Kuwait Neg MSJHS2011

- 1 –Kuwait Negative JV Division
MSJHS Debate Club, 2011
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg
Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg ..............................................................................................1

**Case Cross-x Guide(1/2)**..................................................................................................3
**Case Cross-x Guide(2/2)**..................................................................................................4
**A2:Inherency** ..................................................................................................................5
Inherency Iraq (1/2) ..................................................................................................................6
Inherency Iraq (2/2) ..................................................................................................................7
**A2: Missile Advantage** ...................................................................................................8
Turkey and TNWs ....................................................................................................................9
A2: Iran Prolif Prevention ..................................................................................................... 10
**A2: Terrorism Advantage** .......................................................................................... 11
A2: Spillover .......................................................................................................................... 12
A2: US presence causes terrorism ........................................................................................ 13
A2: Nuclear Terrorism .......................................................................................................... 14
**A2: Democracy Advantage** ........................................................................................ 15
A2: Proliferation .................................................................................................................... 16
**A2: Solvency** ................................................................................................................. 17
Squo Solves............................................................................................................................ 18
Missile Adv. Solvency .......................................................................................................... 19
Terrorist Adv. Solvency ........................................................................................................ 20
**Topicality** ...................................................................................................................... 21
Reduce is not eliminate ......................................................................................................... 22
Useless troops are not Military Presence ............................................................................. 23
In Means Throughout ............................................................................................................ 24
ASPEC ................................................................................................................................... 25
**1 Card DA’s (General)** ............................................................................................... 26
Job Placement DA ................................................................................................................. 27
PTSD DA ............................................................................................................................... 28
**DA’s (General and Specific)** ...................................................................................... 29
Econ DA (1/3)........................................................................................................................ 30
Econ DA (2/3)........................................................................................................................ 31
Econ DA (3/3)........................................................................................................................ 32
Arifjan DA (1/3) .................................................................................................................... 33
Arifjan DA (2/3) .................................................................................................................... 34
Arifjan DA (3/3) .................................................................................................................... 35
Isreali Relations(1/3) ............................................................................................................. 36
Israel Politics DA (1/3) ......................................................................................................... 39
Sunni Alliance DA (1/3) ....................................................................................................... 42
Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

**CP’s** ............................................................................................................................... 45
Consult NATO CP (1/4) ....................................................................................................... 46
Consult NATO CP (2/4) ....................................................................................................... 47
Consult NATO CP (3/4) ....................................................................................................... 48
Consult NATO CP (4/4) ....................................................................................................... 49
XO CP (1/3) ........................................................................................................................... 50
XO CP (2/3) ........................................................................................................................... 51
XO CP (3/3) ........................................................................................................................... 52
Phase out CP (1/2) ................................................................................................................. 53
Phase out CP (2/2) ................................................................................................................. 54
**Kritiks** ........................................................................................................................... 55
Fem K IR (1/3) ...................................................................................................................... 56
Fem K IR (2/3) ...................................................................................................................... 57
Fem K IR (3/3) ...................................................................................................................... 58
Security K (1/5) ..................................................................................................................... 59
Security K (2/5) ..................................................................................................................... 60
Security K (3/5) ..................................................................................................................... 61
Security K (4/5) ..................................................................................................................... 62
Security K (5/5) ..................................................................................................................... 63
Terror Talk K(1/3) ................................................................................................................. 64
Terror Talk K(2/3) ................................................................................................................. 65
Terror Talk K(3/3) ................................................................................................................. 66
Note to user: Make sure you read all the cards before using them. Some cards have
special conditions, mainly Topicality. Use the cross-x guide to ask questions after the
1ac. This is a straight up neg. If you face a critical aff, don’t use the Kritiks, because they
might be the advantages.

**Case Cross-x Guide (1/2)**
Inherency:
Are you aware that there will be a withdrawal from Iraq? If yes then: Doesn’t that
mean troops will be withdrawn? You state they aid in withdrawal.
Missile Advantage:
1. IS IRAN CURRENTLY PROLIFERATING?
(answer should be yes)
2. HAS THE UNITED NATIONS ATTEMPTED TO STOP IRAN’S PROLIFERATION?
(answer should be yes)
3. HAS IRAN STOPPED PROLIFERATING?
(answer should be no)
4. IS KUWAIT PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS?
(yes)
5. IF THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO STOP IRAN FROM
PROLIFERATING, HOW WILL KUWAIT, A TINY COUNTRY, FURTHER UNAIDED BY U.S.
MILITARY PRESENCE, WORK WITH IRAN TO STOP ITS PROLIFERATING?
Democracy Advantage
1.What kind of democracy will Kuwait become? Do the citizens have set any
certain type?
(the likely answer is no. bring this up as showing that the citizens are incapable of
implementing an effective democratic government)
2. How quickly will Kuwait become a democracy after the U.S. withdraws?
(if they say they don’t know, ask “Then how do you know it will? )
(If they name a specific date, ask, how do you know it will?)
(If they name a general date, ask for specifics. If they don’t name any, ask, then is it
certain that it will? )
3.Okay, how will Kuwait even become a democracy?
(if they name external influences, ask, how will they do so? How will they not come
to the same as the power-hungry U.S.?)
(If they name by itself, ask, how will they, with terrorists? How will they, on their
very own? Many underdeveloped countries have become corrupted when trying to
aim for ideal societies, such as Russia)
4. Do you have evidence that Kuwait will not become a dictatorship after U.S.
withdrawal?
5. Will the Kuwaitian monarchy definitely lose power?
6. Will it be eradicated? (Remember, it took the French several centuries to
become a democracy, literally)

**Case Cross-x Guide (2/2)**

Terrorism Advantage
1.Terrorism is sparked by U.S. presence in Kuwait, true?
(if yes, ask Then the terrorists are the Kuwaitians themselves? If they answer no to
this, ask, then why would they care about U.S. presence? If they make up some
bullshit, ask Then why would Kuwait have reason to be afraid of them, if they’re
just the public itself? If they say they’re just violent public, ask how stability will be
maintained? Therefore the Terrorism Advantage is bullshit. They aren’t terrorists
at all. If they answered yes to terrorists=Kuwaitians, follow the same path (why
would Kuwait be afraid?))
(if no, ask, then what do they have to do with U.S. precence in Kuwait? How does
U.S. presence relate to that terrorism? Obviously the U.S. has nothing to do with it.
This is further reason to keep U.S. there, to protect the people against other
terrorists)
2. Do you have evidence that terrorists will leave after U.S. withdrawal?
(If they say that terrorists are there only because US, either see above blue
highlighted, or emphasize LEAVE. Remember not to do both)
Once again, do you have ANY EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER that the terrorists will
leave after the U.S. withdraws.
(they’ll probably say no. if they say yes, listen for it, or ask for it directly. Use logic
to strengthen case: because people, especially terrorists, like to take advantage of
others’ weakness. Just look at the Taliban in Afghanistan)
3. Do you have any evidence that Kuwait would be able to defend itself from
Terrorists without U.S. Military Presence?
(state this in your speech: because the aff has brought up no evidence that the
terrorists will leave, or die down, without U.S. presence, THERE IS NO
SOLVENCY WHATSOEVER, AND THE AFF’S “IMPACTS” WORK FOR THE
NEG AS WELL. TERRORISM WILL STILL SPILLOVER AND STILL
AFFLICT THE COUNTRY. IN FACT, THE AFF PLAN WOULD WORSEN THE
CONDITION, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WOULDN’T BE ABLE TO
PROTECT THE COUNTRY.)
(Remember to take a cynical point of view of people. Terrorists are opportunists. )
Topicality
1. From where in Kuwait are you removing troops? (If specific base, run
In=throughout)
2. What are the functions of US troops in Kuwait? (If they answer “they
have no function” run Useless troop=/=military presence.)

**A2:Inherency**

Inherency Iraq (1/2)

Withdrawal from Iraq means troops will inevitably withdraw from Kuwait.
The World Tribune, 4-22-10
(“Contractors to expedite U.S. withdrawal, shrink infrastructure in Kuwait”
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0335_04_22.asp)
WASHINGTON — The U.S. military has selected contractors to help reduce its presence in Kuwait. Officials said the
Defense Department has been awarding contracts to U.S. firms to facilitate the reduction of forces in Kuwait. They
said the U.S. military would thin its huge logistics and training infrastructure in Kuwait as
the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq concludes in September 2010. “We could have
a much smaller footprint in Kuwait once there is no longer a need to support a combat
presence in Iraq,” an official said. On March 31, the Pentagon awarded a $46 million contract to Combat Support
Associates, based in Fort Worth, Texas. Under the contract, Combat Support would help in the flow of
U.S. troops and equipment from Kuwait. The company has already been under contract to
the U.S. military. “This procurement is for base operations support services, including security and logistics for
supplies and services, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and functions of assigned and tenant units moving
into, out of, and within the country of Kuwait,” the Pentagon said on April 6. Officials said the U.S. military
has nearly 20,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help in the withdrawal from Iraq. They said this has
marked an increase in American personnel based in the Gulf Cooperation Council sheikdom in an
effort to enhance security and other functions. “Base operation services also support the Coalition/Joint Reception,
Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration mission; promotes security and stability within the region; and provides
operational support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously fulfilling international security commitments and
theater deterrence in support of the Defense Cooperative Agreement between the United States and Kuwait,” the
Pentagon said. Officials said the U.S. military has been copying elements of its command and
control network in Iraq for installation in Afghanistan. They said the Pentagon has awarded a $14
million contract to FedTech Services to develop an information technology solution in Afghanistan — termed Theater
Network Management Architecture — that would be similar to that operating in Iraq. The contract with Combat Support
would take place in Kuwait through September 2010. The statement said one bid was solicited and received. The
Pentagon also awarded a $77 million contract to DRS Technical Services to assist in the U.S. military withdrawal from
Iraq. Under the contract, DRS would support the transition of the military’s command, control, communications and
computer capabilities from several locations within Iraq to the Baghdad International Zone, the U.S. embassy, and other
enduring forward operating bases. “The majority of the services involve project management, program planning and
analysis, telecommunications engineering, systems and network engineering and integration, and communications
infrastructure installation to include inside and outside plant architecture,” DRS said on April 7
This clearly shows that troops will be withdrawn when troops from Iraq are
withdrawn.
Obama plans to remove troops from Iraq

The Washington Post 2010 (Wilson, Scott, Staff Writer “U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will be on time, Vice
President Biden says” May 27, 2010)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/AR2010052605349.html
President Obama called Iraq his predecessor’s war of choice. Now it is his war to exit –
and quickly. The challenge for Obama, whose opposition to the Iraq invasion helped propel
him to the presidency, is sticking to his timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal despite a
jump in violence and continued wrangling among Iraqi politicians over who will lead the
country. The sensitive departure is being managed by Vice President Biden, who says the U.S.
military will reduce troop levels to 50,000 this summer, even if no new Iraqi government
takes shape. “It’s going to be painful; there’s going to be ups and downs,” Biden said in a 40-
minute interview in his West Wing office this month. “But I do think the end result is going to
be that we’re going to be able to keep our commitment.” White House officials say Iraqis
are increasingly relying on politics, rather than violence, to deal with disputes, diminishing
the need for U.S. forces. But the situation on the ground demonstrates that Iraq remains
fractured.

Inherency Iraq (2/2)

This clearly shows Obama plans to remove troop, which mean that troops from
Kuwait will follow. We have proved that the affirmative team has no inherent
barrier what so ever. This is a voting issue for the neg. If we win on inherency we
win the debate
Also the affirmative team read a card in the 1ac that says troops will be guaranteed
usage because they will be used in the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, so they
concede to this. Since troops will be removed from Iraq forever, there will be no
more use for those troops and they will thus be removed
If the aff claims that this is not the case and that they will mot be used to do so, not
only do they contradict themselves, but they will thus have no inherency evidence,
and thus they loose, because they have the burden of proof in this debate. It’s a
double bind.

**A2: Missile Advantage**

Turkey and TNWs

The affirmative claims that by having troops and deploying patriot missiles, this
increases tensions with Iran and leads to global war. Let’s look at this rationally.
First off all we have TNWs in Turkey that are much more tensioning to Iran.
TNWs in Turkey are certainly more of an issue, because nuclear weapons are. In
fact a nuclear Turkey causes disruption in the middle east.
P.D. Spyropoulos, Boston Globe, December 9, 1999, p.http://www.ahmp.org/bosglob8.html
Many are now convinced that a nuclear Turkey, already among the most highly militarized
states in the world, will be the surest way to usher in a nuclear arms race in the Balkans and
Mideast, two of the world’s most volatile regions, and both at Europe’s doorstep. Turkey’s
military adventurism in the Balkans, Cyprus, Central Asia and the Middle East should
further underscore the fact that placing nuclear power into the hands of governments that
have not yet developed the maturity to harness it can soon develop into the greatest global
security threat of the coming century.
What this evidence says is that Turkey is causing all these problems, yet we are still
here, and there has been no war at all. We know Turkey has nuclear weapons, and
none of these things have happened. It is almost impossible that the affs impact will
occur of we have patriot missiles.

- 10 –Kuwait Negative JV
Division
A2: Iran Prolif Prevention
The affirmative states that if Kuwait – Iranian relations improve, that Kuwait can
stop the proliferation of Iran. They’re completely flawed in their thinking. First off
all Un sanctions have done nothing to Iran’s nuclear program
Dareini 6/17 (Ali, The Chronicle Herald, The Associated Press,
http://thechronicleherald.ca/World/1187652.html)JFS
TEHRAN, Iran — Defying week-old UN sanctions over its nuclear program, Iran promised to
expand its atomic research Wednesday as its president vowed to punish the West and force it
to “sit at the negotiating table like a polite child” before agreeing to further talks.
Tehran, which insists its nuclear work is peaceful, said it will build four new reactors for atomic
medical research. The United States and some of its allies believe Iran is trying to develop
nuclear weapons, and the Islamic Republic’s plans to expand research could encourage calls in the
West for more economic pressure against the country.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran will not make “one iota of concessions.” He said he
will soon announce new conditions for talks with the West, but first he wants to punish world
powers for imposing sanctions.
Kuwait is part of the UN, and has agreed to sanctions against Iran
Khaleej Times 10(7/12, Kuwait starts applying Un sanctions on Iran,
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle08.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2010/November/middleeast_No
vember269.xml&section=middleeast, date accessed: 2-2-11.)
The central bank of Kuwait has asked the Gulf emirates banks, investment companies and money
exchange firms to start implementing UN sanctions against neighboring Iran, local media said on
Friday. The instructions for the freezing of assets and financial resources related to “Iran’s sensitive
nuclear programmes or activities,” said Al-Rai newspaper, citing a circular by the bank.
This card shows that Kuwait is taking an active role in sanction giving. Those have
done nothing. So even if Iran – Kuwait relations improve, Iran hasn’t even
attempted to listen to Kuwait about nuclear disarmament, so the chance of that
happening is practically zero. Iran will want to punish Kuwait because they helped
in applying sanctions against them. The first card stated so, there will be no
negotiations.
In fact because of Iran’s intentions towards Kuwait, we should leave our troops in to
defend them. The patriot missiles will be used as deterrence. The missiles are an
advantage to the status quo. Look at this as a disad to the aff plan.

Division
**A2: Terrorism Advantage**

Division
A2: Spillover
The affirmative claims that having US troops presence leads to terrorist build up,
which leads to spillover and global war. Sounds great on paper, but in reality is
completely and totally ridiculous. There is no way terrorist spillover will lead to
global war, because there are terrorists currently in the Middle East, yet we haven’t
had global war. So it is highly unlikely for such an event to occur.
Also let us keep in mind that it is highly unlikely that such an event will occur
because of the fear of nuclear inhalation, and economic ruin. A global will just not
happen any time soon for us to be concerned. The affirmative is being very
melodramatic, for you to appeal to them. However the status quo is not as they
describe. There accusations are outrageously far fetched.

Division
A2: US presence causes terrorism
US-Kuwait relations are important- terrorism, Iraqi instability, civil war.

Terril, Middle East Specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, 07
(Andrew, Strategic Studies Institute, “KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub788.pdf.)
This monograph notes that the United States can, if insufficiently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti
relationship and fail to adequately consult the leadership and take Kuwaiti interests into account.
Kuwaitis have the potential to become more jaded and less cooperative in their relations with the
United States if they view themselves as taken for granted or dealt with as subordinates. The
United States has a long history of resentful allies carefully measuring the degree of cooperation
they will give in return for security guarantees. There is no need for this to occur with Kuwait.
Moves to strengthen U.S.-Kuwait relations thus become important and may become especially
vital if setbacks in Iraq eventually prompt a U.S. withdrawal under less than optimal conditions.
Strong efforts should be made to prevent sectarian warfare in Iraq from spreading to Kuwait
under such scenarios. Such efforts may require a great deal of new and creative thinking by both
Kuwaitis and Americans as the threat of a conventional Iraq attack has now been overshadowed
by the dangers of spillover from an Iraqi civil war, new and deadlier terrorism, and large- scale
subversion.
What this card is saying is that the troops are actually key to preventing a terrorist
disaster. The affirmative claims that removing troops will solve the problem of
terrorism, because terrorism will go down. However Us presence checks terrorism.
Also let us remember 9-11. When we were not fighting terrorism, we were attacked,
and many were killed. Ever since the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, there have
been no major attacks. We can thus deduce the US keeps terrorism at its heels, too
concentrated on escaping us, then attacking us, so far a successful tactic.

