The EEAS vs The National

Embassies of EU Member
States?

1st draft: do NOT quote without author’s consent.

Email: clive.cusens@coleurope.eu

Diplomacy Today: Theory and Practice

Prof. A. Henrikson

Student No. 20100144

Word count: 1,898

Introduction

The increased political integration of the European Union is now also

focusing on increasing diplomatic integration, in the form of the European
External Action Service. In an era in which the EU is operating in a framework of
increasing interdependence and in which the need for a common position is
becoming more and more of a norm (taking as an example the fact that Council
decisions are increasingly agreed to by consensus, even for decisions in which
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) systems are in place)1, what is the rationale of
still having 27 different national embassies, operating both within the inter-EU
realm as well as beyond the EU’s borders, instead of having a single EU
diplomatic corps?

This thought leads one to the question under discussion in this essay,
namely: to what extent will diplomatic integration, taking the EEAS into
particular account, lead to the demise of the national embassies of EU member
states? In order to answer this question, this paper will look at two levels of
interaction; the inter-EU level, meaning the diplomatic relations between EU
member states as well as the external level, meaning the relations between the
EU member states and third countries. By looking at the diplomatic relations at
these two levels, my hypothesis is that: the national embassies of EU states will
not become a relic of the past as long as direct political, commercial and/or
bilateral interests between two countries still exists, whether at the inter-EU level
or at the external level.

Therefore, the paper will begin by looking at the neccesity of still having
several national embassies operating concurrently in the internal arena or
whether these should be allowed to slowly disappear into the history books, and
then look at the external arena and examine the feasibility of having both EU
representations as well as EU national embassies, and whether this is worthwhile
or justified in the long run.

The Internal Dimension

1
S. Sieberson, “Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and Unanimity
Under the Treaty of Lisbon”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 50:4, 2010, p.938
 There are currently a plethora of institutions within the EU in which
representatives of member states can directly discuss topical issues ranging
from the least technical of internal policy to the most ambitious of defence
policy. The main institutions include the European Parliament, the European
Council, the Council of Ministers and COREPER. The European Commission was
deliberately left out of this list since Article 245 TFEU states that “Member States
shall respect their [the Commissioners that are chosen from each member state]
independence and shall not seek to influence them in the performance of their
tasks”.2 Surely, with all these institutions in place, the role of the national foreign
ministry ought to be in decline. And yet, the embassies remain. Why?

To begin with, the national embassy’s traditional role of “representation,

intelligence-gathering and communication” has been challenged by “the twin
forces of globalisation and regionalisation”, according to Hocking.3 Though the
book is somewhat dated (having been published in 2002), I would have to agree
that the traditional role of the national embassy has indeed been diminished due
to the several afore-mentioned EU fora. However, there are still other areas
where the embassy can play a crucial role in another EU state. One of these
areas is business, where the embassy can aid investment – whether for
investment from country A into the host state (country B) or to secure deals for
country A from investors in country B. The institutions at the EU-level do not
cater for such bilateral agreements between states and this is one argument in
favour of keeping an embassy. As if to emphasise this point, the Ministry Foreign
Affairs of Malta, as recently as the 3rd November 2010, issued a press-release
which referred to a renewed commitment to strengthening its bilateral relations
with Germany, and reference is made to commercial investment and political
and economic collaboration within the document.4

Another important role for the national embassy in the EU arena is of

course public diplomacy. Sometimes, it may be beneficial to bypass the heads of
government (or other representatives at the EU level) and appeal directly to the
2
European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, p. 156

3
B. Hocking, “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign
Ministries in the European Union”, in B. Hocking and D. Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the
European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 1

4
“Malta Consolidates Its Bilateral Relations With Germany”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Malta,
03/11/10, accessed on 14/11/10 from: http://www.foreign.gov.mt/default.aspx?
MDIS=21&NWID=1256
host country’s population or popular media in order to convince them that their
government’s actions are good, or to at least ensure fair reporting of anything
related to their government’s actions or words. This is why some embassies have
their own Public Relations teams with resources such as printed materials, multi-
language websites, information officers and so on; in order to clarify, justify or
defend their government’s position.5 Therefore, as long as an EU state has
enough funds to sustain an embassy in another EU country, it will do so for some
or all of the reasons highlighted above. But what about the external dimension?
Would it not be appropriate to argue that since the EU’s external relations with
other states in issues such as trade, development aid, crisis management and
others6 - in which member states have increasingly less divergent views from a
common EU position - the role of the national embassy should make way for the
EEAS to communicate the EU’s position to third countries? This is what the next
part of the paper will attempt to discuss.

The External Dimension

There are two main arguments that I would like to put forward in order to
highlight the need for national embassies to remain operational in third countries
outside the EU; namely, the fact that the EEAS does not have the competence to
deal with all aspects of foreign policy (other than the ones mentioned above),
and the relationships that exist between certain EU states and third countries,
either due to historical ties and/or geographic location.

