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Introduction
In Herbert and Stuart Dreyfus’s paper “Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial
Intelligence Back at a Branch-point,” there is shown a historical favoritism towards the Physical
“Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” Allen Newell and Herbert A.
Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis. A physical symbol system has the necessary
and sufficient means for general intelligent action. (116)
This hypothesis has guided AI researchers to expect that any intelligent system is necessarily a
physically instantiated symbols are explicit representations. These representational symbols are
systematically manipulated, ordinarily making use of a structure in the symbols. By stating the
hypothesis as empirical, Newell and Simon mean that it very well could be false and that
empirical evidence can be used to demonstrate the truth of their hypothesis. Dreyfus describes
connectionism as an alternative paradigm for AI researches and says “both approaches looked
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equally promising...Yet the result of the internal war between the two research programs was
surprisingly asymmetrical” (4). The Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis proponents basically
won, and Dreyfus quotes Jerry Lettvin who gives a typical disposition that this approach is “the
The theory of mind originating from the Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis is still
dominant, but there continues to be alternatives proposed. It will be discussed how–much like
the situation described by Dreyfus–these alternatives are not treated on equal ground to the
dominant view. In “What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?”, Tim van Gelder lists some
approaches, ecological psychology, situated robotics, synergetics, and artificial life (345). Some
“Doing Without Representing?”, Andy Clark and Josefa Toribio say there is “a growing distrust
in the practical attempt to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior” (401). This
architecture in which he says “representations and models of the world simply get in the
developed by Brooks and the dynamical hypothesis defended by van Gelder. The two
frameworks will be outlined, the representation related arguments will be analyzed, and a
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conclusion will discuss why non-representational theories of mind are viable alternatives that
Subsumption Architecture
Representation.” Brooks calls the new approach a “behavior based approach,” but Rolf Pfeifer
says the architecture is now appreciated as a part of “Embodied Cognitive Science” (Pfeifer
201). In contrast to typical AI research, Brooks believed that intelligent systems should be built
as wholes, even if very simple, instead of retreating “into specialized subproblems, such as ways
to represent knowledge, natural language understanding, vision or even more specialized areas
such as truth maintenance systems or plan verification” (Brooks 1990, 140). Brooks developed
the subsumption architecture while building robots designed to work in messy and unpredictable
Instead of the traditional notion of input and output, the subsumption architecture makes use
of layers. Each layer consists of a short perception/actuation loop. To elucidate the use of
layers, Clark describes Brooks’ first mobile robot with three layers: the first layer avoids
obstacles by halting if an object is dead ahead and orienting to an unblocked direction, the
second layer wanders randomly, and the third layer explores distant targets. This architecture is
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contrasted with the more dominant paradigm in the following figure:
shows different ways of decomposing an agent. figure 7.1 from Pfeifer 1999
In the subsumption architecture, the layers work largely independently and influence each other
through inhibition and overriding. In contrast, the typical representational scheme is a single
serial input-output loop involving perception, model building, planning, and finally acting on the
Brooks claims that his approach has no representations. Clearly, there is no central
representations since the layers work largely independently. While Brooks concedes that to a
certain level actions are represented, he stresses that there are neither represented goals nor
explicit planning:
the goals are implicit in the coupling of actions to perceptual conditions, and apparent
execution of plans unroll in real time as one behavior alters the robot’s configuration
in the world in such a way that new perceptual conditions trigger the next in a
sequence of actions (Brooks 1997, 292)
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Brooks presentation of the subsumption architecture is clearly a case of strong rejection of
representations.
Dynamical Hypothesis
Van Gelder presents the dynamical hypothesis as an alternative to what he calls the
dominant framework for theory of mind. Van Gelder characterizes computational as having
and homuncularity (i.e. functionally broken into sub-systems, each sub-system being viewed as a
relatively stupid homunculi) (van Gelder 1995, 351). Van Gelder’s dynamical framework is not
usefully described as having any of these components (although he sometimes makes a partial
Van Gelder’s dynamical hypothesis states that cognition is a dynamical system, and should
be described and analyzed in the same language of dynamics and differential equations used to
describe the Watt centrifugal governor. The governor solves the problem of keeping the speed of
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a flywheel constant by controlling a valve that lets in a variable amount of steam.
As shown in the figure above, the wheel is connected to two arms with attached weights. As the
wheel and weights spin faster, the arms are pushed out and up. The system is set up so that as
the arms move up, the valve closes. Closing the valve reduces the amount of steam driving the
flywheel. This effectively keeps the speed of the flywheel constant as the amount of steam
varies and the load of the flywheel varies. Differential equations describe the dynamic
relationship between the arm angles, flywheel speed, and valve opening. The Watt centrifugal
Van Gelder stresses that the centrifugal governor is not usefully described by representations.
For example, the arm angle and engine speed, while at first glance one may appear to represent
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the other, van Gelder explains how the relationship is too complex to be described as
representational (van Gelder 1995, 352). Showing the anti-representationalism of dynamics, van
Gelder says,
Unlike Brooks, van Gelder partly condones representations in his alternative theory of mind;
however, the notion of representations in dynamics is very different from in more dominant
theories and dynamics suggests that representations are not the focus of a theory of mind.