Division
A2: Nuclear Terrorism
The chance of a terrorist using a nuclear weapon to lead to global war is extremely
unlikely
Cnn 8 (12-5,WMD terrorism is overthrown, Peter Bergen, security analyst for CNN, and analyst for New
York Universities, security center, http://www.newamerica.net/node/8679., , date accessed:12-13-10)
The congressionally authorized Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism issued a report this week that concluded: “It is more
likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.” The findings of this report received considerable
ink in The New York Ti mes and The Washington Post and plenty of airtime on networks around the world, including on CNN. And the day the report was released Vice President-
. Terrorists have already used weapons of mass
elect Joseph Biden was briefed on its contents. So is the sky falling? Not really
destruction in the past decade in attacks around the world, and they have proven to be something of
a dud. In the fall of 2001, the anthrax attacks in the United States that targeted politicians and jour nalists caused considerable panic but did not lead to many deaths. Five
people were killed. The alleged author of that attack, Bruce E. Ivins, was one of the leading biological weapons researchers in the United States. Even this brilliant scientist could
only “weaponize” anthrax to the point that it killed a handful of people. Imagine then how difficult it would be for the average terrorist, or even the above-average terrorist, to
replicate such efforts. Similarly, the bizarre Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which recruited leading scientists and had hundreds of millions of dollars in the bank, embarked on a
large-scale WMD program in the early 1990s in which cult members experimented with anthrax and invested in land in Australia to mine uranium. In the end, Aum found
biological and nuclear attacks too complex to organize and settled instead on a chemical weapons operation, setting off sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995 that killed 12
commuters. It is hard to imagine a place better suited to killing a lot of people than the jam-packed Tokyo subway, yet the death toll turned out to be small in Aum’s chemical
weapons assault. More recently, in 2006 and 2007 al Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate laced several of its bombs with chlorine. Those attacks sickened hundreds of Iraqis, but victims who
There
died in the assaults did so more from the blast of the bombs than because of inhaling chlorine. Al Qaeda stopped using chlorine in its bombs in Iraq more than a year ago.
is a semantic problem of WMDs because the ominous ter m ‘’Weapons of Mass Destruction’’ is something of a
in any discussion
misnomer. In the popular imagination, chemical, biological and nuclear devices are all weapons of mass destruction. In fact, there is only one weapon
of mass destruction that can kill tens or hundreds of thousands and that is a nuclear device. So the
real question is: Can terrorists deploy nuclear weapons any time in the next five years or even
further in the future? To do so, terrorists would have one of four options: to buy, steal, develop or be
given a nuclear weapon. But none of those scenarios are remotely realistic outside the world of
Hollywood. To understand how complex it is to develop a nuclear weapon, it is worth recalling that
Saddam Hussein put tens of millions of dollars into his nuclear program with no success. Iran, which has had a
nuclear program for almost two decades, is still years away from developing a nuclear bomb. Terrorist groups simply don’ t have the massive resources of states, and so the notion
that they could develop their own, even crude, nuclear weapons is fanciful. Well, what about terrorists being given nukes? Preventing this was one of the underlying rationales of
the push to topple Hussein in 2003. This does not pass the laugh test. Brian Michael Jenkins, one of the leading U.S. terrorism experts in a book published this year, “Will
Terrorists Go Nuclear?,” points out that there are two reasons this is quite unlikely. First, gover nments are not about to hand over their crown jewels to organizations that are “not
entirely under state contr ol and whose reliability is not certain.” Second, “giving them a nuclear weapon al most certainly exposes the state sponsor to retaliation.” For the same
reason that states won’t give nukes to terrorists, they also won’t sell them either, which leaves the option of stealing a nuclear weapon. But that is similarly unlikely because
nuclear-armed governments, including Pakistan, are pretty careful about the security measures they place around their most valued weapons. None of this of course is to suggest
that al Qaeda is not interested in deploying nuclear devices. Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly bloviated about the necessity of nuking the West and
have even implied that they have the capability to do so. This is nonsense. Yes, in the mid-1990s when Al Qaeda was based in Sudan, members of the group tried to buy highly
enriched uranium suitable for a nuke, but the deal did not go through. And it is certainly the case that a year or so before 9/11, bin Laden was meeting with veterans of Pakistan’s
nuclear program to discuss how al Qaeda might get into the nuclear weapons business. But all of this was aspirational, not operational. There is not a shred of evidence that any of
In 2002, former U.N. weapons inspector David Albright undertook a careful study
this got beyond the talking stage.
of al Qaeda’s nuclear research program and concluded it was virtually impossible for al Qaeda to
have acquired any type of nuclear weapon. However, there is plenty of evidence that the group has experimented with crude chemical and
biological weapons, and also attempted to acquire radioactive materials suitable for a “dirty” bomb, a device that marries conventional explosives to radioactive materials. But
even if al Qaeda successfully deployed a crude chemical, biological or radiological weapon these
would not be weapons of mass destruction that killed thousands. Instead, these would be weapons of
mass disruption, whose principal effect would be panic – not mass casualties. So if not WMDs, what
will terrorists use in their attacks over the next five years? Small-bore chemical, biological and
radiological attacks are all quite probable, but those attacks would kill scores, not thousands. What we are
likely to see again and again are the tried and tested tactics that terrorists have used for decades: The first vehicle bomb blew up on Wall Street in 1920 detonated by an Italian-
American anarchist. Since then, the car/truck bomb has been reliably deployed by terrorists thousands of times.Assassinations, such as the one that killed Archduke Ferdinand in
Sarajevo in 1914, sparking one of the bloodiest wars in histor y.Hijackings, such as those that inaugurated the worst terrorist attack in history on 9/11.Guys armed with AK-47s
intent on murder and mayhem as we saw in Mumbai, India, brought one of the world’s largest countries to a standstill and generated continuous news coverage around the globe
for 60 hours.Why go the deeply uncer tain, and enormously complex and expensive WMD route when other methods have proved so successful in getting attention for terrorists in
the past? The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism makes all sorts of sensible recommendations. Among them is creating a
WMD adviser in the White House who would coordinate all the issues of WMD proliferation and terrorism, something the Obama administration would do well to implement.
Right now, responsibility for this important job is diffused over numerous agencies, from the Department of Energy to the Pentagon. But the report’s overall conclusion that WMD
What this card states is that it would be impossible for a terrorist to get their hands
on a nuclear device. If a terrorist can’t get their hands on such a device, then there
is no way that they can start a nuclear war. Its impossible. Ignore this aff advantage.

Division
**A2: Democracy Advantage**

Division
A2: Proliferation
The affirmative claims that the proliferation of middle east countries has to do with
the fact that there is no stable democracy. This is merely a coinsidence. Look at
Isreal.
It is a stable democracy.
The American Prospect 09 (12-4, Political Magizine, and Utne Reader Award reciever,
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=is_israel_a_democracy, date accessed: 2-3-11)
This a just a selection from the last few weeks' news reports on the ethnic gap in Israel -- not that
inequality is big news. The most clichéd phrase in Israeli political discourse is that the country is a
"Jewish and democratic state." The phrase is overused precisely because of the tension between the
two adjectives, because of the majority's insecurity over whether both can be achieved at the same
time. (The minority generally presumes it can't.) The standard line of the country's boosters is that it's
the only democracy in the Middle East. The most concise criticism is that it is an "ethnocracy," as Israeli
political geographer Oren Yiftachel argues in his 2006 book of that name. An ethnocracy, he explains, is a
regime promoting "the expansion of the dominant group in contested territory … while maintaining
a democratic façade." Looking at this debate in light of two new books by Israeli scholars and of a faded
and remarkable document that I've just read in the Israel State Archives, it seems both sides could be right.
What this card is saying is that, true, Isreali is a Jewish state, but it is also a
democracy. With this evidence, we can conclude that Isreali is a democracy in the
Middle East, so the aff cannot claim to have a link. There is a stable democracy in
the middle East and yet Iran is trying to proliferate. So an unstable democracy isn’t
the cause here.

Division
**A2: Solvency**

Division
Squo Solves
Withdrawal from Iraq means troops will inevitably withdraw from Kuwait.
The World Tribune, 4-22-10
(“Contractors to expedite U.S. withdrawal, shrink infrastructure in Kuwait”
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_gulf0335_04_22.asp)
WASHINGTON — The U.S. military has selected contractors to help reduce its presence in
Kuwait. Officials said the Defense Department has been awarding contracts to U.S. firms to
facilitate the reduction of forces in Kuwait. They said the U.S. military would thin its huge
logistics and training infrastructure in Kuwait as the withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq
concludes in September 2010. "We could have a much smaller footprint in Kuwait once there is
no longer a need to support a combat presence in Iraq," an official said. On March 31, the
Pentagon awarded a $46 million contract to Combat Support Associates, based in Fort Worth,
Texas. Under the contract, Combat Support would help in the flow of U.S. troops and equipment
from Kuwait. The company has already been under contract to the U.S. military. "This
procurement is for base operations support services, including security and logistics for supplies
and services, which are critical to accomplishing the mission and functions of assigned and
tenant units moving into, out of, and within the country of Kuwait," the Pentagon said on April
6. Officials said the U.S. military has nearly 20,000 soldiers in Kuwait to help in the withdrawal
from Iraq. They said this has marked an increase in American personnel based in the Gulf
Cooperation Council sheikdom in an effort to enhance security and other functions. "Base
operation services also support the Coalition/Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration mission; promotes security and stability within the region; and provides operational
support for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while simultaneously fulfilling international security
commitments and theater deterrence in support of the Defense Cooperative Agreement between
the United States and Kuwait," the Pentagon said. Officials said the U.S. military has been
copying elements of its command and control network in Iraq for installation in Afghanistan.
They said the Pentagon has awarded a $14 million contract to FedTech Services to develop an
information technology solution in Afghanistan — termed Theater Network Management
Architecture — that would be similar to that operating in Iraq. The contract with Combat
Support would take place in Kuwait through September 2010. The statement said one bid was
solicited and received. The Pentagon also awarded a $77 million contract to DRS Technical
Services to assist in the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq. Under the contract, DRS would
support the transition of the military's command, control, communications and computer
capabilities from several locations within Iraq to the Baghdad International Zone, the U.S.
embassy, and other enduring forward operating bases. "The majority of the services involve
project management, program planning and analysis, telecommunications engineering, systems
and network engineering and integration, and communications infrastructure installation to
include inside and outside plant architecture," DRS said on April 7
What this is saying is that the status quo will easily solve the aff’s case, so there is no
point in doing the plan. The status quo will do it. Vote neg because we defend the
status quo, and it will solve the plan. The aff must provide incentive to run there
plan.

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Missile Adv. Solvency
The aff claims they can solve their missile advantage by removing troops, which
removes patriot missile, and thus eliminates tensions. However they neglect Turkey,
a much higher threat to Iran. The Turkish TNWs are causing tension as well.
TNW’s cause Iran Prolif
Kibaroglu 10 (Mustafa, Fellow at the Harvard University’s BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs, the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu#bio) PR
Because of the view that NATO’s deterrent will be more credible with the presence of forward-deployed U.S. nuclear
weapons in the allied territories in Europe, Turkish diplomats believe that the burden of hosting these weapons should
continue to be shared collectively among five allies, as has been the case over the last several decades. Even if all of
Turkey’s allies accept this proposal and act accordingly, Turkey will still face a dilemma in its
foreign and security policies if it sees the hosting of U.S. nuclear weapons as the only way for it
to fulfill its burden-sharing obligations. Ankara’s continuing support for the presence of the U.S. weapons on
Turkish territory could be justified only if there were a threat from the military capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, the two
most significant of which would be Iran and Syria, and if the Western allies shared that threat assessment. There can be no
other meaningful scenario that would justify Turkey’s policy of retaining U.S. nuclear weapons on its territory as well as
leaving the door open for the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Turkey in the future. Recent trends, however, appear to
be moving from such a threat assessment by Turkey. Over the last few years, Turkey has experienced an
unprecedented rapprochement with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Last year, Turkey held joint
ministerial cabinet meetings with Iraq in October and Syria in December. Until recently, Turkey had treated both countries as
foes rather than friends. These meetings have produced a significant number of protocols, memoranda of understanding, and
other documents on a wide array of issue areas including the thorniest subjects, such as ways and means of dealing with
terrorism effectively and using the region’s scarce water resources more equitably. Moreover, these high-level meetings
resulted in the lifting of the visa requirement for Turkish citizens traveling to Syria and vice versa. That action has paved the
way to an opening of the borders between the two countries; the borders had stayed closed for decades due to the presence of
large numbers of heavy land mines on both sides. The mines will soon be cleaned up with a view to opening huge land areas
to agriculture. In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more
involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in
1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a
willingness to take on a similar role in Iran’s dispute with the international community over
the nature and scope of Tehran’s nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey’s
NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the
region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that
the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued
insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism
from Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors. Some of these neighbors, such as Iran and Syria,
criticize Turkey’s policy of retaining nuclear weapons because they see the weapons as being
directed against them . Others in the Arab world, such as Egypt, portray these weapons as a
symbol of Western imperialism. Turkey therefore will have to seriously reconsider its policy
on U.S. nuclear weapons. For this to happen, a debate should take place in the country in various platforms, in closed
as well as open forums, with the participation of experts, scholars, officials, and other concerned citizens. There is a common
belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the
possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if
Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to
develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear
weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous
policies. Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible
reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish
territory. The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some
Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-
weapon state.” There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually
spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the
country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.
This card shows that the TNWs in Turkey cause the proliferation of Iran, so the aff
cannot claim to solve for Iranian prolif, if there are TNWs in Turkey
Division
Terrorist Adv. Solvency
The aff cannot solve for terrorism leading to global/nuclear war, because there are
terrorists throughout the Middle East
Pakistan Daily News 10 (Where are Hideouts of Terrorists?, Sajjad Shaukat, Editor for the Pakistani
Daily News, and Gonvernment author, http://www.daily.pk/where-are-hideouts-of-terrorists-22120/, date
accessed: 2-3-11)
In the recent past, Afghanistan’s National Security Adviser Rangin Dadfar Spanta has also called on
Pakistan to “take serious measures against the militants groups” who launch attacks on Afghan
targets from secure havens inside Pakistan. However, these are not new allegations against Pakistan
because from time to time, both Afghan and US high officials have been accusing Islamabad of cross-
border terrorism and hideouts of terrorists. In this connection, recently, US Vice President Joe Biden has
pointed out during an interview with the ABC television, “everyone knew in these summer months,
when they (Taliban) can infiltrate from Pakistan under the cover of foliage and the rest and it is open
that there would be more deaths.” On July 18, during her latest visit to Pakistan US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton urged Pakistan to ‘do more’ to counter terrorism. She elaborated, “There are still additional
steps that we are asking and expecting Pakistan to take.” In a threatening style, Ms. Clinton also stated,
“there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that if an attack against the United States be traced to be
Pakistani, it would have a very devastating impact on our relationship.”
What this card shows, is that there are terrorists in Pakistan that are high threat,
and thus the aff cannot solve for their advantage, because they cannot stop other
terrorists like these from causing global war.
Answer in C-X:
Q: How are these terrorist threatening us?
A: They aren’t so much threating us directy, but are threating the alliance between the US
and Pakistan which would cause destabilization of the Middle East and result in global
war.

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**Topicality**

Division
Reduce is not eliminate
A. Interpretation—Reduce means to make something smaller in size—it is distinct

from eliminate
Words and Phrases 2(Volume 36B, p. 80)

The word “reduce” is its ordinary signification does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to
naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state. Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188
Mass. 363
B. Violation—The aff eliminates presence rather than reducing it.
C. Standards:
1. Grammatical Predictability—it is impossible to predict an elimination of
troops, destroying the negatives ability to generate ground.
2. Education— It is not real world to remove all presence from nations,

eliminating military presence ignores the in-depth real-world debate about
the strategy behind military withdrawals.
D. Voter for fairness and education—evaluate under competing interpretations—it

forces debate about what the topic should look like, while reasonability is arbitrary.

