THE PROBLEMS OF COMMAND

Gene Giannotta

CASE ONE: McChrystal Takes Command, Summer of 2009

***Draft – 1 June 2011***

Introduction

The summer of 2009 was a key moment in Operation Enduring Freedom. March had seen

the announcement of a major shift in strategy and an increase in troop levels, and in August,

Afghanistan would hold a critical presidential election. With the change in command in May, the

pieces appeared to be in place for a renewed effort. But the new strategy required an integrated

civil-military effort, and the security situation on the ground would turn out to be much worse

than the decision-makers apparently realized in the spring.

This chapter examines the summer months through the lens of the agency theory, first

presenting a narrative overview of the historical record, and then assessing the real-life civil-

military game in terms of the model’s variables and its predicted sequence of play.

Narrative

McKiernan's Removal

The summer began ignominiously for the American mission in Afghanistan. Days before

Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan were due to meet with

Barack Obama in Washington, an attack in the Bala Baluk district of western Afghanistan went
 2

awry. The Afghan government initially reported that “at least 30 civilians” were killed, but this

number was disputed by local residents, who put it closer to one hundred.1 The severity of the

incident would cast a pall over the entire summer. For Karzai, it and other instances of civilian

casualties served as a useful campaign talking point, while for the Americans, it presented a

political and military concern.

While the incident of 4 May surely provoked the already unstable Karzai, “a manic

depressive…[who] was on medication and had severe mood swings” (Woodward 2010, 65),

Zardari also had reason to be on the defensive when he arrived in Washington. In announcing his

original strategic decision on 27 March, Obama did not mince words and, reflecting the growing

concern within his own government, made it abundantly clear that Pakistan was a key

component in his country’s mission in the region - perhaps the key. “The future of Afghanistan is

inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor Pakistan,” Obama stated. The threat was

existential: “Al Qaida and its extremist allies…[were] a cancer that risks killing Pakistan from

within.”2 As long as its neighbor remained open as a convenient escape hatch for the Taliban and

Al Qaeda, the fight against the insurgents within Afghanistan was in danger of being

undermined.

Against this backdrop, the civil-military dynamics appeared much cleaner. There doesn’t

appear to have been any conflict over the need to minimize civilian casualties. We’ll see, as the

summer unfolds, that both civilians and the military reiterate the importance of that aspect of

counterinsurgency (COIN). Nor does there appear to be much disagreement over the centrality of

Pakistan to the mission. Indeed, by this point in the eight-year-long American military
1 Sha, Taimoor and Carlotta Gall. 2009. “Afghans Say U.S. Raids Killed 30 Civilians.” May 6,
The New York Times.
2 Obama, Barack. “Remarks on United States Military and Diplomatic Strategies for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, March 27, 2009.” In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Barack Obama, 2009, Book One: January 20 - June 30, 2009, Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Printing Office. 2010. Pages 366-67.
 Giannotta 3

engagement, “AfPak” had become the inclusive shorthand capturing the interdependent nature.

But despite these coincident preferences and understandings, there was unease over General

David McKiernan’s ability to lead the COIN strategy. Both Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen were convinced by early May

that new leadership was required. Bob Woodward quotes Mullen as saying that he “cannot live

when I know I have a better answer…when kids are dying every single day” (2010, 118). And

the “better answer” just happened to be the man who “was essentially the chairman’s deputy,”

the director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal (Woodward 2010, 118).

The problem was that McKiernan refused to exit quietly when given the opportunity by Mullen

(Woodward 2010, 119), and so on 11 May, Gates announced that he was being replaced as

commander of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan

(USFOR-A)3.

The Secretary of Defense rested the decision on the fact of broader changes in how the

United States related to Afghanistan: “We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new

ambassador. I believe that new military leadership is also needed.”4 But if the civilian and

military elites agreed that a change was needed, it was not clear that the same sentiment was to

be found throughout the ranks. The Washington Post reported that “sympathy ran high for

McKiernan among Army officers” because of a widespread perception that he didn’t have the

tools necessary to get the job done. A “senior officer” is quoted as saying that the general “was

running a very under-resourced theater and doing as well as anyone could expect.”5 But Andrew

3 Bumiller, Elisabeth and Thom Shanker. 2009. “Pentagon Ousts Top Commander in Afghan
War.” The New York Times, May 12. See also: Woodward 2010, 119; Tyson, Ann Scott. 2009.
“Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan is Fired.” Washington Post, May 12.
4 Tyson, Ann Scott. 2009. “Top U.S. Commander in Afghanistan is Fired.” Washington Post,
May 12.
5 Tyson, Ann Scott. 2009. “Sympathy for McKiernan Among Officers,” Washington Post May
12, page A12.
 4

Exum, a veteran of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and fellow at the Center for a New American

Security6, said in a blog post at the time that “many policy-makers and journalists think that

McChrystal’s work as the head of the super-secret Joint Special Operations Command was the

untold success story of the Surge and the greater war on terror campaigns.” Petraeus, the head of

U.S. Central Command7 at the time, apparently has a “close working relationship in Iraq in

2007” with McChrystal, and essentially giving McKiernan a pink slip indicated that Obama,

Gates, and Petraeus were “as serious as a heart attack about a shift in strategy” for the AfPak

theater.8

It was obvious at this point that the President was going all-in on COIN in Afghanistan,

perhaps taking in the lessons of the “surge” in Iraq. But even though Obama had made clear in

his presidential campaign that he saw Afghanistan as the proverbial “good war” that the Bush

administration had irresponsibly ignored, his decision to defer to the military recommendations

of spring 2009 and double down on the AfPak mission was still fraught with political risks.

Republicans remained critical of a president they considered “inexperienced” in foreign affairs,

and controversial decisions about the prison at Guantanamo Bay and the release of photos

showing detainee abuse by American officers opened the line of criticism even wider.

In both of these cases, however, Obama ended up either explicitly (as in the photos) or

implicitly (as in Guantanamo) on the Republican side of the issue. He reversed his decision to

release the photos after the Pentagon had changed its mind and urged him to prevent their release

6 CNAS, a relatively new organization founded in 2007, is considered a holding tank for
potential Democratic defense officials. The Obama Administration was fond of stocking open
security positions with CNAS people (cf. Alter 2010, PAGE?). Exum’s bio can be found here:
http://www.cnas.org/node/737.
7 Central Command, or CENTCOM, is the U.S. combatant command that oversees American
forces in the Middle East. CENTCOM headquarters, however, is located in Tampa, Florida.
8 Exum, Andrew. 2009. “McKiernan out, McChrystal in.” The Argument blog at
ForeignPolicy.com, May 12, 2009.
http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/12/mckiernan_out_mcchrystal_in (Accessed 3
May 2011)
 Giannotta 5

in order to protect service members overseas. After his decision to close Guantanamo was

thrown to the Congress, the usual political wrangling made its realization questionable. But,

combined with his decision to increase the force level in Afghanistan and increase aid to

Pakistan in an attempt to stabilize the two countries, Obama provoked some dissension in his

own party’s ranks. After all, the Democrats could ascribe some their electoral success in the

previous two cycles to public dissatisfaction with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so there

was a good deal of wariness over the President’s decision to re-commit the country to the latter

theater. Since McChrystal’s promotion from three-star Lieutenant General to four-star theater

commander required Senate confirmation, the political costs for Obama were made more salient

by the fissures within the broad civilian unit.

