New Strategies of the Tatmadaw in

Northern Kayin State and Bago Region,
Myanmar

November 2010

Kim Jolliffe

 
  

Notes on Methodology

The following information has been compiled primarily from retired Western Special
Forces working in Eastern Myanmar with various urban and rural underground and
resistance forces, who therefore have access to intelligence coming from these sources.
Other sources include persons closely associated with the Karen National Liberation
Army, security experts that have spent time in the region, as well as a number of public
secondary sources that are cited accordingly.

Aside from the public secondary sources, citations are not provided. This report will
therefore be approached with a certain amount of skepticism. While this is understood
by the author, who is also not in position to assert any of the following information to be
absolute, undisputed fact, all readers with stakes in the region are strongly advised to
anticipate the realization of its fundamental predictions

Notes on Terminology

Throughout this paper the author aims to denominate all institutions, organizations,
governments and people groups with the most common designation self-assigned by the
respective entity or its ruling government in the English language, to avoid politicization.
However, in some cases the author has used a shortened version.

Myanmar is officially known as the The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. It is often
referred to as Burma, a shortened version of its previous official denomination
The Myanmar Government is officially known as the Government of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar. It often referred to as the State Peace Development Council or
informally as the “the Burmese Junta” or “the Burmese Regime”
The Tatmadaw is a transliteration of the Burmese term and is used by Myanmar State
media. The countryʼs armed forces are often referred to as the Burma Army or, more
recently, as the Myanmar Armed Forces. The armed forces itself is also commonly
referred to as the State Peace and Development Council
Bago Region is often referred to as Pegu Division, its previous official denomination
Kayin State is often referred to as Karen State, its previous official denomination
The Karen and Karenni Ethnic Groups are referred to by many as Kayin and Kayah
respectively, as a transliteration of the pronunciation used in the Burmese language
The Bamar ethnic group is often referred to in English as Burman or by fewer,
Burmese. Although, the latter is more commonly an unofficial term used for all Myanmar
citizens
Thahan Prahn is a transliteration of the Thai term taken from Des Ballʼs “Boys in Black”
The Thanlwin River is the Burmese name. However, the Thai pronunciation, which is
very similar to the Karen, Karenni and Shan, can be transliterated as Salween, Salawin
or Salaween.

 
  

Executive Summary

Following general elections in Myanmar, a predicted post-election push from the

Tatmadaw to wipe out the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) now seems
certain to materialize, focusing on northern Kayin State and Eastern Bago
Region.

Decades of unnecessarily protracted conflict in the region, perpetuated by

civilian-targeted counter-insurgency (COIN) methods, have forced the Tatmadaw
to shift their approach to the insurgency significantly. Indicators in the field show
that The Myanmar Government may now be borrowing methods from the
Government of Sri Lankaʼs successful COIN strategy used against the Liberation
Tamil Tigers of Ealam in 2008 (LTTE). This strategy would include the
assassination of key leaders, the pinpointing of key bases and the herding of
KNLA forces and civilians into kill zones using heli-borne forces. The final phase
of these hammer and anvil tactics is the obliteration of everyone in kill zones
using massed artillery.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) activities have been undertaken by the Tatmadaw

in the region for the past two and a half years, aimed at developing networks of
local informants. This has set the stage for the introduction of hunter-tracker
teams now training in the region, whose mission is to pinpoint key KNLA
individuals and basing. From the resistance forcesʼ perspective, the
Tatmadawʼs recent construction of helipads along the Thanlwin (Salween) River
and its purchase of fifty helicopters signal unambiguous intent to envelop KNLA
from the rear.

The Tatmadaw has been methodical and in no apparent rush to develop this new
capacity in what appears to be an economy-of-force effort to destroy the KNLA.
This is likely because it has failed to defeat KNLA frontally in the field or indirectly
by forcing it to become a border guard force under the Tatmadawʼs command.

Following a decades-long trend of receiving tacit and explicit support from the
West, the KNU has recently received backing from Western corporate leaders to
document the Tatmadawʼs activities in detail using hi-tech remote-controlled
cameras and other associated technology.

