Fifteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), IIT Bombay, December 2008

Directional Earth Fault Protection for

Transmission Lines – Need and Operational
Experiences
V.H.Manohar, N.Sankaranarayanan and K.Jagannath

kV sub-station at Phadge. On 1/10/06 at 22:23:31:500, 400
Abstract— This paper attempts to bring out the necessity of kV Tarapur –Padghe Line-1 (Fig. 1) tripped on directional
activating directional earth fault protection in numerical distance earth fault with C-Phase to ground fault indication and
relays and also highlights an operational problem with this disturbance recorder data showing an earth fault current of
protection in double circuit lines. These aspects are discussed 500A(Relay setting 200A-1sec time delay)max varying from a
with specific reference to two incidents taken place in 400 kV
value of 152A to 500A in around 5seconds. Exactly 1sec after
and 220 kV transmission lines emanating from Gas Insulated
Switchgear (GIS) of 540 MWe Nuclear Power Plant and from
this incident at 22:23:32:500 400 kV Tarapur-Padghe Line-2
220 kV Out door Switchyard of 220 MWe Nuclear Power Plant tripped on Zone-3 with a distance to fault (DTF) of 192.7 Km.
respectively. Around 1.4 sec after that 400 kV Padghe Line-1 remote end
tripped on Zone-2 DTF- 92Km. The fault existed on 400 kV
Index Terms— Broken conductor , Directional, Double Tarapur –Padghe Line-1 very near to the TAPS- 3 &4
Circuit, Earth Fault Switchyard, but nothing abnormal was found even after
thorough yard survey. The fault might be high resistance
I. INTRODUCTION arcing discharge in the line.
Traditionally 220 kV transmission lines are provided with
distance protection relay as main protection and directional
A 400KV L-1 B
over current and earth fault protections as back up. But now as
per CEA recommendations, two main protections each having
distance relay of different type not necessarily of different Arcing fault
make are provided. 400 kV transmission lines are generally
have Main-I and Main-II protections at least one of them is C 400KV L-2 D
distance principle. With the introduction of numerical relays
which have multiple protective functions, apart from distance
protection other protections such as broken conductor and
Fig. 1 Double circuit 400 kV lines from TAPS-3&4 to Padghe
directional earth fault protection are normally activated.
However, some utilities are not in favour of activating the B. Analysis of the incident
directional earth fault (DEF) protection in the numerical relay.
The trippings occurred due to a transient C-phase fault near
A case study is presented here illustrates the necessity of DEF
TAPS-3&4 switchyard on 400 kV Line -1.The fault resistance
protection in 400 kV transmission lines which is useful in
was so high that the distance protection at Local/remote end
clearing high resistive faults thereby enhancing 400 kV
could not detect the fault and directional earth fault (backup
system security. On the contrary second case study highlights
protection) at A tripped Circuit breaker at A. The remote end
the possibility of healthy line tripping by DEF protection in
breaker did not trip as the directional earth fault element was
case of broken conductor in one of the double circuit lines.
not activated at B. Zone-3 starter for 400 kV Tarapur Padghe
Line-2 picked up due to the reduction in the fault resistance as
II.CASE STUDY-1
seen by the relay at C. After 1 sec of A breaker tripping on
A. Description of the Incident D.E.F. breaker C tripped on Zone-3 leading to outage of both
the lines. Similarly after 1.4 seconds of the breaker C tripping
This case study pertains to an incident that took place in
on Zone -3 breaker at B tripped on zone -2 as the C phase
one of the 400 kV double circuit lines emanating from 400
voltage dipped to 54.3 kV i.e. the fault resistance reduced
kV Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) of 540 MWe Tarapur
drastically. Thus the fault in the line could not be cleared until
Atomic Power Station -3&4. These lines are connected to 400
it transformed into a low resistance fault. Had the fault not
been cleared by DEF, it would have tripped TAPS-3&4

Mr. V. H. Manohar,Mr. N. Sankaranarayanan and Mr. K. Jagannath are Generator Transformer. Also non-provision of back up DEF
with Nuclear Power Corporation of India limited, Mumbai, 400 094, India. (e- protection and the non operation of main/backup protection at
mail: vhmanohar@npcil.co.in , nsankaranarayanan@npcil.co.in, and remote end of Tarpur-Padghe Line-1 led to unwarranted
kjagannath@npcil.co.in )
outage of healthy 400KV Tarapur –Padghe Line-2

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 Fifteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), IIT Bombay, December 2008

C. Remedial action other lines. The system configuration and vector diagram after
This incident was discussed in detail with Grid Authorities the incident are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5
and provision of back up DEF protection along with main-1 &
main-2 distance protection for all the lines was agreed upon.

