R I V ISTA DEGLI STUDI ORIENTALI

NUOVA SERIE
 RIVISTA DEGLI S TUDI ORIENTALI
NUOVA SERIE

SAPIENZA UNIVERSITÀ DI ROMA

ISTITUTO ITALIANO DI STUDI ORIENTALI

*
Direttore responsabile
Raffaele Torella

*
Direttore scientifico
Raffaele Torella

Comitato scientifico
Prof. Pia Brancaccio (Drexel University)
Prof. Cristina Scherrer-Schaub
(Université de Lausanne, École pratique des hautes études, Paris)
Prof. Phyllis Granoff (Yale University)
Prof. Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi (École pratique des hautes études, Paris)
Prof. Ghanshyam Sharma (inalco, Paris)
Prof. Lawrence Wang-chi Wong (Hong Kong University)
Prof. Cécile Michel (cnrs, Paris)
Prof. Barbara Pizziconi (soas, University of London)
Prof. Carter Eckert (Harvard University)
Prof. Florian Schwarz (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien)

Comitato editoriale
Alessandra Brezzi, Antonetta Bruno, Vanna Calasso,
Leonardo Capezzone, Federica Casalin, Mario Casari,
Franco D’Agostino, Ciro Lo Muzio, Matilde Mastrangelo,
Giorgio Milanetti, Luca Milasi, Lorenzo Verderame

Segretaria di redazione
Carmela Mastrangelo

*
Pubblicato con il contributo
di Sapienza Università di Roma
anvur: a
 S A P I E N Z A U N I V E R S I TÀ DI ROMA
I S T I T U TO I TA L I A N O D I S TU DI O RIEN TALI

PROCEEDINGS OF TH E M E E T I N G
OF T HE ITALIAN AS S O C I AT I O N
OF SANSKRIT S T U D I E S
(BOLOGNA 27-28 M A RC H 2015)
EDITED BY
RAFFAELE TORELLA, MARCO FRANCESCHINI,
TIZIANA PONTILLO, CINZIA PIERUCCINI,
ANTONIO RIGOPOULOS, FRANCESCO SFERRA

SUPPLEMENTO Nº 2
ALLA RIVISTA DEGLI STUDI ORIENTALI
NUOVA SERIE
VOLUME LXXXIX

PISA · ROMA
FABRIZIO SERRA EDITORE
2016
 RIVISTA DEGLI S TUDI ORIENTALI
NUOVA SERIE
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 SOMMARIO

Editorial 9
Omar Abu Dbei, The poet’s meal: nourishment purveyor of inspiration
and skills 11
Alessandro Battistini, “Latet anguis in herba”: nāgabandhas in
Sanskrit literature 25
Marco Ferrante, On ṛṣis and yogins: immediate and mediate
extraordinary cognitions in early Brahmanical thought 41
Alberto Pelissero, Marginal not to Ātmollāsa 63
Gianni Pellegrini, Di erentiating jāti and upādhi: towards a further
exeges of the six jātibādhakas according to Navya Nyāya 73
David Pierdominici Leão, Mattavilāsa-prahasana: new perspectiv of study 93
Cinzia Pieruccini, The aśoka grov of the Rāmāyaṇa: imagery and
meanings 107
Chiara Policardi, Therianthropic yoginīs in early Śaiva tradition 119
Rosa Ronzitti, Are the Sanskrit words of the jüngere Sprache Indo-
European? 155
Margherita Serena Saccone, Con icting theori regarding
externalism: Śāntarak ita and Kamala ī
la against the Nyāya in the
Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā 165
 CONFLICTING THEORIES
REGARDING EXTERNALISM*
ŚĀNTARAKṢITA AND KAMALAŚĪLA
AGAINST THE NYĀYA IN THE
DRAVYAPADĀRTHAPARĪKṢĀ **

Margherita Serena Saccone

1. Introduction

T he practice of supporting as well as defending different and, at times, con-

flicting epistemological and ontological theories is quite common among
the authors of the so-called Buddhist logico-epistemological school. This has
been the focus of some studies with reference to Dharmakīrti1 (ca. 600-660?)2 as
well as Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788) and Kamalaśīla (ca. 740-795).3
Particularly, regarding the latter authors, this usage is present in some of their
works and is (or has been regarded as) connected with the practice of cintāmayī
prajñā, insight born of reflection,4 propaedeutic to vipa yanā, discernment.
Within that context, these doctrines are arranged hierarchically in order to facil-
itate a deeper investigation into the true reality of things. This is evident, for ex-
ample, in the Bhāvanākramas (BhK) of Kamalaśīla, which openly deal with the

* I shall use the term “externalism” as a literal translation of the term Bahirarthavāda, found
in the Dravyapadārthaparīk ā, generally referring to views which admit the existence of external
objects of cognitions, whether or not those cognitions are admitted as assuming the images of their
objects.
** This article reports some of the results of the project entitled “The Criticism of the Concepts
of Time and Substance in the Philosophical Debate of the VIII Century in India – A Philosophical
and Philological Study of the Dravyapadārthaparīk ā of the Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita and
the related pañjikā of Kamalaśīla,” financed by the University of Naples, “L’Orientale.” An earlier
version of this paper was presented during the “Kamalaśīla Workshop” at IKGA (Österreichische
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna) in June 2016. I thank all the participants for their useful
suggestions and feedback.
1
See, particularly, Dunne 2004: 53-79; Dreyfus 1997: 98-99, 103-105; Kellner 2011.
2
Regarding Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the dates provided here are those proposed
by Frauwallner (1961). For a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s dates, see Eltschinger 2010a: 398.
3
See McClintock 2003, 2010.
4
For this translation and the concept of cintāmayī prajñā, see Eltschinger 2014: 318-328 and
Eltschinger 2010b.

https://doi.org/10.19272/201603824011 · supplemento n. 2 «rso · n.s.», lxxxix, 2016

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subject of realization.5 Accordingly, one could say that, in their works, 6 Śānta-
rakṣita and Kamalaśīla (implicitly or explicitly) argue for a gradual philosophical
analysis that entails a refinement of reason through the use of several views from
distinct standpoints (or schools).
The focus of this paper will be a few verses, kk. 583-591, along with the relat-
ed commentary, from the Dravyapadārthaparīk ā (Investigation of the Catego-
ry of Substance), a chapter of the Tattvasaṅgraha (TS) by Śāntarakṣita and the
Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (TSP) by Kamalaśīla. These two works appear not to be
immediately concerned with meditation,7 but rather with philosophical argu-