 
  

Contents

1. Current Context

2. A shift in strategy
2.1 Tatmadaw COIN strategies in recent decades
2.2 New Developments and Their Origins
- 2.2.1 The Sri-Lanka Connection
- 2.2.2 The strategy fundamentals

3. The Offensive
3.1 Visible Tatmadaw actions
3.2 Expectations of coming events

 
  

1. Current Context

Following general elections in Myanmar, a 61-year war continues between the

Tatmadaw and the Karen National Union (KNU) and their allies, the Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) in the east. A final push from the Tatmadaw
to wipe out the KNUʼs armed wing, Karen National Liberation Army has for the
past 2 years been expected to come after the elections, a scenario which now
seems certain to materialize once the former are ready.

The KNUʼs last remaining stronghold, which corresponds closely to the areas
denomintaed Hpapun Township, Kayin State and Nyaunglebin District, Bago
Region by the Government, will be the prime target. Since 2007, eastern parts of
this region have seen routine burning of villages and attacks on KNLA bases,
while areas closer to the border have been kept sectioned off and isolated by
Tatmadaw troops guarding supply roads. This has been coordinated alongside
efforts to maintain a state of blanket instability in the isolated regions by use of
landmines, mortar attacks on farms and markets, as well as attacks on civilians,
including torture, harassment, rape, and extrajudicial killing.

This month, Myanmarʼs ruling generals have undertaken the fifth step in their “7-
step roadmap to democracy”, which can be understood more accurately as an
overall effort to rationalize and centralize the countryʼs political and economic
structures, reshuffle military to suit those most loyal to Than Shwe, and develop a
more internationally-friendly environment to encourage investment and closer ties
from the fast growing economies across all borders. While numerous
stakeholders in the country unaligned with Than Shwe have persisted to use this
shift in approach towards governance to develop a more diverse political
landscape, the process has been successfully dominated by the senior general.
However, their efforts have achieved unprecedented successes in the
proliferation of legitimate civil society and the loosening of restrictions on the
media and information technology, which was previously an instrument solely
used by successive military juntas to suit their aims.

Tantamount to Than Shweʼs endeavor to reshape the countryʼs economy has

been the elimination or total subjugation of all political opposition outside of the
militaryʼs direct rule, both armed and non-armed. The primary obstacle to this
undertaking has been the vigilance of armed opposition groups in predominantly
non-Bamar ethnic regions, attempting to govern and achieve greater autonomy
for the populations of their respective ethnic group.

Less threatening in recent years has been the non-armed opposition in urban
areas and exile. Reliant primarily on the fosterage of public dissent and political

 
  

defiance, as well as encouragement of international pressure through isolation,

this movement has been rendered increasingly ineffectual by the Government.
This has been accomplished by use of violent retribution for acts of dissent, the
protracted detainment of iconic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, augmentation of
regional economic ties and, in the past 3 years, the allowance of relative
proliferation of civil society addressing civilian needs in non-conflict regions.

The Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing the KNLA, have played a
significant role in both the “ethnic” armed opposition movement and the non-
armed political movement for decades, aligning their political wing closely with
non-armed opposition groups in exile. During this period, neither The Myanmar
Government, nor previous ruling military juntas, have attempted to hold evenly-
matched negotiations with the KNU based on the organisationʼs role as the
governors of Karen citizens of Myanmar, making the emphasis on military
activities necessary to the latter to try to remain relevant and force bilateral talks.

From the Governmentʼs viewpoint, the KNLA, alongside the KNPP, have
remained the symbol of longest-standing resistance to Tatmadaw since 1949.
The length of this resistance adds further insult, as it underscores the failure of
Tatmadaw.

For the Government, elimination of the KNUʼs power base is crucial at this stage
in order to gain secure access to Hpapun townshipʼs border with Thailand,
primarily for trade; augment its rule in nearby contested regions; and
psychologically damage the violent and non-violent opposition movements.
Furthermore, the territories in which the group remains in control or has a
presence are critical to secure the construction and maintenance of the Wei Gyi,
Dagwin, Hatgyi and Kyauk Naga hydropower dams, primarily for sale of power to
Thailand, as well as the exploitation of the regionʼs extensive logging and mining
potential. The financial potential of the region is likely in the billions and is key to
Than Shweʼs long-term plans to secure power in the hands of his lineages and
close corporate associates before retirement.

