Archive of Revolutionary Warfare Tactics

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Department of the Army
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Washington 25, D.C.
Intelligence Translation No. H-2060
Intelligence Document Branch No. 2091451
Translation Requested by: ODCS OPS, Special Warfare
Translated (From) French
Translated by: W.E.C.
SUBJECT: (FOREIGN TITLE)
Part I La Guerre Revolutionnaire et ses Donnees Fondamentales.
Part II Cas Concrets de Guerre Revolutionnaire.
Part III Le Raisonnement du Chef Revolutionnaire.
Part IV Les Conditions de la Parade et de la Riposte a la Guerre
Revolutionnaire.
SUBJECT: (ENGLISH TITLE)
Part I Revolutionary War and Its Fundamental Facts.
Part II Concrete Cases of Revolutionary War.
Part III The Reasoning of the Revolutionary Chief.
Part IV Requirements for Checking and Countering Revolutionary War.
REFERENCES:
AUTHOR: Ximenes, Capt Labignette, Capt A. Souyris and H. Carrere d'Encausse.
TITLE OF PUBLICATION: "Revue Militaire D'Information" No. 281
PARTS TRANSLATED: Pages 9 - 111
PUBLISHER, DATE AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION: February-March 1957
---------------------------------------------------------------
Part I.
WHAT IS REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE?
We must look at this problem not only as it appears to us, but also, and
especially, as the Marxists and Leninists present and treat it, directly
when the local Communist Party is sufficiently strong, or indirectly
when they decide to support the Nationalist Parties. We must cease to be
duped by "appearances" and propaganda, which vary according to the
circles to which they are addressed. Lastly we must understand this mode
of combat, which has been perfected throughout the world since the
creation of the union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and especially in
our overseas territories since the end of World War II.
It seems, however, that in spite of our knowledge of its "external
forms" and techniques (which we French are in a good position to
evaluate), we have not yet grasped the "basic ideas" underlying
revolutionary warfare. It is high time, however, that we studied these
ideas carefully, for ignorance thereof is often the cause of the failure
of our efforts.
The object of revolutionary warfare is to be able to seize power with
the active participation of the population (who have been physically and
morally won over) by means of technical methods which are both
destructive and constructive, depending on the exact method used.
AN ESSAY ON REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
"Your men know how to fight, but they do not know how to engage in combat."
(Malraux)
Military opinion has now become allergic merely to the term
"revolutionary warfare". Any allusion to this problem arouses immediate
reactions. French officers, especially those who have served in
Indo-China or have served or are now serving in North Africa, engage in
violent arguments about it. Some deny the existence of any forms of
warfare other than those of the traditional type, while others awkwardly
use a new jargon, and still others exhibit a sort of inexorable fatalism.
The results obtained, the diversity of aspects, and the extensive spread
of certain phenomena may disconcert those who try to examine in detail
the mechanism of revolutionary warfare. It is difficult to give a
concise definition of the latter. This is why the problem now discussed
will be delimited, as well as defined, by a study of the armed struggles
of a minority who gradually succeed in controlling the population and in
giving them reasons for resisting the established rulers or an authority
whom they reject.
Owing to the increase of the manifestations observed, it has seemed
advisable to elucidate a number of permanent elementary phenomena, which
have been classified according to their effects. We have therefore tried
to regroup the facts in a few logical sequences that seem to apply
specifically to revolutionary conflicts. Lastly, we have tried to
determine the underlying motives, which, by overturning the apparent
ratio of power, make possible the astonishing victory of David over Goliath.
THE METHODS USED.
At first, the revolutionary minority is the very image of weakness as
compared with a governmental machine which appears formidable. All the
efforts of the rebels obviously tend to destroy this governmental
machine and to construct their own system.
The elementary manifestations of revolutionary warfare are therefore the
effects of techniques some of which are "destructive" and are used in
attacking the established order and its defenders, while the others,
which are "constructive", are designed to create the will to fight, the
means of combat, and the new forms of the State and of society.
DISINTEGRATION. We may distinguish among the former, those methods
designed to break up the old society, such as passive resistance,
strikes of different kinds, riots, and selective terrorism, such as the
destruction of bridges; in other words, the removal of persons capable
of inducing the population to accept the established order, (in colonial
countries, such persons comprise the traditional elite, physicians,
teachers, and professors, etc.).
INTIMIDATION. Disintegration is supplemented and reinforced by
techniques of intimidation, such as: the utilization of crowds (huge
parades and mass meetings), systematic terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla
warfare, etc.).
In the conduct of systematic terrorism, it is not merely necessary to
cause the disappearance by means of threats or assassination, of a
certain person who is hostile to the cause or is feared because of his
great influence. That which is sought is no longer merely the
elimination of an obstacle, but a general psychological effect.
If maltreatment is inflicted upon representative individuals of a
certain group (bankers, industrialists, large landed proprietors,
politicians, or public officials), this is done in order to intimidate
through them the entire group and place its members on the defensive or
induce them to flee.
This is also true of sabotage; crops are burned not merely to destroy
the crops themselves but to prevent the peasants from paying their taxes
or to discourage them quickly.
As for guerrilla warfare, its main features have often been described,
but its real effects do not solely consist in the losses inflicted upon
the enemy or in the arms recovered. The government officials, police,
and soldiers are intimidated by being constantly harassed, and the
government is weakened by the creation of a feeling of permanent insecurity.
(Figure 1, 7x5 in., entitled "A Destructive Technique: a Monster Parade
in Athens", appears here on p.12 of original).
(Figure 2, 7x5 in., entitled "A Method of Intimidation: Heckling
Degenerates into a Pitched Battle", appears here on p.13 of original).
DEMORALIZATION. Efforts are being made constantly, on every level. to
demoralize the political and military agencies of the enemy, by denying
successes, exaggerating checks, scepticism concerning the justice and
efficacy of the measures adopted, and casting doubt upon the good faith
of administrative officials. An effort is also made to deprive
government agents of reasons for their actions or, at least, to cause
them to doubt the value of what they are doing.
Such action is supplemented by poisoning the minds of neutrals: those
who have not taken sides and cannot be immediately terrorized or
demoralized are given all the assurances desirable and are overwhelmed
with justifications. The essential thing is to keep them out of the
struggle until their cases can be settled.
ELIMINATION. An effort is made to eliminate irreconcilables whenever
there is an occasion to do so. Moreover, selective or systematic
terrorism and guerrilla warfare have already made it possible partly to
attain this objective.
However, it is mainly when a hitherto impossible test of strength
becomes possible to the revolutionaries under favorable conditions that
they can have recourse to important means, such as "battles of
annihilation", "physical liquidation", and "mass" deportation and
execution. The "tough" ones who have resisted intimidation, the
poisoning of their minds, and demoralization are then given no quarter.
The impenitent neutrals are then called upon to make their choice.
It has been necessary for the rebels to prepare one by one, until this
time, the arms with which to win success.
CONSTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES.
SELECTION AND BASIC TRAINING. It has been necessary, in the first place,
for them to discover active elements, convince them of the necessity of
common action, strengthen their will, give them instructions, and place
them. Two techniques closely overlap, namely: the selection and the
basic training of active persons of every kind (leaders, speakers,
propagandists, and specialists from a certain circle) "volunteers", and
officers.
SOWING THE SEED. The active persons and leaders thus trained are used in
sowing the seed, at first in order to set up Communist cells, and
afterward to control the different circles and organized groups.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPREGNATION. Individual action is not sufficient. The
final resources of experimental psychology are employed in order to
sensitize an indifferent population. This technique is called
psychological impregnation, and consists in the supplying of stimuli,
the preparation of slogans adapted to the situation, the incessant
repetition of affirmations, the systematic resumption of the same
subjects by all the means of publicity, and the giving of a special
slant to information. Masters of this art have not been lacking, from
Pavlov to Tchakotine.
ORGANIZATION. The masses, after being recruited by the active workers
and indoctrinated daily, are prevented from falling back into their
habitual indifference by the organization technique. "Parallel
hierarchies" are organized (1) These comprise:
Trade associations (unions of workers, peasants, youth movements, sport
associations, veterans' societies, etc.);
Local committees, forming successive strata in a pyramid extending from
the elementary social cell to the "Central Committee";
A party machine.
EDIFICATION. The masses, who are at first amorphous and inert, are thus
gradually differentiated until they become an organized and animated
human group. At the same time, they are gradually weaned from the lawful
government through the effect of the destructive techniques.
The masses are engaged deeply during the struggle in applying the
constructive technique:
-To the organization of a base of support, to the support of the
revolutionary government, and to means of testing characteristic future
reforms;
-To the multiplication of similar bases strictly controlled by the
"Provisional Government";
-Lastly, to the "liberation of vast areas, consisting of a superficial
conquest followed by a conquest in depth." The revolutionary machine,
which has been secretly and patiently organized and improved, is now
revealed in the light of day.
TRADITIONAL RIPOSTES.
Revolutionary warfare, however, does not develop merely in accordance
with its own laws. The revolutionaries are not immune to the traditional
political and military means of action. They are constantly confronted,
on the contrary, with the reactions of the established government: on
being broken up, intimidated, demoralized, and decimated, it cannot long
remain passive without disappearing. It is compelled to defend itself.
It tries at a given moment to adapt itself to the conditions imposed by
the struggle, and responds in an increasingly violent fashion:
-At first, by means of pure and simple repression exerted by the police,
judicial, administrative, and military authorities, the object of which
is to eliminate the leaders and suppress the nuclei of pen or secret
opposition;
-Then, by means of "pacification", during which it tries to establish an
administration with a "new look" designed to restore the shaken social
order and promote the most urgent reforms;
-Later, by means of a frontless defense (2) consisting, on the one hand,
in the strong occupation of certain piers and in stationing militia or
territorial units in the intervals between them, and on the other, in
regrouping the mobile trained reserves in the hope of striking "decisive
blows against the revolutionary forces;
-Lastly, by means of a war of annihilation patterned after that waged by
the enemy, when the ratio between the strength of the opposing forces
tends to become equal. The established government then tries to enroll
the entire population; when its cause becomes desperate it appeals to
foreign nations for aid.
(Figure 3, 4.5 x 6.5 in., entitled "Riot Scene in Bombay. A Traditional
Response: The Re-establishment of Order by the Police", appears on Page
15 of the original).
THE METHODS USED.
Most of the studies of revolutionary warfare have hitherto tried to
divide it into the phases which are easiest to delimit and define. These
phases are, at bottom, merely periods of time during which the different
effects produced by the combined employment of several techniques are
seen. Theoreticians thus succeed in distinguishing certain "key
moments", to which they give certain more or less expressive names. At
the same time however, this dissection operation makes it impossible to
grasp and express the continuity and rhythm of revolutionary conflicts.
Now these conflicts exhibit great diversity and comprise initial
situations, the objectives pursued, the types of human beings involved,
the attitude of foreign countries, the successive changes in the
organization of forces, and include many more variants than do the
simple factors in traditional types of warfare.
Unless this matter is extremely simplified, it is therefore difficult
not only to define these "periods of time" but also to reduce the
revolutionary warfare waged in different places and under different
conditions to a common type.
We seem to get closer to the reality of the phenomenon by defining three
essential methods in accordance with which all the activities already
examined are constantly organized.
For convenience in description, these have been called CRYSTALLIZATION,
ORGANIZATION, AND MILITARIZATION.
CRYSTALLIZATION. By "crystallization" (3) we mean the rallying of wills
about the common motives for fighting. This is the "Why we are fighting
of the Americans. This is obviously a gradual state, and is constantly
strengthened by the dual method of attacking the enemy's morale and of
psychological impregnation of the masses. The rate at which the ideas of
the active propagandists are thus spread is not constant, but varies
according to the degree of crystallization already attained, and the
enemy's reactions. There are periods of expansion, periods of hardening,
but no periods of regression during successful revolutionary struggles
which succeed.
ORGANIZATION. We must include in "ORGANIZATION" the establishment and
functioning of the parallel hierarchies and their complete performance
in the areas containing partisans and bases of support.
MILITARIZATION. By "MILITARIZATION" we mean the simultaneous creation
and operation of an increasingly complicated military machine, engaged
in proportion to the completeness of its organization, as the creation
and operation of the units keep pace with each other. While the armed
forces are at first limited to action squads, they are gradually
increased and united in local bands and depend more and more on the
armed population (the militia) and are divided into territorial units
(guerrillas) and intervention units. While the intervention units
grouped in a main force have many features that render them comparable
to a traditional army, the combination of the territorial units and the
armed population is really specifically characteristic of revolutionary
warfare (4).
THE COMBINATION OF METHODS.
(Figure 4, 5 x 6.5 in., entitled "All Methods are good for Rallying
Wills about the Common Motives for Fighting; A Campaign of Posters", on
P.16).
(Figure 5, 4.5 x 7 inches, entitled "Political Propaganda and Courses of
Political Educations Create Volunteers", appears on p.17).
It will be found that numerous activities to which the use of these
techniques give rise (Cf. Part I), are actually comprised in the three
methods thus defined. We can now describe the continuity and rhythm of
revolutionary warfare.
These methods do not, indeed, develop independently. On the contrary,
they permanently interact upon each other in combinations that are
constantly changing.
1. -Thus, when a small cell of active persons has created a sufficiently
firm conviction by their work in a small group, this constitutes
crystallization.
It is possible to distribute certain responsibilities among the members
of this group (ORGANIZATION) and then to send forth a small shock group
to capture the arms kept in a police station (MILITARIZATION).
2. -A little later, after a band has been intensively trained, the
success of a large-scale ambush (MILITARIZATION) which is methodically
exploited by means of propaganda among the local population
(CRYSTALLIZATION), makes it possible to rally the latter and then to
establish a village council (ORGANIZATION).
3. -Following the installation of village, district, and provincial
committees in a new territory (ORGANIZATION), the propaganda
disseminated and the courses of political education held result in the
appearance of volunteers (CRYSTALLIZATION), who, after passing through a
training period, are permitted to engage in their first combat
(MILITARIZATION).
THE EVALUATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE SITUATION
It will be seen that the general situation can be evaluated and even
defined, at a given moment, by the extent of development of each method
at the time considered.
Conversely, an incorrect evaluation of the situation may be stated if
the state of development of certain processes at the time involved is
unknown or incorrectly evaluated.
For example:
1. -If the revolutionaries appear to have won over the population of a
territory, but these people have not been organized in efficient
parallel hierarchies and do not have a local secular arm at their
disposal, a sufficiently dense and skillful military occupation will be
capable of reversing the situation (CRYSTALLIZATION GOOD, ORGANIZATION
AND MILITARIZATION WEAK).
2. -If, on the contrary, a majority of the people have been won over by
the revolutionary ideology and persons secretly responsible have been
placed on the essential levels (CRYSTALLIZATION AND ORGANIZATION
STRONG), the revolutionary military machine may be rudimentary and
awkwardly managed (MILITARIZATION WEAK), the situation will not be so
"good", and the rottenness cannot be as easily reabsorbed as a
superficial study of the "enemy" factor (in the traditional meaning of
this word) might indicate.
The following famous phrase uttered by Mao Tse Tung: "We are opposed to
a purely military point of view and the principle of wandering bands,
but we regard the Red Army as a propaganda organization and a means of
organizing the power of the people", then becomes plain evidence of and
completely agrees with what has been said.
The interdependence of the three processes or methods is perfectly
evident: there are to be no wandering bands, because they do not permit
the complete development of the processes of crystallization and
organization among the population.
(Figure 6, 5.5 x 4 in., entitled "The Unanimous Opinion of the
inhabitants and their Solid Organization accelerates the Processes",
appears on p. 18 of original).
THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AND ITS BASES
As long as the revolutionaries live and fight in a hostile environment,
the development of these processes is retarded by opposing influences
(ideologies hostile to the revolution, and the acts of the lawful
authorities and of a large governmental army).
The establishment of a base of support (5) profoundly modifies these
environmental conditions. The unanimous opinion of the inhabitants,
their solid organization, and the military power represented by the mass
of the armed population supporting the main force, considerably
accelerates these processes and makes the techniques employed more
effective.
The base of support becomes a sort of micro-state after the
establishment of a Provisional Government. It henceforth constitutes a
sort of guaranty that these processes can function freely and derive new
vigor from the fact that it foreshadows a political and social
equilibrium. It prepares the way for post-revolutionary economic forms.
THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.
Revolutionary warfare thus appears to be an increasingly complicated and
far-reaching politico-military struggle. During recent years, the modes
of action of the revolutionary forces are generally found to be superior
to those of the opposing forces. It may also be stated, however, that
its successes are not due solely to the application of new principles of
warfare, the employment of psychological weapons, or even to the
technical efficiency of revolutionary armies, for these factors are not
sufficient to bring about success in spite of their effectiveness.
In fact:
-The traditional principles underlying warfare are applied in every case
of revolutionary warfare, for none of the principles claimed to be new
(6) seems to be of sufficiently wide application to be used as a
permanent rule of conduct;
-The employment of the psychological weapon imparts to the
politico-military operations a remarkable range, coherence, and
continuity; this weapon prepares the conditions required for success and
makes it possible to exploit the latter to the maximum extent, but it
does not create the success. A test of strength in which political and
military weapons are used is indispensable for bringing about a decision;
-The revolutionary armed forces generally continue to have a technical
value inferior to that of a good regular troop unit, in spite of the
efforts made to improve them. This is even true of the main force, for
when the Red Army has outgrown its "provincialism" it is incapable of
conquering the enemy and even suffers bloody checks (Warsaw in 1921,
Korea in 1951).
To what does revolutionary warfare owe its superiority?
It is due to two extraordinarily powerful factors, namely:
-The winning over of the population,
-Ideological conviction.
The theorists who advocate traditional warfare dwell upon the tyrannical
influence of the "terrain" and, since they are anxious to understand
better the real nature of modern warfare, they have begun to substitute
for this term (terrain) the more expressive word "environment." The
people thus take a modest place among the decisive factors in the
decision, owing to the bias due to considerations relating to physical,
economic, political, and human geography.
It is conceivable that the people might be regarded, at a pinch, as
merely a scenic element on the battle-field, when a judicial combat is
concerned. In the process of the evolution of combat from the tournament
of the Middle Ages into the traditional type of warfare, its nature has
not changed, but only the scale on which it takes place. In
revolutionary warfare, however, it is obviously insufficient to reduce
the population to mere accessory, for it is then completely engaged
wherever it may be found and whatever kind of arms is employed. It is
everybody's business to teach, harass, sabotage, and paralyze the enemy,
and not merely that of specialists.
The population should therefore be regarded as capable of engaging in
every form of activity and not merely as a source of recruits or a means
of production.
How can the conquest of this human environment be brought about?
It is first necessary to KNOW it. The revolutionists are well equipped
to do this, for in the first place they generally come from the circles
which they try to win over, and share their natural reactions, and
afterward, observers on a higher level again study these elementary
facts and interpret them in accordance with a strategic line.
It then becomes necessary to detach the people from the authority which
controls them. The techniques of intimidation, disintegration, and
demoralization play their full part here. We must specifically state,
however, that this work must be permanent and cannot permit any pause
resulting in a retreat nor any error in evaluation that would result in
a check.
At about the same time, an effort is made to get a hearing from the
masses of the people. The methods used are extremely numerous and varied
and even
(Figure 7, 7 x 5.5 in. entitled "The People have a Place among the
Factors in the Decision", on page 20)
include demagogic tricks; interest is shown in the lot of the most
miserable outcasts, in the problems of such and such a class, and
promises are made to ameliorate or abolish in a spectacular manner
especially flagrant abuses.
Lastly, the population is progressively controlled after being detached
from the authority which controlled it and listening more and more
attentively to the new leaders.
This control exhibits at least two aspects:
-A defensive aspect; it prevents the lawful government from regaining
its authority by making or instituting the aforesaid promises or
reforms; it muzzles recalcitrants until they can be converted by
persuasion or frightened by violence, and it calms its impatient partisans;
-A constructive aspect: it sets up hierarchies, encourages the timid,
and spurs on those waiting to see which side will win before taking
sides. (attentistes).
On a purely military plane, it then forges and uses the second arm of
Mao Tse Tung's warrior. The people are brought, with any arms they can
obtain, into contact with the enemy, and there is a paralysis of the
traditional forces, which are compelled to beat a "pillow". The
situation is like that in which a lion is harassed by bees, or like a
brawl in a public square, where a brilliant fencer sees a crowd stirred
up against him. What good does his sharp blade do him? Buffeted about
and losing sight of the instigator, his strokes become inaccurate even
when the crowd is not hostile. Does it become so? He is immediately
seized, prevented from moving, and subjected to the blows of his assailant.
There is danger that revolutionary conflicts may terminate in this way
unless help comes at the last moment: the main force (with a traditional
structure) wages battles of annihilation against an immobilized enemy
whose defense already has been penetrated by a people in arms.
IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION
It is not so easy, however, to induce a people to play the role of a
shield and to entrust to them the thankless tasks of manual labor and
transportation, or the dignified but more dangerous missions of the
guerrilla or partisan. The people will not "participate" with increasing
activity, instead of maintaining a prudent and natural reserve, nor will
they persevere in their exhausting efforts only in so far as they know
why they are fighting.
If the revolutionists succeed in employing and keeping in an
increasingly bitter struggle a constantly larger mass of people, who
fight with increasing ferocity, it is because they systematically build
up the morale of their friends and destroy no less methodically that of
the enemy.
These two objectives are attained by means of a number of steps the
elements of which have already been specified, but the sequence of which
must again be emphasized. A machine composed of activists is gradually
built up, based on a few ardently convienced men wholly devoted to the
cause. This machine, which is at first small, constantly grows larger,
and becomes diversified and better adapted to its mission:
-By means of internal education, (consisting of stages of training,
courses, meetings, theoretical study, etc.);
-Through direct external action, consisting of agitation, explanation,
individual propaganda, and a sort of apostolate.
This sporadic action (the leaven in the dough) is followed without delay
by bringing the psycho-social techniques already mentioned to bear on
the minds of the masses. The press, the radio, the motion picture, and
the poster are then used to confirm the information given in the
propaganda and oppose the counter-propaganda, and designed to harmonize
the types of action ("plans", "battles", "campaigns", etc.)
These external forms of control (or of capture) of human consciences are
accompanied by human contacts, the importance of which cannot be
ignored. The revolutionary officers are planted in more or less large
groups in which they "radiate" influence and bring about adhesion to the
cause, either by their efficiency, devotion to the public welfare, and
honesty, or by the mere fact that they still retain a little power
(police, supplies).
The verification of the value of these officers, their orthodoxy, and
their adhesion to the general strategic line, is assured by the fact
that they are officers in a special hierarchy, namely, the Party. This
saint of saints, in addition to his role as guide, is continually
revising the ideological line, in order to make it adequate.
This mass of the people, indeed, who have been stimulated and inveigled,
"have made the cause their own" (though perhaps not wholly with very
good grace); they are "on the march" after taking sides, being examined,
and being assigned their places. It then becomes the duty of the
revolutionists to keep in touch with them, to see that they do
everything that can be demanded of them, and to see to it that they want
what is "desirable" and make no mistakes. The high ideological
authorities of the Party devote themselves to this delicate work of
analysis and of "planning", often using a phraseology which mystifies
all but the elect. This proceeding does not always terminate in the
proclamation of a hazy or grandiloquent theory; far from it. It may, on
the contrary, result in the adoption of a well-defined and sometimes
even brutal concrete measure. Thus, the efficient execution of the
agrarian reform in the Frontier Region of China won the rudimentary
psychology of the Chinese peasant to the side of the Reds.
CONCLUSION.
Revolutionary warfare, now a "global" conflict, creates a struggle in
the heart and conscience of every society. It does this in a realm
infinitely greater than that occupied by traditional warfare, and its
scope cannot be reduced to that of the latter type. The three-fold
execution of its techniques is expressed harmoniously and is aimed at a
single objective, namely, the overturning of the established order and
the taking of power.
Its successes are impressive. It is as incorrect, however, to regard its
triumph as inevitable from the moment when it breaks out, as to
underestimate its extent and depth and to limit its field of action to
the use of arms. The execution of the processes mentioned includes every
field of human activity; whoever, wishes to conquer must therefore fight
in every field.
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RETARD CRYSTALLIZATION, PREVENT ORGANIZATION, OR
DESTROY THE MILITARY MACHINE SEPARATELY. ALL THIS MUST BE DONE
SIMULTANEOUSLY.
A correct analysis of the general situation, at least after a
consideration of the three phases we have tried to describe, should make
it possible to discover the series of measures capable of reestablishing
peace. It would by no means be possible to reestablish the "status quo
ante". The political, economic, social and military solutions
contemplated should be applied on the different planes and all efforts
should be combined in order to create a new equilibrium.
The Army may give valuable information about the problems to be solved,
but it is not incumbent on it to select the suitable remedies. On the
other hand, it can, and should, on being enlightened concerning the
"global" mission, thoroughly examine the steps to be taken and do
everything in its power to make them succeed.
___
(1) See "A Lesson in Revolutionary Warfare" by Col. Lacheroy.
(2) This is a civil war or a defense in which there is no definite
"front" and the two opponents are distributed thruout the country
involved. I have coined the word "frontless" to describe it. Trans.
(3) . . . of wills, that is, the birth and development of ideological
conviction.
(4) "In such warfare, the armed people and the guerrillas, on the one
hand, and the Red Army, acting as the main force, on the other,
constitute the two arms of the same movement. A Red Army constituting
the main force, without the support of the armed populaton, would be
like a one-armed soldier."
(5) A base of support is a section of territory in which the lawful
government has been completely eliminated and the revolutionaries have
installed their regime.
(6) Such as: the solidity of the population in the rear, the Army's
morale, the number and quality of the divisions and arms, and the
organizing ability of the officers.
