Cover photo courtesy of Salvatore

Vuono, FreeDigitalPhotos.net
 Northwest Mountain Region, Federal Aviation Administration,
Department of Transportation
Transport Certification Update
From the Directorate Manager:
Keeping an eye on the future
O
ver the past two years, we have introduced a
series of organizational changes aimed at
preparing for eventual implementation of
Safety Management System within Aircraft
Certification Service. We have created the Boeing
Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO), responsible
for overseeing Boeing Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA), the largest and by far the more
complex delegated organization in the U.S. We also
established an office called Oversight and Evaluations.
This office is responsible for monitoring and measuring the
performance of the Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD)
in accomplishing our safety mission. It provides the quality
and safety assurance functions within TAD. Although
organizational change may be necessary for the
implementation of SMS, it won’t be sufficient without
structured, data-driven, process-based methods like
Monitor Safety Analyze Data (MSAD), one of our newly
established processes and tools designed to help us with
Continued Operational Safety oversight (see the MSAD
article in this Edition).
Reflecting back on these two years, I can report the
change process has gone relatively well. There is no
doubt that we have more to do, and more changes are
coming our way. Although we’ve followed a change
management process and walked through all the right
Transport Certification Update
.
steps, it is clear now that more could have been done to
communicate the vision with people affected. I’m not
speaking of presenting a concept or idea to them, but
rather helping with the understanding of what these
organizational changes mean to them personally. The
more people understand their roles, the more willing they
are to embrace the change. Still, most of our colleagues
kept the end objective in mind, trusting the process,
demonstrating a tremendous degree of resilience and
flexibility to achieve that objective. I am thankful for the
great support of these very important activities.
We are in the early stages of the SMS journey. The
initial indicators show that we are on the right track.
Much like a complex puzzle, pieces are beginning to fit
very nicely together, and the emerging picture is an
exciting future—a safer global aviation system with
shared responsibilities. What we do today and how we
prepare for the future will dictate the pace and the
degree of success we can achieve. The stakes are high.
Fortunately, we have the most important ingredient for
success—dedicated and committed people. We have the
right team to help us along the long and sometimes rough
road ahead.
~ Ali Bahrami
Edition 29, Spring 2011 1
 Transport Certification Update

Features
Safety Management System: By Suzanne Masterson and Phil Page 3
Risk-based safety decisions Forde

Widespread Fatigue Damage: By Annette Kovite Page 5

You can barely see it Walter Sippel and Patrick Safarian
contributed to this article.
Wi-Fi Onboard By Nazih Khaouly and Dave Walen Page 8
Profile of a CSTA: By Mina Mitchell Page 10
Ann Azevedo

Departments
From the Directorate Manager: By Ali Bahrami Page 1
Keeping an eye on the future

Regulatory Radar: Information compiled by James Page 11

Regulations published in the Federal Register Wilborn
since the last edition
In memory: Back cover
A tribute to Jill Byington, Update Editor-in-Chief

On the Web
Aircraft Certification (AIR) Web Site Federal Rulemaking Web Site
AIR Draft Docs. Open for Comment Regulatory and Guidance Library
FAA Flight Plan Quarterly Report Transport Airplane Directorate Web Site

Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD) Organization

Contact Us:
If there is a topic you would
like to read about, if you
would like to subscribe to the
Transport Certification Update,
Christopher Spangenberg, Acting Manager.
or if you have a question or
comment, please e-mail us:
9-ANM-TAD-
Update@faa.gov
Ali Bahrami, Manager
Technical and Administrative Support Staff,
John V. Barrett, Manager.
Manufacturing Inspection Office,
Transport Standards Staff,
Mike Kaszycki, Manager.
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office,
Angelos Xidias, Manager
KC Yanamura, Assistant Manager
Denver Aircraft Certification Office,
Todd Dixon, Manager.
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
Bob Breneman, Acting Manager.
Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,
Kevin Hull, Manager
Oversight and Evaluations Office,
John Piccola, Manager

Transport Certification Update Edition 29, Spring 2011 2


Safety Management System:
Risk-based safety decisions
S
afety is paramount to the FAA.
Always has been, always will
be. We have long had a
system of establishing criteria
and setting priorities to address unsafe
conditions. But we lacked a precise,
structured approach. There was no
standard method to measure and
compare the qualitative data we were
using to make decisions on continued
operational safety (COS). There was
no standardized way to characterize
or measure risk associated with a
safety issue, or to apply that
standardized risk assessment
methodology across products.
MSAD: Continued operational
safety through structure and
standardization
The FAA’s Aircraft Certification
Service recently established a process
called “Monitor Safety/Analyze Data,”
or MSAD, to standardize the
procedures and approaches the
Aircraft Certification Offices (ACOs)
use to make continued operational
safety decisions. Across the service,
MSAD standardizes the way we
capture, classify,
and store safety
information. By
providing a
common tool and
process with risk-
based guidelines
to evaluate information, MSAD will
significantly enhance safety.
The associated MSAD order, Order
8110.107 (an FAA employee
directive), requires each aircraft
certification directorate to develop
product–specific, quantitative risk
analysis methodology and guidelines
Transport Certification Update
for determining risk (within the MSAD
tool as part of the record) in terms of
the statistical probability of a fatal
accident.
TARAM: Our answer to MSAD
In 2002, the Transport Airplane
Directorate (TAD) chartered its own
team to develop a risk analysis process
specifically for transport airplanes. The
result of that multi-year team
development is the Transport Airplane
Risk Assessment Methodology, or
TARAM. TARAM has evolved
significantly from lessons learned, as
well as from comments and suggestions
from many sources.
TARAM Handbook
The TARAM handbook was
prototyped beginning in 2006 in some
technical areas in the Seattle and Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Offices
(ACOs), and is now in use in all technical
areas in each ACO that oversees
transport category airplanes. Thanks to
feedback received from users, we have
further improved many areas such as
the risk assessment guidance, the
automation tools, and screening of
safety issues. The Handbook is posted
on the AVS Draft Document website,
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/
draft_docs/, available for public
review. The comment period closed
February 28, 2011. While the ACOs
have been using TARAM as part of the
MSAD process for risk analysis and risk
management for transport category
airplanes, this methodology may also be
used by design approval holders, in
whole or in part, by agreement with the
responsible ACO.
Edition 29, Spring 2011
Transport Certification Update
Another use for TARAM
Recently the Seattle ACO and
Transport Standards Staff created a
new use for the TARAM risk process.
The Seattle ACO used TARAM to help
address chem-mill
cracking of
fuselage skins in
an older fleet
following a
decompression
event. This new
application goes
beyond calculating
just the safety risk
and now can also
predict the number
of future events
(i.e., decompressions) that would occur,
based on each of three actions:
replacing the skin, relying on
inspections only, or doing nothing. This
ability to predict possible future safety
events is a first for structures. We
shared this information with airplane
operators at meetings to address the
chem-mill issue, which helped operators
to better understand what may be a
very burdensome inspection program
that will supersede four existing
airworthiness directives. Using TARAM,
it is now possible to calculate the effect
of various inspection thresholds on the
risk of a decompression event. This is
groundbreaking work that is increasing
FAA capabilities and fostering industry
cooperation on safety issues.
Other safety-related teams
The TAD is also co-leading a sub-
team with industry under a joint
Commercial Aviation Safety Team and
International Civil Aviation
Continued on page 4
3

