CP

SCFI 2010 1
Rodabough Consult NATO
Consult NATO
Consult NATO...............................................................................................................................1
1NC Shell........................................................................................................................................3
Consult CP’s Good........................................................................................................................4
Text Comp Bad..............................................................................................................................5
YES..................................................................................................................................................6
YES..................................................................................................................................................7
YES..................................................................................................................................................8
A2: Perm.........................................................................................................................................9
A2: Perm.......................................................................................................................................10
Relations Low...............................................................................................................................11
Consultation Key.........................................................................................................................12
Consultation Key.........................................................................................................................13
A2: Delay......................................................................................................................................14
A2: EU Replace............................................................................................................................15
NATO Good – Terrorism............................................................................................................16
NATO Good – Democracy..........................................................................................................17
NATO Good – Democracy..........................................................................................................18
NATO Good – Econ.....................................................................................................................19
NATO Good - Heg.......................................................................................................................20
NATO Good – China...................................................................................................................21
NATO Good – War......................................................................................................................22
NATO Good – War......................................................................................................................23
NATO Good – EU Heg................................................................................................................24
NATO Good – Prolif....................................................................................................................25
......................................................................................................................................................25
Aff Answers..................................................................................................................................26
Consult CP’s Bad ........................................................................................................................27
Text Comp Good .........................................................................................................................28
NO.................................................................................................................................................29
......................................................................................................................................................29
Delays............................................................................................................................................30
No Impact.....................................................................................................................................31
SCFI 2010 2
Consultation Bad.........................................................................................................................32
Normal Means..............................................................................................................................33
Solvency Take Out.......................................................................................................................34
EU Replace...................................................................................................................................35
Plan Trades Off............................................................................................................................36
A2: Democracy............................................................................................................................37
A2: Heg.........................................................................................................................................38
SCFI 2010 3
1NC Shell
The United States federal government should enter into genuine and binding consultation
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over
(INSERT THE MANDATES OF THE PLAN)
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
____ The United States should implement the outcome of the consultation.
Consultation is a key part of keeping NATO strong. The US is weakening its commitment
in the status quo.
Łukasz Kulesa March 2009 (analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). “Reduce US Nukes in
Europe to Zero, and Keep NATO Strong (and Nuclear). A View from Poland.”
http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/Strategic_File_7.pdf)
Assuring the cohesion of the Alliance when such a change is agreed upon would remain the top
priority. In practice, this calls for close consultations between the two sides of the Atlantic during all
stages of the process. There should be a common assessment that the positive consequences of the
discontinuation of the nuclear sharing arrangement will outweigh the negative ones, and that the other
elements of NATO’s nuclear policy will remain valid. It would be damaging for the Alliance to create the
impression that the US weapons are being “pushed out” of Europe by pacifist Europeans, or that the
US is weakening its commitment to NATO by initiating changes in the nuclear strategy without
properly consulting its allies.
NATO collapse leads to war.

John S. Duffield 1994 (Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University “NATO’s Function After the
Cold War” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 5. (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 763-787.)
Initial analyses of NATO's future prospects overlooked at least three important factors that have helped to
ensure the alliance's enduring relevance. First, they underestimated the extent to which external threats
sufficient to help justify the preservation of the alliance would continue to exist. In fact, NATO still serves
to secure its members against a number of actual or potential dangers emanating from outside their
territory. These include not only the residual threat posed by Russian military power, but also the
relatively new concerns raised by conflicts in neighboring regions. Second, the pessimists failed to
consider NATO's capacity for institutional adaptation. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance has begun
to develop two important new functions. NATO is increasingly seen as having a significant role to play in
containing and controlling militarized conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. And, at a deeper level,
it works to prevent such conflicts from arising at all by actively promoting stability within the former
Soviet bloc. Above all, NATO pessimists overlooked the valuable intra-alliance functions that the alliance
has always performed and that remain relevant after the cold war. Most importantly, NATO has helped
stabilize Western Europe, whose states had often been bitter rivals in the past. By damping the security
dilemma and providing an institutional mechanism for the development of common security policies, NATO
has contributed to making the use of force in relations among the countries of the region virtually
inconceivable. In all these ways, NATO clearly serves the interests of its European members. But even the
United States has a significant stake in preserving a peaceful and prosperous Europe. In addition to
strong transatlantic historical and cultural ties, American economic interests in Europe - as a leading
market for U.S. products, as a source of valuable imports, and as the host for considerable direct
foreign investment by American companies-remain substantial. If history is any guide, moreover, the
United States could easily be drawn into a future major war in Europe, the consequences of which
would likely be even more devastating than those of the past, given the existence of nuclear weapons.
SCFI 2010 4
Consult CP’s Good

1. Counter interpretation – we can only do consult counterplans written about in the literature
base.
2. Lit checks abuse – Checks squirrely “consult Trinidad” counterplans not central to the
topic. There are only a few reasonably grounded counterplans which they should have
prepare for which checks back all their ground and education standards.
3. Key to real education –
a. Real world - Crucial to understanding the details of international policy issues,

relations, and how the United States frames multilateral issues which is a better
internal link into education because it’s the point of debate.
b. Best policy option – consulting with another agent is crucial to testing whether the
aff is the truly the best course of action.
4. Neg Ground
a. Predictable – only allowing reasonable consultation steeped in the core neg ground
which the aff can prepare for.
b. Neg Flex – consult counterplans are key to negative flexibility and checking back
unpredictable affirmatives.
5. Err neg on theory -- aff gets first and last speech and unlimited prep.
6. Not a voter - Reject the argument not the team.

SCFI 2010 5
Text Comp Bad

1. Education
a. More real world – congressman fight over implementation, not how the bill is
specifically worded
b. Best policy option – tests a wider variety of solutions to the resolution and different
ways to solve versus small, incremental textual differences.
2. Ground
a. Textual comp encourages bad plan writing – they will just make the text vague
enough to limit out textual competition which destroys negative ground.
b. Any CP would be legit – you can just rephrase the plan text and it would compete
the same way.