5
In the Bhāvanākramas, vipa yanā is introduced as an examination of reality in order to understand
selflessness. This investigation consists in gradually surpassing the pudgalavāda, the false concept of
the existence of material dharmas and so on. Cf.: […] tato vipa yanāṃ bhāvayet | bhūtapratyavek aṇā
ca vipa yanocyate | bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyam | tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā
skandhānām ātmātmīyarahitatā | dharmanairātmyaṃ yā te ām eva māyopamatā | […] tato
rūpiṇo ’pi dharmān dharmanairātmyādhigamāya vicārayet […] tathā cānupalabhamān te v
astināstitvavikalpān nivartayati | cittamātraṃ ca traidhātukam avatarati nānyathā | […] sa evaṃ
vicārayati | cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anutpannam | […] yathā citrākāratayā rūpādayo
naikānekasvabhāvās tathā cittam api tadavyatirekeṇa naikānekasvabhāvam | […] tasmān māyopamam
eva cittam | yathā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat paramārthato ’nutpannāḥ | (BhK III, ed.
p. 5, 17-20; 6, 5-11; 6, 21-7, 9). “Therefore, one should realize vipa yanā. And the investigation of
reality is said ‘vipa yanā.’ Moreover, the reality is the selflessness of pudgala and dharmas. Between
these, the selflessness of the pudgala is the fact that the aggregates are devoid of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ The
selflessness of the dharmas is the fact that they are indeed similar to an illusion. […] Therefore, in
order to understand the selflessness of dharmas, one should examine also the material dharmas. […]
And thus, not perceiving [material dharmas], he abandons the concepts regarding their existence
and non-existence. Moreover, he comes to understand that these three worlds are mind-only, not in a
different way. […] He investigates as follows: ‘Also mind from an absolute point of view is non-arisen
like an illusion.’ […] Like visual forms, [sensations,] etc., having variegated aspects, are devoid of
svabhāva, neither one nor many, similarly also mind, through a non-difference from those, is devoid
of svabhāva, neither one nor many. […] Therefore, mind is nothing but similar to an illusion. Like
mind, also all dharmas, similar to an illusion, are non-arisen from an absolute point of view.”
6
This is also true with regard to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra, its vṛtti by Śāntarakṣita and the pañjikā
by Kamalaśīla, see Kajiyama 1978. Based on his analysis of those works, Kajiyama (1978: 114) defines
Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s school as “syncretic” with regard to philosophy. In analyzing the sub-
ject of this hyerarchy of views, Kajiyama also refers to BhK I and the quotation of Laṅkāvatārasūtra
10.256-258 (ed. p. 298-299) found therein. With reference to this, see also Nagasawa 1962; Gomez
1983; Lindtner 1997; Bentor 2002. This quotation is also found in the Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti
and Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā, cf., respectively, ed. pp. 296, 298, 300 and 297, 299, 301. On this,
cf. also Ichigō 1989: 156-157, 220-223; Kajiyama 1978: 132. Similar arguments to those found in the
Bhāvanākramas are present in the Vajracchedikāṭīkā by Kamalaśīla.
7
Kamalaśīla suggests that the scope of this treatise is also that of favouring the realization
of the cintāmayī prajñā. Cf. sa cāsmād aviparītapratītyasamutpādasaṃprakā akāc chāstrāc
chravaṇacintābhāvanākrameṇopajāyata ity ato ’vagamyata eva tattvasaṅgrahakriyāto jagaddhitam
api sampadyata iti. (TSP ad TS 1-6, ed. p. 12, 4-6). “And this [non-error] is produced from this
treatise, which expounds non-erroneously the dependent origination, through the succession of
[wisdoms arisen from] hearing, reflection and realization. Therefore, one [should] understand
indeed that also the benefit of the world is obtained from the action of the Tattvasaṅgraha.” Cf.
also McClintock (2010: 107-108). She notes that, according to Kamalaśīla, one of the aims of the
treatise, which is the subsequent result of the understanding of it, is the attainment of the “benefit
[3]
167 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [3 ]
167

mentation and debate on various subjects,8 even though these things may not
necessarily be distinct.9 Regarding the above-mentioned verses, I shall analyze
the two philosophers’ utilization of a Sautrāntika10 viewpoint.11 This reveals it-
self as a very useful tool against a particular group of opponents, namely the Nai-
yāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. However, in the middle of his argument, Kamalaśīla
feels the need of demonstrating that this view (which they are indeed defending)
is just provisional and must be considered as inferior to the Vijñānavāda.12 I shall
argue that he does so because he is aware that a particular aspect of that view is
a virtually unfailing refutation of one of the Vijñānavāda standard arguments
against external objects of cognition; this being an indication of Kamalaśīla’s
prevailing interest in systematizing and settling an “orthodoxy” of the Buddhist
logico-epistemological school, also for the benefit of his student-monks.
In doing so, I shall also provide a new critical edition13 and English translation of
some parts of the Dravyapadārthaparīk ā.

