Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press and Harvard Divinity School are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to The Harvard Theological Review.
http://www.jstor.org
HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW 6I (1968), 249-261
I
Tillich writes that he had the nineteenth century for his teacher
during his university years from 1904 to 1907.1 "The spirit of the
nineteenth century still prevailed, and we hoped that the great
synthesis between Christianity and humanism could be achieved
'PAUL TILLICH,Ultimate Concern (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 37.
250 HARVARDTHEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
with the tools of German classical philosophy."2 Although he
could not unlearnall he had imbibedduringthese formativeyears,
Tillich saw that the World War had brought an end to this entire
intellectual world.3 "I find more 'theonomous philosophy' in
Schelling than in any of the other idealists. But to be sure, not
even Schelling was able to bring about a unity of theology and
philosophy. The World War in my own experiencewas the catas-
trophe of idealistic thinking in general. Even Schelling'sphiloso-
phy was drawn into this catastrophe."4 Still, Schelling's second
period had been "a prelude to the things to come," 5 "the philoso-
phically decisive break with Hegel and the beginning of that
movement which today is called existentialism."" Although
works by others on his own thought made Tillich more conscious
of the importance of Schelling for him, the decisive confirmation
of Tillich's opinionon Schellinghad come to him as he encountered
the "Philosophy of Life" and the philosophy and art of existen-
tialism.7 If Schelling could only be correctly understood in light
of the currentswhich with Kierkegaardand Husserl would spark
the various forms of existentialism, still he was different from ex-
istentialism. Tillich's early writings, his dissertations for the doc-
torate in philosophy and the licentiate in theology (both on Schel-
ling),8 an interesting program for a Religionsphilosophie9 were
original yet distinctively related to Schelling. All were written
before Tillich's decisive years at Marburg. To study Schelling's
influence on Tillich (a fortiori, other influences of the nineteenth
2
TILLICH, Autobiographical Reflections, The Theology of Paul Tillich, C. W.
Kegley, R. W. Brettal, eds. (New York: Macmillan, 1952), I1.
'TILLICH, The Interpretation of History (New York: Scribner's, 1936), 60.
4 Ibid., 35.
5 Autobiographical Reflections, art. cit., ii.
SIbid., 14.
7 TILLICH, Vorwort, Friihe Hauptwerke, Gesammelte Werke (Stuttgart: Evange-
lisches Verlagswerk, 1959), I, 9; see Existential Philosophy: Its Historical Meaning,
Theology of Culture (New York: Galaxy, 1964), 77-79.
'
TILLICH'S thesis for the doctorate in philosophy was: Die religionsgeschicht-
liche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie, ihre Voraussetzungen und
Prinzipien (Breslau: Fleischmann, 1910); for the licentiate in theology: Mystik
und Schuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung (Giitersloh:
Bertelsmann, i912); the licentiate thesis is reprinted in Friihe Hauptwerke, ed. cit.,
II-io8.
9TILLICH, Religionsphilosophie, Lehrbuch der Philosophie, M. Dessoir, ed.
(Berlin: Ullstein, 1925), II, 765-835, reprinted in Friihe Hauptwerke, ed. cit.,
295-366.
TILLICHAND HEIDEGGER 251
century) in these works is quite a different matter from under-
standing the influence of the Germanphilosopheron Tillich's ma-
ture works. The form and influence of "existentialism," the
varied new intellectual encounters from Marburg to New York
after 1925 cannot be underestimatedif the valid meaning of Til-
lich's vocabulary and thought is to be met. Often the same ideas
appear in the later works as in the early studies on Schelling, but
in the later works there are overtones of German existentialism,
or of Greek and scholastic philosophy. Tillich acknowledges that
his systematic apologetic theology is intentionally existential and
that existentialism, while not the only philosophy, is a natural
ally of Christianity. Existentialism has analysed the predicament
of man and his world, and thereby has helped to rediscover the
classical Christian interpretation of human existence.10 If it is
clear that Tillich saw himself as a theologian for whom revelation
was in dialogue with man as analysed by existentialism, and that
Schelling for Tillich was a propaedeutic thinker, still it is not
clear how or how deeply the far from unified movement called
existentialism formed his thought.