SCFI 2010 6
YES
There will be no objection to the reduction of forces.
David S Yost April 2004 (Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) “The US Nuclear Posture Review and
the NATO allies” International Affairs 80, 4 (2004) 706-729)
Perhaps partly because of improved relations with Russia, allied observers have expressed no noteworthy
concerns about the effects of the NPR-mandated reductions in operationally deployed US strategic
nuclear warheads on extended deterrence. This is consistent with a longstanding pattern in which most
allies have deemed strategic nuclear matters a US responsibility and have deferred to US judgement about
the appropriate structure and level of US strategic nuclear forces. Exceptions to this pattern have, however,
arisen historically; and in some circumstances more such exceptions could occur. Ever since the Soviet
Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world’s first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to
periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America’s will to defend its allies, given
the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated
whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities— as during the ‘bomber gap’
and ‘missile gap’ controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about SALT II, ICBM
vulnerability and ‘grey area’ systems such as the Backfire bomber in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Any
Europeans inclined to be worried about the credibility of US extended deterrence in view of the
constraints on US strategic nuclear forces imposed by arms control or budgetary limits would
probably be influenced by interactions with US experts, policy activists and politicians—as was the
case in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the last time US policy regarding strategic nuclear forces became a
significant topic in transatlantic security discussions. If a debate emerged in the United States about the
adequacy of the US strategic force posture in the context of national security (without necessarily considering
extended deterrence for allied security), allied experts and officials would probably ask questions about the
implications for NATO, Japan and other beneficiaries of US nuclear guarantees. In this event, the perceived
political commitment of the United States—including its manifest intentions, and its apparent confidence
in the adequacy of its strategic nuclear posture—would probably matter more in reassuring allies than
the size of the force and its specific characteristics. Short of a grave crisis in which the resolve and
operational capabilities of the United States were tested, however, the US strategic nuclear force posture is
significant for extended deterrence in Europe mainly on a political level. Moreover, many allied
observers have long regarded the numbers of US strategic nuclear warheads as disproportionate to the
requirements of the post- Cold War world, in which the most immediate threats are terrorists and regional
powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and in which Russia (it is hoped) may increasingly
become a reliable partner of the alliance. It is widely believed that, even after the reductions envisaged in
the NPR, the remaining US nuclear forces would be more than sufficient to fulfil their strategic and
political purposes.
SCFI 2010 7
YES
Consultation leads to a yes
Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal Nov/Dec 2008, (Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and immediate past
President of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a former senior Defense Department and White House
official, “The Logic of Zero Subtitle: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, Lexis)
An intensive dialogue between the United States and Russia would of course be useful, but it must not be the
first condition for success. Instead, Washington's international diplomacy should aim to create an ever-
growing coalition of countries that accept the logic of zero. Success on this will require that more and
more countries subscribe to three principles: that a world without nuclear weapons is the only way of
guaranteeing that such weapons will never be used, that in the interim the only valid purpose of nuclear
weapons is to prevent their use by others, and that all fissile material must be subject to international
comprehensive accounting and control. Once a nation has accepted these principles, it has accepted the logic
of zero, which implies a willingness to give up its weapons when all others do so as well. A somewhat
different diplomatic approach will be needed for each of three groups of countries: the United States' allies,
many of which rely on Washington's commitment to their security and defense; those nonnuclear countries
that have long sought a nuclear-weapons-free world; and the nuclear weapons states, both declared and
undeclared. The first diplomatic step must be to convince the United States' allies that no change in
nuclear weapons policy (before zero is reached) will alter Washington's fundamental commitment to
respond to a nuclear attack against an allied nation with a devastating nuclear response of its own.
Similarly, it should be made clear that a nonnuclear attack -- including with chemical or biological
weapons -- against any U.S. ally would trigger a response the consequences of which would far
outweigh any benefits an attacker may have hoped to achieve. Once the clarity and certainty of the
continued U.S. commitment to their security are clear, the United States' nonnuclear allies are likely to
embrace the logic of the course Washington has laid out. Virtually all of them have the capacity to
build nuclear weapons but have decided that they would be more secure in a world with fewer, rather
than more, nuclear powers. They have also strongly supported the NPT, including its Article 6
commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons. It should not be a big leap for them to accept the three
principles behind the logic of zero and join the effort to move toward a world without any nuclear
weapons. Once U.S. allies are on board, Washington's diplomatic attention should shift to the nonnuclear
states that have long clamored for greater progress in arms control and disarmament. Countries such as
Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, and Sweden are important players in the
international disarmament field -- and have long accepted the logic of zero -- and they should be
natural allies in this effort. Some of them seriously considered acquiring nuclear weapons (and in the case of
South Africa actually did) only to conclude that even in the absence of having a formal alliance with a
nuclear weapons state, their security would be enhanced if they did not have them. Similarly, the proposed
comprehensive nuclear-control regime ought to be attractive to nations that have long complained about the
discriminatory nature of the current nonproliferation regime. With U.S. allies and other nonnuclear
countries on board, Washington will have created a broad-based, diverse, and global coalition
consisting of the vast majority of the nations in the world. The final diplomatic target will be the nuclear
weapons states not already behind the consensus. There is a good chance that two or even three of them
will have joined the effort from the beginning. The United Kingdom has, in many ways, already bought
into the logic. China and India have both adopted the formal position that they will not be the first country to
use nuclear weapons -- essentially an affirmation that they would consider their nuclear capabilities
superfluous if others had no nuclear weapons to use against them. More challenging will be to convince the
other four long-standing nuclear powers -- France, Pakistan, Israel, and, of course, Russia. France, which
insists on retaining a nuclear force to protect its vital interests against any threat, has firmly embraced the
logic of nuclear deterrence rather than the logic of zero. But as other nuclear powers move in a different
direction, Paris' ability to remain a holdout will diminish -- as became clear in the 1990s when France
finally decided to sign the NPT and, once again, after two last series of nuclear tests, when it signed on to
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A democracy like France can remain an international
outlier only for so long.
SCFI 2010 8
YES
NATO would love the plan
David Krieger 4/21/1999,( founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, “NATO: Abandon First Strike
Doctrine, De-Alert Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1999/04/21_krieger_abandon-
dealert.htm)
First, it has expanded. George Kennan, an American elder statesman who crafted the containment policy
against the former Soviet Union, has called NATO expansion the single greatest mistake in American foreign
policy in the post Cold War era. It is a mistake because it threatens the Russians. Second, NATO has changed
from a defensive alliance to an offensive alliance in disregard of its own Charter. NATO, is currently
engaged in hostilities that are in clear violation of international law. Third, NATO has resisted any change
in its nuclear doctrine. It continues to have a nuclear first-strike doctrine, meaning that NATO refuses to
declare that it will use nuclear weapons only against attack by nuclear weapons. Fourth, NATO continues to
maintain U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and continues to employ a nuclear sharing policy. U.S. nuclear
weapons are located in Germany, UK, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, and Belgium. It is important to
note that all of this takes place under strong pressure from the United States, and is the result of U.S.
leadership of NATO. When the new German government came to power and wanted to pursue a No
First Use (of nuclear weapons) policy for NATO, the U.S. put strong pressure on them to fall into line.
Similar pressure has been applied to Canada and to other NATO governments.
NATO will not object.

Judy Dempsey October 29, 2009 (“Ridding Germany of Nuclear Arms; Letter from Europe” International Herald
Tribune, LexisNexis)
The United States placed the short-range tactical weapons in NATO West European countries during the
early years of the Cold War to deter the former Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. At its peak, during the early
1970s, there were more than 7,300 of the weapons in Europe. By 1990, the number had dropped to 4,000 and
by 1992, to 700. Since 1994, according to the Federation of American Scientists, the number of U.S. nuclear
weapons in Europe has leveled off to around 480. They are based in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Turkey. The weapons now serve little purpose, said Professor Krause. Their range is too
limited to deal with threats from the Middle East or farther. There is also the physical problem of
carrying them by air. Germany's Tornado fighter aircraft will be phased out in a few years. The Eurofighter,
its replacement, has no capability for carrying such weapons. The United States has been much quicker to
acknowledge these deficits than the Europeans. Even before the election of Mr. Obama, previous
administrations have unilaterally decided to withdraw such weapons from certain bases or ceded to
requests to do so. Secretly, according to security experts, the United States recently emptied its base in
Ramstein, Germany, of nuclear weapons and earlier pulled nuclear arms out of Lakenheath in England. And
when Greece asked the United States to withdraw its weapons from Araxos Air Base in 2001, it was
done quietly as well. There was no fuss in NATO.
SCFI 2010 9
A2: Perm
Perm kills relations even in NATO likes the plan.
Stanley Sloan July 25, 1997 (Senior specialist in security policy with the congressional research service,
“Christian Science Monitor” Johnson’s Russia List http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/1084.html)
Self-confident US behavior has rubbed many Europeans the wrong way. When the Clinton
administration revealed its choice of three candidates - Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to
participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. Even France, which is a
strong proponent of including Romania and Slovenia, was not surprised that the United States and several
other allies would only support a smaller group. But the fact that the United States appeared to have
abandoned the process of NATO consultations in making its choice clear, and then said its decision was
non-negotiable, troubled even our closest allies. It strengthened the hand of those in Europe who claim
that the United States is acting like a "hegemonic" power, using its impressive position of strength to
have its way with weaker European allies. One official of a pro-American northern European country
that supports the package of three told me, "We liked the present but were troubled by the way it was
wrapped." US officials say that they wanted to keep the issue within alliance consultations but that
their position was being leaked to the press by other allies. They decided to put an end to "lobbying" for
other outcomes. Their choice to go strong and to go public may be understandable and even defensible.
However, the acknowledged leader of a coalition of democratic states probably needs to set the very
best example in the consultative process if it wants other sovereign states to follow. Perhaps it is just
hard being No. 1. US officials have noted that the United States is "damned if it does, and damned if it
does not" provide strong leadership. Perhaps the style of the NATO decision simply reflects a
Washington culture in which the bright and brash more often than not move ahead in the circles of
power. But the style does not work well in an alliance of democracies. Whatever the explanation, US-
European relations would have been better served by a US approach that allowed the outcome to emerge
more naturally from the consultative, behind-the-scenes consensus-forming process. The final result would
have been the same, and the appearance of a United States diktat to the allies would have been avoided.
SCFI 2010 10
A2: Perm
The perm doesn't solve-consultation must be genuine to solve for relations
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, February 18, 2005 (CFR And Senior Research Scholar, Center For International
Security And Cooperation, Stanford University, Federal News Service "Council On Foreign Relations Briefing,)
<First of ail, I agree on the description of the content of consultations. The distinction for me is whether
you go to inform or actually consult -- (chuckles) -- and I think the pattern of the last four years has
been we inform YOU of our views, you're with us or against us. We're looking for real -- and I think the
Europeans are looking for real -- listening and engagement. I mean, the tradition in the alliance, the
alliance that worked for 50 years, was that we actually used the fora that we had built. both formal and
informal mechanisms of dialogue, to reach agreement on the most contentious issues out of the
limelight. And the whole purpose was that we would discuss and disagree, but not have a pissinn
match in public. And so the question is whether we can find some way to get back to a process in which
we actually talk. listen and work out agreed positions on highly contentious issues.>
Only prior and genuine consultation can improve transatlantic relations

