Boomers, Hunters, & Spies: American Submarine Espionage in Cold War Military Policy

Boomers, Hunters, and Spies:
American Submarine Espionage in Cold War Military Policy
History 500
Professor Leavitt-Alcantara
December 7, 2009
List of Abbreviations
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DSSP Deep Submergence Systems Project
GIUK Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom oceanic bottleneck
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
MAD Mutually Assured Destruction
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVINT Naval Intelligence
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
PACFLT Soviet Pacific Fleet
SIGINT signals intelligence
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SONAR sound navigation and ranging
SOSUS Sound Surveillance System
SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSN nuclear fast-attack submarine
USN United States Navy
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
i
Genifer Snipes HIS500a
The Cold War is frequently described as a nuclear standoff between the only superpowers
left standing after WWII—the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R.). 1 Nuclear weapons loomed over every aspect of the Cold War, from peace
summits and periods of détente, to conflicts like the Berlin Crisis, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
At the time, both Soviet and American governments believed any direct confrontation between
the U.S. and U.S.S.R would necessarily result in a nuclear exchange. In response, American
strategists were compelled to find ways of combating the Soviet threat via indirect means. Of all
the methods they developed, no concept was more important than that of nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear deterrence was designed to discourage the Soviet Union from initiating an attack by
making the potential damage inflicted by a retaliatory American nuclear strike too catastrophic to
risk. 2 Responsibility for the American nuclear deterrence arsenal would be distributed among
land-based ICBM sites, intercontinental bomber fleets, and the United States Navy’s submarine
fleet in a structure known as the Nuclear Triad. 3
Of the three segments of the triad, only the submarine fleet would play an active role in
the strategic aspects of deterrence policy. Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) carried the
missiles that comprised the U.S. retaliatory, or second-strike, nuclear arsenal. These boats were
designed to disappear into the ocean and wait, undetected, until a first-strike nuclear attack
occurred and they were activated to retaliate. 4 Due to books like Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red
October and controversies over nuclear proliferation, the SSBN’s are considered the
1
Although European NATO member’s involvement in the Cold War was constant and invaluable in the war’s
outcome, this paper addresses the actions of only United States organizations and individuals; therefore, for the sake
of clarity, the United States will be the only entity addressed in terms of NATO action.
2
John Pina Craven, The Silent War: The Cold War Battle Beneath the Sea, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster,
2002, p. 53.
3
Atomic Archive. "Nuclear Deterrence." atomicarchive.com: Exploring the History, Science, and Consequences of
the Atomic Bomb. http://atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page15.shtml (accessed November 3, 2009).
4
Submarines are traditionally referred to as boats rather than ships, potentially in homage to the first submarines,
which were as small as boats.
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quintessential Cold War submarine. Despite this, the true battle of the Cold War belonged to the
fast-attack submarine (SSN) fleet. The primary assignment of the SSN was to shadow Soviet
SSBN patrols, ensuring that, if war broke out, the Soviet missile fleet could be destroyed before
it could launch its missile arsenal. However, a frequently overlooked aspect of American
submarine activity is the fleet’s secondary special missions and espionage role. These special
missions activities included maneuvers designed to rob the Soviet military of the coastal and
fleet security necessary to launch a military offensive while other missions gathered information
on Soviet technology and tactics, enabling U.S. scientists and strategists to upgrade American
deterrence systems and strategies to neutralize Soviet advances. Ultimately, submarine
espionage would allow U.S. policymakers to penetrate Soviet naval strategy and neutralize the
Soviet naval threat. It is my goal to examine the ways in which the special missions program
contributed to winning the military portion of the Cold War through groundbreaking covert
programs designed specifically for the submarine’s unique capabilities.
The Submarine in Cold War Scholarship
Despite a wealth of academic research into the intricacies of the Cold War, one aspect of
its history that remains critically neglected is the special missions and intelligence-gathering role
played by the United States Navy (U.S.N.) submarine fleet in American Cold War strategy. This
is not to say detailed information regarding the role of American submarines in intelligence is
non-existent—in 1984, Tom Clancy’s novel, The Hunt for Red October galvanized the public’s
imagination with a glimpse of the constant game of cat-and-mouse being played by the
submarines of the Soviet Union and the United States. Later, in 1998, Blind Man’s Bluff, a non-
fiction collection of submarine espionage stories, triggered aspurt of public interest in Cold War
submarine activity. It is a strange reality that more has been published about submarine
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espionage in the realm of popular literature—newspapers, novels, and non-fiction books—than
in historical journals. Pertinent studies regarding the impact of submarines on Cold War strategy
appear in numerous military and scientific publications including Security Studies, Naval
Warfare Studies, International Security, and Social Studies of Science; however, even these
focus on the submarine’s relationship to nuclear policy as opposed to its special missions history.
Developing a deeper understanding of this subject required consultation with general
Cold War and submarine histories, of which Thomas Parrish’s The Submarine and Thomas S.
Burns’ The Secret War for the Ocean Depths provided the most information. In addition,
biographies of individuals involved in the special missions program and popular non-fiction
volumes mentioned elsewhere played a large role in this paper. By cross-referencing accounts
between general histories, military journals, and popular non-fiction, a clearer picture of the
submarine’s role was attained than was possible by relying solely on academic sources.
A potential reason for the lack of scholarship in this area may rest in the current
popularity of social histories in scholarly work. The study of social history gained acceptance in
the 1950s and 1960s and has continued to grow in popularity throughout the Cold War and into
the present day. 5 Since its acceptance by academia, political and military subjects like
submarine warfare have been eclipsed in favor of studying the social aspects of Cold War life.
Another definite factor contributing to the lack of research into submarine warfare is the
level of security at which most Cold War records remain classified. Many, even most, primary
sources regarding the escapades of American submarines were buried under mountains of gag
orders and secrecy. Despite this, certain facts have become part of public record by virtue of the
contradictory nature of intelligence policy. The character of Cold War politics was such that,
even when a technology or activity was known by both Soviet and American governments,
5
John Tosh, The Pursuit of History (4th Edition), 4 ed, New York: Longman, 2006, 131.
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neither side would admit to knowledge of said event, allowing a submarine crash off the coast of
Hawaii, and technologies including the SOSUS network to be known by both sides yet remain
officially unacknowledged. 6 Another byzantine feature of international intelligence is that there
exists a point at which certain activities may be tacitly acknowledged by the government simply
by their disinterest in suppressing leaks, yet the information will remain officially classified.