XIMENES.
---------------------------------------------------------
PART II.
CONCRETE CASES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE.
Most of the lessons to be derived from the writings of the "masters" of
revolutionary warfare can be summarized by stating that although this is
a unique mode of combat, it may assume different aspects in different
countries.
As good "materialists", that is, as realists, the revolutionary parties
know how, indeed, to adapt their struggle to the situation in their own
country. Since they are past masters in the art of exploiting the
"favorable factors", or, in other words, the internal contradictions
existing in the enemy's camp, the insurrectionary organizations prepare
and then execute their plans of action after taking mainly into account
the "favorable elements and moments".
The following account of certain number of concrete cases tends to show
the different aspects of revolutionary warfare. It shows that a
particular type of revolutionary warfare is waged in each country. The
art of waging a war for the conquest of power originates a unique method
which, however, is adapted to each particular case.
It may at first seem astonishing to regard the disturbances in dependent
countries as cases of revolutionary warfare. A number of uninformed
persons believe, indeed, that the essential criterion indicating this
form of warfare consists in the presence of a Communist Party in the
directive echelon. Now the official statements of the Soviet rulers
indicate, and experience has proven, that Nationalist parties, even if
they are not Marxist or Leninist, are assisted directly or indirectly by
the local Communist Parties, the Peoples Republics, or by interposed
persons temporarily allied therewith (Egypt, etc.).
In its first stage, in fact, the revolutionary warfare which the
Communists have taught the Nationalists to prepare for and wage is
designed to oust the protecting power. It is also designed, however,
according to the statements of Lenin and Stalin, to enable the local
party of the extreme left, which has made the struggle its own until
national independence is achieved, to take over the power during a
subsequent stage.
SOME REVOLUTIONARY WARS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Country Dates Results
Russia 17-21 Establishment of USSR
Germany 18-22 Failure
(Nosske)
China 31-49 Estab. Peoples Republic
Spain 31-36 Spanish Republic
36-39 Republican failure and success for France
Yugoslavia 41-44 Liberation. Peoples Republic (Tito)
Palestine 36-39 Arab Failure
47-48 Creation of State of Israel
Indo-China 45-54 No. Vietnam Peoples Republic
Malaya 45-54 Failure
Indonesia 45-46 Indonesian Republic
Iran 45-46 Failure
54
Philippines 46-53 Failure
Burma 46-53 Failure
Czechoslovakia 1948 Peoples Republic
Korea 50-53 Failure Autonomous
Tunisia 34-54 Kingdom of Tunisia
Morocco Autonomous Kingdom of Morocco
Algeria 45-54 Failure
(Figure 8, 4 inches high, entitled "The War of the Viet-Minh", appears
on page 25 of original).
The war of the Viet-Minh was a revolutionary war waged in an
under-developed dependent country by a Marxist-Leninist Party inspired
and supported by the Chinese Communist Party.
This war succeeded because of favorable circumstances (the Japanese
occupation lasting until the end of World War II) and the methodical
application of the principles of revolutionary
warfare.
The War terminated with the establishment of a Peoples Democratic
Republic (North Viet-Nam) and left in existence three independent States
(South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia).
Among all the recent insurrectionary wars, the conflict in Indo-China
merits special study. It was, in fact, throughout this conflict that the
Communist leaders had an opportunity to apply in all strictness the
doctrine of "revolutionary warfare" as stated by Lenin and Mao Tse Tung,
as if to make it more precise and complete. While adhering to the
international strategy of Communism, though constantly taking care to
take the local conditions objectively into account, they incessantly
tried to perfect the methods and processes involved therein.
The Communist leaders thus acquired a singular mastery of this form of
warfare, with the aid of their anxiety to be orthodox, their
intellectual worth, their worship of "objectivity", and their habits of
"self-criticism". Those who executed their plans became, at the same
time and at every level, efficient politico-military combatants.
When confronting such an enemy practicing such new methods and animated
by so great a desire for perfection, the French Army has always felt
that it is poorly prepared for and adapted to such combat.
This is why many of those in its ranks are trying passionately to
discover the enemy's "secrets".
UNITY OF DIRECTION AND THOUGHT
The war in Indo-China was a revolutionary war led by orthodox Communists
within the framework of the world strategy of subversion conducted by
the party. There is derived from this truth, known but often forgotten,
the complete unity which characterizes every echelon of this Party, in
both conception and execution.
THE MEN.
Ho-Chi-Minh, the venerated and undisputed chief of the Viet-Minh, was,
we must remember, one of the very first members of the French Communist
Party, as he was present at the Congress of Tours in 1920, when Lenin's
followers quitted the 2nd International to found the French Communist
Party. It was always in the capacity of a "French" militant that he
studied in Moscow in 1923. The national label, however, is of no
importance to the Party except in so far as it can be useful, and
beginning in 1925, Ho-Chi-Minh fought wherever a revolutionary action in
southeastern Asia needed leaderships, to wit: at Canton, with Borodine
and Gallen, at Handow in 1926, at Canton again in 1927, in Siam in 1928,
at Hongkong in 1930, where, after the failure of the Annamite
Nationalist revolt of Yen Bay, he gathered the disappointed rebels and
founded the Communist Party of Indo-China. Moscow then placed him in
charge of Communist action throughout southeastern Asia, and he
instigated the strikes and riots that broke out in Namdinh, Mong-Tuong,
Ben, Thuy, the Transbassac, North Annam, and Thai-Binh (1930-31). He
departed for China again in 1933, and when the General Government
decided to react, he perfected the organization of the Communist Party
of Indo-China (P.C.I.) from outside the country, while continuing to
travel extensively. Between 1935 and 1939, his followers, who remained
on the spot, took advantage of the period when the French Popular Front
was in control by extending the organization of the P.C.I. (Communist
Party of Indo-China) throughout the country, at his instigation.
Ho-Chi-Minh, who is intelligent, industrious, and ascetic, is a typical
"professional revolutionist" of the new type, who dangerous efficiency
we have already learned. He is training his followers to imitate him;
these include Giap, who controls the Army, Pham Van Dong, the economic
military dictator, Dong Thai Mai, Tran Van Man, Hoang Van Hoan, and
Nguyen Thanh Son, all of whom are old Communists, while Truong Chinh,
Hoang Minh Giam, who are young, follow in their footsteps.
THE COMMUNIST PLAN FOR INDO-CHINA
"The team" thus consists of genuine Communists. Its members therefore
naturally devote themselves to the local application of the plan of
world subversion. On May 18, 1925, Stalin, speaking at the Oriental
Workers' Communist University in Moscow, defined the task of Communism
in southeastern Asia, prescribed the tactics it should follow, and
concluded:
"The liberation of the colonial countries is impossible without a
"victorious" revolution. This revolution is impossible unless the
working-class elite, grouped in a Communist Party, assumes the task of
directing the rural and working proletariat and casts discredit upon the
conservative national bourgeois class. A victory also presupposes that
the revolutionary movement is supported by the proletarian movements in
the developed western countries."
(Figure 9, 4 in. high, entitled "Ho Chi Minh, the Venerated and
Indisputable Chief of the Viet-Minh, Photographed with his "Team" in
November 1949, appears on page 27).
We have thus been forewarned since 1925 that the Communist Party desired
and was preparing for a war in Indo-China. We were already in a position
to know that the technique employed would be that used by the "National
Front", the local form of the "Popular Front", and that the insurrection
would be supported by the "proletarian movements in the developed
western countries. The fact that Russia had given to Mao Tse Tung in
1949, at the Congress of Peking, the task of directing and controlling
the Communist Parties of eastern Asia and of being their chief authority
on dogma, could do no more than confirm the solutions stated in Stalin's
speech.
There consequently existed in Indo-China a directing team of
professional revolutionists welded closely together both by their
Communistic orthodoxy and by their past struggles, which enabled them to
apply the directives of International Communism in this part of the
world-directives according to which the "road from Moscow to Paris
passes through Pekin, Saigon, and Calcutta"
(7).
THE TWO-FOLD CHOICE OF THE INDO-CHINESE COMMUNISTS
THE OBJECTIVE: - THE MASSES.
Communist doctrine attributes great importance to the "masses". For all
militants, and especially for directors, the control of the "masses" is
the essential objective that assures a victory.
This stake is of even greater importance when revolutionary warfare is
being waged. (8)
This is why the Party in China, following Mao Tse Tung, decided toward
1927, not to base its efforts upon the workers but to appeal mainly to
the real "masses", consisting of Chinese peasants, who constituted 85%
of the population. It is to this decision that Mao Tse Tung owed
his final success.
The Party in Indo-China does not hesitate. It has resolutely decided to
appeal to the "masses" in its effort to make a psychological and
physical conquest, for the masses include both the most numerous
elements and the most dynamic individuals. The masses will thus at first
be composed of residents of Viet Nam, even if this would largely
alienate the natives of Laos, Cambodia, and the mountainous regions; the
youth will then be included, even if this should result in the loss of
the help of those who are traditionally nationalists, and they will
finally include the poor peasants, even if this should bring about the
hostility of the medium and large landed proprietors.
Furthermore, the Communists, due to the amorality of their psychological
action, may adapt their efforts to any class; they consequently do not
hesitate to employ different and sometimes conflicting arguments,
according to the category to which the persons addressed belong.
Moreover, the Party sometimes appeals at the propitious moment to
temporarily neglected minorities; the appeals made by the Viet Minh to
the mountaineers living on the plateaus in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia
are perfect illustrations of such acts.
There, as elsewhere, however, the method adopted will always consist in
utilizing and aggravating the internal "contradictions" inherent in any
society, in order to win over the "class" offering the greatest
possibilities because of its numbers or dynamism. In Thailand, for
instance, the Viet Minh will take as its basis the poor peasants against
the feudal chieftains. In Cambodia, it will try to ignore the Viet Nam
Leaders and will dissolve the C.P.I. in order to create a "Khmer Labor
Party", but in spite of all that it will not fail to utilize the
Viet-Namese and Chinese immigrants, whom it will organize in special
leagues.
A WELL-ADAPTED IDEOLOGY: POPULAR DEMOCRATIC NATIONALISM.
In order to win over the "masses", which is the Communist objective, an
ideology and a technique are needed. The latter, which is familiar to
the Communist officials and leaders, is designed to make it possible to
take possession of both minds and bodies. As for the ideology, it must
be well chosen, sufficiently dynamic, and respond to the confused
aspirations of the class to which it is addressed. In Indo-China, the
Communists have used Popular Democratic Nationalism.
WHY NATIONALISM?
Because this country has always been confusedly and secretly
nationalistic; because the innate pride of the Viet-Namese urges him
toward this extreme form of patriotism, and because the nationalistic
ferment has never ceased in Annam; because the successes of the Japanese
and Chinese during the 20th century has reawakened and revived the
latent xenophobia which is always dormant in the minds of Asiatics;
because hatred is often a more powerful stimulus than an ideal and is
easier to stir up, and lastly, because the nationalism prevalent in the
Viet Minh will make it possible to interfere with the non-Communist
nationalist movements in this country. The mask of "nationalism" will
also make it possible to deceive the noncommunists of the whole world
and to dupe them into giving unexpected support such as that received
from the United States from 1941 to 1945, or that given by the French
Left between 1945 and 1954.
(Figure 10, 4.5 in. high, entitled "An Ideology and a Technique are
needed in order to Win over the Masses, which is the Objective." appears
here on p.28 in the original).
Why Popular-Democratic?
Because it is primarily necessary that the ideology proposed be adapted
to the mass of people
who are to be won over, and demagogy is very productive. The division of
the land delivered the Chinese peasants to the Party which utilized this
device until the latter undertook, on entering the phase of
"collectivization", to withdraw what it had given them, since this
device was no longer needed. The "agrarian reform" should therefore
secure for the Party the support of the Viet-Namese peasants, since the
liquidation of outstanding persons would satisfy the secret desire for
revenge on the part of the "Nhaque", (9) who has been exploited for
centuries.
Moreover, it is necessary to prepare for the advent of Communism, and
the road which leads to it passes through popular democracy: this is a
dogma stated by Stalin and Lenin, and well as by Mao Tse Tung. Viet-Minh
nationalism will therefore be of the popular-democratic type. It will
also make it easier to discredit the middle-class (see Stalin's
Instructions dating from 1925), whose members will be traitors to their
country, and to neutralize them by inspiring them with fear and
transferring most of them into "attentistes" (persons waiting to see
which side will succeed.). It will be possible, above all, to
indoctrinate gradually the nationalists who have come into the Viet Minh
and to convert them to Communism without their even perceiving it.
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR
The Taking of Power by the P.C.I. The Indo-Chinese Communist Party had
already attracted after 1930 a large part of the revolutionary
nationalists disappointed by the failure of other movements. In 1941 it
decided that the circumstances were favorable and that the time for a
victorious revolution had arrived. Giap crossed the Chinese frontier
with some cadres and began his operations in the elevated Tonkin region.
The War in Indo-China began, and the ability of the Communists had
already brought about trickery: the struggle was waged under the guise
of a combat against French imperialism, to be sure, but primarily
against "Japanese Fascism". This included the Americans to drop arms for
Giap from parachutes and gained for him the support of the naive Yankee
agents of the OSS. These arms, of course, were hardly used at all
against the Japanese but in equipping the first Communist troops.
On August 16, when the Japanese surrendered, Giap had nearly 6,000 armed
men. The organization of the P.C.I. was ready for use and the
governmental power was given to Ho Chi Minh as a result of a
"spontaneous uprising" of the masses of the people. The Red Flag with a
Gold Star floated in Hue on August 25. The P.C.I. conquered power in ten
days by making an agreement with the Nationalist allies of the Japanese
(especially in the South), and the latter caused to be turned over to
themselves numerous French and Japanese weapons.
The United States, however, presented a fine gift to China, namely the
occupation of northern Indo-China. The exiled non-Communist Nationalists
(the V.N.Q.D.D., and Dong Minh Hoi) returned with the Chinese troops.
The P.C.I. was obliged to make a compromise with them and give them a
place in the Government. Ho Chi Minh was unable to get rid of them
without occasionally engaging in bloody fighting until the departure of
the Chinese and until he could profit by the new prestige conferred upon
him by the recognition of his Government by France in 1946, for the
first Viet Minh troops arrived at Langson in French trucks, and they
seized Hong Hay, Vinh-Yen, Phuto, Caobang and Langson under the eyes of
the French.
This is how the P.C.I. was gradually to eliminate its rivals (some of
whom, indeed, such as Caodaists, Hoa-Hao, and the Catholics, were to
come over to our side) or was to assimilate them to the point when, in
1951, in order to absorb them better, it officially disbanded and
established the "Lao Dong" party (10), within which those who were at
first Nationalists were to end by becoming Communists. The deviation "to
the right", about which Stalin spoke in 1925 ("to underestimate the
strength of the Communist movement and give the bourgeois Nationalists
too much room") was to be avoided, as well as the deviation "to the
left" (to overestimate the strength of the Communists and neglect
possible Allies"). Toward 1949, everyone took sides and hardly anyone
joined the nascent Viet Nam National movement except the Vietnamese who
were already fighting on our side and a few "attentistes".
On taking over power, Ho Chi Minh and his group exercised it without
pity and created the necessary politico-military organization while
changing as little as possible the traditional territorial boundaries.
The village, the essential cell of the Annamite Society, constitutes its
basis. The Viet Minh has provided it with a People's Political and
Military Committee, which retains full power (11). The originality of
this system is due to the fact that this Committee is not a mere
"anonymous" assembly exercising collective authority, like the old
"Council of Notables, but a gathering of individuals each of whom is
responsible in his own field; they include the person responsible for
"public order", those responsible for information (propaganda), and
those responsible for the personnel (the entire population), for the
economy, for self-defense (People's troops and guerrillas). Thus, the
person responsible for the numerical strength keeps up to date his
register of all the village inhabitants in every house, records their
arrivals and departures, issues their passes and permits, and orders
relating to missions. He is generally even given charge of questions
relating to sanitation. No human being can live in or enter the village
without his permission, and it is he who is generally called to account
personally if some individual violates a law or regulation. Above the
village, which is distrusted by the Viet Minh because it is too
conservative, there is often a "Lien Xa" (group of villages),
established by the Viet Minh, then the Hoyen (Delegation), the Tinh
(Province) and the Lien Kuu (groups of provinces created in order to
facilitate command). All these subdivisions are provided with a strong
Executive Committee similar to the Village Committee and endowed with
absolute power and reporting only to a superior echelon, but each member
of which is personally responsible for his own acts and is watched by
his comrades on the Committee, by the Security Police, and above all, by
the party.
At the top is the Government, which is remarkably stable (Ho Chi Minh
will remain its head without interruption, Giap has been
Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1941 until the present time and the
Government exercises authority firmly and did not hesitate in 1951, for
instance, to call to Tonkin, in order to explain certain of his acts,
Nguyen Binh, a man of great prestige, who organized the Resistance in
Cochin-China, and to compel him to make a long and dangerous journey,
during which he met his death.
The entire machine is animated and kept under surveillance by the Party.
The Communist Party Organization in a province of South Viet Nam, for
instance, comprises, among other committees, in addition to an Executive
Committee and a Committee of Current Affairs:
- A Committee for Control of the party itself,
- A Committee for Control of the People's Military and Political
Committees (or C.R.E.) of the province,
- A Military Committee
- Three "Lien Chi's", one of which controls and animates the cells of
officials, a second the cells of the people (lien Viet) and the third
those of the Armed Forces.
(Figure 11, 4.5 in. high, entitled "The Politico-Military Organization
of the Viet Minh is based on the Village, the Essential Cell of Anamite
Society", appears on p.31)
The P.C.I. thus makes its presence felt everywhere. One may even imagine
without too much risk that every Cabinet meeting is preceded by a
meeting of the "Cell of members of the Government", which prepares and
anticipates the decisions to be made by the few non-Communist Ministers.
Within a few years, the Indo-Chinese Communist Party and its leaders
have thus succeeded in eliminating or absorbing all their Nationalist
rivals (except those who have joined our side) and in taking over all
the power. They have created a territorial organization which is both
very greatly decentralized and very flexible, and which is establishing
unity of command in every echelon, beginning with the village, while
instituting a strict control by the highest echelon. This hierarchy is
also under the control of its members as a whole. They are thus capable
of conducting warfare in their own way without the fear of opposition of
"deviation". Lastly, they are sure of their stability.
THE WINNING OVER AND CONTROL OF THE MASSES
After defining, on the one hand, the masses whom he intends to win over
and keep, and, on the other, the ideology which he presents to them, the
Communist employs the "techniques" with which he is familiar in order to
win the masses over and control them. Some of these techniques are
directed toward physical persons; these deal with the "organization";
the others, which are psychological, are aimed at the morale. All of
these techniques are, of course, closely linked and inseparable.
Parallel Hierarchies. To the Communists, "organization" has the
importance of a dogma. They know that propaganda is not really effective
unless it is directed toward organized masses, and they need a docile
population in order to conduct their revolutionary warfare. The system
they have adopted is that of "parallel hierarchies": the individual is
imprisoned in several networks of independent hierarchies. The civil
population in the Viet Minh or semi-controlled region is controlled by a
People's politico-military territorial hierarchy which is especially
effective and which extends from the family and the group of houses to
the Lien Khu, passing through the village, the delegation, and the
province. This system, however, is still inadequate, so the Viet Minh
has created a second hierarchy completely independent of the first,
which divides the population according to other standards. All
individuals are grouped in different associations according to their
age, sex, or trade. The "Lien Viet" (the State association) which
comprises the male and female youth groups, the mothers of families, the
farmers, the trade union of the workers and that of the employees of
rubber plantations, the Catholic group and those of the Caodaist
resistants and the veterans, etc. It might also very well include the
Flute-Players' Association of the Bicyclists' Association, for it is
essential that no one escape this regimentation and that the territorial
hierarchy thus be cross-regimented by a second one which will exercise
surveillance over the first and will be watched by it, and that both of
them be kept under external and internal surveillance by the Department
of Public Order and by the Party which has created them. The individual
who is caught in such a fine-meshed net has no chance of preserving his
independence.
"It is evident that on one can escape such a fine-meshed net; so we are
not surprised to see a son denounce his father or a woman her husband,
as guilty of having given information to a detachment of the forces of
law and order or of having killed a pig to feed the family. They cannot
do otherwise. Since informing is obligatory, they become accomplices if
they refrain from such action. So denunciation is inevitable; if an
offense has admittedly escaped the vigilance of the person responsible
for the group of houses, or for the defense or economy of the village,
or for that of the local representatives of the Party of the Public
Safety organization, it is practically certain that the nerves of a
member of the family, of a neighbor, or perhaps even of themselves, will
give way during the weekly self-criticism meeting of the male or female
youth, the employees of rubber plantations, the farmers, or the mothers
of families. It is therefore better to denounce the guilty person and
save the rest of the family!
"The system of "parallel hierarchies" thus places individuals at the
mercy of the authorities. It likewise facilitates the use of
"psychological techniques", which are applied much more effectively to
homogenous categories of human beings" (12).
THE WINNING OVER AND CONTROL OF HEARTS AND MINDS
The physical persons are thus strictly controlled. The authorities,
however, are not content with this result; they must control hearts and
minds. This is the object of the psychological techniques. The latter
are exercised all the more easily because the bodies are completely
submissive and Marxist-Leninist materialism is devoid of any moral
scruples (13).
These techniques, which are directly inspired by the Soviet and Chinese
examples, have long been known. The Viet Minh has ably adapted them to
the Indo-Chinese people and has employed them to the limit by means of
whispered propaganda, conferences, courses, "directed" information,
assemblies and meetings in which the leaders animate and orient the
reactions of the collective mind of the crowd, directed discussions led
by specialists who know how to impress upon their hearers the ideas
which they wish to suggest, and by means of false rumors, pamphlets,
radio, plays, meetings at which folklore is discussed, etc. all these
means have been used in order to indoctrinate the crowds. The success
has often been proportionate to the efforts exerted, and the different
populations in Viet Nam, which are simple, often very uneducated, and
lacking other information, are more impressible because they are
traditionally inclined to respect a well-read person or a savant, and to
believe anything which appears in written form.
The "morale technique", however, which is the most original and no doubt
the more terrifically effective, is probably that of "self-criticism".
Everyone has heard of this method, but very few have realized all its
possibilities. Let us remember the importance which the Catholic church
attached to confession in the purification of the soul, in order to get
an idea of the effectiveness of this system.
"He who confesses his efforts knows that his confession will be recorded
and checked with all the other information possessed by the Party
concerning his activities, and does not know how much his "confessor"
knows. Harassed, tormented, anxious, and mentally exhausted, he soon
prefers to expel any heretical idea as soon as it enters his mind, and
to think along the "line" suggested to him rather than to struggle
continually to conceal it." (14)
(Figure 12, 4 in. high, entitled "Youth Groups form a Part of these
Parallel Hierarchies" which Constitute the Real Framework of the
Regime", appears on page 33).
The Viet Minh owes much to self-criticism. The latter has been useful
under any circumstances and especially during the hard campaign in the
Northwest in 1953, when the greatly impaired morale of certain units was
restored only by increasing the number of self-criticism sessions. many
soldiers, and even officers, confessed that they "had thought of
deserting", and again began to follow the "line" of endurance and
heroism, relieved because they had confessed their crime and had nothing
more to conceal.
All these "morale techniques", which are fully perfected, are employed
with an effectiveness which is all the greater because the "masses" are
organized in a system of "parallel hierarchies" (15). The psychological
action is thus varied according to whether it is applied not only to the
inhabitants of a certain village, delegation, or province (propaganda is
all the more effective when it is concrete and local, and especially
when brought to bear upon simple people), but also according to whether
it is applied to male or female "youth", rice-growers, "strong
Buddhists", or Army veterans. Each is given the "food" which is adapted
to him or her, and minds are "classified" like bodies. There are thus
turned out, as required, simple sympathizers, guerrillas, admirable
regular soldiers, or volunteers willing to suffer death.
THE CONQUEST AND CONTROL OF A REGION
The Viet Minh, armed with such powerful techniques, was able to proceed
confidently to action. It is interesting to see how it took possession
of a region which it desired to convert into a "base".
"The word "base" does not have the same meaning for Marxist-Leninist
theoreticians as for us. They apply the word "base" to a region, large
or small, in which the population has been won over secretly if
possible, and subjected to the strict physical and moral control that we
have described. The movement then has complete freedom of action there,
and the enemy agents who infiltrate the area are immediately unmasked
and the inhabitants give no assistance to the government forces. On the
other hand, all the human and economic resources are at the disposal of
the rebels: their troops and depots, protected or concealed by the
population, are perfectly safe."
"In short, the revolutionary movement is almost invulnerable even if it
is militarily weak, and can prepare there in peace its strong blows
against the controlled region." (14)
A base is prepared secretly. The ideal method is to refrain from
revealing the purpose involved until the people are completely won over.
In order to achieve this purpose, 5 successive phases, which have been
described by Trotsky, are contemplated. In Indo-China, the entire plan
has always been observed. If, for example, we study the establishment of
the "base" of the provinces of Kampong-Cham and Kratie, to the north of
RP 14 and 12, (Provincial Roads 12 and 14)* we shall wee the development
thereof very plainly.
In 1949, armed Khmer and Vietnamese propagandists who came from
Cochin-China, infiltrated into the villages isolated in the depth of the
forest and began to propagandize their inhabitants skillfully; they did
not mention Communism and showed the utmost respect for the Buddhist
priests. The Khmer agents spoke to the people and tried to arouse
xenophobia and to aggravate any resentment that they might feel toward
the lawful authorities. The Vietnamese got in touch with the men working
on the plantations along the borders of the region and the Anamite
colonies on the banks of the Mekong. A network of sympathizers was
gradually developed, and the first "groups" were formed, but took great
pains to avoid discovered. Our few troops, attracted mainly by the
neighboring frontier of Cochin-Vhina and reassured by the apparent
calmness of the country, sent out a few patrols without result and
underestimated the seriousness of the problem.
