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SZABIST Model United Nations Conference 2010

SZABIST Model United Nations Conference 2010 Special Political and Decolonization Committee Study Guide

Special Political and Decolonization Committee

Study Guide

A Message from the Director,

Hello Delegates,

On behalf of the ZABMUN council I welcome you all to the third annual ZABMUN Conference 2010. I am very glad that you will be joining our talented staff and me this November for what is sure to be four days full of exciting and intense debate. The topic that we will be debating upon in the committee need the utmost attention from the youth of today as you will be leaders of tomorrow and it will depend on you to shape our society and this world.

I believe that the two topics which will be part of the committee of SPECPOL are crucial in achieving world

peace. For the betterment of the society as a whole some ideologies need to be enforced at times no matter how unpopular they might seem at that moment. The recent spur in the business of private Military Corporations poses a direct threat to the sovereignty of many nations all around the world. On the other hand the formation of a UN Military Intervention Force with the right logistical and tactical support can prevent the casualties of thousands. Both these topics are interlinked in certain manners and need urgent attention for

World Order.

Now let me tell you a bit about myself. I am an MBA student at SZABIST and I have been a part of ZABMUN since its initiation. I was a part of the Executive Body last year and was leading the organizing committee of ZABMUN. I along with my team have organized many successful events of ZABMUN which includes ZABMUN Conference 2008, Internal ZABMUN Conferences 2007 and 2008 and many other similar events. I have also represented ZABMUN in an international conference that is OXIMUN (Oxford Model UN). Apart from that I am also working as the Editor of Synergyzer which is one of the biggest marketing and media journals of Pakistan.

I strongly believe in the importance of learning from people, and their different opinions and point of views so

I have as much to learn from you as you have from me. I look forward to meeting you all this October.

Good luck Delegates!


Syed Ali Maisam Zaidi Committee Director SPECPOL

Hello everyone,

I, Abeera Jahangir, student of BBA V, welcome you all as the Assistant Committee Director for SPECPOL; a

committee where we look forward to four days of lively and heated debate.

It has been more than two years since I became associated with both SZABIST and ZABMUN. Earlier to this

I have experienced LUMUN and Internal ZABMUN as a delegate and have had many constructive and

interesting experiences.

MUNning has always been a great learning experience, and a platform for me to interact with people having a different mindset. It has broadened my thinking, and made me more aware of current global issues.

I hope that four days together, we will have a tremendous MUN experience while knowing and respecting each other, making new friends and having a great time.

Looking forward to meeting you all!


Abeera Jahangir Assistant Committee Director SPECPOL

Topic A: Private Military Corporations (PMCs)


Prior to the 1600s, most European conflicts were fought using armies composed almost entirely of private, professional soldiers. Transnational corporations such as the British East India Company boasted an army in the tens, even hundreds, of thousands as late as the 19th century. Modern private military corporations (PMCs), of which famous (or infamous) organizations such as Blackwater, DynCorp, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), and Armor Group are only a handful of examples, represent the latest incarnation of the private security or military industry.

The PMC industry has experienced explosive growth over the past ten to fifteen years, with current annual revenues believed to be near or over $100 billion. Their clients include states looking to augment their existing forces, multinational corporations (MNCs), and even non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian groups wanting to protect personnel and assets in unstable regions. PMCs now provide a wide range of military and security services, including logistics, maintenance, operation of technological assets, intelligence, reconnaissance, training, security and tactical analysis, as well as in some cases furnishing clients with actual armed personnel. PMCs have been involved in most of the low-intensity conflicts of the past fifteen years, usually in the employ of one of the state actors participating in the conflict or MNCs that have assets in the zone of conflict. In past cases, involvement by PMCs has been instrumental in restoring stability to war-torn regions, most notably in Angola in 1994 and Sierra Leone in 1995.

The involvement of PMCs in many regions that have become issues of peace and political stability raises the question of the legality of such involvement and, if legal, what the relationship between PMCs and the organizations that deal with questions of peace and stability, especially the United Nations, should be.

Private Military Corporations and Mercenaries

Modern private military corporations have been referred to as mercenary groups. The term “mercenary” conjures images of armed renegades who roam from battlefield to battlefield, offering to fight alongside (and in some cases, lead) anyone or any group willing to pay their (often exorbitant) fee, with no regard to ideology. Recent scandals involving armed (and sometimes unarmed) employees of PMCs in Iraq have led the populace to find some resemblance between the popular image of mercenaries and PMC contractors. However, while the public envisions mercenaries as lone guns-for-hire, modern PMCs are, in the words of one scholar, “corporate

bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills – including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training, and military technical assistance.”2 PMCs have grown to provide a plethora of services beyond simply providing armed and trained individuals for combat operations – in fact, many modern PMCs do not even have armed employees to furnish to clients.