2. A shift in strategy

2.1 Tatmadaw COIN strategies in recent decades

For over 30 years, the Tatmadawʼs primary counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy

in the Mountainous regions of Kayin State and Bago Region has been terrain-
centric, visibly focusing on securing key routes to critical terrain for mining and
hydropower production. In order to secure these targets, it has undertaken a
continual forcible relocation program that aims to destroy civilian settlements,
destabilize communities out of reach and systematically move all civilians in
enemy-dominated and contested regions into areas under the Governmentʼs

 
  

control. While ensuring access to human resources, this has served to weaken
the civilian support base upon which the insurgents depend.

Ruthlessness has allowed the army to slowly remove the majority of insurgency
threats in Myanmar by dividing alliances, forcing ceasefire agreements, and
responding to the most persistent insurgents with disproportionate force and
violent intimidation methods thought to have been learned from the Japanese
during World War 2.

However, these COIN methods have arguably prolonged the conflict

unnecessarily and further entrenched xenophobia among non-Bamar citizens,
fueling anti-government sentiments, and thus the insurgentsʼ support bases.
They have also given opposition movements significantly more clout when calling
for the international community to apply pressure to the Government.

Another self-imposed hindrance which has burdened the Government has been
the poor allocation of funds. While spending vast sums on building the new
capital Napyidaw, its extensive network of bunkers and tunnels and a poorly-run
nuclear program, salaries and even ration supplies for military personnel have
been minimal leading to low moral from the battalion commander level down.
There have been reports in recent years through multiple channels of units
fighting one another, work stoppages and desertions, as indications of this. Up
against nationalist armies, fueled by the belief they are the only hope to protect
their ethnicity from total subjugation, these under-nourished, underpaid and
largely apathetic troops suffered kill rations of over 80:1 in some Karen regions
over the past year. While continuing to have the upper hand overall, the
Tatmadaw were making unnecessary sacrifices.

The successful assassination of highly revered leader Padoh Mahn Shah in 2008
caused catastrophe not just for the KNU, but for the pro-democracy movement in
exile and chances for an evolution towards peace between the various Karen
armies. The success of this method proved the viability for using this on a larger
scale to defeat oppositions groups by literally “taking off their heads”, as one
source put it. This has been achieved with a number of other armed opposition
leaders since.i Subsequent attempts to assassinate Karen leaders have been
less successful than planned, largely due to incompetence and leakages from
within the government-aligned splinter group Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
(DKBA).

2.2 New Developments and Their Origins

2.2.1 The Sri-Lanka Connection

 
  

The Myanmar Government and Government of Sri Lanka have undertaken

information exchange on COIN methods and it now appears that a shift in
strategy occurred among Tatmadaw leaders a number of years ago, which will
likely be seen on the ground in coming years if not months. New methods look
like they have been adapted from those used by the Government of Sri Lanka in
2008 to bring an end to the insurgency of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Ealam
(LTTE).

Connections between the two militaries are public and well-documented. In May
2009, representatives of both countries spoke at the 2009 Shangri-La Dialogue,
an event which saw multiple Governments hail the Government of Sri Lankaʼs
COIN success. The Shangri-La Dialogue is an annual convention that according
to itʼs website, is the “most important regular gathering of defence professionals
in the region and has become a vital annual fixture in the diaries of Asia-Pacific
defence ministers and their civilian and military chiefs of staff.”ii

At the event, Myanmarʼs speaker, the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Major
General Aye Myint, proclaimed, “The world has already witnessed the successful
end of a longstanding insurgency in Sri Lanka, but people have forgotten about
insurgency in Myanmar.” He then indicated a shift in his own armed forcesʼ
approach to COIN, stating, “We have realised that hard power alone is not fully
effective in winning counter-insurgency campaigns. Therefore, we are
painstakingly and patiently solving the problem of insurgency.” iii

Subsequently in June 2009, Than Shwe and other leading generals visited Sri
Lanka to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two
countries, where the senior general was thanked by President Mahinda
Rajapakse for the The Myanmar Governmentʼs support to "combat illegal
activities carried out by the LTTE in the past and in drug trafficking in the region."