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Useless troops are not Military Presence
Before runnning this T shell, make sure to ask what the function of Kuwait troops
are. If the answer that they do nothing, the use this shell. Other wise DO NOT!
A. Interpretation: Military personnel require active duty designation
Office of the Secretary of Defense 88

(http://law.justia.com/us/cfr/title32/321.1.1.4.46.html.)
Military Personnel. Includes all U.S. military personnel on active duty, U.S. National Guard or
Reserve personnel on active duty, and Military Service Academy cadets and midshipmen.
B. Violation: The plan removes troops without active duty station, which violates the
topic, under the removal of military presence
C. Standards
1. Fairness – The removal of useless troops moots neg ground, because we
cannot have links that apply to disads.
2. Education – There is no way to predict such an aff plan such as this that
removes useless troops which causes abuse. This leads the neg into a
breath over depth situation, in which we cannot debate about the disads
to the plan, and ruins our ability to learn about the complex interaction
invovled in a military withdrawal
D. Voter for fairness and education: -evaluate under competing interpritations-

allows the debate to be about what the topic should be, while allowing for neg
ground, and no aff abuse.

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In Means Throughout
Ask during C-X, where they are removing troops from. If they answer with a single base,
then use this shell. If not , DO NOT!
A. Interpretation—In means throughout.
Words and Phrases 1904(Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases,
Volume 4, pg. 3465)
In the act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to her and
determine all complaints, etc., the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties.
Reynolds v. Larkin, 14 Pac. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.
B. Violation—They only reduce presence in certain areas.
C. Standards:
1. Predictable Limits—There are thousands of areas the U.S. has troops—it
is impossible to predict what areas the aff would remove from, and all the
permutations of these areas exponentially increase the topic.
2. Ground—Removing troops in certain areas allows the aff to spike out of

perception links and DA’s by having more specific evidence about the area
than the neg.
D. Voter for fairness and education—evaluate under competing interpretations—it

forces debate about what the topic should look like, while reasonability is arbitrary.

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ASPEC
Only use this if the aff does not provide a specific branch. Make sure you know what
you’ re talking about. If the branch is provided DO NOT USE!
A. Interpretation— The USFG is the 3 branches
The Government of New Zealand 9 (http://www.library.auckland.ac.nz/subjects/law/pdfs/

RetrievingLegalMaterialsOrganisedbyRegion.pdf)
The United States federal government consists of the legislative branch (the House of
Representatives and the Senate), the judicial branch (a hierarchy of courts), and the executive
branch (the elected President).
B. Violation—The affirmative doesn’t specify which agent enacts the plan.
C. Standards:
1. Predictable Ground—Not specifying allows the aff to spike out of agent
DA’s or eliminate competitiveness on counterplans by choosing an agent in
the 2ac.
2. Education—We lose education that is based off the real-world

implementation of the aff.
D. Voter for fairness and education.

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**1 Card DA’s (General)**

Division
Job Placement DA
Most of the United States Army Recruits around the world are high school dropouts, this
means that bringing them back will force them to compete in a harsh economic
environment with absolutely no job experience
Schmitt, 09, Journalist for NY Times, Army Recruiting More High School Dropouts to
Meet Goals http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/11/politics/11recruit.html
WASHINGTON, June 10 - The Army is having to turn to more high school dropouts and lower-achieving
applicants to fill its ranks, accepting hundreds of recruits in recent months who would have been rejected a
year ago, according to Army statistics. Eight months into the recruiting year, the percentage of new recruits
in the Army without a high school diploma has risen to 40 percent, the upper limit of what the Army is
willing to accept, from 8 percent last year. The percentage of recruits with scores in the lowest acceptable
range on the standardized test used to screen potential soldiers has also risen to 2 percent, also reaching the
Army's limit, from slightly more than a half-percent last year, reaching the highest level since 2001.
In the last major troop withdrawals in WWII and Vietnam, soldiers coming home
were treated to free higher education in order for their placement back into society
Adolph Reed 01 Jr. “A GI Bill For Everybody” professor of political science on the Graduate Faculty of
Social and Political Science at the New School for Social Research, a member of the Interim National
Council of the Labor Party. Disent Magazine Fall 2001 JL
Universal access to higher education is not entirely unprecedented in recent American history. The most
dramatic approximation to it was the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, popularly known as the GI
Bill, under which a generation of Second World War veterans received what was usually full tuition
support and stipends (up to nearly $12,000 per year in 1994 dollars) to attend post-secondary educational
institutions. By 1952, the federal government had spent $7 billion (nearly $39 billion in 1994 dollars) on
sending veterans to college. This amounted to 1.3 percent of total federal expenditures ($521.8 billion)
during that period. A 1988 report by a congressional subcommittee on education and health estimated that
40 percent of those who attended college under the GI Bill would not otherwise have done so. The report
also found that each dollar spent educating that 40 percent produced a $6.90 return (more than $267 billion
in 1994 dollars) in national output due to extra education and increased federal tax revenues from the extra
income the beneficiaries earned.
So, without a mandate for higher education predicated in the GI Bill which was
repealed in the late 20th century, bringing back troops from foreign countries will
place them in an environment where they are unable to compete with fresh college
graduates. Unemployment, which hovers at 9.8% will skyrocket if more troops
return home and are unable to seek jobs. Therefore their plan which does not
mandate any education reform bills or rehabilitation bills will lead to complete
chaos economically. It is too early to bring back troops just of the top of your head.
You need to establish a firm and stable environment for their return before you
agree to pull them out. Since the Affirmative team thinks of no such solution, and
simply absentmindedly decides to pull them out, voting for them is a mistake
because of unforeseen consequences coming to haunt us after a seemingly easy
solution to the problem. Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

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PTSD DA
Army Spc. Shawn Saunders was proud of his first two tours in Iraq. In his third year, he snapped. His
parents say his breaking point was watching his best friend die while guarding a checkpoint. Texas medic
Taylor Burke took Saunders’ turn, and the car blew up. "When he passed, it was like a part of me that's
left me, and I haven't been the same since," Saunders said. Thousands of veterans just like this will suffer
from PTSD when the return from their turn of duty. Without solid programs to mentally rehabilitate all the
troops from neurological disorders, veterans find themselves in situations where violence and suicide seem
to be the only option.
William M. Welch, USA Today, 2-28-2005, (“Trauma of Iraq war haunting thousands returning home”,
USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-02-28-cover-iraq-injuries_x.htm)
As the United States nears the two-year mark in its military presence in Iraq still fighting a violent
insurgency, it is also coming to grips with one of the products of war at home: a new generation of
veterans, some of them scarred in ways seen and unseen. While military hospitals mend the physical
wounds, the VA is attempting to focus its massive health and benefits bureaucracy on the long-term needs
of combat veterans after they leave military service. Some suffer from wounds of flesh and bone, others of
emotions and psyche. These injured and disabled men and women represent the most grievously wounded
group of returning combat veterans since the Vietnam War, which officially ended in 1975. Of more than 5
million veterans treated at VA facilities last year, from counseling centers like this one to big hospitals,
48,733 were from the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of the most common wounds aren't seen
until soldiers return home. Post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, is an often-debilitating mental
condition that can produce a range of unwanted emotional responses to the trauma of combat. It can emerge
weeks, months or years later. If left untreated, it can severely affect the lives not only of veterans, but their
families as well. Of the 244,054 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan already discharged from service, 12,422
have been in VA counseling centers for readjustment problems and symptoms associated with PTSD.
Comparisons to past wars are difficult because emotional problems were often ignored or written off as
"combat fatigue" or "shell shock." PTSD wasn't even an official diagnosis, accepted by the medical
profession, until after Vietnam.
Military neglects and denies PTSD troops treatment

Kimberly Dozier, Chief Reporting Correspondent for Iraq, 12-20-2007, (“Is The Military Neglecting
PTSD Troops? Veterans' Advocates Say Ignoring Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Is A Military-Wide
Problem”, CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/20/eveningnews/main3637097.shtml)
During home leave from Iraq, Shawn talked of suicide. At Fort Hood, his home base, he asked for help.
Instead of treatment, he says he got bureaucracy. "I was basically just trying to find out what was wrong
with me, because I was thinking about hurting myself, thinking about hurting other people," he said. His
dad took action, flying him to a New York veteran’s hospital. Doctors there diagnosed Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder. The Army disagreed. Military police arrested him at the hospital, jailed him and kicked
him out. Veterans advocates say it’s a military-wide problem, where symptoms of PTSD - from substance-
abuse to rage to suicidal depression - are misdiagnosed or blamed on the troops themselves. . Discharging
for a personality disorder takes days, and costs the military nothing. A PTSD discharge can take up to nine
months, and treatment can last a lifetime - in severe cases, costing up to $2 million each.
If the affirmative team brings home troops in significant number from the battlefields of *insert country
here* without setting together a solution to solve the PTSD problem, they risk not only hurting the lives of
the troops themselves, but also the citizens here in America. That is a risk we cannot take. Although the
affirmative teams actions are well intentioned, the truth of the matter is, they cause more harm than good.
We cannot afford to pass the affirmative teams plan unless we are ready to rehabilitate all the incoming
troops that return home.

Division
**DA’s (General and Specific)**

Division
Econ DA (1/3)
A. Kuwait’s economy is on the brink now – a rescue package has stabilized the
economy but if any worsening means catastrophe.
Reuters 6/21 (Reuters, international news organization,
[http://arabia.msn.com/Business/Market/AF/2010/June/1730513.aspx?ref=rss] AD:
6/24/10)JM
Kuwait's numerous trading and holding companies known as investment houses were hard hit
by the meltdown, which prompted a government economic rescue package worth 1.5 billion dinars
($5.15 billion) last year. Critics note the houses require no banking licenses despite offering investment banking services,
some real estate firms are licensed to operate as investment companies, and others lend without having to fulfil reserve
requirements like banks. "This measure is just an attempt to accelerate the process of cleaning up the market," said independent
economist Jassem al-Saadoun. "(The central bank) believes that if things are left without controls, companies will remain hanging between life
and death for a long time and that is harmful to shareholders and to confidence in the market." Saadoun estimated some 40
percent of
Kuwait's investment firms were too weak to survive, and 40 percent were in good condition.
The rest, like Global Investment House and Investment Dar, were "too big" to be allowed to fall.
Their keeling over would be "catastrophic" for banks, asset prices, individuals who invest in
their funds and even the judicial system that could be swamped in the aftermath, he said. Global has
reached a deal with creditors to reschedule $1.7 billion in debt, and Investment Dar, which is struggling to restructure about $3.48 billion of
debt, has applied for support under the rescue package.
B. US security assurances are critical for oil investment

Habibi and Woertz 9 (Nader and Eckart, Nader – Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East and Eckart – Director of
Economic Studies @ the Gulf Research Center, Middle East Brief Vol. 39, Feb, www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB34.pdf) JPG
The second component of U.S. oil policy in the region is close alliances with the oil monarchies
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. These six oil-exporting countries,
which make up the GCC, rely on the U.S., and to a lesser extent on the UK and France, for their external
defence and domestic security assistance. The third component of U.S. oil policy is to
maximize the participation of U.S. oil companies in the production, refining, and transportation of oil
and gas products in the region. Western oil companies such as Halliburton, ExxonMobil, Texaco, and
British Petroleum (BP)—with a large American ownership—are actively involved in
exploration, production, and refining activities in GCC countries. In the past two decades, American oil
firms have continued their involvement in the production and distribution of oil and gas in several MENA countries. This
cooperation has mostly taken the form of service contracts for specific activities—whereas
lucrative production-sharing agreements that allow international oil companies to show the oil reserves of a particular project
on their balance sheets have been off-limits. Some American oil firms have also participated in public-
private joint ventures in partnership with national oil companies. The Bush administration actively
promoted the participation of American oil firms in these public-private partnerships and encouraged GCC governments to
accept foreign investment in their energy sectors.4
C. Kuwaiti oil is key to the regional economy.

Al-Fil 4/7 (Gérard, financial journalist in Dubai, [http://www.marcopolis.net/kuwait-economic-vision.htm?Itemid=112] AD:
6/23/10)JM
The
The objective: Kuwait aims to be a prosperous state that is less dependent on oil but based on a well diversified multi-industry.
country wants to play a pivotal role in the gulf region. With production of 3,15 million barrels
per day (bpd), Kuwait, whose surface of 20,000 square kilometers is half the size of Switzerland, produces more crude
oil per day than Algeria and Indonesia combined. Within the Organization of Petrol Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of
12 members states, Kuwait stands at number four in production ranking, together with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Nigeria. In addition to its role as a major
Kuwait is also the home of global players in the non-oil sector
oil supplier, . From A like Agility to Z like Zain, Kuwait
corporations are increasingly quoted in the Middle Eastern business news sections. Agility is a leading logistics firm in the region and is listed at both the Kuwait Stock
The Kuwait-based telcom giant Zain (formerly MTC Kuwait),
Exchange KSE and the Dubai Financial Mar ket DFM.
was founded in 1983 as the region’s first mobile operator. It has since emerged as one of the
leading players in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena). Zain operates today in 22 countries
and has a client base 56.3m people. Kuwait’s Minister of Commerce and Industry , Amad A-
Haroun , stresses that “Kuwait has a strategic geographic location, which is unique in the

Division
region. Situated between three major economies, it has much potential to become a trade
center and a trade route, bringing back the glories of the historic Silk Way.” Kuwait is a
member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a political and economic union founded in
1981, which is composed of Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, Bahrain , Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Among
GCC members, Kuwait has always been on the forefront of investing abroad. No other people travel
more. No one is investing more aggressively abroad than Kuwaiti businessmen.
Econ DA (2/3)
D. Middle East economic instability spurs political instability and terrorism.

Raddatz 9 (Martha, reporter for ABC News, Feb 13, 2009
[http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/International/story?id=6895135&page=1] AD: 6/24/10)JM
"Yes, we have to look at this as part of our threat matrix," the secretary of state said. "I know
some people have criticized him and said, 'what does the economy have to do with terrorism.'
That's a very short-sided view. I think what director Blair was saying is that we get fixated
sometimes on the headlines of dangers, and that is not in any way to underestimate the
continuing threat from terrorism, the instability in the Middle East and Afghanistan and
Pakistan and elsewhere." "But this economic crisis, left unresolved, will create massive
unemployment," she said. "It will upend governments, it will unfortunately breed instability, and
I appreciated his putting that into the context of the threat matrix." In linking the economic
downturn to instability, Clinton singled out Pakistan, where Taliban-linked militants have taken
control of the frontier region along the border with Afghanistan, and of the once-tourist haven Swat.
"... Look at Pakistan, a country that we know has to be stabilized for the benefit of not only South
Asia, but beyond," Clinton said. "It is where the terrorists and their allies have found haven. But the
economy in Pakistan is under even greater pressure now because of the global economic crisis. If
Pakistan becomes even more unstable, that increases the danger we will face by the extremists
to the Pakistan government." Asked about reports of shariah law being imposed in the Swat
valley as part of a peace deal between the government and militants, and Pakistani officials saying
that the government will not undertake any more offensive attacks on militants, Clinton said there
have been some "contradictory reports" and that she wants to "get the whole picture" before
commenting.
2. Terrorism causes extinction

Alexander 3 [Alexander, Professor and Director of Inter-University for Terrorism
Studies, Washington Times, August 28, Lexis ]
Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated
dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the
magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself.
Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical
nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It
is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the
unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the
nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the
Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began
almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic
efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements
[hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the
universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many
reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's
expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double
standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist
propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists
have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and

Division
Econ DA (3/3)
<card continued
impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it
clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological,
nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global
security concerns.

