Habermas and Foucault: Thinkers for Civil Society?

Author(s): Bent Flyvbjerg

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 210-233
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science
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Bent Flyvbjerg

Habermasand Foucault:thinkersfor civil

society?l

ABSTRACT

Takentogether,the worksofJurgenHabermasand MichelFoucaulthighlightan

essentialtensionin modernity.Thisis the tensionbetweenthe normativeand the
real,betweenwhatshouldbe done and whatis actuallydone. Understandingthis
tension is crucial to understandingmodern democracy,what it is and what it
could be. It has been arguedthat an effectivewayof makingdemocracystronger
is to strengthencivil society.This article containsa comparativeanalysisof the
centralideasof Habermasand Foucaultas theypertainto the questionof democ-
racyand civilsociety.Morespecifically,the discourseethics of Habermasis con-
trastedwiththe poweranalyticsand ethicsof Foucaultevaluatingtheirusefulness
for those interested in understanding,and bringing about, democraticsocial
change.

KEYWORDS: Civilsociety;democracy;modernity;power;MichelFoucault;
Jurgen Habermas

1.

Havel (1993:3)has observedthat a strongcivilsocietyis a crucialcondition

of strong democracy.Empoweringcivil societyis a centralconcern for the
projectof democracy,just as the question of how best to think about such
empowermentis importantto social and politicaltheory.But what is 'civil
society'?A search for clear definitionsin the relevantliteratureis in vain.
Not because the concept lacks definitions;rather the definitions are too
multiple and varied to bring clarity.Most writerson civil society agree,
however,that civilsocietyhas an institutionalcore constitutedbyvoluntary
associationsoutside the sphere of the state and the economy. Such associ-
ations rangefrom,for example,churches,culturalassociations,sport clubs
and debating societies to independent media, academies,groups of con-
cerned citizens,grass-rootsinitiativesand organizationsof gender, raceand
sexuality, all the way to occupational associations,political parties and
labourunions (Habermas1992a:453).

Brit.Jrzl.of SociolonVolume no. 49 Issue no. 2 June 1998 ISSN 0007-1315 C)London School of Economics 1998
Habermasand Foucault
211
The fundamentalact of citizenshipin a pluralistdemocracyis that of
forming an associationof this kind. Keane (1988a:14) ascribes to these
associationsthe taskof maintainingand redefiningthe boundariesbetween
civil society and state through two interdependentand simultaneouspro-
cesses: the expansion of social equalityand liberty,and the restructuring
and democratizingof stateinstitutions.This explainsthe importanceof civil
societyto democracy.That importanceis supportednot only by social and
politicaltheorybut by historical-empirical evidenceas well (Putnam1993).
The worksofJurgen Habermasand MichelFoucaulthighlightan essen-
tial tension in modernity.This is the tension between consensusand con-
flict. With a point of departurein Kant,Habermasis the philosopher of
Moralitat based on consensus.Foucault,followingNietzsche,is the philoso-
pher of wirkliche Historie(real history) told in termsof conflict and power.
This article presentsa comparativeanalysisof the central ideas of Haber-
mas and Foucaultas they pertain to the issue of empoweringcivil society
and democracy.Wewillaskwhethersuch empowermentis bestunderstood,
and acted, in terms of consensus, or whether conflict is a more suitable
frameof reference.Keane (1988b:21)explicitlywarnsus thatinequalityand
dominationhas been built into the concept of 'civilsociety'from the start.
Historically,'civilsocietyis establishedafterthe imageof the civilised[Euro-
pean] male individual,'Keane says, 'it rests on a foundation of excluded
women, who are expected to live under conditions of household despot-
ism'. Today,the problem of exclusion is raisednot only by gender groups
but also by groups defining themselveson the basis of, for instance, eth-
nicity and sexuality.Clearly,if presentlywe are to build anything- and
something as importantas democracy- on the concept of civil society,we
need to deal with the problemsof exclusion, difference,diversityand the
politicsof identity.Therefore,as a sub-themeto this articlewe willask,what
do Habermasand Foucaulthave to contributeto this task?

2.

'WithKant, the modern age is inaugurated,'says Habermas (1987:260),

who cites the importanceof Kant'sattemptto develop a universalrational
foundation for democraticinstitutions.2Habermasagrees with Kantas to
the need to develop such a foundationfor democracyand its institutions,
but he points out that Kantfailed to achievehis goal. Accordingto Haber-
mas (1987:18-21, 302), this wasbecauseKant'sthinkingwasbased upon a
subjectwenteredrationality.Moreover,Habermaspoints out that the later
philosophers,from Hegel and Marx to contemporarythinkers,have also
been unable to develop the much sought-afterrationaland universalfoun-
dationfor such socialinstitutions.Accordingto Habermas(1987:294), this
is because they have all workedwithin a traditionhe calls, 'the philosophy
of the subject'.
212 BentFlyvbjerg

Mostcontemporaryphilosophersand social scientistshave accepted the

consequencesof more than two millenniaof failed attemptsto establisha
universalconstitutionof philosophy,socialscience and socialorganization,
having concluded that such a foundation does not seem feasible. Not
Habermas,however,who thinksthat his own workcan providethis consti-
tution, and that the consequences of abandoning it are unacceptable.
Withouta universallyconstitutedphilosophy,science and democracy,says
Habermas,the resultwould be contextualism,relativismand nihilism;all
of which Habermassees as dangerous.
According to Habermas,the problem with Kant and with subsequent
thinkerson modernityis not that they were mistakenin their goal of con-
stituting society rationally,but that they had the wrong ideas of how to
achievethe goal. ForHabermas,the path towarda rationalconstitutionand
the establishmentof a bulwarkagainst relativismis a reorientationfrom
earlierphilosophers'focus on subjectivity,withinwhichHabermasclassifies
both Hegel's 'worldspirit'and Marx's'workingclass,'to a focus on inter-
subjectivity.And Habermas'sown work, particularlyhis 'theory of com-
municativeaction' and 'discourseethics', is located in the intersubjective
approach to the problematicof modernity (Habermas1983, 1987, 1990,
1993).
The goal of Habermas'stheory of communicativeaction is that of 'clari-
fying the presuppositionsof the rationalityof processesof reachingunder-
standing, which may be presumed to be universal because they are
unavoidable' (Haberrnas1985:196). In his PhilosophicalDiscourseof Mod-
ernity,Habermasdevelopshis intersubjectiveapproachto modernityusing
the concept of 'communicativerationality'.
The communicativerationalityrecallsolder ideas of logos, inasmuchas
it bringsalong with it the connotationsof a noncoercivelyunifying,con-
sensus-buildingforce of a discoursein which the participantsovercome
their at first subjectivelybased views in favor of a rationallymotivated
agreement (Habermas1987:294, 315).
AlthoughHabermassees communicativerationalityas being threatenedby
actual modern society, he neverthelessargues that the core of communi-
cativerationality,'the unconstrained,unifying,consensus-bringingforce of
argumentativespeech', is a 'centralexperience'in the life of a humanbeing
(Habermas1983: 10). According to Habermas (1983: 316), this central
experience is inherent in human social life: 'Communicativereason is
directlyimplicatedin social life processesinsofaras acts of mutualunder-
standingtake on the role of a mechanismfor coordinatingaction'. Haber-
mas leavesno doubt that by 'inherent'he means universallyinherent. The
universalityderives from the fact that for Habermashuman social life is
basedupon processesfor establishingreciprocalunderstanding.These pro-
cesses are assumedto be 'universalbecause they are unavoidable'(Haber-
mas 1985: 196). In an earlierformulation,Habermas(1979:97) statesthis
vieweven more clearly
Habermasand Foucault

