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Irrigation is an artificial application of water to the soil. It is used to assist in the growing
of agricultural crops, maintenance of landscapes, and re-vegetation of disturbed soils in dry areas
and during periods of inadequate rainfall.
The waters of the Indus basin begin in the Himalayan mountains of Indian held
Kashmir. They flow from the hills through the arid states of Punjab and Sind, conve rging
in Pakistan and emptying into the Arabian Sea south of Karachi. Where once there was only
a narrow strip of irrigated land along these rivers, developments over the last century have
created a large network of canals and storage facilities that provide water for more than 26
million acres - the largest irrigated area of any one river system in the world.
The partition of the Indian subcontinent created a conflict over the plentiful waters of
the Indus basin. The newly formed states were at odds over how to share and manage what was
essentially a cohesive and unitary network of irrigation. Furthermore, the geography of partition
was such that the source rivers of the Indus basin were in India. Pakistan felt its livelihood
threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani
portion of the basin. Where India certainly had its own ambitions for the profitable development
of the basin, Pakistan felt acutely threatened by a conflict over the main source of water for its
cultivable land.
During the first years of partition the waters of the Indus were apportioned by the
Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to release sufficient waters to
the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual payments from the government of Pakistan.
The accord was meant to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a
more permanent solution. Neither side, however, was willing to compromise their respect ive
positions and negotiations reached a stalemate. Pakistan wanted to take the matter to the
International Court of Justice but India refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral
resolution.
By 1951, the two sides were no longer meeting and the situation seemed intractable.
The Pakistani press was calling for more drastic action and the deadlock contributed to hostility
with India. As one anonymous Indian official said at the time,
"India and Pakistan can go on shouting on Kashmir for all time to come, but an early
settlement on the Indus waters is essential for maintenance of peace in the sub-continent"
Despite the unwillingness to compromise, both nations were anxious to find a solution, fully
aware that the Indus conflict could lead to overt hostilities if unresolved.
In this same year, David Lilienthal, forme rly the chairman of the Tennessee
Valley Authority and of the US Atomic Ene rgy Commission, visited the region to write a
series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen interest in the subcontinent and was
welcomed by the highest levels of both Indian and Pakistani governments. Although his visit was
sponsored by Colliers, Lilienthal was briefed by State Department and executive branch officials,
who hoped he could help bridge the gap between India and the United States and also gauge
hostilities on the subcontinent. During the course of his visit, it became clear to Lilienthal that
tensions between India and Pakistan were acute, but also unable to be erased with one sweeping
gesture. In his journal he wrote:
”India and Pakistan were on the verge of war over Kashmir. There seemed to be no possibility of
negotiating this issue until tensions abated. One way to reduce hostility . . . would be to
concentrate on other important issues where cooperation was possible. Progress in these areas
would promote a sense of community between the two nations which might, in time, lead to a
Kashmir settlement. Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan work out a program jointly
to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were
dependent for irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries
could be made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production.
In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties
to agreement, and help in the financing of an Indus Development program. (Gulhat i 93) “
Lilienthal's idea was well received by officials at the World Bank, and, subsequently, by
the Indian and Pakistani governments. Eugene R. Black, then president of the World Bank
told Lilienthal that his proposal "makes good sense all round". Black wrote that the Bank was
interested in the economic progress of the two countries and had been concerned that the Indus
dispute could only be a serious handicap to this development. India's previous objections to third
party arbitration were remedied by the Bank's insistence that it would not adjudicate the conflict,
but, instead, work as a conduit for agreement.
Black also made a distinction between the "functional" and "political" aspects of the
Indus dispute. In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan leaders, Black asserted that the
Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional aspects of disagreement were
negotiated apart from political considerations. He envisioned a group that tackled the question of
how best to utilize the waters of the Indus Basin - leaving aside questions of historic rights or
allocations.
Black proposed a Working Party made up of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank engineers.