There are a number of international definitions of “mercenaries”. The first Protocol Additional the Geneva Convention (1979) defines a mercenary as a person who is recruited to fight in an armed conflict for the purpose of monetary gain (and is usually paid more than soldiers of similar rank and function), and is not a citizen or a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or a resident of the area where the conflict is taking place, nor is sent to the conflict as an official member of the armed forces of a state not party to the conflict. The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, which entered force in 2001but currently only enjoys the support of thirty signatories, includes the Geneva Convention definition, and further defines a mercenary as a person recruited specifically for taking part in a violent act to overthrow a government or otherwise disrupt the order and territorial integrity of a state, motivated for the purpose of monetary gain, and not a resident or member of the armed forces of the state or sent by another state on official duty.

This widely accepted definition of mercenaries apparently includes the activities of armed PMC contractors who participate in combat, though it is worth noting that contractors usually participate in conflicts on the request of and on behalf of states party to the conflict. The definition of a mercenary was established following a spate of mercenary activity in Africa during the decolonization and independence movements of the 1960s and 1970s. It was in response to the activities of these individuals such as Irishman Michael Hoare and Frenchman Robert Denard, who fought in the Congo in the 1960s for various independence and rebel groups in many countries in Africa during this period and who popularized the image of the modern-day mercenary in the public consciousness, that the Geneva Convention definition of mercenaries was written. Only a small percentage of the services provided by PMCs can be considered to fall under the definition of mercenary activity, and they provide these services to Fortune 500 companies and states, both big and small alike. For example, during the 1999 NATO operation in Kosovo, PMCs were involved with the U.S. effort at every level, including supplying the military observers who made up the American contingent of the international verification mission, providing logistics, aerial surveillance, and information warfare services to U.S. forces, and constructing refugee camps. The PMC industry has quickly evolved beyond the simple role of providing soldiers-for-hire to being able to work alongside military forces and provide and perform virtually every function that those armed forces do.

PMCs and the services they provide can be organized into three categories: providing, consulting, and support. It must be noted that the larger PMCs generally tend to provide two or all of these categories of services, whereas smaller firms often specialize in only one type of service. Provider firms offer services that include providing clients with individuals who can engage in actual combat and/or command a client’s forces on the battlefield. Provider firms are often contracted by clients who have low or inadequate military capabilities and face immediate, serious threats to their security and stability. In such situations, provider firms may often spread their employees across a client’s force to provide experience and leadership to a maximum number of individual soldiers.

This differs from the role fulfilled by the second type of PMC, consulting firms. Consulting firms assist clients with security and tactical analysis with the situations and threats a client’s force may face. They can also provide advice to clients restructuring their forces, as well as help with training. Consulting firms can provide expertise that clients with smaller and inexperienced forces may lack or can augment the knowledge pool of even the most advanced and experienced militaries in the world. The difference between PMCs that provide and those that consult is the trigger factor – PMC consultants generally do not engage in combat.

The third type of PMC service is support, which generally includes many of the functions that the military performs for itself and for the state outside of direct combat. PMC support services range from logistics (such as providing food and shelter services to a client’s forces) to technical support, maintenance, and transportation.

PMCs who provide these kinds of services are often engaged in long-term contracts with clients, who rely on support service PMCs to provide logistical support that a client’s military is unable to provide due to technological or manpower limitations, or at a lower cost, or to free up a client’s military forces for combat-related duties. While companies that are strictly in the private military industry often provide these services, a number of multinational conglomerates, such as the U.S.-based Halliburton corporation, have expanded into this line of private military services, blurring the lines between what is and what is not a PMC.

It is clear that PMCs have evolved beyond the traditional conceptions of the mercenary profession. Unlike mercenaries who only work for one client at a time, even the smallest PMCs generally work with several clients at a time in various regions of the world. Many of a PMC’s employees are not permanent (especially those who work directly with clients), but instead draw on databases of professionals based on the specific skills a particular contractor possesses to meet the needs of the client. Most modern PMCs are legitimate national and multinational corporations who remain answerable to owners, investors, and stockholders. As

legitimate businesses, they are subject to the industry laws of the countries in which they are based or operate; they sign legally enforceable contracts with their clients, which provides a measure of control and accountability to those clients should PMCs act in a manner unsanctioned by their clients or8 default on their contractual obligations. Nevertheless, with the lack of international regulatory mechanisms, PMCs continue to operate in a legally murky area, with many loopholes in the national laws intended to regulate PMCs and protect clients, and little or no impartial oversight over the clients themselves.

The Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-Determination detailed in its latest annual report to the Human Rights Council its concerns about the activities of PMCs, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, citing allegations of human rights violations by employees of PMCs whilst providing contracted services for states and MNCs; more importantly, the Working Group expressed reservations about the continued outsourcing of military and quasi-military functions by states to PMCs and ramifications it could have for international peace and political stability.

