Problem of a of Rational Agency.” Kant-Studien 85: 15-31.
Science of Humanity.” In Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, Meerbote, Ralph. 1982. “Wille and Willkühr in Kant’s Theory
ed. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain. Cambridge University of Action.” In Interpreting Kant, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Iowa
Press. City: University of Iowa Press, pp. 69-84.
Kain, Patrick. 2003. “Prudential Reason in Kant’s Anthro- Morrison, Iain. 2004. “Kant’s Theory of Pleasure,”
pology.” In Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, ed. Brian presented at the APA Central Division.
Jacobs and Patrick Kain. Cambridge University Press. Munzel, G. Felicitas. 1999. Kant’s Conception of Moral Charac-
------. “Kant on the Moral Status of Persons” (unpublished ter: The “Critical” Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflec-
manuscript). tive Judgment. The University of Chicago Press.
------. “Kant’s Account of Divine Freedom” (unpublished Palmquist, Stephen. 1986. “Is Duty Kant’s ‘Motive’ for
33
Patrick Frierson Kant’s Empirical Account of Human Action
Moral Action.” Ratio 28: 168-174.
Reath, Andrews. 1989. “Kant’s Theory of Moral Sensibility:
Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclina-
tion.” Kant-Studien 80: 284-302.
Schneewind, J. B. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History
of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Sloan, Philip. 2002. “Preforming the Categories: Eighteenth-
Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots of
Kant's A Priori.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:
229-53.
Sorenson, Kelly. 2002. “Kant’s Taxonomy of the Emotions.”
Kantian Review 6: 109-28.
Stroud, Barry. 1977. Hume (The Arguments of the Philoso-
phers). Routledge.
Sturm, Thomas. 2001. “Kant on Empirical Psychology: How
Not to Investigate the Human Mind.” In Kant and the Sci-
ences, ed. Eric Watkins. Oxford University Press.
Watkins, Eric. 2005. Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality.
Cambridge University Press.
Westphal, Kenneth. 1995. “Kant’s Critique of Determinism
in Empirical Psychology.” Proceedings of the Eighth Inter-
national Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson. Marquette
University Press.
Wood, Allen. 2003. “Kant and the Problem of Human Na-
ture.” In Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, ed. Brian Jacobs
and Patrick Kain. Cambridge University Press.
------. 1999. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge University
Press.
------. 1984. “Kant’s Compatibilism.” In Self and Nature in
Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen Wood. Cornell University
Press.
Zuckert, Rachel. 2001. “A New Look at Kant’s Theory of
Pleasure.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60:
239-52.
34