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, February 18, 2005 (CFR And Senior Research Scholar, Center For International
Security And Cooperation, Stanford University, Federal News Service "Council On Foreign Relations Briefing,)
<MS. SHERWOOD-RANDALL: This is the wrong group. But I would say, 1 mean, if you're looking at
transatlantic relations, the important thing is with respect to an overall plan for reaching some -- for
achieving progress on the Middle East peace front, I believe we should be doing what we have
traditionally done with the Europeans, which is to no to Europe first, talk to our key allies about what
we're thinking about doing, work out an agreed process that they are a part of it, and use our collective
leverage to bring about results. So it's not about us going out first and then hoping people will come
along, it's about going through Europe first. I mean, that's the big difference in ps~cholo~iys ,w hether
you choose to strengthen transatlantic ties as you pursue broader goals, or whether you go around
Europe and expect people to either be with vou or against you and bear the consequences of being
against you, which was the first- term approach. My view is we are much more effective, much stronger,
both in terms of our policies in the world and also the import of our relations with Europe, if we choose
to go to Europe first. That needs to be a part of any action plan, is to consult first with our European
allie bilaterally and multilaterally, in capitals and at NATO.>
SCFI 2010 11
Relations Low
U.S. NATO relations low now
International News, June 24, 2010, ( “McChrystal dismissal causes unease at NATO,” The International
News, Geo Television Network, http://www.geo.tv/6-24-2010/67230.htm)
General Stanley McChrystal's replacement caused unease among some NATO allies Wednesday,
concerned that it sends a bad signal after he masterminded a strategy to tackle the Taliban in
Afghanistan. NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen had on Tuesday backed the alliance's commander in
Afghanistan, amid a storm over an interview in which McChrystal criticised the White House. "We are in the
middle of a very real conflict, and the Secretary General has full confidence in General McChrystal as the
NATO commander, and in his strategy," Rasmussen's spokesman had said. But on Wednesday US President
Barack Obama decided such insubordination could not be tolerated and McChrystal duly resigned.
Rasmussen swiftly sought to assure that McChrystal's strategy would survive his departure. "While he will no
longer be the commander, the approach he helped put in place is the right one. The strategy continues to have
NATO's support, and our forces will continue to carry it out." Rasmussen stressed in a statement. "The
Afghan people should have no doubt that we will continue to carry out our mission in partnership with
them," he added. In private, several NATO delegations in Brussels had expected McChrystal's removal,
deeming his position untenable after Rolling Stone magazine published an interview in which he and his
aides derided top administration officials and spoke dismissively of Obama. However there was regret that he
had been left with no choice but to go just because of some ill-judged remarks to a reporter. German
Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg told German television that McChrystal was "a guarantor
of the new strategy in Afghanistan," before the announcement of the US general's resignation. Zu Guttenberg
warned that NATO forces were facing a "very tough summer" and that the alliance needed steady
leadership during a potentially very bloody period.
SCFI 2010 12
Consultation Key
Relations and NATO are on the brink. Consultation is the key to restoration.
Philip H Gordon July 2004 (Senior fellow at the Brookings Institute “Letters to Europe”, The Prospect,
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gordon/20040701.pdf)
Dear Friends. How did it come to this? I cannot remember a time when the gulf between Europeans and
Americans was so wide. For the past couple of years, I have argued that the Iraq crisis was a sort of "perfect
storm" unlikely to be repeated, and that many of the recent tensions resulted from the personalities and
shortcomings of key actors on both sides. The transatlantic alliance has overcome many crises before, and
given our common interests and values and the enormous challenges we face, I have beenconfident that we
could also overcome this latest spat. Now I just don't know any more. After a series of increasingly
depressing trips to Europe, even my optimism is being tested. I do know this: if we don't find a new way to
deal with each other soon, the damage to the most successful alliance in history could become
permanent. We could be in the process of creating a new world order in which the very concept of the
"west" will no longer exist. I am not saying that Europe and America will end up in a military stand-off like
that between east and west during the cold war. But if current trends are not reversed, you can be sure we
will see growing domestic pressure on both sides for confrontation rather than co-operation. This will
lead to the effective end of Nato, and political rivalry in the middle east, Africa and Asia. Europeans
would face an America that no longer felt an interest in—and might actively seek to undermine—the united,
prosperous Europe that Washington has supported for 60 years. And Americans would find themselves
dealing with monumental global challenges not only without the support of their most capable
potential partners, but perhaps in the face of their opposition. Britain would finally be forced to choose
between two antagonistic camps. Some argue that such an outcome is inevitable. But I have always thought
my friend Robert Kagan’s claim that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus” was
exaggerated. Obviously there are real and even growing differences between Americans and Europeans on a
range of issues. The end of the cold war, the rise of US military, political and economic power during the
1990s, and Europe’s preoccupation with the challenges of integration and enlargement, have combined to
accentuate these differences. But we have had different strategic perspectives— and fights about strategy—
for years, and that never prevented us from working together towards common goals. And despite the
provocations from ideologues on both sides, this surely remains possible today. Leaders still have
options, and decisions to make. They shape their environment as much as they are shaped by it. The right
choices could help put the world’s main liberal democracies back in the same camp, just as the wrong
choices could destroy it. WHAT WE need is a “new deal,” and that’s what I am writing to propose:
Americans will have to show some humility, admit that we do not have all the answers and agree to
listen, consult and even compromise. We must accept that even our immense power and new sense of
vulnerability does not mean that we can do whatever we want, however we want. We must
acknowledge that we need allies to achieve our goals, which means bringing others into the decision-
making process, however frustrating that process might be. On a range of issues that have divided the
US and Europe in recent years—from climate change and nuclear testing to international law—
Americans will have to recommit to seeking practical compromises with others, rather than assuming
that our power exempts us from obligations to the global community.
SCFI 2010 13
Consultation Key
Genuine consultation is key to continued NATO relevance
Robert Bell 05 (NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment, NATO Review,
http://www .nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue 1 /english/main-pr.h tm1)
<Soldiering on NATO today is, on the one hand, being saluted bv the leaders of its most
powerful member as "more active than ever", "the most successful alliance in history", and "the vital
relationship for the United States when it comes to security". It can justifiably point with pride to its
success in expanding its membership, reorganisinn its Command Structure and Headquarters
organisation, expanding its operations and its operational reach, and making progress in modernising
its inventory of capabilities to meet new threats and security challenges. O On the other hand, doubts
about the risk of failure persist. From the Secretary General on down, the organisation bemoans the
disconnect between Allies' willingness to embrace new missions and new capabilities, on the one hand,
and to pledge the manpower, equipment and resources needed to deliver on those missions and
capabilities, on the other. In both cases, critics. and not iust critics, wonder whether the requisite
political will is really there. In addition, Chancellor Schroder obviously touched upon a raw nerve in
publicly highlighting NATO's diminished importance as a venue for genuine transatlantic
decisionmaking on issues of transcending strategic importance. U OBut NATO will soldier on. as it
always has. As the indispensable security alliance of the transatlantic cornmunitv of nations, NATO
can be counted upon to continue to pursue its three transformation agenda - Prague, Norfolk and Munich -
with good intent and common purpose, however haltingly, however imperfectly. Much rides on the
outcome.>
Genuine consultation is key to effective cooperation

Richard Haass June 1, 2004 (President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The United States and Europe:
Adjusting to the Global Era," http://www.cfr.org/publication/7069/united~states~and~eurhotpme.l)
Genuine consultation is a must. Consultation cannot consist of simply informing others of what has
already been decided or going through the motions and not adapting policies yet still expecting
support.
Nor can consulbitions wait until a crisis is upon us; talks should be held in advance on how to deal with
the central challenges of this era. This promises to be the best and most likely only way of forging a
policy framework relevant to the challenges central to this era of international relations. Both
Europeans and Americans have reason to maintain and where possible expand their cooperation. As
has already been alluded to, this is the optimal way to deal with those regional and global challeneges
that affect both but which neither alone can manage. such challenges (and opportunities) go beyond the
full gamut of transnational issues. Let me single out two. The first is to promote political, economic,
educational. and social reform throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds. It i sn essential that young lncn and
women in these societies see a reason to live. This will require meaningful reform resulting in meaningful
political participation, economic opportunity. and access to an education that will provide the tools basic to
this global en. Making progress here will require the wisdom and resources of both Europe and the United
States.>
SCFI 2010 14
A2: Delay
NATO consultation process is hella fast.
Michael Rühle, summer 2003 [Head of Policy Planning in the NATO Political Affairs Division, “NATO after
Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11” Parameters page 95-96]
The third area of Alliance reform concerns the organization itself. NATO’s working methods must
reflect the requirements imposed by the new strategic environment. Although the Alliance will soon have 26
members, the organization’s working methods have remained largely unchanged from those developed in the
early 1950s for an Alliance of 12. Even if American charges that the Kosovo campaign was “war by
committee” were an urban myth, the need for change is still clear. As NATO is enlarging both its
membership and its mandate, its working methods cannot be left unaffected. In a nutshell, NATO needs to be
less bureaucratic and more flexible. Almost unnoticed by the broader public, the Prague Summit made a
strong start in this direction. Heads of state and government agreed to reduce the numbers of NATO
committees (currently 467) by 30 percent. More decisions will be pushed toward subordinate
committees, leaving the North Atlantic Council room to discuss strategic issues. The procedures for
ministerial meetings have been streamlined as well, sacrificing formality in order to gain time for more
substantive exchanges. Over time, these changes should lead to a different working culture within the
Alliance.
SCFI 2010 15
A2: EU Replace
The EU cannot replace NATO
Kwok 05 (James, staff writer at the Harvard International Review, "Mending NATO: Sustaining the
Transatlantic Relationship," Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer,
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/ 13441)
<The goals of any country do not always match up with those of its multilateral institutions, but the
European Union as it stands has not rendered NATO obsolete. If anything, the European Union needs
to rely on NATO for the military force that underpins any sort of cultural or "soft power" that Europ
can lend to international politics. Currently, the military expenditures of the three largest countries in the
European Union-the United Kingdom, France, and Germany-hover around US$40 billion. In stark
contrast, the United States spent roughly US$370 billion equipping its military forces in 2004, more than
the aggregate of the three countries' military expenditures. Close association with the US ability to
marshal massive resources is necessary if Europe wishes to invoke the threat of military force to back
its diplomacy: it inevitably will need to when its influence and voice grow. While the European Union's
Common Foreign and Security Policy is starting to provide another basis for EU primacy in its own
security affairs, NATO still stands as a key determinant in transatlantic security. That the United
States is some sort of power mongerer wishing to emasculate transatlantic security for its own sake is a
specious notion. In 2002, the administration of US President George W. Bush called for a highly responsive
"rapid reaction force" within NATO, comprising 20,000 troops. At a time when the European Union is
developing military capabilities of its own, it seems that US policy is trying hard to establish a
diplomatic relationship with Europe that is reliant on a common multilateral
institution.>
SCFI 2010 16
NATO Good – Terrorism