Division
Arifjan DA (1/3)
(The aff may have good intentions, but they have failed to consider the effect of
regional stability on Kuwait.) On the issue of stability, we agree with the Aff that
Kuwait is stable at the moment.
AFP 10 (June 4, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iliKXlauRMdj1Uijz1Zv-WkJ7RUQ)
WASHINGTON — High-profile attacks and casualty figures in Iraq fell in 2010 to their
lowest level since the US invasion, while the number of Al-Qaeda leaders captured or
killed soared, the US commander in Iraq said Friday. "All of those statistics for the first five months
of 2010 are the lowest we've had on record," General Ray Odierno told reporters in Washington. "Although
there has been some violence -- there have been some bad days in Iraq -- every statistic continues to go in the
right direction." He said US and Iraqi security forces in the past three months have detained or killed 34 of the top 42 Al-
Qaeda in Iraq leaders, following a "significant" infiltration of AQI's apparent headquarters in the city of Mosul. "We've been
whittling away at this for a very long time," Odierno said, adding that "we were able to get inside this network." The terror group,
he said, "will attempt to regenerate themselves (but) they are finding it more difficult" in the face of persistent joint US-Iraqi
security operations and what he described as a rejection of Al-Qaeda by "99.9 percent" of the Iraqi population. The
steadily
improving security, the intelligence boon and the new statistics -- announced by Odierno two days
after his White House meeting with US President Barack Obama -- bode well for Iraq as the US prepares a
drawdown from 88,000 troops on the ground today to 50,000 by the end of August. But Odierno stressed: "There are still
some very dangerous people out there, and there are some mid- and low-level leaders -- we don't want them to develop into senior
leadership." Iraqi security forces in late May announced the arrest of Al-Qaeda's Baghdad military chief Abbas Najem Abdullah
al-Jawari, who went by the alias Abu Abdullah, as well as Mohammed Nuri Matar Yassin al-Abadi, who was in charge of Al-
Qaeda's assassination units in the capital. In April, AQI's political leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the group's self-styled
"minister of war" Abu Ayub al-Masri were killed in a joint US-Iraqi operation. Odierno
attributed the successes
to dramatic improvements in capability by the Iraqi security forces, which he said are Comment [LD1]: Isn’t this a Uniqueness
overwhelms link? >.>
now leading security efforts "across the country," including on most counterterrorism
operations.
However, we ask the judge to vote negative because the affirmative’s plan triggers
this link. Unfortunately, although Kuwait’s stability is improving it is by no means
safe. The Middle East is currently on the brink of multiple wars, and all that’s
needed to push it over the edge into a full-out conflagration is a trigger—just like
the Affirmative’s plan.
London 6/28 (Herbert, president of Hudson Institute, June 28, 2010, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-
middle-east)
The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to
World War I, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, often
described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomatic activity: if the Iranians
send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they have apparently decided not to do
in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli. [cause for war] Syria, too, has been
playing a dangerous game, with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to
most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian
territory has been serving as a conduit for military materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move
its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a
wider regional war with Israel
could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to
produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but the road to that goal
is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to Comment [LD2]: >.>
change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran, poised to be "the hegemon" in
the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse" as American forces incrementally retreat from the region.

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Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage,
and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranian ambition.
However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all bets
are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" must stand on two legs: if one, falls, the
tent collapses. Should this tent collapse, and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a
Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in
tow, might decide that a war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible
annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear
exchange.
Arifjan DA (2/3)
US forces in Kuwait are critical to regional stability and preventing terrorism
Leverett 7 (Flynt, The American Prospect, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_way_out_of_iraq, AD: 6/28/10)
The forces in Kuwait, plus the offshore balancing of the carrier battle groups and the Marine
Expeditionary Force, would give us sufficient military power to protect our existential
interests in the Gulf, that is, preventing Iraq from becoming a launching pad for
international terrorism or a catalyst for regional instability that is so great that it jeopardizes
U.S. economic or security interests.
Removal of Camp Arifjan from Kuwait collapses stability [Camp Arifjan key to Comment [LD3]: We have to argue that troop
presence is key first, once we do ‘Think of the poor
troop presence] American soldier fighting for another country in
The previous card explains how integral US military presence is to horrible conditions!’
maintaining stability. Now think of the poor American soldier, fighting for
another country in the horrible, dusty desert conditions of the Middle East.
America can’t just abandon its troops halfway across the globe, it is a moral
obligation to support them! Camp Arifjan does just that, providing
essential services to our troops.
Global Security Dot Org 5 (26-04-2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-arifjan.htm)

Camp Arifjan is a new $200 million state-of-the-art facility built courtesy of the Kuwaiti government.
This new army base has literally risen out of the sand. The base will provide permanent support facilities
for American troops in Kuwait, replacing temporary facilities that have been used since the Gulf War. The Army
component of US Central Command (USCENTCOM), US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT), maintains a forward
presence in the region. Government-to-government agreements were negotiated with the Qatar and Kuwait to allow the
The Army has met major milestones in its security strategy in
prepositioning of military assets.
the Middle East by completing a prepositioning facility in Qatar, and by the rapid pace of construction
on a new installation in Kuwait. These facilities support USCENTCOM's efforts to protect US interests
in this region in accordance with the National Security Strategy. US forces use these facilities under a variety of
agreements, which include host nation involvement with providing and managing the facilities. A new prepositioning facility is
under construction by the Kuwait government at Arifjan, south of Kuwait City [Arifjan is also known as Araifjan, Arefjan and
Urayfijan]. When complete, the facility will replace Camp Doha, a former industrial warehouse complex that
has been converted for use as an Army installation. Camp Doha was leased by the Kuwait Ministry of Defense and provided to
the Army to
support its three major missions in Kuwait -- to maintain prepositioned
equipment, supplies and materials; direct joint exercises with the Kuwait armed forces; and ensure the
security of Kuwait. Camp Doha was intended as a temporary facility until the permanent installation was designed and Comment [LD4]: Warrant? Need another link
built at Arifjan. A full brigade set of equipment is stored at Camp Doha, much of it outside. The new facility will have most
<card continues>

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Arifjan DA (3/3)
<card continued>
of the equipment sets stored in large warehouses, similar to the ones built in Qatar, to protect them from the harsh desert
environment. While troops jokingly call the pair of tall smokestacks near Camp Doha the "Scud goal posts," commanders have
had to install makeshift measures around the facility to keep troops protected from terrorist threats. All that will change when the
Army shifts its operations to a new facility now being built south of Kuwait City near the village of Arifjan and the
headquarters of a Kuwait armored brigade. It will be absolutely state of the art, from force protection to life
support. For starters, troops will live in actual barracks instead of the beehives carved out of the warehouses.
Instead of hanging Kevlar netting across windows to protect against blasts, the new facility will use shatterproof
Mylar glass. Armored vehicles will get special maintenance bays for the contracted mechanics who
keep the equipment at one of the highest availability rates in the Army.

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Isreali Relations(1/3)
U.S.-Israeli Relations are essential to maintaining Middle East peace.
Uniqueness:
Relations currently keep a strike on Iran in check, but it’s still an option
Haaretz Service 7/8 (http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obama-israel-

won-t-attack-iran-without-coordinating-with-u-s-1.300793) GAT
U.S. President Barack Obama told Channel 2 News on Wednesday that he believed Israel would not try to
surprise the U.S. with a unilateral attack on Iran. In an interview, to be aired Thursday evening, Obama was
asked whether he was concerned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would try to attack Iran without clearing the move
with the U.S., to which the president replied "I think the relationship between Israel and the U.S. is
sufficiently strong that neither of us try to surprise each other, but we try to coordinate on
issues of mutual concern." Obama spoke to Channel 2's Yonit Levy one day after what he described as an
"excellent" meeting with Netanyahu at the White House. The two leaders met alone for about 90 minutes Tuesday evening,
during which time they discussed the peace process with the Palestinians, the contested Iranian nuclear program, and the
strategic understandings between their two countries on Tehran's efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities.
Currently, strikes are an option but diplomacy seems to be prevailing

Schneider 10 (Howard, writer for Washington Post, 1/1/10,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/31/AR2009123101934.html?hpid=moreheadlines) GAT
Israeli officials say they will support President Obama's move to impose sanctions on Iran as a
next step in the standoff over the country's nuclear program, though the narrower measures being considered by the White
House may fall short of the "crippling" restrictions advocated here. With the expiration of the United States' year-end
deadline for Iran to resolve the issue, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is "focused on working with the
international community to upgrade the pressure on Iran in a way that makes the Iranian regime know that its
nuclear program is unacceptable, that they are going to pay a price that will make them rethink," said spokesman Mark
Regev. Obama "has been successful in galvanizing an international coalition that many people were cynical about. We are
on the same page." The endorsement is significant because it comes from a country that is considered the most likely to
launch a military strike to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's denial
of the Holocaust and his anti-Israel rhetoric have led Netanyahu to draw parallels to the years preceding World War II, and
Israeli officials have said that all options are open in preparing for what some here regard as
an "existential" threat. Israelis were initially skeptical of Obama's decision to engage Iran diplomatically, worried it
would lead to the same end as previous diplomatic overtures -- years of talks and ineffective resolutions while Iran continued
its nuclear development. The events of the last few months, however, helped curb the doubts. Ongoing pro-
democracy demonstrations in Iran have created the sense of a regime vulnerable to pressure,
while revelations about the extent and nature of the country's nuclear program have broadened international support for
action. Israeli officials and analysts say they understand the limits Obama faces in pushing more stringent measures
through the U.N. Security Council, where China holds a veto and remains hesitant to act against the Islamic republic. But
they also say Obama now shares their sense of urgency and will soon propose a meaningful set of
restrictions on the Iranian leadership -- sticking to a rough deadline he mentioned in a meeting with Netanyahu in May.
With European nations and, more importantly, Russia looking poised to go along, "Israel is a spectator, like most other
countries in the international community," said Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon. "We trust that Obama and the U.S.
will lead." Along with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Iran has been at the core of U.S.-Israeli discussions since Obama and
Netanyahu took office in early 2009. They began with an overlapping set of priorities -- Obama viewing establishment of a
Palestinian state as key to curbing Iran's influence over Islamist radicals in the region, and Netanyahu viewing Iranian
influence as a security threat that needed to be addressed for the conflict with the Palestinians to be resolved. Beyond the
risk of an Iranian nuclear strike on Israel -- considered unlikely because of Israel's nuclear deterrent capacity
and the possible U.S. response -- Netanyahu has argued that a nuclear Iran would destabilize
moderate Arab states in the region and embolden Iran-supported groups such as Hamas and
Hezbollah that sit on Israel's borders. Obama and Netanyahu seem to have reached an understanding, with some of
Netanyahu's overtures to the Palestinians winning U.S. support and Obama's policy toward Iran gaining Israeli trust.
Meanwhile, talk of an Israeli strike has been tempered by discussion of the complexity of such an
operation and the likelihood that it would do little other than delay Iran's progress. "As long as Obama is engaged in
some kind of diplomatic effort, Israel is going to wait and see how it plays out," said Emily Landau, director of

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the arms control program at Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies. "It is in Israel's interest for it to be
dealt with diplomatically. The military option is only getting more and more difficult." Other options are being discussed. At
a Jerusalem news conference this week, Canadian lawmaker and former justice minister Irwin Cotler announced an effort to
try Iran on grounds that its actions and the statements of its leaders put it in violation of international treaties on genocide
prevention.
Link:
If the USFG should completely withdraw all of its troops from Kuwait, Israel would
feel even more insecure, because it is comforted by US troop presence.
Israeli fear of rejectionist states is appeased through US troop presence in the
Middle East
Martin 3 (L.G., Middle East Specialist at the Strategic Studies Institute, Summer 2003.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB104.pdf) GAT
Israel’s perceptions of its own national security threats are weighted heavily towards a
strategic and military calculus. Israel’s experience with the Arab world since its war of independence
in 1947-48 has been unremitting hostility punctuated by wars and terrorist attacks. This hostility has
been interrupted by quiet on its western flank since the 1979 Camp David Accords, by the cold peace with Egypt, and since
the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, quiet on its eastern flank. Quiet without a peace treaty also has existed on Israel’s northern
border with Syria―but not its northern border with Lebanon. However, espousals of intentions to eliminate the
“Zionist state”by the so-called “rejectionist”states, primarily Iran and Syria (and previously Iraq), and
their development of WMD, which may have a range of delivery systems from terrorists to missiles, have
stimulated Israel’s existential need to continue developing WMD to enhance its deterrent
capability, as well as the Arrow anti-missile system that it has jointly developed with the United States. 12
Concern over the growing military capabilities of the rejectionist states also stimulates Israel’s
desire for technologically advanced conventional weaponry to offset the conventional superiority of the
combined forces of its regional Arab and Iranian enemies. However, less visible and more complex nonmilitary
threats to Israel’s national security go underemphasized in this strategic and military calculus.
13 Paying for a strong defense puts a substantial strain on the Israeli economy. The economy is challenged to overcome the
lack of natural resources such as water, and must expend valuable financial resources for the generation of desalinated water
or to purchase water from Turkey. 14 Moreover, Israel lacks its own secure sources of energy, gas and oil supplies that are
critical for its developing economy. 15 For all these reasons, Israel looks to its close U.S. alliance for strategic
and military assistance, as well as for economic assistance that is indispensable for its national
security. 16
The US’s presence in the Middle East protects Israel

Albright 8 (Scott, Apr 17, 2008,
http://israel.suite101.com/article.cfm/obama_promises_to_defend_israel)KFC
Presidential hopeful Barack Obama defended the United States' policy to support Israel during a
debate with democratic opponent Hillary Clinton in Philadelphia. The debate was held the same day Reuters cameraman
Fadel Shana was killed in Gaza, Wednesday, April 16. Reports indicate that Shana was killed by a blast of darts, or
flechettes, released from a projectile which exploded after an Israeli tank was seen firing toward the journalist. Neither
Obama or Clinton mentioned the journalist's death during the debate, but both said they would support Israel if elected
president. "An attack on Israel is an attack on our strongest ally in the region," Obama said during the
April 16 democratic debate aired on ABC. The statement came after ABC's George Stephanopoulos asked the two democrats
if it should be U.S. policy to treat an attack on Israel as if it were an attack on the U.S. Obama did not
give specifics as to how he would respond to an attack on Israel, but he did say that the U.S. would "take appropriate action." Obama
stated that it was unacceptable to allow Iran to continue its nuclear weapons program and military support for Hezbollah and Hamas
during the debate. Shana was killed after reported fighting between Hamas and Israeli soldiers had occured earlier in the day. Reuters
news reported that Israeli troops killed 17 Palestenians, after three Israeli soldiers were killed in clashes in the Hamas controlled
enclave. The news agency reported that fighting had ceased when Shana was killed. Some online bloggers believe the person who
fired on Shana thought he was a threat because he was holding a television camera that could have looked like a weapon. Other
bloggers have said that it was impossible to mistake Shana as anything but a reporter because his vehicle was clearly marked and
because Israeli optics are too powerful for the soldiers using them to not be able to clearly identify their target. The Bush
administration has labeled Hamas and Hezbollah as Iranian backed terrorist groups. The administration openly disapproved ex-
president Jimmy Carter's visit to the region where he has met with Hamas leaders in hopes of opening dialogue between rivaling
factions. As U.S. president, Obama said he would take no options off the table to keep Iran from

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obtaining nuclear weapons. He said the carrot and stick approach was a possible route in
preventing the Iranian nation from becoming a nuclear power.
Israel is dependent on U.S. counter to Iran—key to relations
Indyk 10(Martin, April 19, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy@Brookings, “When Your Best Friend Gets Angry”,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0419_israel_iran_indyk.aspx, accessed 7/8/10)jn
At the heart of this disagreement lies a dramatic change in the way Washington perceives its own stake in the game. It
actually began three years ago when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared in a speech in Jerusalem that U.S.
“strategic interests” were at stake in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — a judgment reiterated by Obama last week
when he said resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is a “vital national security interest” for the United States. In other words,
this is no longer just about helping a special ally resolve a debilitating problem. With 200,000
American troops committed to two wars in the greater Middle East and the U.S. president leading a
major international effort to block Iran’s nuclear program, resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has
become a U.S. strategic imperative. Ironically, as the U.S. position has evolved in this direction, Israeli
attitudes have evolved in another. To many Israelis, especially those in Netanyahu’s right-
wing coalition, peace with a divided Palestinian polity seems neither realistic nor particularly
desirable. Given Israel’s dependence on the United States to counter the threat from Iran and
to prevent its own international isolation, an Israeli prime minister would surely want to
bridge the growing divide. Yet the shift in American perceptions seems to have gone unnoticed in Jerusalem. Hence
Netanyahu’s surprise when what he saw as merely a matter of a poorly timed announcement during Vice President Biden’s
visit drew a stinging rebuke from Washington.
From these cards, one could very rationally conclude that by withdrawing, Israel
would feel threatened by the looming superpower near it: Iran. It would feel
threatened…and as the saying goes, offense is the best defense.
Internal Link:
When the US completely withdraws, Israel, feeling vulnerable to Iran, will attack it.
US forces are key to reassuring Israel and thus preventing Israel from attacking out
of desperation.

