EVTOENCE FOR LOCALLY PRODUCED, NATURALLY
ACCOUNTABLE PHENOMENA OF ORDER**, LOGIC, REASON,
MEANING, METHOD, ETC. IN AND AS OF THE ESSENTIAL
QUIDDITY OF IMMORTAL ORDINARY SOCIETY, a OF IV):
AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF STUDIES^
HAROLD GARFINKEL
University of California, Los Angeles
At a recent symposium of the American
Sociological Association celebrating the 50th
anniversary of the publication of The Struc-
ture of Social Action?, Jeffrey Alexander
called attention to the book's continuing
influence upon professional sociology. In the
generosity of the celebration, he situated
ethnomethodology's program in the agenda of
analytic sociology and offered ethnomethodol-
ogy good advice.
From his place within the agenda, he
identified for ethnomethodologists the studies
they do, advised them of studies they should
do, and offered friendly advice about empha-
ses they cannot avoid. In thoughtful reflec-
tions, he praised ethnomethodological studies
for carrying on with the problem of social
order that Parsons specified with which he
instituted formal analytic sociology. In a
spirit of generosity Alexander offered ethno-
methodology an olive branch. Rather than
' When, in this paper, order*, is spelled with an
asterisk, but only then, it serves as a convenient proxy. I
use order* as a marker to hold a place for any of the
endless topics in intellectual history that speak of logic,
purpose, reason, rational action, evidence, identity, proof,
meaning, method, consciousness, and the rest. Any of
the topics that order* is proxy for should be read witfi an
accompanying suffix: (order*)-in-and-as-of-the-workings-
of-ordinary-society. Then the topic of order* would be
understood to speak of a phenomenon of order*, a
practical achievement. When order is spelled without an
asterisk it is used in its textually appropriate vernacular or
technical meaning.
^ Based on my talk, "The Seriousness of Professional
Sociology" at the Annual Meetings of the American
Sociological Association, Chicago, August, 1987. (See
footnote 3.) A prior version, A Reflection, was published
in the d.a.r.g. Newsletter, Fall, 1987, of the Discourse
Analysis Research Group, Dr. Richard D. Heyman and
Dr. Robert M. Seiler, The University of Calgary,
Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
' Section on Theoretical Sociology, "Parsons' The
Structure of Social Action: Three Views Fifty Years On,"
Bernard Barber, Chair. Annual Meetings of the American
Sociological Association,' Chicago, August, 1987.1 wish
to thank Bernard Barber for his invitation to speak at this
celebration.
Sociological Theory, 1988, Vol. 6 (Spring: 103-109)
pursuing their program of current studies—
which in another context he has criticized as
"individualistic"—ethnomethodologists should
celebrate The Structure of Social Action by
returning to the analytic fold.*
I disagree. There are good reasons for
ethnomethodological studies to specify the
production and accountability of immortal,
ordinary society—that miracle of familiar
organizational things—as the local production
and natural, reflexive accountability of the
phenomena of order*. Among those reasons
is making discoverable one of those phenom-
ena of order* but only one, namely what
analysis incarnate in and as ordinary society,
as practical action's locally and interaction-
ally produced and witnessed embodied de-
tails, could adequately be.
Although both formal analytic sociology
and ethnomethodology address produced phe-
nomena of order*, and although both seek to
specify the production and accountability of
immortal ordinary society, a summary play
on Durkheim's aphorism reminds us of their
differences.
For The Structure of Social Action, Durk-
heim's aphorism is intact: "The objective
reality of social facts is sociology's fundamen-
tal principle."
For ethnomethodology the objective reality
of social facts, in that and just how it is every
society's locally, endogenously produced,
naturdly organized, reflexively accountable,
ongoing, practical achievement, being every-
where, always, only, exactly and entirely,
members' work, widi no time out, and with
no possibility of evasion, hiding out, passing,
postponement, or buy-outs, is thereby sociol-
ogy's fundamental phenomenon.