(continued from page 3)
Organization Common Taxonomy Team
to develop improved taxonomies for
use in data sharing. After a thorough
analysis, the teams’ results will be
incorporated into the MSAD program.
A unique feature of MSAD is the
requirement to include a reviewing
board intended to improve safety
through better decision making. The
“CARB” (Corrective Action Review
Board) is a cross-functional group that
reviews safety issues and the proposed
corrective actions; the goal is improved
quality and consistency of safety
decision making within the Aircraft
Certification Service. Participating
CARB members from the FAA’s
manufacturing, operations, and
maintenance counterparts in Aviation
Safety bring valuable perspective to
safety decisions. Efforts by the CARB,
together with the use of objective risk
measures, will produce better
communicated and globally accepted
safety decisions.
Implementing TARAM involves a few
key points:
1. TARAM encourages data-driven
decision making.
Through TARAM, the data associated
with a particular safety issue, combined
with the collective engineering
judgment of the analysts, produce a
best-effort, good-faith estimate of the
actual risk involved. It is important that
analysts base their best estimates on
relevant data when developing the risk
values.
2. TARAM guidelines aren’t based on
a “go/no-go” threshold.
The risk guidelines in TARAM are not
thresholds or requirements and do not
obligate the CARB to make safety
decisions based only on the results of
risk analysis. According to the MSAD
Order, the CARB’s determination as to
Transport Certification Update
Transport Certification Update
whether an issue represents an TARAM training to all ACOs, which was
unsafe condition requiring corrective followed by a Risk Assessment Workshop in
action is based on all considerations October. We also provided training for a
relevant to the issue. major transport airplane manufacturer in
February 2011. We continue to offer
3. TARAM doesn’t override individual support for transport airplane
regulatory requirements for
safety issues as needed. 
airworthiness directives (AD).
When a regulation requires that
ADs be written (such as the
For more information ...
Widespread Fatigue Damage rule
requirement for mandatory • Forrest Keller— All transport
modifications to justify a limit of airplane risk assessment issues
validity), TARAM results will not be except airframe structures
(425-227-2790)
used in making the decision to write
an AD. The policy decision to write
• John Craycraft – Transport
ADs in those cases was made during
airplane structures risk
the course of rulemaking, and assessment issues, and back-up
prevails over the TARAM risk for other risk assessment issues
guidelines. TARAM results can still be (425-227-1951)
used to aid in setting compliance
• Jim Voytilla – Technical support
times in most cases.
for Excel version of TARAM
worksheets, and back-up for
TARAM training transport airplane risk assessment
In July through September 2010, issues (425-227-1164)
we offered in-person and online
MSAD user testing participants have provided valuable feedback. From left to right:
Kevin Rodriguez AQS-230;Anthony Flores, ACE-117C; Gregg Gullickson, IBM; Casey
Garhart, IBM; Doug Pegors, ANM-100S; Chris Spinney, ANE-142; Brett Portwood, ANM-
130L; Barry Ballenger, ACE-110;Dan Kerman, ANE-180; Brennen Roberts, AIR-140; Ann
Johnson, ACE-116W; Eric Barnett, ASW-112; Edwin Tait, Volpe Center; Mike Hemann,
ASW-112; Rabah Belloula, Volpe/CSC; Phil Howells, Volpe/CSC
Edition 29, Spring 2011 4
 Transport Certification Update

Widespread fatigue damage:

You can barely see it

It was two days before Christmas. I was sitting in a 737 at 35,000 feet, on my way to a family gathering. I was using my favorite
purple rollerball pen to pass the time with a crossword puzzle. As I was filling in the block for E3, I noticed something strange. A drop
of purple ink had appeared at the tip of my pen and was growing bigger and rounder as I watched. When it reached “critical mass,” it
splashed all over E3 and filled the box with purple ink. A new ink drop followed right behind it, growing larger in just the same way
and dribbling all over my page. My pen was reacting to the change in air pressure since the airplane had left the ground. The air
inside the pen was at ground-level air pressure because the pen had been manufactured at ground level. But by the time the pen reached
cruising altitude inside the airplane, the surrounding pressure in the cabin was less than the pressure inside the pen. So the ink wanted to
come out. The pressure inside the pen pushed the ink out until it spilled all over my newspaper.