The Myanmar Government gave a goodwill donation of 50,000 USD and was
offered “placements for two officials of the Tatmadaw to be trained at the
Kothalawala Defence Academy… to strengthen the cooperation in combating
terrorism and intelligence sharing.” iv

Numerous indicators visible both on the ground in Northern Kayin State and from
ethnic opposition groupsʼ intelligence networks show that these agreements have
taken effect and that methods adapted from those used in Sri Lanka in 2008 are
likely to take place in Myanmar soon.

2.2.2 The strategy fundamentals

The Tatmadawʼs strategy now appears to have become increasingly leader-

centric. It aims to kill leaders, leave forces in disarray, then clobber them in kill

 
  

zones with artillery. This is a steel-on-forces approach, which by avoiding force-

on-force engagements on the KNLAʼs terms that have consisted predominantly of
ambush tactics in the past, aims to minimize Tatmadaw casualties and dictate
the terms of combat.

In its essence, the Tatmadawʼs new strategy would appear to consist of the
following phases:

(1) Wage a continuous disinformation campaign to minimize international

awareness of the Tatmadawʼs evolved COIN strategy
(2) Develop human intelligence to support targeting requirements
(3) Pinpoint key leaders, basing and critical nodes
(4) Kill key leaders in Myanmar and in Thailand to create disarray
(5) Use air mobile forces to drive forces and supporters into kill zones
(6) Destroy with massed artillery and conventional infantry

3. The Offensive

3.1 Visible Tatmadaw actions

For at least two and a half years, the Tatmadaw has undertaken low-level
intelligence activities in Northern Kayin State and eastern Bago Region, which
have focused on developing Human Intelligence (HUMINT) networks with the aim
of pinpointing commanders and bases. Since Springtime 2010, the Tatmadaw
has introduced hunter-tracker teams to the region to capitalize on this HUMINT
effort.

Helicopter landing pads have been completed along the Thanlwin (Salawin)
River, which borders Myanmar and Thailand, consistent with COIN methodology
to envelop KNU forces from the rear. Mi-24 helicopters purchased from Russia in
September 2010 are expected to be used to this end. This purchase was first
leaked by a Burma Air Force official speaking with the Irrawaddy, who also
confirmed, “The main reason for purchasing the Mi-24s is for counter-
insurgency”. v

In recent months the Tatmadaw has reinforced troops along the border from Htu
Mway Ke, Kayin State to Pasaung in Kayah State. They have existing camps at
Ler Toe, Kaw Hsa Ko and Mae Kar Hta, near Ei Thu Hta IDP camp which all
have long range artillery capabilities.

The Thai border guards, Thahan Phrann, some of which have close relationships
with SPDC and DKBA, recently placed restrictions on the KNU and their relief
networks using the Mae Sot-Mae Sariang road for the elections period. This route
is the only link between key unofficial border crossing points and KNU

 
  

infrastructure on the Thai side of the border. It is crucial for the deliverance of
humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of people in Kayin State as well as military
supplies. This is not the first time Thahan Phrann has aided the Myanmar
Government in this way and indicates its potential to become part of the
Tatmadawʼs aim to cause disarray within the KNLA in the target region.

Similarly to the Government of Sri Lanka, this has all been carried out alongside
a continuous disinformation campaign of many facets to covet brutal methods
used by the Tatmadaw and promote national support for the Government and the
need for military rule. This campaign has focused on both Myanmarʼs population
and the international community and uses state-controlled media outlets
including, The New Light of Myanmar and MRTV, both of which have English and
Burmese services and continuously propagate disinformation regarding the
conflict and displacement crises in Myanmarʼs ethnic regions.vi

3.2 Expectations of coming events

As before, the Tatmadaw continues in its intention to assassinate key Karen

leaders, but the focus appears to now be on commanders in Northern Kayin
State and Bago Region and key functional leaders along the Thailand-Myanmar
border that support military and humanitarian operations in those regions.

Once this is achieved mobile air forces will be able encircle KNLA troops and
force them into a kill zone away from the borders with Thailand and Bago Region.
Such hammer and anvil tactics would typically call for the use of air mobile forces
to drive insurgents into kill zones blocked by infantry to then destroy them by use
of supporting artillery, as well as fires from helicopters.

