Discrete Coverings

May 24, 2010

Let N be a finite set with |N | = n < ∞. A nonempty collection C of nonempty

subsets of N such that ∪S∈C S = N is called a covering (of N ). Let C N be the set of
coverings of N .
A real valued function v on C is called a value function if v(C) ∀ C ∈ C with ∀ S ∈
C |S| = 1.
A vector valued function Y v is called an allocation rule for v, if ∀ C ∈ C i∈N Yiv (C)
P
= v(C).
A covering C is efficient (relative to v) if v(C) = M axC 0 ∈C v(C 0 ).
A covering C Pareto dominates (relative to v, Y v ) C 0 if ∀ i ∈ N Yiv (C) ≥ Yiv (C 0 ) and
∃ j ∈ N such that Yiv (C) > Yiv (C 0 )
A covering C is Pareto efficient (relative to v, Y v ) if there is no other covering that
Pareto dominates C

Remark 1 Pareto domination defines a transitive and asymmetric binary relation on C.

Proof Let ∀ C,C 0 ∈ C C  C 0 if and only if C Pareto dominates C 0 . Asymmetry of 

is clear by definition. Suppose C  C 0  C 00 for coverings C, C 0 , C 00 . This implies that ∀
i ∈ N Yiv (C) ≥ Yiv (C 0 ) ≥ Yiv (C 00 ) and ∃ j ∈ N such that Yjv (C) > Yjv (C 0 ) ≥ Yjv (C 00 ) ⇒
C Pareto Dominates C 00 as required. 

Remark 2 ∀ {N, v, Y v }, there exist an efficient and Pareto efficient covering C ∈ C.

Proof Since N is finite, so is C, which clearly implies there exists a maximum element
of {v(C)}C∈C . Note that a Pareto efficient covering is a maximal element for . Pick an
arbitrary covering, say C1 ∈ C. If C1 is Pareto efficient, we are done. If it is not there is a
covering C2 1 that Pareto dominates C1 . If C2 is Pareto efficient, we are done. If not, there
is a covering C3 that Pareto dominates C2 and so C1 , by transitivity. Asymmetry implies
that C3 is not in {C1 , C2 }. Continuing in this fashion one will have a finite sequence of
coverings. By construction, this sequence is finite since C is finite, and any cycle will
contradict with asymmetry and transitivity. The last element of this sequence is not
Pareto dominated by any covering. 

Proof of Remark 2 could be much shorter with the help of the following observation:

Remark 3 Any efficient covering is Pareto efficient.

1
There might be many, just pick an arbitrary one.

1
Proof By definition of an allocation rule, if a covering C 0 Pareto dominates C, then
v(C 0 ) > v(C). Result follows by contrapositive. 

Definition 1 A covering C 0 is reachable from C via T ∈ 2N − {∅} if

1. ∀ S ∈ C S ⊂ N − T ⇒ S ∈ C 0 .

2. ∀ S 0 ∈ C 0 [ S 0 ∩ T 6= ∅ and S 0 ∩ N − T 6= ∅ ] ⇒ [ ∃ S ∈ C such that S 0 ⊂ S and

{S − S 0 } ⊂ T ].

Remark 4 Any two coverings are reachable from each other via N .

Proof Since N − N = ∅, both conditions in the definition of reachability hold trivially

and irrespective of the coverings in consideration.

Definition 2 A covering C is k-stable if there is no other covering C 0 that is reachable

from C via a set T with kardinality weakly smaller than k, and C 0 Pareto dominates C.
A covering is called core-stable if it is n-stable.

Remark 5 Any core-stable covering is Pareto efficient and k-stable for k ≤ n.

Proof If a covering C is core-stable, then it is not Pareto dominated by any covering

that is reachable from C via N . But by Remark 4, this means that no other covering
Pareto dominates C. If a covering is not k-stable for some k, then there is a destabilizing
set T with cardinality k, but the same set also prevents the covering from being core-
stable. 

For any N with cardinality n < ∞, the number of nonempty subsets of N is 2n − 1.

n
Then the number of coverings of N is 22 −1 − 1. Thus, checking each covering seperately
to see if they satisfy a particular property will consume unreasonably high amounts of
time. So for constructing an example of value function and allocation rule, one needs to
classify coverings into small number of homogeneous categories or find a formula which
takes a property of elements of coverings (like cardinality) to a real number.
Now consider the following example:

Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. We will define v and Y v simultaneously.

If the covering C is only N itself, then v(C) = 8, and this is allocated every element
equally. Note that C1 = {N, {3, 4}} is reachable from C via {3, 4}. Let v(C1 ) = 6, and
Y1v (C1 ) = Y2v (C1 ) = 0.5 and Y3v (C1 ) = Y4v (C1 ) = 2.5.
Note that C2 is reachable from C1 via {1, 2}, where C2 = {N, {1, 2}, {3, 4}}. Let v(C2 )
= 6 and it is allocated equally.
Let all other coverings’ values be zero.
In this example, the only 2-stable covering is C2 , and efficient one is C. The set of
Pareto efficient coverings are C1 and C.
Note that there is no core-stable covering for v and Y v we have, as C is reachable from
C2 via N and Pareto dominates it, but it is not 2-stable, so is not core-stable. However,
if we change v(C) to 11 without changing anything else, C will become core-stable. But
then C would be the only Pareto efficient covering.

2
 If we change allocation rule to Y v ’ as follows, keep everything else same, we will get
C2 being core-stable but, all C, C1 , C2 being Pareto efficient, where Y v ’ is same as Y v
except Y1v ’(C2 ) = 4, Y2v ’(C2 ) = 1, and Y3v ’(C2 ) = 0.5 = Y4v ’(C2 ). In this case, 1 will
not participate any destabilizing movement from C2 . Thus the biggest coalition that can
destabilize C2 is {2, 3, 4}, but all coverings that can be reachable from C2 via this set has
value zero. Thus no coalition has an incentive to deviate from covering C2 . In this case,
C is the only efficient covering.