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22 November 2010
Report
Bert Jansen
Paris: +33 1 44 95 98 55
bert.jansen@exanebnpparibas.com
Lars Kreckel
London: +44 207 039 9514
lars.kreckel@exanebnpparibas.com
www.exanebnpparibas.com/strategy
Market Outlook___________________________________________ 6
Earnings Outlook and macro backdrop_____________________________________ 6
Valuation and index targets ____________________________________________ 14
Monetary conditions __________________________________________________ 22
Risks ______________________________________________________________ 29
Investment themes_______________________________________ 32
Growth vs Value – a polarised market ____________________________________ 32
Commodity price inflation ______________________________________________ 36
Konsum – Germany Shops_____________________________________________ 42
European periphery – waiting for cost cuts_________________________________ 57
Government exposure ________________________________________________ 63
After a decent, but far from spectacular 2010, we expect European equities to break
out of their trading range and make new post-trough highs in 2011. We forecast a rise
of 12% for the MSCI Europe, which should deliver a total return of 15% including
dividends.
The global economy looks likely to slow next year, but 3.8% global GDP growth is
plenty for an upbeat equity outlook. We expect the US to slow down slightly, Europe to
post slightly higher growth and emerging markets to contribute the best growth rates
yet again. We assume consumer price inflation will be contained by persistent output
gaps, an average euro/dollar exchange rate close to spot and commodity prices in
2011 to be, on average, 10% higher than in 2010.
We expect the MSCI Europe to deliver 16% EPS growth in 2011e (14% ex Financials),
driven in equal measure by top-line growth and margin expansion. Unusually, our top-
down forecast is higher than bottom-up consensus (14% EPS growth), leaving some
room for positive revisions. We have extended our top-down EPS forecast to 2012e,
where we expect 11% average EPS growth.
In our opinion, relative to other asset classes, equities present an attractive risk/reward
ratio. A dividend yield of nearly 4%, coupled with 12% dividend growth compares very
favourably with the yield on fixed income alternatives. In this environment, equities
could get a growing share of fund flows, given the mediocre returns to be expected
from bonds.
Monetary conditions should remain benign in 2011: zero interest rate policies from
most major central banks, quantitative easing by the Fed and decent economic and
earnings growth which should keep corporate bond yields low.
Of course no scenario is risk free. One obvious downside risk is an escalation of the
sovereign debt crisis beyond the smaller European peripheral countries and/or another
round of heavy losses in the banking sector. To us the more likely outcome is a drag on
potential growth rather than a solvency crisis. Rising inflation in emerging economies
could bring further policy tightening, leading to a larger than expected slowdown.
The upside risk to our base scenario could be a re-rating of equities. The Fed’s
unprecedented monetary stimulus could inflate asset prices beyond what would be
justified, which would provide additional upside to our index targets.
In order to address the dilemma between Growth and Value, we have screened for
European stocks that offer a combination of the best of both worlds: above average
FCF growth, but at a reasonable price.
Sectors which are most exposed to government spending cuts are Construction &
Infrastructure, Defence, Healthcare and IT Services. We have compiled a list of stocks
which have above-average exposure to government deleveraging and limited emerging
market exposure. The basket has underperformed the market by 13% year-to-date, but
is not trading at a discount to the market.
It is difficult to get particularly excited about Financials. Banks (=) offers good value, but
a sustained rerating vs the market looks unlikely because of Basel III constraints, such
as structurally lower ROE, subpar dividend growth and limited M&A potential without
the help of dilutive capital increases. Insurance suffers from mediocre earnings growth,
due to the combination of low interest rates and limited exposure to emerging markets.
In short, we expect 16% EPS growth for the market in 2011 (14% excluding Financials)
and 11% in 2012.
Macro backdrop
Of course, our Economics team’s forecasts of how the global economy will develop
beyond the initial recovery phase lies at the heart of our top-down earnings forecast.
Broadly speaking, a double-dip in the global economy next year seems highly unlikely,
but potential growth in the developed world is likely to be below the average of past
cycles. This should result in lower average earnings growth over the coming years.
However, over the next two years, the sharp fall in real interest rates is likely to boost
economic activity.
* Year averages.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates
For 2011 we expect world GDP growth to decrease slightly, from 4.4% to 3.8%. Within
that, we expect the US to make a smaller contribution than in 2010, as the benefits of
fiscal stimulus disappear and unemployment stays stubbornly high. Europe, on the
other hand, should post a slightly higher growth rate than in 2010, in-line with the
traditional time lag vis-à-vis the US.
For 2012, GDP growth in the euro zone is likely to be in line with 2011. The better
economic situation in peripheral countries should be offset by the impact of austerity
measures in the core countries of the euro zone. On the contrary, we expect a very
gradual fiscal consolidation in the USA. As a result, the gap between the USA and the
euro zone is likely to widen in 2012.
Global inflation is likely to be low over the medium term as the current period of private
debt reduction in developed countries should last 5 to 10 years. Unemployment rates in
developed countries are likely to remain high, limiting wage increases. Additionally we
expect credit demand to be subdued in the USA or more generally in countries where
household debt is high.
In the absence of progress in the real economy (e.g. innovation and rebalancing),
aggressive monetary policy put in place in developed countries, especially QE, brings a risk
of instability in the longer term. The global liquidity glut will persist (see Figure 2), which is
likely to lead to poor allocation of capital (e.g. bubbles.). Against this backdrop, inflation is
likely to increase in emerging countries and the commodity markets could continue to be
compelling for investors. Should a commodity bubble develop before the developed
economies have completed their deleveraging, this would hit households’ purchasing
power.
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To arrive at these forecasts we have built an aggregated P&L of the MSCI Europe
excluding Financials using bottom-up consensus forecasts for all constituents. The result
can be seen in the table below, together with our own top-down forecasts (see Figure 3).
The sales growth and cost forecasts, arguably two variables where a top-down view is
particularly important, are based on our macro assumptions (discussed below). These
inputs then flow through the P&L using implicit bottom-up consensus assumptions for
depreciation. At the interest and tax expense line we again make a top-down adjustment.
In our opinion, this approach has the advantage of combining the strengths of a top-
down approach with those of a bottom-up approach. The top-down inputs use
consistent macro input factors across the market (e.g. currencies, commodity prices,
economic growth, inflation), which should neutralise the natural optimistic bias of
analysts for their companies. At the same time it tries to use bottom-up know-how in
factors such as depreciation and to a certain degree also on tax rates, where we
believe bottom-up knowledge of individual companies is essential.
Figure 3: Earnings forecast 2011 and 2012 – core scenario (MSCI Europe, excluding financials)
Consensus Consensus Exane Consensus Exane Consensus Consensus Exane Consensus Exane
BNPP BNPP BNPP BNPP
2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012
EURbn % growth
Sales 6,023 6,297 6,381 6,624 6,676 2% 4.6% 6.0% 5.2% 4.6%
COGS 4,952 5,112 5,187 5,356 5,374 10% 3.2% 4.7% 4.8% 3.7%
EBITDA 1,070 1,185 1,195 1,269 1,303 20% 11% 12% 7% 9%
Depreciation 332 355 355 367 367 (2%) 7% 7% 4% 4%
EBIT 738 830 840 901 935 33% 12% 14% 9% 11%
Interest & Tax 431 485 490 521 546 33% 13% 14% 7% 11%
Earnings 307 346 350 381 390 34% 12% 14% 10% 11%
Revenue growth
Top-line growth can come from two sources: volume growth and price increases. We
estimate both of these components using Exane BNPP Economists’ scenarios as a
starting point. We estimate that European companies will be able to expand top lines
by approximately 6% next year.
Volume growth
On aggregate, volume growth in the corporate sector is driven by real GDP growth. Our
Economists forecast a small acceleration in growth in Europe and a small deceleration
in the USA (see figure above). Most growth should once again be delivered by
emerging markets, where we expect real growth in excess of 6%. Using a regional split
of revenues (65% Europe, 10% US, 25% emerging markets) should provide the
European corporate sector with volume growth of approximately 2.7% next year.
Price increases
Forecasts for the price increases that the corporate sector is likely to be able to push
through have to be based on expectations for inflation. Our economists expect
consumer price inflation to remain subdued next year, at 1.6% in Europe, a mere 1.1%
in the USA and 5% in the emerging world. Of course not all companies sell directly to
consumers, so PPIs and commodity prices also form part of our price forecasts. We
assume PPIs to increase slightly more than CPIs and commodity prices to stabilise
close to current spot prices, implying a 10% year-on-year increase in 2011.
We calculate selling prices and input prices from the same components. The only
difference lies in the component weights. For input prices we use only PPIs and
commodity prices; for selling prices we mix in CPIs as well.
It is important to keep in mind that higher input costs from, say, raw materials prices,
are not necessarily accompanied by lower margins. It depends very much on why
commodity prices are rising. If they are driven by strong demand, companies are also
likely to experience volume growth of their own and with fixed costs staying unchanged
operating leverage should boost margins. The best example of this was the record
breaking margin expansion across all sectors between 2003 and 2007 as the oil price
quadrupled.
We do not expect margin pressure from rising wages next year. Historically, US wage
inflation only tends to pick up once US unemployment rates fall to 6% or less, a far cry
from our forecast of 9% on average in 2011. With significantly above-trend
unemployment rates in large parts of Europe, wage inflation should also stay low on
this side of the Atlantic, with the possible exceptions of the stronger euro-zone
countries like Germany and the Nordics. (See our Investment Theme on German
consumer spending later in this report).
When discussing margin expansion in 2011, it is important to keep in mind that margins
are not yet at historical peaks. Margin expansion since the economic trough has been
impressive, but for the market excluding Financials, EBIT margins remain several
percentage points off the 2007 peak (see Figure 5). Using our forecasts from above we
estimate EBIT margins could expand to 13.2% next year, 40bp below the peak. And we
see peak margins as achievable over the coming years given decent volume growth.
The corporate sector seems to be escaping higher tax rates for the foreseeable future
and stubbornly high unemployment rates are keeping labour costs down.
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Interest expenses
We expect interest expenses to decline slightly next year.
Credit spreads have narrowed sharply and in our core scenario, of a continued gradual
normalisation of credit markets and quantitative easing, credit spreads should grind
lower but the room for additional yield compression over 2010 is small. Our core
scenario also suggests roughly unchanged government bond yields (on average 2.6%
for 10-year Bunds in 2011e).
Any impact from an improvement in corporate bond yields on 2011 earnings would be
further absorbed by the fact that fixed-rate interest expenses change only when debt is
refinanced. As a result, lower (or higher) corporate bond yields hit interest expenses
with a delay depending on the maturity structure of each company’s debt.
Tax
We expect tax expense to rise roughly in line with EBIT next year. Higher corporate
taxes seem unavoidable in the longer term, but should not be a topic before 2012 at the
earliest.
In the recent wave of austerity packages there has been a notable absence of
corporate tax increases. With unemployment still lingering uncomfortably above trend
levels in many countries, governments have been unwilling to increase the burden on
companies and building further barriers for new jobs. The British government’s decision
to cut corporate tax rates from 28% to 24% (1% reduction per annum over the next four
years) and similar plans in Japan show this trend.
Tax increases could become a topic of debate should the economy stabilise and
unemployment decline next year, but given the time-lag involved in such decisions any
increases are unlikely to be implemented before 2012, probably even later.
Of course, there is still a great amount of uncertainty attached to 2012 forecasts, but
our first take is based on the following assumptions:
– A small acceleration in global GDP growth, close to 2010 growth rates. This
assumption is based on current IMF forecasts, to which we have applied a small safety
discount.
– Stable inflation rates, only marginally above 2011 levels.
– We make no call on currencies and commodity prices beyond 2011, so assume
stability on both
Our assumptions give us a top-line growth target of 4.6%, slightly below current
consensus of 5.2%. This amount of top-line growth should again be sufficient to let
margins expand further, slightly exceeding 2007 peaks, and gives us an earnings
growth target of 11% for the Pan-European market excluding Financials. Given the
even greater uncertainty attached to Financial sector profits in 2012, we choose to
apply market-average growth rates instead of slightly higher consensus growth
expectations. So our total market EPS growth forecast remains at 11% for 2012.
For the more bullish scenario, we use the following assumptions. We assume a
stronger global economy than in the core scenario, with growth rates accelerating
slightly rather than slowing down. This assumes the economic recovery in developed
markets proves more self-sustainable with the boost of quantitative easing. The US
economy would maintain 2010 growth rates rather than slowing down and a slightly
larger acceleration in Europe. This would boost volume growth to 3.3%. Such an
economic scenario would likely also lead to higher commodity prices where we assume
20% appreciation, implying a 2011 average 10% above spot prices. This naturally lifts
selling and input prices, but due to the weight of the Resources sectors and operating
leverage remains a significant positive for 2011e market EPS.
With the above bullish assumptions we arrive at a top-line growth forecast of 8.4%.
Greater volume growth meets increased operational leverage, so our EBIT margin
expansion forecast rises to 150bp. All of this filters down to a bottom-line increase
of 21%.
The bearish scenario differs from our core scenario in three main ways. We assume
less economic growth across all regions as the effects of austerity begin to bite and the
private sector struggles to offset the decline in government spending. This leaves us
with volume growth of only 2.3%. In line with a weaker economic environment we
assume commodity prices remain unchanged compared with the average of 2010,
implying a 10% decline for spot prices. We assume the same operational leverage as
in our core scenario. As an additional small stress we add the assumption of a slightly
stronger euro.
It is highly unusual for our top-down forecast to be higher than bottom-up consensus.
This is the first time in several years this has happened. And usually it is a good
starting point to be cautious about analyst forecasts, as during the past 18 years
analysts have initially over-estimated earnings by 10% on average. Forecasts have often
been too high, even during earnings growth phases. During the bull market of the 1990’s,
for example, earnings grew from year to year but revisions tended to be to the downside
from an overly optimistic starting point (see Figure 10).
Analyst forecasts have fallen since the summer, perhaps somewhat too far. With
economic uncertainty rising, deteriorating macro-economic news flow from the US (e.g.
declining ISM), analysts have become more cautious about 2011 and 2012 earnings. For
the MSCI Europe, 2011 EPS estimates have been revised down by 4.5% since June and
it was a broad downgrade trend with 16 out of 24 sectors seeing significant forecast cuts.