The US being part of a strong NATO is key to stopping terrorism.
Alan M. Stull & Raymond A. Millen March 15, 2005 (Both Lieutenant Colonels in the US Army “A Strong
NATO is Essential to the United States National Security Strategy”)
Europe has been one of America’s strongest supporters in its efforts to defeat global terrorism.
Without this close relationship, U.S. power to defeat this threat is greatly diminished. In addition, Europe has
also stood with the United States to diffuse regional conflicts. The United States must continue to strengthen its resolve
with leadership and partnership to diffuse regional conflicts across Europe, Eurasia and Northern Africa. Finally, the
EU is potentially becoming one of the strongest economic powers in the world and America is more intertwined with its economy than
any other country or region. This makes European security an imperative to the economic well-being of the United States. NEW US
FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE One can easily argue that four mechanized/armor brigades in Europe are not justified by the current
threats in Europe; however, what type of forces and how many should remain is open to great debate. President Bush’s announcement to
bring home 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees came as no
surprise as DOD continues to transform while fighting the GWOT. 5 The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) will bear the brunt
of this with approximately 40,000 U.S. Army soldiers returning from Europe and over 160 installations closing across Europe over the
next ten years.6 Though collective defense has evolved into collective security, NATO’s role is still vital to
U.S. national interests not only in Europe but around the world. Many critics question whether fixed alliances with
traditional partners are helpful in dealing with the GWOT,7 but U.S. military presence in Europe is more than just helping Europe
defend itself; it is about presence, leadership and influence. “NATO has long been something more than the sum of
its parts. Designed in part to transcend old-fashioned balance-of-power politics within Europe, it has evolved over the years into a
deep-rooted institution with a commitment to democratic values and practices that, along with its unique, integrated military structure,
sustains it even at times when its members' short-term strategic calculations diverge. In the wake of the bitter dispute over the war in
Iraq, however, it is unclear whether the transatlantic partners are ready and willing to overcome their differences and reaffirm their basic
common interests in security and other relations: the essence of the NATO alliance”.8 With over one quarter of the U.S. Army active
forces deployed in direct support of the GWOT, another quarter preparing to deploy and another quarter recovering from deployment,
there are not enough soldiers left to support all the other missions the U.S. Army is given. On top of this the Army is also transforming
every tactical organization across its entire spectrum. This has caused the Army to reevaluate every mission not in direct support of the
GWOT to determine the best way to allocate its limited resources. The United States will remain committed to the provisions of the
Alliance treaty, but the end of the Soviet threat no longer requires an American troop presence for collective defense. STRENGTHEN
ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM A major goal of the Bush NSS is to “strengthen alliances to defeat global
terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.”9 The United States has already seen a great divide between it and a
few European Alliance partners on the strategy for fighting global terrorism. Though the NATO Secretary General implemented Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty immediately following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and took significant measures
to assist the United States, lack of consensus in NATO diminished its support to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and only 16 of 26
NATO countries are deployed with the U.S. action there. Though the United States prefers building coalitions rather
than acting through NATO, NATO backing is still critical. Pulling back from Europe at this time,
though not tied to current tensions with Germany and France, can only weaken one of the greatest
alliances against global terrorism. NATO is the strongest U.S. long term alliance. It has one of the best
established military command and control structures and an established intelligence sharing system
which is vital to tracking terrorists that transit through Europe and neighboring countries. Europeans
also have 30 years of experience in dealing with modern terrorism. The restationing of 40,000 soldiers from
USAREUR back to the United States may be sending the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to Europe and the NATO Alliance.
The Germans, who will see almost all of these reductions, understand the United States’ rationale for a restructuring and restationing in
light of their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the threat reduction to Europe, but they may not understand the significant
levels of these reductions.10 The bottom line is they support the withdrawal but lament the economic consequences.
Terrorism causes extinction
Yonah Alexander; Senior Fellow and Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies, 2/28/2002 (The
University of Wisconsin Press; Terrorism in the 21st Century; http://www.wisc.edu/wisconsinpress/terrorism.html)
The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States have demonstrated that terrorism has unfortunately
become a permanent feature of contemporary life. The safety and welfare of ordinary people, the stability
of state systems, the health and pace of economic development, the expansion of democracy, and even
survival of civilization itself are all threatened by this phenomenon. Today's terrorists are better
organized, more professional, and better equipped than their historical counterparts. Technological
developments offer new targets-and their possible use of chemical, biological, and nuclear violence to
achieve mass disruption or political turmoil is a real possibility. The advent of information warfare and
cyber-terrorism is a new feature of this potential challenge to the very survival of civilization.
SCFI 2010 17
NATO Good – Democracy

NATO is critical to successfully promoting Middle East democracy
Rebecca R Moore 2007 ( Prof. of Political Science at Concordia “NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a
Post-Cold War World”, p. 137-38)
Moreover, it is also generally accepted that, just as the reform process in Central and Eastern Europe required a security dimension, so
too will any effort to democratize Central Asia and the Middle East.129 As Stephen Blank has argued with respect to Central Asia, "the
requirement for beginning a liberalization process that will end in something recognizable as democracy, in
part or in whole, probably must be sparked by a deus ex machina, or external actor or actors who reinforce
and strengthen domestic trends within those societies." The security guarantees provided by the presence
of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Blank suggests, have the potential to "provide a
respite for terrorism and opportunities for building security that could also contribute to the general
pacification and democratization of the entire area."130 Asmus, Leonard, McFaul, and others also argue that NATO
has a role to play in creating an external security environment conducive to democratic change in the Middle East, by providing the
peacekeeping capabilities necessary to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan and by promoting more democratic practices in the
region through a "new version of the Partnership for Peace program." In a play on former NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay's famous
line, they propose that "NATO's new role would be to keep the Americans and Europeans together, the aggressors out and the terrorists
down."131 Indeed, despite continued gloomy predictions regarding NATO's future, the Alliance is remarkably well
positioned to contribute to democratic change outside of Europe. NATO today has at its disposal a host of
essentially political tools developed in pursuit of Europe whole and free, which it can now utilize and build upon in an effort to project
stability farther south and east. While NATO's newest partnership initiative, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, does not have the
explicit democratization focus of PfP, it does have the potential to build on NATO's experience elsewhere in encouraging the reform of
regional security institutions and practices in ways that are ultimately conducive to democratization. As a policy paper released by the
Atlantic Council observed, "through the Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plan, NATO has evolved ways of
promoting and fostering such policies and institutions in countries in which they do not have deep
roots. The great promise of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is that it would offer to apply these same
approaches in those countries of the Broader Middle East."132
Democracy prevents global nuclear war