McChrystal's Confirmation Hearing

On 2 June, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a joint confirmation hearing for Lt.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s appointment to the Afghanistan command, along with Admiral James

Stavridis’s posting to Commander, U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied

Commander, Europe, and Lt. Gen. Douglas Fraser of the Air Force to the position of General and

Commander, U.S. Southern Command. The committee’s questioning related to Afghanistan

focused on McChrystal’s views as the incoming field commander and Stavridis’ role in securing

allied support from the European states.

Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) reiterated Gates’ description of McChrystal’s replacement of

McKiernan, saying it provided “fresh eyes” to the mission. He also stressed its holistic quality,

saying that success required "all instruments of U.S. and coalition power, not just military force,

but also diplomatic, economic, and legal tools."9 Ranking member John McCain (R-AZ), who

9 Committee on Armed Services. 2009. “Hearing to Consider the Nominations of Admiral

 6

had been defeated by Obama in the previous fall’s presidential election, seconded this, saying the

“long overdue change of course” had his backing. “Now that we have a new strategy,” McCain

said, “I believe we must quickly follow up with the development of an integrated joint-agency

civil-military campaign plan for all of Afghanistan and for the Pakistan border area.10”

McCain also stressed Stavridis' role in securing the support of other NATO governments,

saying that he would "play a critical role in marshaling NATO's efforts in Afghanistan," but that

there should be a shift "away from stressing what Washington wants Europe to give and more

together encouraging what Europe is prepared to contribute."11

In his opening statement, McChrystal made clear his own view of the nature of his new

mission:

There is no simple answer. We must conduct a holistic counterinsurgency campaign, and we must do it

well. Success will not be quick or easy. Casualties will likely increase. We will make mistakes.

Commitment and continued support of this committee, Congress, and the American people will be vital.

With the appropriate resources, time, sacrifice, and patience, we can prevail.12

Foreshadowing the coming divergence over resourcing, McChrystal addressed the recent

troop-level increase and the question that necessarily followed. "You might properly ask if that is

enough," he said. "I don’t know. It may be some time before I do. What I do know is that

military-centric strategy will not succeed."13 He then reported the continuing efforts at joining

civilian and military operations in the overall Afghanistan operation, and his intention to

James G. Stavridis, USN for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander,
U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Lieutenant General
Douglas M. Fraser, USAF to be General and Commander, U.S. Southern Command; and
Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA to be General and Commander, International
Security Assistance Force and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan,” June 2. United States
Senate. Page 3.
10 Ibid, page 4.
11 Ibid, page 4.
12 Ibid, page 10.
13 Ibid, page 10.
 Giannotta 7

"support fully the completion and execution of that plan."14

McChrystal also addressed the issue of civilian casualties head-on, stating that "central to

counterinsurgency is protecting the people.” He continued:

In counterinsurgency, how you operate, the impact of civilian casualties, collateral damage, cultural

insensitivity, and the inherent complexities involved in separating insurgents from the population often

determine success or failure. If defeating an insurgent formation produces popular resentment, the victory

is hollow and unsustainable.15

McChrystal pointed to his background as convincing him of the need for this “holistic”

effort.

Later in the hearing, McCain questioned McChrystal about the 10,000 troop request left on

the table by General McKiernan.

“Do you expect to renew this request, alter it, or rescind it?”

“Sir, I believe I’ll have to make an assessment on the ground, and can’t tell you right now

whether I would do that.”

Not satisfied, McCain pressed the general for an answer.

“What is your initial assessment? Do we need the additional 10,000?”

“Sir, I’m just not sure, at this point.”16

McCain then moved on to the general’s thinking about the length of the U.S. commitment

in Afghanistan, which again McChrystal was wary of answering with anything definitive enough

to pin himself down. But he did re-affirm his prepared statement’s prediction of an increase in

casualties, something McCain points to as “an important message.”17

The general was probably hesitant to judge the situation prior to getting the lay of the land

14 Ibid, page 10.

15 Ibid, page 11.
16 Ibid, pp. 16-17.
17 Ibid, page 17.
 8

himself, but there was certainly also a desire to avoid tying his own hands in any future

recommendations he might need to make regarding resource levels. At this point, however, there

is no indication that McChrystal was making any blatantly political considerations. His

testimony instead appears to betray his own ambivalence in making irresponsibly broad-gauged

assessments based on conjecture and not firsthand experience, and an honesty in acknowledging

that until he arrived on the scene, he was not clear as to how it might shake out.

Indeed, in response to questioning by Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT), McChrystal affirmed

his commitment to the mission, but qualified by saying “it is winnable, but I don’t think it will be

easily winnable.”18 Lieberman also questioned McChrystal about his ability to work with Karl

Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general who had served two tours in Afghanistan and was then

the ambassador to the country, and the timeline for securing the plans for a joint civil-military

effort. McChrystal responded by saying that he “hate[d] to be pinned to goals, but I think we

need to finish that this summer.”19 McChrystal’s answers seem both reasonable but also perhaps

politically astute. For a newly-appointed field commander who has yet to step foot in theater, this

would seem prudent; in light of the ensuing relationship issues with his civilian superiors, it

could also be considered foreboding.

John Thune, a Republican senator from South Dakota, questionied McChrystal on the

coalition nature of the mission, which the general conceded was “not as clean and as unified as

we might like…I think, historically - and I think strongly - we get more out of being a

coalition…it’s sort of like democracy, you pay for a certain lack of order, but the benefits are so

great.”20 He also agreed with the idea of “the accidental guerilla,21” that individuals could be

18 Ibid, page 20.

19 Ibid, page 21.
20 Ibid, p. 30.
21 Cf. the influential work of David Kilcullen, a former Australian soldier and expert in
counterinsurgency, particularly his book The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the
 Giannotta 9

driven to join insurgents not out of ideological agreement but practical necessity or as the

response to counterinsurgent errors. “What we’ve got to do,” he said, “is eliminate the people

who do it for other than just absolutely strong ideological reasons.”22

Lindsey Graham (R-SC) raised an issue that would prove a prelude to the conflicts of the

summer and fall months. “Do you feel constrained at all, General McChrystal, to ask for more

troops? Is there any political restrain[t] upon you to ask for more troops if you think they’re

necessary? Do you think you could make that request without any concerns?”

“Sir, I’m not in the job yet, so I - you know, I’m speculating on that,” McChrystal replied.