In action oriented to reachingunderstanding,validityclaimsare 'always 213

already'implicitlyraised.These universalclaims. s . are set in the general
structuresof possiblecommunication.In these validityclaimscommuni-
cation theory can locate a gentle, but obstinate,a never silent although
seldom redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognised de
facto wheneverand whereverthere is to be consensualaction.

The consequence, for Habermas,is that human beings are defined as

democraticbeings, as homodemocraticus.
As for the validityclaims, Habermas(1990: 93) explains that validityis
defined as consensuswithout force: 'a contested norm cannot meet with
the consent of the participantsin a practicaldiscourseunless . . . all affected
can freely [zwanglos]accept the consequencesand the side effects that the
generalobservanceof a controversialnorm can be expected to have for the
satisfactionof the interestsof eachindividual' (italicsin original).This prin-
ciple of validity,Habermas(1990: 120-1) calls '(U)', the 'universalisation
principle' of discourseethics. Similarly,in a key passageon truth, Haber-
mas (1990: 198) states:'Argumentationinsuresthat all concerned in prin-
ciple take part,freelyand equally,in a cooperativesearchfor truth,where
nothing coerces anyoneexcept the force of the betterargument'.The only
'force' which is activein the ideal speech situationand in communicative
rationalityis thus this 'force of the better argument',which consequently
obtainsa criticalplace in Habermas'swork.
Validityand truthare ensuredwhere the participantsin a givendiscourse
respect five key processualrequirementsof discourseethics: (1) no party
affectedby whatis being discussedshould be excluded from the discourse
(the requirement of generality); (2) all participantsshould have equal
possibilityto presentand criticizevalidityclaimsin the processof discourse
(autonomy); (3) participantsmust be willing and able to empathizewith
each other's validityclaims (ideal role taking); (4) existing power differ-
ences betweenparticipantsmust be neutralizedsuch that these differences
haveno effect on the creationof consensus(powerneutrality);and (5) par-
ticipantsmust openly explain their goals and intentions and in this con-
nection desist from strategicaction (transparence)(Habermas1993: 31,
1990: 65-6, Kettner 1993). Finally,given the implicationsof the first five
requirements,we could add a sixth:unlimited time.
In a societyfollowingthis model, citizenshipwould be defined in terms
of takingpartin public debate.Participationis discursiveparticipation.And
participationis detachedparticipation,in as much as communicativeration-
ality requires ideal role taking, power neutrality,etc. Habermas'smodel,
i.e., discourseethics, should not be confusedwith contingent typesof bar-
gainingor withmodels of strategicallynegotiatedcompromisesamong con-
flicting particular interests. What is missing in strategic pursuits and
rational-choicemodels is the recourse to ultimate normativejustification
that Habermasclaimsto give us (Dallmayr1990:5). Empirically,Habermas
 F7yvbjerg
Bent

214
rationalityand
movements as agents of communicative
newthe
sees social
in the public sphere. communicativeration-
ofchange
definitions of discourse ethics andabove,makeit clearthat
Habermas's mentioned 'Dis-
andthe proceduralrequirements
ality, as opposed to substantiverationality:
talking
are about procedural Instead it establishes
we substantiveorientations.guaranteethe impar-
ethics does not set up
course and designed to
based on presuppositions is a uni-
aprocedure (Habermas 1990:122). Habermas
ofthe processof judging'as concerns process:the rules for correct
tiality
'top-down'moralist of the requirements
versalistic,
normatively given in advance,in the form Habermasis
are
process Conversely, as regardscontent,
for thespeech situation.
ideal
whatis rightand true
in a givencommunicative
situationalist: that process.
a'bottom-up'
solely by the participantsin and
is
process determined
study of processes for establishingconsensus of
Asconsequence
a the standsat the centre
claims on which the processesare built process is directly
validity
the view of the democratic of the democratic
work. Habermas's
Habermas's 'I wish to conceive
tojudicial institutionalization: of those formsof communication
linked
procedure as the legal institutionalization Habermas(undated:15) says.
willformation'
for rationalpolitical process, Habermas
necessary
between law and power in this thesanctioningof law
the
On relationship ofpowerbylaw and
statesthat 'authorisation thus
(undated:8) uno acto' (emphasis in original). Habermas
power
by must both occur of lawand sovereignty.
it clear that he operateswithina perspectivecontrastswith Foucault
makes is a perspectivewhich
Aswewill see below, this conception of power 'byno means adequate'.
87-8) who finds this that it 'can
(1980a:
90) says about his own 'analyticsof power' of
Foucault (1980a:82, completely from [this] representationof
only if it frees itself image
beconstituted .. . a certain
that I would term ... "juridico-discursive" that Foucault
power It is in this connection of the king' in
power-law, of power-sovereignty'. 'cut off the head
89) made his famousargumentto understandingof power.For
(1980a: by a decentred
political analysisand replaceit is still very much on, in the sense that sov-
Habermas the head of the king powerby law.
a prerequisite for the regulationof about mod-
ereignty is
more optimistic and uncritical such as
Habermasis substantiallyand membersof the FrankfurtSchool, of
than both Max Weber main 'methods
ernity
and Theodor Adorno. Habermas's writing of con-
MaxHorkheimer society,are the
for strengtheningcivil central
progress', for instance
development, which thereby become
stitutionsand institutional It is hard to over-empha-
in and endpoints for Habermas'sproject. 514) quite simplysees
elements (1994:
of this point. Habermascitizensin a pluralistsociety
sizethe importance
main device for uniting
constitutionsas the
philo-
of a society shaped by social,cultural,and
Whatunites the citizens pluralismare firstof all the abstractprinciples
of law.
sophical [weltanschaulich]order, createdthrough the medium
of an artificialrepublican
Habermasand Foucault 215