(Figure 13, 4 in. high, entitled "A Base is Prepared Secretly; the
Communist Propagandists in Cambodia select Isolated Villages in the
Depth of the Forest in Order to Take Possession of a Region", appears on
p.35).
Recruiting began, however, after the end of 1949; the Viet Minh induced
the coolies to desert the plantations and regrouped them in the forest.
Arms arrived and feverish preparations were made for action. The general
situation was such that it was possible to contemplate the winning over
of the population. Some unpunished murders, several successful ambushes,
and the capture of several planters, who were paraded throughout the
region, at the motion-picture theater on the Chup Plantation, convinced
the villagers, who felt isolated and unprotected in their forest, that
the Viet Minh was the strongest organization. It was time to unleash the
"terror" in order to neutralize the inhabitants. The Viet Minh proceeded
to hold spectacular trials and execute "traitors (who had actually never
given the least information to the lawful authorities; the Viet Minh
knew this but intended merely to impress the minds of the people and to
bring about a general implication thereof.)
The time had come "to organize"; the village committees had been
established, the "associations" had been formed, and everyone belonged
to them either willingly or unwillingly. During 1959, the lawful
Administration, always theoretically in control, was completely
duplicated by a Viet Minh Administration, and the lawful "Mekhuns"
(village chiefs) now became merely the often involuntary but silent
representatives of the people's politico-military village committees in
dealing with the Sub-Prefect (Chauvaysrok). Many of them would have
preferred to flee to the chief town.
The country still looks safe, however. The villages are still inhabited
and their inhabitants continue to pay their taxes and carry them
religiously to the Mekhum, who has taken refuge in the chief town of the
district. The Administration is therefore not very anxious and our
soldiers ridicule the "purillanimity" of the officials, who no longer
dare to return to the villages in the forest.
It is then that the People's Troops, trained and drilled, really went
into action from their camps situated in the depth of the forest and
protected by the general silence of the inhabitants. Attacks and
ambushes followed one another, and the Command became aroused. Our
troops operated in this region. Exasperated by the general complicity
and the slight results of their raids they committed psychological
errors and sometimes treated the peasants roughly. The Viet Minh
exploited these errors thoroughly and took advantage of them in order to
control the population even more strictly, cause them to evacuate the
villages, and compel them to take refuge in the forest. Henceforth, our
detachments did not find anyone, the forest seemed deserted to them, the
known trails were barred by means of abatis traps, the guides whom it
was possible to obtain outside the region became worthless, the aspect
of the region was changed, and it was impossible for our troops to take
the inhabitants by surprise. The Viet Minh was the absolute master and
enjoyed complete freedom of action. Two years and the perfecting of a
new method designed to regain partial control over them (15) will be
required in order to remedy this state of affairs.
This process is well known to us under the name of "decay". It has been
employed by Mao Tse Tung in China and by the Viet Minh in Indo-China,
with invariably interesting results. It is important, however, never to
forget that it is never valuable unless it utilizes the techniques
consisting in winning over and controlling physical and moral
individuals in the manner previously described. Revolutionary warfare is
a unit, and its different methods cannot be used separately.
THE CENTRALIZED ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION
The importance and Unity of Information.
The Viet Minh, which knows that it is the weaker organization, counts
greatly upon information for guiding its action. It is known, for
instance, how carefully and thoroughly ambushes and attacks have been
prepared. For weeks, and sometimes for months, the garrison to be
attacked was spied upon, all the details of its installation and life
were noted, and the artillery emplacements were carefully located. The
Viet Minh, however, has never distinguished between "military
information" and "political or economic information". It was primarily
important to this organization, before attacking a post, to know the
feelings of the people living in the neighborhood and the latter's
resources, for revolutionary warfare is a "unit", and unity of Command
prevails therein.
Likewise, the Viet Minh makes no distinction between "external" and
"internal" information; the warfare extends everywhere from the heart of
Saigon or Hanoi to the depths of the Laotian forest or the "redoubt" in
Viet Bad. There is consequently no vain subtlety in differentiating
between what occurs on this or that side of a "front" which is
nonexistent; there exist, at most, degrees of perfection of the
organization.
Since the Viet Minh has recognized the unity of revolutionary thought
and the unity of direction and Command, it also proclaims the Unity of
military politico-economic information, and this anxiety for information
also surely applies to the "liberated" region as well as to the
temporarily controlled region, and to enemies as well as to friends.
(Figure 14, 4.5 in. high, entitled "The Old Woman who is going to sell
her Eggs in the Market Must Report Certain Information to the
Neighboring Post", appears on page 36).
THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The Search for Information. Everything is essentially based on the
organization which we have described. The village Viet Minh is protected
by the structure of the "parallel hierarchies" from penetration by any
"absurd" agent, no matter how he may escape the control of the official
"responsible for the effective", of the one "responsible for public
safety", or the vigilance of all the inhabitants, for whom, regardless
of their age, a "failure to denounce" is a crime which will surely be
discovered. The village community as a whole, is also, however composed
of information agents. The "plan of search" is transformed by the
responsible leader into "orders for a search", which are distributed to
everybody in proportion to their capability. The old woman who goes to
sell her eggs in the market must report certain information to the
neighboring post; the little boy who takes care of the water buffaloes
must count the French soldiers or wandering strangers who cross his
rice-field, etc. This is an order; to fail to obey it would be treason,
and punishment would follow.
The procedure is hardly any different in a controlled region. Suppose
that the Vietnamese Secretary in a certain office has a family, some of
whose members sometimes live in the Viet Minh or semi-controlled region.
Agents contact him and make him ashamed of his "treason", or they
explain to him the danger to which he is exposing himself and his
family, and they offer him pardon if he deserves it. The Viet Minh soon
has a new agent at its disposal.
Agents are thus innumerable, zealous, and cheap, since only the more or
less complete training given them costs the Viet Minh anything. As for
the information furnished by them, it is immediately sent to the
interested parties, thanks to the politico-military unity of Command.
The Public Safety Organization. The Viet Minh Command is, however,
anxious to create more specialized information agencies, such as the
Public Safety Organization (Cong An) and the military Trinh Sat. It is
important, however, not to lose sight of the fact that there are no
water-tight compartments in the Viet Minh and that the information
obtained, regardless of its source, is sent without delay to those
entitled to it. The military Trinh Sat, for instance, utilizes to a
large extent the local information furnished by the villagers and the
Public Safety Organization in preparing for an operation.
The Public Safety Organization is divided into two main branches. Only
the first branch (called the Political Inquiry Service) is used solely
for obtaining information. It has at its disposal a representative in
each of the territorial subdivisions and detachments of varying size
(from 600 to 1,000 men in the average province). It is feared, and does
not hesitate to resort to terrorism or preventive arrests.
The Trinh Sat. The military Trinh Sat is represented from the echelon of
the company (a noncommissioned officer and three privates) to that of
the division, where it forms a special company. Its members, sometimes
working as agents, and sometimes assisted by regular units and at others
by volunteers or conscripted villagers, observe our troops with tireless
patience, listen to our chatter, and try to capture prisoners or
documents. Every action of the Viet Minh has been prepared in this way,
sometimes for weeks or months (in the case of the campaign in the
Northwest, for instance). One can imagine the abundance of information
procured by the enemy in this manner.
The Dich Van. It is necessary to combine this "information" activity
with the activity of the "Dich Van". It is the objective of the Viet
Minh to create in all our units (and especially in the native units) a
Dich Van cell (or even two independent cells) the members of which must
show that they are excellent soldiers and gain our confidence. In order
to attain this objective, it generally acts through the mediation of the
relatives of our men, who have already been contaminated or are
threatened with reprisals. These Dich Van cells are excellent sources of
information until the time comes for action.
The Viet Minh thus has at its disposal everywhere, in its own territory
as well as in ours, in the cities as well as in the country, in both the
administrations and in our posts and garrisons, innumerable sources of
information, which are trained in varying degrees but are always
zealous. In particular, all the information furnished by these agents is
distributed and transmitted without delay to those interested in it,
without making any artificial distinction between "political" and
"military" information, or that relating to domestic or foreign affairs.
It is obvious that the information is obtained from a large force.
THE VIET MINH PEOPLE'S ARMY
As the Viet Minh is thoroughly convinced that warlike action, while
necessary, is not the essential factor in its warfare, it has planned an
Army adapted to the struggle which it intends to conduct. It has finally
created a revolutionary military organization that aspires to play the
part assigned to the masses and is willing to engage in frontless warfare.
The People's Army is therefore like a three-story building with firm
foundations.
THE ORGANIZATION.
Its basis is, from the village echelon up, the whole population, grouped
in "People's Self-Defense Troops" and in the "guerrilla group". This is
a huge Army which accepts extremely numerous missions (patrol duty,
harassment, and the guarding of the rear area), and often participates
in important operations. The village guerrillas are thus often regrouped
in the "huyen" (delegation or district) echelon, in order to take part
in an attack on a post, or in an ambush.
The first stage consists of the "Regional Forces", the soldiers of which
come from local formations and are organized in well-trained companies
and invariably serve in their own province, where they assist and
protect the local forces by conducting the more important operations and
making possible, when the command so desires, the engagement of
"regular" troops.
The apex of the pyramid consists of the "Regular Forces", which are the
best armed, trained, and officered. These Forces are employed only for
striking an effective blow, and village guerrillas and even regional
units are sacrificed in order to save them, if necessary. As a rule, the
regular troops act only on the "offensive", and are handled with a view
to their use in the "general counter-offensive".
The system is therefore extremely flexible. It makes it possible, on the
one hand, to recruit the men easily, since vacancies in the ranks of the
"regulars" are immediately filled by the transfer of men from regional
elements, who are themselves replaced by means of an appeal to the
village guerrillas. Such a transfer is regarded as an honor by those
concerned. On the other hand, there is no impassable boundary between
these different elements. For example, we have seen a "Regional mission"
assigned temporarily to regular units (as in the case of the 320th
Division in Thai Binh).
(Figure 15, 3.5 in. high, entitled "The Regional Forces Constitute the
First Floor of the People's Army", appears on p.38)
THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY VALUES
This "three-floor" People's Army claims to have all the traditional
military values, as it is convinced that it is as efficient as other Armies.
Its High Command is meticulous, patient, and exact in preparation,
tenacious in execution, realistic and free from all false pride in the
evaluation of the results obtained and the lessons to be drawn from
them, and is anxious to improve its methods constantly and to increase
the numbers and efficiency of its troops. It employs a system which
makes the Commander of the Army a veritable "dictator" concerning the
national defense, and involves the unity of politico-military command in
all echelons.
The cadres are selected from all circles, especially those of the common
people, and are subjected to an intensive military training. Even during
a period of active operations, courses and exercises follow one another.
Beginning in 1950, many of them have been sent to schools in China.
The unit is excellent: it is rural, light, and mobile. The Regular
Forces are trained during eight months in a year in all forms of combat
and in all the specialties, including the handling of arms, mines, and
explosives, the use of heavy weapons, assaults against fortified
positions, night combat, and "Trinh Sat training". The regional and even
the local forces are trained with the same enthusiasm, although in a way
which is necessarily more irregular, and advantage is taken of every
opportunity to train them. They also have the benefit of attending many
courses and being taught by instructors who are specialists. Regular,
regional, or local forces tirelessly rehearse every operation in advance
whenever it is possible.
The discipline is extraordinarily strict: the soldier and officer are
trained to do obediently whatever they are called upon to do, no matter
how hopeless the mission may seem. At Na Sam, Xam Pheo, etc., an order
to attack is obeyed whenever it is given, no matter how numerous the
casualties may be. The materiel, and especially the armament, is really
worshipped, and no weapon may be injured through negligence or loss on
the battlefield.
(Fig. 16, 3.5 in. high, entitled "The Regular Forces" constitute the
Apex of the Pyramid", appears on p. 39).
THE REVOLUTIONARY VALUES
The traditional military values, however, do not suffice for the Viet
Minh. It wishes to add to them the revolutionary military values, and in
order to do so, it applies to the Army the same control techniques which
it uses in dominating the population. The natural hierarchy is thus
duplicated with a second hierarchy, to wit: that of the political
Commissars, who are independent of the former. Both are kept under
surveillance and animated by the Party (16). This over-zealousness is
carried so far as to group ordinary privates in squads each containing
several men, who fight, live and take their recreation together, and one
of whom is a Communist (the "Troika" or group of three). These methods
are astonishingly effective in a rigidly disciplined Army, and subject
the privates and officers to morale techniques which they are given in
heavy doses, such as "information conferences", guided discussions, the
learning of watchwords and slogans by heart (the soldier's ten
commandments) and are followed by self-criticism sessions. These are all
aimed at suppressing the Former Man, who could think for himself, and
creating the "People's Soldier",
(Figure 17, 5 in. high, entitled "The Successes of the Viet Minh were
solemnly Consecrated by the Entrance of the People's Army into Hanoi in
October 1954", appears on p. 40).
all of whose mental reactions and thoughts are inspired by the Party.
The officers are past masters of this technique. After Na Sam, for
instance, self-criticism sessions were conducted from the squad echelon
upward, it was so important to understand fully the reasons for the
defeat. Under other circumstances, they are used in order to gauge the
morale of the unit (ascertain those who would like to return to their
villages, wish to get married, or are afraid to fight) and to regain
control over them (these sessions were used to a very large extent
during the hard campaign in the Northwest in 1933.) On the whole, the
"political" training of the Unit occupies nearly half the time allotted
to training.
As a result of the combination of these traditional and revolutionary
military values, the Viet Minh thus obtains an excellent unit. It
utilizes it for both political and military action.
The troops thus trained and indoctrinated are actually a remarkable
propaganda tool. Wherever they are stationed they participate in the
psychological influencing of the population, carefully avoiding
displeasing them (17) but mingling with them and helping to get it in
the harvest, transporting the inhabitants, organizing plays and meetings
at which the actual local events are discussed, and circulating
watchwords. The Viet Minh Command thus gains in every way; on the one
hand, it wins the favor of the population, while, on the other, it
improves the morale of the unit.
The conduct of a military action mixes the People's Army with the
population harmoniously (18) and combines all the advantages that a
single totalitarian Command can derive from the employment of "Communist
techniques."
CONCLUSION
The experience gained through the eight years of war and two years of
reflection following the Geneva Armistice now lead us to think that the
real strength of the Viet Nam lies in its unity, which has gained for it
several advantages, namely: unity of direction and thought at the
international and local levels, as well as unity of politico-military
command, served by a solid totalitarian organization, anxiety to ensure
the support of the industrial (?) popular masses, eventually amounting
to the complete winning over and control of the masses, based on a
dynamic ideology.
Unity at every echelon, in conception as well as execution, in all
fields, political, psychological, economic, and military, a stubborn
desire for perfection, pitiless discipline, unity due to a strict
application of Communist methods: these constitute the secret underlying
the successes of the Viet Minh.
A GROUP OF OFFICERS
(Figure 17-A, filling one page and showing an inscription reading "ALT
ED 'HELLAS' " (Greece), appears on page 42).
THE COMMUNIST INSURRECTION IN GREECE (1946-1949)

This is the case of a revolutionary war conducted in an independent
State which is economically weak by a Marxist-Leninist Party inspired
and sustained by the USSR and by the neighboring People's Democracies
(Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria).
This War comprised a period of success owing to favorable circumstances
(the end of World War II, and to the systematic application of the
principles of revolutionary warfare.
It finally failed, however, because of the combined effects of the
material support given by the Free world to the National Government and
the return of the country administered by Gen. Papagos into energetic hands.
The Greek insurrection of 1946-1949 is the best known example of a
revolutionary war which ended in failure, in spite of long preparation
and an excellent start. As it developed in the atmosphere of the
international tension which followed World War II, the public paid
special attention to the annexational character of this new
manifestation of Stalin's policy and to the Anglo-American reaction
consisting in support of the Greek Government.
The history of this uprising and its repression deserves to be studied
by those who are interested in the techniques of revolutionary warfare,
for one sees in the two camps thereof several experiences gained through
trial and error which make it possible to detect certain solid
principles in a field generally impalpable and shifting.
We shall examine here the essential facts relating to this War and the
way in which the General Staffs of the two camps reacted to them. A more
complete study would, indeed, occupy too much space to be included
within the limits of a magazine article. We shall then try, in the light
of the history of this War, to present the information capable of making
a contribution to the formulation of the doctrine underlying
revolutionary warfare.
THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT
Stalin, who was a Byzantine despot like the Czars, was naturally
inclined to follow their policy. After accomplishing their plan to bring
about Panslavism, he tried to take possession of Constantinople. He
apparently believed that Greece would constitute an auspicious stage of
his march toward the dome of Santa Sophia, which would extend his
frontiers and grasp the adjacent Turkish Territory with the Soviet
tongs. Moreover, the Muscovite Empire would thus succeed in reaching the
shores of the Mediterranean, which considerably increase its influence
and enable it to prepare for new conquests.
It seemed as if Greece would be an easy prey to subversive warfare, for
it had suffered terribly as a result of the War and was in a frightful
economic situation. The Communists by no means had a majority, but they
had crept into the "Hellas" Resistance organization, which they
practically controlled. At the time of the Liberation and the return of
the Regular Army (composed of a brigade of 2,000 men and the "sacred
squadron" of 700 officers), they had been compelled, however, to sign
the Convention of Varkisa with the Greek Government, by means of which
the "Hellas" movement was dissolved and surrendered its arms. While most
of the members of the Resistance Movement were glad to return home,
however, four or five thousand Communists in this Movement left the
country and took up their abode near the frontier in the territory of
the adjacent Satellite States. There they organized the insurrectionary
movement under the direction of Markos, their chief, assisted by Soviet
advisers. At this time Tito had not completed his break with Stalin,
whose directives he was accepting. Greece was bordered by three
Satellite States, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. This fact was
valuable to the insurgents, who were sure to find asylum on retreating
after a combat.
Greece, which possesses fertile plains in Macedonia and Thessaly, is
completely covered with calcareous mountains having a rugged appearance,
some of which are bare, while others are covered with brushwood.
Carriage roads are rare in that country and mule tracks are the most
characteristic means of communication. Since the mountains, which are
accessible with difficulty, contain many places suitable for the
establishment of ambushes, it was among them that persons pursued from
the neighboring provinces took refuge. It is especially easy to organize
guerrilla action on such a terrain.
THE BRILLIANT BEGINNING OF THE INSURRECTION.
The outbreak of the insurrection was accompanied, as always, by the
assassination of politicians or representatives of the governmental
authority. The Government had few more than the 15,000 gendarmes with
which to resist them. The Army was then undergoing a reorganization with
the aid of the British Army. The gendarmes were called upon to ensure
the safety of the citizens. Its patrols were attacked in their turn, as
well as its small posts. Persons who assisted the gendarmes by giving
them information were put to death. The action of the gendarmes was
hampered thereby, for the people refrained from giving them information
owing to fear of reprisals. The different stationary and mobile elements
of the gendarmerie were soon attacked by forces so large that the units
of the gendarmerie were compelled to entrench themselves in the large
towns, leaving the less important localities at the mercy of the rebels,
who began to levy taxes in kind and in cash and to recruit volunteers
for their guerrilla bands. The Communists thus obtained control of
important "bases", the rugged nature of the terrain and the absence of
carriage roads made it possible to isolate completely. At first,
terrorism extended throughout the country, but it was quickly localized
at three points, namely: the Grammos Mts., on the frontier with Albania,
the Vitsi Mts., on that with Yugoslavia, and the Pinde group of
mountains in the central part of the country. This created a critical
situation for the Government, which was already contending with a
disastrous economic crisis, the effects of which were greatly increased
by the necessity of combatting the guerrilla insurrection.
(Figure 18, 7 in. high, appears on p.45).
This result, however, was not obtained by a numerous Communist Army but
by a small number of guerrillas, who did not exceed 3,000 at first. They
had easily recruited nearly 6,000 persons before the end of 1946. Their
effectives numbered nearly 15,000 in April 1947, when the gendarmerie
had proven inadequate to cope with the insurrection. This force
consisted, of course, of armed partisans, for those who assisted them in
making their movements, and who gave them food, willingly or
unwillingly, and supplied them with information, were then much more
numerous (there were about 200,000 Communists or sympathizers). At this
time, there was a general impression that the Greek insurrection against
the Government was developing at a rapid rate and that nothing could
stop it.
THE ARMY BECOMES A RURAL POLICE FORCE.
The Greek Government had at its disposal, in order to oppose this
extension of the revolution in a famished and disorganized country, only
a poorly trained and equipped army devoid of morale, consisting of
120,000 effectives, which were increased to 150,000 during 1948.
This Army, which was hurled into the struggle against the partisans by
officers accustomed to the traditional type of warfare, immediately
proved poorly adapted to its mission. The partisans employed against
them the same methods of combat that they had used against the
gendarmerie, consisting in ambushes against the patrols, attacks upon
small posts, intimidation of the masses, reprisals against those who
informed against them, and principally in night actions. The soldiers
reacted like the gendarmes and took refuge in the large towns, leaving
the population defenseless in the hands of the bandits, and left their
refuge only to comb the area, invariably without success. Moreover, as
the rebellion was spreading, the soldiers scattered the Army throughout
Greece in small posts, which could not defend themselves from the very
violent attacks which the partisans did not fail to make. It was under
these conditions that the Government created the National Defense Corps.
The object of this new institution was to relieve the Greek Army of its
static mission and relieve its members in their small posts by filling
the latter with troops whose sole object was the static defense of these
sensitive points or localities. It was necessary to again assign to the
Army a dynamic role, consisting of attacks upon partisan units in their
nests. This measure was the first remedy for the initial error of
scattering the effectives. The National Defense Corps was afterward
reorganized in 100 battalions of 500 men each, which, under the name of
Light Infantry Battalions, executed numerous sector missions. The
defense of localities was partly entrusted to organizations of armed
civilians, known as the "Men."
The "Democratic" Army is Organized and Takes Root
While the Government Party was moving toward salutary reforms, the
result of hard lessons learned through trial and error, the
insurrectionary party, on the contrary, took a bad road. After a
brilliant start which had given it control of a large part of Greek
territory, the "Democratic Army", the effectives of which must have
exceeded 20,000 in 1948, adopted two measures which were fatal to it;
1. On the one hand, it made up for its losses, which were enormous
compared with its effectives and approached 1,500 combatants per month,
by taking men recruited by "compulsory" methods, without making a wise
selection of individuals. This resulted, on the part of certain
combatants, in a lack of zeal which became evident mainly during the
last days of the campaign.
2. The Army changed the organization of its units, and was transformed
much too rapidly into units of the traditional type - an error which was
all the more injurious because the inner structure lacked strength and
the parallel hierarchies could not be established without serious
difficulty. The population, began, after they felt that they were
protected by the National Defense Corps, to denounce the secret chiefs,
who were then eliminated. The organization of the Guerrilla Army was
therefore not effected with the support of the entire population and was
not long supported by an adequate inner structure.
The guerrilla bands, each 100 strong, forming light infantry companies
completely adapted to the train and to their mission, were united
brigades and then in "divisions". The administration of these
excessively large units required
(Figure 19, 6 in. high, entitled "Soldiers of the Greek Democratic Army
Photographed Jan 4 1947 at the Command post of Major Nikitos", appears
on page 47).
the creation of veritable logistic bases which needed to be established
in a well defined zone, resulting in the loss of the mobility and
fluidity which constituted the main strength of the guerrilla units.
These logistic bases were situated in regions which gave their occupants
in the illusion of being safe. They comprised caverns in calcareous
regions, lost in a maze of stones of all sizes, roads nearly all of
which were impracticable for carriages, and terrain over which tanks
could not pass: in short, zones favorable for defensive warfare and
murderous for any undertaking requiring the use of main force. At the
end of 1948, this Army was equipped with artillery materiel.
The National Army Fights Feebly and Fails on Attacking Redoubts. If the
Communists did not have more than 200,000 members or sympathizers in
Greece, the corresponding percentage thereof in the ranks of the
National Army, while not absolutely disastrous, was nevertheless injurious.
The units comprised a certain number of cells, which, without
instigating disorder, disseminated the Party's ideology and maintained a
current of opinion favorable to the partisans. The acts of the
Government were openly criticized and no reaction against the masked
opposition to the Government was observed.
(Figure 20, 4.5 in. high, entitled "In Certain Regions the Guerrillas
Enrolled Women in their Ranks, often by Force", appears on p.48).
The Army was therefore pervaded by a certain moral malaise. This
resulted in the complete absence of a fighting spirit during combat. The
soldier did not run at the enemy but exchanged distant and ineffective
volleys with him. The discipline was relaxed as greatly as the morale.
The Army combined with this psychological inferiority a complete lack of
adaptation of its organization to the role assigned to it. Its units,
patterned by the British Army after the conventional model, were
equipped with heavy armament not adapted to guerrilla warfare and with
means of transportation adapted to carriage roads, which did not exist
in the larger part of the country.
Lastly, the Training was Very Inadequate.
We must therefore not be surprised at the failure of such an Army in its
first offensive actions against regions favorable to the defenders, in
which the heavy infantryman quickly became physically and morally
exhausted. The Command had expected action in the central part of the
country, in the pinde mountain chain, along which the rebel
concentration zones were located. As soon as this zone had been
pacified, the Army was compelled to return toward the frontier and repel
the Communist troops in the Satellite States on the frontier, consisting
of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The pacification of the Pinde
Chain, begun in April 1947, failed because the partisans had time to
move from this base to others, an operation which permitted them to be
heavily loaded and enabled them to evade the dynamic action of the
Government's Army.