Yesterday, in a meeting, Admiral Mullen said that - if I was confirmed, to ask for what I need,

almost quote/unquote. He looked me in the eye and said that. So, I believe that, if I have a

requirement, I can look Admiral Mullen in the eye and tell him, ‘That’s what I need.’”

Graham then asked if “that’s true of the administration” as a whole.

“Sir,” came the reply, “I don’t know.”23

McChrystal appeared ambivalent in making any firm assertions of the situation on the

ground and any additional resources it might require. At the same time, his response to Graham’s

question regarding the administration’s commitment to him and the possibility of political

roadblocks to any further resource requests makes one wonder. Woodward’s account reports that

National Security Advisor Jim Jones, himself a retired Marine General, saw the writing on the

wall. Through his NATO contacts, he had begun hearing about “a campaign for more troops”

and questioned Gates and Mullen about it. The Secretary of Defense and JCS Chairman gave it

to him straight: things were not good, and reconsidering the plan seemed inevitable (Woodward

2010, 123-24).

Midst of a Big One, 2009, New York: Oxford University Press.

22 Ibid, p. 36.
23 Ibid, p. 45.
 10

But Jones was growing frustrated by what he knew could spiral out of control and cause

fissures between the new administration and the military leadership. The plan they had all agreed

on only months prior was for “holding forces at the current level for a full year” before any

evaluation and consideration on more would be made. Instead, it was happening only three

months later, before the new COMISAF was even on the ground. The first five months had, to

some degree, appeared a model of orderly civil-military relations. As Woodward states: “The

military had given its advice. Obama had supported it.” Now, it threatened to unravel. In this

context, Jones proposed, and Gates agreed to, McChrystal taking sixty days to develop an

assessment of the situation. Instead of “campaign[ing] for more troops behind the president’s

back,” this allowed some cover (Woodward 2010, 124).

So far, the real-life game has played according to our expectations. The ultimate

punishment - severance from service - was employed to conclude the off-study precursor game

between the Obama Administration and General McKiernan. That precipitated McChrystal’s

appointment and confirmation. The civilians used the media, through statements like Gates’

original announcement of McKiernan’s removal, and intrusive monitoring tools like the hearing

questions as to the new commander’s views on the strategy and his relationship with the

civilians, to ensure military acquiescence in the new regime. McChrystal concurred with the

desire to limit civilian casualties, which was a distinct military policy preference in any case (and

which we’ll return to later in this chapter), and declined to raise any overt objections to civilian

oversight or authority. Indeed, at this point, explicit shirking by the military would have been too

obvious a faux pas, given the firing of McKiernan only weeks prior and the apparent unity of the

civilian behind the new, “fully resourced” counterinsurgency strategy as well as all indications at

this point being that the military had received what it had asked for. So in early June, the
 Giannotta 11

relationship was stable and relatively conflict-free. But as the frustrations of Jim Jones signaled

and the rest of the summer would confirm, once McChrystal arrived in theater and the drumbeats

for more troops began again, tensions would escalate.

McChrystal Arrives

As McChrystal took command, there were a few obvious threads in play with regard to

Afghanistan. First, the aforementioned issue of Pakistan and the newly re-christened “AfPak”

mission. This, along with the “whole of government” counterinsurgency approach decided on in

March and cemented with McChrystal’s appointment, and made even more salient after the 4

May incident, made clear that just racking up body counts was no longer a goal in Afghanistan.

It could even be counterproductive. So, it became a key tenet of the new mission there to secure

the support and trust of the Afghan population and stabilize Pakistan to whatever extent possible.

Second, and related, was the continuing salience of the civilian casualty problem. Karzai

was certainly going to keep raising it as a talking point in his presidential campaign, which did

not begin in earnest until late July. But, it offered a tantalizing bit of steak to throw to the masses

who were growing increasingly wary of the American presence.

With under a month before the presidential election, Karzai had done little in the way of

campaigning, declining even to produce a platform. But in a Kabul rally on 25 July, he played to

the public concerns about civilian casualties, promising to re-assert control over their country

with greater restrictions on foreign troops. He told the crowd of 3,000 Afghans that “we want our

home to be safe, not to be insecure. Our law should be respected, our religion and our culture

should be respected.” If the message wasn’t clear, he continued, “It should be known who is the

owner of the house and who is the guest. We want to legitimize their presence.”24

24 Gall, Carlotta. 2009. “Karzai Vows More Control Over Troops From Abroad,” New York
 12

Of course, this was probably nothing more than campaign boilerplate. Given Karzai’s

known instability, its possible he sincerely believed it, but at the same time, he was dependent on

those very same foreign troops for his own security. Public opinion, however, was apparently in

no mood to defer to them. Nor were they too keen on Karai’s government.

In the southern part of Afghanistan, for example, home to “the strongest Taliban

insurgency in the country,” many locals had no love for either the foreigners or the national

government. The population here was quick to blame the NATO troops for their problems and

instances of civilians being killed in combat did not help, even if they were labeled “accidents.”

More problematic, there was no sense of trust or loyalty to the central government, if there was

even an awareness to begin with.25 For a good number of Afghans, there was nothing but their

own persona, daily existence, and all they knew was that, thanks to the Americans, violence

persisted in their land, perhaps even touching their own lives or those of their neighbors and

family. It was no surprise that they would hold no love for the foreigners, and it’s easy to see the

point about how a regular Afghan could easily be tipped over into becoming an insurgent.

For the Americans, this proved problematic given the strategic military goals. For Karzai, it

proved a problem for his own political ambition. Unlike the Americans, however, he could call

on allies to help minimize his own unpopularity. He held a second rally in central Afghanistan on

the first of August and it became clear that even though many were none too happy with his

government’s performance, their loyalty to their tribal leader might ensure his victory anyway.

One Afghan was quoted as saying, “We have been ordered by our leader to vote for Hamid

Karzai. His choice is our choice.”26

Times, July 25, page A10.

25 Gall, Carlotta. 2009. “Marines Land in Caldron of Afghan Resentment.” The New York
Times, July 3.
26 Wafa, Abdul Waheed. 2009. “Karzai Campaigns in Remote Valley, Wooing Minority Shiite
Group.” The New York Times, 2 August. Page A10.
 Giannotta 13

As we touched on earlier, Karzai was not necessarily the United States’ first choice in the

August elections. His history of corruption and paranoia had made him a difficult working

partner. But the disconnect between the government in Kabul and the rest of the country made

the Americans wary about how the election would play out. Like the Pakistanis, Karzai did not

seem to have a problem with playing both sides to his advantage. He would pander to the

masses’ fears of the occupying army while being dependent on those very Americans for his own

security. But, as mentioned earlier, the Afghan president had a paranoid streak, and in some

respects, he was not altogether off the mark in thinking that the United States was cool to the

prospect of his continuing in office. Obama had discontinued the weekly video conference

meetings that his predecessor had held with Karzai. And it was an open secret that corruption

was rampant in Afghanistan, running all the way to Karzai’s brother, if not himself. Clearly, that

relationship was rocky and would only continue to be so as the 20 August election neared.