But global growth should remain resilient next year and we believe downward revisions
have now gone too far, leaving room for upgrades as macro data improves and economic
growth comes through.
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P/E EV/EBIT P/CF P/Book EV/Sales
1 Jan 10 Latest
The 6% rise of the DJ Stoxx 600 index, for instance, is in sharp contrast with the
substantial earnings upgrades seen in 2010 (see Figure 12). As a result, the market’s
12-month forward P/E has shrunk from 12.6x at the beginning of the year to 10.8x,
which is a 14% discount to its 15-yr average (excluding the Great Bubble years 1998-
02) of 12.6x.
Jan 10 Nov 10
Financials 37 48
Non-Financials 21 34
Total 25 39
As a result of this multiple contraction, Europe’s forward P/E, EV/EBIT, P/CF and
P/Book are trading at 5-15% discounts to their long-term mean (we have excluded the
Great Bubble years of 1998-02 from the long-term averages).
The only ratio which is not trading at a discount is EV/Sales (1.1x, in line with its
historical average).
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EV/Sales P/Book P/CF EV/EBIT P/E CAPE**
The Cyclically Adjusted P/E (‘CAPE’, based on price/10-year average EPS, trailing) is
the only valuation ratio which has risen in 2010 (from 13.9x in January to 14.5x in
November) because of its backward looking nature.
This, however, still leaves the European CAPE at a 26% discount to its long-term mean
(excluding the Great bubble years of 1998-02).
The US market CAPE, however, has risen above its long-term average (100 years)
once again (20x vs 18x), which suggests that the S&P500 is some 10% overvalued
(see Figure 14). This overvaluation is corroborated by another long-term indicator,
Tobin’s Q-ratio, which compares the stock market value with the underlying asset value
of companies. For US non-Financials, the current ratio (0.9x) is 20% above its long-
term average (0.75x).
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USA Europe
The chart above shows that Europe’s CAPE trades well below its own historical
average. It should be noted, however, that the significant discount to the US CAPE is
not very meaningful, for two reasons.
First, the valuation gap is to some extent explained by sector bias. For instance, in
Europe, Financials account for 22% of the DJ Stoxx 600, against 16% of the S&P500.
This lowers the European CAPE, given Financials’ discount to the market average. The
converse applies to Technology (usually trading at a premium), which accounts for 17%
of the S&P 500, against a mere 3% of the DJ Stoxx 600.
Second, historical averages of both markets are not comparable, simply because of
their different time frames: 100 years for the USA, vs a mere 27 years for Europe.
All in all, absolute valuations in Europe look attractive from an historical perspective. All
but one of the six valuation ratios that we monitor are trading at a discount to their
historical average. The US equity market, however, is we believe some 10%
overvalued, based on the market’s cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE).
In May 2010, for the first time in living memory, the average dividend yield exceeded
the average corporate bond yield in Europe (see Figure 15). This is highly unusual,
because shareholders usually have the benefit of rising dividends (historically,
dividends have been growing a bit less than GDP, but growing nevertheless), whereas
bondholders do not share this benefit.
This negative yield gap suggests that either investors take an unduly negative view on
future dividend growth, or, that bond markets are overvalued as a result of the asset
price-manipulating Fed.
Admittedly, the outlook for dividend growth in the mature, high yielding sectors,
including Financials, Oil & Gas, Telecoms and Utilities, is not what it used to be. But the
risk of widespread dividend cuts is highly unlikely, in our view.
This means that equities provide a fairly safe yield, in our view, that is higher than the
average yield on investment grade corporate bonds. The risk profile of equities is, of
course, not the same as that for bonds. But the latter are far from risk-free in an
environment of rising inflation expectations as a result of rising commodity prices and a
persistently bubble-blowing Fed. History shows that equities offer a better hedge
against inflation than bonds.
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Dividend yield (12m fwd) Corporate BY (inv gr.) 10y Bund yield
Figure 16: Ample cash flow coverage for capex and dividends
European sectors – 2011e pre-tax operating cash flow/(Capex + Dividends), %
Beverages
IT Hardware
Pharma
Leis. & Hot.
Media
Capital Gds
Mining
Market
Aero. & Def.
Constr.
Chemicals
Luxury Gds
Food & HPC
Automotive
Gen'l Retail
Food Retail
Oil & Gas
Telecoms
Utilities
The aim of QE2 is to boost asset prices and raise inflation expectations. The former is
supposed to encourage consumer spending as a result of a positive wealth effect. The
latter lowers real interest rates, which, in turn is supportive of economic growth.
By merely hinting at another round of quantitative easing at the end of August, the Fed
was able to drive down real interest rates. In the US and the UK, 5yr real bond yields
turned negative in October, while real bond yields in Germany, fell to a marginal 0.5%.
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UK USA Germany
Negative real interest rates are supportive of economic growth, but quantitative easing
also provides a major boost to asset prices in general and real assets in particular.
Just consider the performance of equities, bonds, gold and commodities in the 10
weeks following Mr Bernanke’s first hint of another round of quantitative easing (QE2)
on 27 August. They all rose in value at the same time (see Figure 18), a rare
phenomenon that cannot be easily explained by factors other than the prospect of QE2.
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Source: Datastream
This uncertainty warrants a certain risk premium. The first round of quantitative easing,
worth USD1,700bn of asset purchases which ended in Q1 2010, did not have the
desired effect, so why would QE2, worth a third of QE1 (USD600bn) be more
successful? And even if it were, it would lead to uncertainty related to the Fed’s
inevitable exit strategy, thereby constraining the potential for P/E expansion.
Second, we believe US equities are overvalued, albeit modestly; the cyclically adjusted
market P/E (CAPE) is trading some 10% above its long-term average. This makes it
more difficult to argue for sustained multiple expansion, even in an environment of
negative real interest rates.
It is true that European equities are undervalued based on this measure, but we see no
reason for the strong correlation between the DJ Stoxx 600 and the S&P500 to cease
anytime soon.
History shows that, counter-intuitively, US market P/Es have been higher, on average,
when real interest rates were positive than when they were negative. The same
applies, more intuitively, to market P/Es and inflation: equity markets prefer low, but
positive inflation to deflation.
< 0% >9%
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Real Bond Yield
US Inflation
5%-10% We are here 3-6%
10%-15% 0-3%
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This does not mean that P/Es cannot expand. Financial markets can and do deviate
from their long-term averages all the time.
Indeed, it may well be that the trend in, rather than the level of real interest rates, which
is down, will push market P/Es higher in 2011e. This would leave more upside for
equities than our base scenario (provided, of course, that P/E expansion is not the
result of EPS downgrades!).
All in all, we expect a 12% gain, on average for European headline indices, which is in
line with 2012e EPS growth (2011e EPS growth is already discounted in today’s 12-
month forward P/E). This gives a total expected return of 15% by including an average
dividend yield of 3%.
This should easily beat the returns on fixed income alternatives, be it cash, corporate
bonds, US Treasuries or Bunds. P/E expansion, thanks to exceedingly low real interest
rates, cannot be excluded and would be a bonus on top of the 15% expected return.
Our index targets, which we review twice a year (at the interim stage and at the end of
the year), warrant a few comments.
First, our 6 and 12-month index targets of a year ago turned out to be spot on, at least
for the DJ Stoxx 600 and the S&P500 (275 and 1,200, respectively). We expected a 5-
10% market correction in H1 2010 (because of budget deficit concerns or disappointing
earnings), followed by a recovery in H2. This is exactly what happened: after a
mediocre H1 2010, all six equity headline indices hit our Y/E targets in November,
within plus or minus 2%.
Second, the usual caveat emptor applies. Index targets should always be taken with a
pinch of salt, for the forecast error is significant, especially with an asset price
manipulating Fed. History shows that equity markets are far more sensitive to monetary
policy than the real economy. This is why they often overshoot (both on the upside and
the downside) when unexpected changes in monetary conditions take place. The
extent of the overshooting is simply impossible to predict.
In other words, it is a difficult task to determine ‘fair value’ for equity markets at the best
of times and nigh impossible when the Fed is manipulating asset prices on an
unprecedented scale. And we haven’t even mentioned the difficulties in valuing stocks
as a result of the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. For instance, what is the risk
free rate to be used for a Spanish company which has more than 50%of its activities
outside Spain?
In conclusion, 2011 will doubtless be another bumpy ride. But the path of least
resistance for equities is up, in our view, driven by attractive valuations and exceedingly
loose monetary policy.
In the euro zone and the UK, fiscal austerity measures add to pressures on central
banks to keep base rates low. For the UK in particular it seems likely that austerity
measures will weigh on growth and consumers’ disposable incomes for some time. To
offset these fiscal tightening measures monetary policy is likely to remain unusually
accommodative for an extended period of time.
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We find it likely that quantitative easing will be extended beyond the initial horizon of
June 2011. The Fed has deliberately left this option open in its most recent FOMC
statement, making the pace and size of asset purchases subject to regular review. As a
result we expect equity markets to remain highly sensitive to inflation and labour market
news flow. Given our economists’ forecasts of a US growth slowdown it seems likely
that economic data will allow asset purchases to be extended beyond mid 2011.
Credit stability
As equity strategists we shy away from making outright forecasts for credit markets, but
given our economic scenario, our top-down view of corporate earnings growth and the
prospects of continued central banks asset purchases, it seems most likely that
corporate bond yields will remain low.
Most factors suggest a stable credit environment, but with limited room for further
spread tightening. Global GDP growth of 3.8% and healthy balance sheets (see chart
below) make a significant increase in corporate default rates unlikely. As long as
companies can post positive earnings growth the risk of large-scale pressure on the
payment of coupons should also be low; we forecast 16% EPS growth for the pan-
European market. Asset purchases as part of further quantitative easing should drag
down yields and spreads in corporate bonds as well as investors’ reach for yield.
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The conclusion of the above is an environment of low (and possibly even negative) real
interest rates for the foreseeable future. On the one hand this should boost earnings
growth. By keeping borrowing costs low the Fed is attempting to encourage business
investment and thus boost economic growth potential. We estimate it takes three to
four quarters for the monetary stimulus to reach the real economy and although the
transfer mechanism may not be working perfectly in an environment of private sector
de-leveraging, history suggests a positive effect on economic growth rates.
At the same time, low real rates should boost equity valuations. Although the assets
purchased by the Fed are government bonds rather than equities we should expect
some spill-over effects into other asset classes. Bond buying pushes down bond yields,
making this asset class relatively unattractive and encouraging investors to reach for
yield in other more risky asset classes. So quantitative easing encourages risk taking
(good for equities) and pulls down yields (push up prices) along the entire risk
spectrum, including equities.
From an equity investor’s perspective one could perhaps even argue that the less
effective quantitative easing is in boosting the economy, the better it is for equities. If
less of the created liquidity finds its way into the real economy, possibly as the result of
a liquidity trap situation, the more liquidity will end up in risk assets (e.g. equities)
boosting valuations.
These fundamental arguments are also reflected in historic correlations. The two most
recent US quantitative easing programs were both associated with rising equity
markets. In the chart below we use the start of central bank guidance about quantitative
easing as the starting point, as that is when markets begin to price in QE. The chart
below also shows that there is no hard and fast rule that says what is good news for
bonds is bad news for equities. The correlation between these asset classes depends
on the reason for the bond yield decline. If, as is the case now, it is driven by low real
interest rate expectations it is good news for both asset classes.
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Low base rates are equally beneficial for equities. As the chart below shows, this effect
is also borne out by historical data. Low rates accompanied and to a large degree
caused both the equity market rallies beginning in 2003 and 2009. It is, of course, not
so much the direction, as the level of base rates which matters (see chart below).
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3.0
1050
950 2.0
850
1.0
750
650 0.0
Jan 01 Jan 02 Jan 03 Jan 04 Jan 05 Jan 06 Jan 07 Jan 08 Jan 09 Jan 10
Tight credit spreads also provide a positive equity environment. Fundamentally, the
correlation is not surprising. Low credit spreads suggest low borrowing costs (as far as
low spreads are associated with low corporate bond yields), a clear positive for the
corporate sector.
Secondly, credit spreads are a measure of risk compensation in a risky asset class, just
as implied volatility is a measure of risk compensation in equities. So both should and
are closely correlated (see chart below). As low implied volatility is associated with high
share prices, credit spreads have been closely correlated with share prices.
100 275
6 200
250
80 5
300
4 225
60
400
3 200
40
2 500
175
20
1
150 600
0 0 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
DJ Stoxx 600 (lhs)
VDAX (lhs) BBB spread in % (rhs) Corporate credit spreads (Baa, inverted rhs,bp)
Fund flows have for some time been dominated by bonds. The data in the chart below
is for US mutual funds, but should be a good reflection of what has happened much
more broadly. Since 2009, as risk aversion has faded most of the flows out of money
market funds have ended up in bonds, both corporate and sovereign. The return of
principle rather than the return on principle has been the priority for investors. It is also
a reflection of regulation that forces many insurers to prefer bonds over presumably
much more risky equities.
800
600
400
200
-200
-400
-600
Jul 07 Jan 08 Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10
With the valuation of equities relative to other asset classes close to historical lows, the
benefits of lower bond yields and quantitative easing should work particularly strongly.
The chart below shows the dividend yield of European equities significantly exceeds
the yields available from government and corporate bonds. On current forecasts the
average European stock yields 3.9%, compared with AA rated corporate bonds offering
3.2% and 10-year Bunds at 2.6%. The admittedly higher risk earnings yield for
European equities stands at an even more impressive 9.1%.
The further bond yields fall, the more attractive equities become to asset allocators and
the more difficult it becomes to justify a continuation of the current fund flow trend. One
can find more and more evidence of investors shifting out of bonds into equities (e.g.
Ageas Insurance), but it remains anecdotal evidence rather than a large trend.
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Jul 01 Jul 02 Jul 03 Jul 04 Jul 05 Jul 06 Jul 07 Jul 08 Jul 09 Jul 10
We would expect equities to get a growing share of fund flows in 2011 rather than a
real reversal of flows in the short term. History suggests that valuations are rarely the
catalysts for a change in trend. Assets can stay cheap or expensive for a long time. For
a real reversal to occur something needs to go wrong with the investment case for the
dominating asset class; something needs to deflate the bubble. It took a recession to
deflate the equity bubble built on the assumption of a new long-term growth paradigm.
