11 Aug 2010

Chechnya: Divisions in the Ranks

Cyclist rides past a partially constructed railway line through the Georgian mountains to Chechnya.

Doku Umarov’s attempt to resign has revealed a schism in the leadership of North Caucasus-based
insurgency and terrorism networks, but whether he stays or goes will have no long-term impact on
the network’s capabilities, Simon Saradzhyan comments for ISN Security Watch.

By Simon Saradzhyan in Moscow and Boston for ISN Security Watch

Two days after the internet release of a video showing the leader of the North Caucasus-based
insurgency and terrorism networks, Doku Umarov, querying fellow warlords about his resignation, the
self-styled emir of ‘Imarat Kavkaz’ (Emirate “Caucasus”) ordered a new video in which he denied plans
to step down.

“In the current situation in the Caucasus I believe it is impossible for me to step down from the post of
the emir of Imarat Kavkaz,” Umarov said in a video uploaded on the networks' news portal Kavkaz
Center on 3 August. “This statement of mine makes the previous statement void. That previous
statement was completely fabricated,” the Chechen warlord claimed, referring to the video of his
resignation uploaded two days earlier by the same Kavkaz Center.

That initial 1 August video addressed leaders of networks in the neighboring republics of Dagestan,
Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria, with Umarov querying the warlords to support his decision to step
down and recognize “commander of the Eastern front of the Imarat” Aslanbek Vadalov as their new
emir.

Flanked by this Chechen warlord and an unidentified third man in a forest, Umarov said “we have come
to a joint decision today *…+ I am leaving my post” to be replaced by Vadalov, who “is younger… more
energetic” and will achieve “different results.”

Vadalov - whom Umarov had earlier picked as his successor in the event of his death - curtly agreed with
Umarov's proposal before giving the floor to a third man, who said it was 46-year-old Umarov’s “age and
aggravating health that do not allow the emir to continue resistance.”

Umarov himself didn’t explain why he was resigning, but urged the emirs of Dagestan, Ingushetia and
Kabardino-Balkaria to get back to him “urgently” with their opinion on the proposal.

Confusion in the ranks

The appearance of the two videos apparently created confusion in the insurgents’ ranks, with some
members posting open letters to Umarov on the Kavkaz Center’s website to “express alarm” over
“contradicting statements.”

Hussein Mailiyev, described as a “plenipotentiary representative of Imarat Kavkaz,” attempted to clarify

the situation in a 6 August statement posted by Kavkaz Center. He blamed Movladi Udugov - who
controls the news portal - for wrongly publicizing information that had been meant for “internal use
only.” Mailiyev said that Udugov had been suspended from his duties as head of the Imarat Kavkaz’s
“informational-analytical service” over the incident.

The appearance of two videos clearly illustrates the divisions among the networks’ leaders, regardless of
the real reasons behind Umarov’s decision to seek the emirs’ approval for his replacement by Vadalov.

Udugov - who is known to have favored a pan-Caucasian state over a secular Chechnya - may have
publicized the first video intentionally in an attempt to prevent the ascent of Vadalov. Vadalov has been
seen as more focused on the cause of Chechen independence, and it should come as no surprise that
the Chechen separatists’ exiled envoy, Akhmed Zakayev, was quick to praise him as a “non-Wahhabi”
and express readiness to work with him as the new “emir.”

Another possibility is that the emirs of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria were also seeking to
prevent the rise of Vadalov and passed the video to the Kavkaz Center to embarrass Umarov into
backtracking on his decision after refusing to support it.

That Umarov ordered the disbanding of the foreign representation office of the Imarat Kavkaz in his
second video on 3 August also demonstrates disagreement among those fighting on the ground and
those representing these networks abroad.

Representative inspiration

As importantly, the very fact that Umarov has floated the possibility of resigning for health reasons
could be perceived as a sign of increasing weakness by the networks’ supporters both within and
outside the North Caucasus. They are still smarting from the recent killing of two senior leaders and the
arrest of Umarov’s previous No 2, the emir of Ingushetia, Magas.

Umarov’s ‘retirement’ would diminish the standing of networks fighting in the North Caucasus in the
eyes of foreign financiers and other sponsors, and may result in a decrease of assistance in financing,
material support and recruitment.

After all, Umarov is the last well-known warlord who has not only served in the ‘Ichekerian government’
as secretary of the Security Council and director of the National Security Service when Chechnya was de
facto independent, but also fought at commanding positions in both Chechen wars.

Umarov’s would-be successor, Vadalov, lacks the same legitimacy, scale, influence and connections,
although he has gained notoriety in the past few years for the ruthless killings of Chechen police officers.
However, while internal divisions are bound to weaken the insurgency in the short-term, the
replacement of the emir of the Imarat Kavkaz will be largely irrelevant for the North Caucasus-based
networks in the longer term. Such a reshuffle will not have significant impact on these networks’ overall
combat capabilities because they operate autonomously to achieve their tactical objectives, while their
overarching goal of a pan-Caucasian caliphate represents an inspiring unifying vision rather than a
realistic goal.

While remaining in command of his own unit, Umarov has also avoided major operations that required
deployment of many dozens of fighters on the scale of the raids on the Ingush city of Nazran and the
Kabardin-Balkar capital of Nalchik, which were co-organized by one of his predecessors - Russia’s most
notorious terrorist Shamil Basayev.

Instead, Umarov would come out to publicly claim responsibility for actions organized by the leaders of
neighboring networks and call for further attacks. He can certainly be replaced in this representational-
inspirational role.

From secular to holy war

As importantly, Umarov has already accomplished the task of completing the long process of re-framing
the low-intensity conflict fought in the North Caucasus from a secular war fought for Chechnya’s
independence to a holy war fought for the establishment of an Islamist state in the North Caucasus.

This process began years before Umarov was appointed ‘president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’
in 2006, but it was Umarov who accelerated it by proclaiming the Imarat Kavkaz and appointing himself
its emir. This decision prompted the 'Icherkian parliament' to fire him from the post of the 'president' in
2007, but didn’t halt the re-framing of the conflict.

Regardless of who is in command of the networks, there are a number of key factors that Russian
policymakers need to keep an eye on in addition to trying to address root causes and contributing
factors behind the insurgency.

One is the 2014 Olympic Games in the nearby Black Sea resort area of Sochi, which may require these
networks to boost their activities if only to prove that they remain a robust and relevant force. And,
here, Russian authorities should be closely watching for further signs that the networks are trying to
hijack the grievances of the Adygs and their ethnic cousins, who were expelled from the Sochi area
during imperial Russia’s conquest of the North Caucasus.

Another factor is the security dynamics in such hotbeds as Afghanistan, Iraq and the greater Middle
East. Sustainable improvement of the situation in these hotspots would free jihadists to turn their eyes
back to the North Caucasus.

Simon Saradzhyan is a research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He is the author of
several papers on security and terrorism.