Thomas Wendt

The Phallic Eunuch and the Castrated Novel: Lacan, Bakhtin, and Montesquieu

Although the eunuch is physically castrated, he represents an individual who is more ontologically complete than a male or a female. In its state of synthesis between binary oppositionsmale vs. female, master vs. slavethe eunuch functions within Persian Letters as a point of reference in a genre that is, according to Bakhtin and Lukcs, incomplete and in a state of progression. In this way, the eunuch, insofar as he is only lacking the physical organ, represents the next stage of completeness via synthesis in the novel, as lacking the penis has potential to bring one closer to the phallus and the power of signification with which it is associated. One may situate both the eunuch and the novel within a dialectical relationshipnot as oppositions, but as objects that exist in categories of relational status despite their opposing qualities. In other words, from certain points of view, both the eunuch and the novel are conceptualized as incompletethe eunuch is something that was once complete and is now lacking, while the novel, according to Bakhtin and Lukcs, has always been in a state of progression. An alternate means of analyzing these two entities is to situate them in the Hegelian dialectical method. In short, the dialectic begins with a proposition, which serves as the thesis, and it then enters into conflict with its opposite, the antithesis, resulting in a combination of thesis and antithesis, known as the synthesis. The synthesis serves as a new thesis, and the cycle repeats itself until one reaches Absolute Knowledge.1 Within the dialectic, concepts are never in

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See section on the Lord and Bondsman from G.W.F. Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit.

eternal, irresolvable opposition with each other, as each depends on the other for its own existencei.e., thesis and antithesis are mutually dependent for the formation of a synthesis. Hegels conception of Absolute Knowledge, then, represents not only the end of the dialectic but also essentially the end, in a more subjectively influential manner. Absolute Knowledge, insofar as it is specifically absolute, is the end of (small k) knowledge, in that knowledge is a progression, a becoming, whereas Knowledge is the end of this progression. Such an idea of wholeness is similar to the function of desire, as Jacques Lacan articulates it, as desire is always based on lack, the primal lack of the (m)Other, and thus the apprehension of the object of desire, the Thing, again borrowed from Hegel, is the end of the desiring subject as such.2 Subjectivity is always in a dialectical relationship to its antithesis, objectivity, resulting in a dependency between the two: the agential subject needs the object of desireand, more importantly, needs to never attain the unveiled objectjust as the master needs the slave, as the slave sustains the masters existence. Lacanian theory posits a desire for wholeness that differs from the demand for fragmentation on the level of subjectivity; the definition of the subject is dependent on his or her incessant, conscious progression toward various objects of desire, defined as the objet petit a, which is always the ultimate object of desire, the Thing, in its veiled form. One consciously demands the continuation of subjective existence, but unconsciously desires the cessation of subjectivity through wholeness (Lacan). Much like the desiring subject, both philosophy and literary theory strive toward establishing wholeness, whether the desire for completeness is explicit or implicit. At the beginning of his text on the novel, Georg Lukcs refers to Novaliss ideas on homesickness: Philosophy is really homesickness, says Novalis: it is the urge to be at home everywhere. That is why philosophy, as a form of life or as that which determines the form and supplies the content of literary creation, is always a

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Lacanian theory of desire and the Phallus will be discussed later in more depth.

symptom of the rift between inside and outside, a sign of the essential difference between the self and the world, the incongruence of soul and deed. (Lukcs, 29) For Lukcs, philosophy lies in between the subject and object, between the internal self and the external world. In this way, philosophys goal is to mediate between these two poles and, in some ways, to bring them closer together. In other words, philosophybroadly defined, in Lukcss case, to include works of literatureis an attempt to bring wholeness to reality qua fragmentation. It assumes the dialectical relationship between self and world, accounts for their differences and similarities, their points of conversion, and strives toward the convergence of these pointssomething philosophy might call Truth. The Truth is whole: it has no gaps, no fissures through which one falls and widens the gap. Existence between two disparate poles is the epitome of fragmentation, the ontological and epistemological distancing from Truth. Subjectivity as such is the essence of the in between: belonging wholly to one category is completion, whereas the in between represents the necessary fissure between self and world. That is not to say that inherently internal aspects of the subject and inherently external aspects of the object are non-existent, but rather that the dialectical relationship of dependence operates regardless of ostensible separation. Within the realm of literature, the novel serves as a genre based of this very fragmentationnot only a fragmented genre, but also one that is in constant progression toward some undefined end. The novel has teleological motivation, a demand for completion. The figure of the eunuch in literature, on the other hand, is one that has relinquished wholeness in favor of a fragmented status between the sexes. In this way, one can interpret the eunuch as a regression in the same teleology of the novel; however, the eunuchs lack is physical, whereas the novels lack is existential.