It took increasing defaults on mortgages to deflate property prices.
For bonds such an event is most likely to be inflation, which would make a nominal
yield of 2.5% for government debt seem very unattractive and could potentially spark a
sharp sell-off in bonds. We expect inflation to remain contained at low levels for the
foreseeable future, so re-allocation out of bonds into equities seems too distant to bet
on it for 2011.
There is also the risk of unintended consequences of QE2, such as trade restrictions
(as a result of further currency frictions), commodity price inflation (undermining
consumers’ purchasing power and eroding profit margins in sectors with limited pricing
power) and the creation of asset bubbles with potentially devastating consequences
(the Fed’s track record over the last 20 years has been impressive on this one).
There is also uncertainty as to what happens after QE2 expires at the end of June
2011. Will this be followed by a credible exit strategy, or, a third round of quantitative
easing in the event that QE2 does not have the desired effect? And how will the
markets react to QE3 in general and the US dollar in particular?
Quantitative tightening
There is the risk that China’s policy tightening, all but inevitable with food inflation
running at 10%, GDP growth close to 10% and negative real interest rates, will lead to
a hard landing rather than a mere slowdown.
25
20
15
10
(5)
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
It goes without saying that a hard landing in China would be unexpected and would not
be taken kindly by equity markets, considering that everyone seems to want to be
Overweight emerging markets or emerging market plays.
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10 Jan 11
The EUR750bn that the European Financial stability Facility (EFSF) has at its disposal
(including the contribution from the IMF) is sufficient to refinance Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain until 2013.
But this is of only modest comfort, given that bondholders are exposed to the risk of a
haircut as part of the new crisis resolution mechanism to be put in place after 2013.
The real risk for European equity markets is that the sovereign debt crisis will spread to
the larger peripheral countries, such as Spain. This would provide a major challenge
and could lead to fears of a fragmented eurozone and a more general rise in the risk-
free rate.
But since the introduction of the EFSF European headline equity indices have been
largely immune to the sovereign debt crisis (see figure below), benefiting from a weak
euro, lower eurozone interest rates for longer (the unintended consequences of the
crisis) and stronger-than-expected corporate earnings growth
280 50
100
270
150
260 200
250
250
300
240 350
400
230
450
220 500
Jan 10 Mar 10 May 10 Jul 10 Sep 10 Nov 10
DJ Stoxx 600 (lhs) Yield spread 10y Bunds-GIIPS*, inverted rhs (bp)
The ability of companies to pass on cost inflation may prove to be more difficult than
during the credit-driven boom of 2003-2007 (oil prices trebled during that period without
meaningful consequences for corporate profitability) because of lower nominal GDP
growth in the absence of inflation.
This would have an adverse impact on profit margins which are expected to hit new
highs in virtually all sectors in 2011e (see Figure 31).
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
Market
Aero.& Def.
Luxury Gds
Mining
Media
Automotive
Beverages
Software
IT Hardware
General Rtl
Steel
Food Rtl
Telcos
Utilities
Constr
Capital Gds
Pharma
Chems
In our top-down earnings forecast for 2011e we have assumed commodity prices to be,
on average, 10% higher in 2011e than in 2010e. The negative impact of such a rise
should be more than offset by the positive impact of operating leverage and productivity
gains (i.e. ongoing restructuring efforts).
But if commodity prices were to rise significantly more than in our base scenario, this
would erode profit margins in certain sectors more than expected. Consumer
discretionary sectors would be particularly exposed as rising commodity prices would
also undermine consumers’ purchasing power.
For details regarding commodity price inflation and sector and stock repercussions,
refer to the section ‘Commodity price inflation’.
In terms of EV/EBIT, the valuation premium for Growth vs Value has risen from 40% in
Q1 2009 to 100% today. Even allowing for superior EBIT growth in 2011e, the premium
is still an impressive 90%, based on consensus forecasts, i.e. 1.5x the 7yr average of
60%. Based on EV/Sales, Growth stocks are now trading at a 180% premium to Value,
double the historical average of 90% (see Figure below).
180%
220%
10.0 2.0
200%
160%
8.0 1.5
180%
140%
6.0 1.0 160%
Jan 04
Jan 05
Jan 06
Jan 07
Jan 08
Jan 09
Jan 10
Jan 11
Jan 06
Jan 07
Jan 03
Jan 04
Jan 05
Jan 08
Jan 09
Jan 10
* Based on a portfolio of 10 European large caps each, equally weighted.(Small population due to survivor issues)
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates, Factset
The result is an increasingly tricky trade-off between cheap, mature Value plays (e.g.
Financials, Telecoms, Utilities and Pharmaceuticals) and vibrant but increasingly
expensive Growth in relative terms (mostly, but not limited to emerging market plays,
such as Luxury Goods and many Industrials).
It must be said that the strong performance of many Growth stocks has simply been led
by earnings upgrades and above-average EPS growth, rather than by a rerating. For
instance, Luxury Goods are currently trading at 12mth forward EV/EBIT of 10.4x, which
is a mere 0.2x more than at the beginning of the year, despite outperforming the market
by more than 40% year-to date.
Indeed, the upper lines in the Figure below above show that in absolute terms Growth
stocks are still less expensive, on average, than prior to the financial crisis.
First, Growth stocks have been a big beneficiary of falling bond yields, thanks to the
longer duration of future cash flows compared to that of value stocks. This comparative
advantage may be coming to an end in an environment of rising inflation expectations
which should put a floor on interest rates.
Second, year on year comparisons are likely to be a lot less favourable for growth
stocks in 2011e than in 2010e. For instance, 2010e EPS growth in Luxury Goods of
36% is 18 times that of Telecoms (2%). For next year, the ratio shrinks from 18x to
2.5x, based on current estimates (16.5% vs 6.5%).
The first two criteria aim to select stocks that offer above average top-line and CFPS
growth. This should give a sufficient buffer for companies to grow DPS and reduce the
risk of including high yielding value traps.
The third filter, a minimum FCF yield, prevents us from overpaying for the expected
growth. We have chosen 5% as the hurdle rate, which is comfortably above the
average Baa-rated corporate bond yield of around 4%.
The solvency criterion makes sure that companies are not financially overstretched.
The stocks which meet all of four selection criteria (but not necessarily rated
Outperform) are summarised in the figure below.
Comments
Most of the popular growth stocks and/or emerging market plays, such as LVMH, do
not qualify because of valuation considerations (FCF yield well below 5%). Conversely,
many value stocks don’t qualify because of a lack of top-line and/or CFPS growth.
Notice the absence of Telecoms and Utilities.
Dividends are, over the long run, a big contributor to total equity returns. Over the last
100 years, for instance, dividends made up more than 40% of the total returns on US
equities, according to Shiller data. In a low growth world, with limited scope for capital
gains, this proportion can easily exceed 50%.
In addition to the limited scope for capital gains, the low yield on fixed income
alternatives are another reason why high-yielding stocks should do better in 2011 than
in 2010.
The yield on corporate and (solvent) government bonds has fallen to exceedingly low
levels and, at these levels, offer an unattractive risk/reward profile in an environment of
rising inflation expectations. With the Fed determined to raise inflation expectations,
German and US government bond yields have already risen over the last two months,
which, in turn put a floor under corporate bond yields.
This should shed a more favourable light on high-yielding stocks, as equities offer a
better hedge against inflation than bonds.
In order to benefit from the high-yielding theme, we have screened for stocks that offer
not only a high yield but also take into account the sustainability and potential for
dividend growth.
We have screened for Europe’s ten highest yielding large caps that meet the following
investment criteria.
Comments
First, it is worth noting that only one Utility and one Telecom stock qualify. The dividend
yield may be above average in these sectors, but most stocks do not meet our
sustainability criteria (e.g. a payout above 80% or an expected drop in 2011e EBIT).
Second, there are thee Financials that make the mark, including one bank and two
insurers. Many banks don’t meet the criteria because of omitting a dividend payment in
2008.
Finally, there are, of course, many more stocks that meet our investment criteria, but
they offer a dividend yield below 4%, which is not meaningfully above the average yield
on corporate bonds.
There are, of course other factors at play that drive commodity prices, such as the
insatiable demand from emerging markets, bad harvests or other supply constraints.
But it is no mere coincidence that commodity prices took off the moment Mr Bernanke
made clear at the end of August that the second round of quantitative easing (QE2)
was on its way (see Figure below).
Soft commodities such as cotton, rice and rubber have risen by a third or more since 1
September. Even gas prices, which are still well down YTD, have risen since early
September. All of this year’s gain, and more, in oil prices were made after 1
September.
The prices of copper, gold, coffee, cotton and rubber hit all time highs this month. Last
but not least, the price of lumber has risen by a third in less than three months. This
can hardly be ascribed to a surging US housing market!
Admittedly, the price increases are less dramatic when converted into euros, but this is
not the case year-to-date, due to a lower euro now than at the beginning of the year.
No wonder that inflation expectations are on the rise, even though they are still low by
historical standards. This is not only reflected in falling real bond yields (the real yield
on 5yr Tips turned negative in October, which implies that the market expects future
inflation to be higher than nominal bond yields), there is also increasing evidence that
rising commodity prices are affecting corporate pricing and/or margins.
The following are just a few recent examples of announced price increases related to
rising commodity prices.
– Anheuser Bush and Starbucks have raised prices to offset rising commodity prices.
Carlsberg announced recently that it is planning to do the same in the near future.
– The UK retailer Next indicated a couple of months ago that clothing prices would
rise between five and eight per cent for the spring/summer season, reflecting the
increase in UK VAT to 20% in January 2011 and soaring cotton prices. The planned
price increase could hit total sales by 1-2 per cent, according to Next.
Both the timing and quantification of the impact of commodity prices on volumes and
profit margins is a challenging task because of factors such as hedging, long-term
contracts and the extent of a company’s pricing power.
For this year, the return of top-line growth, the lagged impact of last year’s margin-
boosting, cost-cutting measures and exceedingly favourable y-o-y comps virtually
guarantee a significant expansion in profit margins.
But 2011 is likely to be more challenging. This is because rising commodity prices tend
to have a lagged impact on margins and volumes and companies are faced with cost
inflation when top-line growth is slowing as a result of slowing GDP growth and lower
inflation. This is different from the 2006-08 economic boom when commodities also
rose sharply. Nominal GDP growth in the G7, for instance, is likely to barely exceed 3%
in 2011e, which is well below the 5% recorded in 2006 and 4% in 2007.
We expect commodity prices to stay firmly supported by the Fed’s quantitative easing
and ongoing buoyant demand from emerging markets.
It is, of course, difficult to tell by how much commodities will rise. What we can say is that,
in real terms, they could double before hitting the highs reached in the 1970s (see below).
Even if the CRB index were to stay, on average, at current levels for the remainder of
this year and the whole of next, this would still mean that commodity prices in 2011 will
be, on average, 10% higher than in 2010.
Figure 36: Commodity prices in real terms – still lots of upside potential
CRB commodity price index, deflated by US CPI
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
650
550
450
400
350
2008 (avge 491)
300
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan
What are the implications for sectors and stocks with above average exposure to raw
materials?
In the table below we have ranked by geographical exposure the European large caps
in the sectors which have significant exposure to rising commodity prices (Automotive,
Beverages, Food & HPC, General Retail, Chemicals and Construction). Those at the
top of the list (mostly exposed to advanced economies) are the relative losers in times
of raw materials cost inflation, while those on the bottom are the relative winners.
Main conclusions:
– Sectors or stocks which are exposed to consumer spending in the advanced
economies and with limited pricing power are most exposed, in our view. This includes
Food and General Retail and Automotive. This is because most companies in these
sectors might find it difficult to pass on the cost inflation without suffering a significant
impact on volumes. German carmakers benefit from a favourable geographical mix and
higher gross margins and should, therefore, be less affected than the French and
Italian carmakers. The tyre makers are also exposed because of their limited exposure
to emerging markets.
– Food & Beverages are less exposed, in our view, given their significant exposure to
emerging markets (45-50% of Sales for Unilever and Danone, for instance). For the
smaller companies, however, rising costs are likely to be more challenging. Food Retail
may find it difficult to pass on cost inflation, particularly for companies with substantial
exposure to Europe, such as Carrefour. Price negotiations with suppliers will be tough
as the retailers will fight to maintain a low average basket price for customers. In
difficult markets, price hikes are likely to be offset by larger promotions or a different
mix. The EBIT margin could be squeezed in a fiercely competitive environment.
– In Industrials, Mining should be the big winner of rising commodity prices. The
correlation between the CRB price index and the sector’s relative performance over the
last five years has been close to 90%. The oligopolistic nature of the industry means
strong pricing power, which should allow companies to pass on most of the cost
inflation.
– Construction is more sensitive than chemicals to rising commodity prices because
of the limited pricing power among the energy-intensive cement makers and a less
favourable geographical mix (e.g. CRH has no exposure to emerging markets).
– In Chemicals commodity cost inflation should be largely passed on amid tight
supply/demand. Significant price hikes are likely for agricultural products (fertilizers), of
which Yara and K+S should be beneficiaries. Companies close to the end-user are
likely to face a margin squeeze.
Constr. & Building 20-25% of sales for cement makers (10% 4-5 Typical time lag between oil prices and industry’s Lafarge (-)
Materials for electricity and 10-15% for combustibles energy costs (mostly pet coke and coal) is ~9
Holcim (-)
depending geography) months. Many producers are increasingly using
alternative energy sources to mitigate the risk of Heidelberg Cement
rising commodity prices. (-)
Chemicals 40-60% of COGS, depending on business 2 Significant price hikes likely for agricultural BASF and Lanxess
segment. products (fertilizers). Higher commodity prices (oil, rubber, +)
Commodity and specialty chemicals are should be largely passed on, while overall Yara and K+S
most exposed. supply/demand remains tight. Companies close (fertilisers, +)
to the end-user are likely to face a margin
Akzo, Solvay and
squeeze.
Simryse (-)
Steel Iron ore and coal each 20% of COGS 2-3 Downside in steel prices is limited as spot prices ArcelorMittal
are below the marginal cost of production. We (iron ore +)
expect steel prices to converge towards the Salzgitter (-)
marginal cost of production in H1 2011, which
Voestalpine (-)
should reverse some of the margin squeeze in
Q4 2010.