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Israel Politics DA (1/3)
Netanyahu is prepared to follow Obama’s lead in peace talks, but to maintain
control he must not make big concessions to the US
Stolberg and Landler July 6 (Sheryl, writer for the New York Times, Mark, American
journalist and Diplomatic Correspondent of the New York Times, New York Times, July
6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/world/middleeast/07prexy.html?src=me)
EH
WASHINGTON — President Obama said Tuesday that he expected direct negotiations between
Israelis and Palestinians to begin “well before” a moratorium on settlement construction expired
at the end of September, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel pledged to take
“concrete steps” in the coming weeks to get the talks moving. The president’s comments, after a 79-minute,
one-on-one session in the Oval Office, were the first in which he articulated a timetable for peace negotiations. They also
reflected a palpable shift in the administration’s approach to a relationship that has been rife with tension since soon after Mr.
Obama took office. The meeting was laden with theatrics as the men shook hands vigorously in front of the cameras
after a series of steps by the Israelis over the past few days to reduce tensions with the United States. But it was also deeply
substantive, the leaders’ aides said, with Mr. Obama and Mr. Netanyahu touching on a wide variety of contentious issues,
including Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons program, as well as the peace process. A single
session in the Oval Office is not likely to have resolved a year and a half of deep policy
differences, and the two leaders could hit more bumps in the months ahead, especially if Mr.
Obama grows impatient with a lack of progress in the peace process. But on Tuesday, they sought to
accentuate the positive. After publicly pressing Mr. Netanyahu for months to curb the building of
Jewish settlements — an American policy that fanned resentment in Israel — Mr. Obama pointedly did
not push Mr. Netanyahu to extend the existing moratorium. Instead, he said that moving from
American-brokered “proximity talks” to direct talks would give Mr. Netanyahu the incentive and
domestic political leeway to act on his own. “My hope is, that once direct talks have begun, well
before the moratorium has expired, that that will create a climate in which everybody feels a
greater investment in success,” Mr. Obama said, adding, “There ends up being more room created by
more trust.” The Palestinian Authority reacted cautiously to the meeting, saying that it, too, wanted
direct talks, but that the onus was on Mr. Netanyahu to halt the building of settlements and to
agree on negotiations that would resume where the last direct talks, in 2008, left off. “It is about words not deeds,” said
Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, by phone late Tuesday. “We need to see deeds.” Tuesday’s much-publicized
meeting in the Oval Office was in stark contrast to the frosty reception Mr. Netanyahu received during his last trip to the White
House in March, when Mr. Obama left the prime minister waiting in the Roosevelt Room while he went upstairs to have dinner
with his wife and daughters. The mood was so sour then that Mr. Obama barred news cameras. On Tuesday, photographers
clicked away in the Oval Office as Mr. Obama praised the prime minister as someone “willing to take risks for peace” and blamed
the press for reports of discord. Mr. Netanyahu loosely quoted Mark Twain, saying, “The reports about the demise of the special
relationship aren’t just premature; they’re just flat wrong.” In another gesture to the Israelis, Mr. Obama emphasized that there
had been no shift in American policy on Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons program, despite the United States’ signature on a
recent United Nations document that singled out Israel for its refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, binding 189
countries. Israeli officials were alarmed by the American decision to allow Israel to be named, which came at the prodding of
Arab states. Some in Israel viewed it as a sign of the unreliability of the United States, Israel’s most important ally. Mr. Obama
also tried to soothe Israeli jitters about calls for a regional conference on a nuclear-free Middle East. Any such meeting, he said,
would only be a discussion of regional security, not an opportunity to press Israel on its nuclear program. “We strongly believe
that, given its size, its history, the region that it’s in and the threats that are leveled against us — against it, that Israel has unique
security requirements,” Mr. Obama said, briefly correcting himself in midsentence. “It’s got to be able to respond to threats or any
combination of threats in the region.” The source of the friction during Mr. Netanyahu’s last visit was Israel’s announcement,
during a visit by Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., that it was approving plans for Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. Now,
settlements are again at issue, but the president’s modulated response seemed intended to return
the American-Israeli relationship to one in which difficult issues are thrashed out in private,
rather than through public lectures. Some analysts suggested that Mr. Obama and Mr.
Netanyahu might have reached a private understanding that Israel would extend the construction
moratorium in return for direct talks. “This enables Israel to say it didn’t pay for direct talks, but
there’s an understanding that once the expiration date rolls around, the moratorium will be extended,” said David Makovsky, a
senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Among the other “concrete steps” Israel is expected to take toward
the Palestinians, analysts said, is greater cooperation with the Palestinian Authority on security matters and increased economic
aid for the West Bank. Mr. Netanyahu has suggested to aides that he has other steps in mind, Israeli officials said, but he has not
yet disclosed them. Mr. Obama’s stance reflected domestic political pressures on both men. Mr. Netanyahu, who is

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struggling to keep his fractious right-wing coalition together, has been under pressure at home
not to appear to pay an additional price to lure the Palestinians to the negotiating table.

The plan is a signal that Netanyahu is conceding Israel’s security on the Eastern
Front
Sofer 10 (Roni, staff writer, Ynetnews is the largest and most popular news source,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3916745,00.html) EH
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Wednesday met with Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu and expressed his support of a move to direct peace talks between Israel and the
Palestinians as soon as possible, in order to advance a peace agreement in the region. The UN chief
thanked Netanyahu for easing the blockade on the Gaza Strip. Netanyahu thanked his host for his
leadership and his friendship and said the Israeli public is willing to take risks for peace.
However, the prime minister stressed that any future agreement must ensure but any future
arrangement needs to guarantee the cessation of rocket fire into Israel. The two also
discussed the Israeli raid on the Turkish flotilla to Gaza, and the implementation of UN Resolution
1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War. Before the meeting, Netanyahu met with US
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and outlined to him Israel's concerns about the rise of an
eastern front after the US troops withdraw from Iraq. Netanyahu expressed concern that the
withdrawal of troops from Iraq, coupled with the strengthening of Iran might lead to a new
"eastern front" against Israel. During his visit, the prime minister is slated appear on a series of
interviews with US' leading TV networks.
New concessions will drain all of Netanyahu’s power

Ephron 10 (Dan, Staff Writer for Newsweek,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/04/between-barack-and-a-hard-place.html, 4/4) dc
It must feel like old times for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. At one end of his
political tightrope, an American administration is pressing him to make concessions to the
Palestinians. At the other end, the super-hawks in his coalition are warning him to stand firm
or lose his majority in Parliament. The last time Netanyahu faced such a predicament, in 1998,
he agreed to hand over 13 percent of the West Bank to Palestinian control under a deal worked
out at Wye River, Md. The result: his right-wing coalition unraveled and Netanyahu lost his
grip on power.
Now is the key time to fix the Arab-Israeli conflict – Netanyahu key.
Meixler and Ferziger 10 (Louis and Jonathan; staff writer, Bloomberg Business Week,
July 8, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-08/obama-says-mideast-
peace-is-possible-before-his-first-term-ends.html) CH
Obama met with Netanyahu at the White House on July 6 and said direct Israel-Palestinian
talks may get started within less than three months. Obama has been trying to persuade
Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to move beyond the indirect talks
they have been conducting through U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell and hold face-to-face
negotiations. Netanyahu is interested “in being a statesman,” Obama said in the broadcast. “The
fact that he is not perceived as a dove in some ways can be helpful.” Abbas and Palestinian
Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad are “willing to make the concessions and engage in
negotiations that can result in peace,” Obama said. The president said there “is a constant contest
between moderates and rejectionists” in the Arab world. Seize Opportunity “We probably won’t
have a better opportunity than we have right now and that has to be seized,” Obama said.
Obama said time may be running out for Palestinian moderates who are willing to make
compromises “if they aren’t able to deliver for their people.” Netanyahu, whose Likud party
supports Jewish settlement in the West Bank, said yesterday in New York that Israel is prepared

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to make “far-ranging concessions” to achieve a political solution. “I intend to confound the
skeptics and critics,” Netanyahu said in a lunchtime speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. “
I’m prepared to do something. I’m prepared to take risks.” Obama, who described his two
hours with Netanyahu as “excellent” and detailed, described the Israeli leader as “somebody who
understands that we’ve got a fairly narrow window of opportunity.”

Middle east peace is key to solve Iran prolif
David Williamson, 1/3/2009 (staff writer, http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-
news/2009/01/03/opportunity-for-obama-to-provide-leadership-91466-22595734/)
The constant sense of insecurity and danger only helps hard-liners and makes discussion of
compromise seem like talk of surrender. If the present levels of violence and human suffering
are permitted to routinely flare up it will be impossible to pursue other long-term goals
towards peace in this vital region.
Hezbollah’s forces in Lebanon retain the ability to rain rockets on Israel and any
confrontation in Gaza has the potential to unleash such an attack from the north. Obama has
put forward the bold foreign policy goal of negotiating with Iran with the aim of persuading the
Islamic republic to abandon any nuclear programme and to stop sponsoring terrorist groups.
This breakthrough will not happen if television screens are filled hourly with images of
wounded and dead Palestinians.
Iranian prolif risks nuclear attack against Israel:

Nile Gardiner, 2006 (Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow @ Heritage Foundation, April
24, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm1047.cfm)
If Iran succeeds in building a nuclear weapon, which it may do within three to ten years, there
can be no doubt regarding the regime’s willingness and intent to use it against Israel or other
close U.S. allies. Nor is there any doubt regarding Iran’s potential to arm a terrorist
organization such as Hezbollah or Al Qaeda with nuclear material. Significantly, a senior Iranian
spiritual leader recently issued a fatwa sanctioning the use of nuclear weapons.[4]

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Sunni Alliance DA (1/3)
UQ: US Kuwait relations are high- new nuclear agreement proves
BERNAMA 10, (no author, June 24,
http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsworld.php?id=508336 accessed June 27) CM
The United States and Kuwait here signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) on nuclear
safeguards and other nonproliferation topics, according to Qatar News Agency. The MoC was signed for Kuwait by
Secretary General of the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC) Dr. Ahmad Bishara and the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Thomas D''Agostino. The MoC includes cooperation in nuclear
legislation and regulations, human resource planning and modeling, nuclear safeguards and security, radiation protection and
environmental. Among others are on the safety and health issues, low-and intermediate-level radioactive waste management, reactor
operations, safety and best practices. During the ceremony, D'Agostino said it is clear that both countries
recognise the importance of preventing nuclear proliferation, and keeping dangerous nuclear materials out of the
hands of terrorists and proliferators. "This agreement is an important milestone further underscoring the
commitment of the United States and Kuwait to address the global challenges of nuclear
nonproliferation, safeguards and security," he added. "Understanding, developing and implementing proper nuclear
safeguards is an important part of any successful nuclear energy program, and this agreement helps strengthen nonproliferation efforts
around the world," D'Agostino noted. Kuwait Ambassador to the US Sheikh Salem Abdullah Al-Jaber
Al-Sabah said Kuwait and the US already enjoy a very strong relationship and this cooperation will
add another aspect to the relationship. "As Kuwait looks forward to its energy needs in the future,
of course nuclear power is one of the options we are looking at very seriously and I see no better
partner to work with other than the US on this venture that we are about to embark on," he pointed out.
"Kuwait is an oil-producing country but that does not put aside our willingness and ability to look into other sources of energy as our
population increases and as our demand for electric generation increases," he affirmed. -- BERNAMA
Link: Kuwait commitment maintains strong relations – if we retreat it collapses

Saudi threat perceptions
David E. Long, ‘4 – Former executive director of the Georgetown University Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies and a former deputy director of the State Department's
Office of Counterterrorism. “US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current Conditions, and
Future Prospects.” Mediterranean Quarterly 15.3 (2004) 24-37, Lexis.
These stresses
and repeated US retreats from its assurances of even-handedness over the Arab-Israeli issue
contributed to continued Saudi anxiety over the strength of the US commitment to the
kingdom's external security. These anxieties were exacerbated by the collapse of the shah's regime in Iran in early
1979. With the United States unwilling in Saudi eyes to save its close friend the shah, the Saudis feared that it would act the
same way if the Saudi regime faced similar circumstances.9 When then Crown Prince Fahd canceled a trip to Washington in
March of that year, not wishing to appear to support the Egypt-Israel treaty that was signed at the same time, the US-Saudi
special relationship fell into disarray. 10 Despite the stresses and strains on the bilateral relations of
basically ambivalent partners, the United States maintained a close and cordial working
relationship. Indeed, the US response in 1991, in which it led a coalition of Western and Arab states in
Operation Desert Storm to drive Saddam's occupation forces out of Kuwait, could be considered a
high point of cordiality in the relationship. The Saudis, on their side and with no publicity, footed the lion's
share of the bill, amounting to over $50 billion. Not only was the relationship vastly beneficial to the
interests of both countries, but a solid body of mutual goodwill had built up, begun in the 1930s by
the honest, straightforward business practices of American oil men, strengthened by the skilled diplomacy of a succession of
American embassy and consulate personnel over the years, and expanded by the thousands of Saudi students who studied in
the United States, particularly in the late 1970s and 1980s.
I/L: Military presence is k2 Saudi Arabia-US relations

Blanchard 9, (Christopher M., December 16, a analyst in middle eastern affairs for CRS,
“Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations”
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf Page 25 Accessed June 27 ) CM
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Long-standing military training programs remain an important pillar of U.S.-Saudi relations. The
United States has played an integral role in the development, training, and arming of the Saudi
Arabian military since the 1940s, when U.S. military advisors first carried out a
comprehensive assessment of the kingdom’s defense requirements.53 Since the 1940s, a
number of subsequent U.S. defense assessments, joint planning activities, and training programs
have established close and cooperative relationships between the U.S. military services and their
Saudi counterparts. The Saudi Arabian government has continually sought U.S. military technology
and training as a guarantee of its national security, and Saudi authorities have pursued military
procurement and modernization initiatives based on the recommendations of U.S. defense
surveys.54 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
completed a series of massive military infrastructure construction projects across the
kingdom; many U.S.-built facilities remain critical to the operations of Saudi security
forces. As noted above, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent coalition
efforts to evict Iraqi forces and enforce United Nations Security Council Resolutions
provided the basis for the expanded U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia that lasted
from 1990 until 2003. Following the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003,
the U.S. military withdrew almost all of the 5,000 troops that had been stationed in Saudi
Arabia and moved its Combat Air Operations Center from Saudi Arabia to neighboring
Qatar. Now, as before, between 200 and 300 U.S. military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia at any
given time to administer long-standing U.S. training programs in conjunction with U.S. civilians and
local hires. Almost all U.S. training for the Saudi armed forces is funded via Saudi
government purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program. The existence of
parallel U.S. training programs for different Saudi security forces reflects the relatively
stove-piped nature of Saudi Arabia’s security and defense establishment; anecdotal
evidence suggests that different Saudi ministries and security forces do not operate jointly
and may serve as sources of influence and patronage for members of the royal family.
Relations prevent prolif
McDowell 3(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear
Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)
States tend to acquire nuclear weapons for reasons ranging from the quest for power and prestige to
the need to deter other states who present a considerable external threat. As discussed in the second chapter,
Saudi Arabia is a realist state that faces a security dilemma. Its alliance with the United
States reassured the Saudis that their security needs are covered, thus reducing the
Saudi desire for nuclear weapons. However, in the wake of the planned U.S. military withdrawal from the
Kingdom, the Saudi regime will likely re-examine its security needs with respect to the removal of U.S. troops. The shift
from a bipolar international structure consisting of the United States and the former Soviet Union had a dramatic impact on
the security alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia. One of the initial consequences of this change was the
propensity among states to proliferate weapons of mass destruction, thereby establishing a causal relationship between the
structure of the international system and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 86 Benjamin Frankel argues the
unipolar world that exists today and the diminished technological difficulties of acquiring nuclear weapons that facilitates the
spread of nuclear weapons as their acquisition “becomes a matter of political decisions.” The
Saudi incentives
to acquire a nuclear weapon are directly related to the credibility of the
security guarantees provided by the United States, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter
four. In short, the perception of the U.S. security guarantee has been considerably
weakened, causing the Saudi regime to explore the need to provide its own

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security interests, especially in the event that U.S.- Saudi relations deteriorate
further. U.S. actions taken such as the military withdrawals from Lebanon in
1984 and Somalia in 1993 demonstrate a dynamic strategic environment that may have
prompted Saudi Arabia to question the resolve of the U.S. security umbrella.
Furthermore, the Saudi regime must address: What is the level of threats in the Gulf region and are they acceptable to the
regime?

Instability means lack of U.S. Saudi relations goes nuclear
McDowell 3(Steven, LT in the U.S. Navy, September, “Is Saudi Arabia a Nuclear
Threat?”, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf)
In the Middle East, the acquisition of ballistic missiles and WMD by one state has often been
perceived as a reduction in security of other Gulf states. Due to its location, historical disputes, and the
conventional and unconventional capabilities of its regional adversaries, Saudi Arabia still faces adversaries
who compel it to replace its CSS-2 missiles, possibly with a nuclear capability. As a result, the Saudis
must monitor the capabilities of its Gulf neighbors despite the status of their relations. The Middle East
is all too familiar with revolutions and military coups, which have on several occasions successfully
facilitated changes in leadership. Consequentially, instability in any Gulf state causes apprehensions in
Saudi Arabia. Saudi potential adversaries possess strong military forces, larger populations, and in
some cases advanced WMD programs. The perceived value of WMD along with the concerted efforts to
conceal them in the Gulf states will continue to distress the Saudi regime until such missiles are
totally removed from all parts of the region. Further complicating the Saudi security dilemma is the continuation of various
regional disputes. Saudi border disputes with Yemen show no signs of disappearing and Saudi relations with Iran, while
cordial on the surface, could face diverging interests over the price of oil in the future. This may lead to hostilities between
the two states. The future of Iraq still remains unclear; however, its previous efforts to acquire WMD coupled with a yet
‘unassembled’ Iraqi government will remain under the watchful eye of the Saudis. Until the Israeli-Palestinian crisis is
resolved, Israel with its advanced WMD programs will continue to unease the Saudis. Despite the large U.S.
military presence in the Gulf region, shifting U.S. strategic priorities will continue to
weaken its security commitments and cause the Saudi regime to re-evaluate its
relationship with the United States. Due to periodic instabilities in the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia may feel that a
nuclear capability is warranted in order to deter potential threats. However, the United States will continue
to push for diplomatic resolutions in the region, which may satisfy Saudi security
concerns. A deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations would ultimately increase the
value of a Saudi nuclear capability.