of the world” (jagaddhita), which consists in “elevation” (abhyudaya) and “the highest good”
(niḥ reyasa). Specifically, regarding the latter, Kamalaśīla states: pudgaladharmanairātmyāvabodha
ca niḥ reyasahetuḥ rutacintābhāvanākrameṇotpadyate. (TSP ad TS 1-6, ed. p. 13, 5-6). “And the
understanding of the selflessness of the pudgala and dharmas, [which is] the cause of the highest
good, arises through the succession of hearing, reflection and realization.” On Śāntarakṣita and
Kamalaśīla on the aim (prayojana) of a treatise, see Funayama 1995.
8
The most credited thesis is that they were manuals on the art of public debate for Buddhist
monks. On this cf. McClintock 2010: 47-111.
9
In BhK I, while talking about cintāmayī prajñā, Kamalaśīla maintains: yuktyā hi sthirīkṛta-
syāgamārthasyānyair apohitum a akyatvāt | ato yuktyāpi pratyavek aṇīyam | (BhK I, ed. p. 11, 4-5).
“Since the meaning of the Scriptures that is confirmed indeed by reasoning cannot be denied by the
opponents, one must therefore investigate also by means of reasoning.”
10
The use of the term “Sautrāntika” in this context may be not totally appropriate, since Kamalaśī-
la never actually employs this term in the chapter. As we will see, he uses the term bahirarthavādin
(“externalist”) once and gives a brief explanation of which views are admitted according to the partic-
ular standpoint they are defending in the chapter, namely, the apprehension of an external object and
the reality of atoms. He also defines the theory that cognitions have an [external] object (vi aya) as
bahirarthavāda. Cf. TSP ad TS 591 in n. 79. The term bahirarthavādin is used as a general means of
referring to externalist views, and thus also to the Mīmāṃsakas, cf. yeyam asmābhir vijñānavadasthitair
nirākāracintā prāg akāri sā sāṃprataṃ bāhyārthābhinivi ṭān bhavato mīmāṃsakān prati bahirartham
abhyupetya sarvajñe pratipādyamāne bhavatāṃ bahirarthavādināṃ katham api nopayujyata eva kar-
tum. (TSP ad TS 3645, ed. p. 1130, 15–17. On this passage, see also McClintock 2010: 314 n. 742).
On the terms “Sautrāntika” and “Bāhyārthavāda,” see Dunne 2004: 58, 59 n. 13. For a brief account of
the history of the term see Ratié 2010: 442, n.16, who quotes Kritzer 2003a, 2003b, 2005: xxxvi-xxx.
11
McClintock (2003: 145-146) brings forward some of the verses and passages concerned here in
order to prove that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla use what appears like an autonomous inference, even
though they do not accept – even at a conventional level – the subject, the quality to be proved and
the logical reason. This is because this Sautrāntika inference is refuted from the higher point of view
of the Vijñānavāda. She also maintains that Kamalaśīla’s step back is due to the necessity of avoiding
that their autonomous inferences are invalidated in such arguments.
12
This is certainly not the only case for Kamalaśīla. As already noted by McClintock (2010: 86),
TSP is rich with indications concerning the different levels of analysis.
13
I shall provide the reader only with the most significant variants of the critical apparatus. For the
Sanskrit text, I refer to my critical edition (still unpublished).
[4
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[4]

2 he Pūrvapak a

padārtha 14
583
591

pūrvapak a 561 562

avayavin
15

sthūlārthāsambhave tu syān naiva vṛk ādidar anam |

atīndriyatayāṇūnāṃ na cāṇuvacanaṃ bhavet 16 561)
sthūlavastuvyapek o hi susūk mo ’rth tathocyate |
sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kimapek āsya sūk matā 562

17

14
idānīṃ guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ ūnyam ity etatsamarthanārthaṃ
aṭpadārthaparīk opak epaṃ kurvann āha ad 546 547). jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam
ayuktaṃ prāk prakā itam | dravyādayaḥ aḍ arthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ 546 ity
āk apādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ | dravyādiprati edho ’yaṃ saṅk epeṇa tad ucyate ||
547 upādhi

svabhāva Sthirabhāvaparīk ā
pāramārthika

āgama tad
ye
yato 546 dam pa’i don du yod pa’i phyir // 1
21 3 1
26 7
15
evaṃ tāvad anumānato ’vayavāvayavinor bhedaṃ prasādhya pratyak ato ’pi sādhayann āha
ad 561

16

562 563.
17
[5]
169 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [5 ]
169

yadi hy avayavī na syāt sarvāgrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, paramāṇūnām atīndriyatvāt | sthūlābhāve

’ṇur iti vyapade a eva na syāt | kasmād ity āha – sthūlavastuvyapek o18 hītyādi | subodham
| ad 561 562)

ex
hypothesi
Nyāyabhā ya

sarvāgrahaṇam avayavyasiddeḥ || yady avayavī nāsti sarvasya grahaṇaṃ nopapadyate |

kiṃ tat sarvam? dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyavi e asamavāyāḥ | kathaṃ kṛtvā?
paramāṇusamavasthānaṃ tāvad dar anavi ayo na bhavaty atīndriyatvād aṇūnām |
dravyāntaraṃ cāvayavibhūtaṃ dar anavi ayo nāsti | dar anavi ayasthā ceme guṇādayo
dharmā gṛhyante | te tu niradhi ṭhānā na gṛhyeran | gṛhyante tu kumbho ’yaṃ yāma eko
mahān saṃyuktaḥ spandate ’sti mṛnmaya ceti | santi ceme guṇādayo dharmā iti | tena
sarvasya grahaṇāt pa yāmo ’sti dravyāntarabhūto’vayavīti || ad 2.1.34 75
10 17)

loc

18
sthūlavastuvyapek o sthūlavastvapek o
[6 ]
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[6]

sion of everything, we understand that there is a part-possessor which is another substance

[different from its parts].”19

It is commonly observed that we experience coarse things endowed with various

properties. However, those properties could not be apprehended if they had no
loc , i.e, a subject of which they are the attributes. In other words, they are per-
ceived only as belonging to a substance. However, atoms, which are admitted as
a substance, are not apprehended, because they are beyond the cognizance of the
senses. Therefore, in order to account for our common experience of things and
properties, we must admit that coarse things, i.e., the part-possessors, are substanc-
es (dravyas) themselves. They are a new ontological reality, different from their
parts, and are the objects of our cognitions.
As a matter of fact, Kamalaśīla mentions Udyotakara as an opponent a few
passages before.20 In his Nyāyavārttika (NV), Udyotakara comments on NBh
and NS 2.1.34 advancing two interpretations of the compound sarvāgrahaṇa,
as a genitive or as an instrumental tatpuru a. By doing so, he also provides two
distinct arguments. Only the first one is directly connected with the proof ex-
pounded in NBh:

sarvāgrahaṇam avayavyasiddheḥ | saṃ ayāpākaraṇārthaṃ sūtram | sarvāgrahaṇam

avayavyasiddher iti | sarve ām arthānām agrahaṇaṃ prasajyeta | yadi avayavy
arthāntarabhūto ’vayavebhyo nāstīti | katham iti paramāṇav tāvad dar anavi ayabhāvaṃ
na pratipadyante, atīndriyatvād ity uktam | avayavidravyāṇi ca bhavadbhir na pratipadyante
tadanabhyupagame ca yo ’yam dravyapratyayaḥ kumbha iti guṇapratyayaḥ yāma iti
kriyāpratyaya calatīti sāmānyapratyayo ’stīti vi e apratyayaḥ kala a iti samavāyapratyaya
iha ghaṭe rūpādaya iti | tathānye ’pi pratyayā eko mahān saṃyukto vibhaktaḥ pṛthak paro
’para iti ca na syuḥ | asti ca sarvasya grahaṇam dravyaguṇakarmādiprapañcasya | tena
sarvasya grahaṇāt pa yāmo ’vayavātirikto ’sty avayavīti | (NV ad NS 2.1.34, ed. p. 227,
14-228, 2)