And this proved to be the third major issue in the summer of 2009: the election, Karzai’s

leadership (or lack thereof), and how they fit into the long-term matter of stability and “good

governance” that was ostensibly the goal of the American mission.

In late July, Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special representative to the region, expressed

such concerns. “We are worried about voter registration fraud,” he said, “and we are worried

about voters who will be unable to reach polling places because of insecurity. And we are

worried about the accuracy of the vote count, and we are worried about the inability of women to

vote.” The major summer goal for the military was securing the country and providing some

sense of stability ahead of the vote, a crucial step in the long-term counterinsurgency mission.

But, as Helmand Province’s election commissioner said, “The people are not that interested in

the elections. They voted before, and they did not see any result from that. And they don’t want
 14

to put their lives in jeopardy for one vote.”27 Helmand was the site of a major Marine offensive in

July, in which thousands of the new troops sent by Obama tried to suppress the region’s

excessive violence. July’s record casualty totals were in large part due to this, and so it is no

wonder that, at this particular time, the locals would be wary of risking their lives for what they

considered a meaningless vote.

The fourth issue proved to be the commitment of the allies. The deaths of non-American

troops in Afghanistan and high-profile meetings between the new U.S. president and his

European counterparts pushed the issue to the fore of the public agenda in other NATO

countries. Some, like Britain, seemed wary of their role,28 while others, like Spain, appeared

more willing to participate because of the fact of a new American commander-in-chief.29 And

Russia also decided to allow American use of its airspace for troop and weapon transport to

Afghanistan, a marked departure from the former chilliness of U.S.-Russian relations.30 But, for

Obama and the American civilian leaders, the already rocky tenure in Afghanistan could not be

helped by any missteps that further detached allies from any sense of purpose there. Feeling that

they had redoubled their own efforts at strategy and resourcing, the next step was ensuring

support from others, and the first three factors - COIN, civilian casualties, and the question of

governance - could force America’s NATO allies to question their role and possibly destabilize
27 Gall, Carlotta. 2009. “Insecurity and Fears of Fraud Cast Pall Over Afghan Election.” The
New York Times, 4 August. Page A1.
28 The highest British casualty figures since 2001 and domestic pressure on the Labour
Party’s fragile government. And, interestingly, there appeared to be civil-military tensions in
the U.K. - The Economist reported a belief, widespread among the military elite, that the
prime minister “does not much care for the armed forces.” Shah, Taimoor and Alan Cowell.
“Bomb Kills 8 Afghans Escorting NATO Convoy.” The New York Times on the Web, July 29;
“And the soldier home from the hill.” The Economist. July 18, 2009.
29 The Socialist government of Spain, under Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero,
changed its tune on adding to the country’s modest 800. An extra 450 were sent in July for
election security, and Zapatero sounded open to more aid, attributing the shift to approval
of Obama. Burnett, Victoria, and Rachel Donadio. 2009. “Spain Is Open to Bolstering Forces
in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Says.” The New York Times, July 30. Page A4.
30 Baker, Peter. 2009. “Russia to Open Airspace to U.S. for Afghan War.” The New York
Times, July 4. Page A1.
 Giannotta 15

the new strategy.

The Drumbeat Begins Anew

The fifth issue, which would prove to emerge over the course of the summer months, was

the future of America’s own commitment in Afghanistan. Almost immediately after his

appointment, it became clear to McChrystal that things were not as good as they had seemed.

The troop levels approved only a few months earlier probably would not be adequate in

succeeding to stabilize the country (Woodward 2010, 124). This would spur frustration on the

part of the civilians, while also eventually leading to a fundamental strategic review in the fall,

the subject of my second case study. This fifth issue would thus prove to be a function of the first

four, which would combine to apply pressure both to the military’s operational mission and the

civilian’s political considerations, while calling into question the broader strategic purpose of the

United States’ enterprise in Afghanistan, and hence sow the seeds of growing tension for a civil-

military relationship that appeared generally stable as the summer began. Once the theory of the

spring decisions met the reality of the Afghan theater, however, it began to unravel.

In his history of the Obama Administration’s handling of Afghanistan over the course of its

first two years, Bob Woodward points to a growing “campaign for more troops by McChrystal

and Mullen,” the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. “Just three months after the Riedel review,” the

desire for more troops was becoming clear even “though the Pentagon had officially committed

to holding forces at the current level for a full year, at which point the new strategy - and the

impact of 21,000 more troops - could be evaluated” (Woodward 2010, 123). Woodward reports

that National Security Advisor Jim Jones saw the writing on the wall and told Gates and Mullen,

“we just went through this. We told the president, we won’t bother you for another year.” The
 16

Secretary of Defense and JCS Chairman, however, made clear that this seemed inevitable - with

McChrystal now on the ground, he was seeing things he hadn’t anticipated. Jones continued to

be concerned, and decided that one “way to defuse the tension” would be giving McChrystal

sixty days to work up “a commander’s assessment…rather than campaign for more troops

behind the president’s back.” Gates agreed, and McChrystal was on the clock (Woodward 2010,

123-25).

Woodward joined Jones on a six-day trip to Afghanistan later that June. During an in-flight

discussion of the war, he reports that Jones reflected on the non-military aspects that had been

overlooked in favor of the military (127). Jones is portrayed throughout as being (almost

uniquely among the players) sensitive to the multiple perspectives, and wary of the military side

he had extensive experience serving. He tried, apparently in vain, to relate the President’s

perspective to the military. Woodward illustrates this in his description of a meeting with

Brigadier General Lawrence Nicholson at Camp Leatherneck in Helmand province. Nicholson,

the base’s C.O. and a Marine like Jones, reported that troop levels were not adequate to carry out

the counterinsurgency strategy. The night before the meeting, a corporal had been killed, which

surely hung over the discussion.

But Jones tried to make the group understand the President’s perspective, laying out the

decision-making process from earlier in the year. First, the military requested more troops, and in

Obama’s first month in office, he approved it. Then, Jones told them that the President approved

a follow-up request for 4,000 more troops for training of the Afghan National Army. The

President had been told that “if you do all that, we think we can turn this around.” Jones asked

the Marines in the room to put themselves in the President’s shoes, and bluntly told them that, if

he heard about new requests for more troops before the last increase had a chance, the President
 Giannotta 17

would have “a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.”31 (Woodward 2010, 132)

But this speaks not so much to a clear civil-military divide, as to a disconnect between

those on the ground and the elites higher up making resourcing decisions in their Washington

meeting rooms. And those on the ground were in the midst of a very difficult conflict.