Tillich in an autobiographicalessay describes the entrance of
Heidegger and existentialism.
In Marburg,in 1925, I beganworkon my SystematicTheology,the
firstvolumeof whichappearedin I951. At the sametimethat Heideg-
ger was in Marburgas professorof philosophy,influencingsome of
the best students,existentialismin its twentieth-century
formcrossed
my path. It tookyearsbeforeI becamefully awareof the impactof
this encounteron my own thinking. I resisted,I tried to learn, I
acceptedthe new way of thinkingmorethan the answerit gave."
Two things here are important: first, it was through Heidegger
(with whom during these years surrounding the appearance of
Sein und Zeit Tillich was in personal contact) that Tillich en-
countered existentialism; secondly, Tillich accepted more the
structure, the method, the Denkform of this philosophy than its
content. Although Tillich speaks of "Existential philosophy,"
it is clear from his works that he appreciates the differences in
oTILLIcH, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University Press, I957), II, 19-28;
cited as ST II.
'
Autobiographical Reflections, art. cit., 14.
252 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW
12TILLICH, Existential Philosophy ..., art. cit., 77. "The third and con-
temporary form of Existential philosophy has resulted from a combination of this
Philosophy of Life with Husserl's shift of emphasis from existent objects to the
mind that makes them its objects, and with the rediscovery of Kierkegaard and
of the early developments of Marx. Heidegger, Jaspers, and the Existential inter-
pretation of history found in German Religious Socialism are the main representa-
tives of the third period of this philosophy of experienced Existence." Ibid., 79.
1 TrrLICH, The Interpretation of History, ed. cit., 39-40.
1"Ibid.
TILLICH AND HEIDEGGER 253
rediscovery of ontology in this century. "Heideggerclaims to de-
scribe the structure of Being itself." '~ There are relatively few
references to Heidegger in the entire Systematic Theology, even
fewer in other works. Heidegger's relationship to Tillich is a
structural one, and as such important. It enters into the very
structure of theology as Tillich conceives and develops it; it
offers the structural foundation for the first example of that
theology in action: Tillich's theology of Ultimate Concern (his
phenomenologicaland hence introductoryterm for God) as Being-
Itself.
II
tion; the question is precontained in the answer; ST II, 14-18. "Faith includes
the ontological question whether the question is asked explicitly or not." Biblical
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University Press, 1955), 59.
254 HARVARDTHEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
"method and structure" of theology,s8 and he relates it to Hei-
degger.
In using the methodof correlation,systematictheologyproceedsin
the followingway: it makesan analysisof the humansituationout
of whichthe existentialquestionsarise,and it demonstratesthat the
symbolsusedin the Christianmessageare the answersto these ques-
tions. The analysisof the humansituationis done in termswhich
today are called "existential."Such analysesare much older than
existentialism . ... (Man) has become aware of the fact that he
himselfis the door to the deeperlevels of reality, that in his own
existencehe has the only possibleapproachto existenceitself .
the immediateexperienceof one's own existingrevealssomethingof
the natureof existencegenerally.Whoeverhas penetratedinto the
natureof his own finitudecan find the traces of finitudein every-
thingthat exists. Andhe can ask the questionimpliedin his finitude
as the questionimpliedin finitudeuniversally.'9
Tillich adds in a note that an example of this is Heidegger: "Hei-
degger's notion of 'Dasein' (being there) as the form of human
existence and the entrance to ontology."20
Tillich's correlatedanalysis of man centers in terms of finitude,
anxiety, meaninglessness, care born of the threat of ontological
nonexistence and personal meaninglessness. Tillich shows his
accurate understanding of Heidegger when he relates his own
use of the existential analysis of Dasein in these terms to a deeper
ontological background. Meaninglessness,anxiety are not basic-
ally psychological terms for Tillich and Heidegger but human
forms of ontological finitude.21 Tillich, referringagain to Heideg-
ger, affirmsthat the fundamentalinterpretationof humanexistence
is finitude entering through non-being. "Both the basic ontologi-
cal structure and the ontological elements imply finitude.