Joshua Muravchik 7/11/01 (Resident Scholar American Enterprise Institute, www.npec-
web.org/syllabi/muravchik.htm)
The greatest impetus for world peace -- and perforce of nuclear peace -- is the spread of democracy. In
a famous article, and subsequent book, Francis Fukuyama argued that democracy's extension was leading to "the end of history." By this
he meant the conclusion of man's quest for the right social order, but he also meant the "diminution of the likelihood of large-scale
conflict between states." (1) Fukuyama's phrase was intentionally provocative, even tongue-in-cheek, but he was pointing to two down-
to-earth historical observations: that democracies are more peaceful than other kinds of government and that the
world is growing more democratic. Neither point has gone unchallenged. Only a few decades ago, as distinguished an
observer of international relations as George Kennan made a claim quite contrary to the first of these assertions. Democracies, he said,
were slow to anger, but once aroused "a democracy . . . . fights in anger . . . . to the bitter end." (2) Kennan's view was strongly
influenced by the policy of "unconditional surrender" pursued in World War II. But subsequent experience, such as the negotiated
settlements America sought in Korea and Vietnam proved him wrong. Democracies are not only slow to anger but also
quick to compromise. And to forgive. Notwithstanding the insistence on unconditional surrender, America
treated Japan and that part of Germany that it occupied with extraordinary generosity. In recent years a
burgeoning literature has discussed the peacefulness of democracies. Indeed the proposition that
democracies do not go to war with one another has been described by one political scientist as being
"as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations." (3) Some of those who find
enthusiasm for democracy off-putting have challenged this proposition, but their challenges have only served as empirical tests that have
confirmed its robustness. For example, the academic Paul Gottfried and the columnist-turned-politician Patrick J. Buchanan have both
instanced democratic England's declaration of war against democratic Finland during World War II. (4) In fact, after much
procrastination, England did accede to the pressure of its Soviet ally to declare war against Finland which was allied with Germany. But
the declaration was purely formal: no fighting ensued between England and Finland. Surely this is an exception that proves the rule.
Continues…This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war
was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to
democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence
or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for
worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the
prospects for democracy may be still more remote.
SCFI 2010 18
NATO Good – Democracy

Democracy key to environmental issues.
Meyer and Konisky, University of Utah, 07 (Stephen M., and David M., “Adopting Local Environmental
Institutions: Environmental Need and Economic Constraints”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 1, March
2007, pp. 3 – 16, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623803) jstor
This momentum toward place-based solutions and the creation of local environmental institutions
(LEIs) is fueled by the desire to make environmental policy more responsive to local values and
interests and to move away from "one-size-fits-all" environmental programs crafted by distant
government agencies. By giving communities more say in environmental decisions, advocates of LEIs
argue, policies will meet less resistance and generate stronger environmental protection with lower
transaction costs.
SCFI 2010 19
NATO Good – Econ

US-NATO Relations key to U.S. economy.
Alan M. Stull 3-15-2005 (, Lieutenant Colonel United States Army “A Strong NATO is Essential to the United
States National Security Strategy” US Army War College)
This divide can only deepen as the United States disengages from Europe. As their strategic visions diverge
and the United States reduces its presence to just a few thousand forces spread among a handful of
European countries, its influence may fade to the point where the United States is no longer a facto in
European policymaking. Through not an immediate threat, it could easily become one ov the next two
decades as the United States concentrates on the GWOT and the European Union (EU) concentrates on
strengthening its union politically, economically as well as militarily with the ratification of its first
constitution. This scenario could easily undermine many of the U.S. NSS goals. Three of the eight goals
are listed below. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and
our friends2 § Work with others to defuse regional conflicts 3 § Ignite a new era of global economic growth
through free markets and free trade4 In addition, Europe has also stood with the United States to diffuse
regional conflicts. The 2 United States must continue to strengthen its resolve with leadership and partnership
to diffuse regional conflicts across Europe, Eurasia and Northern Africa. Finally, the EU is potentially
becoming one of the strongest economic powers in the world and America is more intertwined with its
economy than any other country or region. This makes European security an imperative to the
economic well-being of the United States.
SCFI 2010 20
NATO Good - Heg

NATO key to US strategy and hegemony
Frank R Douglas 2008, (former USAF officer The United States, NATO, and a New Multilateral Relationship, p.
168-69)
Change during the 1990s was the common denominator for the security environment for Europe, NATO, and
the way the United States deployed its military forces in Europe. How that change was to occur and be
managed was not so clear at the beginning of the 1990s. Despite the apparent opportunity for the United
States to withdraw all of its military forces from Europe and end its "temporary deployment" due to the threat
of the Soviet Union, it instead chose to transform how it deployed its forces in the post—Cold War Europe.
The long-term American issue of burden-sharing between the United States and its NATO allies proved to be
quite minor compared to the value the United States receives from its membership in NATO. NATO
augments the global prestige, political influence, and military power of the United States. President
George Bush worked to preserve NATO and influenced its transformation. He began the process of reducing
the numbers of U.S. military forces assigned in NATO Europe. President William J. Clinton continued that
process of reducing U.S. forces in NATO Europe while his administration worked to formulate and refine the
strategy of Forward Presence, which gives continued legitimacy to U.S. involvement in European security
affairs and provides military enhancement for the United States to project its military power globally. There
is no direct military threat to Europe today, but the access to facilities and logistical support is considered
vital to the United States in meeting its vital national interests. The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 proved
the utility of military facilities and logistics in Europe, which contributed to the successful prosecution of that
war. The value of U.S. military assets in NATO Europe has greatly supported operations in the Iraq War of
2003. It is an American hope that its NATO allies in the near future will share in supplying military forces,
equipment, and other resources in addressing what the United States describes as "shared threats" out of area,
such as the interruption of the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and the spread of international terrorism. The American strategies for its post—Cold War
membership in NATO are all designed to keep it involved in the security affairs of Europe and to
preserve its military power and capability to project its military force. Forward Presence is the over-
arching strategy that contains the individual but interrelated strategies of maintaining military relationships,
interoperability of equipment and doctrines, strategic system of enroute air bases (ERS), pre-positioning
programs, and the U.S. military forces assigned to Europe. No single element of the Forward Presence
strategy can be fully realized without the reinforcement of the other elements. Establishing and maintaining
military relationships helps to create the environment that allows for the use of strategic air bases or
pre-positioning of military equipment by the United States in European countries, while fostering
interoperability through exercises between European and U.S. forces in Europe.
Nuclear war
Khalilzad, US Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1995 (Washington Quarterly)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a
global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding
principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the
United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment
would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law.
Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major
problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level
conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling
the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers,
including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability
than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
SCFI 2010 21
NATO Good – China

NATO is key to burden-sharing that allows containment of China – status quo reluctance
to pressure China is part and parcel with America’s shifting focus away from Europe
Gabriel Kolko, leading historian of modern warfare, 8-1-2003 Journal of Contemporary Asia
This confusion and loss of priorities is best illustrated by the shifting importance of Asia in
Washington's priorities. When the Bush Administration took power at the beginning of 2001 it was
committed to a much more activist foreign policy in East Asia, and was especially resolved to confront
China. Until September 11 China was the threat of choice to most of official Washington, a potential enemy
big enough to justify the Pentagon's extravagant spending. The crash of an American spy plane with a
Chinese fighter over Hainan island in April 2001 gave force to the imminent administration designation of
China as the leading "peer competitor" to the U. S. September 11 changed everything, and wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq have completely altered America's priorities. China is no longer of prime importance
to it, and even North Korea's nuclear bombs remain a question it wavers on, and it is a challenge it is loath
to confront soon because it lacks the military resources--it is spread far too thinly throughout the
world. The war in Afghanistan destabilized the Musharraf regime in Pakistan, and South Asia with it--future
relations between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan are more unpredictable than ever. As for the Western
Hemisphere, which is essentially outside of the leading decisionmakers' vision, Washington has neglected
and thereby alienated Mexico and Canada--its two neighbors and major trading partners--to an extent
which was completely unintended. One may look at America's resolve over the past two years and ultra-
sophisticated military equipment as a sign of strength as well as imperialist pretension, but it is also an
indication of endemic confusion and a policy that will unintentionally lead to the diffusion of its
power--and create more weakness for it. This is the history of its improvised and often chaotic behavior
since 1945. The people who lead the United States today do not think in these terms, because priorities
and their systematic application imply constraints and a recognition of the limits of power, if only to exploit
its formidable resources more rationally. For these men, the only question over the past several years was
of timing and how the United States would escape NATO's clear military obligations while maintaining
its political hegemony over its members. They still want to preserve NATO for the very reason it was
established: to keep Europe from developing an independent political as well as military organization. Some
of its members want NATO to reach a partial accord with Russia, a relationship on which Washington often
shifted, but Moscow remains highly suspicious of its plans to extend its membership to Russia's very borders.
When the new administration came to power in January 2001, NATO's fundamental role was already
being reconsidered. What it did add--at least as much out of ineptness as conscious policy--was a readiness
to smash the alliance if necessary. For apart from their penchant for action, which in itself is scarcely unique,
its spokesmen have a completely incompetent sense of public relations, creating shock and opposition among
friends as well as enemies--and resistance to America's objectives well before it might otherwise occur.
Although it would eventually have happened anyway, NATO's demise is a good example of this policy
based on blunders whose unintended consequences then become decisive.
SCFI 2010 22
NATO Good – War