The new strategy, for instance, called for “clear-hold-build32,” and the first such operation

began in early July, in the violent southern Helmand province that Jones had just visited33. The

intention was to provide some security so tactical gains turned into strategic victories, by

providing space for the Afghan locals and government to establish themselves. Reflecting this

new goal, a spokesman, Captain Bill Pelletier, was quoted in The New York Times as saying,

“We are not worried about the Taliban, we are not focused on them. We are focused on the

people. It is important to engage with the key leaders, hear what they need most and what are

their priorities.” A civilian in Helmand Province threw some cold water on this ambition by

pointing out that for those in the area, “it is very difficult to tell who is Taliban and who are

civilians. They all have the same face, same beard and same turban. It is very difficult to defeat

them.”34 The Marines, on the other hand, stood out like a sore thumb, putting them at a steep

disadvantage in a war for the population’s support.

The lack of enough Afghan soldiers made the American mission even more daunting. The

operation in Helmand Province was comprised of about 4,000 Americans and only 400

31 This phrase recurs in discussions of Jones’ reactions to the “more troops” movement.
Whiskey Tango Foxtrot is the military version of the common acronym “WTF,” which stands
for “what the f***,” using the NATO phonetic alphabet.
32 Clear-hold-build is a key part of COIN. At the level of the locality, the counterinsurgent
force first clears the area of insurgents, then works to hold the area, and finally, once
secured, builds a base of support for the host nation government. See Counterinsurgency
Field Manual, 174-184.
33 Shanker, Thom and Richard A. Oppel, Jr. 2009. “In Tactical Shift, Troops Will Hold Afghan
Ground After Clearing It.” The New York Times, July 3. Page A8.
34 Associated Press. 2009. “Moving Into Afghan Villages, Marines Woo Residents.” Thew
New York Times, July 4.
 18

“effective” Afghans. Marine General Nicholson, who had made the case for more troops to Jones

at the end of June, said, “What I need is more Afghans.” Marine Captain Brian Huysman called

it their “Achilles’ heel.” This proved a possibly fundamental flaw in the mission - more Afghan

soldiers were needed if it was to have any chance at success at moving beyond “hold” and into

the final stages of the counterinsurgency: “We can’t read these people; we’re different. They’re

not going to tell us the truth. We’ll never get to build and transition unless we have the

Afghans.”35 Indeed, General McChrystal was sure to stress the full breadth of the

counterinsurgency’s requirements for success. Over the summer months, he repeatedly pointed

to the need to minimize civilian casualties, refine civil-military operations, and gain the trust of

the Afghan people. “Militarily, you can think you can control areas, but sociologically if you

don’t control them, you’re not going to be able to do what we need to do here.”36 But that was

easier said than done. The difference between the fighting in Iraq and Aghanistan was made clear

by Marine Sergeant Jacob Tambunga’s description: “They are two totally different worlds. In

Iraq, they’d hit you and run. But these guys stick around and maneuver on you.”37 The problems

of fighting a counterinsurgency in such an environment were thus obviously magnified, and

avoiding collateral damage made ever more difficult due to a savvy foe. “They’re not stupid,”

Lance Corporal Frank Hegel was quoted as saying. “You can tell they catch on to things, and

they don’t make the same mistake twice.”38

In late June, the civil-military nature of the mission was once again addressed in a

Congressional hearing. Before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee,

35 Oppel, Jr., Richard A. 2009. “Allied Officers Concerned by Lack of Afghan Forces.” Thew
New York Times, July 8.
36 Ibid.
37 Oppel, Jr., Richard A. “Iraq Veterans Find Afghan Enemy Even Bolder,” New York Times,
July 26. Page A1.
38 Ibid.
 Giannotta 19

Richard Holbrooke, the special representative to the AfPak region, pointed his “special office in

the State Department” being described by Secretary Gates as “a genuine whole of Government

effort.”39 General Wallace Gregson, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific

Affairs, remarked on a question about whether the military was engaged in “nation-building” by

reinforcing the jointness of the mission, saying that “the military role in the counter-insurgency

in a large respect is protection of the population” and that the goal was to transition to the

Afghans themselves, but that this transition required adequate protection and that was the

military’s primary role. But, Gregson said, the entire process requires more than just armed

troops. “The Nation fights the Nation’s wars, not the military. But the goal of any conflict or any

engagement of the military is profoundly political,” and in this case, the war can’t be won until

the dual political goals of security and good governance are realized, and the Afghan people are

able to reject the Taliban.40

Democratic Representative Christopher Van Hollen touched on the civilian casualty issue,

which Gregson took up, once again repeating the now-standard military line about the peculiar

nature of their counterinsurgency struggle. “I could not agree more on the potential for any use

of close air support missions or any air support missions to be counterproductive,” Gregson told

Van Hollen. “All the Commanders and all their air crews are very carefully attuned to the

necessity to prevent civilian casualties.”41 Holbrooke followed up:

On the bombing, let me add to what General Gregson just said, a personal comment just echoing what

General McChrystal, Ambassador Eikenberry, and I have all said publicly in the past. The war could be lost

over this issue. If the war turns from a war against the Taliban and to a war against the Pashtun people, we

39 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on National

Security and Foreign Affairs. 2009. “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of a New
Interagency Strategy.” United States House of Representatives, 111th Congress, First
Session. June 24. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Page 126.
40 Ibid, P. 150
41 Ibid, p. 167
 20

will lose. The Taliban propaganda is all designed to make that point. We were successful in the 1980’s in

turning the Soviet invasion along those lines. We cannot let that happen to us. That is why we are putting

so much attention on what is called strategic communications, a phrase I am not comfortable with because

it does not quite convey what we are talking about. We are talking about counter-propaganda. And the

Taliban have been winning the propaganda struggle.42

The issue of civilian casualties remained a prominent one over the course of the summer

months. McChrystal, in his Commander’s Guidance, stressed the need to “think before you act.”

He made explicit the connection between the strategic goals of COIN and the requirement of

prudence in operational and tactic means of getting there, saying that “if we harm Afghan

civilians, we sow the seeds of our own defeat.”43 But while it was a strategic reality, expecting

the troops down the line to understand it was a more difficult prospect. Pointing to the inherent

difficulty of preventing civilian casualties, British Major Giles Harris was quoted by The

Economist as calling it “a continual challenge.” “You are asking my guardsman not to empty the

magazine of his weapon into the compound wall from which he is being shot at.”44

The last day of July saw a United Nations report state that 1,013 Afghan civilians had been

killed in the fighting since the beginning of the year, an increase from 2008 of almost 200 deaths.

And while the report blamed the Taliban for over half of those, that proved little solace with the

crucial election only a few weeks away and the population remaining wary of NATO’s presence.