“[There] is the non-apprehension of everything since the part-possessor is not estab-

lished. [This] sūtra is aimed at removing the doubt. [With] ‘[there] is the non-appre-
hension of everything since the part-possessor is not established,’ [it is said] that the
non-apprehension of all things would follow, if the part-possessor which is a different
object from its parts does not exist. How is this possible? Atoms, first of all, do not be-
come objects of observation since they are beyond the [reach of the] senses. This was stat-
ed. Moreover, [those] substances that are the part-possessors are not established by you
and if that is not admitted, [then] precisely a cognition related to a substance like ‘pot,’
a cognition related to a quality like ‘dark,’ a cognition related to an action like ‘moves,’
a cognition related to a generality like ‘is,’ a cognition related to a particularity like ‘wa-
ter-pot,’ a cognition related to an inherence like ‘in this pot there are [these] forms, etc.,’

19
I regard dravyāntarabhūtaḥ in NBh as commented on with avayavātiriktaḥ in NV. Accordingly,
I translate with “which is another substance [different from its parts].”
20
Cf. nanv ityādinodyotakarabhāviviktādayo hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayanti | (TSP ad TS 556).
Jp has a gloss (which corresponds to the word Bhāvivikta) stating: granthakāraḥ.
[7]
171 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [7 ]
171

21

3 he e istemic roof against atoms as

one of the main roof s of the i na da

Bahirarthaparīk ā22
vijñaptimātratā,23

grāhya

21
atha vā sarvāgrahaṇam iti
sarvaiḥ pramāṇair agrahaṇaṃ kathaṃ pratyak asya vartamānamahadvi ayatvāt | yad vartamānaṃ
mahac ca tad bāhyakaraṇapratyak am | ghaṭādyavayavipratyākhyāne ca na bāhyakaraṇapratyak a-
vi ayo ’sti | tasyābhāvād anumānāder apy abhāvaḥ | seyaṃ sarvapramāṇanivṛttih | upalabhyante
cārthāḥ pratyak ādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ | taiḥ sarvair grahaṇāt pa yāmo ’sty avayavīti | ad 2.1.34
228 3 7 Sarvāgrahaṇam
tatpuru a pramāṇa

pramāṇa pramāṇa
22
Bahirarthaparīk ā
On the Nature of Things – A Buddhist Debate on Cognitions and their Object.
23

pratibimbādisannibham ity etatpratītyasamutpādavi e aṇasamarthanārtham idānīṃ vijñānavādam

upak ipati | tatra vijñaptimātram evedaṃ traidhātukam | ad 1964

vijñaptimātra.
Da abhūmikasūtra cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam Da abhūmikasūtra
32 9 vijñaptimātraṃ traidhātukam. 22 14 15
vijñaptimātram evedam. 1
vṛtti 1 3 12 1
Da abhūmikasūtra Viṃ ikāvṛtti 135 10.
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[8]
24 25

grāhya

nirākāravāda26

vijñaptimātratā vṛtti Viṃ ikā

27
Ālambanaparīk ā28

29

24
tatrābhyāṃ prakārābhyāṃ vijñaptimātratābhī ṭā – bāhyasya pṛthivyādisvabhāvasya
grāhyasyābhāve grāhakatvasyāpy abhāvāt | saty api vā santānāntare grāhyagrāhakalak aṇavaidhuryāt
ad 1964 vijñaptimātratā

25
mā bhūt pramāṇataḥ siddhir aṇūnām astu saṃ ayaḥ | abhāvani cay tv e āṃ kathaṃ
prek āvatāṃ bhavet || 1988 pramāṇa

ekatva
14 12
26
nirākāravāda
sākāravāda
Dravyap-
adārthaparīk ā sākāravāda
Bahirarthaparīk ā nirākāravāda sākāravāda
nirākāravāda sākāravāda
1965 1935 77 ākāra
2014.
27

nāpy anekaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ pratyekam agrahaṇāt. vṛtti 11 67

30 1
2014 384 385.
28

der mi snaṅ phyir de’i yul ni || rdul phran ma yin dbaṅ po

bźin || Ālambanaparīk ā 1

2014 384.
29
svavyāpārabalenaiva pratyak aṃ janayed yadi | na parāmar avijñānaṃ kathaṃ te
’dhyak agocarāḥ || 1972) tathā hi – pratyak am avi e eṇotpannam api sat, yatraivāṃ e
yathāparigṛhītākāraparāmar aṃ janayati, sa eva pratyak a i yate vyavahārayo atayā | yatra tu na
[9]
173 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [9 ]
173

conditio
sine qua non
Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā
30
33
par excellence

don med yaṅ dag bsgrub pa la || re re yoṅs su mi chod phyir ||

rdul phran mi snaṅ ź smr pa || sems daṅ sems byuṅ rnams ky kyaṅ ||
the tshom za ba ñid du ’ ur || 33)31

kārikā
32

janayati tad gṛhītam apy agṛhītaprakhyam | tata ca nāsiddho hetuḥ | yataḥ pratyayāprativedanād
ity atra pratyak ābhimate pratyaye parāmar ahetāv apratibhāsanād ity ayam artho ’bhipretaḥ
ad 1972
parāmar avijñāna