Collapse of ties between the U.S. and NATO causes immediate instability that escalates to
superpower nuclear war
John O'Sullivan, editor of the National Review and founder of the New Atlantic, 6-1998 [American Spectator]
Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite
apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has
been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which
Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been
permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia
is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World
War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the
Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe
and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If
none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the
existence of NATO makes any such threat futile and even counter-productive. No nation or would-be
nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could
mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given
that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But
neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective
security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there
is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it
attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have
succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other
than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American
forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO
structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in
the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be
replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European
Union--it would invite chaos as every irredentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the
main guarantor of European stability.
SCFI 2010 23
NATO Good – War

NATO collapse causes multiple bloody wars
Simon Serfaty, senior professor in international politics at Old Dominion, 2005 The Vital Partnership p. 78-9
Yet, Richard Holbrooke understood especially well (and earlier than most) the enormity of the issues at
stake: not only to end the war and save Bosnia from Serbia but, and even more urgently, to save Europe
and even the United States from themselves—the former's tragic history of bloody conflicts and the
latters foolish tradition of isolation and self-denial. For such goals to be achieved. NATO had to be
preserved as America's prime institutional conduit to Europe, but it also had to be renewed as its
members' security institution of choice. Otherwise, it threatened to be like a huge whale stranded on a
beautiful Atlantic beach. If left untended. it would "die. stink, and pollute even-thing around it." within
Europe because of the ensuing sauve-qui-peut among countries suddenly reminded of their past fears
and conflicts, as well as with the United States, now denied its primary institutional point of entry into
the continent.24.
NATO collapse causes worldwide wars

Simon Serfaty, senior professor in international politics at Old Dominion, 2005 The Vital Partnership p.46
For the new breed of Euro-Atlantic skeptics, the imminent "end of the West" is forecast without satisfaction.9
Such announcements bring their authors close to the unthinkable, which has to do with the risks of an ill-
defined transatlantic divorce. They would much prefer another fate for the institutions that promoted peace
and achieved prosperity after World War II—a different fate for America, left alone in an increasingly
dangerous and hostile world. "The West is being lost," deplored French defense expert Francois Heisbourg in
the spring of 2003, amidst the many "fault lines" that are "unmaking the alliance" especially as "U.S.
hawks ... [who are] simply not interested in the alliance" take precedence over those who continue to believe
that "it is worth trying to rescue the transatlantic relationship."10 One year later, America's "stubborn activism
and unlimited incompetence" lead Heisbourg to "plead [though with "much sadness"] for the disassociation
between Europe and U.S. policies that have become too hazardous under President Bush."11 The same
anxious tones are heard when the warnings— that the \Vest is at risk, or that either side might be better off
without the other—are issued in the United States by the very architects of the Cold War transatlantic order
—like former Secretary of State George Shultz, as he wistfully reflects that "maybe we don't" need the
Atlantic Alliance after all.12
SCFI 2010 24
NATO Good – EU Heg
NATO relations solves for EU hegemony.

John Van Oudenaren, Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Summer 2005 [National
Interest]
This is fundamentally a matter for Europeans themselves to resolve, but how the United States acts toward
and talks about the EU can play a role in placing, as it were, both a floor under Europe's insecurities
and a ceiling on its ambitions. Talk of disaggregation is obviously harmful, in that it both fuels anxieties
and stokes ambitions when U.S. efforts (largely imagined) to thwart Europe's aspirations are defeated. Talk
of partnership is less damaging but also problematic. It raises fears of being locked in an unequal
embrace, even as it reinforces the impression of a rising Europe moving to a position of equality or--who
knows--perhaps a bit more than equality. Instead of endlessly debating the merits of a more or less
unified EU, or the conditions under which a satisfactory partnership finally might emerge, the United
States should take a pragmatic approach that emphasizes solving concrete economic and political
problems to the extent possible in broader multilateral forums where the views of third countries can
be brought to bear as well. Such an approach does not preclude direct engagement with, and the
further development of, bilateral relations with the EU. Indeed, the opposite is likely to be the case.
Freed from concerns about nailing down the terms of a future partnership, Washington would be able to take
a more relaxed attitude toward issues such as membership for Turkey and Ukraine, thereby removing one
irritant in the relationship. Saving NATO would remain a U.S. objective, but less energy and emotion could
be expended on defining the terms of EU-NATO cooperation (terms that the EU is certain to demand be
revised as the common European security policy reaches new stages of development) and on correcting
deficiencies in European forces (unlikely to be addressed in any case) and more on using NATO as a forum
for political consultations. The pursuit of a more plural European order also would provide incentives
on the U.S. side to defuse bilateral conflicts with the EU. Clearly, the United States needs to fight to
protect its national interests in some cases. But U.S.-EU conflict tends to be asymmetrical in its political
effects. Those in Europe most interested in building up the EU as a counterweight to the United States
arguably have a vested interest in a certain level of tension with Washington--one that encourages them
to pick fights on various issues. If Europe "wins" in any given dispute, the value of European unity is
demonstrated for all to see. If Europe loses, the familiar arguments for a stronger Europe are trotted out.
Either way, there is little downside to conflict. For the United States, a different logic applies. Wins, while
sometimes necessary to protect concrete interests or to uphold legal positions, garner nothing in the way of
good will, even as they spur the same calls for efforts to counterbalance U.S. power. And losses, well, are
losses. Conflict avoidance thus would be a key element of a pluralistic strategy toward Europe. Finally, a
strategy to preserve an open, plural environment in Europe should provide both added incentives and
opportunities for increased consultation with a range of European political actors. Calls for partnership
from the U.S. side inevitably reinforce centralizing tendencies in the EU, providing the European
Commission, the European Parliament and the more ambitious member states ready-made arguments that
"more Europe" is needed to meet the demands of co-equal cooperation with the United States.
Disaggregation, ironically, contributes to the same result, as European leaders feel a need to increase
solidarity to counter U.S. tactics. Fostering a plural order entails avoiding either extreme. Washington thus
should welcome expanded consultation with Brussels, using the mechanisms established under the 1990
and 1995 U.S.-EU agreements, covering both matters of bilateral concern and matters relating to regions and
issue areas where U.S. and EU interests intersect. But the United States also should cultivate bilateral ties
with the EU member states as well as use other multilateral forums--NATO, the G-8 and the OECD--to
expand consultation. Without overtly challenging EU prerogatives, such consultations quietly reinforce
the existing reluctance in national capitals to relinquish bilateral ties to third countries and to channel
the pursuit of national interests exclusively through Brussels.
SCFI 2010 25
NATO Good – Prolif

NATO consultation key to solve terrorism and nuclear proliferation
David Abshire and Wesley Cross Summer/Fall 2004 (, President and CEO of the Center for the Study of the
Presidency and Special Assistant and Advisor to the President of the Center for the Study of the Presidency,
“Reinvesting in the Art of NATO,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs)
This rising challenge to NATO comes at a critical moment for world history, U.S. foreign policy, and
transatlantic relationships. The United States now faces a moment of both extreme risk and opportunity. Over
the next four years, the success or failure of U.S. foreign policy will likely set the course for the next fifty
years. In an increasingly disordered international context of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, failed and
rogue states, and fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is stretched thin. Also, anti-
Americanism is rising. The much-needed debate over U.S. foreign policy is complicated by a polarized
domestic political culture and an election year that threatens to be particularly bruising. If, at the Cold War’s
end, NATO looked like an alliance in need of a mission, the United States’s challenges today—from
fighting terrorism and nuclear proliferation to Middle East stability— now need an alliance. NATO
should be that alliance. With skillful American leadership based on trust, consultation, and
cooperation, NATO could regain its preeminent role in tackling transatlantic security problems.
Recent events have begun persuading a Hobbesian United States and a Kantian Europe that when “facing
long-term, strategic challenges, there can be no substitute for long-term, strategic partners: partners
you can trust. Partners who trust you.”4 NATO is the tool that best combines combines the strengths of
multilateral legitimacy and collaboration with the planning, capabilities, and operational effectiveness of
unilateral action. No other option—neither unilateralism, nor the UN, nor even ad-hoc coalitions of the
willing—is both viable over the long term and effective over the short term.
Proliferation leads to full scale nuclear war

Taylor 2001 (former nuclear weapons designer and chairman of NOVA “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”)
Nuclear proliferation – be it among nations or terrorists – greatly increases the chance of nuclear
violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons
will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world.
Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups may decide to use
nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against
humanity as a whole. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons
could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced
stage of “latent proliferation”, finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to
deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the
Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate
into a global nuclear war.
SCFI 2010 26
Aff Answers
SCFI 2010 27
Consult CP’s Bad