The report also indicated that insurgent activity had become more threatening to the country than

in the past. This in turn required heightened counterinsurgent activity - necessitating the very

missions in populated areas that risked collateral damage.45 Indeed, the report stated that “as the

42 Ibid, p. 168.
43 McChrystal, Stanley. 2009. “Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance.” Mirror 55: 3.
44 “And the soldier home from the hill.” The Economist, July 18, 2009.
45 Otterman, Sharon. 2009. “Afghan Civilian Deaths Rise, With Militants Causing Most, U.N.
Says.” The New York Times, August 1. Page A7.
 Giannotta 21

conflict intensifies and spreads, it is taking an increasingly heavy toll on civilians.”46 As the

insurgency spreads into civilian residential areas and the counterinsurgent forces follow, “a

rising toll in terms of civilian deaths and injuries and destruction of infrastructure” were

threatening the population’s “survival and the maintenance of livelihoods.”47

As the summer went on, the military began to make some key changes to address the needs

created by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially as the latter ramped up. Gates announced

on 20 July that the Army would be increasing in size by 22,000, albeit temporarily. He reiterated

his complaints about Congressional deliberations over the defense budget, saying that “some of

the wheeling and dealing on the Hill of a few hundred million here and a few hundred million

there for a pet project here and a pet project there confront us with ever more difficult choices

when we’re trying to make trade-offs in terms of how do we help our soldiers out.” He pointed to

the anticipated cost of the troop increase, of “less than a hundred million dollars,” as being one

such instance where the DoD would be forced to make difficult cost-benefit calculations.48 And,

facing a dearth of officers to oversee large numbers of newly enlisted men, the Army embarked

on a new marketing mission, meant to stress the service’s potential appeal to ambitious young

college graduates. Lt. Gen. Benjamin Freakley was quoted as saying that “it’s a different era, and

it requires a different kind of thinker,” reinforcing he idea that the United States faced both new

forms of warfare and the need to develop innovative strategies for dealing with them.49

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, July would end with record casualty tallies. “75 American and

NATO troop deaths,” read the report in The New York Times, “a number that surpassed the

46 United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, Human Rights Unit. 2009.

“Afghanistan: Mid Year Bulletin on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009.” Page 1.
47 Ibid, pp. 1-2.
48 Bumiller, Elisabeth. 2009. “Gates Says Army’s Size Will Grow By 22,000.” New York
Times, July 21. Page A8.
49 Quenqua, Douglas. 2009. “With Enough Soldiers, The Army Is Looking For a Few Good
Officers.” The New York Times. 3 August. Page B5.ig
 22

highest previous monthly casualty toll by almost two-thirds.”50 In early August, NATO juggled

its command structure, putting Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez in charge of “the day-to-day war,” with

McChrystal still in overall command.51 Only a few weeks later, the election would be past and

McChrystal’s assessment would be due.

Analysis

Preferences

By mid-May, with the new strategy, new troops, and new commander in place, the civilian

and military preferences were nearly coincident. As time went on, and the situation in the

Afghan theater deteriorated, it was obvious that a rethinking was necessary. But, when this

particular phase of the civil-military game began with the removal of McKiernan and the

appointment of McChrystal, both the civilians and the military had decided on a

counterinsurgency approach based on Petraeus’ own template used in Iraq.

The clearest indication of the lack of daylight between the principal and agent is in seen in

their treatment of the salient issue of noncombatant casualties. The Army/Marine Corps

Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) stresses the importance of winning the support of

the population as the key to defeating an insurgency. To this end, civilian deaths in the course of

firefights between COIN and insurgent forces are anathema to the mission objectives. As the

manual states,

…COIN is “war amongst the people.” Combat operations must therefore be executed with an appropriate

level of restraint to minimize or avoid injuring innocent people. Not only is there a moral basis for the use

of restraint or measured force; there are practical reasons as well. Needlessly harming innocents can turn

the population against the COIN effort. Discriminating use of fires and calculated, disciplined response

50 Oppel, Richard A. 2009. “Afghan War Hits Peak Toll For a Month.” The New York Times. 3
August. Page A11.
51 Erlanger, Steven. 2009. “NATO Reorganizes Afghan Command Structure.” The New York
Times on the Web, August 5.
 Giannotta 23

should characterize COIN operations. Kindness and compassion can often be as important as killing and

capturing insurgents. (2007, 167)

Later, in the chapter on ethics in counterinsurgency operations, the manual once again

treats this explicitly, plainly stating that “when conditions of civil security exist, Soldiers and

Marines may not take any actions that might knowingly harm noncombatants” (2007, 248).

Collateral damage is often unavoidable in any military engagement, and especially so in the case

of counterinsurgent operations, often conducted in residential areas, in which the “fog of war” is

further complicated by that fact. FM 3-24 ties this issue to the principle of “proportionality,”

namely that the extraneous damage inflicted by any operation cannot outweigh the intended

military goal. In other words, destroying an entire village and killing scores of noncombatants to

kill a few minor insurgents would be counterproductive and a waste of resources. That being

said, COIN itself requires a heightened level of awareness as to the possibility of unintended

consequences. Contrasting against the starkly “utilitarian” cost-benefit calculations that make up

conventional war-fighting, FM 3-24 states

Soldiers and Marines require an innate understanding of the effects of their actions and weapons on all

aspects of the operational environment. Leaders must consider not only the first-order, desired effects of a

munition or action but also possible second- and third-order effects - including undesired ones. (2007, 248)

The Army’s 2009 Posture Statment, submitted to Congress in early May, reiterated this

commitment to reducing potentially counterproductive, if unintended, violence against the

civilian population in counterinsurgent operations:

Conflicts are increasingly waged among the people instead of around the people. Foes seeking to mitigate

our conventional advantages operate among the people to avoid detection, deter counterstrikes, and secure

popular support or acquiescence. To secure lasting stability, the allegiance of indigenous populations

becomes the very object of the conflict (2009, 7).

The statement also pointed to the necessity of the “whole of government” approach in
 24

contemporary warfare, stating that “interagency partnerships are essential…Military forces alone

cannot establish the conditions for lasting stability” (2009, 8). The COIN doctrine had become a

major part of the Army’s readiness and strategic outlook. Additionally, the civilians expressed

support for the same goals. President Obama responded to a question about the unintended

consequences of military actions in early June by saying that there’s no doubt that anytime you

have civilian casualties that always complicates things, whether it was a Muslim or a non-

Muslim country.”52 Holbrooke, as we saw earlier, was even more blunt in assessing the potential

impact that civilian casualties could have on the American mission: “The war could be lost over

this issue.”53

Of course, as the summer went on, the preferences began to diverge. The civilians, as we

saw in Jim Jones’ reaction to the talk of more troops in early June, were questioning why the

original plan had been dispensed with so quickly, even before it had been put in place and tried.

This engendered not only a divergence in policy, but called into question the relationship more

fundamentally.

Electoral Costs

From the President’s perspective, he had committed fully to a new course in Afghanistan

and Pakistan, ordered more troops, and changed the field commander. All of this was quite

public and signaled an important shift in American foreign policy. Obama had made a point of

identifying Iraq as the “war of choice,” and Afghanistan as neglected yet more vital to U.S.