Beverages Brewers: 67% of COGS (30% packaging, 2 Spirits less sensitive than beer because of higher Carlsberg (-)
30% commodities (e.g. barley, malt), 7% gross margins and lagged impact of cost Remy Cointreau (+)
energy (e.g. transport and electricity) inflation. Brewers should be able to pass on cost
Spirits: 50% of COGS (23% packaging and inflation, given degree of concentration and track
23% commodities, 4% energy) record, but at the expense of volume growth.
Food Mfg. Raw materials (20-25%) and packaging 2-3 Sector faced with sizeable input cost inflation in Danone (dairy +)
(10-15%) are typically 35% of Sales. 2011. Operational performance of three large caps Unilever
should be resilient, helped by strong brands and (edible oils, -)
exposure to emerging markets. For the smaller food
Northern Foods (-)
companies (weaker brands) cost inflation will be
challenging.
Food Retail Raw materials represent 15-90% of the 3 Price negotiations with suppliers will be tough as Carrefour (-)
retail price retailers will fight to maintain a low average
Tesco (+)
basket price for customers. In difficult markets,
price hikes are likely to be offset by larger
promotions or a different mix. EBIT margin could
be squeezed in a fiercely competitive
environment.
General Retail Raw materials and freight costs 50-65% of 4-5 Higher cotton prices and freight rates (Asia to H&M (-), Inditex (=)
COGS for clothing retailers Europe), plus wage inflation in emerging
countries, should squeeze 2011e gross margins
for clothing retailers such as H&M, Inditex and
Next, as cost inflation is unlikely to be fully
passed on.
* 1 = strong; 5= weak
After a decade of misery, there are signs that the fortunes of stocks exposed to
German consumers could be turning. The stage is set: healthy balance sheets suggest
an ability to consume more; after years of flat consumer spending pent-up demand for
discretionary and durable consumer goods has built up; German economic growth
should be among the most robust in Europe in the next few years; export-driven growth
is beginning to trickle down to consumers via a rise in employment and consumer (and
retail sector) confidence is near its 20-year high.
So far the macro improvement has not translated into a sustained increase in spending,
but if real wages begin to rise the final piece of the puzzle could slide into place. Recent
wage negotiations look promising in this respect. Wage increases have been pulled
forward and indefinite job guarantees have been given by a growing number of
companies. Greater job security and rising real incomes could release the pent-up
demand and excess savings mentioned above. We will be watching the Christmas
shopping season for the first signs of a change in German consumer behaviour, but the
real benefits should be seen throughout 2011.
Finland 120
Sweden 115
France 110
Ireland 105
Greece 100
UK 95
Spain 90
Denmark 85
Belgium 80
EU 15 75
Netherlands
70
Dec 96
Dec 97
Dec 98
Dec 99
Dec 00
Dec 01
Dec 02
Dec 03
Dec 04
Dec 05
Dec 06
Dec 07
Dec 08
Dec 09
Germany
Italy
Source: Eurostat
The German savings ratio is returning to historic highs in 2010. As uncertainty over
Germany’s economic future grew, culminating with Germany being labelled the ‘Sick
Man of Europe’, the savings ratio rose from 8.9% in 2000 to 10.5 in 2003. Since then
the Agenda 2010 reforms implemented under then-Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder put
Germany on a recovery path, but reforms initially benefited the corporate sector at the
expense of consumers’ wages and job security, further boosting the savings ratio to
12%. This stands in stark contrast to savings ratios in the UK and the US, highlighting
German consumers’ untapped potential.
13
11
(1)
Dec 91 Dec 94 Dec 97 Dec 00 Dec 03 Dec 06 Dec 09
Germany UK US
As a result of this cautious behaviour, consumer balance sheets look healthy. German
consumers not only failed to jump on the leverage bandwagon that cut such a wide
swathe through most developed economies – but they have even paid back some of
the debts they did incur. Household liabilities peaked in 2003 and have since declined
by 6%. As disposable incomes continued to rise, the percentage of household debt to
disposable income has declined from 113% to 96% over the past decade.
45,000 115
110
40,000
105
35,000
100
95
30,000
90
25,000
85
20,000 80
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Household liabilities (lhs) % of disposable income (rhs)
This health is also reflected on the asset side of balance sheets. As liabilities declined
household assets continued to increase. Since 2003 gross assets increased by 19%,
and net assets (taking into account the decline in liabilities) increased by 36% to
EUR77,900 per household.
Figure 43: Net assets have grown and grown…now double disposable income
Household assets - liabilities
80,000 220
70,000 200
60,000 180
50,000 160
40,000 140
30,000 120
20,000 100
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Another favourable factor is that Germany, unlike many of its European peers, has had no
property price bubble that will have to be digested over the coming years. German
property prices have been flat since the Reunification-related increase in the early 1990’s.
We have no strong views on German property prices going forward, but the risk reward
ratio on this factor seems much more favourable than in most other European countries.
180%
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
(20%)
Spain UK Germany
That said, we expect a more optimistic scenario to crystallise as we believe the recent
period is a blip rather than a new equilibrium, and that it is likely to be followed by a
period of catch-up spending to upgrade discretionary durable goods.
The car sector is a perfect example of pent-up demand. Between 2000 and 2008 the
proportion of German cars older than 10 years increased from 25% to 35% of all cars.
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Labour market reforms and painful nominal wage reductions in 2004 reduced unit
labour costs and created a highly competitive labour force and corporate sector. This
occurred at a time when much of Europe has gone in the opposite direction with the
periphery countries struggling with high unit labour costs.
4
Hartz labour market reforms & landmark Siemens
3 deal to extend working week without extra pay
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Dec 95
Dec 96
Dec 97
Dec 98
Dec 99
Dec 00
Dec 01
Dec 02
Dec 03
Dec 04
Dec 05
Dec 06
Dec 07
Source: Bloomberg, Exane BNP Paribas
Germany also boasts one of the largest exposures to emerging markets. As the second
largest exporter in the world its export strength is no secret. A total of 16% of exports
went to Eastern Europe in 2009, 10% to Asia ex Japan and 3% to Latin America.
Overall, our colleagues in the Economics team forecast further GDP weakness in
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) next year, whereas Germany (as well as
France and the Nordic nations) should enjoy GDP growth rates in excess of 2%. They
also expect this growth advantage to last several years as the periphery countries cope
with the fallout from aggressive fiscal consolidation. The longer-term IMF forecasts in
the chart below show a structural change in Germany’s growth relative to the rest of
Europe, starting about one year after the introduction of the Agenda 2010 reform
package.
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
(0.5)
(1.0)
(1.5)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: IMF, Exane BNP Paribas
Dare to spend
There are a number of promising signs that German consumers are beginning to benefit
from Germany’s economic recovery. If this trend continues, as we expect, it could provide
the catalyst for some of the pent up demand to be released.
German consumers are a typical late-cycle play on the German economy. It normally takes
some time for export-led economic gains to trickle down to consumers. In the ‘ideal’ cycle,
as global economic growth recovers exporters are the first to feel the improvement. They
respond by investing domestically to meet increased export demand. With both the export
and domestic sides of the industrial economy improving, demand for workers and thus
hiring should pick up. At this stage consumers begin to fully participate in the economic
recovery as both the number of jobs and wages can rise.
The German labour market is showing signs of improvement. After reaching a post-war
record of 5.2 million unemployed in February 2005, unemployment has declined steadily
with only a relatively small set-back during the credit crunch. Total employment has now
reached a new record high at over 43m, despite the stable population.
40,500
40,000
39,500
39,000
38,500
38,000
37,500
37,000
Dec 93
Dec 95
Dec 97
Dec 99
Dec 01
Dec 03
Dec 05
Dec 07
Dec 09
Source: Bloomberg, Exane BNP Paribas
(1)
(3)
(5)
(7)
(9)
(11)
(13)
(15)
Jan 92
Jan 95
Jan 98
Jan 01
Jan 04
Jan 07
Jan 10
Jul 93
Jul 96
Jul 99
Jul 02
Jul 05
Jul 08
5% 80 30 5%
4% 60 20 4%
10
3% 40 3%
0
2% 20 2%
(10)
-10
1% 0 1%
-20
(20)
0% (20)
-20 0%
-30
(30)
(1%) -40
(40) (1%)
-40
(40)
(2%) -60
(60) (50)
-50 (2%)
Q1 1992 Q1 1995 Q1 1998 Q1 2001 Q1 2004 Q1 2007 Q1 2010 Q1 1991Q1 1994Q1 1997Q1 2000Q1 2003Q1 2006Q1 2009
So far, however, improved confidence has not translated into a real increase in spending.
Consumers may feel better about their own prospects over the next 12 months, but after
years of disappointment and job uncertainty it is perhaps unsurprising they are not yet sold
on the sustainability of the recovery. Retailers have posted positive top-line growth rates
for most of this year, but this is so far mostly a reflection of base effects after last year’s
slowdown in retail sales owing to the recession. However, retail sales offer only a partial
view on spending, as the figure does not include cars or any type of services, telcos or
other leisure activities. The gap between retail sales and total consumer spending reflected
in the Q2 GDP numbers is a signal that we should also track broader indices than retail to
get a full picture on consumer spending.
(2)
(4)
(6)
(8)
Jan 95
Jan 96
Jan 97
Jan 98
Jan 99
Jan 00
Jan 01
Jan 02
Jan 03
Jan 04
Jan 05
Jan 06
Jan 07
Jan 08
Jan 09
Jan 10
The most important catalyst for increased consumer spending would be an increase in
real wages and incomes. We noted the correlation between employment and retail
trade and the important link between the two is wages. Naturally, increased disposable
incomes and job security are vital for consumers to feel comfortable consuming today
rather than saving for a future rainy day.
After years of wage constraint, market forces seem aligned for real wage increases.
Demand for work is increasing as the economic recovery continues, both in export and
domestic markets. At the same time the supply of work is tightening, as we showed above
with employment levels increasing. That means employers will not be in the situation of
2004 where record unemployment allowed wage reductions despite economic growth.
Beyond the normal market forces there is also increased political pressure on the
corporate sector to share record profits with employees. Senior members of all parties
have publicly called on companies to allow significant wage increases. This is a marked
change from the calls for wage moderation of previous years.
6 120
5
4 115
3
110
2
1
105
0
(1)
100
(2)
(3) 95
(4)
(5) 90
Dec 95
Dec 96
Dec 97
Dec 98
Dec 99
Dec 00
Dec 01
Dec 02
Dec 03
Dec 04
Dec 05
Dec 06
Dec 07
Dec 08
Dec 09
Employee compensation per hour, absolute (rhs) Employee compensation by hour, yoy (lhs)
The real test of whether wages can rise in excess of inflation will come with the next rounds
of wage negotiations over the coming six months. In this context it is important to keep in
mind the time lag between economic recovery and wage recovery. Wage deals negotiated
at the bottom of the cycle, last year, were often set for more than one year, so most sectors
have not yet been able to negotiate wages against the backdrop of a stronger economy.
Nevertheless, recent news flow on wages has been encouraging. Despite having a wage
deal through April 2011, Bosch agreed to pull forward the scheduled wage increase to
February. Several other companies (e.g. ZF Friedrichshafen, Audi and Porsche) have
followed this template. Siemens has given its 128,000 German employees an indefinite job
guarantee. Without agreement of the workers’ council Siemens will not make
redundancies. Job reductions would have to be achieved via voluntary redundancy, early
retirement and regular retirement.
The next data point to watch is the upcoming holiday shopping season. This is
traditionally the most important part of the year for retailers, with a high proportion of
discretionary spending, and as such is a good barometer for changing consumer
spending patterns. The last two months of the year contribute about 19% of full year
sales in the Retail sector. For some of the more discretionary sub-sectors, which are
most likely to reflect changes in consumer sentiment and spending patterns, the ratio is
even higher (e.g. toys 30%, watches/jewellery 26%, books 25%).
The dependency on the holiday sales season becomes even clearer when looking at
profits. Given the same fixed cost base the increase in sales translates into a much
bigger increase in profits. For Douglas, 33% of sales and 65% of EBITDA are
generated in the holiday quarter.
Recent comments suggest cautious optimism on holiday season sales from German
retailers. Douglas’ CEO expects a significant increase in seasonal retail sales over last
year and believes the company will beat the sector average. Metro’s comments, which
also referred to ‘cautious optimism’ for the holiday sales period, mirrored this.
Micro leverage
Low margins mean small improvements in spending can have a disproportionate effect
on bottom lines. So German consumers do not have to start spending like British
consumers to make this theme work; even a small improvement in consumer spending
patterns would suffice to turn German retail into a Buy.
The lower the margin the more sensitive earnings are to changes in the top line. This
may sound like common sense, but the effect is often underestimated. The chart below
illustrates the effect. We show how two companies’ profits react to changes in the top
line. The only difference between the companies is that one operates on a 1% margin
and the other on a 4% margin. All else being equal, a sales increase of 1% adds 50%
to the profits of the 1% margin company, but only increases profits by 13% at the 4%
margin company. We assume a 50/50 split between fixed and variable costs.
200%
150%
50%
0%
(50%)
(100%)
(150%)
(200%)
94 96 97 99 100 102 103 105 106
Sales
Profit growth at 1% margin Profit growth at 4% margin
German retailers have some of the lowest margins in Europe, making them extremely
sensitive to changes in the top line. The above example is not as far from reality as it
may seem. Some companies, for example Praktiker with an EBITA margin of 1.9% in
2010, may be extreme examples, but even for the broader Retail sector the margin gap
between Germany and the rest of Europe is huge. On 2011 consensus estimates the
German sector will achieve a 3.7% EBIT margin, compared with 12.7% for the pan-
European sector.
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
German Retail German Retail ex Metro European Retail
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
Mar 91
Mar 93
Mar 95
Mar 97
Mar 99
Mar 01
Mar 03
Mar 05
Mar 07
Mar 09
Mar 11
Mar 13
Mar 15
Mar 17
Mar 19
Germany reported Germany consensus forecast US Japan
Valuations suggest investors are also still cautious on the German consumer recovery,
or at the very least that no great optimism about this theme is yet priced in. The
German Retail sector trades at a premium to the rest of the German market, which
suggests expectations of above-average earnings growth in the coming years.