If Habermasis rightabout the importanceof constitution-writing and insti-

tutionalreforms,the prospectslook good indeed for changinggovernment
in a more democraticdirectionby meansof discourseethics and the theory
of communicativerationality.The problem, however, as pointed out by
Putnam(1993:17-8), is that ' [t]wo centuriesof constitution-writing around
the worldwarnus . . . that designersof new institutionsare often writingon
water. . . That institutionalreformsalter behavioris an hypothesis,not an
axiom.' The problem with Habermasis that he has the axiom and the
hypothesisreversed:he takesfor grantedthatwhich should be subjectedto
empiricaland historicaltest.
The basic weakness of Habermas'sproject is its lack of agreement
between ideal and reality,between intentions and their implementation.
This incongruitypervadesboth the most general as well as the most con-
crete phenomena of modernityand it is rooted in an insufficientconcep-
tion of power. Habermashimself observesthat discoursecannot by itself
insure that the conditionsfor discourseethics and democracyare met. But
discourseabout discourseethics is all Habermashas to offer. This is the
fundamentalpoliticaldilemmain Habermas'sthinking:he describesto us
the utopia of communicativerationalitybut not how to get there. Haber-
mas (1990: 209) himself mentions lack of 'crucial institutions',lack of
'crucialsocialization'and 'poverty,abuse, and degradation'as barriersto
discursivedecision making. But he has little to say about the relationsof
power that create these barriersand how power maybe changed in order
to begin the kinds of institutionaland educationalchange, improvements
in welfare,and enforcement of basic human rights that could help lower
the barriers.In short, Habermaslacksthe kind of concrete understanding
of relationsof power that is needed for politicalchange.
With his characteristicallycomprehensiveapproach, Habermas (1987:
322) lets us know that his theory of communicativeaction opens him to
criticismas an idealist:'It is not so simple to counterthe suspicionthatwith
the concept of actionorientedto validityclaims,the idealismof a pure, non-
situatedreason slips in again'. I will argue here that not only is it difficult
to counter this suspicion,it is impossible.And this impossibilityconstitutes
a fundamentalproblem in Habermas'swork.
'There is a point in every philosophy,'writes Nietzsche (1966:15[§8]),
'whenthe philosopher's"conviction"appearson the stage'.3ForHabermas
thatpoint is the foundationof his ideal speech situationand universalvalid-
ity claimsupon a Kirkegaardian'leap of faith'.4Habermas,as mentioned,
statesthat consensus-seekingand freedomfrom dominationare universally
inherent as forces in human conversation,and he emphasizesthese par-
ticular aspects. Other important philosophers and social thinkers have
tended to emphasize the exact opposite. Machiavelli(1984: 96), whom
Crick (1983: 1S, 17) and others have called 'a most worthyhumanist'and
'distinctlymodern',and whom, like Habermas,is concernedwith 'the busi-
ness of good government,'states:'One can make this generalisationabout
men: they are ungrateful,fickle,liars,and deceivers'.Lessradically,but still
 F7yvbjerg
Bent
216
Derrida
to Habermas, are statementsby Nietzsche, Foucault, by
incontrast is at all times alreadypenetrated
many others that communication therefore
and Foucault(1988:11, 18). It is
'poweris alwayspresent',says
power: of com-
according to these thinkers,to operatewitha concept
meaningless,
munication in which poweris absent. by
of power, communication is more typicallycharacterized
Forstudents from
of intereststhan by freedom
non-rationalrhetoricand maintenance via
and consensus-seeking. In rhetoric,'validity'is established
domination hidden control, rationaliz-
themode of communication- e.g., eloquence, between participants- rather
using dependency relations
charisma,
ation, Seen from
rational arguments concerningthe matterat hand.
through
than andidealistic
297-8) seems overlynaive
perspectiveHabermas(1987:
this human conver-
he contrasts 'successful' with 'distorted'utterancein
when distortion.
success in rhetoric is associatedpreciselywith
because
sation, position is 'correct'is not
Whether the communicativeor the rhetorical point of
here. What is decisive, rather, is that a non-idealistic
important that both positions are possible,
departure must take account of the fact context, some-
In an empirical-scientific
even simultaneouslypossible. the
and takesgreatpainsto define himself,
thingto which Habermasotherwise versus rhetoric must therefore
question of communicative rationality by concrete examinationof the
settled
open. The questionmustbe and
remain
must ask how communicationtakesplace, by
at hand. The researcher
case Is communication characterized
how politics and democracyoperate. communicationthe exer-
and absence of power?Or is rhetoric,
consensus-seeking do consensus-seekingand
ciseof power and rhetoric? How of power,eventuallycome together
freedom fromdominationand exercise
individualacts of communication?5
in here is whether one can meaningfully
The basic question being raised each other in communication
and
distinguish rationalityand power from as does Haber-
isolationfrom power,
whether rationalitycan be viewedin is just as invalidas pre-
question a przorz
mas. To assumean answerto this of whether
answerthe biblical question position
sumingthat one can ultimately either
or basicallyevil. And to assume
humansare basicallygood it, as Habermasdoes,
exante, to universalize
it and build a theory upon This is
and speculativesocial science.
makesfor problematicphilosophy when using the theory of communicative
onereasonwe haveto be cautiousin relation to civilsociety.6
rationality to understandand act is hardlysus-
democracyon a leap of faith
Constitutingrationalityand that philosophical
to forget his own axiom
tainable.Habermashere seems empiricalverification.And it is preciselyin
to
questionsought to be subject seen as utopian. RichardRorty impel
does not
that Habermas must be which
thissense is neverthelessthe same issues
use these exact words, but it for having religious
( 1989: 68) to criticizecommunicativerationality unitringpower
Rorty
Habermas's thinking, and for being 'a healing and
status in 'We no longer
will do the work once done by God'. As Rortysays,
which
need [that]'.
Habermasand Foucault 217