52 “Interview with Michele Norris and Steve Inskeep of National Public Radio,” PPP, p. 751.
53 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on National
Security and Foreign Affairs. 2009. “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Oversight of a New
Interagency Strategy.” United States House of Representatives, 111th Congress, First
Session. June 24. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Page 126.
 Giannotta 25

interests and security.54 At the same time, the administration faced a myriad of other issues over

the summer, from the recession (the top issue for the public), the health care reform debate that

would intensify over the summer months, controversies over his policies with regard to the

prison at Guantanamo Bay and the release of detainee abuse photos, and the uprising in Iran over

what was perceived to be a fraudulent election. The costs of any intrusive monitoring were thus

prohibitive. Having made a major decision which essentially gave the military what they asked

for, the president did not think he would have to, and then could not afford to, micromanage the

implementation of the policy. It was inevitable that they would all have to face what was

becoming glaringly apparent - that the situation on the ground was not good, even in light of the

new troops - but once Jones’ deal was cut with Gates and Mullen, it appeared to buy some time,

and delayed the need for any more hands-on monitoring by the principal.

Policy Costs

Similarly, there isn’t much that the civilians could do in policy terms. Since the civilian

position was to stay the course and test the new strategy and impact of new troops prior to any

major strategic shifts, the policy costs of intrusive civilian monitoring were probably negligible.

The civilians were not convinced that the March decision had been given enough time, so

intrusive monitoring was likely to work toward what did occur - buying more time for that plan

to play out. While the military became concerned that this was a fool’s errand, the civilian

position was to hold the line on the earlier decision. One complication here is in the fact of the

integrated nature of the AfPak strategy. Since it required joint effort by both civilian and military

agencies, there was constant interaction - or should have been. This resulted in the lines between

civil and military being blurred out of necessity, and in a way that intertwined the different tracks

54 “Remarks in Cairo.” Public Papers of the Presidents: Barack Obama, 2009. Page 763.
 26

of policy with regard to AfPak and the political and military objectives and interests. So, the

nature of the new enterprise in Afghanistan makes it difficult to assess policy costs attributed to

civilian monitoring. Separating the civil from the military requires a more fine-grained analysis

that does away with the unitary actor assumption and begins to disaggregate the mission down to

the ground level. But, in all, intervention by the civilian elites occurred because of a desire to

subdue talk of another troop increase, and so in that context, the costs were minimal.

Expectations of Punishment

Multiple factors were at play in determining the military’s expectation of civilian response

should it shirk: the status of David Petraeus as a prominent (and dominant) counterinsurgent

intellectual force, the firing of McKiernan, and Secretary Gates’ history of no-nonsense

management in his two-plus years in office. General Petraeus had achieved quite the stature in

the military establishment and the public mind, owing to his development of the revised

counterinsurgency doctrine and leadership of “the surge” in Iraq that appeared to turn America’s

fortunes around in that theater. He was considered to be very intelligent and very ambitious.

According to Jonathan Alter’s account of Barack Obama’s first year as President, the ambition

was not so much political (as some wishful Republicans hoped and the White House feared) but

rather “to be his era’s Carl von Clausewitz or Alfred Thayer Mahan, the dominant military

strategist of the twenty-first century” (2011, 365).

Alter reinforces the perception of the contemporary news reports - that McKiernan was

fired for being a poor fit in the COIN strategy Obama had committed to in March. McKiernan

was simply too conventional, with his background as an armor commander in Iraq, and couldn’t

adapt to the needs of his theater. However, Alter points to an unintended consequence of the
 Giannotta 27

general’s sacking, and one which holds some interest from the civil-military relations view.

Because dismissals were so unusual in the military - and so disruptive to the culture of the armed forces -

McKiernan’s firing meant that all the other generals in the U.S. military were now fire-proof, safe in their

jobs for the foreseeable future. (2011, 367)

He goes on to say that this resulted in a situation where the military felt free “to toy with

the civilian leadership without fear of the consequences” (2011, 367). But did the military truly

receive the signal that they were “safe”? The argument is probably partly accurate, but we have

to remember also that Robert Gates had built a no-nonsense reputation in his two-plus years as

Secretary of Defense. In March 2007, a scandal over the conditions at Walter Reed Army

Medical Center led to its commander, Major General George Weightman, being fired by Army

Secretary Francis Harvey. Harvey chose a former Walter Reed commander, Lieutenant General

Kevin Kiley, and the decision so angered Gates that both Harvey and Kiley ended up gone

before the month was out.55 In the summer of 2008, the mishandling of nuclear material by the

Air Force led to the forced resignations of the service’s secretary and chief of staff. Thom

Shanker, in his report for The New York Times, remarked that “in office 18 months, Mr. Gates

has made accountability a central theme, firing senior Army officials after disclosures of shoddy

conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and pushing into retirement other generals

closely associated with a faltering strategy in Iraq.”56

Despite Gates’ history, it’s likely that the military expected a low probability of

punishment. The new president, already under fire for his ostensibly weak national security

credentials and receiving the de facto criticism due a Democratic Commander-in-Chief, could

not afford to make another major firing so quickly after McKiernan’s, as Alter points out. At the

55 Shanker, Thom and David Stout. 2007. “Chief Army Medical Officer Ousted in Walter
Reed Furor.” The New York Times, March 13. Page A17.
56 Shanker, Thom. 2008. “2 Leaders Ousted From Air Force In Atomic Errors.” The New
York Times, June 6. Page A1.
 28

same time, the administration had so far been open to giving the military what they wanted - at

what point do they even understand shirking as such, and feel that they have crossed the line

from giving professional advice? Petraeus’ level of influence, the civilian decision to defer to

military preferences, and the desire to forge ahead with a common purpose and joint effort made

it likely that the military felt it had a free hand in mid- to late May. But Jones’ admonitions in

June made it clear that they did not have a free hand to subvert the plan everybody had

previously agreed upon. Setting a window for McChrystal to assess the situation and deliver a

report gave both the civilians and the military incentive to maintain the status quo for a while

longer.

Discussion

The summer of 2009 thus presents a gradually decaying civil-military relationship. As

we’ve seen, the first few months of the new Obama Administration appeared to be relatively

quiet in terms of any overt conflict between the civilian and military elite. A review of the

inherited mission in Afghanistan produced a new strategic decision in late March, which by all

accounts seems to have played according to an orderly, almost ideal, template for civil-military

relations. The military wanted more troops and a new strategy emphasizing the

counterinsurgency nature of the Afghan theater, shifting the focus from the waning Iraq mission.

Obama signed off on it, and once McChrystal was put in place in mid-May, Operation Enduring

Freedom appeared to have undergone a complete, top-to-bottom reorganization. Everything

seemed in line with the desires of both the new civilian administration and the military leaders.

