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China
Special Report
Chinese Banks – Annual Review
and Outlook
Analysts Summary
Charlene Chu As Western banks continue to wrestle with the events of the past year, Chinese
+8610 8567 9898 x 112
charlene.chu@fitchratings.com
banks have emerged from the global crisis relatively unscathed, and now stand
among the largest financial institutions in the world. The resilience of Chinese
Chunling Wen banks has attracted a growing amount of attention and inquiry from market
+8610 8567 9898 x 105
chunling.wen@fitchratings.com participants. Could banks in China be stronger than they are being given credit for?
With lending expected to rise by close to 30% of GDP by year‐end (2008: 16.7%) and
Related Research loan spreads down 160bp from mid‐2008, many analysts have been worried about a
· Bank Systemic Risk Report (November 2009) deterioration in Chinese banks’ performance. However, earnings and asset quality
· Chinese Banks: Soaring Credit Amid Weak have generally surprised on the upside in 2009. Consequently, most measures of
Corporate Climate a Concern (May 2009)
capitalization, although clearly weaker than at end‐2008, have demonstrated less
· Asset Quality Under Pressure As Credit
Cycle Turns (January 2009) erosion than expected given the magnitude of growth.
· Chinese Banks: Signs of Strain Emerging,
Despite Strong H108 (September 2008) While recent performance has been better than anticipated, Fitch Ratings continues
to believe that a high degree of caution is still warranted due to major ongoing
weaknesses in loan classification and disclosure of off‐balance‐sheet exposures,
Chinese banks’ lack of experience operating through a full economic cycle, and the
lengthy process of instilling a new credit culture. Meanwhile, although this year’s
fiscal and monetary stimulus appear to be succeeding in reviving the economy, the
aggressive growth of credit in H109 has raised the spectre of a medium‐term bad
loan crisis, although this by no means is a foregone conclusion.
Other recent developments provide additional cause for concern; chief among these
is the growing amount of unreported loan transactions, which are increasingly
distorting credit growth figures at an institutional and systemic level and represent
a growing pool of hidden credit risk.
Reflecting Fitch’s long‐standing caution in China, many of these concerns are
already built into the Individual Ratings of Chinese banks, which continue to hover
at the lower end of the scale from ‘A’ (high) to ‘F’ (low, see Table 1). However,
0 10
Credit Growth
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Without question, the dominant theme in 2009 has been the unprecedented level of
credit growth, which has surpassed all forecasts published at the start of the year.
Source: Bloomberg, PBOC
Fitch expects total combined CNY and foreign currency loan growth of 32%, or
USD1.5trn, for 2009, with the total loans/GDP ratio rising to 127% from 106% at
end‐2008 (see Chart 1). This is a tremendous amount of money to enter an
emerging‐market economy in the span of one year, particularly given that over
three‐quarters of it was concentrated in just the first six months. Credit growth of
this magnitude inevitably places a strain on banks’ internal risk management, and
raises concerns about a future deterioration in loan quality.
In other countries, past episodes of banking system distress have often been
preceded by periods of very rapid credit growth in excess of nominal GDP growth.
In its semi‐annual “Bank Systemic Risk Report” (see Related Research on front
page), Fitch’s sovereign team evaluates trends in credit growth, asset prices, and
real effective exchange rates for 86 countries under coverage, and assigns a Macro‐
Prudential Indicator (MPI) score ranging from ‘1’ (low risk) to ‘3’ (high risk). China’s
MPI has been ‘1’ since the launch of the report in July 2005, but this could be
revised upward in 2010 given this year’s acceleration in lending.
Looking into next year, loan growth will be less brisk than in 2009 as the pressure
for economic stimulus eases and balance sheet constraints from weakened capital
and loan/deposit ratios become more binding. Fitch’s baseline estimate is net new
loans of CNY8trn or more, or 20%+ growth yoy. A key factor to monitor will be the
trend in outright sales of loans and/or re‐packaging of loans into wealth
management products, which are growing in popularity but are largely unreported.
These transactions, which free up space to extend new loans and lessen the
pressure on capital and liquidity, can lead to a noticeable reduction in a bank’s
outstanding loans and result in understated credit growth figures at an institutional
and systemic level. Fitch suspects this activity was one factor behind the marked
slowdown in aggregate loan growth figures in H209, which may not have moderated
as much as official figures suggest.