On June 29, 1948 the following year, an offensive was launched against
the Grammos mountain region, on the frontier with Albania. There, for 2
1/4 months, 15,000 partisans held in check 50,000 soldiers of the
Regular Army. They retreated methodically into Albania, passed through
Yugoslavia, and appeared soon afterward in the Vitsi Mts. The Government
troops tried in vain to dislodge them. These defensive victories had
renewed the courage of the secret fighters in the rest of Greece, and
blood was shed in terroristic or guerrilla actions throughout the
country, mainly in the Peloponnesus. The situation became critical, and
the whole country was completely demoralized. It was feared that the
uncertain outcome of the fighting and the misery, and despair prevailing
would prove good soil for Communist propaganda.
As a matter of fact, the public was wrong. The partisans had just
committed their most serious error: they had prematurely militarized and
stationed their forces and provided them with heavy equipment. They were
no longer scattered everywhere, but were in well-known regions where
they could be surrounded and starved. The Grammos and Vitsi mountain
regions were uncultivated and the supply of food and ammunition had to
be brought from abroad over precarious mule tracks which could be
rendered difficult by airplanes, while supply trains on them might be
intercepted by commando raids. It was under these circumstances that
Premier Sophondis entrusted the command of the ground forces to Gen. Papgos.
PAPGOS AND VICTORY OF PATRIOTISM
The Greek People were violently shaken by the agitation due to this War,
but they understood that their liberty was at stake in this conflict.
They knew the object of the warfare waged by the Cominform, namely, to
create a Communist Balkan Confederation obedient to Moscow, which Greece
would enter minus Macedonia, which would go to Yugoslavia, and Thrace,
which would be annexed to Bulgaria. They remembered the Balkan Wars and
the history of the fight of Greece for her independence. Freedom in
exchange for a virtual paradise under the Muscovite knout seemed to them
like a fool's bargain. The Greek Communists desired the ruin of their
own country and its dismemberment, and they worked in harmony with
foreign countries. The masses of the people did not follow them. Now
without the masses, the establishment of the inner structure and of the
parallel hierarchies is impossible, the secret plotters are denounced
sooner or later, and the guerrillas no longer have the helpers who are
indispensable to their information and Logistic Services.
Papagos understood all this immediately. What was it necessary to do,
then, in order to get rid of these enemies of the country? It was
necessary to give the Army an organization adapted to its new mission,
and to breathe into it a new spirit as soon as it was engaged in its
mission. He began by proceeding to recast its personnel. The Corps of
Officers was purged of its politicians and incompetents. The infantry
units provided with equipment too heavy for guerrilla warfare were
unburdened by giving them lighter equipment and armament better adapted
to the terrain. Elite corps and "command groups" composed of young
warriors selected for their vigor and courage were created, and their
exploits received a degree of publicity which caused other corps to try
to emulate them. Training was again respected, and the supply of food
and equipment increased. Mules took the place of trucks rendered useless
by the absence of carriage roads. Lastly, numerous efforts were made to
restore the country's economy and fight poverty, simultaneously with the
effort to reorganize the Army.
Fighting was resumed in the Peloponnesus, where 3,500 partisans were
annihilated. Several very extensive operations in the central part of
Greece restored peace throughout nearly the entire country. On August 10
1949, the Vitsi region, wherein the partisans had been entrenched for
two years, was taken in three days. 2,000 Communists of the 7,000 who
occupied this region were killed or captured, and the others took refuge
in Albania. The last bastion of the insurrection fell and the War ended
with the capture of the Grammos Mts, and the 5,000 partisans occupying them.
THE LESSONS TAUGHT: THE CAUSES OF THE COMMUNIST DEFEAT
The facts which marked the stages of this unsuccessful revolution seem
to confirm the correctness of the theories underlying revolutionary
warfare. The history of this struggle has shown three causes of the
defeat of the rebellion, upon which it is necessary to dwell:
1. The absence of a common ideal crystallizing in the minds of the masses;
2. The organization of secret action was not based upon a solid inner
structure and on parallel hierarchies accepted by the population;
3. The premature militarization of the guerrilla bands, causing them to
become inactive.
Lack of Crystallization of a common Idea in the Minds of the Masses.
In 1946, Greece contained 7,500,000 inhabitants. Among the male
population of this country, there were only 200,000 Communists or
Communist sympathizers, or only one-twelfth of the adult males. It is
all very well to talk about active minorities, but it would seem that it
is useless for a Party to undertake insurrectionary warfare unless it
comprises a certain percentage of males. It would be interesting to
examine this percentage limit. In the case in which we are now
interested, one-twelfth of the adult male population of Greece was
unable to impose its ideology or the regime which it desired upon the
rest of the inhabitants. A considerable number of people were, to be
sure, compelled to furnish information to the insurgents under the
influence of terror and intimidation, to shelter them, and to
participate in their logistic work, and some even had to swell their
ranks. These persons, however, who collaborated with the insurgents when
forced to do so, collaborated to an equal extent and much more willingly
with the Government. This was proven when we saw whole populations
evacuate the regions in which the partisans had established themselves.
Toward the end of the campaign, a counter-current of thought in
opposition to the Communist propaganda was seen, in spite of the general
disorder. This movement of public opinion originated in the profound
patriotism of the Greeks, who had been embittered by the plans for the
parceling out of Greek territory among Albania, Yugoslavia, and
Bulgaria, the three States bordering on its frontiers. In spite of their
indifference a great majority of the soldiers in the Government's Army
were not Communists, and the final victory of this Army shows that when
led by efficient commanders, its dynamism could equal that of the
partisans. Even among the latter, the new recruits hastily indoctrinated
gradually because as spiritless as the Government's reservists in
proportion as the original Communists fell in action.
Organization of Secret Action not Based on a Strong Inner Structure.
It is difficult to establish in any region a strong inner structure, and
therefore coherent and self-reliant secret action, without the adhesion
of the entire population. The logistic organization of the campaign
suffered the most annoying consequences of this situation. As the
partisans lived among the mountains and in sparsely inhabited regions,
it was out of the question for them to live on the country. Those
located in the frontier regions such as the Grammos or Vitsi Mts. could,
if absolutely necessary, obtain their supplies from depots in foreign
countries, but those who were in the central part of the country, in the
Pinde or Peloponnesus, where they had established no bases which would
have hampered their mobility, had to be supplied by means of mule
trains. It took from 50 to 100 mule loads per day to supply the
partisans in the interior of Greece, that is, from 700 to 1400 mules,
moving ceaselessly over tracks on the mountains, where they were
attacked by airplanes. It was this impossibility of supplying the
partisans properly which led their Staff to set up depots in the regions
which they occupied. In order to centralize the supply and
administration of the different bands, they resorted to the
organizations of small bands comprising 80 to 100 men; this logistic and
administrative organization constituted the first step toward a sort of
militarization which rapidly became effective.
The Militarization of the Guerrilla Bands. Guerrilla warfare cannot be
waged without light infantry living off the country. The only way in
which such infantry operated is by harassing the enemy by means of rapid
and transient actions, ambushes, and surprise attacks. When such
infantry is established in large units supplied by a QM depot and
supported by artillery, it is militarized and becomes a regular Army
strong enough to face another Army of equal numbers, but it no longer
has the mobility and fluidity of a Guerrilla Army. Now the Greek
Communist Partisans comprised only one-tenth as many affectives as did
the Government's Army. To engage in combat with forces ten times as
strong amounted to heading coolly for a disaster. The following course
was therefore taken by the Communist Staff: owing to the advantages of
the terrain on which it was established for defense, it succeeded in
halting its enemy in 1948, but failed in 1949 because of the numbers and
fresh enthusiasm of the National Army. It was this abandonment of the
very principles of guerrilla warfare and the too rapid transformation of
its units into a Regular Army which caused or hastened its final defeat.
CONCLUSION
During this entire campaign, the influence of foreign nations, mainly
that of the two opposed ideological blocks, played a considerable part.
The Communist uprising was a Moscow enterprise prepared for by the
Cominform. The free nations replied vigorously, at first by means of
declarations of the United Nations Organization, in which Russia
formally announced the cessation of her intervention, and then by the
very substantial aid given the Greek Government. Food, armies, and 4,000
mules were sent to Greece. No intervention by foreign troops occurred,
however, even in the form of volunteers. Only Greeks were engaged in the
military conflict. At the start, the Communists, well-trained by Moscow,
whose methods are always very effective during wars of subversion,
obtained astonishing successes and created a situation which it seemed
would necessarily terminate in their victory.
When considered as a whole in its historical perspective, the Greek
insurrection of 1946-49 shows that is was possible for the accession of
Gen. Papgos to the supreme Command of the Army to change the course of
the Revolutionary War during a critical situation. He was able to win
back and galvanize the people and to establish, by means of effective
methods, a territorial organization and a tool valuable in combat.
CAPTAIN LABIGNETTE
(Figure 21, 8.5 in. high, entitled "The Shah of Persia (left), who, in
august, 1953, Won the First Round in the Struggle in Which His
Government and the "Tudeh" Opposed Each Other"), appears on p.52.
THE IRANIAN TUDEH.
In Iran, we have seen a Revolutionary War waged in an under-developed
independent
State by the Tudeh, A Nationalist Leftist Party.
The Tudeh made two attempts at insurrection. In spite of its initial
successes, however,
it failed each time. Its failures were due to its ignorance of the basic
facts underlying
revolutionary warfare, but they were equally due to the support given
the National
Government by the United States.
After returning to the pre-revolutionary phase, the Tudeh developed; it
ceased to be a
Nationalist Party and became a veritable Marxist-Leninist Party which
now applies
strictly the principles of revolutionary warfare.
FROM MIDDLE CLASS NATIONALISM TO REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
In spite of its difficult relations with the Middle East, the West still
seems to have a bit of luck there. The hostility shown the West by the
countries in this region is unorganized and ineffective because they are
in an anarchical situation which is growing worse. No man or party seems
to have mobilized the masses permanently about an idea. This luck,
however, which does not exceed the maintenance of order, or rather the
existing disorder, is not complete, for one country is a dangerous
exception. In Iran, the Tudeh Party has for years conducted a
revolutionary struggle which has not yet been perceived. It is advisable
however, to reflect upon this matter in order to prevent serious
disappointment, but especially because this exceptional case yields an
abundance of information concerning the future of the "colonial"
countries which seek in revolutionary warfare a solution to their
conflict with the West.
We have accepted here the following definition of revolutionary warfare:
an armed struggle, within a social system, of a mass trained gradually
by a minority which gives reasons for acting against the machine of an
authority which this minority refuses to obey.
It seems necessary to extend this concept somewhat by adding to it a
second proposition, namely:
The armed struggle is the final stage of the process of revolutionary
warfare, which is primarily based upon an initial success, namely, the
monopolization of public opinion. In this respect the example of the
Tudeh is especially instructive concerning the preliminary process of
revolutionary warfare, and is also of capital importance because of its
political leaders. We have hitherto seen revolutionary wars succeed in a
colonial setting, where they were waged against a foreign "occupying" or
"colonizing" country. In Iran, an independent country like China, the
struggle is waged primarily against the lawful national Government and
only incidentally against the foreign country (the United States in the
present case) which supports it. The Tudeh has really arrived at the
second phase of revolutionary warfare; during this phase, the forces
which have gotten rid of the foreign country, turn against their own
Government. It would be a mistake indeed, to believe that the sole
object of revolutionary warfare is to expel the occupying Power,
whichever it may be. Its real, but more distant objective is the taking
of power by the forces of the extreme left, which must then take the
place of the National Government, which is generally non-Communist,
established after the liberation. During the National liberation phase,
terroristic or military action is of primary importance, but during the
second phase the mobilization of minds, that is, positive action,
becomes most important. In Iran, an independent country, the
insurrectionary action of the Tudeh has not yet begun but will
constitute the final stage of an operation begun more than ten years
earlier.
THE ORIGIN OF THE TUDEH
The Tudeh (19), (the "Party of the Masses"), is at present a unique
Party of its own enthusiasm, has evolved from a Left Nationalism toward
Communism in order to keep moving in the direction of revolutionary warfare.
The Tudeh has become rooted deeply in an old revolutionary tradition. As
recently as 1905-1907, Taki Zadeh headed an extremist movement of short
duration, but the latter's influence was felt during the revolts
occurring in 1918, 1920, and 1921, which terminated in the creation of
ephemeral democratic republics in Ghilan and Azerbaijan, and after their
collapse, in the creation of a new Iranian Communist Party, declared
illegal by Reza Shah in 1921 after his accession to power.
The failure of the revolutions during 1920 was inevitable because they
had neither created any basis for their support nor any organized party.
The revolt in Ghilan was of capital importance in this respect. It was
an anarchistic agrarian revolt, ideologically resembling the attempts of
the Russian Social Revolutionists (SR), and was mainly the product of
leftist intellectuals and small land owners who omitted the initial
stages of constructive preparation, psychological impregnation, and the
training of leaders, and proceeded directly to initiate the military
phase of the movement. This attempt was doomed to failure, for a false
start was made in initiating the revolutionary process, although it was
not useless. In addition to leaving a "romantic" memory in the heart of
every Iranian, it compelled the revolutionaries to revise their methods.
They then made a first "objectively sound" "Leninist" attempt to create
a "Center of Thought" as the first step toward crystallization.
After the dissolution of the Communist Party in 1921, Taki Irani, a
Professor in the University of Teheran, gathered the Marxist
intellectuals in study circles which functioned between 1930 and 1938
and contributed certain positive elements toward the establishment of
the Tudeh.
THE HISTORY OF THE TUDEH
In 1941, the reign of Reza Shah was brutally terminated. Iran was
totally different at that time from the other Middle Eastern countries,
for it possessed an intelligentsia capable of supplying theoreticians
and technicians; it also possessed an industrial proletariat created by
Reza Shah, though this was still weak, and a peasantry which was
agitated but consisted mainly of minorities (Kurds, Azeris, Turkomans),
and was therefore incapable of acting on a National scale. Lastly, the
forced denomadization undertaken by Reza Shah created a new class of
socially unadapted individuals, who were discontented and ready to
participate in any military adventure.
(Figure 22, 6.5 in. high, Legends are as follows: Line separating the
British and Soviet Zones (1941-1946).
The Soviet Republic of Ghilan (1920-21).
The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan (1945-46), appears on page 55).
This agitated political environment greatly favored the creation of the
Tuden, which was established on October 20, 1941, at Teheran, with a
Temporary Committee of 15 members, whose Chairman was Soliman Mohsen
Eskandari, and which comprised Iraj Eskandari, Yazdi, Radmaneh, Rouzteh,
etc., in other words, intellectuals educated in the West. Soon afterward
the Zaerbaijan group of Pichevari joined the Tudeh, bringing to it their
practice in political agitation and experience in direct action in
contact with the Russians (it must not be forgotten that the great
"organizer" of the Ghilan revolt was Ordjonikidze, a Georgian and a
personal friend of Stalin). In spite of this, the Tudeh was weakened at
the start by the absence of trade-union leaders, whom it had tried for a
long time to create.
The history of the Tudeh, a Nationalist Party of the left, may be
divided into four periods which mark a long search for effective
revolutionary methods.
(Figure 23, 4.5 in. high, entitled "Reza Shah Pahlevi, founder of the
Ruling Dynasty, engaged in the Struggle against the Iranian Communist
Party," appears on page 56.)
The Tudeh naturally patterned its organization after that of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the top of the hierarchy is the
Party Congress, elected at a National Conference, and its mission is to
choose the traditional Central Committee. The first Central Committee
was elected in August 1942, and then included 11 members, a Committee of
Control, a Political Bureau, and a Secretariat of three members, which
was reduced in 1946 to a single Secretary.
The first conference of the Party took place in June, 1942, with a
hardly Marxist program in which Nationalist slogans predominated. At
that tie the Tudeh was still utilized by the Allies in the common
struggle against the Axis Powers, and it received the freedom of the city.
Certain American observers who were impressed by the astonishing
vitality of the Party claimed that it has numbered nearly 200,000
members from its creation. It must be admitted that the active members
of the Tudeh have always been few in number and that they amounted to
20,000 at most during certain periods when it was exceptionally popular,
after which its membership fell to an average figure of from 3,000 to
5,000. During this period in which it benefited from the tolerance of
the general public, the Tudeh accomplished considerable organizational
work, trying to get in touch with the public opinion of "advanced"
circles, and to carry out the initial stage of organization by
establishing parallel hierarchies.
The Tudeh, it must be remembered, was limited in its action because it
was compelled to obey certain imperative rules relating to foreign
policy. This explains the limitation of its search to constructive
techniques alone, such as the quest and training of active elements and
the psychological impregnation of the population. The disintegration of
Iranian society and the organization of the population by a Party which
still lacked stability could hardly be realized at that time. The Tudeh
contented itself with doing constructive work which was all the more
effective because it could not be resisted, owing to its lawful appearance.
1944: The Parliamentary Period. In the climate of well-being due to a
victory to which the USSR had contributed, the Tudeh was able to
participate in the elections, in which it gained considerable success.
Eight (of its) candidates were elected in the Soviet Zone by 120,000
votes out of 150,000. The prestige of the Tudeh, however, was real even
outside the Soviet Zone, where one of its candidates was elected. A
total of one-fifth of the voters of Iran (200,000 out of 1 million)
voted for this Party. The Iranian Parliament received a real political
party for the first time, but this Party also commenced very soon to
decay. On being exposed to the hostility of the successive Chiefs of
State (Tabatabay, Saed, Mohammed Sadr), the Tudeh took refuge in
alliances of doubtful value with Nationalists of all kinds and old
advocates of Nazism. The members of the Tudeh did, to be sure, become
more numerous, but this increase in its active members was accompanied
by a decrease in its ideological purity. It was exactly at this time
that the Tudeh decided to attempt armed action.
1945-1947: Its First attempt at Revolutionary Action. In 1945 the
northern part of Iran was occupied by Soviet troops and 20,000 Iranians
voted for the Tudeh's candidates. Dazzled by the political situation and
by their electoral successes (20), the leaders of the Party believed
that the time for armed action had come and entered the phase of
militarization. Under what conditions did they make such a decision?
(Figure 24, 5 in. high, entitled "Teheran is a large modern City, as is
shown by the photograph of this square near the Parliament Building",
appears on p.57).
The organization of the Tudeh is still incomplete; the parallel
hierarchies exist but are not yet functioning.
The techniques employed are inadequate; on the other hand, destructive
techniques are still absent; on the other, the population is not yet
organized.
The results of this movement are too well known to be dwelt upon. The
revolution, which broke out on December 12, 1945 in Azerbaijan, and at
the beginning of 1946 in Kuristan, was at first marked by brilliant
successes. In June 1946 Ghawan es-Soltaneh, Prime Minster of Iran,
signed an agreement with the Provisional Government of Azerbaijan
granting it autonomous Parliament and a General Government. This de
facto recognition of the "democratic" Governments of Azerbaijan and
Mahabad was accomplished by a Government in which the Tudeh
participated. The honeymoon lasted only a few months, as Ghawan
es-Sultaneh, on being subjected to pressure by the conservative
elements, changed his policy completely in December 1946, dismissed the
Tudeh from the Government, and caused the invasion of the "democratic
republics", the resistance of which immediately collapsed. The
revolutionary venture appeared to be terminated, and its Azeri and Kurd
allies proved to be weak. Should the boldness of the Tudeh be condemned?
The outbreak of the armed revolutionary struggle was really on the
military plane and was perfectly justified from the organizational
viewpoint. The Iranian Government was weak, was embroiled constantly in
tribal disturbances, and was incapable of facing the increasing mistrust
of a confused public opinion. The Tudeh, however, which was too greatly
impressed by these favorable conditions, committed two serious mistakes:
In the first place, its incomplete development prevented it from
entering the stage of militarization, as it had not sufficiently
employed the destructive techniques; Iranian society was nearly intact,
and the enemy (the middle class, which was in power) was not at all
demoralized. Lastly, the propaganda had obtained hardly any hold on the
neutral Iranian masses. The Tudeh had, to be sure, made a great effort,
but this effort proved inadequate both because of the small number of
Communist cells established and because of the lack of organization of the
population.
Above all, however, the Tudeh had committed a very serious error in the
selection of the battlefield. By favoring the revolt of the minority
regions (Azerbaijan and Kurdistan), the Tudeh had aroused the hostility
of the deeply patriotic Iranian masses, who, moreover, hated foreigners.
Its selection was indeed dictated by necessity, as only the Kurds and
Azeris possessed the very embryonic elements of a revolutionary Armed
Force. This Force proved, in fact to be much smaller than the Tudeh had
estimated, and was incapable of resisting the Iranian Army, which was
reinforced by tribal elements loyal to the Government. In the regions
inhabited by a majority of Iranians, however, the nomads had not yet
been organized and had hardly been reached by the Tudeh's propaganda.
The recourse taken to military action was therefore very premature and
evidently occurred during a very favorable situation, but at a time when
the personal preparation therefore was very inadequate.
The Tudeh, on being beaten, was outlawed, practically persecuted, and
compelled to go underground.
On becoming an "underground" and almost illegal Party, the Tudeh, like
all underground Parties, tried to take advantage of this situation by
organizing and making progress. Its leaders, who had been hit hard,
studied the causes of their failure, and their reflections led them to
bring about an important doctrinal and tactical development. On the
doctrinal plane, the Tudeh approached the most orthodox Marxism. On the
tactical plane, it again prepared for revolutionary action but as it
realized its past mistakes, it seemed to have decided not to precipitate
events. In spite of these precautions, the leaders were to commit
another grave tactical error which would again deprive the Party of a
victory for which it had very well prepared.
(Figure 25, 4 in. high, entitled "Ghavan es-Soltaneh, Premier of Iran,
who tried in 1946 to form a Government in which the Tudeh Participated"
appears on p.59)
Nearly all the leaders were sojourning in France, whence they were
reporting the signs of the times. It was to be the tragedy of the Tudeh
that it was guided by leaders educated in the West, who were therefore
incapable of adapting Marxism to the local revolutionary conditions and
of getting in touch with the masses and thus changing the latter's mode
of thinking, which had already been westernized, or at least based on
Cartesian standards.
The general program of the Tudeh at that time is very clear. It was
trying, by offering a helping hand at once to all the leftists elements,
to create a Popular Front which would constitute the first stage on the
road toward the proletarian revolution, their final objective. In order
to realize this program, the Tudeh had recourse to the most well-tried
techniques of revolutionary warfare. At first, these techniques were
destructive; the enemy was demobilized by an insidious propaganda which
disparaged his most praiseworthy intentions and constantly questioned
the honesty of his actions. The Tudeh instigated strikes throughout the
country and brought pressure to bear upon public opinion. The
organization of the population was entrusted to the Party hierarchy,
which was set up alongside the official administration, in which an
effort was made to create Communist cells. A crystallization of public
opinion about the ideas of the Tudeh was gradually brought about.
Working-class circles furnished the subalterns and means and the first
small "combat" "squads" made their appearance.
Simultaneously with this organizational work, the Tudeh tried to make
its way into official political life, and achieved in six years a
gradual ascent which was to bring it up from complete secrecy to a
quasi-official position, and then to take over the power immediately
afterward lost.
In 1947, soon after the defeat in Azerbaijan and Mahabad, the Tudeh was
virtually outlawed (the official outlawry was not to occur until two
years later), but it is a paradoxical fact that two Tudeh deputies
continued to sit in the Majliss (21).
Differences of opinion which degenerated into schism came to light at
that time in the leadership of the party. Malki, one of the most active
leaders, rebelled
(Figure 26, 3.5 in. high, entitled "The Leaders of the 1945 Rebellion
Photographed after their Defeat," appears on page 60).
against the unduly strict discipline of the organization and its not
very spectacular activity. He then founded the Socialist Party of the
Masses," which wanted to win over the popular membership of the Tudeh,
which it would have transformed into a coterie of leftist intellectuals.
Malki and some faithful friends, having failed in this attempt, joined
Dr. Baghai's Workers' Party, which also failed to detract from the
prestige of the Tudeh. In 1949, the Progress made by the Tudeh in
moulding public opinion drew the attention of the authorities, who then
decreed its outlawry and proceeded to arrest its leaders. The Tudeh,
decapitated and disconcerted by police pressure, then suffered a short
period of almost total activity, which ended in 1951 with its triumphal
return to political life. The oil conflict ranged the entire population
of Iran against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., and behind this Company
against Great Britain.
The Tudeh, which has always proclaimed its national mission, returned to
public life, bringing with it all the advocates of nationalization, that
is, nearly all the country's public opinion. On May 28, 1951, the
leaders who had evaded the police in 1949 presented their first
memorandum concerning the oil problem to the Mossadegh Government and
offered it their support. Dr. Mossadegh, who had no communistic
tendencies, as has too often been asserted afterward, but was merely an
ardent nationalist, rejected this proposal from an illegal party whose
extremism he disapproved. To him, the Tudeh was a Communist Party, and
the authentic Prince Kadjar, who was related to the dynasty whose place
on the throne had been taken by Reza Shah, felt no attraction either for
the Communists or for Russia, who supported them. In March 1953, Dr.
Mossadegh likewise rejected a second proposal by the Tudeh, for the
creation of an "anti-Imperialist Front" - the real prelude to a Popular
Front. Between 1951 and 1953, however, the situation continued to
develop. The relations between Iran, on the one hand, and Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co. and Great Britain, on the other, became considerably worse and
the extremely sensitive people of Iran were ready to listen to the Tudeh
propaganda, which related wholly to the subject of Nationalism. At this
time, the prestige of the Party was so great, and its support of the
Government so complete, that it was impossible to keep it wholly
separated from political life. The outlawry imposed upon it was never to
be lifted, but gradually forced upon the Government and acquired a
status of quasi-legality, while its leaders were discharged one at a
time from prison.