This allows popular fiction like Tom Clancy’s The Hunt for Red October and non-fiction books
like Stalking the Red Bear and Blind Man’s Bluff, which rely heavily on technically classified
information, to be published without federal objections. 7 The necessary emphasis placed on
primary sources in scholarly research means interested scholars are unable to access verifiable
information regarding incidents like those detailed in popular literature. Cold War documents
are slowly being declassified; however, there is an estimated ten-year backlog of Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) applications awaiting security inspection. Finally, in strategic terms, the
Cold War ended quite recently and the tactics and activities wielded against Soviet targets may
still be in use, preventing the government from safely disclosing historical details.
The Dawn of Modern Submarine Warfare
In 1914, the standards of maritime warfare were shattered when the German’s U-boat
fleet announced its entrance into World War I by sinking three British naval destroyers in a
matter of minutes and escaping unscathed. 8 This ability to operate undetected would become
their most valuable asset in future conflicts. When submarines first appeared, ASW technology
6
Christopher Drew and Sherry Sontag, Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage,
Brattleboro: Harper Paperbacks, 2000, p. 40; Richmond, Clint, and Kenneth Sewell. Red Star Rogue: The Untold
Story of a Soviet Submarine's Nuclear Strike Attempt on the U.S. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005, p. 68-
9—SOSUS, or Sound Surveillance System, was a series of ultrasensitive hydrophone ‘nets’ that allowed land-based
sonar technicians to monitor submarine traffic. By the late 1960s, all major Russian submarine installations were
netted, as were Allied coastlines and waterways throughout the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
7
Clancy, Tom. The Hunt for Red October (Jack Ryan Novels). New York: Berkley, 1992; Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff;
Peter Sasgen, Stalking the Red Bear: The True Story of a U.S. Cold War Submarine's Covert Operations Against the
Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009.
8
Tom Parrish, The Submarine: A History, First Edition, ed. New York: Viking Adult, 2004, p. 60-61.
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and tactics were virtually non-existent. What little anti-submarine warfare (ASW) strategy
existed during WWI was developed as the Royal Navy sought to combat the U-boat blockade of
the British Isles and consisted of little more than surface ships designated as ‘sub-hunters,’
rudimentary depth charges, and crude directional hydrophones operated from fleet ships. 9 The
WWI hydrophones developed by the Royal Navy were little more than waterproof microphones
lowered from the aft of a stationary ship in hopes that a U-boat might be detected before it
surfaced to open fire. 10 Despite later developments by American scientists allowing it to filter
out more ambient ocean noise, during WWI, the hydrophone was useful only for determining the
general direction of an incoming U-boat, not its actual location. 11
Submarine Warfare Comes to the United States
During World War II, the Battle for the Atlantic was waged between the Allied surface
fleet and German U-boats whereas the Pacific conflict was between the Japanese Imperial
surface fleet and the U.S. Navy, specifically its submarine fleet. 12 In the Atlantic, maintaining
the shipping lanes connecting Britain and the United States was crucial to the downfall of Nazi
Germany. In contrast, the focus of the Pacific war was the quarantine of Japan and destruction
of the Japanese Imperial Navy. Due to the disparate demands of warfare in the Atlantic and
Pacific, WWII submarine strategy developed independently in the two theatres of battle, offering
two different sets of tactics to be incorporated into later Cold War strategy.
The Kriegsmarine, or War Navy of Nazi Germany, developed the infamous Rudeltaktik
or wolfpack strategy prior to the start of WWII in preparation for a repeat of the WWI blockade
9
Parrish, The Submarine, p. 148.
10
Anti-submarine warfare is an aspect of military strategy responsible for detecting and neutralizing an opposing
submarine fleet. During the Cold War, neutralization would require not the destruction of the submarine but the
ability to keep them from attacking the defender’s interests, a major contrast with submarine warfare prior to the
Cold War.
11
12
Parrish, The Submarine, p. 305; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Navy at War 1941-1945: Official Reports to
the Secretary of the Navy. Washington, D.C.: United States Navy Department, 1946, 38.
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of naval traffic between the United States and the British Isles. 13 The wolfpack was a tactic of
encapsulation in which an arc of U-boats arrayed across a shipping convoy’s path, allowing the
convoy to sail into the arc before opening fire. 14 This same tactic would become the basis for
United States and Soviet maritime strategy throughout the early decades of the Cold War.
As during WWI, ASW formed a crucial facet of naval strategy in the Atlantic theatre.
Prior to the introduction of radio and telephone communication in 1900, military intelligence had
relied upon human intelligence (HUMINT) tools such as observations of fleet movement, and
intercepted messages for planning battles. As radio communication spread throughout Nazi and
Allied military forces, the British would develop the first Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) program
to monitor German radio communication. 15 Later, British and American intelligence
communities would develop a joint Operational Intelligence Department (OPINTEL), which
combined SIGINT, cryptology, and human intelligence (HUMINT), to create a comprehensive
system for identifying and tracking U-boat fleets. 16 During the Cold War, this organization
would form the basis of the United States’ system of tracking the Soviet submarine fleet, albeit
in a far more advanced iteration. Another major ASW technology developed during WWII was
the British sonar system. Ideally, sonar allowed ships to locate underwater objects including
submarines, and calculate their distance from the detecting ship. 17 However, like the WWI
hydrophone, early sonar technology was limited—initially, it was unable to detect objects further
than 1500 feet away from the sensor or distinguish between submarines and other underwater
13
Parrish, The Submarine, p. 231; Hughes, Terry, and John Costello. The Battle of the Atlantic. New York: The Dial
Press/James Wade, 1977, 30; King, U.S. Navy at War, p. 79.
14
15
Randy Carol Balano, Christopher A. Ford, and David A. Rosenberg, The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Navy
Operational Intelligence in World War II And the Cold War, Annapolis, MD.: Us Naval Institute Press, 2005, p. 6.
16
Balano, The Admirals Advantage, p. 11; Cote, Owen R. "The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent
Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines." The U.S. Navy. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/cold-
war-asw.html (accessed September 25, 2009), 11.
17
Parrish, The Submarine, p. 212-13; Balano, The Admirals Advantage, p. 11.
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features. 18 As the Pacific conflict progressed, U.S. military scientists would develop new radar
and sonar systems that mitigated much of this technology’s earlier weaknesses. 19
The true American submarine battle of WWII belonged to the Pacific Submarine Fleet
(PacSub), a circumstance brought about by the catastrophic attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941 by the Japanese Imperial Navy. When Japanese fighter planes
attacked the US fleet, they annihilated the Pacific battleship force, yet left the submarine
installation across the harbor untouched. 20 This was understandable since, unlike battleships,
submarines had no great role in current naval strategy; however, this neglect left the advanced
PacSub ready for a counter-strike. 21 By destroying the U.S. surface fleet, the Japanese ensured
the first American ships sent after them would be the only ones they would never see coming.
Despite the necessity of using submarines as independent entities in the wake of Pearl