In his talk, Alexander properly reminded
the profession that in The Structure of Social
* Alexander's extended argument is found in his book.
Action and Its Environments, Columbia University Press,
New York, 1988, pp. 224-258.
103
104
Action Parsons gave to professional sociology
a way to find and exhibit the real production
and accountability of immortal, ordinary
society. Concerned with, and profoundly
reasoned about generic, massively recurrent
properties of human action in and as the
properties of populations. The Structure of
Social Action set an example for form^
analytic sociology and has become emblem-
atic of analytic sociology and of the world-
wide social science movement.
Ethnomethodology has its origins in this
wonderful book. Its earliest initiatives were
taken from these texts.' Ethnomethodologists
have continued to consult its text to under-
stand the practices and the achievements of
formal analysis in the work of professional
social science.
Inspired by The Structure of Social Action
ethnomethodology undertook the task of
respecifying the production and accountabil-
ity of immortal, ordinary society. It has done
so by searching for and specifying radical
phenomena. In the pursuit of that program, a
certain agenda of themes announced and
elaborated in The Structure . . . . has over
the years offered a contrasting standing point
of departure to ethnomethodology's interest in
respecification. Found throughout the book,
faithful to the book, and used by ethnometho-
dologists to read the book, these themes
brought the book's materials together as its
coherent and researchable argument that the
real society was available to the policies and
methods of formal analytic sociology. With
these policies concrete society could be
investigated and demonstrated to indefinite
depths of detail, with no actual setting
excused from jurisdiction, regardless of time,
place, staff, locality, skills, or scale.
In the brief remarks that space allows, I
must reduce Parsons' agenda of themes from
an argument to a recitation of slogans.
Endlessly seminal was sociology's stun-
ning vision of society as a practical achieve-
ment. Affiliated to this vision were several
technical specifics. A first one was the
problem of social order formulated by Hobbes.
Another, inexorably tied to it, were theoriz-
ing's constantly undertaken and unfinishable
tasks of requiring that the vexed problem of
the practical objectivity and practical observa-
bility of practical actions and practical
' Of course, in deliberately reconstructive readings of
them.
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
reasoning, because it was vexed, serve as the
standing source and grounds for the adequacy
of theorizing's claims. Third, in every actual
case of inquiry a priority of relevance was
assigned, no matter how provisional, to
empirical studies to specify the problem of
social order's identifying phenomena. Alto-
gether, sociology's standing job was to
specify the issues that identified as society's
workings—real workings, actual workings,
and evidently—the ongoing production and
accountability of ordinary society.
Deep policies and technical methods of
theorizing were stated explicitly with which
to specify real immortal, ordinary society in
the methods of its production, and in the
conditions of their effectiveness, as structures
of practical action. Administering the unit act
as if it were constitutive of practical action
was one of these methods of theorizing.
Administering an in-principle difference be-
tween common sense knowledge of social
structures and scientific knowledge of social
structures was another. Theorizing was di-
rected to design and administer policies with
which to specify real society as observable
structures of practical action.
These policies were accompanied by con-
cerns to design, develop, clarify, correct,
criticize, and administer methods of construc-
tive analysis. For one example, a recurrently
used method consists of designing a formal
scheme of types, giving their formal defini-
tions an interpreted significance with which to
develop and explain the orderly properties of
the types as ideals, and then assigning the
properties of the ideals to observable actions
as Aeir described properties of social order.
The book's policies of theorizing and
methods of constructive analysis emphatically
provided for issues of immortal society's
observability. Among these policies one
policy dominated all the rest: the distinction
between concreteness of activities and action
provided for analytically. The distinction
inhabits every line of The Structure of Social
Action. When the book was written, the
distinction was omniprevalent in professional
sociology and the social sciences, and it
remains so today.
I shall call actions provided for concretely
that Parsons provided for with his distinction.