August 1953: The Second Attempt at Insurrection. This return of the
Tudeh to the normal standards was to occur very late, and we must not
forget that Mossadegh opposed it as long as he could, but in June 1953,
Dr. Mossadegh and his Party, the National Front, found themselves in the
same position as the Tudeh. Mossadegh, imprisoned in this alliance,
which he had neither desired nor requested, was quickly outdistanced by
the Tudeh, and by certain of his collaborators, such as Fatemi, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was drawn into the revolutionary
adventure which had been initiated by the Tudeh in August 1953. The
monarch was abolished amidst a great explosion of popular fury which
seemed about to carry a Mossadegh Government, supported by the Tudeh,
into power. Three days later, when the success of the revolution
appeared, a new coup d'etat brought back the sovereign, who entrusted
the Government to Gen. Zahedi, the contriver of the counter-revolution.
Within a few hours the Tudeh collapsed before a handful of officers, and
its lack of resistance astonished both its enemies and world opinion.
The revolutionary adventure so carefully prepared for ended in headlong
flight, bloody, to be sure, but also very comprehensible.
Reasons for the Failure of this Act of Violence. The incomprehensible
failure of the Tudeh, which nothing could seem to stop in its march to
power, has a tactical explanation. Its leaders, educated in the West and
faithful to the strictest doctrines of Marxism, could conceive of no
revolution except one led and organized by the working masses. According
to these leaders, these masses could act only using the traditional
tactic of a proletariat struggling against the constituted authorities,
that is, by means of strikes, sabotage, and terrorism. Now this action
is effective when it is necessary to overthrow an authority already
condemned, but on the other hand, it is inadequate when it is to be
aimed at a strong Army still loyal to the Government, as was the case in
Iran. Moreover (and this is the lesson taught by Mao Tse Tung), which
the western Communists and their pupils have ignored), working-class
action, especially in countries having an agrarian structure, must be
supplemented by a revolt of the rural masses and the establishment of
centers of armed revolt.
(Figure 27, 4.5 in. high, entitled "Dr. Mossadegh is Carried in Triumph
by the Crowd at the Moment of His Greatest Popularity. With the Help of
the Tudeh, He Was to Initiate a Revolutionary Movement against His
Sovereign in 1953", appears on p.61.)
The Tudeh, which was too attentive to the urban proletariat, had hardly
begun to furnish leaders for the rural population, and had been unable
to provide a zone into which its combatants could retreat, and lastly,
the working-class commandos were too weak to oppose the gendarmerie (to
which the American instructors had brought modern techniques) and the
Army commanded by Gen. Zahedi.
Lastly, as in 1944, when the Tudeh had been reinforced by foreign
elements, it was filled to overflowing in August 1953 with extremist
elements which, to be sure, supported it, but might also have taken over
the leadership of the revolution. Drawn along among the mass of
opponents coming from all political quarters, the Tudeh became unable to
win more than a nationalistic and anarchistic revolution which the
Russians (we imagine) did not want on their frontiers with Moslem countries.
THE TUDEH MARCHES TOWARD COMMUNISM
Secrecy has always been advantageous for revolutionary parties, but it
is especially so for the Tudeh, which is compelled by inaction to
analyze the causes of its repeated defeats.
Its leaders point out all the mistakes which will doom the Party, unless
it corrects them, to sterile and bloody experiences. The reasons for the
defeats of the Tudeh are threefold, to wit: internal, international and
purely Russian.
As far as the responsibilities of the Party itself are concerned, these
are serious, and all their bases are being arraigned. This is a party
with nationalistic and anarchistic leaders, who dream of a romantic
revolution. Its proletarian bases are inadequate, and the organization
of the peasantry (the main element in oriental countries) has been
stopped by means of a failure. Its organizational weakness is combined
with an equal doctrinal weakness which forbids the Tudeh to adopt the
Popular Front solutions toward which its occasional allies would have it
deviate.
On the international plane, the cold war climate, which is especially
perceptible in the Middle East, is unfavorable for revolutionary
adventures. Lastly, the USSR itself had strong reasons for abandoning
the Tudeh to its fate. It was under the control of leaders educated in
France (tending to follow Marty), who were essentially intellectuals and
were in danger of escaping from the influence of the Russians. It is a
Nationalist Party, and the revolutions which it can promote will create
bourgeois "democracies." Now the USSR cannot tolerate on its frontiers
with Moslem countries regimes which exert a dangerous attraction upon
the moslems themselves. The problem posed to the leaders of the Tudeh
was therefore as follows: how to communize the Party so that it could
support effectively (and without danger to itself) a National
revolution, and then take the latter's place.
The evolution of the Party toward Communism since that time has occurred
during three periods:
The Period of Organization lasted 1 1/2 years, from the end of 1953
until August 1955. During this period, the Zahedi Government engaged in
a still moderate purge affecting almost exclusively those who
participated in the coup d'etat. This purge, which might have been
expected, and of which the Tudeh is the main victim, is arousing no echo
in the minds of the masses. The "underground" Tudeh is reacting in
various ways. A severe internal "purge" is eliminating the "lukewarm"
and the least reliable elements, and the establishment of a new
decentralized machine (in regions inhabited by Kurds and Azeris and in
the northern and southern parts of Iran) makes it possible for the
Communist to conceal themselves better and also to prepare withdrawal
areas patterned after the Chinese Yenans. Lastly, the tightening of the
bonds with the USSR, which is conscious of this effort, has resulted in
replacing the leaders trained in France with elements educated in the
Soviet Union and well versed in combat techniques.
(Figure 28, 4 in. high, entitled "Sadchikov, the Russian Ambassador,
receiving an Iranian Trade-Union Delegation. The USSR now seems to
Support the Tudeh. . . and the Soviet Press calls it a Part of the
Communist Party," appears on p. 63).
The Tudeh's efforts are also important on the purely organizational
plane; it is operating a complete system of cells in the Army and
securing key posts in the administration and the systems of
transportation and communication, as well as in the police, where its
agents are demoralizing elements loyal to the Government. In short, it
is trying to win over the tribes in the South (the Kashgais, Kurds and
Turkomans).
The USSR has seemed to support the Tudeh since that time, because it has
proven its strength by surviving the repression and by organizing (22),
and also because unlike what was true in past years, it has no other
alternative. The Tudeh was formerly a leftist National Party among many
others. In 1954, it was the only one of its kind in Iran, and the Soviet
press was henceforth to call it the Communist Party.
The terror and the Trotskyist temptation were to mark a break in the
evolution of the Tudeh in the middle of 1955. The Iranian Government
inflicted genuine terror upon the entire country and primarily upon the
highest leaders of the nation. It purged the Army (without reaching all
the Tudeh's members who had infiltrated into it), the Bench, the
University, etc. This time the Tudeh went completely "underground", gave
up the organizational work already undertaken, and took refuge in
ideological discussions, propaganda, and even the "temptation" of
terrorism (23). It returned for a short time to the infantile stage of
Communism; its whole future was at stake, and if it had succumbed to
this temptation it would no longer have been a party of the masses.
At that time, however, its leaders showed that they were wiser than they
had been in the past, and the reaction ended very quickly; on being
threatened by Teheran, they transferred their leaders and a part of
their militants to the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, which was also an
underground Party but was completely organized and controlled by the
Russians. The revolutionary warfare machine, though weakened, was
patiently reestablished and was thus saved. Moreover, the end of the
year was marked by a general change in Iran. Public opinion slowly
turned against the Government and the Americans, against whom the same
resentment was felt, and the spiritual authorities made their voices
heard in favor of "those condemned to death, who were elevated from the
status of culprits to that of martyrs.
The "Tudehization" of Iran then took place very quickly, and the Iranian
Government is partly responsible for this fact. The repression affected
the whole country and turned public opinion in favor of the Tudeh. Since
the purge had placed all its victims under the accusation of being
members of the Tudeh, the latter, with the exclusiveness characteristic
of the history of martyrdom, claimed to be the sole champion of the
National cause. Out of the divergent tendencies by which it had
traditionally been torn, the Tudeh appears to have definitely chosen
that led by Goreichi, one of its most reliable leaders, and the only one
who was a genuine Communist. Goreichi has liquidated the old team in
which great feudal land owners rubbed shoulders with intellectuals
educated in the West, and has replaced them with young leaders who were
real Communists and thoroughly "Russianized". The efforts of the Party
to organize were henceforth directed toward the rural masses (the
Chinese example was studied), and the para-military organizations
(trade-union organizations, Youth groups, etc.). The parallel
administrative machine went "underground" but was very extensive.
The Tudeh has, we see, developed through the force of events from a
leftist Nationalism to Communism, both in order to be able to bring
about a revolution and to be capable of keeping control thereof. At the
present time, the results of its efforts are indisputable. This
para-Communist Party has established a revolutionary warfare machine
which can be set in motion at any time and seems capable of effective
action.
The Tudeh does not have to use destructive techniques, for these will
henceforth be useless. Iranian society has been shaken under the blows
of the successive repressions, and public opinion is leaning toward the
Tudeh. It is hard to perceive any force in Iran which could be used to
oppose its action, as the Shiite clergy seems to have become neutral.
The constructive techniques, on the other hand, have been pushed very
far. The Party possesses a veritable Army of "leaders", agitators, and
trade-union leaders. The psychological impregnation of an already
organized population is another factor of success.
Finally the Tudeh, for the first time in its history, knows that the
fields are ready for the armed struggle, especially in the northern part
of the country; it also knows that it can stop the economic life of the
country whenever it likes, for it holds the key positions therein.
If this is true, serious minds will reply: "What prevents the Party from
beginning armed action at once?" The international situation, and
probably the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
The seizure of power by the Tudeh would probably mark the beginning of a
third world war, and the Soviet Union does not appear to desire this (at
least not now).
The revolutionary machine, troublesome and dangerous to world peace, and
no less a threat to Iran, is ready to function.
At the end of fifteen years of efforts and sacrifices, often very
bloody, the Tudeh seems to have reached the stage of political maturity
which permits action; it is merely awaiting a favorable period before
beginning the world-wide struggle.
H. CARRERE D'ENCAUSSE
THE REVOLUTION IN TUNISIA

We witnessed in Tunisia a Revolutionary War waged in an under-developed
dependent country by a Nationalist Party (of the Western type) inspired
and directly supported by the local Communist Parties (French and
Tunisian) and indirectly by the USSR and its temporary allies (the Arab
countries).
After suffering an initial failure (1938), the action of this Party
succeeded in creating an autonomous State tending to become independent
because of favorable circumstances (the war waged by the Viet Minh and
Dien Bien Phu with the support of the United Nations Organization) and
the systematic application of the principles underlying revolutionary
warfare.
The Tunisian Liberal Constitutional Party or Neo-Destour, which was a
minority group in 1934, when it was created, is now seen to be the
victor of what it was generally agreed in 1952 to call "the events in
Tunisia".
The struggle carried on during twenty years by this party enabled it to
extend its influence throughout the larger part of the country and to
attain its primary objective, namely, the internal autonomy of Tunisia -
"an important stage on the road to independence".
The real fight of the Neo-Destour, which had been prepared for ever
since the creation of the Party, in accordance with the principles
underlying revolutionary warfare, began after favorable conditions had
been realized.
The economic-military phase, during which the "fellaga" (24) period was
the decisive and effective phase, was prepared for during the
politico-psychological phase.
We have again observed in the action of the Neo-Destour the principal
characteristics of revolutionary wars.
THE NEO-DESTOUR
AND THE PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
On being examined, the disturbances in Tunisia seem like the end, or
rather the decisive phase of a struggle waged by the Party since its
creation. These principles, owing to the Western education and
revolutionary training of its leaders, were executed in accordance with
a plan of action, thanks to a Party organization and the use of methods
inspired by the extremist Parties.
(Figure 29, 4.5 in. high, entitled "The leaders of the Neo-Destour
Generally Received their Higher Education in French Universities: Above:
President Bourgiba".
The present leaders of the Neo-Destour generally received their higher
education in French universities. They acquired, during their stay in
France, a thorough political training in leftist or extreme leftist
groups, as well as their university education. It is very important that
we know that these Tunisians who constitute the "brains" directing this
revolution that we are witnessing, have received such an initial
training, for it enables us to understand the method of action that they
have succeeded in perfecting and which has enabled them to attain their
objective. During their many courses of study and their numerous
contacts with the representatives of French and foreign revolutionary
Parties, especially those of countries in a situation resembling that in
Tunisia, they have been able to study the conditions relating to the
struggle that must be undertaken for the "Liberation of Tunisia".
By following the materialistic, or rather the "realistic method" learned
from their Marxist teachers, they were able to solve the problem posed
by the struggle to be undertaken as required by the state of their
country. An analysis of the situation made in Tunisia toward 1930 showed
these young Tunisians that there existed:
Some Unfavorable Factors.
- One of these was the fundamental difference between their plans for
independence and the intentions of the protecting Nation, which was an
International Power. (The latter considered that the presence of about
200,000 Frenchmen and foreigners necessitated the organization of a
co-sovereignty, involving the participation of the European element in
the Administration of the country).
- Another was the existence of Control Corps and a large French
technical personnel ensuring efficient control of the Tunisian
Administration.
- The settlement, begun long ago, of a European element numerically weak
but qualitatively strong, which it was necessary to treat with
consideration because it was indispensable to the economic equilibrium
of the country.
- A certain opposition to the views of this element with regard to the
creation of a modern State with a secular constitution, on the part of
the traditionalistic Tunisians, who imbibed their views from the Orient.
A Favorable Factor.
A growing, though relatively small number of Tunisians developed and
trained by Western methods.
A Neutral Factor:
- The great mass of rough, ignorant, and unorganized people, isolated
within the traditional local groups (tribes), mainly in the interior of
Tunisia.
THE 1934 PLAN OF ACTION.
These Nationalists were facing a veritable revolution to be undertaken,
and an objective view of this actual situation showed them the necessity
of adopting a strategy which would require a long period for the
realization of their plan.
They then decided to wage this combat in two phases: in the first place,
to win internal autonomy, a necessary stage for taking over the
organization of the country. Then, after the Tunisian elite had taken
over the internal administration and the new State had the necessary
leaders at its disposal, the final stage, consisting in independence,
would easily be brought about "from within". (These successive
objectives were inscribed in the Party's rules and regulations).
The conditions under which a national struggle of a revolutionary
character was to be waged for the conquest of power had been "codified"
in Marxian doctrine. They had just been tested in Germany and Italy,
after having been tried out by the USSR, on the one hand, and by certain
Arab countries in fighting against the Ottoman Empire (25), on the other.
The principles underlying this revolutionary strategy can be summarized
in the following basic formula, which is a compromise between the
principles of Leninism and those of the British School (26).
"In order to overthrow an enemy, it is necessary to push him off balance
by introducing into the field of operation a psychological or economic
factor which will place him in a position of inferiority, before an
attack can be launched against him with excellent chances of success."
"The object of this strategy is to place the enemy in a false position,
in the same way as do the judo methods which make it possible for a
little fellow to floor an athlete in spite of the relation between the
physical strength of each" (27).
The application of these principles showed them the necessity:
-Inside the country, of gaining the support of the population so that
the Party could at its disposal have a psychological and economic factor
indispensable for any decisive action;
-Abroad, to obtain important support so as to compensate for the
inequality of strength.
All internal action would be doomed to failure unless it received
approval and active support both from the sympathetic French parties,
and from foreign nations, and especially from the Anglo-Saxon countries,
the totalitarian States (at the time) and the Arab States.
Their plan therefore involved:
-Inside Tunisia;
The creation of a Party capable of unifying the population. This Party,
organized as a genuine instrument of struggle, was to make possible the
employment of the methods of revolutionary warfare, both against the
internal enemies (the traditionalistic members of the Des-Tour and other
parties) and against the established authority (the protecting Nation).
-Outside Tunisia:
The search for support either in France, by maintaining contact with the
sympathetic Parties, or abroad) in countries having an Arab policy, such
as Germany, Italy, England, or the new Arab Kingdoms).
These young men, after their return to Tunisia, enrolled in the Liberal
Constitutional Party or Destour. Their origin, however, (most of them
came from the middle class) and their Western education and
revolutionary training rapidly brought them into conflict with the Party
leaders, who were generally of bourgeois origin. At first, they
constituted the advanced wing of the party and tried to impose their
views on it. Later, in 1934, they brought about a rupture and founded a
new Movement, Although they took the title of the Liberal
Constitutionalist Party of Tunisia, they designated themselves more
briefly with the name Neo-Destour. Since then this last designation has
been changed by the Opposition to the Old Destour or Archais Destour.
On having at their disposal a fighting instrument, the leaders organized
it in accordance with the principle underlying revolutionary parties. On
the highest level, they created a directing agency called the Central
Committee, which was assigned a certain number of tasks (propaganda,
Youth, Training of Leaders, Social Affairs, and Action Groups. The
territorial regions organized Federation composed of a certain number of
cells, basic elements of the Party. The latter were composed of a
bureau, with a president, secretary, treasurer, and delegates,
responsible for the activities directed by the Commissions in the higher
echelons, with a variable number of members. While informing the
different elements of the hierarchy of the state of mind of the masses,
these cells were charged with the task of organizing cells among the
population and acting upon them by the means characteristic of the Party.
The procedures used, which were inspired by the methods customary in
totalitarian movements, made their appeal by means of persuasion and
fear. Persuasion was used by means of written or spoken propaganda. The
ideas and slogans of the Party were spread by means of pamphlets and
newspapers, and were repeated orally to the often rough, ignorant masses
by the leaders and militants. The members of the Central Committee made
many propaganda tours, during which they aroused the nationalistic
feelings of the people. These manifestations served to demonstrate the
strength of the party and supplemented the psychological action of the
newspapers. When dealing with recalcitrants or members of opposing
Parties, terroristic methods were used without mercy. Acts of
malevolence, criminal attempts, and sabotage were employed in order to
keep them neutral, and sometimes even to suppress them.
Since its foundation, the Neo-Desturian Party has tried with all its
energy to establish its fighting organization and to perfect its means
of action. It accomplished this purpose so well that in 1958 (four years
later) its leaders believed that they could obtain their primary
objective by arousing the country. They failed, and the Party was
dissolved, for they had not observed the basic principle, which required
that France, the enemy in this case, be placed "in a false position".
The Neo-Destourians had believed that by inciting the people they could
win wide-spread popular support and take advantage of the international
situation in order to compel the French Government to compromise with
them. They were reduced to secret action until the end of the hostilities.
(Figure 30, 6.5 in. high, entitled "Kairouan, the Holy City and
Stronghold of the Traditionalistic Tunisians, whose Opposition to the
Plans of the Neo-Destour to Establish a Modern Secular State this Party
Feared," appears on page 69).
Since then, a new plan more complete and more in harmony with
revolutionary principles has been prepared. Its object was:
Inside Tunisia:
- To organize the Party systematically so as to make it more effective
(the Resistance Committee):
- To create allied organizations (trade-unions, professional groups and
groups composed of young people and women) in order to extend the action
of the Party and penetrate every social stratum;
- To train groups by means of para-military methods designed to increase
the fighting spirit of the militants and the Destourian Youth;
Outside Tunisia:
- To establish relations with the Western political organizations and
trade-unions interested in the liberation of "dependent peoples";
- To create a "combat instrument" with the support of the Arab States
capable of giving foreign support to a "direct action" enterprise within
the country.
Beginning in 1945, all the activity of the Neo Destour was designed to
carry out this plan, and the weapons, henceforth traditional, of a
revolutionary struggle, entered into action in 1952.
THE REVOLUTIONARY ACTION OF THE NEO-DESTOUR
The real combat began at the beginning of 1952, for the conditions
favorable to its success had been carefully prepared by the Neo-Destour.
Inside Tunisia, the Party and the various organizations attached
thereto, having regrouped the different classes of the population, were
sure of their hold on the people.
(Figure 31, 5 in. high, entitled "The Great Mass of Often Rough,
Ignorant, and Unorganized People, Isolated in the Traditional Local
Groups was Neutral Factor but one that could not be neglected", appears
on p. 70).
In foreign countries, the "diplomatic preparations" of the Bourguiba
obtained support for this combat from numerous sources, in both Eastern
and in certain Western countries.
The preparations made, both within the country and abroad, were
sufficiently advanced in October 1951 to cause the Neo-Destour, which
now felt sufficiently strong, to believe that the time had come to
determine its destiny. Through the mediation of the Chenik Ministry, in
which it participated in the person of its Secretary General, Salah Ben
Youssef, it tried to bring about the country's internal autonomy rapidly
by means of more or less exacting claims.
The response of the French Government, made December 15, 1951, gave the
Neo-Destour the opportunity for which it was waiting in order to begin
"Decisive action", Bourguiba returned to Tunis January 2, 1952. He
caused the Tunisian Ministry to draw up a request for appeal to the
United Nations Organization, and sent out his final appeals to the
people of Tunisia. He declared as follows at Bizerta, January 13, 1952:
"The United Nations Organization will intervene in order that we may
negotiate, and if it is "not enough for the Ministerial delegation to go
to France (where the session of the United Nations Organization is to be
held), it will be necessary to undertake widespread military action
throughout Tunisia." The first incident took place at Tunis on January
14, 1952, and the decisive phase began.
On reading the speeches of Bourgiba, one would be inclined to think that
the outbreak of these disturbances constituted the spontaneous
expression of a veritable outburst of anger of the Tunisian People as
the result of this note of December 15. However, an examination of the
facts, the journeys made, the press conferences, and the official or
private writing of the New-Destourian leader, shows that these
disturbances were premeditated and that a real plan of action had been
prepared.
The struggle which occurred during and after 1952 began in the form of a
politico-psychological phase, followed by an economic-military phase,
the fellagha period of which constituted the decisive moment, as we have
stated.
In studying the disturbances in Tunisia, two phases are very clearly
distinguished. A first phase during which terrorism was given free
course, mainly in the urban centers. During the second period, the
disturbances extended into the rolling country, and armed bands
recruited from the tribes of the interior spread over most of the country.
The Terroristic Phase (1952-1953). The first period can be regarded as
the politico-psychological phase of this struggle. It was political,
because its essential purpose during the year 1952 was to attract the
attention of the United Nations Organization to the Tunisian problem. It
remained political in 1953, in order to struggle against the reforms
that France was trying to bring about. It was always psychological, for
it aimed at obtaining the support of the people and drawing all of them
into the struggle.
On October 23, 1952, a majority (of the members of the United Nations
Organization) decided to hear the complaints lodged against France. The
discussion took place in the absence of the French delegation, who had
withdrawn (28), and ended in the adoption of "recommendations" that the
French Government settle the Tunisian question in accordance with the
objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
The final result was not very important, for it was in accordance with
the intention of the French Government to effect reforms. It was
sufficient, however, in the eyes of the Neo-Destour. France had appeared
on the international scene before the people of Tunisia in the role of
an accused party. Plots and collusions in favor of the terrorists become
more and more numerous. The repression of terrorism resulted in numerous
arrests, and caused a reaction leading many neutrals into the
Nationalist camp. The effect of all this was that as a result of the
party's sustained propaganda and the continuing terror aroused by the
assassinations (and thus became of the consequences of the repression) a
majority of the Tunisians became sympathizers with the Neo-Destour
during this period.
The Fellaga Phase (1954). The Party leaders, who were henceforth assured
of the support of an increased number of people, decided to proceed to
the execution of the decisive phase. This second period may be regarded
as the economico-military phase, of this combat, for it took the form of
a frontless war.
There was a sort of guerrilla warfare, in the usual sense of this term,
but there occurred behind this a veritable total mobilization of the
population. The alerting of the population and the employment of all the
resources in the form of morale, men, and goods, in so far as these were
mobilized, really amounted to a frontless war.
Simultaneously with the action of secret groups assigned the task of
keeping the Tunisian population, mainly in the cities, alerted, fellaga
bands appeared in the rural regions and gradually extended their
influence throughout the greater part of the country. The period between
September 1953 and March 1954 was relatively calm in Tunisia. Relaxation
was in vogue after the arrival of M. Voizard, the new Resident, so that
all the leaders of the Neo-Destour except Bourgiba left their distant
camps and were able to perfect openly the organization of the military
phase, properly so-called.
A special Commission with the Political Bureau, composed of the main
leaders, was charged with the conduct of the War.
This could not be done from abroad, for the bands were compelled to
remain where they could be controlled by the political organization and
be used as a means of exerting pressure upon the French Government. Two
agencies were created by this Commission in order to direct the
operations, namely:
- A civil organization, domiciled in Tunis, which was given the task of
recruiting, supplying, and financing the bands and was authorized to
deal with questions relating to liaison and information for the benefit
of the various armed groups;
- The military organization in Tripoli, whose main mission was to train
the cadres and specialists and to give technical and tactical
instructions to the men commanding the bands.
The reforms instituted March 4, 1954 (deemed inadequate because they did
not grant the internal autonomy demanded by the Neo-Destour) was the
signal for the outbreak of the Fellaga Movement. The bands in the South
went into action and started northward; the carefully made preparations
were rapidly bearing fruit. The ranks of the old groups were rapidly
swollen by the numerous volunteers recruited by the chiefs of the bands
and the directors of the local cells or federations. The fellaga chiefs,
acting under the orders of the Destourian leaders, rapidly captured the
interior of Tunisia. In spite of the preventive measures adopted, their
action was felt within three months from the southern part of Tunisia to
the Mexjerdah. Consequently, at the end of July 1954, the bands from
Sahel and Bizerta, and especially those from the southern and central
parts of the country, occupied the larger part thereof.