Harbor, U.S. naval strategists were unsure how to utilize the submarine’s unique capabilities
absent a sizeable surface fleet. 22 Early attempts to use submarines as fleet battleships proved a
miserable failure, dispelling the notion that submarine warfare was identical to surface warfare. 23
The submarine’s role began to develop as reports to Congress, written by Fleet Admiral Ernest J.
King in 1944, observed that, like Britain, Japan is an island nation dependent on imports for its
survival, an observation which led to the first comprehensive US submarine strategy. By
replicating the German wolfpack's blockade and using it against the Japanese archipelago, the
U.S. was able to choke Japan into submission instead of being forced to mount a bloody land
18
Parrish, The Submarine, p. 213; Hughes 31
19
King, U.S. Navy at War, p. 226; Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War
II: Victory in the Pacific, Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1960, p. 126.
20
21
Ibid, p. 307.
22
Ibid, p. 319.
23
Ibid, p. 377.
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invasion. 24 Despite the similarities between the American and German submarine blockades,
American submarine strategy differed from its German inspiration in one crucial area. Unlike
the U-boats, whose effectiveness depended on constant communication with central command,
U.S. admirals chose to give submarine commanders basic orders, such as which convoy or area
to attack, and allowed the commanders to coordinate their missions as they saw fit. 25 This
decision laid another section of groundwork for later Cold War strategy, all of which placed a
premium on the submarine commander’s ability to display ingenuity and initiative within the
boundaries of their orders.
As declassified post-war reports revealed, the Pacific battles of 1944-45 first utilized the
26
submarine’s unique ‘special missions’ capabilities. Missions included rescuing shot-down
pilots, evacuating HUMINT personnel from Corregidor prior to its overrun, and resupplying
besieged land forces at Luzon. 27 The U.S.S. Barb went so far as to sail up to the coast of Honshu
and send sailors overland to blow up a railway trestle. 28
Fighting to Avoid War
In the aftermath of WWII, the U.S.S.R. engulfed Eastern Europe and Eurasia, creating
what Winston Churchill called the “Iron Curtain.” 29 The US Department of State would publish
U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security in 1947,
24
King, U.S. Navy at War, p. 77.
25
Parrish, The Submarine, p. 407:Morison ,Victory in the Pacific, p. 494.
26
27
King, U.S. Navy at War, p. 203; Morison ,Victory in the Pacific, p. 296; Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean
War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1963, p.
503-4.
28
King, U.S. Navy at War, p. 202.
29
Churchill, Winston. "Modern History Sourcebook: Winston Churchill: The Iron Curtain,”fordham.edu.
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.html (accessed December 7, 2009).
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analyzing the growing battle between the two superpowers. 30 The roots of the Cold War were
summed up in this report, saying:
Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate that the ultimate
objective of the leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world. Soviet leaders hold
that the Soviet communist party is the militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise
to political power, and that the USSR, base of the world communist movement, will not
be safe until the non-communist nations have been so reduced in strength and numbers
that communist inﬂuence is domina nt throughout the world. The immediate goal of top
priority since the recent war has been the political conquest of Western Europe. The
resistance of the United States is recognized by the USSR as a major obstacle to the
attainment of these goals. 31
After the U.S.S.R. developed nuclear weapons in 1949, land-based warfare ceased to be a
feasible form of conflict between the Soviet Union and United States; however, some form of
warfare was necessary if the ideological ambitions of Soviet Russia were to be effectively
contained. 32 Western strategists chose to focus their attention on the world’s oceans where war
could be kept ‘cold’ by creating an overwhelming military presence that could locate and
neutralize threats if necessary, otherwise, staying quiet and overlooked—the submarine. 33
A major part of preventing nuclear warfare was a policy known as nuclear deterrence. In
the U.S., deterrence policy relied on a form of psychological conditioning that emphasized the
devastating outcome of nuclear warfare yet assured the American public that simply having the
ability to cause total nuclear destruction would be enough to prevent a Russian attack, thereby
30
"NSC-68, U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 1950." Mount Holyoke College Archives.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nsc-68/nsc68-1.htm (accessed September 9, 2009).
31
"U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," NSC 20/4, 23 November
1948. Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar/nsc20-
4.htm (accessed September 25, 2009).
32
Sasgen, Stalking the Red Bear, p. 3-- As we have learned since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, most Soviet
leaders did not want a nuclear war because they knew they could not win; however, they tended to project their
expansionist ambitions onto their opponents, leading to strident threats regarding their desire to wipe the U.S. out of
existence.
33
Burns, Thomas S. The secret war for the ocean depths: Soviet-American rivalry for mastery of the seas. 1st ed.
New York: Rawson Associates Publishers, 1978, xii.
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eliminating pressure for a pre-emptive strike. 34 Deterrence policy also encouraged the Soviets to
develop a nuclear arsenal roughly comparable to that of the U.S. in accord with a concept called
“weapons parity” which provided a rough assurance that no one side could do more damage than
their opponent could retaliate with, a policy known as MAD. 35
Theoretically, MAD should have been enough to avert nuclear warfare; however, due to
the ideological basis of Soviet Communism, the Soviets had a professed interest in anti-
American aggression equal to or greater than America’s desire to avoid a conflict.
Consequently, there was always a chance Soviet ideologues would decide the gains of a nuclear
attack outweighed the damage if the worst the United States could do was equal damage. Also,
military technology and strategy evolves and develops in an almost organic manner, creating a
constant shift in the balance of power, making it crucial for the American government to know
what technology and tactics the Soviets were employing in order to prevent an overwhelming
threat to U.S. national security. 36
It was in this atmosphere that special missions submarine activity would become a
critical tool of deterrence policy. 37 The submarine’s ability to plunge into the depths of the
ocean where it could travel unseen and unheard allowed it to poke into Soviet ports, ‘fingerprint’
Soviet missile submarines, study the wreckage of sunken ships, and turn secure phone lines into
a party line that allowed American policymakers to neutralize the entire Soviet Navy.
Calculated Risk: Strategic Coastal Invasion
Coastal invasion, the most self-explanatory form of Cold War special missions activity,
was a tactic in which U.S. submarines infiltrated locations along the Soviet coastline, including
34
Craven, The Silent War, p. 53.
35
Craven, The Silent War, p.53.
36
37
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ports and naval installations, to hover just beneath the water’s surface, gathering visual and
SIGINT data via the boat’s periscope and antennae arrays. 38 Despite the obvious dangers, in the
years prior to the Space Race, physically penetrating these locations was often the only way for
U.S. intelligence officials to observe Soviet naval installations, or look for signs that the military
was preparing an offensive against the U.S. or its NATO allies. At the same time, strategic
invasion allowed American SSN crews to hone the war-fighting skills necessary to navigate
blindly into heavily monitored locations, pause to gather intelligence, then retreat from the area
without the Soviets realizing their security had been breached. 39 Invasions were also an effective