The problem with pressure Properties of pressure long and 5 feet tall. Since the fuselage

C
hanges in air pressure affect
far more than pens, of
course, and are a serious
safety consideration to
aviation engineers. The interior of an
airplane must be pressurized to
counteract outside pressure at cruising
altitude for the safety and comfort of
the passengers and crew.
On the ground, we walk around
experiencing an air pressure of 14.7
pounds per square inch (psi) (at sea
level) pressing against our bodies.
Our bodies were designed to function
best under these conditions. But when
an airplane is 35,000 feet in the air,
the outside air pressure is roughly 3.5
psi. Passengers inside the airplane
couldn’t tolerate such low pressures.
Regulating pressure
According to the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 25.841), cabins and
compartments must be pressurized at
a cabin pressure altitude of not more
than 8,000 feet at the maximum
operating altitude of the airplane.
Manufacturers typically design
airplanes to maintain a pressure
differential of about 8.6 psi between
the outside air pressure and the inside
pressure at cruising altitude.
Transport Certification Update
If the outside air is pressing on the
airplane at 3.5 psi, and an 8.6-psi
pressure differential is maintained,
that means 12.1 psi of cabin air
pressure must be generated within the
airplane. The net effect of that
pressure difference is that 8.6 psi then
pushes out from the inside, against the
fuselage skin.
The pressure generated in the cabin
to maintain the pressure differential
changes as the airplane changes
altitude—and as it lands and takes
off. The 8.6-psi pressure differential
keeps people in the airplane
comfortable, but here’s the dilemma:
The constant cycling of pressure over
the life of the airplane—similar to the
constant inflating and deflating of a
balloon—eventually takes a toll on
the airplane’s metallic airframe
structure, such as the fuselage skin.
And the effects of this stress appear
at the most vulnerable places.
Patrick Safarian, Damage
Tolerance Technical Specialist for the
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
explains that during each cycle, the
fuselage skin reacts to the 8.6-psi
differential pressure that is pushing
out against it. The outside of an
aluminum-skin airplane is composed of
sheets of metal that may be 12.5 feet
of the airplane is essentially a large
circular tube with a radius that can
range from about 5.5 feet for the
smallest narrow-body transport airplane
to about 11.5 feet for the largest wide-
body, each section of skin is curved to
cover its part of the circle. Then those
sections are overlapped, much like roof
shingles but on a rounded surface, and
the overlap areas appear where the
sections are joined to each other. These
overlapping portions, typically joined
together with three rows of hundreds of
rivets, are called “lap joints” or “lap
splices.”
If you unfold a paperclip and bend
and stretch it back and forth, eventually
it will break under the stress. When
pressure increases inside the fuselage
and presses out against the aluminum
skin, that stress is felt in the metal as a
stretching and bending, especially
around the fastener holes of the lap
joints. Unlike a balloon, however, metals
can be stretched only so many times
before they begin to fail. Industry has
developed, and continues to generate,
data to determine when metals will fail
under repeated stress cycles.
Effects of Pressure
Because the fuselage skin on different
airplane models has been designed with
different thicknesses, results of this stress
will show up in different ways. If the
Continued on page 6
Edition 29, Spring 2011 5
(continued from page 5)
fuselage skin is thicker (e.g., 0.040-
inch thickness or more), minute cracks
might begin to occur around the
edges of certain fastener holes of lap
joints and at multiple locations. If the
skin is less thick, the continual
stretching may cause small cracks to
form under the skin’s surface.
Such subsurface cracks occur a little
distance away from the fastener
holes, but they too can occur at
multiple locations. Cracking below the
surface occurs because the thinner
fuselage skin, which is not as stiff as
the thicker skin, is actually trying to
bow out to accommodate the pressure
and the cracks are starting at the
curve of the bow. Cracks that start this
way can’t be seen until they’ve grown
to an unsafe length. Because there
typically might be only 1 inch
between fastener holes, by the time
such cracks reach the fastener holes
and are reliably detectable, each
crack is about 0.3 inch long and has
reduced the structural integrity of the
metal fuselage skin to below safe
levels.
Imagine a 1-inch section of metal
fuselage skin between two fastener
holes and two invisible cracks, 0.4 inch
apart, growing beneath the skin—one
towards each fastener. Each crack
begins at a place 0.3 inch away from
the fastener and grows towards it. By
S-4
Lap splice repair
Transport Certification Update
Fuselage Lower Skin @ Lap Joint (Externally Hidden Detail)
Fuselage Lower Skin @ Lap Joint (Externally Hidden Detail)
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Up Up First Initiation (Hole 9)
Aft Aft
Externally Visible Portion of Crack
Fuselage lap splice cracking
the time the two cracks have reached the
fastener holes and can be reliably
detected, each is about 0.3 inch long.
Now that 1-inch section of fuselage skin is
composed of 0.6 inch of cracks and 0.4
inch of solid metal. This cracking scenario
is repeated over many inches and at
multiple fastener holes—potentially an
unsafe condition.
One possible effect of pressure
Small, undetectable cracks like the ones
described—cracks that develop
simultaneously at multiple locations from
years and years of pressurization
cycles—can link up and grow very
rapidly to bring about catastrophic
failure of the metallic structure. This multi-
site cracking is called widespread
fatigue damage (WFD). The likelihood of
WFD increases in metallic structure as the
airplane accumulates additional flight
cycles. Although not discussed in this
article, fatigue cracking can also
simultaneously occur in similar adjacent
S-4 R
Airplane center
S-4 L
New
splice
Transport Certification Update
structural elements, such as frames or
Frame Shear Tie stringers. This multi‑site cracking will
Frame Shear Tie
not occur in composite (non-metallic)
11 12 13 14 15 16
structure because its design and
fabrication are different from that of
metallic structure.
First Initiation (Hole 9)
Externally Visible
Portion of Crack
Body frame cracking
The Aloha incident
What WFD can do to an airplane
was dramatically illustrated in April
1988 on a Boeing Model 737 airplane
operated by Aloha Airlines en route
from Hilo to Honolulu, Hawaii, when an
18-foot section of the upper fuselage
flew off the airplane during flight.
There was one fatality.
“Because of that accident,” says
Walter Sippel, Aerospace Engineer
from the Transport Airplane
Directorate, “we had to change our
thinking. We have to decide how long
an airplane can operate under a given
structural maintenance program before
we need more engineering data to
determine whether that maintenance
program needs to be changed.
Because WFD is inevitable and will
happen to every airplane (with metallic
structure) eventually, we need to
establish the limit of validity (LOV) of
the engineering data that supports the
structural maintenance program for
each airplane. We need to be sure
that WFD will not occur in airplanes,”
says Sippel, pointing to a picture of the
Continued on page 7
Edition 29, Spring 2011 6
(continued from page 6)
How widespread fatigue damage develops
Aloha airplane with the top of the
fuselage gone and the seated
passengers exposed, “or we may end up
with another Aloha-type accident, but
worse.”
Fuselage damage on Aloha Airlines Model 737
airplane. The Lessons Learned from Transport
Airplanes web site describes several lessons
learned from this accident, and explains that,
“continued operational safety is dependent
upon the development and implementation of
an effective airplane maintenance and
inspection program.” For more about this
accident, see Aloha Airlines Flight 243, Boeing
737-200, N73711, on the Lessons Learned site.
Preventing WFD: Rulemaking
and a Public Meeting
Walter Sippel is team lead for the
WFD rulemaking project. The WFD final
rule mandates that once the fatigue
characteristics of an airplane model are
Transport Certification Update
known and the LOV is established,
airplanes must not fly beyond that point,
unless additional engineering data are
developed to support an extended LOV
and any associated maintenance
actions.
Because of the Aloha Airlines
accident, and because of aerospace
engineers like Patrick Safarian and
Walter Sippel, as well as many in
industry who participated through the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee, much time, thought, and
effort have been put into developing a
systemic solution to the WFD challenge
and enhancing safety. Immediately
after the Aloha accident, airworthiness
directives were issued to require
operators to inspect for WFD or, in
some circumstances when inspections
were determined to be unreliable, to
replace parts.
As discussed in Edition 25 of the
Transport Certification Update (page
7), the FAA published a WFD notice of
proposed rulemaking in 2006 that
would have required design approval
holders to establish operational limits on
their transport category airplanes and
determine if maintenance actions are
needed to prevent WFD before an
airplane reaches its operational limit.
Edition 29, Spring 2011
Transport Certification Update
The FAA received many comments
about the WFD notice of proposed
rulemaking. Based on our analyses of
those comments, we revised the
requirements and changed the
assumptions made in our regulatory
evaluation.
Based on the comments received, in
2008, the FAA decided that it was
necessary to give the public an
opportunity to comment on those
changes before finalizing a WFD rule.
So we posted in the WFD rulemaking
docket a technical document describing
the changes. We also held a public
meeting as an opportunity for members
of industry who would be affected by
this rulemaking to express their concerns
and viewpoints in the meeting. It was
clear from the comments made at the
meeting that establishing a way to
prevent WFD accidents was everyone’s
goal, and that finding a cost-beneficial
way to do so was the challenge.
After the
comment period WFD Rulemaking. The
for the public publicly available
meeting closed, Docket for the WFD
Rulemaking contains
the FAA the WFD notice of
considered all proposed rulemaking
comments as well as the final
received on the rule and all comments
technical received regarding
document. The the notice of
proposed rulemaking.
final rule was
published November 15, 2010, and
became effective January 14, 2011.
A safer future
Through the proactive efforts of many
individuals, we were able to come up
with a rule that adequately addresses
the concerns of industry, and still
maintains the end goal of all these
activities: preventing future accidents
due to WFD. 
Many have expressed interest in classes
related to WFD. We are aware of one
class offered by one University of
Washington professor. For more
information about the class, contact Ms.
Silva Bedoyan at 509-339-5158,
fdtcourse@gmail.com.
7
 Transport Certification Update