Comparing the German sector to its European peers, however, shows it trading at a
small discount and a slightly larger discount than the historical average. This suggests
the market is looking for less earnings growth in Germany, which in turn implies less
optimism on top-line growth in Germany. Given the German sectors’ low margins, less
sales growth is needed to achieve the same earnings growth.
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
Aug 03
Feb 04
Aug 04
Feb 05
Aug 05
Feb 06
Aug 06
Feb 07
Aug 07
Feb 08
Aug 08
Feb 09
Aug 09
Feb 10
Aug 10
Source: Factset, Exane BNP Paribas
Consensus analyst trends do not yet assume a significant German consumer recovery.
Analysts expect significantly lower top-line growth for the German sector than for their
European peers, but given the lower margins this still translates into greater earnings
growth, at least for 2011. Looking beyond the growth figures, however, shows that
consensus forecasts for the absolute level of EPS in 2011 and 2012 have been revised
down steadily over the past months. Forecasts for Europe, on the other hand, have
been revised up over the same period.
7% 20%
18%
6%
16%
5% 14%
12%
4%
10%
3%
8%
2% 6%
4%
1%
2%
0% 0%
2011 2012 2011 2012
German Retail German Retail ex Metro European Retail German Retail German Retail ex Metro European Retail
50
45
40
35
30
25
Nov 08
Nov 09
May 08
May 09
May 10
Jan 08
Mar 08
Jul 08
Sep 08
Jan 09
Mar 09
Jul 09
Sep 09
Jan 10
Mar 10
Jul 10
Sep 10
F.Y. 2010 F.Y. 2011 F.Y. 2012
How to play it
Although this theme is a perfect example of how a macro view can filter down to a
specific investment recommendation, stock selection remains as important as ever. Not
all stocks are likely to benefit equally from this theme. As a rule of thumb, we look for
the following characteristics:
– Exposure to discretionary spending and to durable goods and services. Both have
been the most neglected in the past, hence have the greatest catch-up potential.
– Pure plays if possible. Not all companies in the German Retail sector are equally
dependent on the German market.
– Look for low margins. The lower the margin, the greater the sensitivity of earnings
to changes in the top-line.
Regional rotation
The country effect has been particularly evident within Europe. The performance gap
between the best and worst European markets is at its widest level in a decade (see
left-hand chart below). Since October 2010, Greece has fallen 46%, whereas Germany
is unchanged and Sweden has gained 16% in euro-terms or 6% in local currency terms
(see right-hand chart below).
0.9 1.3
0.8 1.2
0.7 1.1
0.6 1.0
0.5 0.9
0.4 0.8
0.3 0.7
0.2 0.6
0.1 0.5
Sep 09 Dec 09 Mar 10 Jun 10 Sep 10
0.0
Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul Jul
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Germany Spain Greece Sweden
But while valuations are beginning to look attractive, they are never by themselves a
sufficient reason to buy. There is no historical correlation between valuations and short-
term returns; stocks can stay cheap for a long time. It takes a catalyst to crystallise
the value.
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
Aug 97 Aug 98 Aug 99 Aug 00 Aug 01 Aug 02 Aug 03 Aug 04 Aug 05 Aug 06 Aug 07 Aug 08 Aug 09 Aug 10
Growth gap
GDP growth is unlikely to provide such a catalyst. Our colleagues in the Economics
team forecast recessions in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain next year, whereas
Germany and the Nordic nations should enjoy GDP growth rates in excess of 2%. They
also expect this growth disadvantage to last several years, estimating an average drag
on growth rates in the periphery countries throughout the (4-5 year) adjustment period
between 0.9 and 2% each year (see chart below).
0.0
(0.5)
(1.0)
(1.5)
(2.0)
(2.5)
Italy
Ireland
Germany
Greece
Portugal
Spain
France
USA
UK
Belgium
Denmark
For equity investors, excessive sovereign debt and inferior GDP growth translate
directly into more muted earnings growth. As a rough estimate, to quantify the effect of
inferior domestic GDP growth we use our 2010 pan-European earnings model.
Assuming 40% of the average company’s sales are domestic, a 1% reduction in
volume growth for this isolated segment of sales takes about 2% off our EPS estimate.
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct
07 07 07 07 08 08 08 08 09 09 09 09 10 10 10 10
Germany Spain
The reason for this seemingly counter-intuitive correlation is that companies in weak
GDP countries are often the ones able to achieve the greatest efficiency gains. So far,
the focus has almost entirely been on top lines driven by domestic demand weakness,
but an earnings boost from labour cost cuts can be equally large. It is important not to
forget the power of operational leverage. If a company with a slim margin of 1% and a
balance between fixed and variable costs can reduce the former by 2% it doubles its
profits (see figure below).
120%
20%
(30%)
(80%)
(130%)
2.4% 1.8% 1.2% 0.6% 0.0% -0.6% -1.2% -1.8% -2.4%
Fixed costs in %
Profit growth at 1% margin Profit growth at 4% margin
115
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Germany Spain
– Labour intensive business models. We screen for high ratios of personnel costs
– High proportion of workforce based in periphery countries
– Low margins. The lower the margin, the greater the effect of wage cost reductions
on the bottom line.
– Exporters. This may be rare, but the ideal company is one which benefits from
domestic labour cost reduction, but which is not effected by the weakness of domestic
demand because it sells into strong global markets. Such companies combine the best
of both worlds.
We show overleaf a broad list of stocks with the aforementioned criteria as a guide to
how sensitive individual companies are likely to be to changes in unit labour costs.
Not all European countries are, of course, in the same fiscal situation. The smaller
peripheral economies (e.g. Ireland, Portugal and Greece) face a more challenging task
than Germany and most Nordic countries (see the figure below). Also, the effectiveness
and impact on growth of fiscal tightening also varies, depending on the country’s
savings rate, the openness of its economy and the size of the public sector.
150
GRE
140
130
Gross debt/GDP (2011e, %)
120 ITA
110
BEL
100 USA IRE
FRA
90 Eurozone
PORT UK
80
70 GER NL SPAIN
60
FIN
50
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Change in Gross debt/GDP ratio (2007-11e, %- points)
Source: IMF
Our Economics team has estimated the amplitude of measures required to meet the
official deficit reduction targets. In Europe, these targets have been set to allow a slight
reduction in the ratio of public debt to GDP within the next three to five years.
The measures required to meet the deficit targets average four percentage points of
GDP. To meet their objectives, the governments of Greece (16 percentage points of
GDP), the UK (5.3 points), Ireland (11 points) and Spain (7 points) will have to make
swingeing cuts to reduce their public deficits. Germany would only need 0.9 points.
History shows that major fiscal adjustments tend to rely more on cost cutting than on
tax hikes. This is because excessive tax hikes are a disincentive for private investment
and spending and can curb the economy’s growth potential in the long term. This
explains why governments, so far, have been very reluctant to raise corporate income
taxes. Witness Ireland’s determination to protect its 12.5% corporate tax rate.
But both sources of leverage, spending cuts and tax increases, have been and will be
used, which means that the adjustment does not exclusively target the weakest
categories of households.
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
(5.0)
Italy (93)
Cyprus (1994)
Switzerland (2000)
Germany (1989)
Germany (2000)
Israel (83)
Sweden (87)
Sweden (00)
Ireland (89)
United States (00)
N.Zealand (95)
Japan (90)
Canada (99)
Spain (2006)
UK (00)
Portugal (85)
Greece (95)
Finland (00)
Belgium (98)
Denmark (86)
Lower public spending Higher fiscal receipts
Source: IMF
As discussed above, there are two ways to reduce budget deficits: 1) cut spending or
2) increase revenues.
Sectors which are exposed to government spending cuts are those selling their
products or services directly to the government (e.g. Construction, Infrastructure,
Defence, Media, Telecoms and IT Services) or are dependent on government in some
other way, such as for subsidies (e.g. renewable energy and healthcare).
Pharmaceuticals
Pharmaceuticals warrant a few specific comments, given the sector’s high sensitivity to
government spending. The comments below are a summary of our sector team’s view
regarding Europe’s healthcare austerity measures.
The negative pricing environment has been a feature of the Pharma industry for years
and is definitely not new (see Figure 70). Several measures to restrict healthcare
spending (mostly public funding to the magnitude of 70-90%) have been implemented
since the late 1990s. As from the mid 2000s, the pricing trend has been negative, by
roughly 2% pa.
6% 6%
5% 5%
4% 4%
0.9%
3% 5.6% 3%
0.1% 4.8% 4.8%
2% 3.7% 2%
3.2%
1% 1.9% 2.1% 1%
0% 0%
(3%) (3%)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
In this context, the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe and rising budget deficits led
most European countries to simultaneously pursue this effort. Unsurprisingly, countries
with the largest public deficits, e.g. Greece and Spain, have taken the most far-
reaching measures. Among the tools at governments’ disposal to contain healthcare
expenses, the easiest and quickest way has been to restrain prices via a combination
of price cuts, reference pricing systems and mandatory rebates.
Pharma companies are in our view well prepared to absorb such price pressure,
notably through regional and product diversification. Big Pharma companies have
consistently decreased their exposure to Europe, from 40% to 34% of total sales in
2009, following increased exposure to emerging markets (25% on average for Large
Pharma). In addition, Pharma companies have become more diversified (OTC,
generics, vaccines, animal health), thereby reducing their exposure to prescription
products.
Many European countries have already taken measures to reduce their healthcare
system deficit. Within the top 5 EU Pharma markets, Germany has been the most
aggressive with a rebate on branded drugs increasing to 16% from 6% and a price
freeze for three years. In France, the government recently announced its main cost-
containment targets in its preliminary 2011 budget. Total healthcare savings are
expected to be up to EUR2.5bn, of which EUR625m for Pharma, meaning that 75% of
the savings will not come from Pharma.
Tax rates vary widely from sector to sector, as well as within the same sector (see
Figure below), because of geographic exposure, specific sector aspects such as the
North Sea tax for Oil & Gas, tax subsidies in renewable energy, financial leverage, and
specific expenses unrelated to earnings (e.g. France’s local business tax). The intra-
sectoral dispersion of total tax is particularly high in Insurance.
* Tax as a percentage of pre-tax earnings; earnings after goodwill write-offs and adjusted for non-recurring items
(e.g., capital gains).
Source: Exane BNP Paribas
It is difficult to draw any meaningful sector conclusions from the data. For example, the
fact that a total income tax rate is particularly low or, on the contrary, high, does not
necessarily mean that it will end up returning to the mean. The Oil & Gas sector has the
highest tax rate, but it is unlikely that the various sovereign surcharges will be cut any
time soon.
Another way to assess the exposure to fiscal austerity is the sector’s geographical
mobility.
We have calculated the average foreign exposure for 13 European sectors, taking into
account not only sales, but also employment and assets, for 65 European large caps.
Specifically, we created a foreign exposure index, made up of foreign assets over total
assets, foreign sales over total sales, and foreign employment over the total labour
force.
Sectors for which the bulk of sales, jobs and assets are domestic will find it difficult to
optimise corporate income tax than those with a high proportion of foreign assets.
As illustrated in the chart below, sectors with the highest domestic exposure include
Utilities, Retail, Automotive Basic Resources, and Oil & Gas. Excluding Automotive and
Retail, these sectors are already subject to specific taxes or surcharges that are difficult
to cut. Such is the case with the North Sea oil tax, the nuclear tax in Germany, and the
mining tax in Australia.
Capital Gds
Consumer Gds
Food & Bev.
Aerosp. & Def.
Construction
Chemicals
Pharma
Telecoms
Oil & Gas
Basic Res.
Automotive
Retail
Utilities
50 60 70 80 90
* Non-Financials, based on the average of foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales, and foreign
employment to total employment.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, UNCTAD
Corporate taxes are an opaque and complicated issue (e.g. Ernst & Young’s 2009
global tax guide has 342-pages on the petrochemical industry alone) and, therefore the
impact of any changes in corporate tax rates is very difficult to quantify. One problem,
for instance, is that, generally, tax as per the P&L account is rarely the same as that
shown in the Cash Flow Statement.
In any event, the impact of a change in corporate income tax or other taxes would be
relatively insignificant for most European large caps. The average tax rate in Europe is 20%.
This means that, all things being equal, a five-point increase by half of all the countries to
which European companies are exposed would reduce net earnings by around 3% (a very
unlikely scenario, in our view; witness Ireland’s determination to protect its 12.5% tax rate)
Such earnings dilution falls well within the margin of error of the consensus earnings
estimates (over the past 15 years, the average gap between consensus earnings estimates
and actual earnings has been 9%).
180
160
140
120
100
80
Jan 07 Jul 07 Jan 08 Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10
Sector allocation
Cyclicals
We have no particular strong bias towards Cyclicals or non-Cyclicals in our sector
allocation. Cyclicals, in particular those with above average emerging market exposure,
remain appealing because of their superior growth prospects. A weak euro, thanks to
Europe’s sovereign debt crisis, is also a positive. But valuations, while still reasonable
in absolute terms, are on the high side when compared to the less vibrant defensive
plays.
1.8x 58%
56%
1.6x
54%
1.4x 52%
1.2x 50%
1.0x 48%
46%
0.8x
44%
0.6x 42%
0.4x 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
Rel. 12m EV/Sales MSCI Europe - Cyclicals (lhs) MSCI Europe - Non Cyclicals (lhs)
In addition, the prospect of further quantitative tightening in China, this time including
more frequent rate hikes (the recent rate hike of 25bp was the first one in nearly three
years), may prove a major headwind for emerging market plays. The economic impact
of policy tightening might be trivial, but financial markets, and Cyclicals in particular, are
far more sensitive to monetary policy than the real economy.
Indeed, what makes sector allocation so difficult is the opposing forces of quantitative
tightening in emerging markets and quantitative easing in the USA.
All in all, we maintain an Outperform rating on Mining and Oil & Gas as a play on the
asset boosting quantitative easing by the Fed. We are more selective among
Industrials after their stellar performance in 2010. Certain segments in Construction
(cement makers) and in Chemicals (companies close to the end-user) are likely to face
a squeeze on gross margins as a result of commodity cost inflation.