Finitude is experienced on the human level; non-being is experi-
enced as the threat to being. . . . Finitude in awareness is anx-
18sSTI, 66, 59.
1oST I, 62.
2 Ibid. How Tillich is related to and employs phenomenology is another
question. Tillich offers a phenomenology of God, but his method and epistemologi-
cal views do not seem to allow a quick identification of Tillich's phenomenology
with that of Husserl.
'"Anxiety about meaninglessness is the characteristically human form of on-
tological anxiety . ... the threat against the finite structure of being." ST I, 210.
TILLICH AND HEIDEGGER 255
III
381ST
I, 164.
HEIDEGGER, Was ist die Metaphysik, ed. cit., 21.
'
MAX MUtLLER, Existenz-Philosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart
(Heidelberg: Kerle, 1964), 94ff.
14 ST I, 235-37.
`
Ibid., 235-38. This seems to be the meaning of Being-Itself as explained by
the Ground of Being and the Power of Being --that Being-Itself is not open to
the multiple threat endangering finite beings. In the German version of ST I
(which is more than a translation), the term Ground of Being is translated Grund
des Seins and not Grund aller Seienden. TILLCH sees Being as within the created
structure.
TILLICH AND HEIDEGGER 259
"
Heidegger's thought contains an "emphatic atheism." Twelve
years later Heidegger explicitly rejected the interpretation that
the absence of God in his thought should be construed as atheism
or nihilism, or that Being was God. "But Being - what is Be-
ing? . . . Being is not God, nor a ground for the world. Being
is broader than any individual being and is, at the same time,
closer to man than all other beings whether they are rocks, ani-
mals, works of art, machines, angels or God."37
Tillich protests against the "supranaturalism"which makes
God a being like all others. Tillich's search for the "God above
the God of theism" is a basic principle for understanding his
theology. "The God of theism is God limited by man's finite con-
ceptions."38 When Heidegger does touch on God, which is sel-
dom,39the sparse remarks are often accompanied by a similar
protest against the God of the past which could be as easily and
as thoroughly discussed in the academic fields of philosophy and
theology as any other being. The above quotation from the Hu-
manismusbriefhas overtones of this, and the following interprets
it:
. . Causasui. This is the proportionately propernamefor Godin
philosophy.To this God man can neitherpray nor sacrifice....
Consequentlythe god-less thought, which gives up the God of
philosophy,Godas Causasui, is perhapscloserto the god-likeGod.40
Since Sein is not God, and ontology's study of Sein and Dasein
is only at its beginnings, there is no reason for philosophy to take
up now the task of theology - if this is its task at all. "The on-
tological interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world doesn't
36TLuLIcn,The Interpretation of History, ed. cit., 40.
37HEIDEGGER, tber den Humanismus (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1947), 76.
On the mistaken interpretation of HEIDEGGER'S Sein as God in the past decades see
MAX MU1LLER,Op. cit., 65ff.
38TILLICH, Ultimate Concern, ed. cit., 51; TnILLCHwrites that many forms of
theology bring "God's existence down to the level of a stone or a star, and . .
make atheism not only possible, but almost unavoidable." The Two Types of
Philosophy of Religion, Theology of Culture, ed. cit., I8.
* "He who has that of the Christian faith or
experienced theology--whether
that of philosophy--from the point of view of its origin and development pre-
fers today in the area of thinking about God to keep quiet." HEIDEGGER,Die onto-
theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik, in Identitdit und Differenz (Pfullingen:
Neske, I957), 51.
'Ibid., 7of.; see Nietzsche's Wort 'Gott ist tot', Holzwege (Frankfurt: Kloster-
mann, 1950), 235-39.