Wi-Fi Onboard

W
hen we board an airplane airplanes include an installed Wi-Fi
today, we expect a safe access point, which is wired to a radio Why “Wi-Fi”?
flight. Some day, perhaps system that communicates between the The term “Wi-Fi” is a trademark of the
soon, we will also be able airplane and the ground network to Wi-Fi Alliance, a nonprofit
to expect—and receive—instant, provide a connection to the Internet. organization that sets worldwide
uninterrupted access to the Internet. See some possibilities in Figure 1. standards for high-speed wireless local
area networks (WLAN). The Wi-Fi
But while we want to connect our Alliance has granted manufacturers the
The current state of
portable electronic devices (PEDs) (our right to use this term to brand their
iPods, laptops, “smart” phones, and e- regulations certified products based on IEEE
books), and while some airlines do offer While safety concerns associated 802.11 standards. But “IEEE 802.11b
Wi‑Fi, most do not—yet. Because of with permanently installed equipment Direct Sequence” wasn’t catchy enough
this increasing passenger demand to use to describe this emerging technology,
are adequately addressed by part 25
and the term “Wi-Fi” was born. First
Wi‑Fi in flight, the FAA is investigating regulations, there are no similar used commercially in 1999, the term
ways to standardize and certify regulations or policy guidance for PEDs suggests wireless fidelity, and might be
installed systems that can be used by and Wi‑Fi in flight. a play on words (think “Hi-Fi”—which
Wi-Fi-equipped PEDs. some readers might remember), but it is
Federal Aviation Regulations 14 CFR
also suspected that “Wi-Fi” might
§25.1353 and §25.1431 address
How does Wi-Fi work in flight? actually have no specific meaning. Wi-
airplane system safety concerns Fi’s yin-yang logo seen in Figure 1
Our PEDs commonly include Wi-Fi related to interference (including suggests the interoperability of
radio transmitters that are based on electromagnetic interference) between products from different companies.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics permanently installed systems
Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standards. operating in the airplane, but these
Wi‑Fi radio transmitters operate in the regulations do not address the possible PEDs using Wi‑Fi radio transmitters
2.4‑ and 5‑GHz radio bands. Many interference from PEDs. As you might are mobile, and their electromagnetic
PEDs contain Wi-Fi radios that operate guess, the current airworthiness rules emissions can potentially affect a wide
in both bands. Wi‑Fi radios in our PEDs
did not anticipate a cabin full of range of equipment installed in an
can transmit to a nearby Wi-Fi access
transmitters being used by passengers! airplane. The regulations specifically
point. The Wi-Fi installations in
addressing the onboard use of PEDs
are found in operational rules, which
require the pilot or airline to determine
Figure 1. One possible configuration of a Wi‑Fi network installed on an airplane. Internet whether the use of PEDs in flight is
connectivity is provided through a satellite or a terrestrial radio. The PEDs communicate
wirelessly to a cabin telecommunications router (CTR). acceptable—no longer a realistic
expectation, considering the large
number and variations of devices
Satellite people bring onboard. The existing
regulations in 14 CFR §§ 91.21,
121.306, 125.204, and 135.144
Cabin require that PEDs do not interfere with
Telecommuni-
High Power
cations Router
the aircraft’s navigation or
Amplifier/Low communication systems. The
Noise Amplifier/
Satellite_Data_Link_WA proliferation of PEDs, including those
LA with transmitters such as Wi-Fi radios,
have resulted in additional concerns for
Satellite LA WA LA WA potential interference to required
Radio
Terrestrial equipment, or to equipment essential
Ethernet
for safe operation such as smoke
detectors or flight data recorders.
Continued on page 9

Transport Certification Update Edition 29, Spring 2011 8

 (continued from page 8)
FAA’s current criteria for using
Wi‑Fi
The FAA has developed acceptable
methods of compliance for Wi-Fi
installations intended to connect PEDs
to the internet. These methods of
compliance are provided to applicants
that want certification of installed
systems that can be used by Wi-Fi-
equipped PEDs.
We are focusing much of our effort
on two issues.
1. Vulnerability of airplane systems to
Wi-Fi radio transmitters in PEDs,
when they are used with the
installed Wi-Fi access point
Applicants should submit a plan for
detailed electromagnetic compatability
(EMC) testing that explains how they
will show that PEDs intended for use
with the installed Wi-Fi system will not
interfere with existing airplane
equipment. The test results then must
show that the PEDs can safely use the
Wi-Fi system in all areas of the
airplane.
2. Network security and access to
airplane control and navigation
systems via a wireless interface
For any Wi‑Fi airplane network that
interfaces with any airborne system’s
networks, servers, routers, data buses,
or electronic flight bags, the applicant
should conduct a risk assessment of the
potential vulnerability to worms,
viruses, etc., due to connectivity
problems or Wi-Fi users’ actions
(inadvertent or intentional) that could
result in corrupted airplane assets,
degraded services, or other anomalies.
Depending on the configuration and
connectivity allowed, the FAA may
need to impose additional
requirements to ensure the security of
airplane equipment from external
entities.
Transport Certification Update
Transport Certification Update
Other approaches Federal Communications Commission
prohibitions. We have, however,
The methods of compliance for developed guidance for specific
certification of installed systems that can airplane installation projects for in-flight
be used by Wi-Fi-equipped PEDs cell phone systems that can be used
address only PEDs with radios that use outside the U.S.
the IEEE 802.11 protocol. It provides a
way to show that this class of
The future of Wi‑Fi certification
transmitting PEDs will not cause
unacceptable interference. But Wi‑Fi We have received numerous
represents just one type of PED radio applications to activate in-flight Wi‑Fi
transmitter on airplanes. For newer systems. We have been working closely
designs, it is much more effective and with industry to ensure that these systems
efficient to build an airplane that is are properly implemented and meet
immune to potential interference from current standards. We will continue
many types of PEDs. these efforts as this technology evolves.
Under such an approach, airplane Using guidance in RTCA/DO‑307,
systems are designed to tolerate both and based on experience gained
intended RF transmissions and through certification of airplane Wi‑Fi
unintended systems, the Transport Airplane
spurious Directorate plans to publish policy that
emissions from will address certification of wireless
PEDs. Both of equipment and systems onboard
these sources of transport category airplanes. This
radiated should reduce the administrative burden
emissions can on individual programs, as long as
interfere with applicants follow the methods of
onboard compliance in the guidance. 
systems essential to safety. The
guidance developed in RTCA/DO‑307,
“Aircraft Design and Certification for
PED Tolerance,” outlines design
approaches that will ensure that
aircraft systems can tolerate all PEDs,
without interference to aircraft systems.
The approaches outlined in RTCA/
DO‑307 may not be practical for
current production airplanes due to the
cost of adding additional interference
protection. But adding protection to
airplane systems to tolerate on-board
PEDs may be possible for new airplane
designs. The guidance in RTCA/DO-
307 is accepted by the FAA in Aircraft
Circular 20-164.
One important note: The Wi-Fi
guidance does not address in-flight cell
phone use, which is subject to specific
Edition 29, Spring 2011 9
 Transport Certification Update

CSTAs
Chief Scientific and Technical Advisors
Profile of a CSTA: Ann Azevedo, CSTA for Aircraft Safety Analysis,
Windsor Locks, CT
The FAA’s CSTAs are a select group of specialized technical experts at the forefront of the agency’s research and
development efforts. CSTAs help design and develop aircraft, and apply regulatory policies and practices for
certification of technology. They represent the best and brightest, and work in all fields and regions. For more
information, see the CSTA website. In this edition we introduce you to another of these 15 experts: Ann Azevedo.