III. CASE STUDY-2

A. Description of the Incident

This case study pertains to an incident that took place in
one of the 220 kV double circuit lines emanating from 220 kV
Switchyard of 220 MWe Kakrapar Atomic Power Station -
1&2 (KAPS-1&2). 6 nos. of 220KV lines i.e KAPS-VAPI-
1&2, KAPS-VAV-1&2, KAPS-HALDARWA-1&2 are Fig. 3 Sequence components prior to the incident
provided for power evacuation from two 220 MWe units of
KAPS-1&2. Out of these, KAPS-VAPI-1&2 (double circuit
lines) usually remain heavily loaded (in the range of 140 MW
on each line with present KAPS-1&2 total generation of 300
MW). On 10/8/2005, KAPS-VAPI-2 line tripped on actuation
of directional earth fault relay (67N). Further checks in field
revealed that R-phase jumper to wave trap of KAPS-Vapi-1
line had snapped at KAPS end. The snapped conductor was
found to be hanging in the air, which means that it has not
touched the earth.
B. System Configuration prior to and after the Incident
As the conductor snapping incident without involving earth
took place in one of the double circuit lines to VAPI i.e
KAPS-VAPI-1 line, the analysis is restricted to the double
circuit lines VAPI-1 and VAPI-2 and the other lines are not
considered. Accordingly system configuration prior to
Fig. 4 System configuration after the incident
incident is as given Fig. 2

Fig. 5 Sequence components after the incident

Fig. 2 System configuration prior to the incident C. Analysis of the incident

After the incident the currents in three phases of VAPI-1
Following assumptions are made for constructing the above
line are :
diagram. Both the generators of KAPS are lumped and are
IR1 = 0
supplying 1 p.u current to the double circuit lines of VAPI-
IY1 = 0.5 (-0.5 - j0.866) = -0.25 – j0.433
1&2. As both the lines are identical, the current would divide
IB1 = 0.5 (-0.5 + j0.866) = -0.25 + j0.433
equally. Accordingly the current distribution is shown in the
above figure. The corresponding vector representation of the Positive sequence components can be obtained as follows:
total currents and currents in both the lines is shown in Fig. 3. IR1+ = 1/3(IR1 + a IY1 + a2 IB1)
When the R-phase conductor got snapped in VAPI-1 line, where a = -0.5 + j0.866 and a2 = -0.5 – j0.866
the current through R-phase would get diverted to R-phase of By substituting the values, we get
VAPI-2 line. This is an assumption as we have neglected
IR1+ = 0.33 at 00

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 Fifteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), IIT Bombay, December 2008

IY1+ = 0.33 at -1200 IB20 = 0.167 at 00

IB1+ = 0.33 at -2400 The above sequence components and total currents are
Negative sequence components can be obtained as follows: shown in vector diagram in Fig. 7.
IR1- = 1/3(IR1 + a2 IY1 + a IB1)
where a = -0.5 + j0.866 and a2 = -0.5 – j0.866
By substituting the values, we get
IR1- = 0.167 at 1800
IY1- = 0.167 at -600
IB1- = 0.167 at 600
Zero sequence components can be obtained as follows:
IR10 = 1/3(IR1 + IY1 + IB1)
By substituting the values, we get
IR10 = 0.167 at 1800
IY10 = 0.167 at 1800
IB10 = 0.167 at 1800
The above sequence components and total currents are
shown in vector diagram in Fig. 6. Fig. 7 Vector diagram for healthy line

It can be seen that zero sequence currents are flowing in the

direction for which DEF relay 67N is supposed to pick up.
This relay would pick up if the level of zero sequence current
is above set value and polarizing voltage is available. The
polarizing voltage for DEF is residual voltage of 220 kV bus
PT secondaries which is zero under normal condition. In this
particular incident also polarizing voltage is supposed to be
zero. However relay actuated and this may be due to little
unbalance in bus PT secondary voltages. The ratio of
negative sequence current to positive sequence current is 25%.
D. Remedial action
To avoid wrong actuation of DEF relay of healthy line
during conductor snapping in the other line of the double
circuit lines, Broken conductor protection which is generally
Fig. 6 Vector diagram for the line with broken conductor
available in numerical distance protection relays can be
activated and wired for alarm in case of single feeders and for
It can be seen that zero sequence currents are flowing in the trip in case of double circuit lines. Setting of broken conductor
direction opposite to that set in 67N. Hence 67N of VAPI-1 protection can be 30% (alarm) in case of single feeders and
line has not picked up during the incident. The ratio of 40% (trip) in case of double circuit lines.
negative sequence current to positive sequence current is 50%.
After the incident the currents in three phases of VAPI-2 REFERENCES
line are :
IR2 = 1 + j 0 [1] Incident report from Tarapur Atomic Power Station-3&4
[2] Incident report from Kakarapar Atomic Power Station-1&2.
IY2 = 0.5 (-0.5 - j0.866) = -0.25 – j0.433 [3] Olle I Elgerd, Electrical Energy Systems Theory, Tata McGraw-Hill
IB2 = 0.5 (-0.5 + j0.866) = -0.25 + j0.433 Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi, 1999
Positive , Negative and Zero sequence components are
V.H. Manohar received his BE (Electrical) degree from University of
IR2+ = 0.67 at 00
Mysore, India in 1983. His areas of interest are EHV system design, power
IY2+ = 0.67 at -1200 system analysis and power system protection
IB2+ = 0.67 at -2400
IR2- = 0.167 at 00 N. Sankaranarayanan received his B.Sc Engg (Hons.) from Regional
engineering college, Calicut in 1980. His areas of interest are main power
IY2- = 0.167 at -2400 output system for nuclear power station.
IB2- = 0.167 at -1200
IR20 = 0.167 at 00 K. Jagannth received his B.Sc Engg (Hons.) degree from Sambalpur
University, India in 1979. His areas of interest are power supply system for
IY20 = 0.167 at 00 nuclear power stations.

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