The urban gangs of terrorists were not involved, a fact which seemed
strange at that time. They were ready to act, however, when ordered to
do so. The organizations attached to the Party, the trade unions, and
the professional and Youth associations, prepared their troops
thoroughly and waited for the bands to capture the rural regions. All
these forces, urban and rural, were now merely awaiting orders to begin
a general attack.
(Figure 32, 5.24 in. high, entitled "The Repression of Terrorism
resulted in Numerous Arrests and the Reaction Thereto brought many
Neutrals into the Nationalist Camp" appears on page 73).
This time the organization of the rebellion, carefully organized and
prepared, was to place the whole country under the authority of the
Neo-Destour.
The promise to grant internal autonomy, made on July 31 by the President
of the French Council of State, the arrival of two reinforcing
divisions, and the opening of negotiations caused the
cessation of this general offensive.
The fellaga bands remained on a war footing despite this, and continued
to carry out the program prepared for them. They were estimated to
number 1,000 men in July, and increased to 2,000 in September and
reached the number of 3,000 in November.
Operations bringing these bands into conflict with the forces of law and
order took place during the negotiations in Paris. These bands, which
were real means of exerting pressure, constituted a persistent threat to
the French in Tunisia.
On being notified that they must be disbanded, the Neo-Destour consented
to their "capitulation" on December 1, 1954, as it had received
guaranties from the French and considered that the losses inflicted on
the bands had been severe (nearly 300 of them had been killed or
captured in three months).
The Protocol agreed upon, granting internal autonomy to Tunisia, was
signed on April 21, 1955. The final texts were initialed by the Bay of
Tunis and the President of the French Republic on September 1, 1955.
The first objective of the Neo-Destour had been attained.
It may appear risky to make a comparison between the action of the
Neo-Destour in Tunisia and the activities of the Viet Minh in the Far East.
To us French, the campaign in Indo-China is still the model of
revolutionary warfare, and it seems questionable to claim that the
struggle of the Neo-Destourian Party is comparable with it. At first
sight, at least, the conditions relating to the two conflicts were
different and forces engaged in the two countries could not be judged
according to the same standard. However, behind the final external
military aspect of these two conflicts, an examination will show the
similarity of the politico-military conduct of both wars.
In the field of strategy, as well as in that of tactics, we have found
in Tunisia the principal characteristics of revolutionary wars.
Exactly like Mao Tse Tung in China, and Ho Chi Minh and Giap in the Far
East, the Neodestourian Party has succeeded in adapting the strategic
principles underlying revolutionary warfare to the particular struggle
that it desired to carry on in Tunisia.
It waged its war in several phases:
First Phase:
The winning of extensive popular support, due to a powerful political
organization capable of silencing the internal enemy so as to obtain
complete freedom of action in the struggle against the dominant Nation.
Second Phase:
A period of direct action based on terrorism in the cities and on
"fellagism" in the rural regions, designed to improve the morale of the
people and, in particular, to impair that of the enemy.
Third Phase:
A general offensive by all forces combined: to wit: "the Army of
Liberation," secret urban groups, and the uprising of the population for
the purpose of crushing the enemy, whose capacity for resistance had
been reduced.
This last phase did not take place, as the opening of the negotiations
and the signing of the conventions recognizing the internal autonomy of
Tunisia had rendered it useless.
The evolution of the struggle throughout these twenty years has shown
the tactics utilized by the Neo-Destour, and we have found the different
means of action and methods characteristic of revolutionary movements.
The agencies designed to wage the combat comprised organizations acting
openly and secret organizations charged with assisting effectively the
action of the former.
The methods of action employed here have thus revealed the revolutionary
technique. A veritable mystical organization, based on a fanatical faith
in the victory of the struggle for the independence of Tunisia, was
created when the Neodestourian Party was formed.
A certain number of "ideas to be impressed upon the people" were
disseminated throughout the country: Tunisia had a glorious past; it was
a Nation and had a right to be independent, and the status of being a
protectorate consituted a humiliation. These ideas were designed to
arouse the nationalistic feelings of the population and proved that the
combat to be undertaken was for a "just cause."
Independence, symbolized by the Tunisian flag and popularized by means
of pamphlets and photographs, was even praised in poems set to music
sung by innumerable wandering singers.
All means provided by the revolutionary technique were utilized in order
to ensure the spread of this idea, including propaganda of various
kinds, terrorism, demonstrations, and uprisings, the utilization of
Youth, and various psychological actions.
These organizations and methods of action, perfected by the Party in
accordance with the doctrines of its revolutionary teachers, obtained
astonishing results: the Neo-Destourian leaders have created a Tunisian
Nation from a collection of peoples differentiated by their origins and
modes of living, and residing in regions as unique as the maritime and
internal regions of Tunisia. Although certain differences still exist,
the feeling of belonging to the same Nation has appeared even in the
most remote tribes.
The most impressive characteristics of this technique, however, are the
vitality and aggressiveness which have characterized the action of the
Tunisian Neo-Destour.
The Party has pursued tirelessly the goal which it had set for itself,
in spite of the repressions and the internment of its leaders (Bourguiba
was interned nine years). Although its leaders were educated and trained
in the West and are closer to us than those of the Old Destour, we
understand why this political group has always been regarded as that
most dangerous to the French in Tunisia.
(Figure 33, 6 in. high, entitled "On December 1, 1954, the Neo-Destour
consented to the "Capitulation" of the Fellagha Bands and ordered them
to Lay Down their Arms," appears on p.75).
This Party, founded in 1934, attained its objective in 1954, or twenty
years later. These twenty years were twenty years of struggle. Struggle
is not an inappropriate term, for there was not a single year after the
creation of this Party that was not marked by incidents, often bloody,
and the last phase assumed the nature of an armed uprising whose victims
became the "martyrs of the Liberation," and the partisans have become
the "heroes" of a National epic.
CONCLUSION
The Marxist world has perfected an effective and resolutionary strategy
and tactics. The theater of the Indo-Chinese operation has shown us how,
within seven years, a Marxist-inspired Party has succeeded in winning
the support of the people, in organizing an instrument of combat, and in
waging total war with "all forces combined" - the people and the Army.
The example of the Neo-Destour in Tunisia has just given us another
example of revolutionary warfare. This Party also succeeded in winning
the support of the people, in creating an instrument of combat, and in
initiating a period of disturbances preliminary to a "total war" in
which all Tunisian elements were engaged.
Although the Neo-Destour benefited by the support given it by the
Tunisian and French Communist Parties, we cannot regard this Party as
dependent on their obedience. We must therefore recognize that the
lessons of the Marxist teachers have borne fruit and that the Destourian
leaders have succeeded in adapting the principles of revolutionary
warfare to their own struggle.
Captain A. SOUYRIS
-------------------------
PART III
THE REASONING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY CHIEF.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND CONDUCT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.
As paradoxical as it may seem, the teachers of revolutionary warfare,
who are champions of materialism, have succeeded in studying thoroughly
and perfecting a method of reasoning mainly based upon the analysis of
the human factors regarded as of primary importance, while the
occidentals--clinging to idealism--continue to reason in terms of the
material elements of a given situation.
To our great astonishment, we have seen our troops, who are superior in
organization and numbers, show themselves impotent to reduce by force
the disturbances caused by elements which are apparently, at least,
weaker than the troops mentioned.
It is not necessary merely to study the enemy and to evaluate his forces
and their capacity and numbers, but we must, above all, know the way in
which he wages "his" war and the methods which he actually employs. It
is expedient to consider not only the form, but the basis of his power.
It therefore seems that in cases of revolutionary warfare (such as we
have faced since the end of World War II) we have been compelled to take
mainly into account the methods of reasoning used by the enemy.
Without claiming to draw a definitive diagram illustrating this method
and to describe the "factors of analysis" involved therein, it appears
necessary to determine the general rules for the examination of a
situation, which are used by the revolutionary chiefs. The example of
China, where revolutionary warfare has been most thoroughly employed,
will concretely illustrate this report.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND CONDUCT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.
It seems difficult to maintain that the revolutionary wars of our era
have broken out at a certain time and in a certain region purely by
chance. It also seems difficult to attribute their development to a Fate
superior to the revolutionary chieftains and combatants. The operations
and the whole nature of each of these wars give the impression of being
guided, as much as do those of wars of the traditional type. The
complexity of the forms of the struggle and the duration of the
conflicts even render the necessity of a permanent and universal control
still more imperative.
To be sure, the behavior and methods of chiefs of a new type bear hardly
any resemblance to those of their predecessors. Those of both types,
however, are obliged to weigh the elements of these wars before arriving
at a decision. The "What is to be done?" spoken by Lenin, corresponds to
the "What is involved?" uttered by Verdy du Vernois and repeated by
Marshal Foch.
An analysis of the situation, general or particular, initial or
immediate, can be made only if based upon clearly defined criteria. It
is necessarily organized around poles of interest and is arranged in
paragraphs, even if any diagram is omitted for the sake of great
objectivity.
As far as we know, no theoretician has yet described, in a plain and
logically conclusive statement, a method of analyzing the situation
applicable to revolutionary warfare.
In the absence of any article as complete and exact as the "Study of the
Factors", published by the French Staff College, or as meticulous as the
American "Estimates", it has been necessary to "reconstitute" and
"restore" such an article, using a mosaic as the starting point. It has
been necessary, rather, to rediscover the successive results obtained
through the use of viewpoints which enable revolutionary commanders to
determine, after studying a situation, the "line" to be followed.
It is therefore on the bases of examples like Mao Tse Tung, who has been
used as such here, that the rules of examination implicitly or
explicitly used by the Chinese commanders have been deduced. As such,
they seem to have a value not confirmed to China.
We shall first state the rules of examination as they have been deduced
from the study of numerous examples. After studying two specific
examples according to the method suggested, we shall try to show how the
chapters containing the analysis of a situation can make it possible to
discover the conditions favorable to the outbreak of a revolutionary war.
THE METHOD OF ANALYZING A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION.
The Environment. The primary most general and most stable factor in the
situation, and that which the commander can evaluate most objectively,
is the environment.
The revolutionaries are not content, however, merely to study this
environment geographically (the dimensions and characteristics of the
territory, and its climate, resources, and population).
That which interest them most is the condition of the population from
the economic and social viewpoint.
What are the demographic facts (Is the population divided vertically
into classes? What is the birth-rate? The death-rate? The rate of
population increase? The demographic pressure?).
Are the people engaged in industry? In agriculture? In commerce? In what
proportions?
What are the relative numbers of the urban (in large and small cities)
and rural population? What are their activities? What is their standard
of living? How are the income and wealth divided?
Are the economic and social "structures" stable or developing rapidly?
What role do the minorities (ethical or religious) play? What are the
strong and weak points of the present system? Are there any strong trade
unions?
(Fig. 34, 3.5 in. high, entitled "The Environment is not Studied Solely
from the Geographic Viewpoint; the Revolutionists are Equally Interested
in the Economic and Social Condition of the Population", appears on p.80).
The international facts capable of influencing the situation are also
examined minutely. Who may intervene? For whose benefit? Under what
conditions? In what way? (Political, economic, financial, military)?
What will be the consequences of such intervention?
The ration between the politico-military forces. The second factor is
the ratio between the politico-military forces, considered mainly from
the viewpoint of the possibilities of friends and enemies with regard to
control of the population: the administrative, judicial, police, and
military machinery of the existing authority; the qualities, weaknesses,
and possibilities of defense and reaction; permeability to the
establishment of (Communist) cells; trade unions; the revolutionary
Party and opposing parties; parties with which an alliance might be made
or common action agreed upon; the press; the radio; armament that might
change hands, etc. The purely military possibilities of the means are
secondary here. The success of armed force is likewise of no interest
unless this makes it possible to maintain or extend the control of the
friendly organization over the population, or to loosen or abolish the
enemy's control.
The Will to Fight. The third factor is very important. It is the
evaluation of the will of the combatants to fight. In the study of the
traditional factors, the "moral forces" constitute only on aspect of the
means used in the struggle. The thing that is important to a
conventional military commander, indeed, is to destroy the organized
enemy forces. He knows that he will be unable to execute his mission if
his means are inadequate, no matter what moral forces they include.
Revolutionary commanders, on the contrary, appear to set a high
valuation on the will to fight (or the reasons for fighting), regardless
of the means. This will be understood if we examine the matters with
which they are concerned. For them, the important thing is to increase
the effective support of the population. What happens to their means,
and in particular to their military means, does not directly influence
the attitude of the population, especially if the latter is controlled
by a secret inner structure. This is even more true when a base has been
created in a favorable environment and its inhabitants share (at the
cost of a certain number of eliminations) the reasons of the
revolutionists for fighting, while the military reverses of the latter
do not suffice to weaken the ideological convictions of the inhabitants.
We therefore wish to point out, in passing, that the victory of the
authority in a "base", which is equivalent to the destruction or capture
of an army in a traditional war, can be accomplished only by the
destruction or capture of all the means used by the revolutionists. This
means either a methodical, slow, and expensive "clearing of the area",
or a massive deportation of the inhabitants.
Thus, in the analysis of a situation in a revolutionary war (see the
Table on p. 82), the characteristic facts relating to the environment,
the ratio between the forces, or the will to fight, are classified in
the corresponding paragraphs. They are then interpreted (as favorable or
unfavorable facts) and a general balance-sheet can be drawn up.
ANALYSIS OF A "GLOBAL" SITUATION
Application to the China of 1936
Factors to be studied
Characteristic facts
i = (examples)
(Dialectical) interpretation
ii = Favorable factors
iii = Unfavorable factors
I - Environment (rough data)
a) Geographic
i) Vastness of territory
Poor communication system
ii) "Withdrawals" possible
iii) Division and dispersion of active elements
b) Economico-social
i) Hardly industrialized agrarian country; great technical backwardness
ii) Great numerical superiority of poor peasants.
iii) Few or no cities in Communist-controlled areas (no means of production)
c) International
i) Stability of capitalist world. Russia under 2nd 5-Year Plan.
ii) Existence of Russia.
iii) No external aid to be expected. The Kuomintang effectively
supported by Foreign Powers.
II - Ratio between politico-military forces:
a) Inner structure
i) Result of the revolution of 1927-1931
ii) Experienced Communist leaders.
iii) Monopolization of power by the Kuomintang.
b) Military means
i) Situation in the forces of the Kuomintang.
ii) Probable differences between officers and troops. Feudal armies.
(Rivalry between Commanders).
iii) Overwhelming superiority of T.K.C. forces in effectives and
materiel. Political training of officers.
III - Will to fight
(of friends and enemies)
"Why we fight"...
i) Agrarian reform brought about by Communist Party
ii) Gives the peasants a motive for fighting.
iii) Renders landowners hostile.
Four Conclusions drawn from the foregoing Table:
1. Summary of interpretations under Ia, Ib, and IIa
A semi-colonial, unevenly developed country which has had a recent
revolution.
2. Summary of interpretation under Ic, IIa, and IIb
A powerful enemy.
3. Summary of interpretations under Ia and IIb
A weak Red Army
4. Summary of interpretations under III
An agrarian reform.
1 and 4 are favorable, 2 and 3 are unfavorable, therefore: "If this war
is not conducted correctly, it is very possible that it will end in defeat".
THE GENERAL SITUATION IN 1936
Out of all the facts which reveal this situation, we are restricted to
the selection of a few examples of simple, characteristic facts relating
to a single subject, to wit: the geographic, economico-social and
international environment, and the ratio between the politico-military
forces. It goes without saying that there are also complicated facts
that must be examined from several "angles", but which have not been
included here in order to prevent this article from being too lengthy.
The second example should, in a more limited context, show several
"polyvalent" facts to be interpreted with the aid of two or more subjects.
a) The Environment. From the geographic viewpoint, we note the immensity
of Chinese territory and the mediocrity of the communications system.
These facts constitute, for the revolutionaries:
- A favorable factor, namely: the possibility of evading attention in
some remote region (withdrawal) and of effecting widespread strategic
withdrawals;
- An unfavorable factor, namely: the division and dispersion of their
partisans, who experience great difficulty in linking their efforts.
b) From the social and economic viewpoints, we find that China is an
agrarian country, hardly industrialized, and that its economy is
backward (the sources of energy are not exploited owing to lack of
technicians and capital, the heavy industry is inadequate, and domestic
commerce is weakly developed).
- One factor is favorable, namely: the overwhelming numerical
superiority of the poor peasants;
- On the contrary, the very small number of cities in the
Communism-controlled areas deprived the Reds of the means of production;
c) On the international plane, there are two characteristic facts to be
considered: the stability of the capitalist world and the execution of
the Second 5-Year Plan in Russia;
- The existence of Soviet Russia is a favorable factor;
- Red China cannot expect any immediate assistance while its enemy, the
Kuomintang; can expect effective foreign aid (unfavorable factors).
a) The Inner Structure. The revolution of 1927-1931:
- Has trained and tested Communist officers (a favorable factor);
- Has made it possible for the enemy, the Kuomintant, to seize power (an
unfavorable factor).
b) Military Means. The situation within the forces of the Kuomintang:
- Present aspects favorable to the revolution, such as probable
differences between officers and men, the rivalry of the commanders
whose (feudal) Armies are their own property;
- Also involves unfavorable aspects, such as the overwhelming
superiority of the Kuomintant forces in effectives and materiel, and
particularly that of Chiang Kai Shek, and political training of his
officers.
The Will to Fight. The agrarian reform effected by the Chinese Communist
Party has two consequences:
- On the one hand, it makes the peasants willing to fight;
- On the other, it renders the landowners hostile.
Conclusions. An analysis of the situation of China in 1936 brings to
light four "details", effectively expressed by Mao Tse Tung:
- "China is a semi-colonial, unevenly developed country in which there
has recently been a revolution (as will be seen by reference to
Paragraphs Ia, Ib, and IIa):
- We are dealing with a powerful enemy (as will be seen by referring to
Paragraphs Ia and IIb);
- The Red Army is weak (as will be seen by referring to Paragraphs Ia
and IIb);
- But (we) the Reds have the trump consisting of the agrarian reform"
(as will be seen by referring to Paragraph III).
And Mao Tse Tung concludes:
"If this war is not conducted correctly, it is very possible that it
will end in a defeat" (of the Chinese Communists).
THE SITUATION AT THE OPENING OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN (29) IN 1931.
The Red Army (40,000 men) was stationed in the Kiang Si base on the
border between the two provinces of Kiang Si and Fukien. 100,000 men,
divided into seven divisions, were marching against it in order to
destroy it.
The map which follows shows where the two enemy Armies were stationed
when the campaign was begun.
It was necessary for the Red Army to know where to strike a part of the
enemy forces in order to destroy it. The decision which had to be taken
was of an operational and almost tactical nature.
The Environment. A study of the terrain (its configuration, planimetry,
and nature) shows that the Lung Kang region is favorable for an
East-to-West attack, that it is possible at Siau Pu to engage in a
limited combat of a defensive character, facing northward, and that an
attack around Yuan Tu coming from the South could easily be checked by
troops in position.
(Fig. 35, 4.5 in. high, entitled "We find that China is, from the Social
and Economic Viewpoints, an Agrarian, Hardly Industrialized Country, and
that It has a Backward Economy", appears on p. 85)
The economico-social environment (the average agricultural region) does
not enable us to show the decisive element in the population. The
opposing Parties can use their means of winning over the population and
find almost equal support.
No foreign intervention can be expected on either side.
a) The Inner Structure.
The Ratio between the Politico-Military Forces.
Conflicting factors can easily be discerned:
- The existence of the Anti-Bolshevik group (30) and of a good local
organization of the Kuomintang renders the Fu Tien and Turg Ku regions
unfavorable to the Red Army;
- The Lung Kang and Yuan Tu regions, on the contrary, are "Red" areas in
which the population is completely controlled.
(Fig. 37, a Map of a Part of China, 3.5 in. high, appears on p. 86)
THE ANALYSIS OF A PARTICULAR SITUATION: THE FIRST CAMPAIGN (1931)
1 = Factors to be studied
2 = Characteristic facts
Interpretation
3 = Favorable factors
4 = Unfavorable factors
I - Environment
(Rough data):
1 - Geographic
2 - Terrain around Lung Hang, Shao Pu, and Yuan Tu.
3 - Terrain propitious for a Red attack upon Lung Kang
4 - Terrain unfavorable for a Red attack on Yuan Tu
1 - Economico-social
2 - No decisive element
1 - International
2 - No foreign intervention
II - Ratio between politico-military forces.
1 - Inner structure
2 - White and Red areas
3 - Lung Kang and Yuan Tu areas favorable to Reds
4 - Fu Tien and Tung Ku areas unfavorable to the Reds
1 - Military means:
2 - The Red Army
3 - Homogenous, well-commanded. A light division at Hsin Kuo makes it
possible to attack the enemy from the rear at Lung Kang.
4 - Small number of effectives (40,000).
1 - Military means:
2 - "White" divisions
3 - Low technical value; one division stationed in 2 fractions. The 7
divisions, in line, are in danger of being cut into 2 groups.
4 - Effectives number 100,000.
3 - Political education intensive.
Fight with "back to wall".
4 - Combat inevitable.
Avoidance impossible.
III - Will to fight
2 - Red Army on the eye of a decisive test, White Army "feudal".
3 - An initial check might demoralize the other "white" divisions.
4 - Faithful to their General.
Conclusion: to attack Lung Kang.
___________________________
b) Military Means:
- There is a very unfavorable numerical ratio between the forces: 40,000
against 100,000.
- The Red Army is homogeneous and well-commanded;
- The seven "White" divisions of the Kuomintang are weak on the
technical level and are not very "maneuverable"; one of them, that of
the Commander-in-Chief, which is stationed in the center, is very badly
placed and is divided into two groups which cannot support each other;
they are drawn up in line and a check in the center might divide them
into two groups, each equivalent to a Red Army;
- A light Red Division, detached from the main body, at Hsin Kuo, makes
it possible to attack Lung Kang from the rear. It is, on the other hand,
useless anywhere else.
- The Will to Fight. The Red Army fights "with its back to the wall",
and its intensified political education has developed its will to fight;
- the seven "White" divisions are the "feudal" troops of a local
commander who is a partisan of Chiang Kai Shek, and are not troops
controlled by the central Government. They are therefore mainly faithful
to the person of their General. An initial check of the latter might
cause their will to fight, already low because of the opposition between
officers and soldiers, to collapse.
- The Balance-Sheet. The center will be attacked at Lung Kang.
Because there is:
1. Good Terrain,
2. A Red area,
3. Local numerical superiority,
4. The possibility of dividing the enemy into two elements,
5. The possibility of exerting a demoralizing effect upon the troops not
attacked,
6. A possible auxiliary effort on departing from Hsin Kuo.
The complicated nature of the conventional tactical data (1,3,4, and 6)
and the original data (2 and 5) appears very clearly from this
balance-sheet.
A SKETCH OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT BREAKS OUT
The same method of analysis can be applied to any other "explosive"
situation. To Indo-China, and to Greece in 1946, for instance.
By thus accumulating analyses of a large number of situations, and by
comparing them, we succeed in throwing light upon a common denominator
of all these situations. Some of the conditions under which a
revolutionary war breaks out can thus be determined, as well as those
which are favorable or unfavorable to its development at a given time.
A table showing these conditions would probably be very complicated and
would contain numerous facts to be studied, and their positive and
negative interpretations. Its is possible to discover certain constants
without going to this trouble. Experience, however, teaches that these
constants never act in isolation or in exactly the same way. Every
situation is given a a character of its own by numerous variations and
combinations. On being thus put on our guard against a tendency to
classify them all as a single archetype, we may try to outline these
constants relating to the environment, the ratio between the
politico-military forces, and the will to fight.
(Fig. 38, 4 in. high, entitled "This Breaking Strain can be arrived at
through the Exacerbation of Several Complexes. The Above Scene Showing
the Execution of an 'Enemy of the People' Seems to Satisfy two
Complexes, namely: those relating to Economic Claims and Social
Promotion", appears on p.88).
The Environment. The purely geographic conditions seem to be of
secondary importance, since the country (or region) studied is sometimes
immense and sometimes small, the climate may be temperate or severe, and
the region may be rich or poor, overpopulated, or a semi-desert.
On the other hand, a state of sociological disequlibrium seems to play a
very important role, whether this disequilibrium is shown by an
opposition between classes, between peoples, or between the people
colonized and the colonizing Power.
The aid, assured or merely possible, of one or more foreign Powers, may
sometimes accelerate the outbreak of a conflict (as in Korea). It exerts
greater influence, however, on the country's further development.
The Ratio Between the Politico-Military Forces. The existence of an
active minority, already instructed concerning the methods and
procedures, as well as the necessary conditions of a secret struggle,
appears to be a condition necessary for the outbreak and development of
a revolutionary war.
Another constant fact appears to be a veritable "rupture" between a
majority of the population and the established authority, due to the
work of lower administrative officials (inadequate colonizing machinery
or the deterioration of a previously efficient or a purely exploitative
administration of occupied territories). In a national framework, a
certain weakness of the authorities and internal dissensions in the
Government generally accompany this state of affairs.
The Will to Fight. This must have reached a sufficiently high level.
This "breaking strain" may be reached in one or more fields through the
exacerbation of different "complexes".
The principal ones seem to be:
- The claim complex, having a purely economic origin;
- The social promotion complex (the "Third Estate" against the feudal
landlords);
- The xenophobic complex, consisting in racial opposition against the
foreigner and especially against those from the Occident;
- The liberation complex, which causes the rejection of all tutelage,
even if it is beneficient in certain respects;
- The racial equality complex, which lines up certain disinherited
ethnic minorities against oppression by the majority race.
(Fig. 39, 5 in. high, entitled "The Success of a Revolutionary War is
Crowned by Establishment of a Government which Exhibits its Success to
the Eyes of the World by Means of Grandiose Spectacles", appears on p. 89).