Parsons' plenum. His plenum is a constituent
part of the pair, actions concretely and actions
analytically. His plenum was administered as
a constituent of the pair.
 EVIDENCE FOR PHENOMENA OF ORDER
Parsons needed a plenum. He was not the
first author ever to need one and he was not
alone. Not only in the social science move-
ment but everywhere in intellectual history
authors have made use of plenums. Authors
have designed plenums with which the tasks
of recording, reading, writing, collecting,
picturing, speaking about, remembering, mark-
ing, signing real world specifics were accom-
panied by provisions for worldly things left
over and worldly things left out, real world
matters that remained unremarked. Webster
tells us "Plenum" has been used to speak of
"a space every part of which is full of
matter—as opposed to vacuum," "fullness,"
"a general or full assembly," "the condition
of being absolutely full in quantity, measure,
or degree; a condition of fullness, comple-
tion." "Plenty!" puts the case according to
Webster. So does "Plenarty." So does
"Plenilunium."
For what I want to get at, the question is
not, what does plenum mean? And not, how
is plenum to be defined? But who needs a
plenum? I don't mean its not needed. I mean
who has had what need of a plenum? By
whom has a plenum been needed? For what?
To do what with it?^
William James' plenum, the blooming,
buzzing confusion, was needed to specify
distinctive generic properties of perception
and attention. Alfred North Whitehead needed
common sense that would sit in judgment on
every version of itself. Edmund Husserl used
his hyle as his plenum with which essential,
invariant structures of consciousness—the
noesis-noema structures—could he found and
made findable without so assigning to a
transcendental phenomenological ego its jobs
that perception's things would have been lost.
The circumstantiality of signs, another of
Husserl's plenums, was needed to carry out
his policy of the ideality of meanings. A
' Obviously, much turns on what plenum is taken to
mean. Having rejected the first two questions—"What
does plenum mean?" and "How is plenum to be
defined?" and insisting on this one: "Who has had what
need of a plenum?", I must risk the charge of willfully
having my way with it, no matter what way it is, by
having left specifically unspecified what plenum is to
mean. Temporarily, and just here, that is just what I want
. to do. To define and explain plenum would introduce a
distracting excursion. I don't want to take up those
questions, but insofar as we can, without taking up those
questions, I want to ask, "Who has used the notion of a
plenum and for what?" The sense of what plenum means
will emerge as I document that.
105
beautiful plenum is Colin Cherry's soundful,
noisy assemblages in and with which intelli-
gible and remembered "sounded doings" are
demonstrable phenomena. Experimental per-
ception's noisy assemblages—iw plenum-
permit published experimental studies of
selective attention to be collected as specifi-
cations of the "cocktail party effect." A
recent and compelling plenum is found in the
intractability of common sense that exhibits
itself in furiously numerous but so far
unsuccessful attempts in the computing indus-
try to design computable representations of
ordinary human jobs.
With his concreteness/analysis pair. Par-
sons demonstrated^ there was no orderliness
in concrete activities. With his plenum.
Parsons specified the analytically empty
concreteness of organizational things. With
Parsons' plenum the concreteness of organi-
zational things is not yet real organizational
things. Nor is it yet organizational things
produced according to, let alone consisting
of, methodic procedures—call these "actual"
organizational things—nor is it yet organiza-
tional things evidently.
Established analytic sociology's big prize—
and Parsons' big prize—is immortal ordinary
society, and not just any imaginable society
but (i) real society, the society available in
coherent structures of inexhaustible details;
(ii) actual society, society for just how it is
produced, with just what causal texture; (iii)
and real and actual society, evidently, i.e.
real and actual society represented in claims
that are offered by analysts for their tmth and
correctness, for their availability to correcta-
bility, for the claimed work of a socially
organized setting's production and account-
ability that is available to autonomous assess-
' I use demonstrated respectfully, without irony, as
Parsons' version of what he was doing with the pair.