The time that these events will take place is impossible to predict, but will
logically be predicated on air-mobile forces readiness and access to targetable
intelligence. Than Shwe was hoping to achieve domination over numerous ethnic
armies in April but was unable too launch a strong offensive, mainly due to low-
morale at battalion commander level and further down the ranks.

There are two schools of thought among analysts regarding the Governmentʼs
optimum time of attack. While it may aim to make this happen before the new
Government is implemented in February 2011, to inaugurate the new political
framework in a reinvigorated environment, it could also see the benefits of
waiting until regional legislatures are in place to bear the brunt of civilian dissent
and discord without stretching the Tatmadawʼs central leadership.

Questions still remain as to how prepared the Tatmadaw is to undertake such a

new type of operation. This will depend largely on the level and amount of

 
  

training received by helicopter pilots as well as the current level of morale and
health among troops.

Indications are that the dictatorship will methodically implement its strategy once
it has set conditions for sure success. The Government needs a sure victory
against the KNU/KNLA and has time is on its side. Following recent spikes in
insurgent activity in Kawkereik, Kyain Seigyi and Myawaddy townships of Kayin
State, the Tatmadaw is likely to be stretched to a greater extent than it had
expected, both in terms of troop availability in the region as well the burden on its
leadership to deal with the uncommon stress of defensive decision-making.

Following close observation of the Tatmadawʼs activities in the region, the KNU
has also taken steps to adapt their approach to opposing the Government, with
corporate backing from the West. The following three paragraphs were taken
from an interview with retired Western Special Forces working in Eastern
Myanmar with various urban and rural underground and resistance forces.

Given that this strategy of annihilation is well underway, a

concerted effort has been made to capture what will likely happen
for unambiguous proof of the Myanmar Armed Forcesʼ human
rights abuses. With the training and technological support of
Western special forces advisors, the Karen have been “wiring the
jungle”, so to speak, installing networks of trail watch cameras,
remote-controlled video cameras, spy cameras and sensors.

Training on mini-UAV technology and cyber warfare is also

underway in at least one third country, as I write. This has been
resourced by a network of Western corporate backers who want to
see change in the present government. Given that ethnic lands
contain most of Myanmarʼs natural resource wealth, the backing of
ethnics may pay off well for profit-minded venture capitalists willing
to “bet on the come” by backing the right horse now.

The thinking here is that if atrocities against the Karen people and
those who protect them are inevitable, then it is best to capture it
all in “living video color” in order to expose what is really going on.
In a land where “itʼs all about profit” this tact may be a real money
maker.

While western support for pro-democratic insurgents in Myanmar has been seen
decade after decade since independence, recent support coming from
corporations in the west is likely to be in part aimed at curbing Chinaʼs
dominance in the region, to which Myanmar plays a pivotal geo-strategic role.

 
  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
i  1.  “Leader  of  ethnic  ceasefire  group  assassinated”.  Mizzima  News  at  

http://www.mizzima.com/news/inside-­‐burma/1989-­‐leader-­‐of-­‐ethnic-­‐ceasefire-­‐
group-­‐assassinated.html  
2.  “Top  Mongla  leader  assassinated”  at  
http://www.bnionline.net/news/shan/7770-­‐top-­‐mongla-­‐leader-­‐assassinated-­‐.html  
ii  http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-­‐shangri-­‐la-­‐dialogue/about/  
iii  http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-­‐shangri-­‐la-­‐dialogue/shangri-­‐la-­‐dialogue-­‐

2009/plenary-­‐session-­‐speeches-­‐2009/fifth-­‐plenary-­‐session/major-­‐general-­‐aye-­‐
myint/  
iv  

http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10150&Itemi
d=44  
v  http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19419  
vi  For  4  examples  read:  

1.  “Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  releases  Press  Statement  in  response  to  the  
declaration  of  EU  Presidency”  at  
http://myanmargeneva.org/pressrelease_PMGev/Press%20Release%20No%205-­‐
2009.pdf  
2.  “What  is  KNU?”  at  http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open7/080110for.html  
3.  “Which  way,  KNU?”  at  http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open7/140210for.html  
4.  “Regional  development  as  witnessed  by  an  expedition-­‐1”  at  
http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open/180506for.html