Impact of Severe Solar Flares, Nuclear EMP

and Intentional EMI on Electric Grids

John G. Kappenman
 A Quick Definition of Solar Activity & Space Weather
• Space Weather due to Solar Activity
can impact many technology and
infrastructure systems

• Solar Flares/Energetic Particles

themselves can directly impact
Communication/Navigation Systems,
Satellites

• CME’s from Sun can cause

Geomagnetic Storms which can also
impact many systems

• Extremes of these Threats have not

been well-understood

• Vulnerabilities of Systems have

generally grown over time

As Recent US FERC, EMP Commission, FEMA and National Academy

of Sciences reviews have noted – Electric Power Grid is one of the
most important and severely impacted Critical Infrastructures
A Quick Definition of EMP and IEMI

• EMP – ElectroMagnetic Pulse

• EMP Risk come from Detonation of a Nuclear Weapon at
high Altitude (above 30 km)
• Intentional Attack carried out by a rogue nation or
terroist Group
• Could also result from Successful Interception of a
Nuclear Missile at high altitudes
• Continental Impact Footprint

• IEMI – Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference

• High Power Electromagnetic Weapons (Non-Nuclear EM
or RF Weapons)
• Limited Area of Impact – Unless used in Coordinated
Attack
• A Risk Scenario of likelihood comparable to Cyber Attack

• E3-EMP can impact Electric Power Grids in manner like that

posed by Geomagnetic Storms
• Both E1-EMP and IEMI can also damage electronic equipment
& control systems like SCADA
 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
Geomagnetic Storms are disturbances in the Earth’s normally
quiescent geomagnetic field caused by intense Solar activity

Geomagnetic Storms have

Continent-Wide &
Planetary Footprints

Intense Solar Activity

 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
A rapidly changing geomagnetic field over large regions will induce
Geomagnetically-Induced Currents (i.e. GIC a quasi-DC current) to
flow in the continental interconnected Electric Power Grids

Storm causes
Geomagnetic Field
Disturbances from
Electrojet Current
that couple to
Power Systems
 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
GIC flow in transformers will cause half-cycle saturation which can
2 0 0 2
cause Power Grid Blackouts & Damage
/ 0 9 / 2 7 0 0 : 0 4 : 0 0 .. 00 00 00

Areas of Probable Blackouts of

Power System Unprecedented
Collapse Scale
 A Review of Power Grid Vulnerability to Solar
Activity & Geomagnetic Storms
GIC flow can also has potential to cause wide-spread catastrophic
damage to key Power Grid Transformers
Causing Restoration Problems
These Key Assets may take a
Year or More to Replace

Internal
Damage due
to one storm

Salem Nuclear Plant

GSU Transformer
Failure, March „89
 Historic Storm Impacts
A Brief Overview of a
Geomagnetic Superstorm
North American Power Grid Impacts
March 13-14, 1989
 March 13, 1989 – Storm 7:39UT

Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) 20 Minutes of Bad Space Weather

 Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989

Time 2:39-2:58 EST (7:39-7:58 UT) Quebec Blackout in 92 Seconds at

Intensity 0f ~480 nT/min
 March 13, 1989 – Storm 21:40UT

Time 4:40-5:30 PM EST (21:40-22:30 UT)

 Reported Power System Events – March 13, 1989

Intensity over Mid-Atlantic Region

Time 16:03-17:30 EST (21:03-22:30 UT) ~300 nT/min
 Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Incidents
Within 25 months after the March 1989 Storm

7 11
12

6 10 1. Salem
2 2. Oyster Creek
8 1 3. South Texas
9
5 4. Shearon Harris
5. Surry 1
4 6. Zion 2
7. WNP 2
8. Peach Bottom 3
9. D.C. Cook 1
3 10. Susquehanna
11. Maine Yankee
12. Nine-Mile

Latent Impacts of March 1989 Storm – Delayed Failures of Large Transformers

at Nuclear Plants suspected across US
 Great Geomagnetic Storms
Disturbance Intensity Perspectives
•Impacts on North American Power Grid on March 13-14,
1989 occurred at disturbance intensities of ~300-500 nT/min

•Disturbance intensities of >2000 nT/min have been observed

at latitudes of concern for US power grid infrastructure on at
least 3 occasions since 1972

•Disturbance intensity of ~5000 nT/min was estimated for

storm on May 14-15, 1921 (estimated to be largest storm of
20th Century and comparable to Carrington Event of 1859)

•Power Grids should expect Storms 4 to 10 Times More

Intense than the March 1989 Storm
 Great Geomagnetic Storms
March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Position of
Westward
Electrojet

Boundaries of Eastward Electrojet

March 13, 1989
 Great Geomagnetic Storms
March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Estimated Boundaries of
Eastward Electrojet
May 14-15, 1921
Larger & More Intense than
March 1989
 Great Geomagnetic Storms
March 1989 Superstorm & May 1921 Storm Comparisons

Severe Geomagnetic Storms will have an even larger Planetary Footprint

 Geomagnetic Storms – GIC & Conventional Wisdom
Conventional Wisdom
•Proximity to Electrojet Intensifications – Large Magnetic Field Disturbances
•High to Mid-Latitude Locations - Largest Magnetic Field Disturbances
•Power Grids at these Locations – Measured Large GIC’s – Related Problems
•This did not explain Power Grid Problems Reported at Low-Latitudes