10 30
25
8
20
6
15
10
4
5
2
0
0 -5
Telcos Pharma Auto Media Mining Beverages
We maintain our Underperform stance on Utilities because of the sector’s low FCF yield
(less than 2% in 2011e) and pedestrian CFPS and EPS growth in 2011e (less than 5%,
on average).
Financials
In Financials, we can’t get particularly excited about Banks. The sector offers good
value, which explains our Neutral stance. However a sustained rerating vs the market
looks unlikely, given structurally lower ROEs, subpar dividend growth and limited M&A
potential without the help of dilutive capital increases because of Basel III constraints.
Insurance suffers from the combination of a low interest rate environment and limited
exposure to emerging markets. The result is structurally low ROEs (10%, on average,
in the next few years) and mediocre earnings growth: less than 5% per annum in the
next three years, according to our sector team.
Automotive ____________________________________________ 75
Banks ________________________________________________ 77
Beverages_____________________________________________ 79
Capital Goods__________________________________________ 83
Chemicals _____________________________________________ 85
General Retail__________________________________________ 91
Healthcare_____________________________________________ 94
Insurance _____________________________________________ 95
IT Hardware ___________________________________________ 97
Media________________________________________________ 103
95
90
85
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
aerodefence@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
2.5x 70%
2.0x 60%
1.5x 50%
1.0x 40%
0.5x 30%
0.0x 20%
déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc-
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Aerospace & Defence (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
9.0x 70%
7.0x 60%
5.0x 50%
3.0x 40%
déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc-
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Aerospace & Defence (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
31.0 100%
26.0 90%
80%
21.0
70%
16.0
60%
11.0 50%
déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc- déc-
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Rel. 12m EPS Aerospace & Defence (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
85
80
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Emission regulation will also have an impact since OEMs must add new features to
Sector – Growth*
comply with them (stop & start, hybridisation) and to downsize engines. The challenge
% ch. 2010e 2011e Hist.
Avg for the OEMs is to pass on these extra costs to the customers.
Sales 18.5 6.0 1.2
EBIT 94.5 16.1 18.0 In China, everybody is increasing capacity to keep up with demand and to localise more
EPS NA. 14.1 23.0 to limit import duties.
Stocks
Sector – Solvency**
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e
VW pref (+) remains our top pick as the group is exposed to all markets and segments.
Net Debt/EBITDA 0.5 NC NC Its profitability is improving thanks to the success of the new models, Audi and to the
Interest Cover 5 10 14 implementation of the new modular approach. This positive trend should continue as the
Gearing (%) 9% (7%) (12%) product momentum will remain strong and the pay back of recent investment materialise.
** based on aggregated figures Out TP, based on our 2012 estimates is EUR139. But a medium term valuation (2015)
NC = Net Cash
would point to EUR178.
NA = Not Applicable
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates Renault (+) is also one of our picks since we believe that the management is now
addressing the group’s main issues such as brand positioning and overcapacity. The
group valuation is compelling and our SOTP points to EUR50, leaving 15% upside.
PSA (+) is doing well thanks to strong product momentum. This should drive positive
earning surprises when the group posts its FY numbers. However, there are still some
major strategic questions about the medium term. Our TP is EUR35 (+10%).
Finally, cost inflation is back on the menu and we see Michelin as the most at risk on this
Thierry Huon topic. Besides, we believe that it is too early to play the new ‘growth’ story as the benefits
(+33) 1 44 95 41 06 of the capex plan will only kick in post 2012. In between, headwinds should be
thierry.huon@exanebnpparibas.com
automotive@exanebnpparibas.com significant.
EV/Sales
2.5x 60%
2.0x 50%
1.5x 40%
1.0x 30%
0.5x 20%
0.0x 10%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
390%
34.0x
340%
29.0x
290%
24.0x
240%
19.0x
190%
14.0x 140%
9.0x 90%
4.0x 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
80%
21.0
60%
16.0
40%
11.0
6.0 20%
1.0 0%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Automotive (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
Favourite stocks
Deutsche Bank + 37,824 10.4 0.7 12.0 110
Société Générale + 31,129 7.5 0.8 11.7
Barclays plc + 40,715 6.1 0.6 10.3
100
Stocks to avoid
Dexia - 5,571 3.1 0.5 7.9
Standard Chartered - 52,904 22.7 1.8 13.6 90 ☺ RBS (+46.05%)*
UBS AG - 47,967 12.8 1.1 14.9 Dexia (-31.9%)*
80
70
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
Sector – Profitability* Exane universe is trading at around 1.05x BV for an estimated across-the-cycle RoE of
(%) 2010e 2011e 2011e 12% (after governments’ bank taxes). Assuming a 10% CoE, the theoretical value of the
vs
Peak sector could thus embed a 20% upside. However, with the aforementioned issues, we
ROE 8.7 10.7 52% believe it is unlikely that the sector will trade at its theoretical value.
* median ratios
Stocks
Sector – Solvency* SocGen (+, EUR55): the set of Q3 results confirms that the earnings recovery is well
(%) 2009 2010e 2011e underway. Moreover, it gave credibility to guidance disclosed by management a few
Tier 1 Ratio 10.8 11.8 11.8 months ago: 1/ breakeven in Russia 2) contribution from legacy assets to results in line
* median ratios with expectations and reduced exposure, 3) confirmation of the gradual fall in the LLPs.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates
Deutsche Bank (+, EUR57): with IB momentum having normalized, a re-rating is now
required for the stock to outperform. The two concerns that prevented it are removed
with the DPB deal: capital adequacy and overdependence on IB. The bank is trading at a
Elie Darwish compelling 0.7x P/BV for an 11.5% ROE in 2011.
(+33) 1 42 99 50 13
elie.darwish@exanebnpparibas.com
Dexia (-, EUR3.4): the restructuring plan is on track but there remains lot to do. We
banks@exanebnpparibas.com believe that even on a 0.5x P/BV, it is early to return to the stock given the low level of
ROE expected over the next few years. Assuming that the AFS reserve has remained
Ian Gordon flat since the end of Q2, the valuation would be close to zero.
(+44) 207 039 9407
ian.gordon@exanebnpparibas.com
StandChart (-, GBP18.31): Strong growth will continue, driven by Global Markets within
its Wholesale Banking division. However, it is adversely impacted on liability spreads by
Eric Hazart "lower for longer" interest rates and on asset spreads by increased competition in Asia
(+33) 1 44 95 35 68 (in contrast to expanding asset spreads in the UK). Also, core tier 1 has risen from c.6%
eric.hazart@exanebnpparibas.com pre-crisis to pro-forma 11% today, so returns are under pressure. We expect RoEs of
banks@exanebnpparibas.com
c.13% in 2011/12e against historic delivery of, and notional targeting of, "high-teens"
returns. These challenges will mitigate against a further re-rating in the near term.
P/E
23.0x 180%
21.0x
160%
19.0x
17.0x 140%
15.0x
120%
13.0x
11.0x 100%
9.0x
80%
7.0x
5.0x 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
P/BV
3.5x 100%
3.0x 90%
2.5x 80%
2.0x 70%
1.5x 60%
1.0x 50%
0.5x 40%
0.0x 30%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
ROE
16.0%
100%
14.0%
80%
12.0%
10.0%
60%
8.0%
40%
6.0%
4.0% 20%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
110
105
100
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
EV/Sales
3.0x 240%
2.5x 220%
2.0x
200%
1.5x
180%
1.0x
160%
0.5x
0.0x 140%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
13.0x 150%
12.0x 140%
11.0x 130%
10.0x 120%
9.0x 110%
8.0x 100%
7.0x 90%
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
25.0
110%
23.0
100%
21.0
19.0 90%
17.0
80%
15.0
70%
13.0
11.0 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Beverages (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
92
90
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Paul Roger
(+44) 203 430 8415
paul.roger@exanebnpparibas.com
infrastructure@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
2.5x 120%
110%
2.0x
100%
1.5x
90%
1.0x
80%
0.5x 70%
0.0x 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Building Materials & Construction (lhs)
MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
13.0x 140%
130%
12.0x
120%
11.0x
110%
10.0x
100%
9.0x
90%
8.0x
80%
7.0x 70%
6.0x 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Building Materials & Construction (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
110%
29.0
100%
24.0
90%
80%
19.0
70%
14.0 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Building Materials & Construction (lhs)
MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
95
90
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
capitalgoods@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
110%
2.5x
100%
2.0x
90%
1.5x 80%
70%
1.0x
60%
0.5x
50%
0.0x 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Capital Goods (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
11.0x
120%
10.0x
110%
9.0x
8.0x 100%
7.0x
90%
6.0x
5.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Capital Goods (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
23.0 130%
120%
18.0
110%
100%
13.0
90%
8.0 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Capital Goods (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
Favourite stocks
120
Clariant + 3,032 11.2 4.9 NC
Linde + 16,895 24.8 7.3 1.6
Yara Intl ASA + 10,189 22.2 5.8 0.8 115
Stocks to avoid
Solvay - 6,256 12.5 4.9 NC 110
Syngenta - 19,179 26.7 9.8 0.2
AkzoNobel = 10,095 13.7 6.7 0.5
105
100
95
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
The sector trades at 9.5x (market cap-weighted) EV/EBIT, a 12% premium to the market.
Diversified chemicals valuation remains attractive but earnings could lack momentum.
Matthias Cornu Stocks
(+33) 1 42 99 24 29
matthias.cornu@exanebnpparibas.com Clariant remains our top pick with a still low utilization rate (mid 70’s), further self-help
opportunities; and potential improvements in pricing power and portfolio transformation.
chemicals@exanebnpparibas.com We also like Lanxess within diversified chemicals. Yara remains the best play within
agrochemicals while Linde and Givaudan offer a nice play on EM exposure.
EV/Sales
2.5x 110%
2.0x 100%
1.5x 90%
1.0x 80%
0.5x 70%
0.0x 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
12.0x
120%
11.0x
110%
10.0x
9.0x 100%
8.0x
90%
7.0x
80%
6.0x
5.0x 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
31.0 130%
120%
26.0
110%
21.0 100%
90%
16.0
80%
11.0 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Chemicals (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
90
85
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Sector – Growth*
Valuation
% ch. 2010e 2011e Hist.
Avg Food is trading broadly in-line with its average post tech-boom P/E. While HPC is trading
Sales 9.9 4.6 4.5 at a modest discount, this likely reflects future earnings growth at both L’Oreal and
EBIT 16.2 7.5 6.7
Reckitt Benckiser being below historical levels. Relative to market P/E, both sectors are
EPS 18.0 9.1 10.6
trading at historical highs (excluding the market implosion in FY08).
Sector – Profitability*
Stocks
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e
vs Our favoured stocks are an eclectic mix. Henkel is our preferred HPC name as we see
peak
EBITDA
much scope for self-help and c.50% of the business is adhesives and therefore not
16.5 16.6 101%
EBIT 13.7 13.5 100% exposed to what will likely be a tough developed world HPC market. In Food, our
Net 8.9 9.4 65% preferred large cap pick is Danone as given increasing global milk production we believe
* median ratios it will face lower cost inflation than peers in FY11. Premier Foods is a special situation
where we believe de-leveraging of liabilities offers very material upside.
Sector – Solvency**
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e Our least preferred HPC stock is Beiersdorf. While M&A speculation will provide share
Net Debt/EBITDA 0.8 0.3 0.3 price underpinning, we believe that trading will remain poor for much of FY11. In Food,
Interest Cover 21 28 42
Gearing (%)
our least preferred large cap stock is Nestle. While it is a fantastic company, given
27% 11% 11%
** based on aggregated figures FY10’s out performance we believe that this is now priced in and we struggle to see a
NC = Net Cash catalyst for further out performance.
NA = Not Applicable
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates
Jeff Stent
(+44) 207 039 9469
jeff.stent@exanebnpparibas.com
foodhpc@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
2.5x 170%
160%
2.0x
150%
1.5x
140%
1.0x
130%
0.5x 120%
0.0x 110%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Food & HPC (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
7.0x 100%
6.0x 90%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Food & HPC (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
Rel. 12m EPS Food & HPC (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
85
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Sector – Profitability* The second important factor is likely to be M&A, particularly in the markets severely hit
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e
vs
by the crisis and still fragmented, such as the USA, Greece, or Spain. The companies
peak that have the best balance sheets are likely to make the most of this situation and
EBITDA 7.4 7.6 92% accelerate their growth.
EBIT 4.9 4.9 82%
Net 2.9 3.4 89%
* median ratios Valuation
The sector is currently enjoying a 10% premium to the market (ex financials). It seems
Sector – Solvency** that some restructuring cases have been well played by the market, driving multiples to a
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e
higher level. The British market seems neglected on consumption fears.
Net Debt/EBITDA 1.6 1.3 1.1
Interest Cover 8 9 11
Gearing (%) 57% 50% 41% Stocks
** based on aggregated figures
NC = Net Cash Our favourite stocks are Tesco and Morrison in the UK; both remain at attractive
NA = Not Applicable valuations and benefit from the oligopolistic structure of the British market. Carrefour is
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates still an interesting bet on the ability of the new hypermarket format to recover share in
mature markets. As for Ahold, its very solid balance sheet will help it make the most of
the consolidation of the US market and enhance growth in the next few years.
Philippe Suchet
(+33) 1 42 99 25 20
philippe.suchet@exanebnpparibas.com
foodretail@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
55%
2.5x
50%
2.0x
45%
1.5x 40%
35%
1.0x
30%
0.5x
25%
0.0x 20%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Food Retail (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
11.0x 110%
10.0x 100%
9.0x
90%
8.0x
7.0x 80%
6.0x 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Food Retail (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
23.0 90%
21.0 80%
19.0
70%
17.0
60%
15.0
50%
13.0
11.0 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Food Retail (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
120
110
100
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Philippe Suchet
(+33) 1 42 99 25 20
philippe.suchet@exanebnpparibas.com
generalretail@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
2.5x 110%
2.0x 100%
1.5x 90%
1.0x 80%
0.5x 70%
0.0x 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales General Retail (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
12.0x
120%
11.0x
110%
10.0x
9.0x 100%
8.0x
90%
7.0x
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT General Retail (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
22.0 110%
20.0 100%
18.0
90%
16.0
80%
14.0
70%
12.0
10.0 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS General Retail (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
Stocks to avoid
100
Sonova - 5,951 40.6 13.1 NC
William Demant - 3,237 35.5 14.24 0.82
Straumann - 2,438 27.3 11.62 NC 95
90
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
EV/Sales
3.5x 200%
190%
3.0x
180%
2.5x
170%
2.0x
160%
1.5x
150%
1.0x
140%
0.5x 130%
0.0x 120%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Healthcare Providers & Services (lhs)
MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
7.0x 90%
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Healthcare Providers & Services (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
36.0
160%
31.0
140%
26.0
120%
21.0
16.0 100%
11.0 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Healthcare Providers & Services (lhs)
MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
70
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
Valuations are undemanding. The sector trades at P/BV10E of 1x for an expected ROE
of 10.6%. Book values, however, are currently inflated by unrealized gains on bonds.