Lastly, it must be noted that religious convictions may cause the taking
of sides or even harden the attitudes of social units by rendering them
responsive to certain choices.
Most frequently, however, the "explosion" is not based upon merely a
single one of these moving passions, but on a group thereof, in which,
for example, economic demands reinforce social opposition, or a mass
desire for liberation at any cost is mingled with a racial hatred which
is doubtless of remote origin.
At any rate, the will to struggle does not become aggressive unless the
oppressed person is spurred to action; no other means of escape is,
indeed, left to him by the powerlessness of the authorities to resolve
the crisis, or by their definite determination to maintain the status
quo, generally supported by means of coercion.
CONCLUSION.
The method of analyzing a revolutionary war situation makes it possible
to establish the objective vases of a decision in case of a "global"
(31) situation, and to determine the strategic "line" to be followed.
The change to the execution of this line changes the initial actions,
which are modified by the enemy's reactions and by the development of
occurrences that might have been neglected at the beginning.
A new "global" situation gradually appears, and it becomes necessary to
take it into account by making a new analysis. The course of the
struggle is thus reflected in a series of pictures which permit accurate
observation of the complete development of the essential phenomena. The
global analysis is therefore permanent.
The method, however, does not apply merely to the successive "factors",
which elicit major decisions. It also applies to each particular
decision and to the tactical decisions.
If, however, this method merely made it possible to draw up the
balance-sheet of the factors favorable (and unfavorable) to the
attainment of the objectives aimed at, it would basically be rather near
to its traditional sister. It has been found, however, that such a
balance-sheet is always disastrous, at first, for the revolutionaries.
Would the art of revolutionary warfare therefore consist in conquering
strength with weakness? The response is less paradoxical. The
revolutionaries, in fact, refuse to play the game, and avoid the
decisive test until they have improved their balance-sheet and turned
the situation to their own benefit. They succeed in doing this only be
studying very closely the factors capable of becoming favorable. From
this study they draw the conclusions necessitated by the first results
obtained. It is usually more important for them to modify these factors
for their own benefit than to risk everything on the only factors
already favorable.
It is this permanent effort to bring about transformation that gives
revolutionary warfare this rate of progress that is at first
extraordinarily slow, at least until the balance-sheet has become
indisputably positive. The conduct of the War is then accelerated and
becomes extremely rapid.
-------
PART IV
THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE PARRY AND RIPOSTE DURING
REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
- The study of revolution warfare makes it possible to throw light upon
both the causes of its success and those of its errors. It then makes it
possible to determine the possibility of conducting a struggle against
this form of "total war".
- It is certain that the first riposte to revolutionary warfare consists
in destroying its mechanism: this war machine so fully perfected then
appears under a light capable of facilitating the search for a means of
a defense and riposte against it.
- As in the case of all other forms of warfare, traditional or nuclear,
it will be found that in the light of the past and present examples of
revolutionary warfare, the period of "preparation" is the most important
for the success of its violent phase.
- Furthermore, as such warfare is a veritable form of "total war", we
are lead to consider that:
- In the pre-insurrectionary phase, the elements required to stop it are
based upon intensive psychological action and organization of a
frontless defense;
- In the insurrectionary phase, the riposte cannot be rendered effective
except by the physical and moral mobilization of the population;
- The energetic and coordinated action of the executive, legislative,
and judicial authorities is invariably the only means which make it
possible first to parry such warfare and then to execute the riposte
against it.
This study has voluntarily been restricted to the framework of the
countries constituting the French Union (France and the external States
and territories governed by her.)
THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE PARRY AND RIPOSTE DURING REVOLUTIONARY
WARFARE
Many Frenchmen at first feel astonishment and skepticism on discovering
revolutionary warfare. After admitting the existence of such warfare, it
is difficult for them to see any possibility of conducting a parry and
ripost against it effectively in a manner compatible with our ideals and
the essential principles of our civilization. It is then that they are
in danger of becoming a prey to panic or resignation - states of mind
which by themselves constitute victories for the enemy.
It is certain that our democratic regime, to which we are deeply
attached, does not favor either a preventive parrying or an energetic
riposte after the revolutionary warfare has reached its period of
violence. In fact, the presence of conscious or unconscious sympathizers
in most of the State organizations and in the masses, disturbs public
opinion and constantly keeps it in an unstable equilibrium. It is public
opinion which is the real judge of the Government's decisions, and is
the stake which determines the results of the struggle. So the enemy
does not hesitate to sow conflict in the people's minds, to exploit all
the methods of modern technique, and, at the same time, to incite
resistance as soon as a Government tries to restrict freedom of speech
for its own advantage.
The international system, also, assists in hampering the possibility of
a riposte. Indeed, the United Nations Organization, with its inevitable
imperfections, sometimes seems like a veritable war machine stirring up
nascent disturbances. Whenever opinions concerning countries in which
signs of agitation appear are expressed from the forum or even in the
corridors of this organization, the subversive organization causes a
recrudescence of assassinations or sabotage in order to attract
attention and prove its power. We have even begun to wonder whether we
shall ever know the number of human lives that have been sacrificed
during every session of the Assembly of the United Nations upon the
altar of revolutionary warfare.
Lastly, the Army, the element charged with the duty of executing the
riposte, is not used until the disturbances have broken out. By this
time, however, the subversive organization has already set up its
politico-military command agency and established Communist cells in the
country concerned. For an Army essentially designed to participate in
traditional warfare against a foreign enemy, it is very late to adapt
its organization to fight urban terrorism and armed bands in rural
regions. In spite of the real efforts of military units to adapt
themselves to such a conflict, it is difficult for them to prevent the
efforts of terroristic groups of action and bands which use surprise and
initiative in the conduct of their operations. A number of soldiers
become bewildered during such combats, not only by the methods used,
which do not at all resemble those employed during traditional combat,
but also by the political and ideological action which constitutes the
basis of all revolutionary warfare.
Must we then admit that revolutionary warfare is always victorious and
that the search for means of defense and riposte against it is in the
realm of utopia?
One might think so if one considered only the results obtained in the
Far East and North Africa.
Several successful experiences, however, which have been obtained in
Greece and South Korea, and, on a smaller scale, in Cambodia, Malaya,
and the Philippines, show that it is possible to resist effectively the
methods used in revolutionary warfare.
Each of these examples of success is, to be sure, a special case by
itself, and it must be admitted that the conditions which have made it
possible to check these disturbances have causes as diverse and varied
as the initial situations, the blunders of the revolutionaries, the
reactions of the Governments, or the important foreign support obtained
in each case. These examples, however, make it possible to determine the
basic conditions necessary for victorious resistance to revolutionary
warfare.
It is only by means of a thorough knowledge of the principles underlying
such warfare that it is possible to determine the conditions required
for the effective use of the parry and riposte against it. The essential
object of such a parry and riposte is to protect the population (which
is the real stake in this conflict) from subversive undertakings.
THE STATUS OF THE PROBLEM.
It is necessary of make one statement before defining the possibility of
fighting against the techniques of revolutionary warfare:
Effective use of the parry and riposte against such warfare is
based-before every other consideration, upon a correct evaluation, by
the leaders (at all levels of the civil and military hierarchy), of the
cause effectiveness, and fundamental facts relating to the revolutionary
warfare.
ERRORS IN EVALUATION.
On making a study, it will be found that the first error to be avoided
is that of failing to recognize - on the "terrain" - the characteristics
of revolutionary warfare.
Experience shows, in fact, that whenever disturbances break out in a
country, the authorities make the mistake of believing that an uprising
of the traditional type is involved. moreover, the Press opens its
columns to writers who are eager to relate the "history" of local
insurrections. . .
There are, to be sure, regions which, because of their relief and the
character of their traditionally rebellious inhabitants, are favorable
for the preparation and incubation of disturbances. A revolutionary
organization in search of a select terrain chooses such a region and
exploits the local facilities, thus camouflaging its plans more effectively.
The example of Algeria is revealing with regard to this matter.
"The insurrection broke out on the night of All Saint's Day, and its
immediate
(Fig. 40, 5.5 in. high, entitled "The Masses Are Won Over; the
Revolutionary War is Won. The Arrival of M. Habib Bourguiba in Tunis in
June 1955", appears on p.95).
results created a belief that this was a tribal uprising similar to
those which have characterized our history in North Africa. It was
therefore believed that it would suffice for the Army to put down the
completely localized dissident tribes by putting a small number of
effectives into action without much foreign support, and for the police
to maintain order elsewhere. It was on the basis of these principles
that efforts to reestablish order were made during the winter of 1954-1955."
The example of Tunisia, however, (a neighbor with undimmed courage in
January 1952-November 1954) should have made possible a better
understanding of the occurrences in Algeria, and shown that a rebellion
of the traditional type could in no wise be involved.
It therefore seems that whenever a revolutionary period has broken out
hitherto, it has become the object of a veritable new discovery and that
the authorities begin to undergo a new experience.
It is thus indispensable that all the authorities (at every level) know
that the presence of Communist elements is not absolutely necessary to
permit recognition of the characteristics of revolutionary warfare. The
Nationalist Parties, though most of them were not under the control of
the Marxist-Leninist movement (32) know the fundamental requirements of
this warfare and know how to use the methods and techniques that they
have learned (generally in Europe) from the Communist Parties.
(Fig. 41 5 in. high, entitled "Methods condemned by Human Morality Must
Be Justified. . . .A Motive which the People can Use in Needed--This is
Why We Fight", appears on p. 96).
In spite of this apprenticeship, the Nationalist leaders often give
evidence that they are ostensibly anti-Communists. They thus easily
attract the sympathy of Americans. However this may be, they are in no
danger of incurring any reproaches from the USSR, for since the days of
Lenin it has been the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to favor
liberation movements by noninterference, even when they are directed by
convinced Nationalists.
Lenin believed that "the proletarian phase of the revolution should be
preceded, in colonial countries, by a nationalistic phase, during which
collaboration with the indigenous bourgeoisie would be advisable, at
least at the beginning, and the class struggle and liquidation of
middle-class elements should not occur until a later stage."
The second advantage seen by the USSR in a colonial insurrection is that
it "weakens the colonizing country militarily and economically and, what
is even more important, divides it ideologically. Bourgeois democracy
thus finds itself placed in an insoluble dilemma" (33).
It is therefore unnecessary for a movement to have Communist leadership
in order to recognize that it has the characteristics of revolutionary
warfare.
As experience has also taught us, the minds of the authorities faced by
an insurrection are often thrown into real confusion. This leads them to
confuse the cause of the rebellion with the "favorable factors"
exploited by the subversive organization.
In such cases, also, we witness press campaigns designed to show the
political, economic, and social reasons for the revolt. While all these
reasons are, to be sure, elements favorable to the rebellion, or, in
Marxist terminology, "internal contradiction", they are not the
terminating cause, which is the action of a revolutionary organization.
This is a grave error, for it assures the dissemination, and indeed even
the success, of the cause of the "bad conscience of the protecting
Nation." The government leaders are them led by their reaction to
propose rapidly reforms in various fields. To the great stupefaction of
the majority, however, the rebel organization rejects these reforms: in
doing so it is consistent and faithful to its line of conduct, whose
mainly political objective is taking of power. Moreover, it cannot
accept these reforms, for it would then itself be suppressing the
"favorable" factors upon which it bases its propaganda. Now this
propaganda is indispensable, for it makes it possible to justify the
revolutionary action both in the country, in the eyes of the masses, and
as abroad. It sows division within the protecting Nation and likewise
justifies actions revolting to the human conscience before the bar of
international public opinion.
It is possible in this way to establish two basic rules confirmed by
very recent events even in the countries behind the Iron Curtain:
- The more reforms are granted in a territory which is in a disturbed
condition, the more the resistance increases, in virtue of a logical
principle very natural for revolutionaries to hold;
- The more international opinion becomes interested in the cause of the
insurrection, the more the manifestations of the rebellion increase.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE METHODS OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
When the characteristics and real cause of an insurrection have been
determined, it then also becomes necessary to discover the effectiveness
of the methods used.
The power developed by a revolutionary war is not brought to light until
the lapse of a relatively long period. This warfare is, in fact,
conducted by a secret organization, and its elements are not known until
they have obtained control of a large part of the population.
Now experience shows that during this period, which is so important both
for the rebellion and for the lawful government, the latter does not
strike back in an effective manner. Everything occurs as if the
authorities were blind, and their blindness remains almost complete
until they are shown the importance of the movement by the facts. It is
already very late to react at this time, and long months have been lost.
This blindness seems to be due, in the first place, to the superiority
that we think we have in the matter of material equipment. The powerful
external appearance of our administrative and military machinery leads
us, in especially critical initial periods, to ascribe exaggerated
importance to police or military technical methods, and this feeling of
superiority often causes us to despise the enemy.
When this equipment is used, however, it is found that in spite of our
assurance (we had nearly said our arrogance) and our confidence in our
material superiority, the enemy, who is often equipped with armament
which they Army's Material Service would regard as unfit for use,
retains the initiative during combat.
This enemy--who has also mastered the art of acting through
intermediaries--has perfected the art of refraining from declaring war
(34), which, together with the obligations of the moral law, which we
regard as imperative (35), prevents us from making a fully effective use
of our materiel (airplanes, the Navy, armored vehicles, and artillery
are not really employed).
This explains why this enemy himself (who is not hampered by these moral
rules) is not duped by the methods used during a rebellion. When similar
facts occur in a country subjected to his influence (36), he strikes
back with vigor and violence and utilizes the entire qualitative and
material superiority of his Army, which enables him to liquidate quickly
any attempt at an uprising. It is certain that our methods will never
approach (on such a vast scale) those employed in the Soviet World (37).
A second cause of this blindness, which may seem trite at first, but
which is found important in practical life, is apparently due to the
feeling of confidence which usually springs from explanations of the
situation.
It is strange to learn, in this connection, the baleful role for the
commanders played by both the civil and military wall maps, which
illustrate the situation with the aid of "thumb-tacks with colored
heads." It is from a study of these documents that the authorities often
derive their reasons for being hopeful. it is certain that the
stationing and judicious distribution of numerous units and posts in the
vital zones and along the vitally important axes is very important in
territory which is in a disturbed condition. Maps, however, are merely
statistical documents. When drawn in the form of outlines, they furnish
only a few of the elements of the situation of either friendly or
hostile countries or troops. It sometimes happens during revolutionary
warfare that these are not
the principal elements.
This is because a map does not show the gangrene which is working in the
minds of the inhabitants. It does not show the real state of the
country, the atmosphere in which the units live, whether they are
friendly or hostile, and the sympathizing or hostile populations.
Then why do they produce such effects, both upon the minds of the
authorities responsible for the conduct of the war and on those of the
Members of Parliament making inspection tours or of many of the higher
military commanders?
It is apparently because conformist or traditional ideas have a vigorous
life and because it is necessary to see the country in the same way as
do the revolutionary commanders in order to become accustomed to reason
in accordance with the basic principles governing the enemy's actions.
THE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE.
When efforts in evaluation have been avoided, the determining cause
identified, and the advantages of the methods used admitted, the search
for effective means of a defense and ripost against the enemy's acts
must ultimately be based upon a thorough knowledge of the fundamental
requirements of revolutionary warfare.
These cannot be understood separately, owing to the events provoked by
the rebels. Because, in fact, of the time necessary for a study of the
situation, for the establishment of the appropriate units, and for the
instruction and training of the same, there is danger that these units
will not be used in action until it is too late to keep up with the
progress of the subversive process. When they are adapted to a specific
phase, they are henceforth not adapted to the following phase.
Moreover, each detailed reaction devised for the purpose of combatting a
method or of neutralizing its effects, does not take into account the
integration of this method in a much vaster plan. Parries and riposts
cannot exert a decisive influence on the course of events unless
conceived within the general framework of the revolutionary war.
(Fig. 42, 3.5 in. high, entitled "Terrorism in all its Forms. . . is
Designed to Demonstrate the Strength of the Revolutionary Movement",
appears on p.99).
It has already been shown (38) that as soon as political, social, and
economic instability creating "favorable conditions" occurs, a certain
number of techniques, organized in the form of processes, bring about
more and more profound transformations which gradually affect every
field of effort. Without exaggerated schematization, and admitting the
existence of innumerable variants, it is possible to distinguish, in a
very general way, between two great periods in this continuous
development; to wit:
- A largely secret pre-insurrectionary period, and
- An insurrectionary period of open combat.
During the former period, the revolutionaries try mainly to detach the
population from the lawful and traditional authorities, and to gradually
gain control over the people. Violence, except social agitation in all
its legal forms, is almost excluded. The parallel hierarchies are
established, however, and propaganda is disseminated, demoralizing some
and arousing the enthusiasm of others, camouflaging the reference points
and drowning obstacles under a continuous flood of oratory.
During the second period, violence is used. The population is
effectively won over and takes a more and more important part in the
numerous aspects of the struggle. It finally becomes thoroughly
committed (to the rebel cause) after a period of valuable length (39).
The sporadic and secret activities of the pre-insurrectionary period can
be checked. The revolutionary impulse of the insurrectionary period,
however, can be shattered only by a ripost which reaches the enemy on
the very terrain on which he is waging his "war".
(Fig. 43, 4 in. high, Legend: "This is a Control Post; element
Commanders STOP," on p. 100).
THE PARRYING ACTION
The preparatory period (which is generally not violent) is characterized
by the activities of the revolutionary organization, which are of two kinds:
- On the one hand, cells (40) of the Party and its attached groups are
created throughout the country (trade unions, various movements, which
are indispensable reserves for use in the establishment of the inner
structure, the leaders, networks, and the active groups, and for
poisoning the minds of the people); these activities constitute the
organization of the "masses";
- On the other hand, there are organized campaigns of psychological
action designed to undermine the established government, disseminate
ideas, and create a favorable climate.
The lawful authority is often confronted with the problem of how to keep
the masses of the population in its orbit.
The solution of this problem necessitates combined action on every
level, (political, economic, social, and psychological) for the purpose
of attacking the factors favorable to the rebellion in order to maintain
the confidence of the masses in the Government.
This means of defense against revolutionary warfare, decided upon at the
highest level, will be realized by means of the local activities of an
energetic and effective administration and through vigorous
psychological action.
AN ENERGETIC AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION
The efforts of the rebels to win over the population should be replied
to by means of coordinated and vigorous administrative action, which
will be all the more effective because it will make possible the
execution of reforms, and because special laws will have been promulgated.
On studying this matter, it will be found that the administrative
officials are often isolated from the crowd, and are dehumanized and
often anonymous, both in the western democracies and in the oversea
territories. On the other hand, the revolutionary political officials,
who live among masses and know their reactions more intimately, can
influence them effectively. These officials are ready to take the place
of the lawful officials when the time comes.
The experience gained in oversea countries shows that the population, at
least at the very beginning, accepts these new leaders very easily in
spite of their administrative incompetence.
The primary condition required for checking revolutionary action is
therefore the adoption of a policy of human contact (41). A more
thorough knowledge of the different administrative circles should,
however, make it possible in the first place, to make a critical
analysis of the problems posed, and therefore of the "factors favorable"
to the revolutionary organization and then to bring about reforms
designed to abolish, or at least to diminish these "internal
contradictions", which constitute the medium in which the rebellion has
germinated.
Moreover, these contacts may make it possible to detect these Party
cells which are used in establishing other cells among the population
and in opposing the latter's activities. Police action directed by the
administrative authority may succeed in neutralizing the disturbing
elements, which, since they have no respect for the freedom of thought
of their opponents, personally attack them or are used in terrorizing
the undecided in order to swell the ranks of the subversive
organization.
One remark must be made, however, concerning the violent action
sometimes employed by the revolutionaries even during the
preinsurrectionary period. While the executive authority has such means
as the police and, if necessary, the Army at its disposal in order to
resist the violent methods, the "state of peace", on the other hand,
does not permit the judicial authority to take effective action. The
revolutionary organization can easily exploit this "legal" weakness by
going to the extreme limit of the possible interpretations and by
supplying any offenders with lawyers skillful in taking advantage of the
slightest errors. This fact makes it less dangerous for the "active
workers" to act, and the revolutionary organization can thus create
easily a legion of martyrs, which also constitutes an excellent means of
propaganda.
Consequently, an effective means of parrying revolutionary warfare may
be based mainly upon the administrative acts of the executive authority,
which permit both human contact and reforms. The means supplied by the
legislative and judicial authorities are not less important. The efforts
of the competent authorities to win back the population can only be
limited and therefore ineffective without the support of the latter.
This physical winning over of the masses regimented in the revolutionary
or near revolutionary organizations (which are known to be such or are
undeclared and have merely been formed into cells by secret leaders)
meet the first of the basic requirements of revolutionary warfare
(organization of the masses). This is an important step, for it permits
the realization of the second step (ideological indoctrination). In
fact, "it is possible to put whatever one will into a vase firmly held."
(42)
(Fig. 44, 3.5 in. high, entitled "The First to Give the Information
Wins; the Loud-Speaker has Become a Combat Weapon", appears on p.102).
Ideological conviction is no less necessary than the winning over of the
people. It is easily instilled when the masses are organized.
The enemy's propaganda should be met on the part of the established
Government with information and training designed to strengthen the
morale of the people and to keep them from the enemy's clutches.
Psychological action, however, does not exist in an isolated condition,
and it cannot be separated from politics or from the authoritative
measures adopted by the Government.
In a totalitarian regime, the art of convincing, which has been
perfected to an astonishing extent, has become a genuine effort to
condition human reflexes. Frenchmen, however, have hitherto been loath
to apply this art to oversea populations, which have thus been left at
the mercy of "agitators" preaching the enemy's ideology.
It therefore appears that action of two types should be undertaken, namely:
- Defensive action: The people should be informed in order that they may
be warned against and protected from the enemy's infiltration and
brought up to date on his subversive techniques (his machinery should be
unmasked);
- Offensive action: The citizens, and especially the young citizens,
should be trained (43) in order to strengthen their civic feeling and
thus facilitate the rallying of public opinion around the established
Government.
In spite of the very different opinions concerning these matters, a
common base can easily be found, consisting of these two principles;
- Democracy of the western type protects the individual from the
encroachments of the Government;
- The citizen must be educated so that he can perform his duties better.
A certain moral elevation must ensure the strength of these principles.
Contrary to what is currently believed, this does not impair efficiency,
as Tchakotine has emphasized:
"Dynamic--and even violent--propaganda can be disseminated without
violation of the moral principles upon which the organization of human
beings is based." (44)
The author of the "Ravishment of Crowds" thus specifies that the basic
doctrine may be independent of the methods of action.
The principal task of a democratic government therefore consists in
defining the principles of the national doctrine and the basic subjects
used in making the latter explicit, since the government is finally
responsible for the unity of its doctrine and program of action.
Likewise, the responsibility of the large national groups (national
parties, trade unions, youth movements) or of certain State
organizations (National Education, Army, Police) is involved in the
expansion of these subjects and in the application of suitable methods
of disseminating them among different circles of which they are in
charge. Furthermore, it is through the application of such a system that
a genuinely democratic regime can continue to remain democratic.
It therefore seems that the parrying of attempts to win the people over
and to disseminate the enemy's ideology is based, during the
preinsurrectionary phase:
- First of all, upon the "coordinated" activities of the different
governmental authorities responsible, and on the administrative and (if
necessary) police acts of the executive authority at all levels of the
hierarchy, for the purpose of resisting the physical conquest of the
population (the first basic requirement of revolutionary warfare).
Subsequently and correlatively: upon psychological action consisting in
informing and training different categories of citizens in order to put
them on their guard against the enemy's seductive ideology (the second
basic requirement of revolutionary warfare) and in ensuring their
confidence in the strength of their Government.
The importance of such a defense against enemy propaganda need not be
emphasized, for the failure or success of this struggle against the
enemy's propaganda largely depends on the failure or success of the
insurrectionary phase proper.
Experience shows, indeed, that the revolutionary parties have succeeded
in taking over power in certain countries without the necessity of
resorting to violence. The country was in such a disintegrated condition
- after the preparatory stage - that it was possible for the
revolutionaries to take over power by legal means (45).
THE RIPOST
The past experiences in revolutionary warfare (the French Army is well
situated to know some of them already) show, however, that revolutionary
organizations, and especially those in under-developed countries, are
too impatient to wait until power is turned over to them peacefully. So
after a more or less long period of preparation (sometimes too short,
which explains the failure of some attempts that failed) (46) the
Nationalist Parties begin the insurrectionary phase when they think that
a favorable moment has come.
As a general rule, the secret organization which has prepared for the
insurrection is able to choose the time. Now the beginning of this
period of violence is designed to inflict a psychological shock upon the
inhabitants by means of spectacular criminal attempts and acts of sabotage.
Our knowledge of such outbreaks should enable us to perfect in time of
peace our preparations for riposte whose essential elements are the
organization of Information Service and of the internal defense of the
territory involved.
The effectiveness of these means should then facilitate an immediate
ripost designed, from outbreak of the insurrection, to engage the enemy
in combat on the terrain, imposed by him, that is, by the population.
The latter will have been "mobilized" physically and morally by the
established Government.
THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE RIPOST
Just as an insurrection is prepared for during an extremely long period,
so the preparations for an effective ripost require a considerable time.
The principal means of preventive defense are those which result in an
efficient Information Service and in the organization of a decentralized
internal defense.
a) An efficient Information Service is indispensable. An insurrection is
prepared for by a secret organization with no apparent connections,
which is sometimes even unknown to the officials of the revolutionary
party. This is a basic postulate which the rulers of the country must
always bear in mind, for every revolutionary movement presupposes
preventive action on the part of the Government which it proposes to
undermine. In order to prevent this from happening, it organizes a
secret machine charged with both preparing the insurrection and ensuring
the responsibility of the organization in case of the disappearance of
the official directing agency.