way of keeping the Communist government and its military apparatus off-balance and insecure.
That U.S. submarines were able to cruise into the most valuable locations in the Soviet Navy
with such impunity indicated that, in the event of an active war, the U.S. would have the option
of launching a nuclear attack within close range of Soviet territory without the Soviet Navy
being able to stop, or even find them. 40
Especially in activities such as this, a submarine commander’s worth was determined by
the extent to which he embodied the “cowboy” ethos of the Cold War submarine fleet, which
encouraged initiative and ingenuity. 41 The rule was, “Drive close to Soviet craft, even closer to
Soviet shores. Take any risks. Don’t get caught.” 42 Most SSN commanders embraced this
charge with a will and plunged into a unique brand of Russian roulette, driving “straight into
Soviet territorial waters,” trading personal security for the triumph of obtaining those precious
pieces of information sought by American intelligence officials and policymakers. 43
38
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 26.
39
Ibid, 26.
40
Ibid, 43.
41
Ibid, 43.
42
Ibid, 42.
43
Ibid, 43.
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In 1960, Commander William Behrens of the U.S.S. Skipjack (SSN-585) would
epitomize this ethos of initiative when he successfully navigated into the heart of the Northern
44
Fleet’s submarine installation in Murmansk, on the Barents’ Sea. To do so, Behrens
maneuvered the Skipjack miles down the channel leading into the base and navigated within
forty feet of the pier before raising his periscope to look around and capture images. Of course,
Skipjack officers had disabled one of the boat’s mechanical tracking devices prior to entering the
waterway, ensuring that, if Behrens failed and the Skipjack was captured, the Navy would have
the protection of plausible deniability in declaiming responsibility for Behrens’presence. 45
Another motive for coastal invasions tactics appeared in the late 1950s, as the Soviet
Navy developed submarine installations throughout their coastal territories. Some of these bases,
like Rybachiy on the Kamchatka Peninsula in the northern Pacific, were difficult, or impossible,
to monitor via aerial or surface ship methods. As the largest of the Pacific Submarine Fleet’s
(PACFLT) installations, Rybachiy could not be left unmonitored; therefore, the SSN fleet
became its watchdog. In the 1970s and 80s, this task would be critical as the Soviets developed a
wartime strategy involving a regional oceanic blockade absorbing the Sea of Japan, parts of
Southeast Asia, and threatening the Alaskan archipelago barely 500 miles from Rybachiy in the
process. 46
Fingerprinting the Soviet Fleet
In addition to gathering HUMINT & SIGINT during coastal invasions, American SSNs
were able to undermine the effectiveness of the Soviet submarine fleet by using sensitive
acoustic equipment and ultra-quiet propulsion systems to covertly monitor Soviet SSBN
locations. John Craven referred to this activity as “track-and-trail,” a tactic in which passive
44
45
Ibid, 42.
46
Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 15; Ford 387
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ASW systems like SOSUS provided an initial “trail” or location of a Soviet submarine to an
American SSN which would intercept and “trail” it through the ocean. 47 Track-and-trail’s
official purpose was to ensure there was no place in the ocean Russian submarines could go
where American submarines could not locate and destroy them. 48 This tactic’s effectiveness was
demonstrated during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when Soviet General Secretary Nikita
Khrushchev dispatched at least four Foxtrot SSBNs to break the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba.49
Each of boats was located and forced to retreat with days of the American fleet receiving orders
to intercept them. 50
In 1967, Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov would present an aggressive new naval strategy
that involved deploying the Soviet Union’s submarine fleet deeper into international waters than
any previous Soviet submarine had ventured—sometimes, their missions even crossed into U.S.
territorial waters. 51 Gorshkov claimed that:
In the past our ships and naval aviation units have been operated primarily near
our coast, concerned mainly with operations and tactical coordination with ground troops.
Now, we must be prepared for broad offensive operations against sea and ground troops
of the imperialists on any point of the world’s oceans and adjacent territories. 52
This strategy, coupled with the deployment of the majority of the Soviet SSN and SSBN
fleets to Rybachiy submarine base, placed dozens of nuclear missiles in close range to American
domestic interests. 53 The Soviet military’s stated intent of creating a long-range offensive
47
Craven, The Silent War, p. 93; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 30.
48
Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 70.
49
Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 23—Although the Soviet Navy had a system of identifying their submarines, it was
not publically released, leading NATO to assign random designations from the universal military phonetic alphabet
such as Foxtrot, Golf, and Yankee to Soviet submarine classes, easing recognition by NATO ASW forces.
50
Polmar, Norman. Soviet naval power: Challenge for the 1970s (Strategy papers). Revised ed. New York, NY:
Published By Crane, Russak For National Strategy Information Center, 1974, 41.
51
52
53
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submarine fleet made track-and-trail missions critical for U.S security in the face of this threat to
the nuclear balance.
As the U.S.S. Lapon’s (SSN-61) forty-two day trailing mission will illustrate, track-and-
trail played another role in maintaining the U.S. Navy’s ability to neutralize the Soviet missile
fleet. Certain track-and-trail missions sought to record technical data about new submarines
entering the Soviet fleet, including a form of SIGINT crucial to track-and-trail, called an acoustic
signature. This signature forms a submarine’s fingerprint and consists of noises made by the
submarine’s propulsion systems, turbines, flow-induced bubbles, and propeller cavitation
patterns. 54 Once recorded, these signatures were sent to NAVINT analysts for incorporation into
a central database of Soviet submarines. In future encounters, this signature database allowed
sonar technicians to identify the Soviet submarines they encountered—sometimes to a specific
class, other times to a single ship. 55 Submarine commanders assigned to these types of track-
and-trail assignments were given the freedom to fulfill their orders any way they could, so long
as they retrieved the intelligence necessary to ensure Soviet submarines could not escape
American detection. 56
In 1969, the first Yankee-class SSBN’s began to leave Soviet shipyards and enter active
duty. 57 American intelligence reports indicated that, in designing the Yankee, the Soviets had
somehow managed to clone the American Polaris SSBN. In addition, the Yankee was believed
to have a missile system capable of striking a target from over a thousand miles away. In
comparison, U.S. SSBNs would not attain this range until Trident I in 1972. 58 Equally, if the
54
Burns, The Secret War, p. 66-67; Cavitation: Each propeller produces a pattern of cavitation noises generated by
air bubbles that form and collapse at the tip of the propeller blades as they rotate in a unique beat.
55
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 122; Burns, The Secret War, p. 64; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 30.
56
57
Ibid, 121.
58
Polmar¸Soviet Naval Power, p. 50.
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Yankee’s propulsion systems were as quiet as Polaris’s, even the SOSUS nets might not be able
to detect its presence. 59 The U.S. government needed to know how accurate these assessments
were, so, if necessary, ASW equipment and strategy could be updated to bring the U.S. back into
parity with the Soviet Union.
In late 1969, Commander Chester M. Mack of the U.S.S. Lapon located one of the new
Yankees performing maneuvers in the Northern Fleet’s training area of the Barents’ Sea and set
out to trail it. 60 Lapon’s crew set out to track the Yankee as it submerged and began its patrol.
Herein rested their first challenge as NAVINT’s fears about the Yankee propulsion system were