In Monetesquieus Persian Letters, the eunuch plays an integral part as the representation of surrogate authority in the absence of the master. Usbek establishes the role of the eunuch early in the novel when writing to the First Black Eunuch: You are in charge of my wives, and you obey them. [] Humiliate yourself profoundly before the women who share my love, but at the same time make them aware of their absolute dependence. (Montesquieu, 42) The eunuch is trapped in the somewhat paradoxical position of both master and slavemaster in the absence of Usbek but still a slave to the same women over whom s/he rules. Absolute dependence applies to both eunuch and wives in that both are in a state of forced servitude; they are slaves to Usbek in his presence, and slaves to each other in his absence. Power and authority are transferred from wholeness, represented by Usbek, onto the physically fragmented figure of the eunuch. Such a transfer of power is indicative of the relegation of authoritative agency onto an individual with essentially no sexual agency, which makes the eunuch an optimal passive protector. The eunuch represents an entity that exists in an anomaly of the Hegelian dialecticthat is, s/he is a third category in addition to the being-for-itself, the slave, and the being-for-others, the master. Usbek establishes the eunuch as one who exist[s] only insofar as [s/he] can obey (Montesquieu, 69), but also as one whose only hope is that [Usbek] should be happy (ibid), thus situating the eunuch in between master and slave on both an existential and ontological level.3 For this reason, the eunuch, in his/her state of physical lack, serves as the perfect guardian for Usbeks wives; not only is s/he destined to fail at any attempt to impregnate the wives,4 s/he will never attain the power of wholeness that would allow for complete domination or servitude. S/he exists at the same time for-itself and for-others: for-itself similar to the slave,

That is, an existential level concerned only with the pure existence of the individual, and ontological in the sense that the individual exists within a world of other individuals. 4 For this is the true source of Usbeks anxiety concerning his wives: it is less about his wives becoming impure in a moralistic sense than it is about another man fathering children that Usbek might think are his. Essentially, the eunuchs task is to guard Usbeks wives qua objects of his sexual virility and procreative potential.
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who will never gain self-certainty, as he is not dependent on the other for recognition, the eunuch is not dependent on the other to categorize him/herself since s/he will never belong to a distinct ontological category; and for-others just as the master, as s/he nonetheless exists only insofar as the Usbek deems it necessary to reinforce his own authority. The question of the eunuch as a castrated individual implies a certain amount of ambiguity surrounding both the method of castration and the consequences of it. It is unclear whether the eunuchs in Persian Letters are completely castrated, with both the penis and testicles removed, thus ridding them of sexual potency and ability, or if they are partially castrated, with the removal of the testicles leaving the individual with ability to perform but not procreate. For the present purpose, however, the ambiguity is arbitrary: the text is very clear concerning the ambivalent effects on the individualalienation, inadequacy, and a mixture of regret and complacency. The First Eunuch describes his present state as the result of sacrificing my desires for the sake of my peace of mind and my career. Unhappy wretch that I was, with my preconceived ideas I could see only the advantages, not the deprivations (Montesquieu, 49), destined to be separated from myself forever. (ibid) The Chief Black Eunuch takes a more optimistic tone, describing the castration operation as painful for a time, but beneficial later, since it gave me access to my masters presence and gained me their confidence. (Montesquieu, 131) One sees, then, that the eunuchs in this particular novel do not simply move from a state of wholeness to one of deprivation. Their state of being is more complicated than one of a movement from pain to pleasure, or vice versa. Oscillation between lack and wholeness exists for both eunuchs and full males, as the eunuchs once were. The question is whether the eunuchs, insofar as they sacrificed their physical organ to gain what they symbolically perceived

as power, succeeded in their attempt, or if their physical castration is nothing more than an extreme attempt to attain the lack which defines subjectivity as such. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the extent of the eunuchs castrationthat is, whether they are fully or partially castratedthere is no doubt that there still exists a certain amount of envy concerning the perceived sexual virility of others. Sexuality is associated with the perceived agency of the eunuch: He did not only possess firmness, but penetration as well. He could read their thoughts and their concealments. Their contrived gestures, their false expressions, hid nothing from him. He knew of their most secret actions and most private remarks. (Montesquieu, 132, italics added) This passage is taken from a letter in which the Chief Black Eunuch is writing to Usbek about a eunuch he knew in the past. The use of the words firmness and penetration is both obvious and significant. The Chief Black Eunuch associates these two traits, which are perhaps not even used for their sexual connotations but nonetheless are associated with active sexual performance and with the eunuchs power to have knowledge into the wives inner thoughts. S/he seems to be more interested in this aspect of power than he is in the connotations of sexual performance. In his/her statement, there is an indication of the desire to take an active stance in his/her power over the wives as opposed to the passive position into which s/he is forced. In other words, the eunuch seeks closer proximity to the wholeness of absolute power in the masters absenceessentially, to take the masters place and go beyond his power of control by penetrating into the wives existence in a manner that not even he can do. There is a certain amount of reverence and envy directed at this eunuch for possessing such firmness and penetration. It would be easy to read a bit too far in to the choice of these words on the topic of the eunuch as castrated male and what s/he is lacking; however, perhaps it