A History of Private Military Corporations

The origins of the rise of the private military industry can be traced to the end of the Cold War, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union ended the ideological struggle between it and its superpower counterpart, the United States. As a result, the economic, political, and military aid both nations had been providing to their client states in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa virtually disappeared overnight. The involvement of the United States and/or the Soviet Union was often the primary force keeping many Third-World nations from disintegrating into wide-scale violence. The rapid withdrawal of the superpowers unleashed a wave of instability and violent, low-intensity conflicts across the globe.

Simultaneously, the U.S. and Russia, along with most of the other Western powers, significantly downsized their armed forces, either due to a lack of available funding, as in the case of the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact nations, or public demand for fiscal responsibility, as was the case in the NATO powers. As a result, large numbers of individuals highly trained in a number of military roles, including combat, strategy and tactics, force organization, training, logistics, military technology, and non-violent forms of warfare, entered civilian life and the private sector. Some of these former soldiers and technical experts found it difficult to adjust to civilian life; others, seeing the breakdown of order and escalation of violence in the Third World, saw an opportunity to continue practicing their trade on behalf of many Third World governments whose militaries and police forces were inadequate to combat the various criminal and insurgent

groups who took advantage of the wide-scale availability of small arms and light weapons caused by decades of military aid from the superpowers and more recently the collapse of the Soviet military and its fire sale of its weapons stockpiles. These former soldiers formed the first modern private military corporations, which included the now-defunct Executive Outcomes and Sandline International.

The American involvement in the second United Nations mission in Somalia that ended prematurely with the death of 18 US soldiers in the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrated a reticence among the major powers to commit to the peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that became necessary to stem the tide of violence occurring in many unstable nations in the Third World such as Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. The governments of these nations lacked the military power to control the insurgent militia causing havoc in their borders. With UN intervention unable to effectively restore order in war-torn countries and the major powers unwilling to incur the domestic political costs of casualties, PMCs stepped in to provide their services to governments under siege. PMCs provided logistical support to Third World armies, trained troops, advised on tactics and strategy, and in many instances conducted combat operations either solely using its own employees, or in conjunction with or leadership of the state client’s own armed forces.

The first major involvement by a PMC in the low-intensity conflicts of the 1990s came in 1993 when South African-based Executive Outcomes (EO) was contracted by the Angolan government to provide military support in its struggle to subdue the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and bring it to the negotiating table. Executive Outcomes was established in 1989 and staffed almost entirely by veterans of the South African Defense Force, the military and internal security force of the apartheid-era government. In Angola, EO provided badly needed weapons to the Angolan army (coincidence with the lifting of the arms embargo on the country) and trained its troops. Over the next three years, the revamped Angolan military delivered a series of defeats to UNITA, forcing them to resume negotiations with the Angolan government.

In 1995, EO signed another major contract with the Sierra Leonean government, facing a situation similar to that in Angola with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In Sierra Leone, EO contractors entered combat, both with small units consisting entirely of EO personnel as well as in larger formations alongside local civilian militias. Utilizing close air support provided by helicopter gunships owned and operated by EO, a few hundred contractors were able to liberate territory held by the RUF which contained natural resources vital to the Leonean economy and at least temporarily put a halt to the internal violence while more long-term efforts at peace were undertaken.

With the relative success of its contracts in Angola and Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes, notoriety

grew. In response to concerns about the activities of EO, as well as the pasts of many of its contractors, the South African government passed the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, which outlawed for South African nationals the direct participation in conflicts to which South Africa was not a party and required government approval of contracts for foreign military assistance. The law prevented Executive Outcomes from operating with the same visibility as before, so the company officially dissolved in 1999, though it is believed that its leadership simply continued their activities in different countries under different company names.

As PMCs in South Africa and other countries such as the United Kingdom and France grabbed headlines and international attention with their involvement in low-intensity conflicts, the industry was developing in the United States. And while some Western powers took steps to forbid or limit the ability of their citizens to operate or work for PMCs, the U.S. government embraced the industry as a force multiplier for the American military. Whereas the United States employed about one PMC contractor for every fifty active-duty personnel deployed to the Middle East for Operation Desert Storm in 1991, in 1999 during the U.S. involvement in Kosovo the ratio had increased to about 1 to 10.