260 HARVARDTHEOLOGICAL
REVIEW
decide positively or negatively about a possible Sein towards
God." 41
To move to a further point, Heidegger and Tillich both link the
mysterious Being to the holy. Tillich writes that like being and
non-being the holy is related to ultimate concern.42 Heidegger's
rare indication of how thought might go beyond Being to God in-
troduces the sphere of the holy, a distance between the real and
transcendent God, and the world of beings. "First of all, from
the truth of Being is the nature of the holy able to be thought;
and first of all, from the nature of the holy can we think out the
nature of God- and in the light of the nature of God what the
word 'God' should designate can be thought."43 But, "while
the holy appears, God remains distant." 44
Tillich's debt to Heidegger lies not here where Tillich's Being-
Itself can be analyzed in dialogue with Aquinas, not in this area
where Heidegger says so little, and where Sein and Being-Itself
are reached through different (but not necessarily contradictory)
thought-ways. A similar method brought them both from an
analysis of human existence to these conclusions. Moreover,
for both of them the movementwas a movementof forms, a move-
ment through the correlation of forms. If Aquinas calls God an
unlimited subsistent and active fullness of all possible and actual
aspects of being, this is because for him every being is a dependent
effect of this independent being.45 Tillich and Heidegger do not
involve themselves with the post-Kantian problem of transcend-
ental causality. Their thought here is Platonic, one form im-
plying or leading through insight or phenomenological analysis
to another irrespective of causal foundation.46
41HEIDEGGER, Vom Wesen des Grundes (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1929), 39.
42ST I, 216; see 215-17, 14.
'
HEIDEGGER, tfber den Humanismus, ed. cit., 36f.
44HEIDEGGER,Heimkunft/ An die Verwandten, Erliuterungen zu Hiblderlins
Dichtung (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951), 27.
4 "Given the existence of a creature as the effect of God, it is necessary that
there be God the creator . . . . the way of effect to cause is found indifferently
in every caused being." In I Sent., d. 3, a. i, ad io.
6TILLICHaccepts the Kantian critique of causality as necessarily finite; ST I,
208-10, 237f. He favors the Augustinian-Neo-Platonic approach to God over that
of Aquinas in The Two Types of the Philosophy of Religion, art. cit. TILLICH
writes, "I believe that the Platonic (Augustinian-Franciscan) tradition is more
fundamental for the understanding of our knowledge of God." Appreciation and
Reply, in Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought (Chicago: The Priory Press, 1964), 307.
TILLICH AND HEIDEGGER 261
This structural resemblance between Heidegger and Tillich's
theological system, though modest in concrete resemblance, is
important. It helps answer the questions as to how Tillich can
be called an existentialist, and how an existentialist can have
strong similarities to ontology and system. Beyond the general
existential terminology there is a basic influence on Tillich from
Heidegger's general analytic. On the other hand, by seeing the
form ontology takes, the respective limits of ontology and revela-
tion in Tillich can be made clearer. An ontological framework
does not necessarily imply that a theology is, ultimately, ontology.
Tillich's use of Heidegger is different from Bultmann's. It does
not limit itself to existential analysis of man and to an anthro-
pocentric theological picture, but employs fundamental ontology
in its widest scope, combiningthe existential and Dasein-centered
with ontology. The identification of Heidegger's thought with
Bultmann's use of it is a likely cause of certain incomplete eval-
uations of Heidegger current outside Germany. Tillich was inter-
ested in the Heidegger of the first pages of Sein und Zeit; he
neglected neither the existential analysis (which Bultmann chose
to apply to the New Testament message) nor the ontology of Be-
ing (which later works presented in place of the unpublishedsec-
tions of Sein und Zeit). Heinrich Ott, Karl Barth's successor
at the University of Basel, has called attention (in a perspective
different from Tillich's) to "a fullness (in Heidegger) of impor-
tant perspectives for theology." 47 Because of Ott's theology, the
important work of Robinson and Cobb,48and the increasing in-
fluence of contemporaryGermantheology, Protestant and Catho-
lic theology in the future is likely to find itself more than casually
interested in the Denkweg of Heidegger - but, as Heidegger him-
self sees it, as a beginning rather than as an end.