(avi e eṇa parāmar a

vyavahārayo atā

1967

30
2014 378 3
761 pāda 1986 186 kārikā
31
33 Blo gsal grub mtha’ 1982 60
(sgrub bsgrub pāda pāda
32
gcig snaṅ ba’i rdul phran gaṅ || phan tshun med na mi ’byuṅ phyir || de la rnam par
bcad n ni || ji ltar re re snaṅ bar ’ ur || 43

rdul phran rnams ni re re n || raṅ dbaṅ ’byuṅ ba mi srid do || de phyir

phra rab rdul rnams ni || re re snaṅ bar mi ’ ur ro || 44
api
pratyekaṃ
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arising as aggregates, they are apprehended by sense perception, which is devoid

of conceptual construction, even though they are not subsequently ascertained
as “atoms.”33 This is because, when conceptual determination occurs, atoms are
falsely determined through concepts. However, concepts are erroneous and do not
appear in sense cognitions.34
In short, if the proof against atoms is based on perception, and this is admit-
ted as occurring as devoid of conceptual cognition (which is indeed a shared view-
point for the Pramāṇavādins),35 then their being subsequently ascertained singly
has nothing to do with that proof. Atoms can be admitted as apprehended even
without that ascertainment. Moreover, things are admitted as instantaneous, even
though there is no ascertainment of their distinct phases.36 Needless to say, the
whole reasoning applies to ordinary beings only.37
As we shall see, this is exactly the type of argument that Śāntarakṣita implements
in defence of his externalism.

na hi cāṇūnāṃ svātantryeṇāsti sambhavaḥ | ato ’pi paramāṇūnām ekaikāpratibhāsanam || (TSP

ad TS 1969).
33
Cf. ji ltar skad cig ’jig pa rnams || re re n mi rtogs pa ltar || de bźin g egs p yoṅs bcad la ’aṅ ||
rdul phran ṅ par mi ’ ur ro || (BASK 34). “Just like instantaneous things are not understood
separately, likewise, atoms cannot be ascertained [by a deluded person], even though the Tathāgata
distinguishes them.” The verse is found in Blo gsal grub mtha’ (having p instead of g egs p ): ji
ltar skad cig ’jig pa rnams || re re n ni rtogs pa ltar || de bźin p yoṅs bcad la ’aṅ || rdul phran ṅ
par mi ’ ur ro || (Blo gsal grub mtha’, ed. p. 59). blo y rtag tu r un chags daṅ || rigs mthun pa la
’dzin mod kyi || rnam par rtog pa’i pa y || de gcig ñid du ṅ par byed || (BASK 36). de phyir raṅ
gi mtshan ñid ky || rnam par la rdul phran rnams || mi snaṅ ź ni smra ba gaṅ || de dag thams
cad sgrub ma yin || (BASK 37). “Even though cognition always apprehends continuous and homoge-
neous [atoms], [still] conceptual cognition determines them as one. Therefore, all statements [of the
kind:] ‘atoms do not appear in terms of svalak aṇa in cognition’ are unestablished.”
34
Cf. gcig gi sgr brjod de dag ni || de dag la ni gcig med do || sgra yi don ni rnam brtags te || dbaṅ
po’i sems la mi snaṅ ṅo || (BASK 40).
35
This view is certainly a key-doctrine in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Cf. pratyaks.am.
kalpanāpod. ham. yasya jñānasya kalpanā nāsti, tat pratyak am | atha keyaṃ kalpanā nāma nāma-
jātyādiyojanā || (PS I.3cd and vṛtti, ed. p. 2, 8). “Direct perception is devoid of conceptual con-
struction That cognition which has no conceptual construction is direct perception. Then, what
is indeed this conceptual construction? The connection with names, universals, etc.” pratyak aṃ
kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam abhilāpinī | pratītiḥ kalpanā […] (PVin 1.4ac1) “Direct perception is
devoid of conceptual construction [and] non-erroneous. Conceptual construction is a cognition
endowed with expressions.” With reference to such a view in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see TS
1213: pratyak aṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam abhilāpinī | pratītiḥ kalpanā […] (TS 1213ac1) Cf.
Funayama 1992, 1999, 2005.
36
Cf. ’dra ba’i skad cig gźan ’byuṅ phyir || ji ltar rtag pa ñid ’khrul ltar || r un chags rigs mthun
’dzin pa la || sṅon po ñid du ’khrul pa skye || (BASK 35). “Just as, because of the arising of similar,
subsequent instants, there is the error of permanence, [likewise] there is the error of [something]
blue when one apprehends spatially continuous and homogeneous [atoms].”
37
Cf. BASK 34, see n. 33; mi o sogs gn blo ldan ni || graṅs la sogs pa’i bye brag g || dmyal sogs
rdul phran la rtog p || de phyir med par mi ruṅ ṅo || (BASK 59). “Since the Bodhisattva, who resi-
des in [one of the bhūm ,] such as the immobile, conceives of atoms, like [those] of hell, according to
differences such as [their] number. Therefore, they cannot be non-existent.”
[11]
175 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [11
175]

4 roof of a rehensi ility of atoms

583 591 pūr-

vapak a 561 562
dravya

pūrvapak a38 583

anyonyābhisarā caivaṃ ye jātāḥ paramāṇavaḥ |

naivātīndriyatā te ām ak āṇāṃ39 gocaratvataḥ || 583)

abhisara

gocara 40

asiddham aṇūnām atīndriyatvaṃ vi i ṭāvasthāprāptānām indriyagrāhyatvāt | yasya hi

nityāḥ paramāṇava iti pak taṃ praty aṇūnāṃ vi e ābhāvāt sarvādaivātīndriyatvaṃ syāt,
nāsmān prati | anyonyābhisarā ity anyonyasahāyā ity arthaḥ ad 583 243
13 16)

prāpta

41

vi i ṭāvasthā)42

38
yac coktaṃ sthūlārthāsambhava ityādi tatrāha ad 583).
39
ak āṇām 1 1
dbaṅ po’i anyānāṃ
40
de rnams dbaṅ po’i spyod yul ñid // min p dbaṅ po l ’d min // 1
22 7
1
28 8). gocara
41
phan tshun du lhan cig c bya ba ni gcig la gcig grogs by pa ź bya’i don do
2
263 3 2
326 3
42
2004 106
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anyon-
yasahāya, 43
2003 168 169
85
Pramāṇavārttika 195 19644
45
46

avasthā ye ’pi pṛthak samastā vā kvacid upayujyante ta

avasthāvi e avācibhiḥ sakṛd eva abdaiḥ pratyayārthaṃ khyāpyante sanidar anāḥ sapratighā veti
tadanyebhyo bhedasāmānyena. ad 137 142 68 21 24

abdaiḥ sakṛd
eva pratyayārtham ad 137
142 68 1966 Svārthānumāna
1093 39
43
anyonyasahāya parasparopakārin (sa-
hakārin dvividha ca sahakārī parasparopakārī ekakāryakārī ca. 58 4 5).
44
arthāntarābhisambandhāj jāyante ye ’ṇavo ’pare | uktās te sañcitās te hi nimittaṃ jñānajan-
manaḥ || 195). aṇūnāṃ sa vi e a ca nāntareṇāparān aṇūn | tad ekāniyamāj jñānam
uktaṃ sāmānyagocaram || 196

sañcita

sāmānya
ko vā virodho bahavaḥ saṃjātāti ayāḥ sakṛd | bhaveyuḥ kāraṇaṃ buddher yadi nāmendri-
yādivat || 223

2015 126 128.