There may be a substantial element of truth in the benefits of consti-

tution-writing a la Habermas. And Habermas's home country, Germany,
clearly needed new constitutional principles after World War II, a fact that
seems to have been formative for Habermas's thinking. But Habermas
(1994: 513-4) relies on something as weak as Verfassungspatriotismus(consti-
tutional patriotism) as the main means to have constitutional principles
take root and gain practical importance in a society
[C]onstitutional principles can only take root in the hearts of citizens
once they have had good experiences with democratic institutions and
have accustomed themselves to conditions of political freedom. In so
doing, they also learn, within the prevailing national context, to com-
prehend the republic and its Constitution as an attainment. Without a
historical, consciously formed vision of this kind, patriotic ties deriving
from and relating to the Constitution cannot come about. For such ties
are connected, for example, with pride in a successful civil rights move-
ment.
Studies of struggles over the actual writing, implementation and modifi-
cation of real constitutions in real societies prove this account - with its
emphasis on conflict-free phenomena like 'good experiences', 'vision' and
'pride' - to be far from sufficient (Putnam 1993). Something infinitely
more complex than these phenomena are at work in real life situations,
perhaps because humans are infinitely more complex than Habermas's
homo democraticus.People know how to be, at the same time, tribal and
democratic, dissidents and patriots, experts atjudging how far a democratic
constitution can be bent and used in non-democratic waysfor personal and
group advantage (Flyvbjerg 1998).
Machiavelli is a more enlightened guide to social and political change
than Habermas when it comes to constitution-writing. In The Discourses
Machiavelli (1983: 111-2[§I.3]) recapitulates that '[a]ll writers on politics
have pointed out . . . that in constituting and legislating for a common-
wealth it must be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that they
will alwaysgive vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity
offers'.7 If Machiavelli and other writers are right in this 'worst-case' think-
ing, then we might clearly end up in trouble if we use Habermas's discourse
ethics as a basis for organizing our society, as Habermas advocates we do,
since discourse ethics contains no checks and balances - other than an
abstract appeal to reason - to control the wickedness which Machiavelli
talks about. Such wickedness is assumed away by Habermas's leap of faith
for the good. History teaches us, however, that assuming evil away may give
free reign to evil. Thus, the lesson to be learnt from Machiavelli is not so
much that moralism is hypocrisy. The lesson is that the first step to becom-
ing moral is realizing we are not.
Furthermore, by determining validity, truth, justice, etc., as an outcome
of 'the better argument', Habermas simply moves the problems of determi-
nation from the former concepts to the latter. As Bernstein (1992: 220)
 F7yvbjerg
Bent
218
and with it communicative
points out, 'the better argument','Abstractly,there is something
correctly
is an empirically empty concept:
rationality, "force of the better
attractive about Habermas's appeal to the The
enormously what this means and presupposes'. for
argument" until we ask ourselves criteria
situations there are few clear
problemhere is that in non-trivial how good it is, and how
what is considered an argument,
determining other. This does not
are to be evaluated against each
arguments
different evaluate them.
we should not attempt to identify arguments and
that
mean procedures
'Any society must have some
asBernstein (1992: 221) states,
Yet by argumentation - even
with conflicts that cannot be resolved
dealing
for In real civil
are committed to rational argumentation.'
whenall parties is precisely these kinds
as opposed to Habermas's ideal types - it
society- both empirically and normatively.
conflictswhich are of interest,
of and Niklas Luhmann
Wellmer, Herman Lubbe
AgnesHeller, Albrecht In comment-
criticisms of discourse ethics.
expressed similarly strong
have principle (U) mentioned earlier,
upon
ing Habermas's universalization approach: 'Put
7) simply rejects the value of Habermas's
Heller(1984-5: our actions here and
if we look to moral philosophy for guidance in
bluntly, guidance from the Habermasian
now, we cannot obtain any positive 63) is equally
of the categorical imperative'. Wellmer (1986:
reformulation principle in
when he writes that adhering to the universalization
harsh an impossibility
justified moral judgment
moral judgment 'would make of institutional analysis, Lubbe
Ding der Unmoglichkeit]'. At the level
[einem institutions
Luhmann comments that upholding any concrete
(1990) and life to the
demands of discourse ethics would paralyse institutional
the
to
1990).
pointof a breakdown (Benhabib interpreters, such as Seyla
Benhabib
Even Habermas's most sympathetic his formal-
for
Alessandro Ferrara, have begun to criticize Habermas provide a cor-
and to
to context. They are trying
ism,idealism and insensitivity on precisely these weak points and to
thinking
rective to Habermas's (Ferrara 1989).8 I
element of phronesisinto critical theory
introduce an need to bring in
that critical theory and Habermas's work also
would argue and other recent work,
of power. In his BetweenFactsand Norms
the element power, and he has,
(1996a, b; 1995) has attempted to deal with
Habermas society (Carleheden
time, developed a deeper analysis of civil
atthe same Habermas's approach
these efforts, however,
and Rene 1996). Despite attention to the
and procedural, paying scant
remains strongly normative to substantive ethical values and to the
preconditions of actual discourse, in society in the
rationality gets a foothold
problem of how communicative forces. Habermas also continues to dis-
face of massive non-communicative cultural divisions as
relating to identity and
regard the particular problems that are being devel-
ways of safeguarding reason
well as the non-discursive
groups and new social movements.
oped by so-called minority besides
of the democracy problematic,
Habermas's universalization instance, the groups in
may also be unnecessary. For from
being unsustainable, suffrage
for the expansion of
civil society which worked
Habermasand Foucault 219

property-owning men to include all adult men did not necessarily have any
ultimate democratic vision that voting rights should also include women.
Nevertheless, their efforts unwittingly laid the groundwork for the subse-
quent enfranchisement of women. Similarly, those civil rights groups who
worked for the right to vote for adult women did not necessarily envisage a
situation where suffrage would also include 18-year-olds, even though this
later came to pass in many countries. The struggle was carried out from case
to case and utilized the arguments and means which worked in the specific
socio-historical context. This mode of action is also pertinent to today's new
social movements, where we still do not know what will be meant by democ-
racy in the future; we know only that, as democrats, we would like to have
more of it.
Rorty (1991: 190) is correct in noting that the 'cash value' of Habermas's
notions of discourse ethics and communicative rationality consists of the
familiar political freedoms of modern liberal democracies, freedoms that
are essential to the functioning of civil society. But such notions are not
'foundations' or 'defences' of free institutions; they are those institutions,
says Rorty: 'We did not learn about the importance of these institutions . . .
by thinking through the nature of Reason or Man or Society; we learned
about this the hard way, by watching what happened when those institutions
were set aside'.
The vocabulary of Enlightenment rationalism, although it was essential
to the beginning of liberal democracy, has become an impediment to the
preservation and progress of democratic societies (Rorty 1989: 44). One
reason for this is that Enlightenment rationalism has little to offer in under-
standing power and in understanding the related discrepancy between
formal rationality and RBalrationalitat (real rationality) in modern democ-
racies. In staying close to the Enlightenment vocabulary Habermas has
developed little understanding of power and thus tends to become part of
the problem he wishes to solve. Habermas's efforts to achieve more ration-
ality and democracy, however laudable, draw attention away from critical
relations of power. The neglect of power is unfortunate, because it is pre-
cisely by paying attention to power relations that we may achieve more
democracy. If our goal is to move toward Habermas's ideal - freedom from
domination, more democracy, a strong civil society- then our first task is
not to understand the utopia of communicative rationality, but to under-
stand the realities of power. Here we turn to the work of Michel Foucault,
who has tried to develop such an understanding.

3.

Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas's thinking is

well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding
of actual political processes. Foucault's thinking, conversely, is weak with
reference to generalized ideals - Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals,
 Flyvbjerg
Bent
220
'What ought I to do?'
as definitive answers to Kant's question,
understood but his work reflects a sophisticated
Lenin's
or 'What is to be done?' - agree that in
of Realpolitik.Both Foucault and Habermas
understanding and similar
must 'side with reason'. Referring to Habermas
one
politics rationalism as
Foucault (1980b) warns that 'to respect
however,
thinkers, analysis of the
never constitute a blackmail to prevent the
should
ideal
an the following com-
really at work' (Rajchman 1988: 170). In
rationalities be placed on what
Foucault and Habermas, emphasis will
of
parison the Foucault who
(1987) has called the 'American Foucault', regarded
Descombes social experiment and who
liberal democracy as a promising
saw on the project of human
a citizen in a democratic society working
as
himself
liberty. and the Frankfurt
was familiar with the work of Habermas
Foucault of Foucault. Foucault
as Habermas is familiar with the work
School,just is a fact of some
even built upon the work of Habermas which philoso-
occasionally
someone who rarely built upon contemporary
significance for 'completely in
an interview, Foucault (1984a: 248) said he was
phers.In of Kant. 'If one aban-
with Habermas regarding the importance
agreement' runs the risk of lapsing
of Kant', explained Foucault, 'one
dons the work was unequivocal in his
And, like Habermas, Foucault
intoirrationality'. of study. Foucault
of the significance of rationality as an object
evaluation been too narrowly
that the work of Kant might have
suggests, however, Kantian question was
by Habermas and his followers. ' [I]f the
interpreted transgressing', says
of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce today has to
that
(1984b: 45), 'it seems to me that the critical question
Foucault is transform
to
back into a positive one . . . The point, in brief,
beturned into a practical
in the form of necessary limitation
thecritique conducted This entails an
takes the form of a possible transgression'.
critique that namely 'that
to Foucault (1984b: 45-6),
obviousconsequence, according practiced in the search for formal struc-
to be
criticismis no longer going
value, but rather as a historical investigation'. sees as
tureswith universal Habermas
about Foucault is what
Habermas's main complaint (1987:276) harshly dismisses
Habermas
Foucault's relativism. Thus as 'relativistic,cryptonormative
illu-
Foucault'sgenealogical historiographies relativism is correct,
original). Such critique for
soryscience' (emphasis in in norms that can be rationally and
unfounded
if by relativistic we mean 294) means when
and this is what Habermas (1987:
universallygrounded; the normative foun-
not giving an 'account of
he criticizes Foucault for Habermas's own work
By this standard, however,
dations' for his thinking. Habermas has not, so far,
been able to
As we have seen,
is also relativistic. of his discourse ethics
and universal grounding
demonstrate that rational such grounding (Habermas
1985: 196,
he has only postulated
is possible, Despite more than
Habermas is not alone with this problem.
1979: 97). And no one has
years of attempts by rationalistic philosophers,
two thousand to avoid relativism our
able so far to live up to Plato's injunction that
been
and universally grounded.
thinking must be rationally
Habermasand Foucault
221
The reason may be that Plato was wrong. Perhaps the polarity relativism-
foundationalism is just another artificial dualism that makes it easy to think
but hard to understand. Such dualisms simplit things conceptually but
with little reference to actual phenomena. Perhaps the horns of the dualism
can be avoided by contextualism. This is the strategy of Foucault. As we will
see, it is clearly wrong to criticize Foucault for being a relativist if we by
relativistic mean 'without norms' or 'anything goes'. 'I do not conclude',
says Foucault (1984c: 374), 'that one may sayjust anything within the order
of theory'.
Foucault resolves the question of relativism versus foundationalism by
following Nietzsche (1974: 284-5) who says about what he calls 'historians
of morality' that
[t]heir usual mistaken premise is that they affirm some consensus of the
nations . . . concerning certain principles of morals, and then they infer
from this that these principles must be unconditionally binding also for
you and me; or conversely, they see the truth that among different
nations moral valuations are necessarily different and then infer from this
that no morality is at all binding. Both procedures are equally childish.
(emphasis in original)
Employing this line of reasoning, Foucault rejects both relativism and foun-
dationalism and replaces them by situational ethics, i.e., by context. With
explicit reference to Kant and Habermas, Foucault (1984b: 46) says that
unlike these two thinkers he 'is not seeking to make possible a metaphysics
that has finally become a science'.
Distancing himself from foundationalism and metaphysics does not leave
Foucault normless, however. His norms are expressed in a desire to chal-
lenge 'every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims'
(Miller 1993: 316) and in this way 'to give new impetus, as far and wide as
possible, to the undefined work of freedom' (Foucault 1984b: 46) . Foucault
here is the Nietzschean dernocrat, for whom any form of government -
liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based on
a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding
consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Foucault's norms
are based on historical and personal context, and they are shared with many
people around the world. The norms cannot be given a universal ground-
ing independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault.
Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uni-
formity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucault
would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Haber-
mas: 'The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense
that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me'
(Foucault 1984f: 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986: 119). In a Fou-
cauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger civil society, not
empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows
restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about
222 BentFlyvbjerg

what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have
produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to
implementing utopian visions of the good.
Foucault's view of the value of universals in philosophy and social science
stands in diametrical opposition to that of Habermas. 'Nothing is funda-
mental', says Foucault (1984a: 247), 'That is what is interesting in the analy-
sis of society'. Compare this with Foucault's (1984d: 87-8) remark that
'nothing in man - not even his body- is sufficiently stable to serve as the
basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men'. Therefore,
Foucault's analysis of 'the rationalities really at work' begins with the
assumption that because no one has yet demonstrated the existence of uni-
versals in philosophy and social science, we must operate as if the univer-
sals do not exist. That is, we should not waste our time searching in vain for
universals. Where universals are said to exist, or where people tacitly assume
they exist, universals must be questioned, according to Foucault. For
Foucault, our history endows us with the possibility to become aware of
those social arrangements which create problems, for instance a weak civil
society, and those which create satisfaction, for instance empowering civil
society. It follows that we have the possibility to either oppose or promote
these arrangements. This is Foucault's point of departure for social and
political change, not global moral norms.9
The basis for understanding and acting is the attitude among those who
understand and act, and this attitude is not based on idiosyncratic moral or
personal preferences, but on a context-dependent common world view and
interests among a reference group, well aware that different groups typi-
cally have different world views and different interests, and that there exists
no general principle - including the 'force of the better argument' - by
which all differences can be resolved. For Foucault the socially and histori-
cally conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most
effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for
action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foun-
dation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-
historical foundation is fully adequate.
According to Foucault, Habermas's (undated: 8) 'authorisation of power
by law' is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ' [The juridical system] is utterly
incongruous with the new methods of power', says Foucault (1980a: 89),
'methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the
state and its apparatus . . . Our historical gradient carries us further and
further away from a reign of law.' The law, institutions - or policies and
plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even
entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom,
even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely
to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or 'correct' think-
ing. On the contrary, history has demonstrated - says Foucault- horrifying
examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom
into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as
Habermasand Foucault
223
an epistemicallyderived techne,that become most repressive.'[People]
reproach me for not presenting an overall theory', saysFoucault (1984c:
- which
375-6), 'I am attempting,to the contrary,apartfrom any totalisation
would be at once abstractand limiting- to openupproblemsthat are as con-
creteand generalas possible' (emphasisin original).