The private military industry experienced its largest burst in growth – and visibility – after 9/11 as the U.S. military undertook its Global War on Terror. Finding itself unable to fight a war and undertake subsequent nation-building in two separate countries with the current manpower of the military, the U.S. turned to PMCs to perform many of the support tasks needed by the military to free up its soldiers for actual combat duty. By now many of the first PMCs formed after the end of the Cold War, such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, had closed up shop and moved on. Now, a new breed of PMCs had taken their place – Blackwater Worldwide (formerly Blackwater USA), DynCorp, Armor Group, Aegis Defence Services, to name a few. And unlike their predecessors who deployed no more than a few hundred contractors into any conflict zone, tens of thousands of PMC employees flooded into Afghanistan and later Iraq. Although the U.S. government professed not using PMC contractors for core combat tasks, the evolution of the War on Terror from traditional formats of combat to insurgent warfare means that contractors are often thrust into combat.

The PMC industry reached new levels of notoriety via its involvement in the U.S. occupation of Iraq. In 2004, four Blackwater contractors were ambushed and killed, and their bodies later mutilated before a cheering crowd, in Fallujah, Iraq, leading to the subsequent Battle of Fallujah later that year. The deaths of those contractors, along with the deaths of dozens more, raised questions among the American public as well as the international community as to how civilian contractors can become involved in combat, or whether they even should. However, a series of scandals involving PMC contractors in Iraq, including the indictment of two PMC translators in

the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the shooting of seventeen Iraqi civilians by Blackwater personnel, and the shooting of a bodyguard to the Iraqi Vice President, also by a Blackwater contractor, increased the visibility of the private military industry and associated it in the minds of the public with the highly unpopular Iraq War. The heavy involvement by PMCs in Iraq and the lack of restraint or U.S. oversight in their activity perceived by some has seriously damaged the credibility of the industry and raised questions about how it operates and will operate in the future that must be answered.

PMCs in Humanitarian/Peacekeeping Missions or Low-Intensity Conflicts

Recent scandals notwithstanding, some scholars have advocated the use of PMCs by the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations to either supplement or replace traditional peacekeepers, who are professional soldiers lent to the organization by its member states. Proponents of PMCs entering into peacekeeping roles argue that PMCs can undertake peacekeeping and humanitarian missions at a much lower cost than traditional peacekeeping forces, can provide more highly trained former soldiers of the Western powers as peacekeepers (nations in the South with smaller, less advanced militaries currently beat the larger portion of the burden of UN peacekeeping), and remove the burden on states to provide peacekeeping troops and then potentially have to explain to their citizens casualties in what is essentially for many nations who participate in peacekeeping missions a foreign war and ensure that there are always peacekeepers for every mandate.

Cost-effectiveness is often given as one of the prime arguments in favor of using PMC contractors as peacekeepers. Scholars point to two examples where PMCs and subsequently UN peacekeepers operated as proof of the cost-effectiveness of PMCs. In Angola, the government contracted with Executive Outcomes to provide 500 employees over a three-year period to help stabilize the country and bring UNITA rebels to the negotiating table; the cost to Angola was approximately $40- 60 million a year (which reportedly covered all costs associated with bringing in 500 personnel as well purchased weapons for the Angolan army), and EO suffered about 20 casualties.18 In Sierra Leone, EO was brought in for 22 months at a cost to the government of $35 million; EO never had any more than about 250 min in the country at any time. The UN missions as well as the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that followed EO’s involvement in both countries ran both organizations over $1 million per day for each mission.

However, the EO contracts in both Angola and Sierra Leone represented significant fractions (up to a third) of each country’s military budget. In addition, there were allegations that EO was also guaranteed rights to some of both countries’ natural resources in addition to the monetary

payments, and that foreign firms invested in both countries’ natural resource markets were involved in bringing EO into the fight; as a result some believe that EO took home far more income than was initially reported on paper. Also worth nothing is the small number of contractors EO brought into both countries. Peacekeeping missions tend to employ thousands of troops, whereas EO was able to keep its numbers down by working alongside the Angolan army, and in Sierra Leone alongside local militias when the arm initially proved unreliable; in Sierra Leone this had the unfortunate effect of strengthening the militias and fostering a conflict between the army and the militias and is blamed for delaying the peace process.

PMCs today are more accustomed to deploying thousands of employees; at the current rate of $1,000 a day for some contractors, bringing in only a couple thousand contractors could easily exceed the cost of a much larger traditional peacekeeping force. To keep the number of contractors down would require their working in collaboration with another force – working with traditional peacekeepers would add to the cost of a mission, while working with local armed forces essentially equates to picking a side in a conflict. While peacekeeping missions have in the past worked with local armed forces, peacekeepers are by their very nature an independent, impartial actors whose mission to halt a conflict with the minimum amount of force.22 Such a mission would be uncharacteristic for a PMC.