borne out. The Yankee disappeared amid the oceanic noise of the Greenland shipping lanes,
successfully eluding SOSUS, ASW planes, and Lapon for days. Only when Mack adopted a
“close trail,” maintaining a traveling distance of less than 3,000 feet between the two boats at all
times, were Lapon sonar technicians able to consistently track the sounds accompanying the
Yankee’s motion. 61 Over the following days, Lapon technicians located flaws in the Yankee’s
propulsion system that enabled easier tracking, developed a method of monitoring its traveling
speed based on propeller cavitation and, crucially, the Yankee’s patrol pattern. 62 Mapping the
boat’s patrol pattern allowed NAVINT analysts to determine that the thousand-mile strike range
tentatively attributed to the Yankee missile system was accurate, and then disseminate this
information to ASW forces in the Yankee fleet’s patrol areas. 63
Ultimately, the Lapon would trail its Yankee target for 47 days, an entire Soviet SSBN
deployment. 64 By trailing the Yankee for such an extended period, not only was Lapon able to
59
Polmar¸Soviet Naval Power, p. 49; Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 121-122.
60
61
Ibid, 132.
62
Ibid, 134.
63
Ibid, 134.
64
Ibid, 127, 138.
Page | 15
capture its audio signature, it also recorded physical quirks of Soviet SSBN patrols such as when
the boat maneuvered to check for intruders or surfaced to radio central command in Murmansk. 65
Another valuable nugget of intelligence discovered was that, however quiet the Yankee’s
propulsion system might be, the boat was nearly deaf. The Yankee’s sonar arrays were barely
half as effective as those aboard American Sturgeon-class SSN’s. 66 Despite leaks to the
American press which, by hinting at the Lapon’s presence, sent the Yankee into active ASW
maneuvers, the Lapon was able to maintain its close trail and follow the boat back to Murmansk
undetected. 67
Deep Ocean of Secrets: Ocean Floor Salvage and Surveillance
Beyond the rigid assignments of attack and missile submarines exists a unique genre of
boats nominally devoted to oceanographic research but truly designed for espionage projects. 68
Each of these boats, referred to as a “special projects” submarines, is modified from an existing
class of American submarine, sometimes a missile boat, more often an attack boat, to fulfill a
certain set of goals set by the NAVINT community. 69 Assignments for special projects boats
during the Cold War included technical espionage, oceanic exploration, and specialized SIGINT
retrieval missions—collectively referred to as ‘special missions.’
The first special projects submarine was the U.S.S. Halibut (SSGN-587), a nuclear-
powered missile boat originally designed for the short-lived Regulus system. When Regulus was
replaced by the Polaris missile system, Halibut was requisitioned by the chief scientist of the
Special Projects Office, and head of the U.S.N. Deep Submergence Systems Projects (DSSP),
65
66
Ibid, p.135.
67
Ibid, p.138.
68
Ibid, p.54.
69
Ibid, p.54, 211.
Page | 16
John Piña Craven. 70 Craven took the Halibut and modified its Regulus missile hold and ballast
tanks into an onboard data-analysis center and launch bay for oceanic surveillance equipment. 71
Halibut’s modified form was dictated by an Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) file titled
“Operation Sand Dollar.” 72 Sand Dollar was the manifestation on the ONI’s long-standing
desire to retrieve Soviet military technology, including nuclear missiles and guidance systems,
from the ocean floor. 73 Their ambitions were being thwarted by the fact that many of these
objects rested beneath as much as 13,000 feet of water and no contemporary submarine could
descend beyond 1,500 feet. 74 Halibut would be adapted to hover over salvage sites, and use
deep-sea cameras to locate and mark objects for retrieval by deep-sea submersibles being
developed concurrently by DSSP. 75 In 1961, Halibut completed its first major retrieval mission
when it successfully located an American hydrogen bomb that had plunged into the ocean off the
coast of Palomares, Spain, when its B-52 carrier collided with a refueling plane. 76 Later, in
1971, Halibut would collect Soviet nuclear missile fragments including a radar altimeter and
parts of the missile’s infrared homing system, which U.S. scientists hoped would contribute to
the development of defense systems capable of neutralizing Soviet cruise missile attacks. 77
The reputation of the special missions submarine program was assured when, in 1968, the
Soviet Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) lost a Golf-class SSBN (K-129) somewhere between Rybachiy
naval base on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. 78 K-129 had been tracked by
the usual Soviet radio checks and American SIGNIT networks—attack submarines, SOSUS, and
70
71
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 61; Craven, The Silent War, p. 135; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 127.
72
73
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 51; Craven, The Silent War, p.130.
74
75
76
Craven, The Silent War, p. 162-175.
77
78
Ibid, 75.
Page | 17
radio intercepts until it disappeared soon after crossing the International Date Line. 79 When K-
129’s absence came to their attention, the Soviet surface and submarine fleet flooded into the
Pacific Ocean, searching desperately for their rogue missile submarine. 80 This unusual activity
naturally garnered interest from NAVINT officials eager to find and search a Soviet missile
submarine for useful intelligence items. Craven and Captain James F. Bradley, Jr. of ONI used
SIGINT data including radio transmissions made by K-129 prior to its disappearance and a
“good-sized bang” noted by SOSUS analysts to conclude that the real site of K-129’s sinking
was nowhere near where the Soviets were searching. 81 Craven convinced the Navy to sink a
mothballed submarine so he could record the sounds of a sinking submarine and compare them
to records from the Pacific SOSUS network coinciding with the time of K-129’s disappearance.
Ultimately, Craven isolated K-129’s location to an area barely three hundred miles north-
northeast of Pearl Harbor. 82 This surprising analysis raised national security concerns among
many American intelligence officials. First, Soviet SSBN’s, which follow rigid patrol patterns,
rarely came so close to U.S. territories. Second, the Soviet Navy was searching for K-129 near
its assigned patrol area, which suggested the submarine had not been acting on official orders
when it sailed so close to Hawaii, leading to the question of what it was doing there. Finally, if
K-129’s deployment was intentional and the search was a cover-up, the U.S. needed to know
who sent the boat to Hawaii and why. 83
Once Craven’s team had located the K-129 where it lay on the ocean floor, they would
engage in nearly a month of examining various pieces of wreckage for clues as to its mission and
79
80
81
Craven, The Silent War, p. 206; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 124.
82
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 80; Craven, The Silent War, p. 212; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 89, 124.
83
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 80; Craven, The Silent War, p. 209.
Page | 18
ultimate demise. 84 Soon after, the operation, which began as part of ONI’s Project Sand Dollar,
would be appropriated by the CIA, which would attempt an unprecedented salvage operation,
known as Project Jennifer, one of the most notorious CIA operations of the Cold War. 85 Today,
NAVINT and CIA reports regarding the K-129 operation remain among the most highly
classified records of Cold War espionage. 86 Despite this, eyewitness reports and records from
both Soviet and American archives have been uncovered and compiled in the book Red Star
Rogue which provides a dramatic hypothesis for why K-129 was so close to Pearl Harbor when it
sank. The author, Kenneth Sewell, posits that K-129 was on a KGB-run covert operation to
launch a thermonuclear attack on Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the city of Honolulu when it was
destroyed by a malfunction in the missile launch mechanism, a hypothesis Craven admitted in
his biography was considered plausible by intelligence officials during the mission. 87
The successful conclusion of the K-129 mission helped Craven and Bradley cement the