A New Class of GIC Risks

•Large GICs are possible at Low-Latitudes
•Significant and Long Duration GIC’s have been observed at Low Latitude
Locations
•Differing Magnetospheric Processes are the Drivers for Geomagnetic Field
disturbances
 An Overview of Low and Equatorial Latitude Risks to Large
Electric Grids
High Latitude
Sub-Auroral Location Low Latitude
Large B Field Disturbances Equatorial Location
From Low-Altitude Electrojet Small B Field Disturbances
From SSC/Equatorial Currents

26o
+/-40o Geomagnetic
Geomagnetic
34o
Geomagnetic

Significantly Large GIC’s measured at Low to Equatorial-Latitudes . . .

Long Duration GIC’s can also destroy Large High Voltage Transformers
Ring Current & Ground Level Disturbances
July 15, 2000 (21:30-22:00UT)
 Observed & Calculated GIC – Nov 6, 2001
Southern/Central Japan
GIC flows out of
Network Observed GICs in Central Japan Power Grid - Nov 6, 2001
50
GIC(A) SUNEN S/S
40 GIC(A) SHINANO S/S
GIC(A) FUKUMITSU BTB

30

20

10

GIC (Amps)
0
1:00 1:30 2:00 2:30 3:00 3:30 4:00 4:30 5:00 5:30 6:00 6:30 7:00 7:30

-10

-20

-30

-40

Time UT
-50

Meso-Scale Models
GIC flows into Validation Across the System
Network

Geo-Electric Field
 Overview of South Africa (Eskom) Episodic EHV Transformer
Failures due to Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic Storms
Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure

Eskom Summary of Failures and Damages

• 5 Major Stations, 15 Large Transformers Failures – ~13% of
System EHV Transformers

• GIC appeared to have activated this

• Oct 29-31, 2003 Storm was Equal in Intensity to March 1989

Storm but Longer in Duration

• Storms many times Larger than this Storm could pose even
higher impacts to Low Latitude Power Grids
Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee
 Overview of Eskom Episodic EHV Transformer Failures due
to Oct-Nov 2003 Geomagnetic Storms
Failures linked to Long Duration / Low Intensity GIC Exposure
Station 3 Gen Transformer 4 Station 3 Gen. Transformer 5
HV winding failure evidence of overheating

Courtesy Eskom, Makhosi, T., G. Coetzee

 Great Geomagnetic Storms
Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness
•New Awareness has developed on the Extremes of Severe
Geomagnetic Storms

•Current Design Practices of Electric Grids have unknowingly

and greatly escalated the Risks and Potential Impacts
•Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize
this Threat
•Present Operational Procedures are based upon limited experience,
do not reduce GIC levels and are inadequate for Severe Storms

•Government Forecasters provide K Indices which have not

communicated the real risks to the Electric Power Industry
•Indices saturate and reach Maximum Levels at Low Thresholds
•Many K9 Storms (post March 1989) have been less intense than
March 1989 Storm – with unintended consequences for power grid
operators
•False Sense of Security & Complacency by Power Grid Operators
 GIC Risk Factor – Growth of Transmission Network
The larger the Grid – the Larger the Antenna to cause GIC

Growth of US Transmission Grid & Electric Energy Usage

4000 180
Cycle 22
3500 160
Annual Electric Energy Usage
High Voltage Transmission Line Miles
140
Electric Energy Usage (Billion kWh)

3000

High Voltage Lines (Miles x 1000)

120
2500

100
2000
80

1500
Cycle 19 60
1969 – First 765 kV Transmission Line
1000
40
1964 – First 500 kV Transmission Line
500 20
1953 – First 345 kV Transmission Line
0 0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 GIC Risk Factor – kV Rating Design

Transmission Line Resistance by kV Rating in USA

1

Lower Transmission Line

Resistance per mile at
Higher kV Designs
Resistance (Ohms/km)

0.1
765 kV

0.01

230 kV
161 kV Highest GIC in Largest
138 kV 345 kV 500 kV
Most Important Parts of
115 kV the Grid
0.001
kV Rating

Trend – ~Factor of 10 Decrease in R

Leads to ~Factor of 10 Increase in GIC
US High-Voltage Transmission Network

500 kV & 765 kV serve ~60% of US geographic

territory and ~86% of US population

765kV European and Asian Continental Grids are

500kV of similar proportions
345kV
 Simulation of Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario
Red & Green Dots
Indicate Transformers
2 0 0 2 / 00 99 // 22 77 00 00 :: 00 44 :: 00 00 .. 00 00 00

with Large GIC Flows

Areas of Probable Blackout of

Power System Unprecedented
Collapse Scale
 Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario
At-Risk 345kV, 500kV, & 765kV Transformers
Many Regions with High
Damage Loss Estimated

Estimated that many large EHV Transformers would have sufficient GIC
exposure to be At-Risk of Permanent Damage & Loss – Replacement could
extend into 4-10 years at current world production rates
 EMP Threat: Historical Evidence (US)*