Over at least the past fifteen years the nations of the South have borne a disproportionate share of the international peacekeeping mission proportional to military strength. The nations that are considered to have the best-trained, best-equipped, and most advanced armies provide comparatively little to peacekeeping efforts. Some of this can be attributed to the NATO powers’ occupation with fighting terrorism, but the fact remains that the major powers are hesitant to commit troops and potentially incur casualties in conflicts that they do not deem vital to their security and interests. PMCs could provide peacekeeping forces with trained former soldiers. PMC contractors do not permanently work for a particular PMC, rather firms maintain databases of former military personnel, which allow PMCs to contract personnel with the skill sets necessary to complete the job. However, using PMCs as peacekeepers runs counter to the current trend of utilizing “local solutions to local problems” – the UN has recently tried to engage regional security organizations in organizing peacekeeping missions for their region. But relying on local solutions to solve local problems risks widening the conflict and erodes universal standards. Having consistent, high standards for peacekeepers can improve the chances of the peacekeeping mission being effective.

Using PMCs as opposed to traditional peacekeepers eliminates an important source of support and opportunity for experience for the smaller militaries that participate in peacekeeping. Many smaller nations may be threatened by the presence of highly trained armed foreign nationals within

their borders, which explains the move towards regional peacekeepers. Furthermore, current issues involving PMCs revolve around the past histories of some of the contractors they employ. Executive Outcomes contractors almost exclusively came from the South African Defense Force (SADF) which was used within South Africa to suppress opposition to apartheid; former SADF soldiers continue to make up a significant portion of PMC contractors. Blackwater Worldwide has been accused of employing in Iraq former members of the special police of the Pinochet regime in Chile. Utilizing PMCs requires ensuring that individuals with unacceptable backgrounds are not contracted to represent one’s organization.

The Future of Private Military Corporations: Inclusion, Acceptance, or Exclusion?

In 1997, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan dismissed suggestions that the UN would ever work with “respectable” PMCs, stating there was no “distinction between respectable mercenaries and non-respectable mercenaries.” However, the rapid growth of the industry over the past decade combined with its acceptance and utilization by a number of the world’s governments means that the industry is unlikely to fade away any time soon. More likely PMCs will continue to be involved in many of the world’s low-intensity conflicts. As the UN and PMCs continue to cross paths, it is perhaps time for the UN to reexamine its stance towards the industry. At the same time, the UN could study the lessons provided by the private military industry and its actions, both successes and failures in low-intensity conflicts, and how they could be applied to improve the effectiveness of UN and other intergovernmental organizations’ peacekeeping and humanitarian missions to those very same low-intensity conflicts.

The current international framework regarding mercenaries and their activities is inadequate to cover PMCs. Relying on individual states to identify PMCs as mercenary organizations and then take approximate action is a hit-or-miss strategy – a number of states have proven receptive, to varying degrees, of the industry. Furthermore, the private military industry has evolved to offer far more services than guns-for-hire, the traditionally sole trade of mercenaries. In addition, PMCs have almost entirely – so far – participated in low-intensity conflicts on behalf of a state party to the conflict, and so raises the issue of whether a state has the sovereign right to hire whomever it wants to work for or alongside its armed forces. The time is right for the creation of a framework governing the private military industry. Such a regulatory framework should address a number of issues regarding the industry: the involvement of PMCs in low-intensity conflicts, the selection of contractors hired to work for PMCs, the nature of the clients of PMCs, the ability of clients to control PMCs in their employ, the legal recourses available to both clients and individual employee-contractors against PMCs, the entities who should shoulder the burden of direct supervision of PMCs, and the possible creation of international, independent oversight of the industry. Moreover, it is important to the effectiveness of any international frameworks governing

the private military industry that states key to the industry – those contract PMCs as well as those that are home to significant numbers of firms – are consulted in the creation of a framework and accede to it.

Depending on their level of success, PMCs involved in low-intensity conflicts are either a stabilizing or a destabilizing force in the conflict area. When international peacekeepers are deployed to an area where PMCs operate or have recently operated, in the case of PMCs being a stabilizing force it is necessary for the UN to figure out how to fulfill its mandate without jeopardizing the stability a PMC provides; in the case of the presence of a PMC being a destabilizing force, peacekeeping forces need to work out how to neutralize the negative effects of the PMC and remove it from the area of conflict with as little disturbance as possible. Either way, when peacekeepers arrive in an area of conflict it is difficult to ignore the presence of PMCs already operating in the area. Whether the international organization decides to work with PMCs or remove them from the conflict, they should be engaged to ensure a smooth transition from the activities of the PMC to the authority of the international organization and its peacekeeping mission. PMCs can maintain the enforcement of a peaceful status quo while the UN deploys its peacekeeping mission and begins the implementation of peace building and post-conflict programs.