role of the submarine in Cold War espionage. 88 More importantly, albeit unknowingly, by
adapting submarines for ocean floor operations, Craven and Bradley were setting the stage for a
mission in the 1980s that would contribute to the transformation of American Cold War policy
and help bring about the ultimate neutralization of the Soviet naval threat.
Party Line: Tapping the Naval Communications Cables
Arguably, the submarine force’s greatest contribution to Cold War espionage was a top-
secret mission to record the conversations of Soviet naval officials sitting in Moscow,
Murmansk, and Vladivostok. The results of this mission would permeate the Reagan Maritime
84
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 77; Craven, The Silent War, p. 213; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 125, 131.
85
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 51; Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 203; Craven, The Silent War, p. 222.
86
Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 123: New York Times, "Project Jennifer," March 20, 1975. http://proquest.umi.com
(accessed December 1, 2009); Seymour Hersh, "CIA Salvage Ship Brought Up Part of Soviet Sub Lost 1968; Failed
to Raise Atom Missiles.” New York Times, March 19, 1975. http://proquest.umi.com (accessed December 1, 2009).
87
Richmond, Red Star Rogue, p. 142-3, 146; Craven, The Silent War, p. 217.
88
Page | 19
Doctrine of the early 1980s, a comprehensive naval strategy contributing to the ultimate end of
the Cold War military threat. 89
Inspiration for this groundbreaking endeavor was drawn from a childhood memory of
ONI director, James Bradley. 90 Growing up on the shores of the Mississippi River, Bradley
often traveled on the river where he saw warning signs marking points at which power and
communication cables ran across the riverbed. 91 Decades later, as ONI director, Bradley
reasoned equivalent signs must exist along the Soviet coastlines marking the location of hard-
line phone cables connecting remote Soviet submarine bases with command centers in
Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Moscow. 92 He postulated that, if he could use Halibut’s superb
ocean floor adaptations to locate and tap these cables, the resulting intelligence might offer
United States policymakers valuable insight into the realities of Soviet government, something
American analysts were just realizing was totally disconnected from western political behavior. 93
The Halibut was first sent to the Sea of Okhotsk in 1970, where it located a
communications cable connecting Rybachiy submarine base on the Kamchatka Peninsula and
PACFLT headquarters in Vladivostok and successfully deployed a team of U.S.N. saturation
divers to lay the initial tap. 94 Whatever data this first tap yielded remains classified as does its
impact on Cold War policy; however, everyone in the intelligence community knew their
accomplishments had been eclipsed by this mission. 95 Never before had so much data been
89
Balano, The Admirals Advantage, p. 107.
90
91
Ibid, 160.
92
Ibid, 158-9.
93
Ibid, 159.
94
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 158-9; Craven, The Silent War, p. 137; Saturation Diving was tool pioneered by the
Sealab program and embraced by DSSP. It is a deep-sea diving technique that allows humans to work for extended
periods in up to 600 feet of water without physical damage. See Craven, The Silent War, Ch. 11 for further details.
95
Page | 20
collected in a single intelligence operation, through either HUMINT or SIGINT. 96 Despite
Halibut’s successes, the pinnacle of the cable-tapping program would not come until the early
1980’s.
In 1973, as the Soviets began to commission new Delta-class SSBN’s for the Atlantic
Northern Fleet, NAVINT observers began to notice a change in their pattern of SSBN
deployment. Rather than engaging in open-water patrols as was customary for missile boats, the
Deltas, boats with the ability to strike American cities from 4,200 miles away, were being limited
to patrols within the Barents Sea, where they were shielded by a layer of Soviet SSN’s and
surface ships. 97 Some analysts, including Richard L. Haver of NAVINT, believed this action to
be a defensive strategy aimed at tipping the nuclear balance in favor of the Soviets, but no one
was positive. 98 Ultimately, the Navy’s method of closing this intelligence gap would be the
U.S.S. Parche (SSN-683), one of nine modified Sturgeon-class attack submarines, designed for
special missions assignments. 99
In 1979, the Parche would be sent after the El Dorado of intelligence resources, the
communications cable connecting the Northern Fleet’s Barents Sea naval installations with
command centers in Murmansk and Moscow. 100 Because the Northern Fleet was comprised of
the best ships in the Soviet Navy, its home waters in the Barents were heavily guarded against
submarine intrusion, making penetration of the area complex and dangerous. Ultimately, Parche
would depart from San Francisco, travel north past Alaska, where it would traverse the Bering
Strait before passing beneath the polar icecap and emerging into the Barents’ Sea some 5,500
96
97
Polmar¸ Soviet Naval Power, p. 50; Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 210; Owen R.Cote, "The Third Battle:
Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines." The U.S. Navy.
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/cold-war-asw.html (accessed September 25, 2009). 63-64
98
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 210; Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, "The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings
of Reagan's Maritime Strategy." Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (2005): 379-409, p. 384.
99
100
Ibid, 211, 215.
Page | 21
miles later. 101 Like the Halibut before it, the Parche successfully laid its tap; however, several
years would pass before the ultimate impact of the Parche’s feat became apparent.
Barely a year later, in 1980, Ronald W. Reagan was elected as the 40th President of the
United States of America on a platform of strong national defense, economic renewal, limited
domestic government, and anti-communism. 102 In support of his national defense agenda,
Reagan would appoint John F. Lehman as Secretary of State and task him with countering the
ongoing Soviet naval buildup and securing U.S. nuclear deterrent advantage. 103 By this time, the
Soviets had further developed their 1970s strategy of restricting SSBN movement, pulling their
SSBNs into even more defensible “bastions” including the Sea of Okhostk, the White Sea, and
waters beneath the polar icecaps—locations American SSN’s would be hard-pressed to penetrate
in the event of war, thereby robbing the U.S. of its ability to neutralize the Soviet missile
threat. 104 Haver and like-minded analysts continued to view this activity as a defensive strategy
meant to protect Soviet SSBN’s from the American SSNs that were omnipresent in open-water
patrols. 105 Despite hypothesis, the United States remained undeniably vulnerable to a Soviet first
strike attack from SSBNs beneath the polar icecap. 106 Concerns about Soviet military activity
were compounded by the rhetoric of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev’s successor, Yuri V.
Andropov, a former KGB director known for brutal treatment of Soviet dissidents, and the events
of the Prague Spring. 107 Andropov adhered to an alarmist platform of "taking the fight to the
enemy," and was convinced that an American first-strike nuclear attack was imminent, claims
101
102
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 221; Reagan, Ronald W. "Inaugural Address." Address, Inauguration of the
President of the United States of America from U.S.S, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1981.
103
104
Ibid p. 232.
105
Ford 384.
106
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 232-3.
107
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 241; Global Security.org. “Yuri Andropov and the Kremlin's Aggressive Foreign
Policy." GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/2007/deep-politics-2-1.htm
(accessed December 7, 2009).
Page | 22
even fellow KGB officials felt were hyperbole. 108 Andropov died in 1984, leaving more rational
leaders in his place; however, U.S. officials were still baffled by what they interpreted as
unnecessary panic in Soviet responses to events like the Pershing Missile deployment and NATO
joint-maritime exercise Able Archer 83. 109