With his pair he took it to be showable, and to have been
shown, he demonstrated, there was no orderliness in the
plenum. Not only for his part, but on behalf of
professional sociology, and as a stand-in for the analytic
social sciences. For their part, with their pairs, with their
administered distinctions, they are able to demonstrate
the same things.
Caution: That does not mean that / figure there is no
orderliness in concrete activities. Because I say Parsons
and the analytic social sciences demonstrate and
demonstrated I fear that this will be treated as my real
position and be used to read my subsequent text. In the
rest of the paper I say otherwise. I must caution the
reader not to use that reading to subsequently understand
the remainder of my argument, which argues just the
opposite.
106
ments of truth, correctness, relevance, fac-
ticity, motivation and other adequacies.
For Parsons, real and actual society,
evidently, that prize is not to be found in the
concreteness of things. Many interesting
things are to be found in the concreteness but
not real, immortal society. Instead, real
immortal society is only specifiable as the
achieved results of administering the policies
and methods of formal, constructive analysis.
Real society is specified distinctively and in
detail and with everything that detail could be
in the formal generic structures of practical
actions. These are obtainable with the policies
and methods of constructive analysis. These
policies and constructive methods also furnish
the correctable warrant for analysts' claims.
Analysts' claims offer constructive methods
to certify their status as objective knowledge
of the work of producing accountable,
invariant, essential structures of practical
action, the great recurring, immortal, compa-
rable structures of ordinary activities.
Orderlinesses in the plenum pose for
formal sociological analysis^ its tasks of
detecting and specifying that orderliness and
demonstrating it in massively recurrent,
distinctive, essential, invariant identifying
details of formally analyzed structures of
practical action.
To review: firom The Structure of Social
Action we could learn there was no orderli-
ness in the plenum. We could learn from The
Structure . . . how to distinguish between
actions provided for concretely and actions
provided for analytically, and we could learn
how to administer this distinction over the
vicissitudes and local contingencies of re-
search and argument.
We learned from The Structure . . . that
specifics in producing the phenomena of
order are found, collected, described, ex-
plained, and demonstrated by administering a
distinction between concreteness of organiza-
tional things on the one hand, and the real
society that methods of constructive analysis
would provide on the other; that only methods
of constructive analysis could provide—on/y
and entirely—for any and every orderliness
whatsoever, for every one of Ae endlessly
many topics of order meaning, reason, logic,
or method, and for every achievement of any
of these topics of order* after they were
' As well as for the social sciences, among other
countlessly many aits and sciences of practical action.
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
prepared for inquiry by formal analytic
sociology by being respecified as phenomena
of order* that are achieved in and as
analytically represented generic workings of
immortal, ordinary society.
Parsons' thematic agenda was in every
respect answerable to the observability of
immortal, ordinary society. It was therein
everywhere sensitive to tiie difference be-
tween the concreteness of actions and actions
construed analytically. In The Structure's
thematic agenda, and, in that the agenda was
everywhere answerable to the distinction for
all issues of adequacy. Parsons was spokes-
man for the social science movement. He was
not its leader in this respect. And of course he
did not originate the distinction. But with that
distinction he spoke for the world-wide
movement of professional social science
which accords the distinction unanimous
endorsement. In all these respects and, most
pointedly, in respect of unanimous agreement
that there is no order in the plenum. Parsons
talked on behalf of professional sociology and
of the world-wide social science movement.
Ethnomethodological studies, in which I
include of course, conversational analytic
studies, learned to take serious exception
without sacrificing issues of "structure" and
the "great recurrencies", and now with
results in hand they take serious exception.
Twenty years after Studies in Ethnometho-
dology there exists as the work of an
international and interdisciplinary company a
very large corpus of empirical studies of
practical actions, so-called "naturally orga-
nized ordinary activities." These studies
demonstrate locally produced, naturally orga-
nized, reflexively accountable phenomena of
order* in and as of Parsons' plenum, in
detail.