According to one scholar, recent empirical studies conclude that outright victories rather than negotiated peace deals have settled the majority of the twentieth century’s civil wars and internal conflicts. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report, noted that UN and other intergovernmental organizations’ peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are deployed to conflicts that due either to military stalemate or international pressure have temporarily halted, although one or more of the parties involved are less than interested in resolving the conflict peacefully. Peacekeeping operations are commonly criticized for their lack of forceful coercion of both parties to come to the negotiating table and make serious efforts at a mediated settlement. Although peacekeepers are sent to a conflict to halt it, in order to effectively enforce peace and stability in a war-torn region, suggested former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William Crowe, planning a peacekeeping operation requires planners taking the same approach as if they were planning for war – essentially, peacekeepers must be prepared to fight a war if they are to have the means necessary to stop one.29 Peacekeepers need to be better trained and better armed, as PMC contractors in Angola and Sierra Leone have been (including effective ground and air equipment), and perhaps more so than countries who regularly participate in peacekeeping missions are capable of. Prepared and well- equipped peacekeepers are less prone to being forced from the conflict by military defeat.

PMCs cannot entirely replace traditional peacekeepers. To employ enough contractors to effectively


do the same job is cost-prohibitive, and it is likely that costs will only continue to rise.

there are ways that the private military industry can be integrated into international peacekeeping operations. Among the suggestions listed by the Brahimi report, PMCs could be used to train troops intended for deployment to peacekeeping missions and raise the standard of peacekeeping troops, analyze and develop tactics and security strategies, and provide much- needed support to peacekeepers in the field. Naturally, the level of training or equipment employed by a peacekeeping force has little effect if their mandate renders the mission ineffective – a peacekeeping mission is only as good as its mandate. While PMC contractors may be better at coercing the parties in a conflict to peace, the limitations imposed by a UN mandate may hamper its effectiveness.30 Improving peacekeeping efforts begins with examining and improving how peacekeepers establish and maintain peace in an area of conflict.

Peacekeeping is only part of the solution to resolving low-intensity conflicts. Peacekeepers or PMCs resolve conflicts and restore peace in the short-term; it is up to peace negotiators and post-conflict programs to defuse tensions among the parties in a conflict and establish a long-term peaceful status quo.

Topic B: Developing a Permanent United Nations Military Intervention Force

Introduction and Overview

Some of the challenging situations for the UN would be:

Should UN establish its own intervention force for peacekeeping operations?

How will such a force be organized?

This question lies at the centre of debates between state sovereignty and the UN’s “responsibility to protect” as well as the role of humanitarian intervention.

It can only be answered when the practices and limitations of current UN peacekeeping, peace enforcement andpeace-building operations are understood. On the other hand the question addresses how the international community can respond to mass extermination, which is arguably the worst crime of humanity.

Should the UN agree on having an intervention force, helping avoid future wars and saving many lives?

The UN peacekeeping operation is an instrument developed by the Organization to help countries torn by conflicts, to help initiate long lasting peace. It initiates from the Chapter VI of the UN charter, which emphasizes negotiation and Mediation, and Chapter VII, allows forceful action by the UN to help retain peace. The Charter gives the UN Security Council the power and the responsibility to take multilateral action to protect international peace and security. Therefore the UN peacekeeping operations are initiated and authorized by the United Nations Security Council.

The UN does not have its own intervention force. So for every UNpeacekeeping operations the UN department UNPKO has to ask its member states such as NATO to donate troops for peacekeeping tasks. The troops then operate under the UN command but remain members of their respective armed forces. The other option UN has is to mandate peacekeeping tasks to regional organizations or coalitions of willing countries whose troops operate under their own respective force’s command but the operation is legalized by a UN mandate.Mostly European countries that believe the UN command is very bureaucratic and ineffective prefer this alternative arrangement of an intervention force. The countries that had donated most troops to

UNPKO’s by 2007 were Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. About 63 troops have been placed around the world to date. As of December 2008, 91,000 peacekeepers were deployed in 16 missions around the world. The United Nations peacekeeping operations are planned prepared and managed by the department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Not all the peace keeping operations carried out by United Nations has been successful. Rwanda genocide, 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre, 1995, to name few of the failures of the international community. UN, NATO and African Union have all been involved in working for the humanitarian cause within their own territories. The most problematic era was of the intervention. However, even in the face of severe humanitarian crisis, United Nation had responded too leisurely to the genocide and Rwanda cause. Few of the reasons highlighted for their behavior was the laziness of the member countries when contributing towards the troop fund and donating military services. To quote, at the time of genocide in Rwanda, they turn down their promise of providing 31000 peacekeeping troops to save the massacre.

After achieving some success in creating the political will to actively stop mass extermination, supporters of humanitarian intervention believe the essential need to provide more effective methods of intervention than the current United Nations peacekeeping operation system.