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**CP’s**

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Consult NATO CP (1/4)
Text: The United States should engage in prior, binding consultation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization over whether to remove troops from Kuwait. The
United States should advocate the plan throughout the process of consultation and
should enact the result of consultation.
Say yes – Europe is worried about American overstretch
De Nevers 7 (renee de nevers, 2007, International Security, Nato’s international security role in
the terrorist era, pg. 59-60 TBC 6/21/10)
NATO’s members also differ on the means to respond to threats confronting the alliance. This was
most apparent in the bitter dispute over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The dispute illustrated three
points of disagreement. First, it rejected different understandings of the nature of the terrorist threat
and how to combat it. Second, it exposed deep differences about the appropriate use of force,
and in particular about the U.S. policy of preventive war. Whereas the United States insisted
that the urgency of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s supposed possession of WMD
mandated immediate action, several European allies argued that Hussein was contained and
could be deterred. Third, the dispute illustrated increasing European concern about U.S.
unilateralism and the fear that NATO’s European members might be “entrapped” by their
alliance commitments to support a reckless military operation. 92 As a result, both France and
Germany balked at supporting the United States.93 Although the Bush administration sought to
repair relations with key European allies and institutions after the 2004 presidential elections, the
acrimony caused by this dispute has left a residue of ill will. The shifting alignments and attitudes
toward threats confronting NATO have reduced the United States’ willingness to accept
alliance constraints.94 Moreover, the United States’ strategic focus has changed, with greater
attention being given to the Middle East, Central Asia, and East Asia. This is evident both in the
changing base deployments in Europe and the State Department’s decision to shift at least 100
diplomatic positions from Europe to other regions, including Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the
Middle East.95 This move is a logical step and if anything overdue, given the end of the Cold War,
but it is telling of shifts in U.S. policy priorities.
Net Benefit: Alliance DA
US – NATO relations high but remains vulnerable to US unilateralism
Slocombe 10 (WALTER B. SLOCOMBE June 2010 PERSPECTIVE Towards A New NATO

Strategic Concept A View from the United States http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07299.pdf)
Nonetheless, NATO remains for the US, as stated in the new national security strategy, »the
pre-eminent securi-ty alliance in the world today«, both the »cornerstone for US engagement
with the world and a catalyst for international action«. Most of the US’s other formal alliance
relationships and all its less formal security partnerships are essentially one-way streets where the
US commits itself to help partners in their own defense but without expecting much, if any, help
from them outside the strict confines of the joint defense of the partner in question. NATO is – with
the partial excepti-on of Australia and to a much lesser extent Japan – the only case where the US
can realistically regard its part-ner as a potential source of assistance outside the con-text of
the US guarantee. This broader relationship is not, however, without its problems simply
because the US expects more of its NATO partners – so it is more likely that the partners will seem
to fall short of what the US expects, and that the allies will believe the US is pres-sing them to act
more in its interests than their own.

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Unilateral withdrawal from collective participation causes failure of the alliance
Hsiung 1 (James C. a professor of politics at New York University

http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/hsiung1.html TBC 6/21/10)
It may not be a coincidence that European resentment to U.S. unilateralism is at its post-Cold War peak following the change
of guards at the White House since January 20. A number of foreign-policy decisions by the new Bush Administration,
ranging from the announced unilateral U.S. withdrawal from Kosovo and, for that matter, reduced U.S.
commitment to the NATO, to the unilateral withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol of 1998 when global warming has
since become a more pronounced threat to humanity, and to a nonetheless unilateral decision (despite perfunctory, cursory
"consultations" with European leaders) to scrap the 1972 ABM treaty with Russia, clearing the way for an equally unilateral
National Missile Defense (NMD) system. This scheme, furthermore, goes against a common chorus of
opposition even among America’s close allies in Europe and in Asia (Japan and South Korea).
The ground of their common opposition is that the NMD may elicit new rounds of destablizing arms race not seen since the
Cold War. True, unilateralism is not a monopoly of any Administration, nor any particular session of Congress. In 1999, the
U.S. Senate unilaterally rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CNTBT), which the Clinton Administration
had signed three years earlier along with 154 other countries. The United States, under Reagan, had unilaterally held out
joining the 119 states that signed the epochal 1982 Law of the Sea Convention after seven years of diligent negotiations. The
ostensible official reason was that the United States would have no part to legislating socialism by treaty. The real reason,
however, was that Washington wanted to have a permanent seat on the governing council of the International Seabed
Authority, an agency to be created under the United Nations with the authority to issue licenses to national mining companies
bent on exploiting seabed resources. Having finally won such an exclusive concession following 12 more years of talks, the
United States then signed the treaty in 1994. But, the truth is that unilateralism has only been carried to new heights
unknown before under the Bush Administration. It has irked America’s allies. Hence, any sensible person can readily infer a
correlation between this unprecedented pitch of unilateralism and America’s ouster from the Human Rights Commission
after it lost the May 3 election. Unilateralism and After Unilateralism may take different forms. Withdrawal from
collective action in producing collective goods (such as environmental control) takes the form of omission. It
may, on the other hand, take the form of commission, such as in the U.S. invasion of Panama, in December 1989, under the
senior Bush. In the latter event, the example thus set may have encouraged copy-catting, such as in Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait scarcely nine months later. A most common form of unilateralism is to set different rules for itself, as
from those for others. In the EP-3E spy plane case, the United States asserted it had the right to spy on another coastal state
from the airspace over the latter’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). When pressed, the Bush White House might
claim, on the ground of non-ratification, that America was not bound by the 1982 treaty’s provisions establishing the rights of
a foreign coastal state, thus freeing America from the duty to observe the "due regard" rule for the latter’s rights (including
the right of privacy) while flying a spy plane over its EEZ. Nor, in this view, is the United States bound by the rule that the
high seas are reserved for "peaceful purposes" only. We need not belabor the point that these rules are or have become
customary rules in general international law binding on all nations. The fact is that the United States in 1983, under President
Reagan, established a 200-mile EEZ of its own by [unilateral] proclamation. One wonders what would happen if any foreign
nation should send spy planes, on routine missions, into the airspace over America’s EEZ so established. The consequences
from such hegemonic unilateralism may vary. The recent troubles the Bush Administration has encountered in the
four events above are but a reminder of what kinds of bitter fruits are likely to result from
America’s unilateralist approach to foreign affairs. The twenty-first century is one
characterized by the rise of what is known as "comprehensive security," comprising environmental
security, economic security, and human security. Remedies require collective action, not unilateral self-
help. The ultimate lesson from these recent events is that they are a wake-up call that the time
has come for America to shift gears toward greater use of collective action, on security matters
as in foreign relations in general – or else, be prepared to face rejection even by America’s
own allies.

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NATO is the only institution that can solve existential threats from terrorism that
can come immediately from anywhere
Robertson 3 (Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the 9th Conference de
Montreal May 6 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030506a.htm TBC 6/22/10
The scale of threats has also increased. Today terrorism is more international, more apocalyptic
in its vision, and far more lethal. And despite the best efforts of our diplomats and counter-
proliferation experts, the spread of bio-chemical and nuclear weapons is already a defining
security challenge of this new century. If not addressed, it will put more fingers on more
triggers. And because not all of these fingers will belong to rational leaders, traditional
deterrents will not always deter. All this adds up to a guaranteed supply chain of instability. It
adds up to a security environment in which threats can strike at anytime, without warning, from
anywhere and using any means, from a box-cutter to a chemical weapon to a missile. In the
months leading to Prague, NATO’s 19 member countries demonstrated that they understood
the nature of this challenge and were united in a common response to it. What this has meant in
practice for the Alliance can be summarised under three headings: new roles, new relationships and
new capabilities. NATO is worth retaining only if it is relevant. It evolved successfully in the 1990s
to engage former adversaries across the old Soviet bloc and then to deal with instability and ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans. Now NATO is radically changing again to play important new roles
in the fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It already provides the
common glue of military interoperability without which multinational operations of any kind
would be impossible. Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 and Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
were able to operate effectively against the Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan only because of
decades of cooperation in NATO. After 9/11, NATO also played a supporting role in actions
against Al Qaida. Most importantly, however, NATO at Prague became the focal point for
planning the military contribution against terrorism, a major new role and one which no other
organisation in the world could play. In doing so, we have put an end to decades of arid
theological debate about whether the Alliance could operate outside Europe. NATO now has a
mandate to deal with threats from wherever they may come.
Terrorism will escalate into extinction

Morgan 9 (Dennis, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea Futures,
Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, World on Fire) LL
Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions
between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these
tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant
terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on
either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear
commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any
attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have,
likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists
or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim
cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on
Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate,
and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as
thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than
those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern
Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift
throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that
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would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as
long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And
what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on.
Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason
could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is
used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the
likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the
“use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a
weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In
other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for
permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of
people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The
bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate
factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt
to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups
who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their
oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit
threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads
to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many,
if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much
of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant,
to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter.

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XO CP (1/3)
Observation 1. Text: The President of the United States should <insert plan>
Observation 2. Solvency
Presidents have traditionally used their executive authority to control military
redeployment.
Cooper 2 (Phillip, Prof of Public Administration @ Portland State, By Order of the
President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action)
The deployment of troops has presented presidents with a range of political and military
issues that involve measures from sending troops into harm's way in existing conflicts to low-intensity wars that had the
potential to grow.95 More often, the administrations worked with various constellations of positioning
troops and their equipment in strategically important or tactically advantageous locations.
Such deployments have also been used to project force as well as to prepare for possible
action, as in the case of President Kennedy's buildup of troops in Europe as conflict with the USSR
over Berlin grew.96 As a number of recent presidents have, learned, one of the more complex aspects of
deployment can be extricating the troops from difficult situations. Thus, President Reagan's
NSDD 123 laid out the plan for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in the midst of
continued fighting.97 National security directives have also been used both to launch military
action and to direct combat operations. One of the more significant examples of such action
was President Bush's NSD 54 that launched the Desert Storm attack on Iraq in 1.991:98 Pursuant to my
responsibilities and authority under the Constitution as President and Commander in Chief, and under the laws and treaties of
the United States, and pursuant to H.J. Res. 77 (1991), and in accordance with the rights and obligations of the United States
under international law, including UN Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 666, 667, 670, 674, 677, and 678,
and consistent with the inherent right of the collective self-defense affirmed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, I
hereby authorize military actions designed to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. These actions are to be conducted
against Iraq and Iraqi forces in Kuwait by U.S. air, sea and land conventional military forces, in coordination with the forces
of our coalition partners, at a date and time I shall determine and communicate through the National Command Authority
channels.99 The next day, Desert Storm was launched. The order defines the purposes of the
attack and the cautions to be observed during the battle. Interestingly, President Bush reserved the right to
escalate hostilities and to target Saddam. Hussein directly if Iraq should seek to destroy Kuwait's oil fields. In such a case, the
NSD announces, "it shall become an explicit objective of the United States to replace the current leadership of Iraq. I also
want to preserve the option of authorizing additional punitive actions against Iraq?, mo Iraq did set the fields on fire, and the
United States did not "replace the current leadership of Iraq." Bush knew that his authority was limited both domestically, in
terms of his dealings with the Congress, and internationally, in terms of holding the coalition together. To be sure, this
was not the first time that NSDs had been used for such a purpose. President Reagan had
issued NSDD 110 in fall 1983, setting in motion the invasion of Grenada.ml

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XO CP (2/3)
Observation 3 Net Benefits
A. XO’s preserve political capital
Executive Orders avoid Congressional battles-helps avoid legislative defeats

Mayer 01 (Kenneth, Proff. Of Polt. Science Univ. of Wisconsin, Princeton Univ., “With
the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 90,
http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20
a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power) CBC
Since executive orders are a unilateral presidential tool, presidents may use them to
compensate for congressional opposition. This theme arises from histories of the civil rights
orders, which have maintained that Democratic presidents used executive orders because they
knew that Congress would refuse to pass legislation. Presidents may also use executive orders
to preempt legislation or undercut Congress in other ways. When faced with the certain
prospect of legislation imposing sanctions on South Africa in 1985, President Reagan
successfully fractured a veto-proof coalition of Democrats and moderate Republicans by
imposing weaker sanctions by executive order. In doing so, he “managed to avoid a major
legislative defeat and the further embarrassment of an almost inevitable veto override,” although
Congress overrode Reagan's veto of sanction legislation the following year. Presidents have restructured the intelligence
community through executive orders, in part to undermine congressional efforts to reorganize the community via statute.
For the same reasons, presidents who have low levels of public approval may be more likely to
resort to executive orders. Doing so offers a way of getting around other institutional actors
who might be emboldened in their opposition to what they perceive as a weak White House,
and also provides presidents with a method of position-taking, framing policy questions, or
delivering on promises made to key constituencies.
B. Presidential Powers
First, Presidential power is decreasing under Obama
The Gazette (Montreal), March 14, 2009 Saturday , Obama's rule of law; Breaks with
Bush's 'enemy combatant'
The Obama administration dropped the term "enemy combatant" and incorporated
international law yesterday as its basis for holding terrorism suspects at Guantanamo prison while
it works to close the facility.
The U.S. Justice Department said it had filed court papers outlining its break from Bush
administration detention standards, and said only those who provided "substantial" support to Al-
Qa'ida or the Taliban would be considered detainable.
"As we work toward developing a new policy to govern detainees, it is essential that we operate in a
manner that strengthens our national security, is consistent with our values, and is governed by law,"
U.S. Attorney-General Eric Holder said. "The change we've made today meets each of those
standards and will make our nation stronger."
Unlike under former president George W. Bush, who greatly sought to expand presidential
powers during his term, the new detention policy does not rely on the president's powers as
military commander in chief to hold terrorism suspects at Guantanamo.
Instead, the Justice Department said: "It draws on the international laws of war to inform the
statutory authority conferred by Congress."

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XO CP (3/3)
Second, must increase Presidential Power to secure hegemony
Paul 98 (Joel, Professor at University of Connecticut School of Law, California Law

Review, “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3481139) CBC
The United States could not exercise world leadership without a shift in power from Congress
to the executive. "Other governments must know, if they are to be willing to undertake
indispensable joint commitments, that the United States can so act to implement integrated
and responsible policy." In McDougal and Lans' view, a foreign policy led by a powerful
executive unhampered by Congress best served democracy. In the new world environment,
the values of efficiency, flexibility, and secrecy took precedence over the deliberative process:
Executive officers, who are charged with the task of conducting negotiations with other
governments, must be able to treat the national body politic as a whole and must be able to
canvass it promptly and efficiently as a whole for the majority will, without being subjected to
delays, obstructions, and disintegrating efforts by minorities... A leisurely diplomacy of inaction
and of deference to dissident minority interests supposedly characteristic of past eras when
economic and political change proceeded at a slower pace and the twin ocean barriers gave us an
effortless security is no longer capable, if it ever was, of securing the interests of the United States.