1. Consult kills education –
a. It’s infinitely regressive – we can’t predict all the different combinations of actors
and policy changes to the plan which shift the debate from the resolution to
irrelevant net benefits and insignificant policy differences.
b. Amendments bad – no one can predict what will be changed without specific lit
which kills education and clash as the aff cannot research for answers because they
simply don’t exist.
2. Kills Ground
a. Time and strat skew – they can steal all the offense from the 1NC by simply
proposing that we listen to some random country’s opinion.
b. Not textually competitive: The counterplan merely adds the words in consultation
with, to the original plan text. Textual competition is the only non arbitrary default
on counterplan debates.
c. Not functionally competitive: The neg can’t produce evidence that <<insert actor>>
would have specific modifications to our plan. Instead, they rely on moving-target
fiat to fill in solvency, links, and uniqueness which are all core tests of
competitiveness. That’s an independent voter for fairness.
d. Plan Plus: The counterplan is plan plus which justifies aff intrinsic and timeframe
perms. This justifies an aff win because the negative can virtually concede case and
just add an extra topical plank.
3. Err aff on theory – neg gets the block and can control the outcome of the debate by
strategically picking certain arguments.
4. Voting issue – for ground, education, and fairness

SCFI 2010 28
Text Comp Good
1. Most predictable – plan is the focus of the debate and is the most stable advocacy in the
round.
2. Fairness – functional competition is arbitrary, it can be derived from anything.
3. Forces better plan writing – better for general education and ground as well as avoiding
procedurals and vagueness arguments

SCFI 2010 29
NO
NATO will say no.
Deutsche Presse-Agentur November 13, 1998 (“U.N. adopts resolution to eliminate nuclear weapons”
Deutsche Presse-Agentur)
Non-nuclear weapons states and NATO countries like Canada, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Greece, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Spain abstained. The United States, Britain, France and Russia
voted against the resolution while the fifth known nuclear-weapons state, China, abstained. Turkey, a
U.S. ally and NATO member, voted against. The United States had been pressuring its North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to vote against the resolution which, in addition to calling for the
elimination of nuclear weapons, asked the United States and Russia to "bring into force without
further delay" START II. That bilateral agreement called for reducing the numbers of accountable
nuclear warheads to under 3,500.
SCFI 2010 30
Delays
Consulting NATO will delay plan action.
Bruno Tertrais, senior research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research and associate researcher the
Center for International Studies and Research in France, spring, 2004 [Washington Quarterly]
If commitments toward the United States are of lesser value for allied capitals, does the United States, for its
part, still need permanent alliances? Permanent alliances appear to be of increasingly limited value for the
United States, as the ratio of costs to benefits has changed to such an extent that conservative commentators
have called for a radical reshuffling of U.S. commitments and bases abroad.n11 Alliances have become more
costly for Washington, as permanent deployments have increasingly created friction with local populations,
with each incident involving U.S. forces and the local populations prompting a public outcry, as in Japan and
in South Korea in the 1990s. Given today's pace of U.S. technological advances, particularly in the field of
communications, allied forces are not as easily interoperable. In many cases, U.S. forces do not use the
NATO Standardization Agreements as much as they did in the past. Washington complains that European
forces are still ill equipped for rapid power projection (only 50 non-U.S. NATO brigades are reported to be
deployable), which makes the planning and conduct of common military operations more difficult and time-
consuming. Operations under the NATO banner bear a heavy political cost, relying on procedures that
require constant negotiation to reach consensus. NATO was created to defend against a major threat; nations
were expected to delegate command to the alliance's military authorities at the first signal of Soviet attack.
Reaching consensus thus was not expected to be a problem. Despite the wishes of some in the U.S. Congress
that the alliance's decisionmaking procedures should be reformed, with consensus giving way to majority
ruling, this perspective remains a minority view both in Washington and in Brussels. At the same time, the
increasing threats of terrorism and ballistic missiles make allied territories vulnerable, risking exposure of the
United States to blackmail. Meanwhile, the benefits of alliances to the United States are decreasing.
Washington is now capable of countering most potential military threats alone, in stark contrast with
circumstances during the Cold War, when local allies were to provide the bulk of defense capabilities in case
of Soviet aggression until U.S. reinforcements could arrive. In addition, the use of allied territory is no longer
guaranteed in times of crisis. Rather, host countries reserve the right to say no to the United States, as Ankara
and Riyadh did prior to the war in Iraq. At the same time, Washington is able to rely increasingly on long-
range power projection for contingencies not involving a large deployment of ground forces and will be able
to do so even more in the future as new-generation hypersonic weapons are developed.n12 Moreover,
alliances appear to be of limited political value if they do not help ensure that allies will refrain from actively
opposing U.S. policy decisions, as some European countries did in early 2003 on issues regarding Iraq. This
change in the costs-and-benefits equation helps explain why Washington finds ad hoc coalitions under U.S.
command increasingly attractive. Another reason is that the United States has grown increasingly weary of
potential risks for U.S. forces operating under an umbrella organization. Following the disaster in
Mogadishu, in early May 1994 then-President Bill Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25,
strictly limiting the possibility of foreign command of U.S. forces. Changes in the U.S. domestic scene and
political culture, particularly since the congressional elections of November 1994 that brought to power a
new generation of Republican politicians, have demonstrated growing U.S. defiance vis-a-vis multilateral
institutions, especially when U.S. troops may be placed in harm's way. All of these factors likely help fuel the
sentiment behind Bush's statement in September 2001 that, "[a]t some point, we may be the only ones left.
That's okay with me. We are America."n13
SCFI 2010 31
No Impact
No impact to NATO collapse.
Steven Meyer, winter 2004 (Professor of poli sci at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in the National
Defense University, “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO”, Parameters page 83)
Post-Cold War American policymakers have not been immune from falling into this trap. Indeed, this
inertial approach, characterized by Washington’s unbending support for NATO and its expansion, has
defined American foreign and security policy since the collapse of the society union and the bipolar
world. During the Cold War, NATO provided the proper linchpin of America- and west European-
security policy, and served as a useful, even fundamental deterrent to soviet military might and
expansionism. However NATO’s time has come and gone and today there is no legitimate reason for it
to exist. Although the strong differences exhibited in the alliances over the war against Iraq have
accelerated NATO’s irrelevancy, the root cause of its problems go much deeper. Consequently for both
the United States and Europe, NATO is at best and irrelevant distraction and at worst toxic to their
respective contemporary security needs.
No impact. NATO isn’t the linchpin of European relations.

Michael Gallagher Winter 2003 (JD at University of Houston Law, “Declaring Victory and Getting Out [of
Europe]: Why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Should Disband” Houston Journal of International Law)
NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will
destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, and isolate the United States from
Europe. The ties of history, however prevent this outcome. The United States also has strong relations
with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that
NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided
Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this commitment
surpasses diplomatic formalities. The United States will not isolate itself from Europe merely because
NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the United
States. Even wit NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, ad need for, [the United States-Europe
security] partnership.” Europe is a continent divided by culture, language, and ethnicity. Its national have
suffered much instability and military conflict. Emphasizing these facts, NATO’s supporters argue that
ending NATO will lead to “a parade of horribles” in Europe, including a resurgence of power politics among
European nations. History however, proves that European nations can unite to defeat a common enemy.
Ending NATO will allow European nations to strengthen their defense capabilities. Even NATO’s
supporters recognize this necessity
SCFI 2010 32
Consultation Bad
There is bilateral consultation in the status quo instead of working through NATO. This
solves better.
Paolo Pasicolan and Balbina Hwang October 24, 2002(Policy analysts for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies
Center at the Heritage Foundation “Heritage Foundation Reports)
The United States was able to rely heavily on a few select countries, particularly its formal allies, for
the main military operations in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. And those countries that
participated in the operation did not hesitate to defer to U.S. control of the operations. The success thus far
of the war on terrorism, therefore, has provided a blueprint for future allied operations. As the
primary victim of the September 11 attacks, the United States led that operation. Had Australia been
attacked, for example, the United States would have offered its vast military arsenal; but it would have
recognized Canberra's right to lead and decide the manner in which to execute the military response.
While some criticize U.S. action as unilateral, it is rather an exhibition of real leadership from a country
that was not only the primary target of the terrorism, but also the most powerful and best equipped to lead the
charge. The valuable role of America's allies during this time of hurried action shows that the system of
bilateral alliances is well-suited to address the new global security environment, providing critical
flexibility to complement U.S. leadership. Bilateral alliances thus have provided the United States with
an immediate and great pool of resources, without the excess deliberation and consultation required of
organizations that require a consensus or even a majority vote. America's system of bilateral alliances in Asia
is well-suited to prosecute the war on terrorism. Alliance commitments give the United States flexibility to
request specific contributions from particular allies; and in turn, they can contribute according to their
capabilities and to the degree to which their national interests coincide with U.S. actions. For example,
Australia sent a detachment from its 16th Air Defense Regiment while Japan provided logistical support in
the form of refueling ships and fuel, because of constitutional restrictions that limit its participation in
offensive military operations. Asia's security environment is sometimes characterized as unstable or insecure
because the region lacks a formal multilateral security institution such as the mutual defense pact of NATO.
While such a collective defense organization has been successful in maintaining peace in Europe for the
last half century, U.S. forward presence -- entrenched in the series of formal bilateral alliances it
maintains with several key players in Asia, has prevented wars in this region. Perhaps more
significantly, faced with the unanticipated insecurities of a new security environment, these bilateral
alliances will provide the cornerstone of future stability and prosperity.
SCFI 2010 33
Normal Means
US is consulting NATO now through normal means.
Sunday Mirror, 2/8/2009,(“US: WE'LL END OLD GO-IT-ALONE STAND,”)
Mr Biden said the US would press ahead with its controversial missile shield in Europe, despite opposition
from Russia. But he made it clear that it would be designed to protect the West from rogue states like Iran,
and that Russia would be consulted over its development. He revealed that America would talk to Iran,
"reach out" to the Muslim world and, on Russia, would "press the reset button and revisit the many areas
where we can and should work together". It would refocus its efforts in Afghanistan and search for a
"broader regional peace" between Israel and its Arab neighbours while equipping NATO to stop the spread
of the world's most dangerous weapons. "We believe that international alliances and organisations do not
diminish American's power. "So we'll engage. We'll listen. We'll consult," Mr Biden told a top-level
gathering of international leaders in Munich. The US would switch its tactics "to a chess game from a
boxing match", he added, saying the country would abandon the old "carrot and stick policy" of coaxing
Iran to give up nuclear activities. But he stressed a new "listening" U.S. would still take a tough stance on
Iran and Russia. It would isolate and pressurise Tehran if it did not abandon its nuclear ambitions and its
support for terrorism, he said.
SCFI 2010 34
Solvency Take Out