It is a characteristic fact that the Government authorities are easily
duped by this apparent duality of the enemy's direction organization.
Consequently, the authorities in Tunisia, Morocco, and even Algeria
(47), have often imagined that the Command of the bands was not under
the control of the political leaders of the movement. While a few cases
of this kind have occurred (and they are very rare), the commanders who
have rebelled against their own Command have been quickly eliminated or
have eventually sought refuge by rallying to their rightful Commander.
They have been replaced.
Such an error in reasoning cannot occur if the basic requirements of
revolutionary warfare (which underlie every real insurrection) are known.
The leaders of the Revolutionary Party, (which is essentially of a
politico-military nature) are not ignorant of the distinction made by
the enemy between the Party's political and military elements. This
distinction is thus employed to poison the minds of the enemy officials
in order to confuse them.
All this shows the necessity for an Information Service centralized (48)
in the field of direction and exploitation, but ramified in that of the
search for clues.
Such an agency should be able to procure for a government the "amount of
time" necessary for the establishment of its defensive system and to
supply it with information concerning the enemy's preparations and the
time chosen for the insurrection.
b) The system of internal defense of the territory is the principal
means of replying to the insurrection. Such an organization, however, is
a veritable watch mechanism. It should therefore be carefully prepared.
The conception which should govern the organization of this agency
should mainly take into account the methods used by the rebels. After
the beginning of an insurrection, the rebels take up positions in
certain regions in order to be out of reach of the central authority.
This is why the internal organization of defense should permit the
instantaneous establishment of both a national and a regional
politico-military Command, which, like that of the rebels will conduct
the struggle on every level, and should also permit the automatic
decentralization of the civil and military authorities, in order that
the conditions may permit a struggle even if the region is isolated.
The basic conditions for the internal defense are realized on the higher
level through the functioning of corresponding mixed staffs. It seems
absolutely necessary, however, to descend to the lowest levels of the
authoritative hierarchy (departments, districts, and even smaller units)
if it is desired to resist effectively the enemy's organization, as he
has decentralized his directing agencies down to the smallest groups
thereof.
The protective units constitute the means of using forces which are
indispensable to the internal defense authorities. These rapidly
mobilized units must be distributed in such a way that every part of the
territory will be held by a detachment responsible for its security.
This presupposes an ultra-rapid mobilization (49) and a very careful
(Fig. 45, 4.5 in. high, with legend: "The Mobility of the Bands Must be
Met by the Mobility of the Protective Units of the Frontless Defense",
appears at left of Figure, on p. 105). (The legend: "The Transport
Helicopter Has Shown its Possibilities in the Perfecting of the Ripost",
appears at the right of the Figure).
distribution of missions among the units, some of which are stationary,
others are mobile, while still others are secret, that is, organized
like the "direct-action groups" of the rebels, whose mission is to
search for and utilize information concerning the inner structure of the
enemy (50).
It is impossible, indeed, to destroy the secret machinery for the
direction of the rebellion and light enemy groups (whose efficiency is
reduced by their anonymity) without employing similar means, for the
activities of such elements must be directed exactly like those of the
other units by the official authority, with the difference, however,
that their organization must remain camouflaged and that only these
commanders should be known in the corresponding echelon of the
territorial hierarchy.
The action of an Information Service and the establishment of a home
defense organization, combined with the administrative and police
activities, and especially with the intensive psychological action
(undertaken during the preinsurrectionary phase) are the most important
elements of the preparations for a ripost against insurrection.
THE RIPOST PROPERLY SO-CALLED (51)
If these preparations have been made carefully, the ripost thereto will
be rendered much easier and much more effective.
After an insurrection has broken out, the ripost brings into use on the
spot the plan for organization of the population and that for its
psychological mobilization. These plans are designed to resist the
enemy's efforts to win over the population.
In order to attain their goal, the leaders of the insurrection establish
"bases", that is, regions, in which the population has been previously
won over and then induced to support the revolution. The revolutionary
part thus extends its influence gradually over the entire country.
A ripost which is to be effective must therefore apply its efforts to
the physical and moral mobilization of the inhabitants (who are the real
stake in the struggle), and if this is not done the structure of the
State is doomed to disappear within a period of valuable length,
depending on the extent of the resistance opposed to it.
On being threatened by the visible forces of the enemy (composed of
groups of terrorists and armed bands), a government too often uses
forces exclusively of the same old type to oppose him, to wit: the
police and the Army, without realizing that the means used by the enemy
at the beginning of an insurrection are mainly designed to win over the
population (52) and not to fight against the government forces. When
most of the inhabitants have gravitated into the rebel camp, the leaders
of the rebellion will organize their army, aided by the people, which,
will attack the military units.
It is therefore absolutely necessary to conduct the struggle against the
insurrection on the terrain selected by the enemy, otherwise there will
be a permanent difference between the phase of the warfare conducted by
the enemy and that of the war made upon him.
The Government, instead of falling into the trap sent by the enemy,
should resist the desire to use solely the forces of law and order
(which remain, whatever precautions are taken, unadapted to secret
methods), and should organize the people's resistance to the actions of
the enemy.
Only the methods used by the enemy, adapted, however, to the local
conditions, are capable of solving the problem posed.
THE PHYSICAL MOBILIZATION OF THE POPULATION.
Fig. 46, 6 in. high, appears on page 106 of the original)
It is necessary to respond to the winning over of the population by the
enemy by executing a plan for the organizations of the people. The total
war waged by the rebel organization will not permit the use of
half-measures. A government which has determined to survive cannot
permit an armed minority to conduct its insurrectionary struggle while
the majority of people are trying to continue to carry on their
occupations without taking sides or engaging in combat. The minority is
rapidly reinforcing its effective while the struggle is getting bogged
down into sporadic military or police actions. The territory in which
the people are effectively controlled by the government, body and mind,
is reduced day by day, and its inhabitants gradually embrace and assist
the enemy's cause more wholeheartedly.
The situation, which was not critical at the beginning of the
insurrection, will rapidly deteriorate unless the authorities are on
their guard against it, and the subverting element, which utilizes fear
and persuasion effectively, will win over the entire country.
The method of ripost most suitable for protecting the inhabitants from
such influences, which has, moreover, proven successful in many places
(53), is the self-defense of the people.
The inhabitants, organized under competent authorities who have armed
self-defense groups at their disposal, can resist effectively
terroristic methods designed (at least at first) to silence and then to
implicate them.
Experience shows that a real defense against terrorism and guerrilla
warfare cannot be effective unless it is executed by the inhabitants
themselves, organized in cities or villages for the purpose of
self-defense and supported by Army units.
One of the most important lessons of the campaign in Indo-China teaches
us that after the bands or the groups of terrorists are no longer
supported by the people (which is an essential prerequisite for their
action), they disappear rapidly from the regions in which self-defense
exists.
We may deduce from the foregoing the following general rule:
After an insurrection breaks out, it is necessary at first to try to
localize the groups of rebels in order to limit the extension of their
base and destroy it if possible; afterward, instead of clearing a large
part of the territory and concentrating forces in order to destroy the
rebels at any cost (it would be utopian to believe in the possibility of
doing this) it is mainly necessary to organize the population throughout
the country without delay in a self-defense system, in order to enable
them to defend themselves from the subversionary forces, since the
presence of the government forces is a factor in their organization
(54). If such an organization is lacking, the people will inevitably be
drawn into the orbit of the rebellion, and after being brought under
control by the enemy's ideology, they will eventually supply the rebels
with their most reliable support.
(Fig. 47, 4.5 in. high, entitled "The Real Counter-guerrilla Warfare is
that Waged Against the Regimented Population by Its Own Rulers", appears
on p. 107).
THE MORAL MOBILIZATION
The population regrouped and organized, can easily be morally mobilized.
After being organized, the inhabitants can easily be contacted by the
competent local officials, who transmit to them the official directives
and arguments capable of revealing the enemy's propaganda mechanism.
Such action cannot be improvised, however, and it, too, must be prepared
for in time of peace.
This is what was demanded by Marshal Montgomery, (55), who expressed
himself as follows in a speech delivered in London on October 10, 1956:
"It must be understood, however, that when the national groups are in a
position of equality on the nuclear plane, the group which will survive
will be that which shall have organized best its domestic front. The
problem posed by the protection of domestic morale is crucial. Civil
defense also seems vital to the modern military commander. Any basis for
security is absent without it. . ."
Civil defense (of the type imposed upon us by the enemy's methods of
warfare) comprises, indeed, and in the very first place, the physical
defense. This is not of the type that we have accustomed to entrust to
the Army, which tries to ensure integrity of the country by establishing
a front, but the kind of defense which those who hold the same ideals or
possess the same system must conduct in order to protect their own
bodies and those of their near relatives. It is the defense of morale
that is now mainly involved.
This is certainly based upon a doctrine and program of action defined by
the Government and disseminated by the "active workers". Hence, it is
necessary to train "specialists" who know how to "adapt" to the circles
for which they are responsible the topics specified by the rulers. These
topics inform the people of the reasons for resistance and encourage
them to have faith in the outcome of the struggle, through the mediation
of those responsible for self-defense and of the modern means of
communication (the radio, television, motion pictures, posters, and
newspapers).
Even according to the enemy's principles, such psychological action can
produce astonishing effects upon a crowd which is no longer an amorphous
mass. The same effect upon the minds of the people caused by the enemy's
"techniques of affecting their morale" can be produced for the benefit
of the lawful government.
Instances in which the inhabitants deceived by enemy propaganda have
been won back again are not lacking in the history of revolutionary
wars. These examples show us, however, that the control of their morale
follows their physical control. The execution of a plan for the
protection or control of the morale of the people is merely utopian
unless it has been preceded by a plan for their organization.
The transformations that have taken place in different countries and in
different political economics, and social fields following the execution
of such plans shows that the system of self-defense of the people is far
from impeding their development and contributes greatly thereto, thereby
fulfilling the deepest aspirations of the people.
The vicious circle within which a government is caught (whether to
reestablish order before granting reforms, or to do vice versa) can be
broken. The system of organization of the people makes a return to
security possible and creates conditions favorable to the execution of
indispensable reforms. The improvements made in the internal regime then
find a soil favorable to their assimilation.
THE WINNING BACK OF THE PEOPLE
An analysis of the elements of a defense and the factors of the ripost
might lead one to think that such acts are not effective unless they
have been carefully prepared in peace time. One might therefore deduce
from this that the road to success consists in undertaking reforms
before the insurrectionary phase has attained a certain development.
The experience gained in certain countries shows that this line of
reasoning is false and that it is possible to win back the inhabitants
of the rebel "bases". Such action is, indeed, difficult, but it is
primarily necessary to apply the technical methods of winning back a
population which had formerly been won over by the enemy.
These methods mainly require the greater participation of the armed
forces, which organize a very dense military network in the country in
order to reduce the rebel forces to impotence.
The presence of groups of specialists in the administration, the police,
the Public Health Service, and in psychological work, etc., makes it
possible, in the first place, to eliminate the suspects, and then to
regroup the inhabitants in such a way as to create a territorial
organization having defensive means of its own at its disposal.
(Fig 48, 5.25 in. high, entitled "The Control of Morale Follows physical
Control According to the Old Principle Practised from Time Immemorial by
Teachers", appears on Page 109).
Notorious recalcitrants or rebels are interned, not in a prison, but in
a "Brainwashing Camp" (56).
Moreover, with all due deference to skeptics, it is learned that after a
period of variable length the vast majority of the interned persons
become proficient in adapting themselves to the new system (without
being coerced by violent methods, but, on the contrary, through the use
of persuasive and humane methods) especially if the official
administration dares to entrust responsible tasks to them. There should
be no hesitation in doing this if they show that they are qualified and
have given guaranties of their good faith.
The most important lesson taught by the campaign in the Far East is that
of how to win back the population. This lesson must be detached from the
multitude of facts that abound in the official reports, for it deserves
more than a special mention. It should be emphasized in the texts used
in enlarging upon the ripost to revolutionary warfare, as being as
important as the physical and moral (not necessarily military)
mobilization of the inhabitants.
The ripost to an insurrection therefore depends on the preparations
made, beginning in time of peace, by a government which has realized the
danger of revolutionary warfare.
The army, indeed, plays an important role during the violent phase, but
its action, contrary to what one might believe, is not of capital
importance. In fact, the enemy's strength does not consist in his
terroristic groups or combat units, but in his political inner
structures established among the population. It is "mob warfare" (57).
Experience shows that a government which is responsible for the conduct
of such a war, but does not exert its efforts on the terrain chosen by
the enemy, can only fail in the effort to preserve its authority.
CONCLUSION
"A new form of warfare corresponds to the stage reached in the Twentieth
Century. It may be called politico-military warfare, since political
means are becoming as effective as airplanes, guns, and tanks".
The correctness of this definition of modern warfare may be denied (58).
Nevertheless, this is the definition given by our avowed enemy. It must
be taken into account in the elaboration of our military doctrine. If
this is not done, we are in danger of conducting combats which are not
adapted to those conducted by the enemy.
We now learn with consternation, after several years of struggle, that
the results (which we had a right to expect from the numerous and often
heroic actions developed on the terrain) are radically different from
what we had hoped for.
We must therefore engage in a minute analysis and criticism of the
enemy's methods, not only of his obvious methods (such as terrorism and
guerrilla warfare), but also of his secret methods, which are not
brought to light until after he has been engaged for many months in
efforts to organize and indoctrinate the people.
We can then easily discover the best methods of defense and ripost.
During preinsurrectionary periods, to be sure, the governments of
democratic countries find it difficult to resist the internal subversion
in which the revolutionary organizations are engaged.
We are thus justified in fearing that the enemy will direct his war
effort in the developed countries toward the conquest of power by legal
methods.
This is impossible, however, unless the great majority of the population
have been won over by the revolutionary party and are not available for
membership in the anti-subversive organization until they have been
"instructed" or "trained" by the established government.
Hence the responsibility of the large State agencies (including the
Army) in the field of what we have agreed to call henceforth
"Psychological action", which plays a dual role:
Defensive: Consisting in giving the citizens information. The "need of
information" has become a characteristic of the modern world, so that it
can be said that "He who first supplies the
information has won".
Constructive: Consisting in training the officers and leaders
responsible for supplying "information" with the aid of modern
techniques of expression and communication. These methods have become so
powerful that the enemy utilizes them to "the fullest extent".
There is no reason why we could not utilize such methods, for a
technique is neither moral nor immoral per se, and it is only the
purpose for which it is used that may be immoral.
This will certainly be an important contribution to an effective defense.
The situation is not the same in the under-developed countries, and
especially in the oversea territories. The enemy has forewarned us that
he would like to go as far as the insurrectionary phase in these countries.
He believes that this is the best method of preparing for the
development of the country to the final stage, namely: that of
Marxism-Leninism. He expects, indeed, to profit by the obvious "internal
contradictions: that will not fail to appear after the new State has
gained its independence.
We must therefore prepare the ripost with which we are to meet the phase
of violence which is now being actively prepared for in all our territories.
The Army must realize the mission which is really its own during a
violent phase. It is absolutely necessary that the officers shall not be
duped by the "appearances" assumed by the enemy. It is necessary to
reply on his own terrain.
It appears, then, that the Army should, at first, participate in
organizing the population, and then in supporting the regrouped inhabitants.
And while the preliminary activities are, indeed, under the jurisdiction
of the local government, it is equally true that the military cadres
must prepare to play their part effectively when called upon by the
Government to do so.
(Fig. 49, 5 in. high, appears on page 111).
Captain A. Souyris
----------------------------
FOOTNOTES
(1) See "A Lesson in Revolutionary Warfare" by Col. Lacheroy.
(2) This is a civil war or a defense in which there is no definite
"front" and the two opponents are distributed throughout the country
involved. I have coined the word "frontless" to describe it. Trans.
(3). . . of wills, that is, the birth and development of ideological
conviction.
(4) "In such warfare, the armed people and the guerrillas, on the one
hand, and the Red Army, acting as the main force, on the other,
constitute the two arms of the same movement. A Red Army constituting
the main force, without the support of the armed population, would be
like a one-armed soldier."
(5) A base of support is a section of territory in which the lawful
government has been completely eliminated and the revolutionaries have
installed their regime.
(6) Such as: the solidity of the population in the rear, the Army's
morale, the number and quality of the divisions and arms, and the
organizing ability of the officers.
(7) And through Cairo, Algiers, and Dakar, we may add without changing
the meaning.
(8) There is no lack of quotations which support this statement ("the
people are to the Red Army what water is to a fish"). One is struck by
finding in the instructions given to guerrillas by the Viet Minh the
importance attributed to the people; it is obligatory to win them over
and keep a hold on them. It is often stated that the support of the
people is indispensable for the conduct of operations. Certain actions
are often planned for the sole purpose of winning them over.
(9) A Nhaque is a coolie boy doing unimportant work like that of a
bootblack. Trans.
(10) "You may tell those who are certainly sympathizers that the Lao
Dong is the Communist Party" (from a circular sent to members of the
P.C.I.).
(11) (P.30) Even the judicial authority.
(12) Cf. "Revolutionary Warfare and Pacification" by J. Hogard, in No.
280 of this magazine.
(13) Whatever facilitates development along the line indicated by
History, that is, whatever, favors the extension of Communism, is "good".
(14) Cf. "Revolutionary Warfare and Pacification" by J. Hogard, in No.
280 of this magazine.
(15) A special study will be made of this method in a future number of
this magazine.
(16) 30% of the young officers, 50% of the captains, 75% of the higher
officers, and all the colonels and generals are members of the Party.
(17) In 1951, in northeastern Cambodia, into which the Viet Minh troops
who had come thither from Anam through Laos had just penetrated, the
"service record" of a V. M. soldier who had been killed recorded that he
had spent 3 months in a "reeducation camp" for having jokingly touched
the breast of a young girl with his foot". . .!
(18) "In our warfare, the Armed People guerrilla warfare, on the one
hand, and the Red Army, on the other, constitute the two arms of the
organization (man). A Red Army without the support of the Armed
Population and the guerrillas would be worth no more than a mutilated
soldier. (Mao Tse Tung).
(19) The word "Tudeh" means "masses" in Persian.
(20) A revolutionary Party cannot regard its electoral successes as a
determining factor causing it to engage in violent action to obtain power.
(21) The Iranian Parliament.
(22) It was at this time that the Tuden gained a real financial
autonomy, and we know that this is the test of the viability of a
Communist Party.
(23) Terrorism (distinctive techniques of revolutionary warfare) was not
involved, but there were individual acts of violence having no
connection with any general action.
(24) The fellaga period means the period of revolutionary warfare.
Translator.
(25) Under the influence of Col Lawrence of Arabia, the instigator of
the revolt of the Middle East during World War I.
(26) Defined by the British critic Liddle Hart.
(27) Col. de Crevecoeur in "A Survey of the Strategy of the Viet Minh",
Military Documentation Section of the Union Francaise, Paris, 1953.
(28) M. Schumann, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that since the
United Nations Organization had no jurisdiction over the Tunisian
affair, France would refrain from appearing during the debates.
(29) Each of the operations by means of which Chiang Kai Shek tried to
destroy the Red Army is called a "campaign".
(30) An active Kuomintang group using methods of agitation resembling
those of the Reds.
(31) Global: This word includes every aspect (economic, social,
politico-military, psychological, etc.) of revolutionary warfare as a
whole, and not merely a single one of its factors or a particular branch
thereof.
(32) The Indo-Chinese Viet Minh and the Kamerun People's Union, whose
chief, Um N'Yobe was trained in Moscow, are exceptions.
(33) Cf. "Black Africa at the Close of the Century", by P. Alexandre, in
this magazine No. 276.
(34) Something which is merely the ripost to our own offensive action is
sometimes also called a "provocation." All this, however, is useful in
dividing public opinion and conducting psychological warfare.
(35) One should see the madness that appears among the ranks of the
sympathizers with the rebellion, in France, when (always according to
the statements of the rebels) an airplane has machine-gunned a village.
No excuse avails the pilot, and especially the Army which he represents.
The rebels are always right. They have a monopoly of the "truth".
(36) As was the case in Georgia in 1923, and in Hungary, the last place.
(37) Here, too, the enemy propaganda may find facts that contradict this
statement, but the cases involved are isolated, in no wise correspond to
the official directives, and are severely punished.
(38) See "Essay on Revolutionary Warfare", by Ximenes.
(39) It sometimes even happens that the population advances faster than
its new masters, who are then compelled to accelerate their pace to
prevent being outdistanced. The examples of Tunisia and Morocco are
characteristic. The example of Hungary can also be explained in the same
manner.
(40) It should be noted that the word "cell" is used not only by the
Communist Party but also by the Nationalist Parties. Examples: the
Tunisian Neo-Destour, the Moroccan Istiqulal, and the Algerian F.L.N.
(National Liberation Front).
(41) It is also necessary that the officials be loyal to the government
which employs them. There seem to be no problems relating to this
subject confronting totalitarian regimes. In the free countries, on the
contrary, it is allowable for a part of the Government agents to
sympathize with the revolutionary party, for the authority of them to
remain neutral, and for only a minority to "actively" support the
Government. The recent examples of Tunisia and Morocco show that both
those who were neutral and those who were "active" have been liquidated
and that they have been replaced in countries which, however, are
deprived of leaders. How could it be otherwise in the more highly
developed countries?
(42) See "A Lesson in Revolutionary Warfare", by Col. Charles Lacheroy.
French Documentation Section of the French Union.
(43) Revolutionaries, who are not ignorant of the Malleable Character of
the Young Exploit Them Thoroughly and Find Their most Active Partisans
among Them.
(44) See "The Ravishment of Crowds", by Tchakotine.
(45) Mainly when circumstances are favorable. This was the case in Spain
in 1936 and in certain central European countries between 1944 and 1948.
(46) Tunisia in 1938, Algeria in 1945, and Madagascar in 1947.
(47) With exception of the difference existing between the M.N.A. and
F.L.N. elements: (Algerian Nationalist Movement and National Liberation
Front).
(48) The difference between "domestic" and "foreign" information, which
may be been important formerly is no longer justified. There is no
longer a "front" or "rear" nor even any "frontiers" in a revolutionary war.
(49) Patterned after a certain number of countries, such as Switzerland,
Sweden, Israel, and Great Britain, which have at their disposal a
"National Guard for Civic Defense".
(50) The secret units of the "Maquis" type created in Indo-China were
described by the Viet Minh Command as "One of the most important
underhanded French means of undermining our morale".
(51) In order to avoid making this article too long, the psychological
action upon the enemy, (which constitutes psychological warfare properly
so-called) has not been examined here. It should not be neglected, for
it constitutes an important means ripost.
(52) It is a characteristic fact that in the three countries of North
Africa, just as in the Far East, it is the natives (the Indo-Chinese and
Mohammedans) who have been subjected to the terrorism of the rebels
after the outbreak of the insurrections.
(53) See with regard to this subject: "The Self-Defense of the
Population", by Capt. Andre Souyris, in the "National Defense Review"
for June 1956; other cases will be examined in subsequent numbers of
this magazine.
(54) Hence the importance of the internal territorial defense, on which
the making of preparations and the ripost, properly so-called, are based.
(55) See "Marshal Montgomery's Ideas", by Rene Vallet, in the "National
Defense Review" for December 1956.
(56) It is a characteristic fact that the best "partisans" that we have
had in the Far East have been members of the Viet Minh captured on the
battlefield.
(57) "Mob Warfare", by Col. Nemo, in the "National Defense Review", for
June 1956.
(58) This remark is attributed to Marshal Bulganin.
BIBLIOGRAPHY RELATING TO REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE.
We have deemed it advisable to publish a bibliography in order to enable
readers so desiring to study more thoroughly the subject discussed in
this number of the Review and "go back to the sources."
This bibliography, although not exhaustive, should facilitate research
on the part of the officers interested in the studies published, which
are necessarily brief.
We wish to express in advance our gratitude to any correspondents who
may point out certain omissions in the following lists.
I. - BASIC DOCUMENTS.
GENERAL SUBJECTS/AUTHOR/PUBLISHER
- The Ravishments of Crowds by Political Propaganda/Serge
Tchakotine/Gallimard
- Guerrilla and Counter-guerrilla Warfare/Gen. Aubrey Dixon and
Heilbrunn/Lavauzelle
GERMANY
- History of the German Army/Benoist Mechin/Albin Michel
CHINA
- Selected works (3 volumes have appeared)/Mao Tse Tung/Social Editions
- What I Have Seen in Red China/Harrison Forman/Pierre Seghers Ed.
- The Children in the City/J. Lefeuvre/Casterman
- The Chinese Adventure/Stillwell/Zeluck
SPAIN
- The Lessons of the Spanish War/Gen. Duval/Plan
INDO-CHINA
- Vietnam: Sociology of a War/P. Mus/Ed. du Seuil
- Journal of a Vietminh Soldier/Ngo Van Chieu/Ed. du Seuil
- An Indo-China: Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare/Col.
Nemo/"Tropics" (Jan. 1953)
- The Campaign in Indo-China; a Lesson in Revolutionary Warfare/Col.
Lacheroy/C.M.I.S.O.M.
- Surveys of the Strategy of the Vietminh/Col. de Crevecoeur/C.M.I.S.O.M.
MOROCCO
- Revolution in Morocco/Robert Montagne/France-Empire
TUNISIA
*Tunisia and France (25 years of Struggle for Free Cooperation)/Habib
Bourguiba/Julliard
USSR
- History of the Russian Revolution/Gerard Walter/Gallimard
YUGOSLAVIA
- The People's Army in the War Revolution/J. B. Tito/LeLivre,
Yougoslave, 30 rue Louis-le-
Grand, Paris
- Partisan War in Yugoslavia/Gen. Dudan - Kvedir/C.I.D.M.
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THE REVOLUTION IN TUNISIA

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