But, as the summer went on, it became clear that things were far worse in Afghanistan than

the winter review and spring decisions acknowledged (or were even aware of). Newspaper
 Giannotta 29

accounts related dismay by the troops on the ground - with the lack of sufficient Afghan troop

levels, with the distrust they faced in the local populations, with the corruption of the local

governments, and with the frustrating nature of the insurgency, much different than the enemy in

Iraq. While it was easy and tempting to compare the troop increases and COIN emphasis to the

Surge in Iraq, the differences between the two theaters were enough to also call it into question.

Those on the ground, with bullets singing the air past their ears, knew all too well that the

debates over strategy in Washington were, at least for them, but academic exercises.

Of course, this empirical reality begins to call into question the utility of the unitary,

rational actor model employed here. It’s easy to see that the civilian actor is not really unitary -

the obvious separation of powers nature of American government and the reality of bureaucratic

politics even within the executive branch make this clear, to anyone with even a cursory

knowledge of American politics. But, it’s often too tempting to see the military as a monolith.

Normatively, the military may indeed be a honorable institution with a number of virtues, but

this does not mean that each branch holds identical preference orderings. Nor does it mean that

particular individuals within the military are devoid of personal ambition or will act on such

ambition.

After all, an understanding of General David Petraeus as a very ambitious officer recurs

quite often in the documentary record of recent American military history. Jonathan Alter, in his

history of Obama’s first year, says that Petraeus’ ambition was not necessarily geared to political

office, but rather toward making an intellectual mark on the way of war in the 21 century.
st

Rather than be another Washington or Eisenhower, he wanted to be an American Clausewitz.

And he was well on his way in being credited with the turnaround in Iraq, although even this has

come under heavy fire. The question of whether it was his COIN and the Surge that actually
 30

reversed the trend in violence or other confounding variables, or if it was only a temporary blip

with no real positive, long-term consequences, has occupied scholars and pundits in the last few

years.

But in the spring of 2009, Petraeus did have quite a bit of influence. He was Commander,

U.S. Central Command, overseeing the American forces in the critical Middle East region. His

relationship with McKiernan (not too good) and McChrystal (close) apparently had much to do

with May’s shift in Afghanistan. And all indications are that the strategic course was being

aligned with his own preferences. But, while the Iraq Surge was a response to his re-written

counterinsurgency manual of 2006, the spring decisions appeared more a case of “this seemed to

work there, let’s try it here,” than a complete strategic re-assessment applied to a very different

theater. The military preferences were not as fully developed as they had been in the Iraq case

two years prior. And the civilian preferences were also vague generalities.

But, ultimately, it appears that going into McChrystal’s tenure as COMISAF, the civil-

military relationship played fairly close to a Huntingtonian script. The civilians wanted to

achieve stability in Afghanistan and re-focus the military from Iraq, and the military in turn

offered its assessment, which the civilians then approved and left the agent to its professional

work. Unfortunately, the agent appeared to find its own assessment constantly evolving as the

situation on the ground worsened, and from the bottom up, a “drumbeat” for new troops began to

be heard in the White House. Jim Jones, understanding the way the military worked, was wary of

this from the start, but appeared somewhat on the outs both in the President’s inner circle and

with the Pentagon. His portrayal in Woodward’s account, for example, appears to be of a man

who clearly saw the writing on the wall but did not trust the “Politburo” of Obama’s inner circle

nor was willing to defer to the military and its allies in the Pentagon.
 Giannotta 31

Over the course of the summer, the most obvious (and easily measurable) examples of

civilian monitoring and military working/shirking came through the media. But, there seem to be

few cases of any overt conflict. Presidential statements over this period do not betray any issues

with the military. On the contrary, President Obama goes out of his way to connect the need for

material and strategic support for the mission in Afghanistan and the military in general on a

number of occasions. But there is very little in the way of direct commentary on the civil-

military relationship or any hint of an issue arising in that relationship. The same can be said of

public statements by other elites. The consensus position that arises from a review of the

documentary record is that the civil-military effort is the product of a joint decision-making

process, and has finally become a unified, “whole of government” strategy with the resources to

succeed.

The behind-the-scenes politicking, as witnessed in the Woodward account (and

elsewhere?), gives us reason to believe that this was but a handy PR smokescreen to mask the

dissent that reached to the troops on the ground. Once McChrystal arrived in theater and was

exposed to this sentiment and the reality of the fighting, his own assessment became far gloomier

than the apparently heady days of May. But, as we saw in the general’s testimony of early June,

he was wary of pinning himself to any firm position on the situation or his future needs prior to

arriving in Afghanistan. This was either a cover for the growing campaign that Jones was wary

of, as Woodward tells it, an expression of prudent caution in making any broad assessments, or a

little of both. In any case, it isn’t clear that this rises to the level of military shirking. While Jones

was apparently not pleased by the message he believed it conveyed, the new field commander

made no blatant challenge to the civilian authority. If anything, he was deferring to the civilians -

acknowledging the Senators’ concerns while also declining to criticize his Commander-in-Chief
 32

and holding open the possibility of future course corrections by all parties involved.

Once Jones arranged the sixty-day assessment window with Gates, that seemed to buy time

and delay the major civil-military conflict that would come in the fall, once McChrystal’s report

was finished. The assessment would become public knowledge and widen the scope of the

conflict so that it occupied a significant portion of the fall political agenda. In the summer,

however, issues such as a turbulent election aftermath in Iran, health insurance reform, the

recession, and Obama’s visits with foreign dignitaries both in Europe and at home obscured

Afghanistan as a major domestic issue. Once the decision had been made in March, and the

change in command made in May, it appears that the military was largely left to conduct the

chosen strategy with the new troop levels over the summer election season.

It appears then that the summer basically conformed to the agency model process. The

decision to change commanders was the punishment for the previous round of the civil-military

game. The civilian then decided to monitor less intrusively, assuming that it had given the agent

what it wanted to do its job on its terms. The military basically worked, saying the right things in

public, but the reality on the ground in Afghanistan was spurring a grassroots lobbying effort for

more troops. Once the civilian, in the form of NSA Jim Jones, caught wind of this campaign, it

punished in terms of confronting the Secretary of Defense (arguably a civilian) and JCS

Chairman, and convincing them and McChrystal to hold off on any overt requests for more

troops. The civilian, through Jim Jones’ police patrols, then monitored more intrusively, while

the military worked under the sixty-day assessment window. Conceivably, the demand for more

troops and a desire for more resources generally (especially the need for more Afghan soldiers)

did not dissipate; indeed it remained in full force once the fall strategic review kicked into gear.

But, there does not seem to be any record of more incidents like Jones’ frustrations with Gates,
 Giannotta 33

Mullen, and the Marines in Helmand province. While the military still preferred more, it did not

make any obvious challenges to the civilian control nor the bargain it had struck with the

principal over the assessment timeline. So, the game played out until the election of 20 August

and the COMISAF’s report at the end of the month kicked off a new phase of McChrystral’s

tenure.