No comprehensive data is available on the nominal amount of this activity, but
there is evidence that loan re‐packaging transactions picked up in H209 (see
Chart 2; no concrete data is available on outright loan sales). Although Chinese
1,000
750
500
250
0
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109 Q209 Q309 Oct‐Nov
09
08
09
06
07
07
07
08
08
08
09
09
fixed‐income issuance during the period, and it is no wonder that the Chinese
Aug
Aug
Aug
May
May
May
Nov
Feb
Nov
Feb
Nov
Feb
Source: Bloomberg
corporate sector has begun to revive.
The key question heading into next year is whether the February 2009 bottoming of
corporate profitability reflects an improvement in core earnings power of Chinese
enterprises, or is simply a product of cheap, loose credit. To the extent the latter is
the case, enterprises could begin to face difficulties later next year as monetary
policy begins to tighten. With close to a quarter of all outstanding discounted bills
already having matured in Q309, some Chinese corporates are already starting to
face an effective interest rate increase as these bills, which were extended at rates
in the neighbourhood of 2% on average, are rolled over into regular loans at a
minimum rate of 4.4% (six‐month loans priced at 0.9x the base rate).
Close to two‐thirds of the corporate loans extended from end‐2008 to Q309 were
medium‐ to long‐term credits, the vast majority of which had been extended to
infrastructure‐related projects or entities, followed by local government financing
platforms (which fall under the category “leasing and commercial services”),
property development, and manufacturing (see Chart 6). The borrowers involved in
these activities tend to be among China’s larger enterprises and have closer ties to
the central and/or local governments, both of which make them a safe haven for
banks in this more difficult environment.
listed banks rose 2bp to 1.07% in H109, while net income as a share of total average
business volume (the sum of on‐balance‐sheet assets plus total reported off‐
balance‐sheet items) remained unchanged at 0.99% (see Chart 8). How RoAA held
steady amid a drop in NIM is partly explained by the slower growth of total assets
compared with loans, noted above. In addition, net income for each bank was also
boosted by varying combinations of reduced credit and operating costs, non‐
recurring items, and increased non‐interest income from acceptances, advisory and
consulting services, and fair value/other gains on securities (see Table 3).
Notwithstanding the dramatically different credit environment in H209, Fitch
expects year‐end net profitability will remain broadly in line with that reported at
mid‐year. Although NIM began rebounding in Q309 as expiring discounted bills were
shifted into regular, higher‐yielding loans, this rise in net interest revenue is being
quickly offset by declining fee and commission income growth from slower
expansion of off‐balance‐sheet items and, for some institutions, higher operating
expenses and credit costs.
In an environment in which corporate profits continue to contract, one would
expect credit impairment charges to be a major factor weighing on Chinese banks’
profitability. However, in some cases, the China Banking Regulatory Commission’s
(CBRC) new 150% loan loss reserve coverage target appears to be having the
unintended effect of lowering impairment charges for those institutions with
coverage ratios already above the 150% level. (At end‐Q309, only one of China’s
listed banks, Bank of Communications, had a reserve coverage ratio more than 10bp
below the 150% target, while four institutions had ratios above 210%.) Table 3
shows that every listed bank posted a decline in impairment charges in H109,
resulting in an average contribution to RoAA of +37bp. While improving asset quality
contributed to this lowering of credit costs (see Asset Quality section below), the
new 150% reserve coverage target has clearly provided some banks with significant
leeway on this parameter, eg, Industrial Bank, whose loan loss provisioning declined
from 16.7% of pre‐provision profit in 2008 to 1% in H109, while loan loss reserve
coverage fell only 8pp to 219%.
Looking into 2010, NIM should benefit from tightened credit policy as loan growth
slows to the low 20% range and the popularity of low‐yielding discounted bills fades.