Representation Debate
discussion over the meanings and boundaries of the terms symbols, representations, and
focus on what the theories have so far failed to accomplish and also on what the theories can in
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In “Doing without Representing?”, the most pressing argument Clark has against the
dynamical hypothesis and behavior based approaches is related to what he calls “representation-
hungry” problems. Clark argues that the application of non-representational approaches are
impressive, but have failed to show any ability to perform well in tasks that prima facie require
internal representations or storage in memory of knowledge (419). Clark assumes that there are
enough” (419), but if counter-examples were so obvious there would be no debate to begin with.
Further, Clark’s whole argument seems rather circular. By starting with the notion of
arguing: that cognitive systems require representations. Clark seems so prejudiced against non-
representational theories of mind that it seems difficult for Clark to make a fair argument.
Along the same line of thought as Clark’s “representation-hungry” argument, others argue
that there is no reason to assume that non-representational approaches will be successful beyond
what they see as very primitive levels of intelligence. In “Today the earwig, tomorrow man,”
David Kirsh states “I am not yet convinced that success in duplicating insect behaviours such as
wandering, avoiding obstacles, and following corridors proves that the mobotics approach is the
royal path to higher-level behaviours. Insect ethologists are not cognitive scientists.” Kirsh is
criticizing Brooks’ robots (here called mobots and related to insects) as not being sufficiently
complex to count as work in cognitive science. It is interesting that Brooks is equally, if not
more, critical of the the simplistic aspects of behavior based approaches, but Brooks does not see
this as a sign that the approach has no potential. In a comprehensive review, Brooks analyzes
every one of the publications in the journal Adaptive Behavior by MIT Press, which Brooks
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identifies as most closely aligned to the behavior based approach (Brooks 1997). Brooks
concludes from his review that the behavior based approaches in the publications focus on
movement and navigation and are overwhelmingly simple and trivial when compared to human
like cognition. Brooks coolheaded analysis is especially praiseworthy given the notorious sort of
exaggerated claims that has embarrassed AI researchers in the past. However, in direct
opposition to Kirsh, Brooks says, “Yes, exactly!” from earwigs to humans (Brooks 1997, 301).
Pfeifer summarizes Brooks position by saying, from earwigs to humans “we don't know, but we
have good ideas about how to make progress toward higher levels of intelligence in artificial
It does not seem that representational approaches to intelligent systems has a strong enough
track record to make such high demands of alternative approaches. While many have strong
feelings about the need for representations in a theory of mind, there is much progress being
made without representations and it seems like poor judgement to dismiss these new approaches
too quickly. Van Gelder says that the dynamical hypothesis “has been starved of attention” (van
Gelder 1998, 617); proponents of dynamics and behavior based approaches deserve a fair chance
to prove themselves.
Conclusion
It was not the intent of this paper to make radical claims towards completely abandoning
warns that his arguments for the dynamical hypothesis are not “knock down arguments” (van
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Gelder 1998, 623). Brooks concludes one of his papers saying, “Only experiments with real
Creatures in real worlds can answer the natural doubts about our approach. Time will
tell” (Brooks 1999, 158). Like the low level of support of connectionism described in Dreyfus’s
“Artificial Intelligence Back at a Branch-point,” these alternative approaches do not have the
same level of support as the more mainstream approaches. Perhaps this time around these
alternative approaches will get a fair chance without being hastily dismissed like connectionism
was.
These alternate approaches demand attention partly because they are such radical departures
program. I recently heard an AI researcher refer to the ‘60s as the time “when we thought it
would work.” I think the following two quotes illuminate how much Rodney Brooks and Tim
van Gelder believe a change is necessary, and I think this attitude is rightfully sympathized by
many who have an open mind and want to understand intelligent systems:
“perhaps at this point we simply do not get it, and that there is some fundamental
change necessary in our thinking in order that we might build artificial systems that
have the levels of intelligence, emotional interactions, long term stability and
autonomy, and general robustness that we might expect of biological systems. In
deference to the elixir metaphor, I prefer to think that perhaps we are currently
missing the juice of life” (Brooks 1997, 301)
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WORKS CITED
Brooks, Rodney A. "From Earwigs to Humans". Robotics and Autonomous Systems 1997; Jun
Vol 20 291-304.
139-159.
Clark, Andy and Josefa Toribio. "Doing Without Representing". Synthese 1994; Dec 101:3
Dreyfus, H. L. & Dreyfus, S. E. (1988) "Making a Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial
Kirsh, David. "Today the earwig, tomorrow man". Artificial Intelligence 1991; Vol 47 161-184.
Newell, Allen and Herbert A. Simon. "Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and
Pfeifer, Rolf, and Christian Scheier. Understanding Intelligence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999.
van Gelder, Tim. “The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science”. Behavior and Brain Sciences
van Gelder, T. “Revisiting the Dynamical Hypothesis”. Preprint No. 2/99, University of
van Gelder, Tim. "What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?". The Journal of Philosophy
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