is more suitable to examine these particular word choices in the light of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Within the realm of such a theory, one is able to see that the eunuch may be lacking physically, but s/he nonetheless operates under the same laws of desire as the complete individuali.e., in addition to lacking the reproductive organ, s/he is lacking in the ontological and Symbolic5 sense, and therefore his/her reverence for one who possesses firmness and penetration is representative of more than mere sexual virility, just as it would be for any other individual. Lacan is quite specific concerning the subjects lack, which he terms the phallus. The name takes on a polemical tone, especially during the rise of feminist theory, but it is evident that the term phallus does not directly imply a hierarchy among the sexes. The phallus is nothing more than the signifier of a constitutive lackthat is, the phallus signifies the lack into which all subjects are incorporated at the time of linguistic acquisition and essentially has nothing to do with the penis. Lacan makes it clear that, although it complicates his theory with respect to its application, his ideas on the role of the phallus are made without regard to the anatomical distinction between the sexes. (Lacan, 576) It is not as simple as saying that males have a penis and women do not. Instead, all subjects, regardless of sex, lack the phallus and strive toward it for the entirety of their subjective lives. This is one point at which Lacan expands on Freuds notion of what separates the sexes and the role that the penis plays in castration anxiety; Lacans modification allows for the incorporation of the linguistic/Symbolic aspects of desire and the object of desire. It is evident from this brief introduction that there exists an essential rift between what the phallus is and what it represents. At its most basic level, the phallus is a

Symbolic is used here in reference to the Lacanian Symbolic system, as opposed to merely something that refers to a symbol. The Symbolic, in short, is the system of signification, which includes language, and is the initial source of constitutive lack, which results from the introduction of the signifier via linguistic acquisition and the Name-of-the-Father, the signifier of Law.
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signifier, nothing more; but what the phallus signifiesi.e., what it representsis a sort of Symbolic anomaly insofar as it signifies what cannot be signified. It is for this reason that Lacan writes the phallus in algebraic terms as 1, which is known in mathematics as an irrational number. The phallus signifies something beyond mathematics, science, and the Symbolic; it is literally something outside the bounds of subjective epistemology. The phallus does not fit well into common psychoanalytic or philosophical categories, nor does it exist within any known discourse relating to verisimilar notions of ontological or existential reality. Thus, one must always speak of something like the phallus in an indirect manner, relying on linguistic play more than logical comprehensiveness. Lacan begins his explanation of the phallus on the basis of its effects: The phallus can be better understood on the basis of its function here. In Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a fantasy, if we are to view fantasy as an imaginary effect. Nor is it as such an object (part-, internal, good, bad, etc.) inasmuch as object tends to gauge the reality involved in a relationship. Still less is it the organpenis or clitoristhat it symbolizes. [] For the phallus is a signifier, a signifier of whose function, in the intrasubjective economy of analysis, may lift the veil from the function it served in the mysteries. For it is the signifier that is destined to designate meaning effects as a whole, insofar as the signifier conditions them by its presence as a signifier. (Lacan, 579) Lacan thus separates the phallus from any kind of function in regard to fantasy. In other words, insofar as fantasy takes form in the Imaginary system, the system of the I, the phallus does not take form as an image or an object but rather as an ideal, a fantasy that is disconnected from the subject. It is an ideal signifier in that it aims to signify the signification process as a whole, which is designated as an ideal, as significationaccording to Ferdinand Saussures theory of structural linguistics, upon which Lacan reliesdepends on differences among signifiers within the system. The entirety of the signification process, then, would need to be designated on the basis of its difference to other signification processes; and insofar as the entirety of signification

operates within its own finite system, that there is essentially no Other Symbolic, the phallus can only represent the system as a whole through an indirect representation of other signifiers. In this way, the phallus is the ultimate undefined, the signifier that is supposed to represent all but can only represent pieces of the system in reference to the whole. A part of this gap in signification manifests itself in the constitutive lack in subjectivity, which has its roots in linguistic acquisition. Such a lack in being is both unavoidable and necessary: [T]he subject designates his being only by barring everything it signifies. [] [T]he part of this being that is alive in the urverdrgt [primally repressed] finds its signifier by receiving the mark of the phalluss Verdrngung [repression] (owing to which the unconscious is language). (Lacan, 581) Similar to the German Idealists, by whom Lacan was certainly influenced, this theory of the subject posits that there is a negation at the level of the subjects relationship to the external; the I is negated when the subject establishes a connection to the Other. Thus, Lacan is able to assert that the unconscious essentially functions like a language, barringintroducing a lackits inherent linguistic proximity to the Other, and the phallus is the signifier of this lack. In this way, the phallus is perhaps best represented as 1. The irrational nature of this number, the fact that one cannot represent such a number within the laws of mathematics, is similar to the paradoxical nature of the phallus. For Lacan, the phallus exists in the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary systems at the same timethat is, it is at once, something that cannot be signified, the signifier of the signification process, and an inherent aspect of the ego ideal. In its intrinsic paradox, the phallus is nothing more than a signifier for the gap left by signification. This idea of a negation is important insofar as subjectivitys relationship with the Other is more than simple negation in the sense of cancelling. Given this complication, the relationship manifests in an act of Aufhebung:

All of these remarks still merely veil the fact that it can play its role only when veiled, that is, as itself a sign of the latency with which any signifiable is struck, once it is raised (aufgehoben) to the function of a signifier. The phallus is the signifier of this very Aufhebung, which it inaugurates (initiates) by its disappearance. (Lacan, 581) Aufhebung loosely translates as raising up, restoring but also as cancellation. Both Lacan and Hegel use it to imply a paradoxical state in which something is negated and preserved. The phallus operates as an Aufhebung insofar as it represents a movement toward the desired, lacking object but also a confrontation with the lack that leaves subjectivity in a vulnerable place with regard to its own progression. The Aufhebung mediates the activity and passivity of the subjects relationship to the Symbolic; essentially, it manifests itself in the vacillation between subject as agent and subject as tool of the linguistic system. Perhaps one of the most important questions regarding the connection between subject and language is on the agency of the subject: To what extent is the subject speaking as opposed to being spoken? Does the individual use language or does language use the individual? Lacan views this problem as a combination of subjective passivity and activity: [T]he signifier plays an active role in determining the effects by which the signifiable appears to succumb to its mark, becoming, through that passion, the signified. This passion of the signifier thus becomes a new dimension of the human condition in that it is not only man who speaks, but in man and through man that it [a] speaks; in that his nature becomes woven by effects in which the structure of the language of which he becomes material can be refound. (Lacan, 578) Here, Lacan is following the Sausurrean assumption that language is pre-individual, that the system of signifiers exists prior to, and regardless of, the individual who uses it. In the current linguistic system, the individual is able to find him- or herself through the incorporation into that which came before and will exist after. The consideration extends much further, however, into

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the role of language concerning the agential status of the subject. Lacan mentions the passion of the signifier, an active process, to become or evoke the signifiedthat is, the signifier has a sense of purpose to accurately elicit the message it attempts to contain within itself. In this way, the signifier represents the active aspect of language and the signified is the passive one, as the signifier contains active purpose within it and the signified only emerges by way of secondary means. Such a strict conception, however, is extremely problematic; one can easily see how the signifier and signified switch roles, either through the intervention of the linguistic subject or, possibly, the phallus. For example, the phallus operates to interfere with the signifiers passion by introducing lack into the equationi.e., passion assumes perfection in the correspondence between signifier and signified, which the phallus, through the signification of essential lack, complicates by injecting its own imperfection. Such a conflict between the demand for wholeness and inherent, unavoidable lack is the basis for Lacans conception of desire. Desire seeks to fill the gap introduced by the phallus; and given that desire functions on the level of the unconscious, it is apparent that both lack and the progression toward wholeness are fundamental to the subject. The subjects unending struggle to gain wholeness, the absolute, in the light of the phallus elicits desire as the constitutive state of being for the subject: For the unconditionality of demand, desire substitutes the absolute condition: this condition in fact dissolves the element in the proof of love that rebels against the satisfaction of need. This is why desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting. [] One can see how a sexual relationship occupies this closed field of desire and plays out its fate there. This is because it is the field designed for the production of the enigma that this relationship gives rise to in the subject by doubly signifying it to him: the return of demand it gives rise to, in the form of the demand concerning the subject of need; and the ambiguity presented concerning the Other in question in the proof of love that is demanded. The gap constituted by this enigma avers what determines it, namely, to put it as simply and clearly as possible, that for each of
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the partners in the relationship, both the subject and the Other, it is not enough to be subjects of need or objects of lovethey must hold the place of the cause of desire. (Lacan, 580) Desire, then, is nothing more than a remainder, what is left over in from the interplay between demand and satisfaction. Essentially, desire is, on some level, indifferent to its satisfactioni.e., the process of desire is more important than the attainment of the desired object, especially when that attainment equates to the destruction of the subject as such.6 Desire, in this sense, is not a progression toward a discernable end but rather a process of perpetual movement. It substitutes the striving toward the absolute by asserting a sense of urgency without telos onto subjectivity, a certain level of arbitrary cathexis, an ontological grasping for that which is self-consciously out of reach. The sexual relationship is integral to this conception in that Lacan refers to it as a closed field of desire. It is important to remember that the sexual relationship in this sense is not the desire for sex felt between individuals; rather, Lacan is relying on a more classically Freudian conception of sexuality, which operates on a much more broad view of sexuality, allowing a theoretical space in which to conceptualize sexuality as subject-object and subjectsubject relationships. In other words, sexuality is merely the relationship of the subject with something else. This field of desire is closed in that sense that there is a direct correlation and investment of energy (libido) between subject and other; however, this formulation is problematic given the inevitable introduction of the phallus, which would open the field to the ambiguity of the signifying system, not only at the linguistic level but also insofar as desire, at least in part, operates within the Symbolic system. Desire becomes not only a remainder but also