The sector’s average dividend yield is 4.2%, ranging from 0% (ING) to 6.2% (Aviva).
Stocks
ING remains our top pick in the sector. We believe that the group is in a good position to
cope with the new regulations (bank and insurance). The disposal process should also
gain some momentum, providing some news flow. The base case scenario is a dual IPO
process for insurance activities.
Swiss Re is a strong cash generation and turnaround story combined with a positive
Thomas Jacquet, CFA
+33 1 42 99 51 96 reinsurance outlook (pricing is unlikely to be as bad as expected by the market).
thomas.jacquet@exanebnpparibas.com Aviva is our only buy in the UK. We find the consensus too bearish. The offer received
for the non life division reflects a more positive outlook. We welcome the potential
insurance@exanebnpparibas.com
disposals in minor countries.
P/E
13.0x 90%
11.0x 80%
9.0x 70%
7.0x 60%
5.0x 50%
3.0x 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
P/BV
3.5x 85%
80%
3.0x
75%
2.5x 70%
2.0x 65%
1.5x 60%
55%
1.0x
50%
0.5x 45%
0.0x 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
ROE
17.0%
110%
16.0%
100%
15.0%
14.0% 90%
13.0%
80%
12.0%
70%
11.0%
10.0% 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
Stocks to avoid 90
Nokia - 27,568 8.6 5.3 NC
ARM = 5,301 83.4 24.1 NC 85
80
75
70
65
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
Sector – Solvency** The sector has faced a massive de-rating and is now trading at a 12-month forward P/E
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e
of 10.2x, its lowest level since 1998 (20x historically). Looking at EV/Sales, the sector is
Net Debt/EBITDA NC NC NC
Interest Cover 33 43 37
also nearly trading at its lowest level since 1998, at 1.8x vs 3.2x historically.
Gearing (%) (21%) (24%) (33%) Paradoxically, the sector has never been so profitable (highest EBIT margin since 2000)
** based on aggregated figures and has never been so cash rich (20% of market capitalization in net cash). At this stage,
NC = Net Cash despite low cash returns to shareholders and a dubious track record of shareholder
NA = Not Applicable value creation in technology hardware, we believe that the de-rating of the sector
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates
observed over the past ten years has now run its course.
Alexander Peterc
(+44) 207 039 9413
Stocks
alexander.peterc@exanebnpparibas.com In semiconductors our favourite stock is Infineon. We believe that its new risk profile is
mispriced and expect a further re-rating of the stock. Our highest conviction in the sector
Jerome Ramel is Apple, the biggest beneficiary of both the smartphone and tablet booms. On the
(+44) 207 039 9484
network equipment side, we believe that Ericsson is still a very good bet for 2011, while
jerome.ramel@exanebnpparibas.com
we remain sceptical on Nokia’s ability to remain competitive in smartphones as long as it
ithardware@exanebnpparibas.com clings to its inefficient operating system roadmap.
EV/Sales
3.0x 200%
2.5x 180%
2.0x
160%
1.5x
140%
1.0x
120%
0.5x
0.0x 100%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales IT Hardw are (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
18.0x 180%
16.0x 160%
14.0x
140%
12.0x
120%
10.0x
100%
8.0x
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT IT Hardw are (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
18.0 130%
13.0 110%
8.0 90%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS IT Hardw are (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
85
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
Hotel stocks have largely re-rated in 2010 thanks to an upturn in RevPARs driven by
business travel revival. They now trade above mid-cycle multiples, which could limit the
upside, although there is still scope for real estate appreciation. Tour operators are more
appealing to us as they trade way below 12-13x their historical 12M forward P/Es.
Improvements in bookings could be among the catalysts for multiple expansion.
Matthias Desmarais
(+33) 1 44 95 58 60
matthias.desmarais@exanebnpparibas.com
Stocks
Our favourite Hotel stocks remain IHG for its cash generative and value creative profile,
leisureservices@exanebnpparibas.com and Sol Melia for its undervalued asset base. Among tour operators, we favour Thomas
Cook and TUI Travel for internal restructuring measures and FCF recovery at affordable
valuations. Compass remains our top pick in Catering.
EV/Sales
130%
2.5x
120%
2.0x 110%
100%
1.5x
90%
1.0x 80%
70%
0.5x
60%
0.0x 50%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Leisure & Hotels (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
11.0x 120%
10.0x 110%
9.0x
100%
8.0x
7.0x 90%
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Leisure & Hotels (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
25.0
100%
23.0
21.0 90%
19.0
80%
17.0
15.0 70%
13.0
60%
11.0
9.0 50%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Leisure & Hotels (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
110
90
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Edouard Crowley
(+44) 207 039 9438
edouard.crowley@exanebnpparibas.com
Leopold Authie
(+44) 207 039 9503
leopold.authie@exanebnpparibas.com
luxurygoods@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
3.0x 160%
2.5x
140%
2.0x
1.5x 120%
1.0x
100%
0.5x
0.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Luxury Goods (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
9.0x 100%
8.0x 90%
7.0x
80%
6.0x
5.0x 70%
4.0x 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Luxury Goods (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
140%
31.0
130%
26.0 120%
110%
21.0
100%
16.0
90%
11.0 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Luxury Goods (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
90
85
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Pre-crisis long-term issues to hit harder in 2011: directories and print newspapers have
Sector – Growth* to cope with perpetual print usage decline and difficulties switching to online model, FTA
% ch. 2010e 2011e Hist. TV need to adapt to new connected devices and audience fragmentation from greater
Avg
DTT and pay-TV penetration in most EU countries.
Sales 5.2 2.9 7.4
EBIT 7.7 10.8 11.3
EPS 11.0 12.2 7.9
The downturn forced most companies to cut costs aggressively, often beyond market
expectations. Yet, cost-cutting stories will fade in 2011 as opportunities to reduce
expenses shrink and risk of losing market share widens.
Sector – Profitability*
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e
vs Valuation
peak
EBITDA 22.8 24.7 86% Following 10 years of market underperformance, the sector has regained momentum
EBIT 18.6 19.3 85% (5% outperformance YTD). Yet, the sector looks still affordable, trading 10% below the
Net 8.8 10.5 57% market on EV/EBIT11. In light of reasonable EPS growth (+10% in FY11), above market
* median ratios average dividend yield (4.5%) and relatively low leverage (1.1x Net Debt / EBITDA in
FY11), we view the discount as unjustified.
Sector – Solvency**
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e
Net Debt/EBITDA 1.8 1.3 1.0 Stocks
Interest Cover 9 10 13
Gearing (%)
Publicis (+) and WPP (+) combine structurally sound business models, digital and
70% 52% 42%
** based on aggregated figures emerging markets exposure, cheap valuation (c.8.5x EBITA11) and earnings
NC = Net Cash momentum.
NA = Not Applicable Reed Elsevier (+) offers catch-up potential owing to the late-cyclical nature of its assets
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates (Events, Legal) and reasonable market expectations
Lagardère (+) is the best way to play the expanding e-book market, with positive
impacts on margins.
The buoyant consumer spending trends in Germany on top of stringent cost control are
likely to sustain ProSiebenSat.1 (+) re-rating.
Charles Bedouelle
(+44) 207 039 9482
charles.bedouelle@exanebnpparibas.com Pearson (-) positive momentum is likely to abate in FY11 as budgetary pressures in
North America are likely to trigger negative earnings revisions.
media@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
3.5x 170%
3.0x 160%
2.5x 150%
2.0x 140%
1.5x 130%
1.0x 120%
0.5x 110%
0.0x 100%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
13.0x
120%
12.0x
110%
11.0x
10.0x 100%
9.0x
90%
8.0x
80%
7.0x
6.0x 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
13.0
100%
11.0
90%
9.0
80%
7.0 70%
5.0 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Media (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
Favourite stocks
Xstrata + 44,332 15.4 5.1 0.3 180
Norsk Hydro + 9,629 14.4 6.2 0.4
Rio Tinto + 105,284 22.3 4.9 0.0
Stocks to avoid 160
BHP Billiton = 174,252 26.7 7.1 0.0
Lonmin = 3,870 29.2 16.9 1.2
140
120
100
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
QE2 together with a weaker USD (arbitrage impact) were among the non-fundamental
Sector – Profitability* factors that helped trading sentiment on traded metals on the LME in recent weeks, but
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e
vs
this could last for another six months under our macroeconomic scenario. In areas where
peak prices have gone vertical we expect some volatility but still to remain at a high level.
EBITDA 40.9 42.6 90% Bottom line: the supply response is still constrained and both supply and demand remain
EBIT 33.1 34.7 85% largely inelastic for a metal like copper. We expect the copper market to remain tight not
Net 21.3 24.2 75%
just for two years but for five or six. Thermal coal should surprise on the upside too, with
* median ratios
Indian imports in FY11e adding to Chinese net imports topping 100mt already. Energy
efficiency closures in China – the first we have seen – are providing some support to the
Sector – Solvency**
aluminium market. Iron ore should remain underpinned by Chinese low grade-high cost
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e
Net Debt/EBITDA 1.1 0.5 0.2
capacity for another two years, but some capacity additions should change the picture
Interest Cover 22 27 35 after that.
Gearing (%) 30% 21% 9%
** based on aggregated figures
NC = Net Cash Valuation
NA = Not Applicable Valuations do not look overly stretched yet at about 5x EV/EBITDA FY11e for our
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates
preferred plays. Plays on industrial metals are already valued on long-term prices,
meaning the extra profits likely to be generated over the next 3-4 years are free.
Stocks
Xstrata is one of our favourite plays, with risks on the upside for both copper and coal
Sylvain Brunet
+33 1 42 99 50 84 (accounting for 80% of EBIT). Vale and Rio Tinto’s leverage to iron ore should still
sylvain.brunet@exane.com benefit from short-term tightness. Norsk Hydro’s earnings in FY11e should record the
first contribution from the group’s low cost Qatar plant and reflect the acquisition of
metals@exanebnpparibas.com
Vale’s alumina assets.
105 Market Outlook 2011
Mining - Valuation and Earnings Dynamics*
EV/Sales
EV/EBIT
4.0x 60%
50%
2.0x 40%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
92.0
82.0 330%
72.0
280%
62.0
230%
52.0
42.0 180%
32.0
130%
22.0
12.0 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Mining (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
90
85
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Sector – Growth* Looking into 2011, we see no reason to change our Outperform rating on the Oil & Gas
% ch. 2010e 2011e Hist. sector. In a world of quantitative easing it should benefit from two effects. Central bank
Avg
asset purchases are pushing down bond yields, making this asset class relatively
Sales 22.5 3.9 9.8
unattractive and encouraging investors to reach for yield in other more risky asset
EBIT 33.9 12.1 17.9
EPS 26.0 11.0 15.8
classes. This should benefit equities as a whole, and especially high yielding stocks.
With a dividend yield a third higher than the equity market average, Oil & Gas fits the bill.
Despite this year’s obvious dividend disappointment, dividends are fundamentally well
Sector – Profitability* covered for most Oil Majors, in our opinion. The second effect of quantitative easing is a
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e
vs
boost for real assets, such as commodities, as a hedge against potential future inflation.
peak The oil price has risen almost 20% since talk of quantitative easing began.
EBITDA 19.7 22.7 77%
EBIT 14.0 16.2 68% Oil & Gas sector earnings should grow 11% next year, on Exane BNPP estimates. This
Net 7.5 8.2 83%
is less than our top-down forecast of total market earnings growth (16%). Given low
* median ratios
sector valuations (see below), however, we do not see this earnings gap as problematic
or a cause for underperformance.
Sector – Solvency**
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e
Net Debt/EBITDA 0.8 0.8 0.7 Valuation
Interest Cover 41 64 42
Gearing (%) 32% 36% 32% On most valuation measures the Oil & Gas sector looks attractive. The dividend yield is a
** based on aggregated figures third higher than the market average and the cyclically adjusted P/E ratio is about a third
NC = Net Cash lower than the market average. On a forward P/E basis, Oil & Gas is one of the cheapest
NA = Not Applicable sectors in the market. The valuation discount should sufficiently protect against
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates
underperforming earnings, whilst we see modest re-rating potential on a dividend basis.
Stocks
Our top picks in the sector are BG and Repsol. Both will benefit from exposure to Brazil,
Alexandre Marie
with the ongoing development of very large fields such as tupi (BG 25%) and Guara (BG
(+44) 207 039 9427
alexandre.marie@exanebnpparibas.com 30%, Repsol 25%) as well as further planned exploration and appraisal drilling. Repsol
should also benefit from the continued improvement in fuel and gas prices in Argentina,
energy@exanebnpparibas.com widening margins for its subsidiary YPF.
EV/Sales
2.5x 110%
100%
2.0x
90%
1.5x
80%
1.0x
70%
0.5x 60%
0.0x 50%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Oil & Gas (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Oil & Gas (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
34.0 130%
29.0 120%
110%
24.0
100%
19.0
90%
14.0 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Oil & Gas (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
85
80
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Sector – Profitability*
Valuation
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e Pharma currently trades at a 5% discount to the market on 12-month forward P/E (10.3x
vs
peak vs 10.8x respectively), still far from the 5-year historical premium average of 15%. This
EBITDA 37.1 37.2 101% fails to fully reflect the positive trends in emerging markets, sound FCF yield (9.2% vs
EBIT 32.0 32.9 114% 6.0% for the market) and dividend yield (4.4% vs historical average of 2.6%).