However, RoAA is likely to remain in the neighbourhood of 1%‐1.1% in 2010 as
additional revenue is used to make up for lower operating costs and under‐
provisioning in 2009. Increases in administered interest rates are a possibility later
in the year, which would be positive for banks’ NIM as interest rate changes
typically have a faster impact on Chinese banks’ assets, while deposits take longer
Asset Quality
For more than a year, Fitch has been voicing concern about the asset quality
outlook for banks in China. But rather than worsening, the asset quality figures
reported by most Chinese banks have actually been improving in 2009. In addition
to declines in nonperforming loan (NPL) and special‐mention (SM) loan ratios from
the denominator effect of fast credit growth, 11 of China’s 12 listed banks posted a
drop in the nominal amount of SM loans, while half recorded a fall in the absolute
amount of NPLs by end‐June 2009 (see Table 4). How does this add up at a time
when the economy has faced its worst downturn in a decade and corporate profits
have been under pressure?
Fitch has emphasized all along that asset quality deterioration is a medium‐term
issue for banks in China because of the extended time it can take for loans to be
recognized as impaired due to widespread rolling‐over of delinquent credits and the
bullet‐oriented structure of most corporate lending. This is not to be overlooked, as
one could argue that many of the flaws in the global financial system might still be
hidden today if banks in the US had been more lenient in classifying delinquent
mortgages.
Another key reason for the improvement in the nominal amounts of SM loans and
NPLs in 2009 is that some new loans were used to pay off old, delinquent credits.
With Chinese corporates raising over CNY7.7trn from loans and fixed‐income
issuance from January to September 2009, many companies that were strapped for
cash in late 2008 may have been able to repay or become current on past‐due loans
in 2009. The stock of NPLs and SM loans stood at CNY352bn and CNY767bn for
China’s 12 listed banks at end‐2008. These amounts are quite small relative to the
CNY7.7trn in new corporate financing, and one can see how channelling just a small
fraction of new financing toward paying off old delinquent debts could have a
noticeable impact on the balances of NPLs and SM loans.
Reconciling Chinese banks’ elevated migration rates with relatively stable nominal
amounts of NPLs and SM loans is extremely difficult in the absence of detailed data
on loan portfolios and loan loss reserves. Nevertheless, after numerous
conversations with Chinese banks on this issue, Fitch has come to two important
conclusions:
· the migration ratios currently reported by many banks appear to be
systematically overstated owing to deficiencies in the mathematical formulas
underlying the ratios; and
· even taking into account this overstatement, it would appear that a
substantially greater amount of loans are migrating to SM and NPL status each
period than changes in the balances of NPLs or SM loans would indicate. This
means that a large number of existing NPLs and SM loans must either be moving
upward in the classification, or getting repaid or disposed of to offset this
downward movement.
With regard to the first point, the formula that the CBRC has suggested banks use
to calculate migration rates requires that all loans within the same class that were
repaid, upgraded or downgraded during the period be subtracted from the
denominator, resulting in systematic understatement of the denominator, and by
extension overstated migration rates.1 For instance, in the example above, Fitch’s
estimate of CNY500bn of combined new NPLs and SM loans was derived by
multiplying 3.7% by the total amount of listed banks’ normal loans at end‐2007, or
CNY13,625bn. However, according to the CBRC’s suggested formula, any normal
loans that were repaid or downgraded during the period should first be subtracted
from this amount. If 50% of normal loans at end‐2007 were repaid or migrated
during 2008 (this is not inconceivable, as 44% of all CNY loans outstanding at end‐
2007 had maturities of one year or less), the implied combined amount of new NPLs
1
Migration formulas typically consist of the nominal amount of loans that migrated during the
period in the numerator, divided by the beginning balance of loans in that category during the
period in the denominator (or ending balance of loans in that category during the prior period).
For example, a migration ratio for normal loans to SM or NPL status of 5% in H109 would typically
mean that 5% of normal loans on 1 January 2009 (or 31 December 2008) migrated to SM or NPL
status by 30 June 2009. However, in China the CBRC instructs banks to subtract from the
denominator all loans within the same class that are repaid or migrate upwards or downwards
during the period, which in turn results in understated denominators and inflated migration rates.
2
Interbank exposures carry a 0% risk weighting if less than 4 months in maturity and a 20% risk
weighting for anything beyond this. Corporate entities invested in by the central government
qualify for a 50% risk weighting versus 100% for other corporate loans.