This notion is a part of Lacans interpretation of jouissance, the cessation of desire and the end of the subject. Desire never reaches its object in any discernable manner, as when the object is attained, the subject is no longer a subject and therefore does not possess the necessary consciousness that allows him or her to cognitively apprehend the event.
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an attempt at completion, at filling a lack, while at the same time unable to escape the bounds of fragmentation. The model for the psychoanalytic conception of desire is found, of course, in childhood. Most childhood desire revolves around the phallus, in terms of both castration anxiety and the childs attempt to become the last missing piece of the lacking mother, in that the child, even before he or she realizes his or her own essential lack, exhibits a wish to be the source of completeness for the (m)other: If the mothers desire is for the phallus, the child wants to be the phallus in order to satisfy her desire. Thus the division immanent in desire already makes itself felt by virtue of being experienced in the Others desire, in that this division already stands in the way of the subject being satisfied with presenting to the Other the real [organ] he may have that corresponds to the phallus; for what he has is no better than what he does not have, from the point of view of his demand for love, which would like him to be the phallus. (Lacan, 582) In short, the child, whether male or female, notices the difference between mother and father at the level of genitaliathat the mother is lacking the penis, causing her to appear incomplete in comparison with the father.7 The child assumes the responsibility of filling the mothers lack, of becoming the mothers sole object of desire that will make her whole. Essentially, lack has nothing to do with considerations of sex or gender; the penis as a signifier of wholeness is merely the childs perception, which does not account for the repressed ontological lack. Nor does the childs perception include the idea of the phallus as master signifier for the entirety of signification. In a defense against the repressed ontological lack, which of course threatens to

It is important to remember that the mothers lack is not an actual lack in the sense that it makes her less than a man, but rather the lack is on the level of the childs perception. The child merely sees that the father has something readily visible that the mother does not.
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return, the child creates a direct relationship between penis and phallus.8 This false link remains with the individual throughout life and manifests itself in defense mechanisms. The connection with the mother, the desire to become the mothers phallus, is the basis for Lacans claim concerning the otherness of desire. Desire is always projected onto and mediated by the Other in the sense that desire is contingent as much on the external Other than it is on the individual as a separate being. Lacan explains this deferral in terms of the feminine desire for the phallus that takes form in the demand for male sexual love: Paradoxical as this formulation may seem, I am saying that it is in order to be the phallusthat is, the signifier of the Others desirethat a woman rejects an essential part of femininity, namely, all of its attributes, in the masquerade. It is for what she is not that she expects to be desired as well as loved. But she finds the signifier of her own desire in the body of the person to whom her demand for love is addressed. It should not be forgotten, of course, that the organ that is endowed with this signifying function takes on the value of a fetish thereby. (Lacan, 583) The identification of the phallus as the signifier of the Others desire is of immense importance given Lacans reliance on phenomenological and ontological philosophy of thinkers such as Kant and Hegel. Both Kant and Hegel situate desire on the individual and interpersonal level, but there is a certain value placed on the individuals conscious experience of desire in the face of Other and the ethical implications thereof. Lacan places much more emphasis on how desire functions as an individual drive that manifests itself in the external world and sometimes on the body of another entity in the external world. It is in this fundamental displacement of desire and demand, or the dialectic of demand and desire (ibid), that justifies the claim that the penis as a