Finally, in 1984, Parche delivered the answer to these questions and so much more when
she returned from a records collections trip. The recordings retrieved on this mission included
copies of Soviet military official’s conversations from throughout the 1983 Able Archer
exercise, including insight into how the USSR would prepare for a nuclear war, their military
command structure, and, crucially, the motivations behind the bastion strategy. 110 These
recording offered such groundbreaking insight into Soviet military strategy, that some
intelligence and military officials would christen this collection “the crown jewels” of Cold War
espionage. 111 In 2005, Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg of ONI’s Maritime Strategy
Department emphasized the implications of this accomplishment, saying:
That new intelligence could be acquired is itself a remarkable tale that owes much
to the planning, foresight and willingness to take risks shown by the Navy’s senior
leadership [. . .] without which these vital ‘deep penetrations’ of the Soviet Union could
not have occurred. That the acquisition of such information could lead to wholesale
doctrinal revisions, however, is in some way an even more remarkable story. 112
The Parche’s intelligence confirmed that, in the event of nuclear war, the Soviet SSBN
fleet would withdraw into coastal bastions and beneath the polar icecap where they would be
held in reserve for a second-strike attack. 113 These reports also exposed the vulnerability of the
Soviet Navy, for whom the bastions offered their last hope of maintaining a viable SSBN force
108
Yuri Andropov; Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 241.
109
Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 243-4; Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 383; “A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983
Soviet War Scare.” Central Intelligence Agency. www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum (accessed November 10, 2009).
110
111
Ibid, 245.
112
Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 390.
113
Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 382, 385; Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 245.
Page | 23
and protecting it from the American SSN’s who dogged their paths everywhere else in the
ocean. 114 While the first-strike implications of the bastions must have been taken into account
by Soviet strategists, defense was the Soviet Navy’s overriding motivation in the “bastion”
strategy. Despite this, for the U.S. to leave the bastions unchallenged would have ceded the
nuclear balance to the Soviets by allowing them to retain an untouchable nuclear strike force. 115
Additionally, although the bastions described in Soviet policy referred to the actual harbors and
inlets shielding the SSBN fleet, guaranteeing that U.S. vessels would be unable to reach these
sites meant the Soviets had to keep Americans ships away from all Soviet territorial waters in a
tactic called “sea denial.” 116 Soviet sea denial plans dictated that the Sea of Japan, Greenland,
and parts of the Northwest Pacific Basin would be blockaded to ensure the invulnerability of the
Soviet SSBN fleet. 117 This plan, which involved Soviet expansion into U.S. territory and that of
its allies, was unacceptable to American officials who set out to overthrow Soviet naval strategy.
American strategists would use Parche’s SIGINT data and other HUMINT sources to
create the first comprehensive naval doctrine shaped by concrete knowledge of Soviet military
planning and psychology, rather than second-hand hypotheses and projection of Western
values. 118 This plan would be known as the Reagan Maritime Doctrine. 119 Major objectives
underlying the Maritime Doctrine included nullifying Soviet naval strategy and minimizing the
U.S.S.R’s militaristic threat in order to push them into greater communication with NATO
countries while pressuring them to abandon the quest for nuclear dominance. 120 To that end, the
Maritime Doctrine as promulgated by Secretary Lehman included a strategy designed to render
114
Cote, Third Battle, p. 65.
115
116
Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 386-7.
117
Ibid, 387.
118
Ibid, 382.
119
Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 382; Cote, Third Battle, p. 77; Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff, p. 245.
120
Page | 24
the Soviets SSBN bastions ineffective by neutralizing the SSN and surface fleets guarding them,
thereby stripping the SSBN’s of their shield, and neutralizing their second-strike potential. 121
Further, the new strategy suggested that if the U.S.N. were able to block the bulk of the Soviet
submarine fleets into a few physical cul-de-sacs, then ASW surface and SSN forces would be
able to isolate and destroy the hostile boats despite the lack of track-and-trail locating. 122
This new strategy led to increased activity within the U.S. submarine fleet as Naval
commanders sent their boats on aggressive missions to demonstrate penetration of the heavily
defended bastions was possible. In addition, U.S. and NATO surface fleets began running war
games designed to demonstrate that American and allied fleets could, and would, go anywhere in
the ocean they so chose—even into the heart of the Soviet-dominated northern seas, negating sea
denial in the process. 123 Mock sinkings, unofficial war-games, underwater “charges,” and polar
icecap operations formed the SSN fleet’s program of “perception management,” a tactic
designed to drill holes in Soviet naval defense and destroy the viability of their wartime
strategy. 124 In penetrating these last bastions of the Soviet Navy, the U.S.N. made it unlikely the
USSR would be able to launch a military attack without risking their entire SSBN second-strike
force. 125
Ultimately, Reagan Doctrine policies would reveal the weakness of the Soviet submarine
fleet and its inability to wage an effective naval war. Despite their aggressive nature, these
activities were designed to avoid nuclear war while demonstrating the weakness of Soviet
communism and its failure to crush the capitalist liberal-democracies of the West. The Soviet
121
122
123
Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 393; Cote, Third Battle, p. 65.
124
Balano, The Admirals Advantage, p. 94; Cote, Third Battle, p. 75-76; Ford, Reagan Maritime Strategy, p. 398.
125
Page | 25
Navy had been so far outstripped by American technological and intelligence advances that it
was neutralized as a significant strategic threat. 126
The Thaw: Conclusions
In conclusion, it is clear that while the USN’s missile submarine program played an
important part in discouraging a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union, the clandestine special
missions carried out by fast attack and special missions submarines throughout the Cold Was
played an equally vital role in nuclear deterrence policy. Submarines, with their ability to remain
submerged for indefinite periods, and travel through the seas undetected, seem custom-made for
the unique demands of the combative non-confrontation that was the Cold War. Throughout the
war, special missions submarines would support U.S. deterrence policy as they sought to provide
American military and political figures with means of attaining technological and strategic
dominance over the Soviet Union and bring about a peaceful end to the nuclear standoff.
Submarines would contribute to the goal as they invaded Soviet waters prove it could be done
and to watch for military activity betraying a Soviet offensive that would need to be reported to
American diplomats and analysts. Their ability to function in water deeper than human divers
could descend allowed boats like Halibut to investigate Soviet and American wrecks or snatch
valuable bits of equipment from the sea floor for scientists and strategists to explore and
counteract. However, any of these missions could be discounted and the submarine would still
have caused the greatest shift twentieth-century American military policy. The Reagan Maritime
Strategy, fueled by SSN-gathered intelligence, borrowed Sun Tzu’s advice that “the highest
realization of warfare is to attack the enemy’s plans,” demonstrating to the Soviets that their
126
Page | 26
military was without defense capabilities and ending the global threat posed by the Soviet
Navy. 127
127
Ford/Rosenberg 393
Page | 27
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Boomers, Hunters, and Spies:

American Submarine Espionage in Cold War Military Policy

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DSSP Deep Submergence Systems Project

GIUK Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom oceanic bottleneck

ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

MAD Mutually Assured Destruction

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVINT Naval Intelligence

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence

PACFLT Soviet Pacific Fleet

SIGINT signals intelligence

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SONAR sound navigation and ranging

SOSUS Sound Surveillance System

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine

SSN nuclear fast-attack submarine

USN United States Navy

U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

fleet in a structure known as the Nuclear Triad. 3

deterrence systems and strategies to neutralize Soviet advances. Ultimately, submarine

programs designed specifically for the submarine’s unique capabilities.

The Submarine in Cold War Scholarship

espionage in the realm of popular literature—newspapers, novels, and non-fiction books—than

Developing a deeper understanding of this subject required consultation with general

officially unacknowledged. 6 Another byzantine feature of international intelligence is that there

information, to be published without federal objections. 7 The necessary emphasis placed on

The Dawn of Modern Submarine Warfare

general direction of an incoming U-boat, not its actual location. 11

Submarine Warfare Comes to the United States

to monitor German radio communication. 15 Later, British and American intelligence

communities would develop a joint Operational Intelligence Department (OPINTEL), which

combined SIGINT, cryptology, and human intelligence (HUMINT), to create a comprehensive

survival, an observation which led to the first comprehensive US submarine strategy. By

boundaries of their orders.

and send sailors overland to blow up a railway trestle. 28

Fighting to Avoid War

summed up in this report, saying:

neutralize threats if necessary, otherwise, staying quiet and overlooked—the submarine. 33

their opponent could retaliate with, a policy known as MAD. 35

American aggression equal to or greater than America’s desire to avoid a conflict.

threat to U.S. national security. 36

Calculated Risk: Strategic Coastal Invasion

being able to stop, or even find them. 40

Especially in activities such as this, a submarine commander’s worth was determined by

pieces of information sought by American intelligence officials and policymakers. 43

In 1960, Commander William Behrens of the U.S.S. Skipjack (SSN-585) would

the protection of plausible deniability in declaiming responsibility for Behrens’presence. 45

Fingerprinting the Soviet Fleet

territorial waters. 51 Gorshkov claimed that:

the nuclear balance.

submarine’s propulsion systems, turbines, flow-induced bubbles, and propeller cavitation

sonar technicians to identify the Soviet submarines they encountered—sometimes to a specific

parity with the Soviet Union.

information to ASW forces in the Yankee fleet’s patrol areas. 63

Deep Ocean of Secrets: Ocean Floor Salvage and Surveillance

retrieval missions—collectively referred to as ‘special missions.’

who sent the boat to Hawaii and why. 83

destroyed by a malfunction in the missile launch mechanism, a hypothesis Craven admitted in

Party Line: Tapping the Naval Communications Cables

the Cold War military threat. 89

PACFLT headquarters in Vladivostok and successfully deployed a team of U.S.N. saturation

Boomers, Hunters, & Spies: American Submarine Espionage in Cold War Military Policy

Boomers, Hunters, & Spies: American Submarine Espionage in Cold War Military Policy