• STARFISH event, July 9, 1962

– 1.4 MT, 400 km HOB
– 800 nautical miles from Honolulu

• HEMP effects felt in Hawaii

– Coupling to Hawaiian electric light
grid turns off some nighttime lights
in Honolulu
– Kauai telecom microwave outage 1962 Starfish - Hawaii
– Other nuisance effects (alarms)

• Collateral effect: Sky swept clean of all

commercial satellites within six months

*EMP Commission
 EMP Threat: Terminology & Overview

E3 or Slow-Transient
of EMP is like Severe
E1 or Fast-Transient of Geomagnetic Storm
EMP can damage micro-
electronic systems
throughout
infrastructures
High Altitude-EMP Threats to US Electric Grid
Source: EMP Commission Executive Report

Both E1 & E3
Threats can have
Large Geographic
Footprints

HEMP Effects Area – Fast Pulse

 EMP Threats to US Electric Grid
Major HV and EHV Substations

HEMP Fast Pulse Exposure covers a total of 1765 substations exposed or ~83%
of 2106 major HV and EHV substations. In addition some 35,000 to 40,000
Distribution Class Substations may also be of concern for Fast Pulse Exposure
 EMP Threats to US Electric Grid
Large Electric Generation Plants

HEMP Fast Pulse exposed power plants (Red) total 10,730 with a generation
capacity that is ~74.4% of the U.S. total generation capability.
 E1-EMP & IEMI Terminology & Overview
• E1-EMP is Fast Transient – Frequency Range Higher than Lightning – so existing Lightning
Protections do not provide Protection against this threat
• IEMI (Intentional Electromagnetic Interference) – Can be produced by simple Non-Nuclear
Weapons, can pose risk at Higher Frequencies and has Great Potential to Grow in Magnitude &
Probability of Occurrence
IEMI Devices
have potential
to reach higher
levels in future
 IEMI Overview – Non-Nuclear Devices
IEMI Weapons can be Highly Portable and Concealable

• Diehl Munitions Systeme has

developed a small interference source
(including antenna)
– 350 MHz damped sine field
– 120 kV/m at 1 meter (omni-
directional antenna)
– 30 minute continuous operation
(5 pulses per second) or 3 hours in
bursts
– 20 x 16 x 8 inches and 62 pounds

• Demonstration in Summer 2004

• Components to Manufacture Devices are readily available

• Can be designed with relative ease (Many Terrorists have Engineering
Backgrounds)
• Has Potential for Big Increases in Threat Environment Output &
Unpleasant Surprises for Society
 IEMI Overview – Non-Nuclear Devices
IEMI Weapons can also be Highly Powerful
Truck or Plane Transportable
• JOLT IRA Hyperband
Generator
• AFRL has developed an
extremely powerful IRA
system that produces
hyperband pulses
– E*r = 5.3 MV
– pulse width
~100 ps

Multiple Sites can be Impacted by Coordinated Attacks

 EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms
US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness
•Historically large Geomagnetic storms have potential to create Power Grid Blackouts and
widespread catastrophic Transformer Damage of unprecedented proportions, long term
blackout, lengthy restoration times, and chronic shortages (multiple years) are possible

•Economic and societal costs could be also of unprecedented levels;

•August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout Cost Estimate - $4 - $10 Billion
•Hurricane Katrina Cost Estimate - $150 - $300 Billion
•Severe Geomagnetic Storm Scenario $1 - $2 Trillion in 1st Year
Depending on Damage, Full Recovery could take 4 – 10 Years

•Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily
available, Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K
Indices

•EMP and IEMI also have capacity to create similar widespread damage to Power Grids

•Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm, EMP & IEMI-Related

Catastrophic Failures
•Remedial Design measures to block GIC(transformer neutral devices) are readily
feasible and cost effective
•Methods available for Hardening against EMP and IEMI
 EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms
US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness
Risk = function of ( Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence )
• Threat
– New Awareness that Geomagnetic Storm Severity is 4 to 10 Times larger
than previously understood
- EMP as a threat condition is even more poorly understood, owing in part
to the sensitive nature of the threat

• Vulnerability
- Power Grid infrastructures have experienced a “Design Creep” over past
few decades that have unknowingly escalated vulnerability to these threats

• Consequences
- Power Supply is an essential scaffolding of modern society
- All other Critical infrastructures will also collapse with long-term loss of
Electricity

• Risk – Events have catastrophic potential, the ability to take the lives of
hundreds of people in one blow, or to shorten or cripple the lives of thousands or
millions more, impact future generations of society
 EMP and Great Geomagnetic Storms
US Electric Grid Vulnerability Trends and Preparedness

The Nation has experienced a Several Decade Long Failure to

Understand how Risk has Migrated into our Infrastructures
from these Threats . . . An Unrecognized Systemic Risk

As Sir Winston Churchill said in 1936 in the early days of

facing a different emerging world threat –

"these are the years that the locust hath eaten."

“the era of procrastination, of half-measures, of soothing

and baffling expedients, of delays is coming to its close.”

“In its place, we are entering a period of consequences.”