45
don gźan daṅ ni mṅon ’drel phyir | rnam par pa
skyed par byed pa’i n pa’i raṅ bźin skyed pa’i rkyen ñe ba’i phyir | rdul phra rab ñe bar len pa’i r u
sṅar n pa med pa dag l rnam par pa skyed par byed pa’i n pa 189 1 2
svabhāva

2004 103 rnam par pa

skyed par byed pa’i n pa’i raṅ bźin skyed pa’i rkyen ñe ba’i phyir ź bya ba ni rnam par pa skyed
par byed pa rdul phra rab kyi | raṅ bźin skyed pa gaṅ yin pa de’i rkyen te | lhan cig byed pa gaṅ yin
pa de ñe ba’i phyir ź bya ba’i don to svabhāva

svabhāva
ñe 198 7 199 1
aṇūnāṃ sa ca jñānajananasāmarthyalak aṇo vi e o ’parān aṇūn avyavadhānavartino ’ntareṇa vinā
na bhavati | ad 196 177 13 14
46
svalak aṇa
[13]
177 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [13
177]

47

5 rehension and no ascertainment

in the he e istemic roof dis ro ed

nīlādir 48
ad 584
49

584)

50

51

apoha

1772

-
166
47
2015.
48
2 2
49

50

1
22 7 1
28 8
51

ad 109 56 19 57 1
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[14]

52

sarve ām eva vastūnāṃ sarvavyāvṛttirūpiṇām |

dṛ ṭāv api tathaiveti na sarvākārani cayaḥ 586)
53

(vyāvṛtti) 54

(iti

55

52
yady evaṃ sarvaprakāreṇāni caye sati kathaṃ nāma pratyak atā te āṃ yuktimatīty āha
ad 586).
53
dṅos po ’di rnams thams cad. 1 23 1 1 28 2
54
ldog pa’i raṅ bzin. 1 23 1 1 28 2
55
na hy aparadar anānāṃ kvacid api vastuni pratyak eṇa gṛhīte ’pi sarvākārani cayo ’sti |
yāvatā tu rūpeṇārthāntaravyāvṛttikṛtena tan ni cīyate, tāvatā tat pratyak am iti vyavasthāpyate | na
sarvākāreṇa | gṛthītasyāpi prakārāntarasya ni cayānutpatter vyavahārāyo atvenāgṛhītakalpatvāt |
tathaiveti yathā tad vastv anubhūtam. ad 586

prakāra

vyavahārāyo atva tan

ni cīyate de ṅ pa na ni cīyate
[15]
179 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [15
179]

56

akalpanāk agamye ’pi niraṃ e ’rthasvalak aṇe57 |

yadbhedavyavasāye ’sti kāraṇaṃ sa pratīyate 587)58

svalak aṇa
sa
(ākāra

ak e bhavam āks.am indriyajñānam ity arthaḥ | akalpanam avidyamānakalpanaṃ ca tad

āks.aṃ ceti vigrahaḥ tena gamye ’pi nirvikalpendriyajñānagamye ’pīty arthaḥ | yadbhe-
davyavasāya iti | yasmād bhedo vyāvṛttir yadbhed tatra vyavasāyo ni cay tasya kāraṇam
abhyāsaḥ pratyāsatt tāratamyabuddhipāṭavaṃ59 cetyādi | na hy anubhavamātram eva
ni cayakāraṇaṃ kiṃ tv abhyāsādayo ’pi | tena yatra te santi tatra ni cayaḥ prasūyata ity
arthaḥ | ad 587)

ak e āk a
Akalpanāk a karmadhāraya

yadbhedavyavasāye
Yadbhedaḥ
vyavasāyaḥ=ni cayaḥ

60

56

nanu ca niraṃ atayā sarvātmanaiva

pratyak eṇānubhūtatvād vastunaḥ kasmāt sarvātmanā ni cayo na bhavatīty āha ... . ad
587
57
sva 1 1
raṅ °sya
58
pratyak eṇa gṛhīte ’pi vi e e ’ṃ avivarjite yadvi e āvasāye ’sti pratyayaḥ sa pratīyate ||
58)
59
buddhi° 2 2
blo uddhi° suddhi°)
60
Pramāṇavāda 35.
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[16]

its object in its partless nature. Its object is the svalak aṇa, the particular. Ascer-
tainment is connected with concepts. Its sphere of activity is, hence, conventional
truth. The process involved with it is only partly guided by the nature of the appre-
hended things. It is also influenced by a series of causes, such as habituation, etc.,
which determine the conceptualization of a certain thing according to one aspect
as opposed to another. 61 According to a famous example, a woman’s body may be
seen as a corpse, as a woman or as meat.62
More importantly, the lack of a subsequent determination of atoms cannot
function as a proof of their non-apprehension by direct perception. Those two,
subsequent determination and direct perception, belong to two different spheres.
Atoms, as svalak aṇa, are ultimately real and are indeed apprehended by percep-
tion. Subsequently, on a conceptual (and conventional) level, they are ascertained
according to properties, i.e., “images,” such as blue.
To sum up, based on the view of direct perception that Śāntaraksita and Ka-
malaśīla admit throughout TS and TSP, the “Epistemic Proof” (which, instead,