10
‐5
Merchants CITIC ICBC CCB BOC BoB SZDB
Similarly, Chart 10 shows a decline in the average risk weighting for off balance
sheet items in H109 for those banks reporting data. Generally speaking, banks with
larger gaps in Chart 10 tend to have larger off‐balance‐sheet positions and higher
balances of acceptances, which are often assessed net of pledged deposits when
calculating risk‐weighted assets. Because of this recent volatility in risk weightings,
Fitch believes it is important for market participants to consider a range of metrics
when examining Chinese banks’ capitalization rather than focusing solely on Tier 1
and total CARs, as these ratios can be heavily determined by internal decisions
about how to categorize and weight different exposures.
45%
30%
15%
n.a. n.a.
0%
Merchants CITIC ICBC CCB BOC BCOM BoB BoSH SZDB
Key Themes in 2010
Few banking sectors in the world are undergoing as rapid change as China’s, and
the list of areas to keep an eye on in the year ahead could fill this page. As
discussed in the previous section, one of the foremost challenges facing Chinese
banks and regulators in 2010 will be balancing continued brisk growth amid
accelerating capital burn. In addition, there are two other areas that Fitch believes
warrant close monitoring in 2010: the proliferation of unreported loan transactions
and concurrent rise in hidden credit exposure; and rising credit and liquidity risk in
Chinese banks’ interbank and investment securities portfolios.
· A larger portion of Chinese banks’ capital may be exposed to credit losses than
on‐ and off‐balance‐sheet exposures would suggest, and therefore current
capital ratios may be even more strained than they appear.
· The growing popularity of these transactions is increasingly distorting credit
growth figures at an institutional and systemic level, contributing to pervasive
understatement of loan growth.
· Although there have been extremely few instances of asset quality problems
with loans sold and/or re‐packaged to date, permitting banks to transfer all of
the credit risk to third parties shields them from the consequences of bad credit
decisions, which over time could foster the same type of recklessness witnessed
with the securitization of subprime loans in the US.
Outright Sales of Loans
While outright sales of loans have been taking place for some time in China’s
banking sector, there are anecdotal reports that this activity increased noticeably
in H209 as the authorities pressured banks to slow loan growth and raise capital
ratios. Information on loan sales is extremely limited, and no public data
whatsoever is available on the nominal amount of these transactions. However,
there have been recent media reports citing a figure of CNY800bn in total loan sales
in 2008 compared with CNY4.9trn in new loans. This figure is impossible to verify
due to poor disclosure, but appears reasonable based on the very limited data Fitch
has seen.
Because of the growing distortions caused to credit growth figures, loan sales have
garnered an increasing amount of official attention in recent months. The China
Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) under the People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
reportedly has submitted a proposal to the State Council to set up a formal trading
platform for loan sales, which would be a very positive development and provide
much‐needed transparency to this activity.
1,250
1,000
750
500
250
0
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109 Q209 Q309 Oct‐Nov
09
banks
Minsheng
Other
CCB
BCOM
CEB
SPDB
BoB
HXB
SZDB
GDB
ICBC
ABC
BOC
CITIC
BoSH
IND
400
200
0
Merchants
Minsheng
banks
BoSH
IND
CCB
BCOM
CEB
SPDB
BoB
Other
HXB
SZDB
GDB
ICBC
ABC
CITIC
BOC
Due to the perceived high credit quality of the underlying loans and the fact that
little to no direct exposure is retained once the product is sold, Chinese banks
argue that they face minimal risk of losses from such deals. Nevertheless, in the
event borrowers were to default, Fitch believes that banks could still be
3
In some cases, banks will sell products in which the underlying loans were originated by a trust
company or other banks. Although the distributing bank has less involvement with the underlying
loans in this latter type of transaction, Fitch believes Chinese banks’ role as distributors could
still make them reputationally liable in the event of losses.
2008 H109
(%)
30
20
10
0
Merchants
Minsheng
SZDB
SPDB
BoB
CCB
HXB
BCOM
BOC
ICBC
CITIC
IND
BoSH
IND
HXB
SZDB
GDB
SPDB
BCOM
CCB
BoB
CEB
ABC
ICBC
CITIC
BOC
This is not to say that major problems are expected in the interbank or investment
securities portfolios down the road. Indeed, some of the increased credit risk is
already addressed through higher risk weightings for corporate securities holdings.
Nevertheless, Fitch believes there are some potential fault lines in these portfolios
that could become an issue in the event of a systemic disruption in interbank and
fixed‐income markets.
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