In order that concreteness not be handed
over to generalities, I shall mention several
studies by ethnomethodologists. These may
remind the reader of just what concreteness
has been used by Parsons and the social
sciences, among indefinitely many analytic
arts and sciences of practical action, to insist
upon.
Talking medicines among the Kpelle of
Liberia so as to be heard by those who need to
hear it that one is properly concealing secrets
(Bellman 1975, 1981).
Mathematicians' work of proving the
schedule of 37 theorems and their proof
EVIDENCE FOR PHENOMENA OF ORDER
accounts that make up, as instructions,
Godel's proof (Livingston 1986).
The work of a local gang in a neuro-
chemistry lab making artifact recognizable
and demonstrable in electron microscopic
records of axon destruction and regrowth in
rat's brains (Lynch 1985).
Designing and administering a medical
school curriculum in pediatrics, and evaluat-
ing the competence with that curriculum of
medical students, interns, and residents (Ro-
billard and Pack 1976-1982).
Administering federally funded mental
health programs in the U.S. Pacific Trust
territory, specifying the way these programs
design and administer, staff, finance, care for
and analyze records with which to track in
specifics social and medical pathologies of
Oceania (Robillard and colleagues 1983.
1984, 1986a. 1986b. 1987).
Teaching English as a second language to
pre-school children &om immigrant families
(Meyer 1985. 1988).
Teacher and students concertedly arranging
for and spotting trouble-in-the-making in an
inner city high school classroom (Macbeth
1987).
Coordination work-site practices of 911
dispatchers in 'working' a call (Zimmerman
and Whalen 1987).
Finding in an afternoon the sequentially
organized character of an experiment in
undergraduate laboratory chemistry (Schrecker
in press).
Understanding among Australian aborigi-
nes learned by an American anthropologist by
helping them document their sacred sites so
that they can withstand legal controversies
instituted by corporate interests (Liberman
1986).
The use by parties at work (1) in the offices
of an entrepreneurial firm in the fast food
business, and (2) in the operations room at the
London air traffic control center, of the
on-site "notion" of a working division of
labor as a local means in each of interrelating
and explication the activities to be found
there. (Anderson, Sharrock and Hughes
1987).
Learning to play improvised jazz piano
(Sudnow 1978).
Talking the convict code in an inmate
half-way house (Wieder 1974).
Undergraduates achieving the definiteness
of sense and the coherence of a text's details
107
in reading introductory sociology (Morrison
1976).
Collaborative writing at a computer in a
Grade One classroom collected and elucidated
as two related production problems: where am
I? and what next? (Heap 1986a, 1986b).
Designing a Xerox copier to assure com-
plaint free operation by office personnel
(Suchman 1985).
Teaching civil procedure to first year
students in one of Uie country's leading law
schools (Bums 1986).
And then there is the extraordinary collec-
tion of studies on conversation. Hundreds of
published studies have established the exis-
tence of a domain of phenomena that was
unknown and unsuspected until it was coUa-
boratively developed by Harvey Sacks, Em-
manuel Schegloff, and their colleagues. (For
a bibliography see Heritage 1985).
I have listed a very small number of titles
in the corpus of published studies that report
radical phenomena.^
When I speak about the phenomena that
they report as radical phenomena what am I
claiming about these phenomena? What is
ethnomethodological about these studies and
their results?
First, the phenomena they report are
available to policies of ethnomethodology—
for example, they are available under the
exercise of "ethnomethodological indiffer-
ence" and they are available under a respect
for the unique adequacy requirement of
methods. But they are specifically not avail-
able to the policies and methods of construc-
tive analysis. These phenomena cannot be
recovered with a priori representational
methods. They are not demonstrable in the
established terms of classic studies.