In some ways, this claim assumes that the child has already been introduced into the signifying system. If the child is pre-linguistic, the ontological lack would not need to be repressed insofar as lack does not exist as such until the signifier causes it. Prior to linguistic acquisition, the individual is substance as opposed to a subject that is, desire in the form of the objet petit a does not yet exist in the individual until the signifier ruptures its wholeness.
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symbol of the phallus is nothing more than a fetish.9 There is nothing fundamentally phallic about the penis, nothing that signifies wholeness or signification in its entirety. The subject merely projects desire onto the penis as an object-symbol of the end of desire, wholeness in its final form. As such, the physical organ of the penis represents an objectification of death in the sense that the cessation of desire, jouissance, is the end, the final event of subjectivity. In this way, the eunuch is someone who rejects the fetishization of the penis and recognizes the inherent association to death, which according to the Freudian concept of the death drive, is the ultimate event of desire. As opposed to taking the penis as an object of desire, acknowledging its perceived link to the phallus, which is the real object of desire, the eunuch eliminates the penis in attempt to attain the phallus. The eunuch, then, chooses a state of physical lack, knowing on some level that what s/he lacks is ontologically nothing more than a false symbol; as a result, the eunuch values physical castration that will allow him/her to acquire power in other forms to a state of so-called physical wholeness but also of absolute servitude. One can see that the eunuch represents a feminist characternot simply because s/he does not have a penis, nor because s/he rejects the penis and chooses to live without the masculine symbol of power, but precisely because s/he rejects the false notion that a penis has the power of signification ascribed to the phallus. The perceived link between the penis and phallus can be traced back to the childs attempt to work through castration anxiety, in which the child moves from the imaginary conception of the penisthe penis as image of wholenessto the symbolic penisthe penis as a signifier of the desire of the Other. This process is the result of the childs active desire to

Fetish is used here in the strict Freudian sense: not only is the phallus an object/concept that is ascribed with undue value, it is also an object that fills in for another missing object. Namely, it fills the potential for lack resulting from castration anxiety. In his essay, Fetishism, Freud posits that the fetish object is a surrogate for the mothers missing penis. The phallus performs essentially the same function in a Symbolic/linguistic sense.
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defer castration anxiety away from the ego: [B]y the child giving up the imaginary one (the image of the penis as representing a precious and precarious source of jouissance, since it is in danger of being taken away) for a symbolic one (being valued for other things that one is in life, for ones qualities or abilities that are desired by the Other). (Fink, 136) At the same time as the child takes a more active role in the external world, he or she also exists within the bounds of the Other. Of course, all subjects introduce themselves to the Symbolic system in this way, but the eunuch presents a unique case. As much as the eunuch adopts the symbolic phallus, s/he also maintains the image of the penis in the form of Usbeks authority: What can we do with our empty shadow of authority, which can never be transferred completely? We represent only a half of yourself, and even that poorly [] Return here, therefore, magnificent lord, return and display your authority throughout the seraglio. Come back so as to soothe these desperate passions, to remove any pretext for disobedience, to pacify discontented love, and make an act of love out of duty itself. (Montesquieu, 180) While the eunuch literally loses the image of the penis, not to mention the physical penis, s/he adopts the symbolic phallus as its replacement but also displays a longing for the return of the imaginary penis. S/he pleads with Usbek, who represents the eunuchs loss of wholeness insofar as s/he is only half of Usbek, to return and bring complete authority to the seraglio. This desire points to a conception of Usbek as the complete man who provides what the eunuch lacks: the power and authority associated with the penis. In this way, the eunuch attempts to internalize the imaginary penis, thus reinforcing the penis fetish, but this is perhaps merely the symptom of the lacking physical penis. According to some readings of psychoanalytic theory, the fetishization of the penis is unavoidable; the individual is a priori encompassed in a world of penis worship, in which the masculine is associated with activity and power, and the feminine with passivity and servitude. To a certain extent, this reading is accurate but certainly not comprehensivei.e., there is
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nothing inherent about reality or the Real that categorizes males and females in such a way. Rather, it is a result of the desire to find representations of the phallus within the individuals reality, which essentially makes the penis a completely arbitrary symbol for the phallus, apart from its association with psychosexual development in childhood. Penis fetishism is indicative of a metaphysical/epistemological drive within philosophy and literature toward the assertion of wholeness, to attain a level of comprehensiveness that leads to Truth.10 One can find examples of this tendency throughout history: Platos Ideal, Hegels Absolute Knowledge, Kants idea of the Thing, and the Freudo-Lacanian unconscious. Within literature, one finds a similar tendency in the desire to designate genres on a hierarchynot necessarily an aesthetic judgment, but a hierarchy nonethelessin which certain genres are more whole than others. At the beginning of his essay, Epic and Novel, Bakhtin identifies the novel as the sole genre that continues to develop, that is yet uncompleted. (Bakhtin, 3) Such a strict categorization implies both a hierarchy and teleology in the genre of the novel as a whole. One can see this even in the word choice of the previous passage: uncompleted as opposed to incomplete signifies more of a development with a discernable end, but it is unclear what the end of the novel would be. Throughout this essay, Bakhtin compares and contrasts the novel with the epic genre, identifying the novel as uncompleted and the epic as least potentially whole. He goes on to say, the novel has no canon of its own, as do other genres; only individual examples of the novel are historically active, not a generic canon as such. Studying other genres is analogous to studying dead languages; studying the novel, on the other hand, is like studying languages that are not only alive, but still young. (ibid) Again, the reference to age, the novel being young, implies that the novel is somewhat akin to a child and the epic is