Net 22.3 24.1 102%
* median ratios
Stocks
Our top picks among large pharmas are Roche and Sanofi which both trade at material
Sector – Solvency** discounts of 10-20% to sector multiples for unjustified reasons in our view. We expect
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e Roche’s re-rating to be driven by the ongoing cost-cutting programme, below-average
Net Debt/EBITDA 0.5 0.6 0.3 exposure to generics and faster 2010-15e EPS CAGR (7.5% vs 3.5% for peers). Sanofi
Interest Cover 16 16 21
Gearing (%)
is likely to acquire US biotech Genzyme for up to USD75 per share (i.e. remaining
23% 25% 11%
** based on aggregated figures disciplined), and should benefit from the gradual improvement of its diversified profile.
NC = Net Cash Also, we buy Novartis, trading in line with peers on 2011e P/E, despite a more attractive
NA = Not Applicable profile, research portfolio and solid 2010-15e EPS CAGR of 4% vs 3% for large pharma.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates Within Specialty pharma, our top pick is UCB which is a growth story (15% 2010-15e
EPS CAGR vs 6% for peers) with limited risk as its three main growth drivers are newly
launched products (Cimzia, VImpat, Neupro). Within the biotech segment, we like
Stallergènes, a fast growing profitable player in the niche market of allergy
desensitization, expanding towards Asia and the US. Within generics, we prefer Stada
Vincent Meunier
and Teva.
(+33) 1 42 99 24 42
vincent.meunier@exanebnpparibas.com
pharma@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
4.0x
3.5x 270%
3.0x
250%
2.5x
2.0x
230%
1.5x
1.0x 210%
0.5x
0.0x 190%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
14.0x 150%
13.0x 140%
12.0x 130%
11.0x 120%
10.0x 110%
9.0x 100%
8.0x 90%
7.0x 80%
6.0x 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
21.0 110%
19.0 100%
17.0
90%
15.0
13.0 80%
11.0 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Pharmaceuticals (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
80
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
Following the decline in bond yields, our NOPAT yield valuation model, which takes into
account the long-term relationship between listed real estate stocks and long-term real
corporate bond yields, suggests that the real estate sector is attractive compared to
bonds. Currently, the European listed real estate sector is trading on a NOPAT yield of
5.2%, 380bp above the European long-term real corporate bond yield of 1.4%. This
400bp spread is some way above the average spread between these two yields between
1989 and October 2010 (120bps). Nonetheless, as a number of other sectors within the
equity markets also appear attractive relative to bonds, we remain Neutral.
Stocks
Klépierre- Klépierre offers the most attractive valuation amongst pan-European
shopping centre companies. We believe that current fears on the Hungarian and Spanish
portfolios (resp 3% and 9% of group revenues) are exaggerated while investors
underestimate the potential value-creation from the Scandinavian portfolio (14%).
Valerie Guezi Icade – We see considerable upside in the like-for-like portfolio, driven by a declining
(+44) 207 039 9505 vacancy rate over the short term and a recovery in development margins over the
valerie.guezi@exanebnpparibas.com
medium term, and further rental growth will come from the EUR750m pipeline.
realestate@exanebnpparibas.com
P/E
27.0x 210%
190%
22.0x
170%
17.0x 150%
130%
12.0x
110%
7.0x 90%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
P/BV
3.5x 80%
3.0x
70%
2.5x
60%
2.0x
50%
1.5x
40%
1.0x
0.5x 30%
0.0x 20%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
ROE
13.0% 50%
11.0%
40%
9.0%
30%
7.0%
20%
5.0%
3.0% 10%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
130
Favourite stocks
ArcelorMittal + 38,014 8.3 6.1 1.6
ThyssenKrupp + 11,001 11.8 6.1 1.3
120
Tenaris + 19,384 22.1 7.9 NC
Stocks to avoid
Voestalpine - 5,155 11.4 5.5 2.5 110
Vallourec = 8,917 17.4 8.1 0.5
☺ Vallourec (+15.9%)*
100 ArcelorMittal (-23.7%)*
90
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Valuation
European carbon steel companies currently trade at between 0.75x (ArcelorMittal,
ThyssenKrupp, Salzgitter) and 1x EV/CE (Voestalpine). At the low end of this range,
valuations already look somewhat beyond the earnings potential in 2011e, but do not yet
discount normalised earnings potential.
EV/Sales
90%
2.5x
80%
2.0x
70%
1.5x 60%
50%
1.0x
40%
0.5x
30%
0.0x 20%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
16.0x 170%
14.0x 150%
12.0x 130%
10.0x 110%
8.0x 90%
6.0x 70%
4.0x 50%
2.0x 30%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
25.0
170%
20.0
15.0
120%
10.0
5.0 70%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Steel (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
100
95
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
EV/Sales
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Support Services (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
14.0x
140%
13.0x
130%
12.0x
11.0x 120%
10.0x 110%
9.0x
100%
8.0x
90%
7.0x
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Support Services (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
24.0 100%
22.0
20.0 90%
18.0
80%
16.0
14.0
70%
12.0
10.0 60%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Support Services (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
Favourite stocks
BT Group + 15,082 11.0 4.0 1.3 100
Telenor + 18,891 20.0 5.5 0.5
Deutsche Telekom + 43,313 17.8 4.8 1.9
95
KPN + 17,995 17.8 5.3 1.9
Stocks to avoid
Portugal Telecom - 8,663 17.2 5.9 2.0 90
Telecom Italia = 18,373 8.3 3.9 2.3
Iliad = 4,308 39.9 6.3 1.0
85
80
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Looking at 2011, we remain believers in the defensiveness of telcos and we still favour
Sector – Growth*
exposure to mobile in emerging markets (notably Asia and Africa).
% ch. 2010e 2011e Hist.
Avg
In Europe, given the more optimistic consensus view on mobiles (as demonstrated by
Sales 0.9 2.0 5.7
EBIT 0.4 4.7 12.8
the excellent performance of Vodafone in 2010), we are constructive but increasingly
EPS 1.8 6.6 20.9 selective: the growth in Nordic markets is well discounted and the Southern markets are
likely to remain very depressed due to the macro backdrop and competitive pressure
(Spain, Portugal, Italy), so we believe that the best place in Europe to play the
Sector – Profitability*
accelerating mobile data growth is now Germany. Fixed-line trends remain very country-
Margins (%) 2010e 2011e 2011e
vs specific but on a sector-wide basis the most interesting theme remains cable.
peak
EBITDA 37.5 36.5 81% Valuation
EBIT 22.5 21.9 81%
Net 16.9 13.7 64% The sector’s discount on P/E has vanished but European incumbents remain uniquely
* median ratios attractive on FCF yield and dividend yield. We believe that their FCF is sustainable, and
so are the dividends, in most cases (on average dividends represent c.70% of FCF).
Sector – Solvency**
(x) 2009 2010e 2011e Stocks
Net Debt/EBITDA 2.0 2.0 1.8
Interest Cover
- BT: we expect FCF upgrades thanks to cost cutting and a progressive improvement in
8 8 9
Gearing (%) 95% 85% 77% the revenue trend (reflecting BT’s gradually improving competitive position in the UK
** based on aggregated figures fixed-line market), plus large upside on the pension deficit front.
NC = Net Cash
NA = Not Applicable - Deutsche Telekom: exposure to the attractive German mobile market, cost cutting
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates protecting the domestic fixed-line EBITDA, while T-Mobile US, which is in a difficult
situation, remains an undervalued option.
- Telenor and Millicom are our favourite emerging market plays, and KPN remains one
of the most defensive stocks with a very attractive valuation and cash return policy.
EV/Sales
3.5x
190%
3.0x
180%
2.5x
2.0x 170%
1.5x
160%
1.0x
150%
0.5x
0.0x 140%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/Sales Telecom Operators (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
EV/EBIT
13.0x
130%
12.0x
120%
11.0x
10.0x 110%
9.0x
100%
8.0x
90%
7.0x
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EV/EBIT Telecom Operators (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials (lhs)
Rel. 12m EPS Telecom Operators (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
75
70
65
Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
* Cyclically adjusted P/E * Best and worst performers in 2010, based on Exane BNP Paribas
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates universe. Relative performance in brackets.
Source: Thomson Datastream, Exane BNP Paribas
Benjamin Leyre
(+33) 1 42 99 24 72
benjamin.leyre@exanebnpparibas.com
utilities@exanebnpparibas.com
EV/Sales
3.5x 170%
3.0x 160%
2.5x 150%
2.0x 140%
1.5x 130%
1.0x 120%
0.5x 110%
0.0x 100%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
EV/EBIT
13.0x 140%
12.0x
130%
11.0x
120%
10.0x
110%
9.0x
100%
8.0x
7.0x 90%
6.0x 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
25.0
120%
23.0
110%
21.0
19.0 100%
17.0
90%
15.0
13.0 80%
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11
Rel. 12m EPS Utilities (lhs) MSCI Europe Ex Financials rebased (lhs)
*Based on consensus estimates for Exane BNP Paribas covered stocks universe.
Source: Exane BNP Paribas, Factset Estimates, MSCI
US sector performances3
Sector Performance over (%)
1 week 1 month 3 months 1 year YTD
Automobiles & Components (1.8) 11.8 27.8 51.2 46.3
Banks (3.0) 4.8 4.0 1.0 5.5
Capital Goods (0.8) 1.0 8.9 14.5 15.5
Commercial Services & Supplies (0.8) (1.6) 5.6 3.4 2.4
Consumer Durables & Apparel (0.3) 1.5 13.7 22.6 20.0
Consumer Services (2.0) 6.2 16.2 28.4 29.3
Diversified Financials (1.9) 2.7 4.9 (8.0) (2.8)
Energy (1.5) 5.1 17.2 5.2 8.5
Food & Staples Retailing (0.4) 0.8 9.4 0.4 2.0
Food Beverage & Tobacco (0.1) 0.4 6.1 12.2 12.6
Health Care Equipment & Services (2.0) 1.8 8.2 4.6 (0.5)
Household & Personal Products (0.0) (0.7) 3.8 0.5 3.8
Insurance (1.2) (1.5) 6.0 10.4 12.8
Materials (3.4) 1.5 11.6 9.5 9.2
Media 0.0 4.0 11.8 24.9 20.4
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology (0.7) (3.3) 4.2 0.8 (1.3)
Real Estate (3.5) (3.3) 3.5 20.7 17.1
Retailing (1.4) 3.5 16.8 20.6 18.5
Semiconductors & Semiconductor (0.4) 8.4 13.4 10.3 3.0
Software & Services (1.9) 0.7 13.9 5.9 2.3
Technology Hardware & Equipment (2.4) (2.6) 11.5 11.7 9.3
Telecommunication Services (1.0) 0.3 6.2 13.7 6.5
Transportation 0.0 1.7 11.3 25.4 25.2
Utilities (1.2) (3.2) 1.4 6.1 0.2
Source: Factset
By group1
Weighting P/E (x) EPS growth (%)
(%) 2010e 2011e 2012e 2010e 2011e 2012e
Energy 10.9 9.8 8.8 7.8 44 12 12
Cyclicals1 38.7 14.4 12.1 10.7 97 19 13
Defensives1 27.9 12.3 11.7 11.0 9 6 7
Financials 20.1 10.7 8.8 7.6 48 21 17
Technology 2.3 16.1 13.2 11.7 51 22 13
Market excl. Basic Res and Financials 72.8 12.7 11.5 10.5 31 10 10
Market excl. Energy 89.1 12.5 11.0 9.8 39 14 12
Market excl. Financials 79.9 12.7 11.4 10.3 36 11 10
Market excl. Oil ex Fin 69.0 13.3 11.9 10.9 35 11 10
Market 12.2 10.7 9.6 39 14 12
1
Cyclicals = Automobiles & Components, Capital Goods, Chemicals, Commercial Services & Supplies, Construction Materials, Consumer Durables
& Apparel, Consumer Services, Media, Metals & Mining, Retailing, Telecommunication Services, Transportation
Defensives = Food & Staples Retailing, Food Beverage & Tobacco, Health Care Equipment & Services, Household & Personal Products,
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Utilities
Technology = Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment, Software & Services, Technology Hardware & Equipment
Source: Factset, Exane BNP Paribas estimates
Rating definitions
Stock Rating (vs Sector)
Outperform: The stock is expected to outperform the industry large-cap coverage universe over a 12-month investment horizon.
Neutral: The stock is expected to perform in line with the industry large-cap coverage universe over a 12-month investment horizon.
Underperform: The stock is expected to underperform the industry large-cap coverage universe over a 12-month investment horizon.
Sector Rating (vs Market)
Outperform: The sector is expected to outperform the DJ STOXX50 over a 12-month investment horizon.
Neutral: The sector is expected to perform in line with the DJ STOXX50 over a 12-month investment horizon.
Underperform: The sector is expected to underperform the DJ STOXX50 over a 12-month investment horizon.
As at 04/10/2010 Exane BNP Paribas covered 577 stocks. The stocks that, for regulatory reasons, are not accorded a rating by Exane BNP Paribas are excluded from
these statistics. For regulatory reasons, our ratings of Outperform, Neutral and Underperform correspond respectively to Buy, Hold and Sell; the underlying
signification is, however, different as our ratings are relative to the sector.
42% of stocks covered by Exane BNP Paribas were rated Outperform. During the last 12 months, Exane acted as distributor for BNP Paribas on the 3% of stocks with
this rating for which BNP Paribas acted as manager or co-manager on a public offering. BNP Paribas provided investment banking services to 9% of the companies
accorded this rating*.
38% of stocks covered by Exane BNP Paribas were rated Neutral. During the last 12 months, Exane acted as distributor for BNP Paribas on the 0% of stocks with this
rating for which BNP Paribas acted as manager or co-manager on a public offering. BNP Paribas provided investment banking services to 5% of the companies
accorded this rating*.
20% of stocks covered by Exane BNP Paribas were rated Underperform. During the last 12 months, Exane acted as distributor for BNP Paribas on the 1% of stocks
with this rating for which BNP Paribas acted as manager or co-manager on a public offering. BNP Paribas provided investment banking services to 3% of the
companies accorded this rating*.
* Exane is independent from BNP Paribas. Nevertheless, in order to maintain absolute transparency, we include in this category transactions carried out by BNP
Paribas independently from Exane. For the purpose of clarity, we have excluded fixed income transactions carried out by BNP Paribas.
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