Given this background theory-basedwriting of constitutions does not

occupy a central place in Foucault'swork as it does for Habermas,and
constitution-writing would not be seen as an effectivewayof empowering
civilsocietyin a Foucauldianinterpretation.This is not becausethe writing
of constitutionsis without significance,but because Foucaultviews it as
more important- both for understandingand for practice- to focus on
the concrete struggle over a constitution in a specific society: how the
constitution is interpreted,how it is practicedin actual institutions,and
especially, how interpretationsand practises may be changed. In other
words,Foucault'sthinking as concerns laws,constitutionsand democracy
focusesmore on how existingconstitutionsand theirassociatedinstitutions
can be utilizedmore democratically,whereasHabermas'sprojectis to estab-
lish more democraticconstitutionsand institutionsas such, where 'democ-
racy'is defined by Habermas'sdiscourseethics.
In this sense, whatFoucaultcalls 'the politicaltask'is
to criticisethe workingof institutionswhich appear to be both neutral
and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political
violence whichhas alwaysexerciseditselfobscurelythroughthem willbe
unmasked,so thatone can fight them. (Chomskyand Foucault1974:171)
This is what,in a Foucauldianinterpretation,would be seen as an effective
approach to institutionalchange, including change in the institutionsof
civil society.Withdirect reference to Habermas,Foucault (1988: 18) adds
The problemis not of tryingto dissolve[relationsof power]in the utopia
of a perfectlytransparentcommunication,but to give . . . the rulesof law,
the techniquesof management,and also the ethics . . . whichwouldallow
these games of power to be playedwith a minimumof domination.
Here Foucaultoverestimateshis differenceswith Habermas,for Habermas
also believesthat the ideal speech situationcannot be establishedas a con-
ventionalrealityin actualcommunication.Both thinkerssee the regulation
of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas
approachesregulationfrom a universalistictheory of discourse,Foucault
seeksout a genealogicalunderstandingof actualpowerrelationsin specific
contexts. Foucaultis thus oriented towardsphronesis, whereasHabermas's
orientationis towardsepisteme. ForFoucaultpraxisand freedom are derived
not from universalsor theories.Freedom is a practice,and its ideal is not a
utopian absence of power.Resistanceand struggle,in contrastto consen-
sus, is for Foucaultthe mostsolid basisfor the practiceof freedom.It is pre-
cisely on the issue of power and freedom that we find the most crucial
 Flyvbjerg
Bent
224
difference reflected in
differencebetween Foucault and Habermas, a
as 'utopian,' while Habermas
Foucault's(1988: 18) labelling of Habermas
Foucault a 'cynic' and 'relativist'.This
(1987: 253, 294) responds by terming
for concrete social and political
kindof 'mud-slinging' is unproductive
to be discovered if everything is
studies,however, since nothing remains
poweror if nothing is power, but instead ideal otopia.
politics, Foucault
Whereas Habermas emphasizes procedural macro
though with the important shared
stressessubstantive micro politics,
venture to define the actual
featurethat neither Foucault nor Habermas both
by the participants. Thus,
contentof political action. This is defined
thinkers as concerns the content
Habermasand Foucault are 'bottom-up'
moralist fashion as
ofpolitics, but where Habermas thinks in a 'top-down'
having sketched out the procedures to be
regardsprocedural rationality-
both process and
followed- Foucault is a 'bottom-up' thinker as regards
Habermas would want to tell individuals and
content.In this interpretation,
about their affairs as regards procedure for
groupsin civil society how to go
about the outcome
discourse.He would not want, however, to say anything
prescribe neither process nor outcome;
ofthis procedure. Foucault would
on conflict and power relations as the
hewould only recommend a focus
domination. This
most effective point of departure for the fight against
i.e., in the relationship
fight is central to civil society both internally,
civil society - groups of different gender
between different groups within
externally, in the relationship of civil society
orethnicity, for instance - and
the fight against domi-
to the spheres of government and business where
nation can be said to be constitutive of civil society.
Foucault has been
It is because of his double 'bottom-up' thinking that
about such criticism
described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says
in the institutional
It's true that certain people, such as those who work
advice or instructions in my
setting of the prison . . . are not likely to find
my project is precisely to bring
books to tell them 'what is to be done.' But
do,' so that the acts, gestures,
it about that they 'no longer know what to
to go without saying become
discourses that up until then had seemed
problernatic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993: 235).
is correct to the extent
The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented
and he directly distances
that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action,
dolle?' formulas which
himself from the kinds of universal 'What is to be
rationality. Foucault
characterize procedure in Habermas's communicative
part of the problem.
believes that 'solutions' of this type are themselves
misleading, however,
Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be
out only in order to
in so far as Foucault's genealogical studies are carried
out, from the contin-
show how things can be done differently to 'separate
of no longer being,
gency that has made us what we are, the possibility
(Foucault 1984b: 45-7). Thus
doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think'
a revolt in some of the French
Foucault was openly pleased when during 'They
his Discipline and Punish.
prisons the prisoners in their cells read
Habermasand Foucault 225