F
AA’s CSTA for Aircraft Safety
Analysis, Ann Azevedo, based
in Windsor Locks, Connecticut,
must stay on top of emerging
and rapidly changing technology
issues and trends in the challenging
field of risk management—a
monumental undertaking. Ms. Azevedo
reports, “I ask myself what I can do to
come up with the best work and the
best answers. I always like to know
what I can learn from other people.”
In her position as the Aircraft Safety
Analysis CSTA, Ms. Azevedo uses risk
management principles and statistical
reports to analyze aviation safety
threats. For example, she helped
develop FAA Order 8110.107,
Monitor Safety/Analyze Data
(MSAD), which was issued on
March 12, 2010. [See the article on
MSAD featured on page 3.] That
order introduces a new process for
FAA engineers, inspectors, certification
offices, and standards staff personnel
to use when they analyze continued
operational safety data and monitor
safety in aircraft fleets. Ms. Azevedo
has been a valuable resource to FAA
offices during implementation of this
new process.
Ms. Azevedo also works with the
Joint Implementation Measurement
and Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT) and
the analytical segment of the
Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(CAST), which are cross-Government/
industry safety teams that address
systemic problems in commercial
aviation. The goal of these teams is to
uncover problems before an aviation
accident occurs. Both CAST and
JIMDAT also work to identify
emerging and changing threats. After
new systems and equipment are put
into service, these teams evaluate the
safety enhancements to ensure they’re
meeting their intended effects and not
causing or contributing to new
problems. Ms. Azevedo is a member of the
American Statistical Association,
Ms. Azevedo was recently
Society for Risk Analysis, and System
recognized by former Senator Ted
Safety Society. In addition, her
Kaufman (D-DE), former Chair of the
industry and Government awards
Congressional Oversight Panel in the
include the Arthur S. Flemming Award
U.S. federal government, for her
for Excellence in Government Service
contributions to aircraft safety and
and the Distinguished Engineer of the
accident prevention. Senator
Year Award from the American
Kaufman’s “Great Federal Employee
Society of Mechanical Engineers.
Initiative” recognizes exemplary
federal employees for their “hard Ms. Azevedo earned her Master of
work and unsung dedication in serving Science degree in Mechanical
the American people.” Engineering from Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute; and her Bachelor
Ms. Azevedo began her FAA career
of Science degree in Systems
in 1997 as an engineer in the Engine
Planning and Management (Applied
and Propeller Directorate in
Mathematics), with Honors, from
Burlington, Massachusetts. She was
Stevens Institute of Technology. 
promoted to CSTA in 2004. Before
she came to the FAA, Ms. Azevedo
spent 18 years as an engineer at the
Western Electric Company and at
Pratt & Whitney.