61
As noted by McClintock (2003: 158 n. 21; 2010: 82 n. 215), the idea that the subsequent as-
certainment is not derived only by the mere apprehension of a certain thing is also present in the
Sthirabhāvaparīk ā: syād etat – yathā k aṇikatvaṃ abdāder avyatiriktam api sat tadgrahaṇe saty
apy agṛhītam ucyate, tadvad idam api bhavi yatīti | tad ayuktam | na hi abde dharmiṇi gṛhīte
’pi tadavyatireki k aṇikatvam agṛhītam iti vyavasthāpyate | kiṃ tu gṛhītam api tanni cayotpat-
tikāraṇābhāvād ani citam ity abhidhīyate | na hy anubhavamātrād eva ni cayo bhavati | tasyārthit-
vābhyāsasādguṇyādisāpek atvāt. (TSP ad TS 458, ed. p. 201, 9-13). “Let the following be the case:
like momentariness, even though non-distinct from sounds, etc., is said [to be] ‘non-apprehended,’
in spite of the apprehension of that [sound], similarly, this will be also. This is illogical. For it is not
established that, with reference to sound as a property-bearer, even though it is apprehended, [its]
instantaneousness, which is non-distinct from it, is non-apprehended. However, even though appre-
hended, it is said ‘non-ascertained’ because there are not the causes of the arising of its ascertainment.
For the ascertainment does not arise only from the mere experiencing, since it depends on interest,
habituation, good qualities, etc.”
62
Cf.: yady apy aṃ arahitaḥ sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo bhāvo ’nubhūt tathāpi na sarvabhede u
tāvatā ni cayo bhavati | kāraṇāntarāpek atvāt | anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ ni cayapratyayān
janayati | yathā rūpadar anāvi e e ’pi kuṇapakāminībhak yavikalpāḥ | tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ
tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo ’nubhavād bhedani cayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ | te ām eva
ca pratyāsattitāratamyādibhedāt paurvāparyam | yathā janakatvādhyāpakatvāvi e e ’pi pitaram
āyāntaṃ dṛ ṭvā pitā me āgacchati nopādhyāya iti | (PSSV ad PV Svārthānumāna 58, ed. p. 32,
3-11). “Even though a svabhāva different from everything [and] devoid of parts, i.e, a true nature,
is experienced, nevertheless, there is not the ascertainment to such an extent regarding all the
differences[, i.e., aspects], since [that ascertainment] depends [also] on other causes. For experience
generates cognitions related to the ascertainment according to the habituation related to conceptual
constructions. For instance, even though there is no difference in seeing a visual form [related to a
woman], there [arise] the concepts of a corpse, a woman and food. In this respect, the acuity of the
intellect, the habituation to their latent impressions, the context, etc., are cooperating causes for the
arising of different ascertainments from the experiencing [of some thing]. Moreover, the succession
of these [different ascertainments] is, indeed, due to the difference of association, priority, etc. For
instance, even though there is no difference between [his] being a father and being a teacher, [the
son,] having seen the father coming, [thinks,] ‘my father is coming,’ and not, ‘a teacher [is coming].’”
On this cf. Dunne 2004: 184, n. 59. On a similar note, see also: parivrāṭkāmuka unām ekasyāṃ
pramadātanau | kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhak ya iti tisro vikalpanāḥ || (Bodhicittavivaraṇa 20)
[17]
181 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [17
181]

6 amala la s ste ac

63

64

65
66 67

63
2008 15 16 2014 358 362 ad 336

-
ad 336 220 16 20
2014 359 23

64
2 2
siddham
65
bhedena 2 2
)
66
.
67
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[18]

cānupalak aṇaṃ68 bhrāntinimittenārthāntarasamāropād iti akyaṃ vaktum || ad

587 244 20 245 12)

abhyupagamya)69

vijñānavādin
1

2
svabhāva
3

vijñānavādin

Bahirarthaparīk ā.

1 4 1 vṛtti 70

68
cā 2 2
yaṅ vā
69
2010 65 155 abhyup-
agamya
abhyupagam
tout court
2010 65
ad hominem
ad humanitatem
ad hominen
1969 111
70
vijñaptimātram evaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt | yathā taimirikasyāsatke acandrādidar anam
|| 1 svapnopaghātavat kt.ryakriyā 4 1 siddheti veditavyam | yathā svapne
dvayasamāpattim antareṇa ukravisargalak aṇaḥ svapnopaghātaḥ | evaṃ tāvad anyānyair dṛ ṭāntair
de akālaniyamādicatu ṭayaṃ siddham | (vṛtti 4 1 4 8 9).
[19]
183 on ṚṢis and
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yogins externalism [19
183]

2. because an external object of sense-cognitions is, in fact, nothing but an

image appearing in an erroneous cognition, as it does not have a svabhāva, neither
one nor many (ekānekasvabhāva ūnyatva).71 [This is an elaboration on what is stat-
ed in Viṃś 11].72
Regarding the existence of atoms, he argues that atoms are not established as real:
3. because they are not proved as being unitary (eka). For, since they are
placed in space, it follows that they are endowed with a difference of parts accord-
ing to direction (digbhāgabheda). [This is a reference to Viṃś 14ab.]73

In the conclusion, he then appears to refer to the “Epistemic Proof.” He argues

that, based on those arguments, the Vijñānavādin cannot admit that atoms are per-
ceptible through their partless form and as placed in spatial continuity, i.e, as being
material “external” realities, even though they are not ascertained as such (but rath-
er determined through erroneous conceptual images).
In brief, in this passage, Kamalaśīla is making a point of defending the “Epis-
temic Proof” – that is, atoms are not established through direct perception, be-
cause they do not appear in that perception which must be the cause of an accor-
dant reflective awareness. In doing so, he resorts to other types of arguments that
prove their unreality (argument 3) as well as the illogicality of the apprehensibil-
ity of external objects (arguments 1 and 2). In fact, argument 2 also includes the