shouted the text to other prisoners', Foucault told an interviewer. 'I know
it's pretentious to say', Foucault said, 'but that's a proof of a truth - a politi-
cal and actual truth - which started after the book was written' (Dillon 1980:
5).10 This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a
genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as 'a dealer in
instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a
sketcher of plans, a gunsmith' (Ezine 1985: 14).
The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action
by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this par-
ticular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault's
genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that
social practices may alwaystake an alternative form, even where there is no
basis for voluntarism or idealism. Cornbined with Foucault's focus on domi-
nation, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by
feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance,
gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination
between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed
(McNay 1992, Bordo andJaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell
1987). Given the interpretation above of Foucault as a practitioner of
phronesis,it comes as no surprise that the appropriation of Foucault by
feminists has recently been followed by a similar adoption of Aristotle - the
philosopher of phronesis par excellence - despite the misogynic character
of some of Aristotle's thinking (Hirshman 1992a, b; Posner 1992; Nussbaum
1992; Sherman 1989). Finally, given the emphasis in phronesis on practical
rationality and common sense knowledge, it is also not unexpected that
Habermas has distanced himself from phronesisand neo-Aristotelianism,
both of which he rhetorically has associated with neo-conservatism (Haber-
mas 1987, 1990, 1993).
Foucault's emphasis on marginality makes his thinking sensitive to differ-
ence, diversity and the politics of identity, something which today is crucial
for understanding civil society and for acting in it. As mentioned in the intro-
duction to this paper, historically the very idea of civil society contains a
gender bias, and this bias must be rooted out if today we are to build on the
concept of civil society. Feminists have found that for this task Foucault is
more helpful than Habermas, and progress has been slow in developing the
theory of communicative rationality in ways that would be sensitive to
gender and race. Even a sympathetic observer like Cohen (1995: 57) criti-
cizes Habermas for his 'peculiar blindness to gender issues'. Other femin-
ists have been sceptical about Habermas's 'confidence in abstractrationality'
as the general cure to social and political ailments, and researchers working
on race, ethnicity and sexuality have received Habermas in a similar manner
(Ryan 1992: 262, Fraser 1987, Eley 1992, Simpson 1986).
Habermas (1992b: 466-7) has acknowledged that his analysis does not
include 'gender, ethnicity, class, popular culture'. But Habermas insists,
wrongly in myjudgment, that 'the critique of that which has been excluded
from the public sphere', and from Habermas's analysis of it, can be carried
 Flyvbjerg
Bent
226
manifest self-under-
'onlyin the light of the
declared standards and the
out of these very same public
proponents and participants
of
standing the repression of
'How could you critically assess the inconspicuous
spheres'. asks Habermas,
national, gender, and identity differences',
cultural,
ethnic,
one basic standard ["the
force of more or less good
in
not
'if the light of this presume will
however interpreted, of procedures that all parties
reason"], time, in a given
the most rational solution at hand, at a given over access
provide
(emphasis added). Thus Habermas sees the struggle
context?' But Habermas's analy-
thepublic sphere as a matter of rational discourse.
to test. With the demarcations
doesnot stand up to historical-empirical
sis 'one' and 'all' the analysis is too
by his use of the terms 'only',
established
categorical. from the public
assessment of the exclusion
Forexample, the critical out unilaterally
talks about can be and has been carried
sphereHabermas regard to follow-
been excluded, and without
thevery groups that have
by of this
and 'manifest self-understanding'
the 'declared standards'
ing have
standards and self-understanding
sphere.As a matter of fact, such the objects of
need of change; they were
oftenbeen seen as what was in Even where the
(Eley 1992, Ryan 1992).
assessment, not its basis may not
critical not seen as a problem, they
standards and self-understanding were means for
groups as the most efficient
have been viewed by excluded choose to use
Groups may therefore
gaining access to the public sphere. of activism or
gain such access, the politics
other,non-discursive, means to initiatives, today
and environmental
power politics, for instance. Feminist many societies,
of civil society in
central to the structure and functioning primarily by rational consensus
agenda not
gottheir issues on the public of activism and
power struggles and conflicts characteristic
butthrough the 1995). Moreover,
Flores and Dreyfus
socialchange (Wapner 1994; Spinosa, constitution of
historically the very
asEley and Ryan have demonstrated, discourse and con-
not solely from rational
thepublic sphere took place, and exclusion'
of conflict, contested meanings,
sensus,but 'from a field constitution of the
to reason implied by the
(Eley1992: 307). The claim Foucault's sense, in
a claim to power in
publicsphere was simultaneously similarly argued that democracy has
has
Eley'sanalysis. Rustow (1970) this form of
into existence not because people wanted
generally come consensus on 'basic
they had achieved a wide
government or because had been at each other's throat for a
because various groups
values'but inability to gain domi-
to recognize their mutual
long time and finally came 1994: 208).
accommodation (Hirschman
nance and the need for some and gender groups
that exclusion of ethnic, cultural, national
In arguing standards of
sphere needs to be assessed by the discursive
from the public cases as a model for
Habermas uses the conduct of court
the public sphere, 'are meant to
'Court cases', says Habermas (1992b: 467),
such assessment. and intended
conflicts in terms of mutual understanding
settle practical Habermas, by use of
And agreement is arrived at, according to
agreement'. force of the better
'force of more or less good reason', that is, the
the
Habermasand Foucault 227

argument, as 'the only alternativeto overt or covert violence' (emphasis

added). It is correctthat courtsare meant to settle conflictsand that argu-
ments, rationalor not, are used for this purpose.Yet such settlementis not
dependent in the individualcase on mutual understandingor agreement
between the partiesinvolvedin the court case, as Habermassaysit is. It is,
instead,dependent on an understandingby the partiesthat once the argu-
ments havebeen heard and thejudge has ruled theywill haveto live by this
ruling,whetherthey like it or not. If they choose not to respect the ruling,
the judge is backed by an elaboratesystemof sanctions,and ultimatelyby
police force and prisons.Thus courtcasesare typicallysettledby power,not
by mutual understandingand agreement.Courtsin pluralistdemocracies
secure the typeof conflict-resolutionRichardBernsteintalkedabout above
when he said that any societymust have some proceduresfor dealing with
conflicts that cannot be resolvedby argumentation,even when all parties
are committed to rationalargumentation.If courts relied on Habermas's
understandingof litigation, the court systemwould break down because
many cases would never come to an end. While morally admirableand
politicallyprovocative,Habermas'sthinkingabout rationalargumenthere
seems not only utopian but sociologicallynaive.
If Habermas7sdiscourseethicswere to be constitutedas realitythiswould
not signifyan end to power,it wouldbe a wayto regulatepower.And to the
extent that actualimplementationof discourseethicswouldrun counterto
the interestsof social and political actors- which is bound to be the case
for societies and decisions of any complexity- discourse ethics will be
opposed, whether such opposition can be rationallyjustified or not. The
basic contradiction here is that coercion would be needed to arrive at
Habermas'snon-coercive(zwanglos) communication.Agreementwould,in
this sense, be forced. So even if one could imagine the existence of what
Habermas (1992a: 453) calls 'a political public sphere unsubvertedby
power', such a sphere could not be said to be free of power since it was
establishedthrough a claim to power. The Nietzschean insight that his-
toricallymoralityhas typicallybeen establishedby immoral means would
hold true for Habermas'smorality,too. Power is needed to limit power.
Evento understandhow publicnesscan be establishedwe need to think in
terms of conflict and power. There is no way around it. It is a basic con-
dition for understandingissues of exclusion and inclusion,and for under-
standingcivil society.