Without an effective mechanism to intervene when mass extermination occurs, the UN resolution will have little effect and by the time the UNPKO is set, there would have already been great losses. This is where the idea of setting up a standing military invention force under the UN command is required. This standing force will be able to deploy immediately and rapidly to make prompt actions on any emerging crisis.

The possibility of a UN intervention force has been in discussion since 1948, during its early days. The UN charter itself includes provisions for such a force in article 45. Many proposals for the logistics of a UN intervention force have been put forward, suggestions for having an army of 6,000 to 500,000 personnel. None of the suggestions have been implemented by any member states of the UN. The main advantage of the UN intervention force would increase the UN’s response time to possibly only 48 hours and remove the unplanned way of leading peacekeeping operations.

The History of UN Peacekeeping

Military intrusion inherently challenges the core principal of national autonomy. Hence in 1956 the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold defined three key principles for UNPKOs to guarantee the protection of national sovereignty and to limit the use of force to self-defense:


The consent of all conflicting parties to the activities of the mission is required prior to


deployment; The impartially of the peacekeepers in their association with the conflicting parties must


be ensured; The use of force is only to be used as a last resort and only in self-defense.

But these principles and the character of UNPKOs have changed drastically overtime. Before the 1990s these three principals were adhered to. Traditional peacekeeping tried to build confidence and facilitate political dialogue for the conflicting parties to resolve the conflict, rather than the peacekeepers attempting to do so themselves. Supervising elections, building democratic institutions, training police and protecting human rights were few other responsibilities that were incorporated. During the 1990s the number of UNPKOs increased dramatically and additional tasks were taken onboard, such as securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protecting civilians from imminent physical threats and ongoing violence. In a hostile environment, it became more difficult to hold fast to these core principles and avoid military force. The assassination of American soldiers during a peacekeeping mission in Somalia in 1993 and the failure of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians against ethnic cleansing in Rwanda and in Bosnia encouraged a reassessment of UNPKOs.

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in 2000, invited a panel to examine all aspects of UNPKOs and to give suggestions for further missions. The so-called Brahimi report gives four key recommendations:

1) Peacekeepers should be explicitly mandated to defend themselves, defend their missions and defend civilians under imminent threat of attack


3) There should be a better consultation between the UNSC and troop-contributing countries 4) A multidimensional approach in peace building should become an integral part of UNPKOs, including disarmament, reintegration of former combatants and protecting Human Rights.

The UN should not mandate a mission before it has resources available to fulfill it

As a result of the report, UNPKO principles were reinterpreted and missions took a different character: Since 2000, peace enforcement became more prominent as an element of UNPKOs. Peace enforcement intends to coerce the conflicting parties to comply with a previously negotiated agreement by using military force under the authorization of the UNSC. The original three principles are interpreted in a way that groups who try to undermine peace by

using violence can be penalized in order to protect the success of the mission. In UNPKOs along with a robust military force there comes a strong civilian component that carries out civil administration, and humanitarian tasks. This allows for successful peace building once a cease- fire has been established.

Possible elements of UNPKOs

Conflict prevention consists of structural or diplomatic efforts utilised before the escalation of a conflict. Good intelligence measures and awareness of early warning signs are crucial for conflict prevention.

Peacemaking addresses a conflict already in progress and attempts to bring hostile parties to negotiations. Peacemaking can include UN Secretary-General Envoys and other means of negotiation and meditation.

Peace enforcement is an action (usually military) authorised by the UNSC to restore “international peace and security”. The UNSC can mandate regional organisations to conduct the operation on its behalf.

Peacekeeping is designed to preserve peace after a ceasefire and to oversee the implementation process of a ceasefire or a peace agreement.

Peacebuilding is a long-term and complex process designed to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict. Any peace building activity should address the roots of a conflict.

It is worthy to note that some states, particularly China, have been strong defenders of the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. However, reforms in the way in which UN peacekeeping missions are conducted after the Brahimi Report have made China much more positive towards such efforts and it has voted in favor to a clear majority of them since 2000.

Possible Elements of UNPKOs

Conflict prevention consists of structural or diplomatic efforts utilized before the escalation of a conflict. Good intelligence measures and awareness of early warning signs are crucial for conflict prevention. Peacemaking addresses a conflict already in progress and attempts to bring hostile parties to negotiations. Peacemaking contains UN Secretary-General Envoys and other means of negotiation and meditation. Peace enforcement is an action (usually military) authorized by the UNSC to restore “international peace and security”. The UNSC can mandate regional organizations to conduct the operation on its behalf. Peacekeeping is planned to safeguard peace

after a ceasefire and to oversee the implementation process of a ceasefire or a peace agreement.

Peace building is a long-term and complex process designed to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict. Any peace building activity should address the roots of a conflict.