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Phase out CP (1/2)
Text: The United States should undergo a gradual reduction of troops from Kuwait
Drawdown needs to be slowest in areas with vulnerable groups – this is key to

solving mass displacement
Olga Oliker, Audra K. Grant, and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘9 – Oliker, Grant and Kaye are
all security analysts at the RAND Foundation. “The Impact of U.S. Military Drawdown
in Iraq on Displaced and Other Vulnerable Populations,” 12-6, RAND,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP272.pdf.
Although the displacement crisis will be long term, and vulnerable populations will face increased risk as
U.S. forces draw down, the dangers emanating from both of these situations can be mitigated. Indeed, the
drawdown of U.S. forces can potentially create opportunities for the United States to more effectively
address this crisis and gain regional and international assistance to do so. A number of specific actions and
general approaches can help ensure the protection of particularly endangered populations,
mitigate the destabilizing effects of mass displacement, and prevent the chronic
underdevelopment that may otherwise be its result. Lower Risk of Violence Where practicable and
useful, adapt troop withdrawals to ensure the longest presence where violence is
most likely, specifically in the regions of Baghdad, Diyala, and along the KRG border. Improve security
for the vulnerable and those at risk of deportation in Iraq by working with Iraq, regional governments, and other key
international actors.
Net benefit:
Turns the case and hegemony is a net-benefit
As the United States draws down its forces in Iraq, it behooves decisionmakers to recognize that this
drawdown, which started in June 2009 and continues at the time of this writing, will affect vulnerable and at-
risk populations. The ways in which it does so have significant implications for the evolution of
Iraq and U.S. policy interests in that country and the Middle East more broadly. Regardless of how the security situation
evolves in the years to come, these issues will continue to create humanitarian challenges, and it is in U.S. interests to take
steps to address them. A number of groups are at risk because of the U.S. drawdown and
withdrawal, because they have depended on U.S. forces and force presence for their security
over the last six years. In addition, the drawdown may exacerbate the already precarious circumstances of displaced
Iraqis, both within the country and in neighboring states. That said, appropriate policies and actions can mitigate destabilizing
regional scenarios and reduce the dangers faced by these populations in the years to come. Vulnerable Groups Groups at
particular risk as U.S. forces depart Iraq include tens of thousands of Iraqis and their families who are affiliated with the
United States in any of a variety of ways smaller minorities among Iraq’s permanent citizens who have relied on U.S. forces
for protection1 Palestinians who took refuge in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government other refugee groups from
outside Iraq who have taken shelter in that country over the years2 the Mujeheddin e-Khalq (MEK), a cult-like dissident
group from Iran that received sanctuary in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991 and whose members have since lived in their own
enclave, from 2003 to early 2009 under the protection of U.S. forces3 contractors from around the world who work for U.S.,
other coalition, a nd Iraqi companies in construction, food services, and myriad other jobs and who may lack documentation.
Violence against these populations is a real danger as U.S. forces draw down. It would surely
present a humanitarian tragedy to which the global community may not be able to respond in time. The United
States would likely be held at least partially accountable, with detrimental results for U.S.
image, credibility, and influence. It could also serve as a starting point for renewed
violence in Iraq. Ongoing efforts to assist Iraqis with U.S. ties include the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program and
the Refugee Resettlement Program, now available to Iraqis with U.S. ties. There has been significant
improvement in the last year in the processing of refugees, especially, and the SIV program
has been expanded. Instead of having to first leave Iraq, U.S.-affiliated Iraqis can now apply to come to the United
States from Baghdad. Processing for both of these programs has remained slow and complicated, however, and no plan exists
for rapid evacuation, which may be needed if the security situation deteriorates. For the other groups, the response thus far

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has been an effort by the U.S. government to engage Iraqi counterparts to ensure these groups’ safety and security, coupled
with efforts by the UNHCR to resettle some of the refugees from elsewhere who cannot stay in Iraq. Success has been
sporadic.
Phase out CP (2/2)

Solvency:
Also turns Middle East stability
The millions of Iraqis who have been displaced as a result of the war face increasing dangers
as U.S. forces draw down. If violence in Iraq worsens as and after U.S. forces draw down, as it may well do in at
least some disputed and multiethnic areas, displacement will increase yet again. Whether or not violence increases
in the near term, however, this displacement crisis may well breed instability in its own right.
Unless these problems are addressed as part of a broad development and integration agenda, displacement
will not only be long term, but it may also lead to increased risk of violence in the future,
as grievances over lost land combine with perceptions of social and economic inequities
between the populations hosting the displaced and the newcomers, both in Iraq and in neighboring countries. This
has the potential to undermine the stability of key regional states, such as Jordan, and a range
of broader U.S. regional goals.

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**Kritiks**

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Fem K IR (1/3)
The affirmative is rooted in attempts at masculine action – their focus on troop
withdrawal ultimately subverts the feminine tendencies in International Relations.
Duncanson and Eschle 8 (Claire and Catherine, U of Edinburgh and U of Strathclyde, New
Political Science 30(4), p. 560)IM
Nonetheless, the British state is, and must be, capable of decisive action. Such capability is central
to Realist understandings of the state and shot through with masculine associations in contrast to
feminised passivity and succumbing to constraint. Thus active verb constructions and
descriptions of decisive action predominate throughout the text. The foreword and executive summary, for
example, mention repeatedly that “we believe” and “we have decided.”90 Even when the state is
doing nothing, or reducing its stockpile, it is actively choosing to do so: “we decided not to
take an option . . . We will reduce . . . we have not conducted . . . we have increased our transparency . . . we
have ceased production . . . We continue to make progress.”91 There is also an overt emphasis on
avoiding inaction or constraint. “[O]ur capacity to act” must “not be constrained by nuclear blackmail by
others,”92 “ we must not allow such states to . . . deter us and the international community from taking the
action required . . . or fundamentally constrain our policy options.”93 The possibility of a “dormant” nuclear weapons
capability cannot be entertained, the capability must be “active” and also “credible.”94 The need for British
nuclear weapons capacity to be “credible” is emphasised at several points so even if we do not act, it must be possible that
we can, and others must believe that we can.
Our Kritik isn’t limited to military violence, but the security paradigm inherent
with the masculine war machine
Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A
Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,
http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ
Anti-war feminists’ opposition to the practice of war is simultaneously pragmatic and moral.
We have an abiding suspicion of the use of violence, even in the best of causes. The ability of
violence to achieve its stated aims is routinely over-estimated, while the complexity of its costs are
overlooked. Our opposition also stems from the perception that the practice of war entails far
more than the killing and destroying of armed combat itself. It requires the creation of a “war
system,” which entails: arming, training, and organizing for possible wars; allocating the
resources these preparations require; creating a culture in which wars are seen as morally
legitimate, even alluring; and shaping and fostering the masculinities and femininities which
undergird men’s and women’s acquiescence to war. Even when it appears to achieve its aims,
war is a source of enormous individual suffering and loss. Modern warfare is also predictably
destructive to societies, civil liberties and democratic processes, and the non-human world.
State security may sometimes be served by war, but too often human security is not

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Fem K IR (2/3)
This masculine ideology is the root cause of all proliferation, environmental
destruction, domestic violence, and war
Warren and Cady 94 (Karen J, Duane L, feminists and authors, Hypatia,
“Feminism and Peace: Seeing connections,” pg 16-17)
Much of the current "unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then
viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and
experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and
assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with
nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women, which
many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only
through observing these dysfunctional behaviors -- the symptoms of dysfunctionality -- that one
can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When
patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is
-- as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy. 11The theme that global
environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of
sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989 , 2).
Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "a militarism and warfare are continual
features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of
such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed
militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" ( Spretnak
1989 , 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the
claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual
frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the
environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, will make life on earth
difficult, if not impossible. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility ties in
understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional,
national, and global contexts.

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Fem K IR (3/3)
Our alternative is to vote negative. Rejection of a framework that normalizes
masculine warfare is critical to adopt epistemologies centered on a feminist ethic of
peace
Cohn and Ruddick 3 (Carol, Researcher and Teacher at Harvard Medical Signs, and Sara, author, A
Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,
http://www.genderandsecurity.umb.edu/cohnruddick.pdf) PJ
Both in philosophy and in “western” thought more generally, “objective” knowledge is produced by
socially autonomous reasoners who have transcended institutional constraints, gender
identifications, and emotion. Many feminists propose an “alternative epistemology” which
stresses that all thinkers are “situated” within “epistemic communities” which ask some but not
other questions, and legitimate some but not other ways of knowing. We are each of us also
situated by social identities and personal histories. To take an example at hand: some of us
address the volume’s questions as heirs of the “victims” of nuclear weapons, or associate ourselves
with them.17 Others are heirs of the attackers. Some address the issue of “proliferation” of nuclear
weapons from the situation of a possessor state, others from a situation in which they would find the
term “proliferation” inappropriate. None of us speaks from nowhere; there is no phenomenon –
including nuclear attack or proliferation – that can be seen independently of the situation of
the seers.18 Three tenets of this “alternative epistemology” seem especially relevant to our work.
Knowing is never wholly separated from feelings. Indeed, in many kinds of inquiry the capacity to
feel and to account for one’s feelings is both a source and a test of knowledge. Secondly, as useful
as hypothetical thought experiments and imagined scenarios may be, we begin with and
return to concrete open-ended questions about actual people in actual situations. Finally, we
measure arguments, and ideals of objectivity, partly in terms of the goods which they yield, the
pleasures they make possible and the suffering they prevent. Grounded in this alternative
epistemology, anti-war feminists criticize the dominant political/strategic paradigm for
thinking about weapons of mass destruction, which we call “technostrategic discourse.”19 In
contrast to just war theory, this discourse is explicitly not centered on the ethics of warfare, but
on its material and political practicalities. As a tool for thinking about weapons of mass
destruction, it essentially restricts the thinker to three issues: the actual use, i.e. the detonation, of
these weapons in state warfare or by terrorists; the physical and geo-political effects of this use; the
deployment of these weapons to deter attacks involving either conventional weapons or weapons of
mass destruction. In other words, the concerns of the dominant strategic discourse are limited to
the destructive effects of the weapons when, and only when, they are detonated, and to the
possible deterrent effects of possessing these weapons. There is scant attention to the potential
suffering of targeted societies, and no attempt to evaluate complicated effects on possessor
societies of deploying and developing these weapons, nor to grapple with the moral significance
of willingly risking such massive, total destruction. When anti-war feminists think about wars,
they take into consideration the political, social, economic, psychological and moral
consequences of accepting the practice of war. When assessing weapons, they do not single out
or isolate weapons’ physical, military and strategic effects from their embeddedness in and
impact upon social and political life as a whole, nor from the effects of the discourses which
constitute “knowledge” about these weapons. Hence when asked to think about weapons of mass
destruction, we strive to consider the totality of the web of social, economic, political, and
environmental relationships within which weapons of mass destruction are developed,
deployed, used and disposed of – all the while starting from the perspective of women’s lives.
It is not possible to do so from within the bounds of “just war” and/or “technostrategic”
frameworks – yet those are the very discourses which have shaped the questions we are asked to
answer in this volume. Thus, as we respond to the editors’ questions, we find we need to both think
inside their frame, and about the frame itself.

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Security K (1/5)
Security is the metaphysical foundation for all modern political arrangements.
Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of
Lancaster, The Politics of Security, pp. 12-14]
There is a preoccupation which links both the beginning and the end of metaphysics, and so
also the beginning and the end of metaphysical politics. It is something which, because it
furnishes the fundamental link between politics and metaphysics, affords me my entry into the
relationship which obtains between them. That something is security. If the question of the
political is to be recovered from metaphysical thinking, therefore, then security has to be brought
into question first. Security, of course, saturates the language of modern politics. Our political
vocabularies reek of it and our political imagination is confined by it. The hypocrisy of our
rulers (whosoever ‘we’ are) consistently hides behind it. It would, therefore, be an easy task to
establish that security is the first and foundational requirement of the State, of modern
understandings of politics, and of International Relations, not only by reference to specific
political theorists but also by reference to the discourses of States. But I want to explore the thought
that modern politics is a security project for reasons which are antecedent to, and account for, the
axioms and propositions of (inter)national political theorists, the platitudes of political discourse,
and the practices of States, their political classes and leaders. Consequently, to conceive of our
politics as a politics of security is not to advance a view held by particular thinkers or even by
particular disciplines. It is to draw attention to a necessity (which Heidegger’s history of
metaphysics will later allow us to note and explore) to which all thinkers of politics in the
metaphysical tradition are subject. In pursuing this thought it follows that security turns-out to
have a much wider register—has always and necessarily had a much wider register, something
which modern international security studies have begun to register—than that merely of preserving
our so-called basic values, or even our mortal bodies. That it has, in Chapter 1 Security, philosophy
and politics 13 fact, always been concerned with securing the very grounds of what the political
itself is; specifying what the essence of politics is thought to be. The reason is that the thought
within which political thought occurs—metaphysics—and specifically its conception of truth, is
itself a security project. For metaphysics is a tradition of thought defined in terms of the
pursuit of security; with the securing, in fact, of a secure arche, determining principle,
beginning or ground, for which its under-standing of truth and its quest for certainty calls.
Security, then, finds its expression as the principle, ground or arche—for which metaphysical
thought is a search—upon which something stands, pervading and guiding it in its whole structure
and essence. Hence, as Leibniz wrote: If one builds a house in a sandy place, one must continue
digging until one meets solid rock or firm foundations; if one wants to unravel a tangled thread one
must look for the beginning of the thread; if the greatest weights are to be moved, Archimedes
demanded only a stable place. In the same way, if one is to establish the elements of human
knowledge some fixed point is required, on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out
without fear.1 (emphasis added) It is for this reason, therefore, that metaphysics first allows
security to impress itself upon political thought as a self-evident condition for the very
existence of life—both individual and social. One of those impulses which it is said appears like an
inner command to be instinctive (in the form, for example, of the instinct for survival), or axiomatic
(in the form of the principle of self-preservation, the right to life, or the right to self defence),
security thereby became the value which modern understandings of the political and modern
practices of politics have come to put beyond question, precisely because they derived its very
requirement from the requirements of metaphysical truth itself. In consequence, security
became the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were
constructed; upon which the vernacular architecture of modern political power, exemplified in the
State, was based; and from which the institutions and practices of modern (inter)national politics,
including modern democratic politics, ultimately seek to derive their grounding and foundational
legitimacy. Thus, for example, and in a time other than our own, the security of an ecumene of
belief in the ground of a divinely ordained universe promising salvation for human beings—
something that, constituting the Christian Church, provided an ideal of community which continues

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to pervade the Western tradition—insisted: ‘extra ecclesiam nulla salus’2 (no salvation outside the
Church). Salvation was the ultimate form of spiritual security. And that security was to be acquired
<Continues>
Security K (2/5)
<Continued>
through being gathered back into where we belong; a belonging, in other words, to God. What is
crucial here is not what happens to us after death, but salvation as the expression of the longing for
the return to a pure and unadulterated form of belonging; a final closing-up of the wound of
existence by returning to a lost oneness that never was. The reverse of Cyprian’s dictum was, of
course, equally 14 Security, philosophy and politics true. No Church without salvation. The
outcome of this project was a rejection of the world through the constitution of an ideal world
which—not least because of the model it offered, the resentment which it fostered and the economy
of salvation and cruelty which it instantiated—acted in the world to constitute a form of redeeming
politics.3 In a way that indicates the continuity of the metaphysical tradition, however, this slogan
can be, and was, easily adjusted to furnish the defining maxim of modern politics: no security
outside the State; no State without security. And this, in its turn, has given rise to powerful forms of
what I would call the disciplinary politics of Hobbesian thought and the actuarial politics of
technologised thought. Each of these is also concerned to specify the principle, ground or rule
that would satisfy the metaphysically sequestered compulsion for security; thus relieving
human being of the dilemmas and challenges it faces to discover, in its changing
circumstances, what it is to be—to act and live—as humans. The basic thought to be pursued is
one which, in simultaneously drawing both our current politics and our tradition of political thought
into question by challenging their mutual foundation in security, serves, in addition, to illustrate and
explore some important aspects of the political implications of Heidegger’s thought. My thought,
then, is that modern politics is a security project in the widest possible—ontological—sense of
the term because it was destined to become so by virtue of the very character or nature of the
thinking of truth within which, through which, and by continuous and intimate reference to
which, politics itself has always been thought. What is at issue first of all, for me, therefore, is not
whether one says yes or no to our modern (inter)national regimes of security, but what Foucault
would have called the overall discursive fact that security is spoken about at all, the way in which it
is put into political discourse and how it circulates throughout politics and other discourses. I think
Heidegger’s account of metaphysics provides a means of addressing that fundamental question.