Second, the social science movement, in
carrying out its research agenda, as a
systematic feature of that agenda, depends
upon their existence as omnirelevant details
of their agenda and makes use of them, finds
them essentially unavoidable and essentially
' I regret that this list will lend itself to finding in it
persons and studies that are not mentioned. I apologize to
the company of ethnomethodologists and CA people for
not knowing how to spare them the unfair consequences
of reading the list as a roll call. Whoever has tried to do
ethnomethodological studies would be thereby equipped
to recognize that the list testifies to a division of labor and
that the list is not a bibliography of all eligible, possible,
relevant, or consequential woric.
108
without remedy, but finds them specifically
uninteresting and ignores them.
Third, the reported phenomena can not be
reduced by using the familiar reduction
procedures in the social science movement
without losing those phenomena.
Fourth, the reported phenomena are only
inspectably the case. They are unavailable to
the arts of designing and interpreting defini-
tions, metaphors, models, constructions, types,
or ideals. They can not be recovered by
attempts no matter how thoughtful, to specify
an examinable practice by detailing a general-
ity-
Fifth, they were discovered. They are only
discoverable and they cannot be imagined.
Sixth, they specify "foundational" issues
in and as the work of a "discipline" that is
concerned with issues of produced order in
and as practical action. >°
Seventh, these phenomena are locally and
endogenously produced, naturally organized,
reflexively accountable in and as of detail,
and therein they provide for everything that
details could possibly be.
Eight, not only do these phenomena
provide for detail as a topic of order*, but any
and every topic of logic, order, reason,
meaning, or method is eligible for respecifi-
cation as locally achieved phenomena of
order*. Not only the topic of detail but every
topic of order* is to be discovered and is
discoverable and is to be respecified and is
respecifiable as only locally and reflexively
produced, naturally accountable phenomena
of order*. These phenomena of order* are
inimortal, ordinary society's commonplace,
vulgar, familiar, unavoidable and irremedia-
ble and uninteresting "work of the streets".
To summarize: It is ethnomethodological
about these studies that they show for
ordinary society's substantive events, in
materisJ contents, that and just how members
concert their activities to produce and exhibit
the coherence, cogency, analysis, consis-
'" Foundational issues are reported in the remaining
three parts of the series, of which this article is Part I.
PART n: The Curious Seriousness of Professional
Sociology
PART ni: Six Rendering Theorems
PART IV: Incommensurably, Asymmetrically Alter-
nate Pairs of Accountable Technologies for
the Production, Analysis, Understanding,
Description, and Observability of Order*
In and As of Practical Action and Practical
Reasoning's Embodied Details.
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
tency, order, meaning, reason, methods,—
which are locally, reflexively accountable
orderlinesses—in and as of their ordinary
lives together, in detail.
A very large corpus shows in and as of
Parsons' plenum, in detail, contrary to the
entirety of the social science movement, in
incommensurably asymmetrically alternate
sociology, the local production and natural,
reflexive accountability of immortal, ordinary
society really, actually, evidently, and these
ordinarily. A development of many years of
work in ethnomethodology and conversa-
tional analysis these studies are founded on,
they continue, and they depend upon the work
of a large company of colleagues.
It is the company's achievement that their
studies, by composing a current serious
situation of inquiry, provide access to a
technical domain of organizational phenom-
ena. These phenomena were not suspected
until their studies established their existence,
provided the methods to study them, and
provided what methods and their accompany-
ing issues of relevance, evidence, adequate
description, observability, validity, teachabil-
ity, and the rest could be.
Distinctive emphases on the production and
accountability of order* in and as ordinary
activities identify ethnomethodological stud-
ies and set them in contrast to classic studies
as an incommensurably alternate sociology.
My purpose in these remarks has been to
sketch these emphases and to identify the fact
of a company whose existence furnishes these
emphases their technical details, assures their
consequentiality for the tasks in ethnometho-
dological inquiries of discovering the identi-
fying issues of the problem of social order,
and grounds my claims in the real-world
practices of their craft.
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