Transport Certification Update Edition 29, Spring 2011 10


Transport Airplane Directorate (TAD)
Regulatory Radar
The following have been published in the Federal Register since the last issue of the
Transport Certification Update. For full text of rulemaking and other actions see:
regulations.gov. For full text of policies and advisory circulars, see http://rgl.faa.gov.
Current Rulemaking.
Final Rules (FRs):
Maneuvering Speed Limitation
Statement. Docket No. FAA-2009-
0810; FR issued 10/4/2010, effective
10/15/2010. Amendment No. 25-130.
This final rule amends the
airworthiness standards applicable to
transport category airplanes to clarify
that flying at or below the design
maneuvering speed does not allow a
pilot to make multiple large control
inputs in one airplane axis or single full
control inputs in more than one airplane
axis at a time without endangering the
airplane's structure. The FAA issued this
final rule to prevent pilots from
misunderstanding the meaning of an
airplane's maneuvering speed, which
could cause or contribute to a future
accident.
Flightcrew Alerting. Docket No. FAA-
2008-1292; FR issued 11/2/2010,
effective 1/3/2011. Amendment 25-
131.
This final rule revises the airworthiness
standards for transport category
airplanes concerning flightcrew alerting.
These standards update definitions,
prioritization, color requirements, and
performance for flightcrew alerting to
reflect changes in technology and
functionality. This amendment adds
additional alerting functions, and
Transport Certification Update
consolidates and standardizes
definitions and regulations for
flightcrew warning, caution, and
advisory alerting systems. This action
results in harmonized standards
between the FAA and the European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
Aging Airplane Program:
Widespread Fatigue Damage (WFD).
Docket No. FAA-2006-24281; FR
issued 11/15/2010, effective
1/15/2011. Amendments 25-132,
26-5, 121-351, 129-48.
This final rule amends FAA
regulations pertaining to certification
and operation of transport category
airplanes to prevent WFD in those
airplanes. For certain existing
airplanes, the rule requires design
approval holders to evaluate their
airplanes to establish a limit of validity
(LOV) of the engineering data that
supports the structural maintenance
program. For future airplanes, the rule
requires all applicants for type
certificates, after the effective date of
the rule, to establish an LOV. Design
approval holders and applicants must
demonstrate the airplane will be free
from WFD up to the LOV. The rule
requires that operators of any affected
airplane incorporate the LOV into the
maintenance program for that
airplane. Operators may not fly an
airplane beyond its LOV unless an
extended LOV is approved.
Transport Certification Update
Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRMs):
Harmonization of Various
Airworthiness Standards for Transport
Category Airplanes--Flight Rules.
Docket No. FAA-2010-0310; Notice 10-
17. NPRM issued 11/5/2010.
Comment period closed 2/17/2011.
The proposed rule would harmonize
the requirements for takeoff speeds,
static lateral-directional stability, speed
increase and recovery characteristics,
and the stall warning margin for the
landing configuration in icing conditions
with EASA certification standards.
Adopting these proposals would
eliminate regulatory differences
between the airworthiness standards of
the U.S. and EASA, without affecting
current industry design practices.
Harmonization of Airworthiness
Standards for Transport Category
Airplanes--Landing Gear Retracting
Mechanisms and Pilot Compartment
View. Docket No. FAA-2010-1193;
Notice No. 10-19; NPRM issued
1/5/2011. Comment period closed
4/5/2011.
The proposed rule would harmonize
the airworthiness standards for transport
category airplanes on landing gear
retracting mechanisms and the pilot
compartment view with EASA
certification standards. This proposal
would adopt the 1-g stall speed as a
reference stall speed instead of the
Continued on page 12
Edition 29, Spring 2011 11
(continued from page 11)
minimum speed obtained in a stalling
maneuver, and would add an additional
requirement to keep the landing gear
and doors in the correct retracted
position in flight. This proposal would also
revise the requirements for pilot
compartment view in precipitation
conditions. Adopting these proposals
would eliminate regulatory differences
between the airworthiness standards of
the FAA and EASA, without affecting
current industry design practices.
Installed Systems and Equipment for
Use by the Flightcrew. Proposed
rulemaking under consideration.
The proposed rule would amend
design requirements for transport
category airplanes to minimize the
occurrence of design-related flightcrew
errors. The new requirements would
enable a flightcrew to detect and
manage their errors when using installed
equipment and systems. Adopting this
proposal would eliminate regulatory
differences between the airworthiness
standards of the FAA and those of EASA,
without affecting current industry design
practices.
Policy and Advisory
Circulars (ACs)
Final Policies
Acceptance of Composite Specifications
and Design Values Developed using
the National Center for Advanced
Materials Performance (NCAMP)
Process. Issued 9/20/2010.
The policy memo provides clarification
on the acceptability of material
specifications and allowables developed
by the NCAMP. NCAMP has published a
standard operating procedures document
detailing the organization, methods, and
processes they will use to work with
material suppliers, manufacturers, and
Transport Certification Update
regulatory bodies to develop composite
materials specifications and limited
associated material allowables.
Material specifications developed
following the NCAMP procedures are
compliant with 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27,
and 29. Applicants who wish to use the
NCAMP databases and allowables
need to validate the applicability of the
data to their project with a limited test
program.
Draft Policies
Lithium Batteries Permanently
Installed on Airplanes, ANM-113-10-
004. Comment period closed
10/28/2010.
The proposed policy provides
guidance on permanently installed (part
of the type certificate or supplemental
type certificate) rechargeable lithium
batteries or rechargeable lithium-