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Security K (3/5)
Modern political relations are reduced to objects of calculation by the imperative to
secure security; calculation replaces valuation, and we are confronted with the
technologized arm of modern politics which would reduce us to cogs in the machine
The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to calculation, results
from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because the appearance of things is
inevitably various, because we ourselves always encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally,
we ourselves are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that
metaphysics seeks, it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things
themselves. For they are too…well, insecure. It has, ultimately, to be suprasensible, situated outside the realm of the appearance of things,
otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure) as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world
itself. It could not serve, therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics’ guiding question requires. Literally, it could not offer any
security for the sensible world of appearances if it were already located within, and therefore also contaminated by, the very insecurity of the
comings and goings of that world. Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some foundation
upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with certainty, and conforming
one’s everyday conduct—public and private—to the foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by
different names but that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent
upon the philosopher—his ‘true’ mission—consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles.
Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, ‘that is, establishment of the uppermost value in terms of which
and according to which all beings are to be’.14 In as much as these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them
no beings would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore spoke as a
security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they
were to be Security, philosophy and politics 21 secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of method. The
philosopher became a security expert, then, in the sense of being able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in
determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity
in knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured (guaranteed). In such wise, whatever was said— meant; done; understood;
esteemed; or valued—was authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The philosopher’s task had to be to
tell you how to secure such a thing even after they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project
could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed,
so that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to
secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending
itself. Hence, though Nietzsche’s will to power may be differentiated as self-overcoming— against the Darwinian, or even Spinozan, principle
The charge levelled at philosophy at
of self-preservation— it is arguable that this represents the security project à l’outrance.
the end of metaphysics—the ‘end of philosophy’ thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a
contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally—is that the philosopher
has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you
and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to
insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is
the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its
nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the
violence licensed and the insecurity engendered. The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic,
as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so
long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered
and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence
indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to
rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it
must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis
required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d’être, in other words, masquerading as the
preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how
could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be
rendered calculable—whatever other value might once have been placed upon it—if we are to be as certain of
it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world. Western
understanding of the political is, therefore, continuously suborned by metaphysics’ will to the
calculative truth of correspondence, and its various regimes of power and knowledge to which Foucauldian genealogy alerts
us. It is consequently Foucault’s indebtedness not only to Nietzsche but also to Heidegger which antecedes, while it remains nonetheless
integrally related to, the task of genealogy.15 In order to pursue the recovery of the question of the political from metaphysics, therefore, I not

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only have to be able to pose the question which I have used Foucault to pose, I have to use it to bring security into question and explore that
question through the sources which Foucault himself drew upon. Metaphysics is itself unwittingly an aid here, for it bears its own
deconstruction within itself. Consider the outcome of the guiding question—why is there something rather than nothing?—for with its closure
we are challenged to rethink the question.
Security K (4/5)
The economies of value created by the technologisation of the political allow for all
subject to the political to be both valued and consequentially devalued, because
death is the frame of reference within which these calculations operate any
comparative devaluation of an aspect of humanity is justifiable, there is nothing
abstract about this, this is the zero-point of the holocaust.
Dillon 1999 [Michael, “Another Justice,” Political Theory 27:2]
Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and
ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of
whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or
not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political.
Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does
for the understanding of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas
the ethical comes first and ethics is first philosophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own defer- ral
to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.32 In this essay I understand the
challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political.
Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two
which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life. Otherness is born(e) within
the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent
stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which
comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular
hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by
this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying
undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations
in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the
dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject
was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another
Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-
possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of
sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the
expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to
the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became
the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies
of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the
political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require
calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without
indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible
not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to
the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There
is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of
holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for
example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may
then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable
itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds
measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of
Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of
this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables
life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable.
Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of
bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or
norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the
mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust
'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'decision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The
management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and

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Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think
decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only
deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a
future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to
this accumu- lation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the person taking the decision not know
everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into
which one cannot see.
Security K (5/5)
Our alternative is to question security. In order to politicize the system of
technologically calculable objects that characterizes international relations, we must
think the very foundations of that system.
Contesting our politics of security, therefore, not only requires more than a technical
engagement over the meaning, range, efficiency, effectiveness, morality or accountability of
conventional and nuclear, military and political, technologies of security, it also requires
something in addition to genealogy as well; because genealogy, however politicising it might be—
Foucault arguing, powerfully, that this politicising takes place for, or rather around, the battle over truth as ‘the ensemble of
rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true’16—does
not directly pose and seek to think the question of the political as such.17 However much it is
therefore stimulated by the interrogatory disposition of the genealogist, my question, like any
question, sets something else, or at least in addition, in train. It opens-up another world of thought and
discloses the prospect also of another form of life, because that is how all questioning works. Such a world goes beyond the
project which allowed the question to be posed in the first place. In the world that a question opens-up, the question itself
multiplies and plurifies. It divides and sub-divides demanding more of you and provoking you to other thought. That is the
way the world of a question builds. And in this burgeoning world not only do new considerations arise but all manner of
other established issues are amplified and intensified in different ways. Not least of these is the way in which the
question alerts us to that which is prior to the question, the source of the question itself to
which the question is in fact responding. That which is prior here is that in which we are
already immersed, the obligatory freedom of human being; what has happened to it, what might happen
to it in the effort to secure it, and what might become of it now it is so secured by and within the security problematic. Hence,
what ultimately concerns me is the very thought of security, rather than just its history or its
genealogy, and how to let ourselves into the struggle of the duality which is entailed in
security—that is to say, the indissoluble relation between security and insecurity which is, as
you shall see, even contained within the word itself— from access to which we are secured for the
moment, however, by security. This movement, integral to questioning, consequently carries us
beyond the Security, philosophy and politics 23 genealogical. That is another reason why the
question I have derived from it (‘Must we secure security?’) offers a way—I think, perhaps, the
way—of opening-up the question of the political. ‘Must we secure security?’ is, then, not one
question amongst many others. Neither is it a question that allows us to confine the response
which it demands to genealogy or to the debates about the status of the International Relations
of political Modernity. To embrace this question directs us towards an exploration of the link
between the philosophical and the political in Western thought. It forces us to consider their
current and shared predicament. It situates us right in the midst of the travails of the Western
tradition, of the very differentiation between thought and action, and of all the questions
which that separation poses. ‘Must we secure security?’ is therefore a question within whose
realm the crisis of modern global politics reverberates and resonates with that of the crisis of
modern thought. It forces us to think about the political at a time when the Western
understanding of the political, having been globalised, has contributed to the formation of a
world that it can no longer comprehend or command—to a world in which it is incapable of
realising the very values which it is said to comprise—and that means thinking once more
about the belonging together of security and insecurity.18

Division
Terror Talk K(1/3)
Terrorist rhetoric reinforces a binary that pits the good in an endless war against
the other
Kellner 7 (Douglas, Chair of Philosophy @ UCLA, Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol.
37 (4), 2007, pg. 622+) JPG
On the day of the strikes on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the U.S. corporate television networks brought out an
array of national security state intellectuals, usually ranging from the right to the far right, to explain the horrific events of
September 11. Fox News presented former UN Ambassador and Reagan administration apologist Jeane Kirkpatrick, who
rolled out a simplified version of Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations (1996), arguing that we were
at war with Islam and should defend the West. (4) Kirkpatrick was the most discredited intellectual of her
generation, legitimating Reagan administration alliances with unsavory fascists and terrorists as necessary to beat Soviet
totalitarianism. Her propaganda line was premised on a distinction between fascism and
Communist totalitarianism which argued that alliances with authoritarian or right-wing terrorist organizations or
states were defensible because these regimes were open to reform efforts or historically undermined themselves and
disappeared. (5) Soviet totalitarianism, by contrast, should be resolutely opposed, as a Communist regime had never
collapsed or been overthrown and communism was an intractable and dangerous foe, which must be fought to the death with
any means necessary. Of course, the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, along with its empire, and although
Kirkpatrick was totally discredited she was awarded a professorship at Georgetown and continued to circulate her extremist
views through Fox TV and other right-wing venues. On the afternoon of September 11, Ariel Sharon, leader of Israel,
himself implicated in war crimes in Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon in 1982, came on global television to convey his regret,
condolences, and assurance of Israel's support in the war on terrorism. Sharon called for a coalition against
terrorist networks, which would mobilize the civilized world against terrorism, posing the
Good versus Evil, "humanity" versus "the blood-thirsty," "the free world" against "the
forces of darkness," which are trying to destroy "freedom" and our "way of life." (6) The
Bush-Cheney administration would take up precisely the same tropes, with President Bush
constantly evoking the "evil" of the terrorists, using the word five times in his first statement on the
September 11 terror assaults. Bush also declared that the attacks were an "act of war" against the United States, presaging the
era of war that was to come. (7) The Fox News network had its anchor Brit Hume ask former Reagan Secretary of State
George Schultz whether military action by the United States was justified, and Schultz answered: "Absolutely.... We need to
put people on notice that if they harbor terrorists, they are going to get it from us. No place to hide." He then recounted a
story from boot camp when a sergeant handed him his rifle and said: "Here. This is your best friend.... And remember, never
point this rifle at anybody unless you're willing to pull the trigger." (8) Newt Gingrich, former speaker of the House, noted
that President Bush just described the attack as an act of war and urged Congress to move immediately toward declaring war
against militant Islam. (9) Commenting later in the day, pundit Bill O'Reilly exclaimed, "I think we have to let the chains fall
down and let the dogs of war," and his guest Colonel David Hunt enthused: "Bill, you've got to unleash the dogs of war." (10)
Such all-out war hysteria, militarism, and extremist rhetoric was the order of the day, and
throughout September 11 and its aftermath, ideological warhorses such as William Bennett came out and
urged that the United States declare war on "militant Islam," asserting: "We have a moment of
moral clarity right now in America.... There is good and evil in the world.... We issued a statement
today at Empower America, Jack Kemp and Jeane Kirkpatrick and I, saying that Congress should declare war against militant
Islam and that the United States should proceed as if in war, because it is war." (11) While Bennett and his group urged war
on Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and other alleged sites of militant Islam, on the Canadian Broadcasting Network, former Reagan
administration Deputy Secretary of Defense and military commentator Frank Gaffney suggested that the United States
needed to go after the sponsors of these states as well, such as China and Russia, to the astonishment and derision of
Canadian commentators. (12) And right-wing talk radio and the Internet buzzed with talk of dropping nuclear bombs on
Afghanistan, exterminating all Moslems, and whatever other fantasy popped into their overheated rhetoric. Hence,
corporate television and radio in the United States allowed right-wing militarist zealots to vent
and circulate the most aggressive, fanatic, and extremist views, creating a consensus around
the need for immediate military action and all-out war. The television networks themselves
featured logos such as "War on America," "Attack on America," "America under Attack," and circulated discourses
that assumed that the United States was at war and that only a military response was
appropriate. Few cooler heads appeared on any of the major television networks that repeatedly beat the
war drums day after day, without even the relief of commercials for three days straight, driving the country into
hysteria and making it certain that there would be a military response and war.

Division
Terror Talk K(2/3)
Terrorist rhetoric shuts off solutions to terrorism, necessitates eradication of those
who its applied to, and incites racist violence
Kapitan and Schulte 2 (Tomis and Erich, Thomas – Prof of Philosophy @ N Illionois U, and Erich –
, Journal of Political and Military Sociology Vol. 30 Iss. 1, 2002, pp. 172+, Questia) JPG
Given that a population has deeply rooted grievances it is determined to rectify, and given that, continually, its members have
been willing to resort to terrorist actions in pursuing its goals, then what is the intelligent response? One might try to beat
them into submission, but short of outright genocide, retaliation against a population from whose
ranks terrorists emerge will not solve anything so long as that population feels it has a legitimate grievance
worth dying for and decides that terrorism is the only viable response. Such "counter-terrorist" retaliation,
combined with a failure to address their grievances, only intensifies their hatred and resolve, their willingness to
engage in more terrorism, and soon the parties will find themselves wrapped in an ever-increasing
spiral of violence. Whether individual terrorists are driven by strategy, psychology, or a combination of both, the
rational approach to persistent terrorism stemming from a given group requires examining the situation wherein terrorism is
seen as the only route of resistance or outlet for outrage. Only then can intelligent moral responses be crafted. This brings us
closer to our main contentions. The prevalent rhetoric of 'terrorism' has not provided an intelligent
response to the problem of terrorism. To the contrary, it has shut off any meaningful examination of
causes or debate on policies and has left only the path of violence to solve differences. Rather than promoting a free and
open examination of the grievances of the group from which terrorists emerge, the 'terrorist' label nips all
questioning and debate in the bud. Terrorists are "evil"-as the U.S. Administration has repeated on
numerous occasions since September 11, 2001-and are therefore to be eradicated. This sort of response to
terrorist violence is nothing new; the 'terrorist' rhetoric has been steadily escalating since the early 1970s, and under the
Reagan Administration it became a principal foil for foreign policy. None of this has been lost upon those who
employ the rhetoric of 'terrorism' as a propaganda device, to obfuscate and to deflect
attention away from controversial policies. A prime example in the 1980s was a book edited by Benjamin
Netanyahu entitled, Terrorism: How the West Can Win. While it offers a standard definition of 'terrorism,' both the editor
and the contributors applied it selectively and argued that the only way to combat terrorism is to respond
with force, "to weaken and destroy the terrorist's ability to consistently launch attacks," even
though it might involve the "risk of civilian casualties" (pp. 202-205). Throughout this book, very little is
said about the possible causes of terrorist violence beyond vague assertions about Islam's confrontation with modernity (p.
82), or passages of this calibre: The root cause of terrorism lies not in grievances but in a disposition
toward unbridled violence. This can be traced to a worldview that asserts that certain ideological and religious goals
justify, indeed demand, the shedding of all moral inhibitions. In this context, the observation that the root cause of terrorism
is terrorists is more than a tautology. (p. 204) One is tempted to pass off comments like this as pure rant, save for the fact that
this book reached a large audience, especially since its contributors included not only academics and journalists but also
important policy makers. Netanyahu himself went on to become the Israeli Prime Minister, and among the American
contributors were U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, U.N. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Senators Daniel
Moynihan and Alan Cranston, all of who voiced sentiments similar to those of Netanyahu. This upshot of the book is that a
terrorist is portrayed as a carrier of "oppression and enslavement," lacking moral sense, and
"a perfect nihilist" (pp. 29-30). Given that the overwhelming number of examples of terrorism are
identified as coming from the Arab and Islamic worlds, and that "retaliation" against terrorists
is repeatedly urged even at the expense of civilian casualties, then one begins to see the point of
Edward Said's assessment of the book as nothing short of "an incitement to anti-Arab and anti-Moslem
violence" (Said 1988:157).17

Division
Terror Talk K(3/3)
Reject the affirmatives construction of terrorism – recognizing that terrorism is not
an objective reality sheds its violent representations
Whitbeck 2 (John V., int’l lawyer dealing w/ Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The
Washignton Report on Midde East affairs Vol. 21 Iss. 2, March 2002, pp. 52+, questia)
JPG
A Devalued Word However, the word has been so devalued that even violence is no longer an
essential prerequisite for its use. In recently announcing a multibillion-dollar lawsuit against 10 international
tobacco companies, a Saudi Arabian lawyer told the press: "We will demand that tobacco firms be included on the lists of
terrorists and those financing and sponsoring terrorism because of the large number of victims that smoking has claimed the
world over." If everyone recognized that the word "terrorism" is fundamentally an epithet and a
term of abuse, with no intrinsic meaning, there would be no more reason to worry about the
word now than prior to Sept. 11. However, with the United States relying on the word to assert, apparently, an absolute
right to attack any country it dislikes (for the most part, countries Israel dislikes) and with President George W. Bush
repeatedly menacing that "either you're with us or you're with the terrorists" (which effectively means, "either you make our
enemies your enemies or you'll be our enemy--and you know what we do to our enemies"), many people around the
world must feel a genuine sense of terror (dictionary definition: "a state of intense fear") as to where the United
States is taking the rest of the world. Meanwhile, in America itself, the Bush administration appears to be feeding the U.S.
Constitution and America's traditions of civil liberties, due process and the rule of law (the finest aspects of American life,
and the principal reasons why the country used to be admired abroad) into a shredder--mostly to domestic applause or
acquiescence. Who would have imagined that 19 angry men armed only with knives could
accomplish so much, provoking a response, beyond their wildest dreams, which threatens to be vastly
more damaging to their enemies even than their own appalling acts? If the world is to avoid a descent into
anarchy, in which the only rule is "might makes right," every "retaliation" provokes a
"counter-retaliation" and a genuine "war of civilizations" is ignited, the world--and particularly the
United States--must recognize that "terrorism" is simply a word, a subjective epithet, not an
objective reality, and certainly not an excuse to suspend all the rules of international law and domestic civil liberties
which have, until now, made at least some parts of our planet decent places to live.

Division

Kuwait Neg MSJHS2011

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- 1 –Kuwait Negative JV Division

MSJHS Debate Club, 2011

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg ..............................................................................................1

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

**Case Cross-x Guide (1/2)**

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

**Case Cross-x Guide (2/2)**

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Inherency Iraq (1/2)

Obama plans to remove troops from Iraq

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Inherency Iraq (2/2)

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

**A2: Missile Advantage**

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Turkey and TNWs

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

**A2: Terrorism Advantage**

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

US-Kuwait relations are important- terrorism, Iraqi instability, civil war.

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

A. Interpretation—Reduce means to make something smaller in size—it is distinct

Words and Phrases 2(Volume 36B, p. 80)

B. Violation—The aff eliminates presence rather than reducing it.

2. Education— It is not real world to remove all presence from nations,

D. Voter for fairness and education—evaluate under competing interpretations—it

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

A. Interpretation: Military personnel require active duty designation

Office of the Secretary of Defense 88

D. Voter for fairness and education: -evaluate under competing interpritations-

Kuwait (Total Withdrawal) Neg

Chatterjee, Cho, Lu, Merchant 2-5-11

A. Interpretation—In means throughout.

B. Violation—They only reduce presence in certain areas.

2. Ground—Removing troops in certain areas allows the aff to spike out of

Case Cross-x Guide (1/2)

Case Cross-x Guide (2/2)

A2: Missile Advantage

A2: Terrorism Advantage