71
The epistemic argument that cognitions do not have an external grāhya implies the ontological
argument that external objects do not have an intrinsic nature.
72
Cf. na tad ekaṃ na cānekaṃ vi ayaḥ paramāṇu aḥ | na ca te saṃhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na
sidhyati || (Viṃś 11) […] yat tad rūpādikam āyatanaṃ rūpādivijñaptīnāṃ pratyekaṃ vi ayaḥ syāt
tad ekaṃ vā syād yathāvayavirūpaṃ kalpyate vai e ikaiḥ | anekaṃ vā paramāṇu aḥ | saṃhatā vā ta
eva paramāṇavaḥ | na tāvad ekaṃ vi ayo bhavaty avayavebhyo ’nyasyāvayavavirūpasya kvacid apy
agrahaṇāt | nāpy anekaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ pratyekam agrahaṇāt | nāpi te saṃhatā vi ayībhavanti |
yasmāt paramāṇur ekaṃ dravyaṃ na sidhyati | (vṛtti to Viṃś 11, ed. p. 6, 27-7, 2). “That [external
āyatana] as the object (vi aya) [of sensory perceptions] is not one, nor many [divided] into atoms.
Nor is it those [atoms themselves when] aggregated, since the atom is not established.” “Any [ex-
ternal] āyatana, such as the visual form etc., which could be the object (vi aya), respectively, of the
perceptions of visual forms, etc., could be one, like [that] form that is the part-possessor is imagined
by the Vaiśeṣikas; or many, [divided] into atoms; or those atoms themselves aggregated. First of all,
a unitary [āyatana] is not the object, because there is no apprehension anywhere of a form that is
a part-possessor, which is different from its parts. Nor are many, since there is no apprehension of
atoms singly. Nor these [atoms], as aggregated, become the object [of a cognition], since an atom is
not established as one substance.”
73
Cf. yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṃyoga i yate yadi vā ne yate | digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvam.
na yujyate | anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhede sati kathaṃ
tadātmakasya paramāṇor ekatvaṃ yok yate | (Viṃś 14ab and vṛtti, ed. p. 7, 17-21). “And whether
or not the conjoining of an atom is admitted. What has a difference of parts according to direction
is not tenable as being unitary. For, regarding [a single] atom, the part which is in the east until the
part which is at the nadir are different; being there a difference of parts according to direction of this
sort (iti), how will the singularity of an atom having that nature follow?” A reference to Viṃś 14ab
is also found in the Bahirarthaparīk a (TSP ad TS 1989-1991), as a siddhānta concluding the part
proving the inexistence of atoms. On such a proof, cf. n. 25.
[20
184 ] margherita
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[20]

svabhāva 74

vṛtti
11 27).

7 en ing the e istemic roof

is the est anti ote to the Avayavin

Bahirarthavāda
588

75

35 1971 36
Bahirarthaparīk ā.76

74
svabhāva

saṃhata 2015 115 116

72.
75
syād etat – yady avayavī na syāt tadā kathaṃ bahu u paramāṇu v ekaḥ parvata
iti vyavasāyo vyāpṛtāk asya bhavatīty āha – | yathā hi dīpādau nairantaryeṇa
sadṛ āparāparajvālādipadārthasambhavāt saty api bheda ekatvavibhramo bhavati tathā
nairantaryeṇānekasūk matarapadārthasaṃvedanato ’yam ekatvavibhrama ity ado aḥ || ad
588
vyavasāya

jvālādi sadṛ āparāparajvālāpadārthasambhavāt

’bar ba la sogs pa’i 2
264 2 2 327 7
76
2014.
[21]
185 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [21
185]

vivekālak aṇāt te āṃ no cet pratyak ate yate |

dīpādau sā kathaṃ dṛ ṭā kiṃ ve ṭo ’vayavī tathā || 589)

yadi hi vivekenānavadhāryamāṇaṃ na77 pratyak am i yate, tadā dīpādau pūrvāparavibhā-

genānupalak yamāṇe sā pratyak atā kathaṃ dṛ ṭā | avayavī vāvayavavivekenāgṛhyamāṇo
’pi kiṃ tathā pratyak atvene ṭa ity anaikāntikam etat. ad 589)

vivekālak aṇāt)

Śāntarak ita
78

Bahirarthavāda
79

77
na 2 2
mi
78

79
etāvat tu bhaved atra katham e ām ani caye | nīlādi paramāṇūnām ākāra iti gamyate || 590
tad apy akāraṇaṃ yasmān naitaj jñānam agocaram | nacaikasthūlavi ayaṃ sthaulyaikatvavirodhataḥ ||
[22 ]
186 margherita
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[22]

8 onc sion

Dravyapadārthaparīk ā
Bahirarthaparīk ā Bahirarthavāda

vijñaptimātratā.80
583 591

Bahirarthaparīk ā vijñaptimātratā.

591 etāvad ityādinā paraṃ codayituṃ ik ayati – e ām iti paramāṇūnām | tad apīti
paramāṇūnāṃ vivekenālak aṇaṃ yat tad akāraṇaṃ paramāṇugatanīlādyagrahaṇasyānyato ’pi
ni cayotpatteḥ | tathā hīdaṃ jñānam avi ayaṃ tāvad bahirarthavādinā satā naive ṭavyam anyathā
hi vijñānamātratādar anam eva syāt | sa cāyaṃ rūpādivi ayaḥ sthūlarūpatayāvabhāsamāna eko
vā syād aneko vā | eko ’pi bhavann ārabdho vā syād avayavair anārabdho vā | tatra na tāvad
ubhayātmā ’py ayam eko yuktaḥ pratyak ādivirodhāt || ad 590 591

590

591

bahirarthavādin
vijñānamātratā

591 naitat naita 2 2 (de ni min naiva gaṅ phyir de la

’aṅ r u med de // pa de ni yul med min // 1 23 3 4 1 28 5 6 ad
591 syād avayavair anārabdho vā |
80
Madhyamakālaṃkāra vṛtti pañjikā Madhyamakāloka
Bhāvanākrama
2010 87 91
1987 102
parīk ā
(1991 219 221 Bahirarthaparīk ā

vijñaptimātratāsiddhir dhīmadbhir vimalīkṛtā asmābh taddi ā yātaṃ paramārthavini caye ||

2083 vijñaptimātratā
Paramārthavini caya. paramārthat tu nirālambanāḥ sarva eva pratyayāḥ
ad 2083
[23]
187 on ṚṢis and
conflicting theories regarding
yogins externalism [23
187]

lists some other arguments in order to make clear to his audience (that of Buddhist
monks), and convince them, that the Vijñānavāda is the view to finally pursue.
This move shows that Śāntarakṣita and (more openly) Kamalaśīla intended TS and
TSP not only as a pedagogical tool to instruct monks on the art of the debate, but
also as a means to systematize and reinforce their doctrinal system so as to create an
orthodoxy within the logico-epistemological school of Buddhism.

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 sta m pato e r i l e gato nella
t i p o g r a f i a d i ag nan o, ag na no pisano (pisa).

*
Finito di stampare nel mese di
Dicembre 2016
(cz 2 · fg 21)

*
Periodico iscritto alla Cancelleria del Tribunale di Roma
in data 7 marzo 2006 n. 121/06
Raffaele Torella, Direttore responsabile
Periodico già registrato in data
30 aprile 1958 n. 6299