battery systems and their protective
circuitry used on transport category
aircraft. Specifically, this policy
addresses new batteries and battery-
systems requirements not adequately
addressed in 14 CFR 25.1353, and
provides guidance to establish when
special conditions are required and
what the special conditions must
address, and to provide a standardized
approach on how to show compliance
for these newly developed battery and
battery systems including their
installations.
Transport Airplane Risk Assessment
Methodology (TARAM) Policy and
Handbook. Comment period closed
2/28/2011.
The proposed policy establishes the
Transport Airplane Risk Assessment
Methodology (TARAM). It outlines a
process for calculating risk as it affects
the transport airplane fleet and
explains how to use such risk analysis
calculations when making determinations
Edition 29, Spring 2011
Transport Certification Update
of unsafe conditions and resulting
corrective actions.
Certification and Continued
Airworthiness of Unbalanced and
Mass Balanced Control Surfaces.
Comment period closed 2/28/2011.
The proposed policy clarifies FAA
guidance for the design, certification
analysis and testing, and continued
airworthiness of control surfaces for
transport category airplanes. These
include all movable control surfaces
and tabs that rely on retention of
restraint stiffness or damping for
flutter prevention. (Note that these
control surfaces may be unbalanced
or partially mass balanced). The
proposed policy also addresses the
maintenance actions necessary to
ensure that mass balanced control
surfaces remain within their balance
limits while in service. This proposed
policy statement would supersede
Policy Statement ANM-05-115-019,
dated November 16, 2007.
Final ACs Issued
AC 25.1322-1 Flightcrew Alerting.
Issued 12/13/2010.
This AC provides guidance for
showing compliance with certain
requirements of Title 14, Code of
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part
25, as amended by Amendment 25-
131, for the design approval of
flightcrew alerting functions. This AC
addresses the type of alert function
elements that should be considered
(including visual, aural, and tactile or
haptic elements), alert management,
interface or integration of alerts with
other systems, and color
standardization. The appendices to
this AC also provide examples for
including visual and aural system
elements in an alerting system.
Continued on page 13
12
(continued from page 12)
AC 25.571-1D Damage
Tolerance and Fatigue Evaluation
of Structure. Issued 1/13/2011.
This AC provides guidance for
compliance with the provisions of
14 CFR part 25, as amended by
Amendment 25-132, pertaining to
the requirements for damage-
tolerance and fatigue evaluation
of transport category aircraft
structure, including evaluation of
WFD, and establishing an LOV of
the engineering data that supports
the structural maintenance
program. This AC includes
guidance pertaining to discrete
source damage.
AC 120-104 Establishing and
Implementing Limit of Validity to
Prevent Widespread Fatigue
Damage. Issued 1/10/2011.
This AC offers guidance on
compliance with 14 CFR part 26,
as amended by Amendment 26-5,
part 121, as amended by
Amendment 121-351, and part
129, as amended by Amendment
129-48. It tells design approval
holders of transport category
airplanes how to establish an LOV
of the engineering data that
supports the structural maintenance
program for those airplanes. It
also tells design approval holders
how to address maintenance
actions that have been determined
necessary to support an LOV. It
tells operators of those airplanes
how to incorporate the LOV into
their Continued Airworthiness
Maintenance Programs. Finally, this
AC provides guidance to anyone
wishing to extend an established
LOV. The actions described in this
AC are meant to prevent WFD in
the transport airplane fleet up to
the LOV.
Transport Certification Update
Transport Certification Update
Draft ACs Issued AC 25.729-X Transport Airplane
Landing Gear Retracting
AC 25.629-1X Aeroelastic Stability Mechanism. Comment period
Substantiation of Transport Category closed 4/5/2011.
Airplanes. Comment period closed
9/29/2010. This AC provides updated guidance
material to ensure consistent
This AC provides revised guidance for
application of harmonized
substantiation of aeroelastic stability
requirements for 14 CFR 25.729, as
requirements in consideration of changes
referenced in the NPRM for
proposed to icing certification
Harmonization of Airworthiness
requirements. The new icing requirements
Standards for Transport Category
were published for public comment in the
Airplanes—Landing Gear
NPRM for Airplane and Engine
Retracting Mechanisms and Pilot
Certification Requirements in Supercooled
Compartment View, Docket No.
Large Drop, Mixed Phase, and Ice Crystal
FAA-2010-1193.
Icing Conditions, Docket No. FAA-2010-
0636, in June 2010 and were highlighted AC 25.1302, Installed Systems
in the Summer 2010 Transport and Equipment for Flightcrew Use.
Certification Update newsletter, 28th Comment period closed April 4,
Edition. 2011.
AC 25-7A, Change 2, Flight Test Guide This AC provides updated
for Certification of Transport Category guidance material to ensure
Airplanes. Comment period closed consistent application of the
2/17/2011. harmonized requirements of 14 CFR
25.1302, as referenced in the
This AC provides updated guidance
NPRM for Installed Systems and
material to ensure consistent application of
Equipment for Use by the
various harmonized airworthiness
Flightcrew, Docket No. FAA-2010-
requirements, as referenced in the NPRM
1175. 
for Harmonization of Various Airworthiness
Standards for Transport Category
Airplanes--Flight Rules, Docket No. FAA-
2010-0310.
AC 25-19X, Certification Maintenance
Requirements. Comment period closed
3/25/2011.
This AC provides guidance on the
selection, documentation, and control of
Certification Maintenance Requirements
(CMRs). This AC also provides a rational
basis for coordinating the Maintenance
Review Board (MRB), if the MRB process is
used, and CMR selection processes to
ensure premises made in the system safety
analysis supporting the compliance with
the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1309, and
other systems safety rules are protected in
service. It also provides flexibility of
operators' maintenance planning.
Edition 29, Spring 2011 13