This idea is somewhat similar to Jacques Derridas notion of logocentrism in western philosophy. Derrida views western metaphysics as constantly driving toward a final Truth, which is always merely a conglomeration of truths.
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like an adult, insofar as an adult is the complete version of a child. Bakhtin does not explicitly state it, but sets up an aesthetic and epistemological preference for the epic over the novel at the beginning of this essay. It is evident that studying the dead language is preferable to the young language of the novel: a dead language presents the entirety of its potential, with no room for missing elements that lead the reader away from Truth. A young language, on the other hand, has missing and/or underdeveloped pieces, which can only lead the reader further away from Truth and wholeness. This reading of the novelistic genre is at least indicative of an implicit assertion that the epic holds status in relation to the uncompleted novel. Bakhtin identifies the epic as a sort of father in literature, as that which dictates law and establishes a model for everything that comes after: The absolute past is a specifically evaluating (hierarchical) category. In the epic world view, beginning, first, founder, ancestor, that which occurred earlier, and so forth are not merely temporal categories but valorized temporal categories, and valorized to an extreme degree. [] The novel, by contrast, is determined by experience, knowledge and practice. (Bakhtin, 15) Thus, the epic gains status over the novel much in the same manner as the whole maleUsbek, in the case of Persian Lettershas status over the eunuch. Bakhtins theory indirectly reinforces the penis fetish in that it gives priority to what is whole over what is lacking. Of course, Bakhtin does not explicitly equate the epics wholeness to anything concerning masculinity or the possession of a penis, but nonetheless he does assume the epics ability to provide a much more complete version of representation than the novel. That is not to say that Bakhtins theory purposefully reaffirms the fetish for the whole, but rather that it relies on the same model for Truth as does the individual subjectthat is, reliance on the fetishization of the penis that affirms hierarchical models of subjectivity. Hence, literary theory, in this case, is analogous to

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the development of the subject through relationships with others insofar as this development is contingent on valorized temporal categories. Bakhtin places immense emphasis on the role of time, situating the novel in the present, which is defined by progression or incompletion, and the epic in the distant past, which appears as whole and complete simply due to its temporal distance. Although one might intuitively interpret the present as wholeness, as the present is absolute immanence in that it is occurring right now; it has direct proximity to the individual, as there is no need to look back or project forward in order to analyze it. Bakhtin, however, posits that immersion in the present results in the loss of completioncastration, perhapsfor the external world: [W]hen the present becomes the center of human orientation in time and in the world, time and world lose their completeness as a whole as well as in each of their parts. The temporal model of the world changes radically: it becomes a world where there is no first word (no ideal word), and the final word has not been spoken. For the first time in artistic-ideological consciousness, time and the world become historical: they unfold, albeit at first still unclearly and confusedly, as becoming, as an uninterrupted movement into a real future, as a unified, allembracing and unconcluded process. (Bakhtin, 30) It is evident that Bakhtin views language and literature as diachronic developments through time, developments that are complicated by the present. The injection of the individual in the present introduces a gap in the progression of language from the complete past to the complete future; the past is only whole because it exists to view in its entirety, and the future is assumed to be complete only because there is an assumption of an end point at which language reaches its outer limit. It is the ambiguous experience of the present, then, that shatters the ostensible wholeness ascribed to the synchronic individual, which subsequently manifests itself in works of literatureand not merely in the epic and novel forms, but also in literary criticism, philosophy,

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poetry,11 etc. Even further, anything that one can read as a text is subject to the same fragmentation, incompleteness, and progression as the novel form. Bakhtins theory assumes that the distant past, the time of the epic, holds a certain status that protects it from the threat of fragmentation, which potentially results from reading the absolute past through the lens of the present. Immanence of the present moment forces a lack onto the text through the act of reading: simply by reading it, the reader adds to the meaning of the text, breaking the limits of interpretation and making additions to an object once thought of as whole.12 The epic, even in its present reading, resists the fragmentation of immanence: Every event, every phenomenon, every thing, every object of artistic representation loses its completeness, its hopelessly finished quality and its immutability that had been so essential to it in the world of the epic absolute past, walled off by an unapproachable boundary from the continuing and unfinished present. Through contact with the present, an object is attracted to the incomplete process of a world-in-the-making, and is stamped with the seal of inconclusiveness. No matter how distant this object is from us in time, it is connected to our incomplete, present-day, continuing temporal transitions, it develops a relationship with our unpreparedness, with our present. But meanwhile our present has been moving into an inconclusive future. (ibid) Despite the epics existence in the absolute past, which places it closer to something whole, it is nonetheless an object that is bound within the terms of the incomplete present. In this way, the epic functions similar to the reader who encounters the eunuchs in Persian Letters. The epic genre, insofar as it is one of perceived and desired wholeness, represents a model for the reader to project his or her own desire for wholeness in the light of the eunuch. When one is presented with a figure that possesses such a blatant lack, the subsequent uncanny feeling provokes the reader to find other representations of wholeness to hold as a future possibility. One must remember, however, that the eunuchs lack is at least partially advantageous: the physical lack