From a financial perspective, EU states with budgetary constraints have a

lot to gain from pooling their resources into a unified EU representation.
Aggestam et al. state that in 2006, the (then) ten new EU members had no
representation with 90 third countries. Thus the benefit of cooperation is an
obvious alternative to establishing national embassies.7 This argument is
especially valid for countries who have a low interest in certain third countries

5
G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy Theory and Practice, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 184 -
188

6
Though many of these issues are currently the competence of the Commission, which is why the
European Parliament suggests that the EEAS works together with the Commission on these issues,
rather than duplicating the work. For more, see:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afco/dv/2010-04-
20_note_eas_fin/2010-04-20_note_eas_final.pdf

7
L. Aggestam et al., “Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and Boundaries
in CFSP and ESDP”, Sieps, Vol. 6-7, May 2008, pp. 64-65
but who would nonetheless wish to have legitimate representation. Some small
states have, for example, downsized their foreign diplomatic presence in third
countries since Article 20.2(c) TEU gives their citizens the right of “protection of
the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State as the same nationals
of that State”.8 However, there is more than the Foreign Affairs budget to
consider and the authors later argue that:

Many difficulties surrounding joint representation boil down to the fact

that commercial and political strength are still closely associated with
extensive diplomatic contacts and that competing interests between
Member States continue to exist, even in areas of regular cooperation.9

With this in mind, it becomes evident that due to the limited scope of EEAS
competences, as well as the arguments put forward by the above authors, the
need for the national embassy remains vital. It is a way for EU states to
individually ensure that their national interests are being safeguarded, as long as
they have the resources to sustain their foreign service.

The above argument considered solely the needs of the separate EU

states. But what about arguing in favour of maintaining national embassies
whilst highlighting the fact that this is also in interest of the EU? The historic
and/or geographic links between EU states and third countries seem to have
been overlooked by ardent supporters of the EEAS. It is expected that decades,
or perhaps even centuries, of diplomatic relations between geographic or cultural
neighbours, or between former colonial powers and their colonies, will carry
more weight than a fledgling EEAS with no such ties. What the supporters of the
EEAS should always bear in mind is that the EEAS can make use of – but not
assume – the close ties that some EU states have with third countries. As an
example, Malta’s traditional close ties with Libya enabled it to be a major player
in the negotiations aiming to resolve the visa dispute between Switzerland and
Libya, with the media reporting that “The Maltese and Italian governments
were at the forefront to help end the diplomatic dispute”.10 Similarly, centuries of
diplomatic relations between the UK and its various ex-colonies undoubtedly
gives it an edge over its fellow EU members, especialy considering its ties with

8
European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union”, Publications Office of the European Union, 2010, p. 156

9
L. Aggestam et al., op cit., p. 66

10
“Libya – Switzerland dispute over”, Maltamediaonline.com, 13/06/10, accessed on 17/11/10
from: http://www.maltamediaonline.com/?p=26248
the Commonwealth, which are still relevant to date. It is therefore my opinion
that it is in the EU’s interest to use particular ties, especially between peripheral
EU members and ENP countries rather than to attempt to redefine a relationship
under the EEAS.

Conclusion

By looking at both the diplomatic relations between states at an inter-EU

level as well as at the external level, I have attempted to show why the national
embassies of EU states are still around, and still relevant in today’s increasingly
supranational EU. However, I ought to clarify the tone of the paper, perhaps. The
examples illustrated throughout this paper should not be seen as a dismissal of
the idea of having an EEAS. Having a coherent foreign policy will undoubtedly
bring great advantages to the EU in terms of prestige, international clout and
trade bargaining.

Thus, the main argument of this paper is to show, as Batora and Hocking
put it, that “[r]ather than a zero-sum relationship, member states and the EU as
a collective foreign policy actor may operate alongside, across and in tandem
with one another”11. After all, Article 27 of the Treaties emphasises that the EEAS
will work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states, and
not replace them.12 In reminding the reader about the hypothesis that this paper
has put forth, it is perhaps ironic to point out that national interest can actually
be used to complement something as supranational in nature as the EEAS.

11
J. Batora, B. Hocking, “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union: Towards ‘post-modern’
patterns?”, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Clingendael Institute, April 2008, p. 6

12
European Union “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union”, Publications Office of
the European Union, 2010, p.32
Bibliography:

Aggestam, Lisbeth, Francesco Anesi, Geoffrey Edwards, Christopher Hill & David
Rijks, “Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and
Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP”, Sieps (Swedish Institute for European Policy
Studies), Vol. 6-7, May 2008, pp. 63 – 67

Batora, Jozef, Brian Hocking, “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union:

Towards ‘post-modern’ patterns?”, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Clingendael
Institute, April 2008, p. 1 - 23

Berridge, G. R., Diplomacy Theory and Practice, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan,

2010, pp. 179 – 190

Brock, Elmar, Guy Verhofstadt, “Proposal for the establishment of the EEAS”,
Working document, 20/04/10, accessed on 16/11/10 from:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/afco/dv/2010-
04-20_note_eas_fin/2010-04-20_note_eas_final.pdf

Hocking, Brian, “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking

about Foreign Ministries in the European Union”, in Brian Hocking and David
Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002, pp. 1-6

Sieberson, Stephen, “Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority

Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon”, Virginia Journal of
International Law, Vol. 50:4, 2010, p.921 - 952

Anonymous documents/articles

Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Publications Office of the European Union,
2010, p. 156

“Libya – Switzerland dispute over”, Maltamediaonline.com, 13/06/10, accessed

on 17/11/10 from: http://www.maltamediaonline.com/?p=26248

“Malta Consolidates Its Bilateral Relations With Germany”, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs – Malta, 03/11/10, accessed on 14/11/10 from:
http://www.foreign.gov.mt/default.aspx?MDIS=21&NWID=1256