In memory:
Jill Byington
This edition of the
Update is dedicated to Jill
Byington, Editor-in-Chief
and our dear friend and
respected colleague, who
lost her valiant battle
against metastatic breast
cancer on December 8.
As Editor-in-Chief, Jill
became known in aviation
circles internationally and
most recently held the
position of Communications
Specialist among a group
of technical writer-editors
in the Airworthiness and
Technical Communications
Branch of the Transport
Airplane Directorate.
Jill’s 30 years’
experience as a
professional writer and
editor was primarily in the
aviation field. During her
career, she was a
respected lead writer who
guided teams in meeting
deadlines and achieving
Transport Certification Update
corporate objectives. She was Although Jill achieved much in her
an experienced newsletter career, her most cherished role in
editor, successful freelance life was that of wife and mother.
writer with articles published in She was extremely proud of her
national magazines, an family and spoke often to her
innovative teacher and colleagues of the joy and meaning
award-winning project
they brought to her life.
manager. But none of her
career achievements really We extend our deepest
capture the essence of Jill, sympathy to her family as we
described by her colleagues dedicate this edition of the Update
as “light hearted, with a to Jill Byington. 
wonderful wit” … “the most
grown-up person I know” …
“one of those extraordinary
individuals who affect
everyone they interact with”
… “one of the most selfless
women I’ve ever had the good
fortune to call my friend.”

The links in the Transport

Certification Update are
current at the time of
publication, but they are
subject to change at any
time. The target
documents may be
moved to another
location, or the links may
Transport Airplane Directorate,
not remain active due to
1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
other factors beyond our
Renton, WA 98057
control. We regret any
inconvenience this may Produced by:
cause.
Airworthiness and Technical Communications
Branch, ANM-114, Transport Airplane
Directorate
We welcome comments and questions. We might edit letters for
style and/or length. If we have more than one letter on the same Acting editor-in-chief: Marcia Walters
topic, we will select one representative letter to publish. Because of Contributing editor: Rose Opland
our publishing schedules, responses might not appear for several
issues. We do not print anonymous letters, but we do withhold names
or send personal replies upon request. Send letters to the address
above or e-mails to: 9-ANM-TAD-Update@faa.gov

The purpose of the Transport Certification Update is to provide the aviation community-at-large and designees with the latest information concerning
regulations, guidance material, policy and procedure changes, and personnel activities involving the certification work accomplished within the FAA
Transport Airplane Directorate's jurisdictional area. Although the information contained herein is the latest available at the time of publication, it
should not be considered "authority approved," unless specifically stated; neither does it replace any previously approved manuals, special
conditions, alternative methods of compliance, or other materials or documents. If you are in doubt about the status of any of the information
addressed, please contact your cognizant Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO), or other appropriate
FAA office.

Transport Certification Update Edition 29, Spring 2011 14