One might even say that poetry is a special case insofar as it purposefully rejects wholeness, preferring generally to create more gaps than existed prior to the text. 12 This emphasis on the reader as an agent of discourse can also be seen in Roland Barthes essays on poststructuralist criticism and Jacques Derridas idea of the supplement.
11

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brings him/her closer to closing the ontological lack signified by the phallus. The eunuch takes direct action to identify him/herself to the absolute past through the negation of present wholeness; s/he is castrated in the present in order to regress to the past. Owing to his/her active regression and desire for wholeness that transcends the physical, the eunuch becomes a representative of the readers and critics demand to find wholeness in a text that is unavoidably lacking. Both reader and critic obsessively search for Truth and Meaning in the text, finding it in the eunuch, which perhaps is both an obvious and veiled source: The absence of internal conclusiveness and exhaustiveness creates a sharp increase in demands for external and formal completedness and exhaustiveness, especially in regard to plotline. The problems of a beginning, an end, and fullness of plot are posed anew. (Bakhtin, 31) Conclusiveness is a highly ambiguous term in itself, and is even more so when coupled with the question of internality and externality. These terms are multivalent and almost operate as placeholders insofar as, when dealing with a text, the internal and the external are not mutually exclusive, and conclusion does not simply occur when the readers eyes process the last word and the book closes. Conclusion, internality, and externality transcend the beginning and end of the story; they essentially have nothing to do with the words printed on the page, the reader, or the criticism that follows. Textuality is the combination of all these aspects, a combination of infinite potential and unending multiplicity. Indeed, just as there is no first word,13 the last word is ever more fleeting. Such ambiguity and overwhelming potential are aspects of literature that Bakhtin considers but only in passing. There is a brief point in the text at which he rethinks the wholeness of the epic genre but does so in a very hesitant manner: The epic is indifferent to formal beginnings and can remain incomplete (that is, where it concludes is almost arbitrary).

13

See passage from Bakhtin on page 18 in the present essay.

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The absolute past is closed and completed in the whole as well as in any of the parts. It is, therefore, possible to take any part and offer it as the whole. (ibid) The focus of this revision in previous thought, that the epics conclusion as almost arbitrary, is relegated to the realm of parentheses: its conclusion is (almost arbitrary). The parenthetical nature of this statement is significant in that the parentheses close it off from the rest of the text, as is their purpose, which removes from the text one of its most significant points. It introduces a gap in the text that makes his entire theory problematic. Certainly, this observation is not an indication of Bakhtins lack of theoretical rigoras these types of rhetorical slips, or perhaps purposeful hesitations, are not unique to Bakhtin and can be found in any given textbut rather an acknowledgement of the intrinsic, paradoxical threat of theoretical backfiring in the content of analysis. In other words, whenever one is dealing with notions of wholeness, the phallus always has potential to reappear in the form of the self-annihilating signifier, the signifier that fails in its function to signify the authors particular idea of meaning. The phallus implants itself as the malevolent interlocutor of comprehensive discourse: it is a priori an inherent aspect of any discourse, always lurking just beyond discursive consciousness, taking its action at the precise time when the subjects illusion of wholeness solidifies itself in individual reality. Given the omnipresence of the phallus, one must conclude that all texts are essentially castrated. The texts of Montesquieu, Lacan, and Bakhtin merely provide a few necessary aspects of the text as a lacking entity, but they are no more whole than any other genre. One must also question the designation of a text as castrated, since castration implies that something has been taken away, which in turn implies a prior wholeness. Bakhtin might say that the epic is a text that once was, and possibly still is, whole. Lacan, on the other hand, might argue that the phallus, as an a priori aspect of the Symbolic, affects the epic to the same extent as it does the

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novel. Epic and novel, then, are lacking in the same manner, and perhaps lacking is a more accurate term than castrated in this sense. They differ in their attempt to veil the effects of the phallus: the epic, as a text of the absolute past, attempts to provide a semblance of completeness, whereas the novel, especially the modernist and postmodernist novel, embraces its fragmentation and lack of wholeness. Literary criticism is also moving in this direction, allowing for textual analysis that acknowledges what it lacks.

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Bibliography Bakhtin, M. M. The Dialogic Imagination. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004. Barthes, Roland. ImageMusicText. Trans. Stephen Heath. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997. Fink, Bruce. Lacan to the Letter. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004. Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Norton, 1961. Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. New York: Oxford UP, 1977. Lacan, Jacques. crits. The Signification of the Phallus. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 2006. Pages 575-584. Lukcs, Georg. The Theory of the Novel. Trans. Anna Bostock. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971. Montesquieu. Persian Letters. Trans. C. J. Betts. New York: Penguin, 2004.

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