Transatlantic alliances are undermined by a host of structural factors. Consulation can’t
solve this.
John Hulsman June 11, 2003 (Member of Heritage Foundation “Cherry Picking: US European Relations”
Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/tst061103.cfm
In the past several years, genuine policy differences between the U.S. and its European allies have
emerged over: trade issues such as the ‘banana war’; genetically modified foods; the American Federal
Sales Corporation (FSC) tax; Europe’s refusal to substantially reform the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) and the repercussions this holds for the Doha global free trade round; the moral justness
of the death penalty; whether Cuba, Libya, and Iran should be engaged or isolated; Iraq; the
Israeli/Palestinian crisis; the role international institutions should play in the global arena; when states
ought to be allowed to use military force; ideological divisions between American realists,
neoconservatives and European Wilsonians; the Kyoto Accord; the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC); America’s increase in steel tariffs; National Missile Defense (NMD) and the US
abrogation of the ABM treaty; the military debate within NATO regarding burden-sharing and
power-sharing; American unilateralism; Turkey’s ultimate role in the West; widely varying global
threat assessments; the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and the efficacy of nation-building; and,
how to organize an economy for the best societal effect, to name a few. This incomplete list should
make it crystal clear to the most complacent of analysts that drift in the transatlantic relationship is
about far more than carping, black leather-clad, ineffectual Europeans glowering about American
dominance from the safety of a Parisian café. It is a bitter truth that in the run-up to the Iraq war,
consistent polling in Europe shows a majority of the public more worried about unfettered American
power than about Saddam Hussein. Instead, the drift is at least partly centered on fundamental
philosophical and structural differences held by people with a very different view of how the world
should be ordered from that of the average American; it should be evaluated far more seriously than
has been the case in Washington
SCFI 2010 35
EU Replace
US is not going to consult NATO, it is working on relations with the EU.
Reginald Dale May 13, 2004 (“In Search of a New Trans-Atlantic Template; Europe and America” The
International Herald Tribune,)
Europeans, who initially scorned Bush's plan, now realize that it closely resembles their own aims for the
region, first enunciated in 1995 in the EU Barcelona plan to develop the Mediterranean, economically and
politically. Meanwhile, the Europeans have become tougher on the spread of weapons of mass destruction,
and have endorsed a security strategy that moves them closer to the United States. Now proposals are being
floated for a "grand bargain," in which Washington would agree to genuine consultations with its allies
before acting, and accept that these will increasingly take place with the EU rather than NATO. In
return, the Europeans would acknowledge that pre-emptive military action may sometimes be necessary and
that they should be more generally supportive of American policies, including financially. The idea is to
shape a new common approach in much the same way that the West conducted the cold war. There is even
talk of something similar to the Helsinki process for the Middle East.
SCFI 2010 36
Plan Trades Off

Plan will trade off. Reducing presence hurt relations and influence in the future
undermining any relation the consultation brings about.
Alan M. Stull, Lieutenant Colonel United States Army, 3-15-2005 (“A Strong NATO is Essential to the United
States National Security Strategy” US Army War College)
The United States has traditionally held influence in European affairs because of its leadership in
NATO as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and possessing the most powerful military
forces supporting NATO. However, if the United States reduces forces too far in Europe it could lead to
a loss of influence in Europe and even a call demanding that the SACEUR be a European. Additionally if
the United States withdrew from the integrated command structures then all influence would be lost.
To further compound this, as the European Union (EU) gains strength, U.S. leadership within NATO may
be the only way for the United States to hold any sway within European leadership. The ultimate
failure here would be for NATO to dissolve and leave the EU wholly responsible for European security
objectives with no U.S. connection. This would have deleterious implications for the alliance against the
GWOT. NATO also bring a certain amount of legitimacy to any operation around the world NATO
sanctioned operations are looked at in more legitimate terms than U.S. unilateral operations. Because
hegemonic United States is often viewed as the big bully, NATO gives it a different face and significant
international recognition. Even though the United States is often the lead contributor of forces, NATO
sanction provides significantly more international legitimacy and cooperation. This helps somewhat to
excise the unilateral moniker from the United States.
SCFI 2010 37
A2: Democracy
NATO hurts democracy promotion.
Reiter, Spring 2001, (author of International Security, International Security, Volume 25, Number 4, Spring 2001,
pp. 41-67 (Article), MUSE
My central argument in this article is that NATO membership has not and will not advance
democratization in Europe. The empirical record during the Cold War is clear: Inclusion in NATO did
not promote democracy among its members. Further, enlargement did not contribute much to
democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999,and the promise of NATO
membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries currently awaiting a
decision on their request for membership. The weakness of the democratization argument, coupled with
the costs and risks of further enlargement, caution against pursuit of this policy in the near or medium term.
Instead the West should rely on the European Union (EU) to spread democracy, an approach that is
more likely to foster democratization yet less likely to alienate Russia.
SCFI 2010 38
A2: Heg
NATO doesn’t help U.S. heg.
Serge Trifkovic, March 19, 2010 (, historian and foreign affairs analyst “NATO RIP? Well Hopefully”
tp://www.alternati veright.com/main/blog/exit-strategies/nato-rip/ )
President Obama and his foreign policy team have failed to grasp that a problem exists, let alone to act to
rectify it. There has been a change of officials, but the regime is still the same – and America is still in need
of a new grand strategy. Limited in objectives and indirect in approach, it should see security and
freedom for the United States without maintaining, let alone expanding, unnecessary foreign
commitments. The treat to Europe’s security does not come from Russia or from a fresh bout of instability
in the Balkans. The real threat to Europe’s security and to her survival comes from Islam, from the deluge
of inassimilable Third World immigrants, and from collapsing birthrates. All three are due to the moral
decrepitude and cultural degeneracy, not to any shortage of soldiers and weaponry. The continued
presence of a U.S. contingent of any size can do nothing to alleviate these problems, because they are
cultural, moral and spiritual. NATO is unnecessary and harmful. In terms of realist grand strategy,
NATO is detrimental to U.S. security. It forces America to assume at least nominal responsibility for
open-ended maintenance of a host of disputed frontiers that were drawn, often arbitrarily, by
Communist dictators long-dead Versailles diplomats, and assorted local tyrants, and which bear little
relations to ethnicity, geography, or history. With an ever-expanding NATO, eventual adjustment –
which re inevitable – will be more potentially violent for the countries concerned and more risky for
the United States. America does not and should no have any interest in preserving an indefinite stats quo in
the region.

CP

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

CP

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

SCFI 2010 1

Rodabough Consult NATO

NATO collapse leads to war.

Consult CP’s Good

3. Key to real education –

a. Real world - Crucial to understanding the details of international policy issues,

6. Not a voter - Reject the argument not the team.

Text Comp Bad

4. Not a voter - Reject the argument not the team.

NATO will not object.

Only prior and genuine consultation can improve transatlantic relations

Genuine consultation is key to effective cooperation

NATO Good – Terrorism

NATO Good – Democracy

Democracy prevents global nuclear war

NATO Good – Democracy

NATO Good – Econ

NATO Good - Heg

NATO Good – China

NATO Good – War

NATO Good – War

NATO collapse causes worldwide wars

NATO Good – EU Heg

NATO relations solves for EU hegemony.

NATO Good – Prolif

Proliferation leads to full scale nuclear war

Consult CP’s Bad

4. Voting issue – for ground, education, and fairness

Text Comp Good

2. Fairness – functional competition is arbitrary, it can be derived from anything.

5. Not a voter - Reject the argument not the team.

No impact. NATO isn’t the linchpin of European relations.

Solvency Take Out

Plan Trades Off

Potrebbero piacerti anche