It should be noted that some states, mainly China, have been strong defenders of the principle of non-intervention in the dealings of superior states. However, reforms in the way in which UN peacekeeping missions are conducted after the Brahimi Report have made China much

more affirmative towards such efforts and it has voted in favor to a clear majority of them since


The Possibility of a UN Intervention Force: Political and Legal Considerations

UNPKO’S have had unsuitable and slow responses to enhance UN rapid use which include frequent delays, vast human suffering, opportunities lost, diminished credibility, rising costs etc.

Up till now there hasn’t been a consensus on intervening in the domestic affairs of other states despite nations being in favor of stopping genocide and interfering for humanitarian efforts. International authorities have been vague about how they will act upon this matter. UN Charter only allows the right to take military steps in cases of self defense. The UN can only act if international peace is threatened but it has been hesitant to implement this right and many countries oppose intervention.

UN intervention can be facilitated legally by activating UN Charter Article 43 or by establishing a reaction force outside the current legal system. Article 43 mentions that all members of the UN have to make armed forces available to the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Troops are supposed to be at the disposal of the UNSC and the UNPKOs could be organized rapidly as a result. Chapter VII would authorize the use of force by UNSC. This article wasn’t used for UNPKO’s because of the Cold War and various other reasons.

UN Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS) can also fulfill Article 43 in theory but is ineffective to improve UNPKO’s practically. UNSAS was established in 1993 and stated that all UN member states had to voluntarily reserve proportions of their military resources for some time. Although troops would remain in their own countries they would be trained in accordance to UN guidelines until a situation arises where they are supposed to go for a peacekeeping mission. UNSAS’s shortcoming is that all members aren’t required to contribute; it is to be done voluntarily. States can also opt out whenever they want which makes peace keeping resources unreliable through this system.

The UNSAS has been modified in several proposals such as The Canadian Proposal 1995 and The Danish Proposal 1995. The latter has led to the formation of Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which was first declared available in 2000. SHIRBRIG can deploy 5000 soldiers within a maximum of 30 days of UNSC authorization and for a maximum of 6 months. These forces have been deployed in Sudan so far.

These suggestions emphasize on the fact that a UN intervention force is more realistic if maintained by the members voluntarily rather than where the UN recruits, trains and positions its own forces.

The Possibility of a UN Intervention Force: Logistical Considerations

With the committee's main focus on the political issue, I would also like you all to take into consideration the matter of the development of the UN intervention force. Logistic point of view would be highly appreciated. The committee should be able to negotiate and come up with a means to facilitate cease-fire and humanitarian relief operation. The past dialogues had shown fierce discussions on this issue and had concluded that the right level of intervention will require a blend of the following factors:

Size and composition: small forces are more mobile but have limited effect.

Capability: highly trained infantry units are probably required, but these need to be supported by armored vehicles, anti-air and anti- tank missile launchers, battle tanks and helicopters, the capacity for purifying and storing water, etc.

Command arrangements: depending on the mandate, strategic command may remain at the UN, while tactical command lies with the donating state/coalition.

Equipment logistics: shipping heavy equipment will take 30 days at best.

Recruitment: depending on whether the decision is for a force which resembles an independent UN army or one made up of many contributing countries, the recruitment can either be managed by the force itself or by delegating it to the contributing countries.

Training: this might have to be higher than the level some states donating to current

UNPKOs are able to provide.

Cost: how is funding provided?

Points to be Addressed in the Resolution

The fundamental question this Committee has to address is whether UNPKOs can be improved by establishing a permanent UN military intervention force, and if so, how this force can be realized politically and legally. Possible ways include, but are not limited to

Start using Article 43 for UNPKOs

Reform UNSAS

Establish voluntary rapid intervention capabilities

Establish a UN owned intervention force

Each of these options has its limitations, costs and risks. States will support different options, or none of them, according to the extent to which their governments prioritize humanitarian interventions over state sovereignty.

Considering all hurdles that need to be taken for a UN intervention force to come into operation, debate in this Committee might remain mere academic exercise. For the victims of the next genocide to come, the question of UN intervention will be anything but academic.


This guide is heavily based on the following articles:

Codner, Michael (2008): Permanent United Nations Military Intervention Capability, RUSI, 153: 3, pp 85-67

Diehl, Paul F. (2005):

Stopped. Can They Find the Mechanism to Do it?, Global Policy Forum



Once Again: Nations agree Genocide Must Be

Langille, H. Peter (2000): Conflict prevention: Options for rapid deployment and UN standing forces, International Peacekeeping, 7:1, pp.


McCarthy, Patrick A. (2000): Building a Reliable Rapid-Reaction Capability for the United Nations, International Peacekeeping, 7:2, pp. 139-154

Stähle, Stefan (2008): China’s Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, The China Quarterly, 195, pp 631-655