In sum, Foucaultand Habermasagree that rationalizationand the misuse

of power are among the most importantproblemsof our time. They dis-
agree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these
problems. Habermas'sapproach is oriented toward universals,context-
independence and control via constitution-writingand institutional
development.Foucaultfocuses his effortson the local and context-depen-
dent and towardthe analysisof strategiesand tactics as basis for power
struggle.
 Flyvbjerg
Bent
228
a clear picture of
The value of Habermas's approach is that it contains
process', arld what precondi-
whatHabermas understands by sdemocratic
'democratic'. His scheme
must be fulfilled for a decision to be termed
tions
and application in relation
canbe used as an abstract ideal for justification
and procedural planning. The
tolegislation, institutional development little
idealistic. His work contains
problem,however, is that Habermas is
strategies and tactics
understandingof how power functions or of those
democracy. It is easy to point to
whichcan ensure more of the sought after
as a solution; it is some-
constitutionwriting and institutional developtnent
and institutional changes.
thingelse to implement specific constitutional
regarding communicative rationality,
Asidefrom his general prescriptions
such implementation
Habermasprovides us with little guidance as to how
couldtake place.
on the dynamics of
The value of Foucault's approach is his emphasis
is the first prerequisite for action?
power.Understanding how power works can
And such an understanding
becauseaction is the exercise of power. a
concrete. Foucault can help us with
bestbe achieved by focusing on the these
ancl RBalrationalitat, and how
materialistunderstanding of RBalpolitik
with Foucault is that
mightbe changed in a specific context. The problem
have their points of departure in the par-
becauseunderstanding and action
to overlook more generalized conditions
ticularand the local, we may come
and structural issues.
concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions
l-listory of philosophy and political theory,
From the perspective of the
and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault
thedifference between Foucault
contextualist tradition, with roots in
works within a particularistic and
one of the more impor-
Thucydidesvia Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is
of this tradition. Habermas is the most
tant twentieth century exponents
of a universalistic and theorizing tradition
prominent living exponent
proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we
derived from Socrates and Plato,
about struggle
are speaking of 'strategic' versus 'constitution' thinking,
versus control, conflict versus consensus.

4.
corrosive and poten-
Generally, conflicts have been viewed as dangerous,
need of being contained
tially destructive of social order and therefore in
outlook on conflict,
and resolved. This view seems to cover Habermas's
Habermas's, experience
which is understandable given Germany's, and
There is mounting evi-
with Nazism, World War II and their after-effects.
the valuable ties
dence, however, that social conflicts produce themselves
provide them with the
that hold modern democratic societies together and
are the true pillars of
strength and cohesion they need; that social conflicts
and societies that
democratic society (Hirschman 1994: 206). Governments
reason for the deterio-
suppress conflict do so at their own peril. A basic may be in
societies
ration and loss of vitality of the Communist-dominated
Habermasand Foucault
229
their success in suppressing overt social conflict. In a Foucauldian interpre-
tation, suppressing conflict is suppressing freedom, because the privilege
to engage in conflict is part of freedom.
If societies that suppress conflict are oppressive, perhaps social and politi-
cal theories that ignore or marginalize conflict are potentially oppressive,
too. And if conflict sustains society, there is good reason to caution against
an idealism that ignores conflict and power. In real social and political life
self-interest and conflict will not give way to some all-embracing communal
ideal like Habermas's. Indeed, the more democratic a society, the more it
allows groups to define their own specific ways of life, and the individuals
to select the form in which such groups are composed, and legitimates the
inevitable conflicts of interest that arise between them. Political consensus
can never be brought to bear in a manner that neutralizes particular group
obligations, commitments and interests. To think that it can be is to repeat
the fallacy of Rousseau's belief in the General Will as distinct from the
actual will of particular individuals and groups (Alexander 1991). A more
differentiated conception of political culture than Habermas's is needed,
one that will be more tolerant of conflict and difference, and more com-
patible with the pluralization of interests.
As pointed out by Ryan (1992: 286), because everyday politics inevitably
falls short of the standards of communicative rationality, which was a
chimera even in the heyday of the bourgeois public sphere, the goal of pub-
licness might best be allowed 'to navigate through wider and wilder terri-
tory'. Such territory is imbued with conflict. Public life is best cultivated,
not in an ideal sphere that assumes away power, but 'in many democratic
spaces where obstinate differences in power, material status, and hence
interest can find expression'. With the plurality that a contemporary
concept for civil society must contain, conflict becomes an inevitable part
of this concept. Thus civil society does not mean 'civilized' in the sense of
well-mannered behavlour. In strong civil societies, distrust and criticism of
authoritative action are omnipresent as is resulting political conflict. Moral
outrage is continuous, because actual authorities inevitably violate whatever
ideal norms civil society has for justice. Civil society guarantees only the
existence of a public, not public consensus (Alexander 1991). A strong civil
society guarantees the existence of conflict. A strong understanding of civil
societyt and of democracy, must therefore be based on thought that places
conflict and power at its centre, as Foucault does and Habermas does not.
This is not to reject the importance of the public sphere as a bulwark of
freedom. Nor is it to deny that Habermas's work is morally admirable and
intellectually stimulating, especially in a time when most philosophers have
given up on the high ambitions for philosophy and social science that
Habermas still pursues, for instance regarding universal grounding of our
thoughts and actions Even if such ambitions cannot be fulfilled, the history
of philosophy and science shows that we have much to learn from atternpts
at doing so. It must be said, however, that forms of public life that are practi-
cal, committed and ready for conflict provide a superior paradigm of civic
 Flyvbjerg
Bent
230
detached and
do forms of public life that are discursive, enable
virtue than
citizen this way, in order to
For those who see things
consensus-dependent.a serious contribution to genuine participation,
sphere to make in Haber-
public
the
back to precisely what it cannot accept
have to
would tie it and partisanship.ll
one focus on conflict, power
interpretation:Foucault's
mas's
BentFlyvbjerg
1997)
accepted:
(Date August of Developmentand Planning
Department
AalborgUniversity,Denmark

NOTES contains an in-

Bauman 5.Flyvbjerg ( 1998) questions can
1.I wish to thank Zygmuntfor their example of
depth how these
two
and anonymous referees
be in empirical research.
analysed
contains of the relation-
comments. This article
helpful 6.For a different view
and methodological discourse ethics and civil
the
of
part theoretical between
ship which
considerations behind (Flyvbjerg 1998). see Cohen
society, andArato (1992)
posi-
Furthertheoretical and methodological be and defends
develops
Habermas's
behind this book can a sympathetic critique of
considerations Phronetic including
tion,
foundin my paper 'Towards An Aris- Foucault.
and Political Sciences: Context, misprint.
Social 7. Text corrected for Bernstein's
Approach to Integrating
totelian and 8. See, for example,
( 1987)
Particular,
the and Narrativein Social ( 1987,
debates 1988) with Rorty
See also Dallmayr
Inquiry,'forthcoming.
Political Dallmayr (1988).
and
of Haber-
2. The following evaluation for .
(1989)
on his concept point, see Dean
workconcentrates
mas's 9. For more on this and defends
Other aspects of his author- develops
democracy. (1994)which critique of
are not taken up.
ship Foucault'sposition, including a
[app.A]) adds
3. Nietzsche (1968: 188 philosopher's Habermas. and prison
to the extent that the 10. For more on Foucault
that of ( 1977),
'conviction' is the basis of a 'system' reform,see Foucault and Deleuze
the system. Deleuze ( 1986) .
thinking it corrupts Foucault ( 1974) and
thatthe claimthat Flores and Dreyfus
4. Some might argue a leap of 11. See also Spinosa,
Habermas's universalisminvolves (1995).
his fallibilisti-
faith is misconstrued, since argumentis
callyconceived transcendental as
subject to formsof indirectconfirmation, concern
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