The World Bank delegation would act as a consultative group, charged with offering suggestions
and speeding dialogue. In his opening statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he
was optimistic about the group's success:
”One aspect of Mr. Lilienthal's proposal appealed to me from the first. I mean
his insistence that the Indus problem is an engineering problem and should be dealt with by
engineers. One of the strengths of the engineering profession is that, all over the world, engineers
speak the same language and approach problems with common standards of judgment. (Gulhati
110) “
Black's hopes for a quick resolution to the Indus dispute were premature. While the Bank
had expected that the two sides would come to an agreement on the allocation of waters, neither
India nor Pakistan seemed willing to compromise their positions. While Pakistan insisted on its
historical right to waters of all the Indus tributaries, the Indian side argued that the previous
distribution of waters should not set future allocation. Instead, the Indian side set up a new basis
of distribution, with the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the Eastern
tributaries to India. The substantive technical discussions that Black had hoped for were stymied
by the political considerations he had expected to avoid.
The World Bank soon became frustrated with this lack of progress. What had originally
been envisioned as a technical dispute that would quickly untangle itself became an intractable
mess. India and Pakistan were unable to agree on the technical aspects of allocation, let alone the
implementation of any agreed upon distribution of waters. Finally, in 1954, after nearly two
years of negotiation, the World bank offered its own proposal, stepping beyond the limited role it
had apportioned for itself and forcing the two sides to consider concrete plans for the future of
the basin. The proposal offered India the three eastern tributaries of the basin and Pakistan the
three western tributaries. Canals and storage dams were to be constructed to divert waters from
the western rivers and replace the eastern river supply lost by Pakistan.
While the Indian side was amenable to the World Bank proposal, Pakistan found it
unacceptable. The World Bank allocated the eastern rivers to India and the western rivers to
Pakistan. This new distribution did not account for the historical usage of the Indus basin and
repudiated Pakistan's negotiating position. Where India had stood for a new system of allocation,
Pakistan felt that its share of waters should be based on pre-partition distribution. The World
Bank proposal was more in line with the Indian plan and this angered the Pakistani delegation.
They threatened to withdraw from the Working Party and negotiations verged on collapse.
But neither side could afford the dissolution of talks. The Pakistani press met rumors of
and end to negotiation with talk of increased hostilities; the government was ill-prepared to
forego talks for a violent conflict with India and was forced to reconsider its position. India was
also eager to settle the Indus issue; large development projects were put on hold by negotiations
and Indian leaders were eager to divert water for irrigation.
In Decembe r of 1954, the two sides returned to the negotiating table. The World Bank
proposal was transformed from a basis of settlement to a basis for negotiation and the talks
continued, stop and go, for the next six years.
One of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerned financing for the
construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer wate r from the eastern
Indian rivers to Pakistan. This transfer was necessary to make up for the water Pakistan was
giving up by ceding its rights to the eastern tributaries. The World Bank initially planned for
India to pay for these works, but India refused. The Bank responded with a plan for external
financing supplied mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom.
This solution cleared the remaining stumbling blocks to agreement and the Treaty
was signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries in 1960.
The agreement also set up a commission to adjudicate any future disputes arising over
the allocation of waters. The Permanent Indus Commission has survived two wars and provides
an on-going machinery for consultation and conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of
data, and visits. The Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as
well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin. Either party must notify the
other of plans to construct any engineering works which would affect the other party and to
provide data about such works. In cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for
mediation and arbitration. While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the kind of
conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual inspections and exchange of data
continue, unperturbed by tensions on the subcontinent.
The Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully imple mented
and upheld by both India and Pakistan. Although its negotiation was often arduous and
frustrating for the World Bank and for the Indian and Pakistani delegations, the final outcome
was amenable to all parties. While the World Bank may have underestimated the political
impediments to technical debate and agreement, Eugene Black's desire to "treat water
development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature . . .
undertaken separately from the political issues with which India and Pakistan are confronted"
suggests possibilities for future areas of Indo-Pakistani cooperation.
Although irrigation takes place in other areas of Pakistan, information on the history and
development of irrigation generally refers to the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS).
Development of irrigation in the Indus basin has progressed in the form of discrete barrage-
controlled systems. With water rather than land being the main constraint, the irrigation systems
were generally designed to use the available river supplies for bringing the largest possible areas
under crops, with minimum water provided to bring the crops to maturity.
absorbed within the systems. Drain construction has not kept pace with requirements, while
infrastructure development has often obstructed natural drainage flows.
With almost 14 million ha, the IBIS is the largest contiguous irrigation system in
the world. It consists of an extensive network of barrages, canals, and watercourses. The total
length of the canals is about 61,000 km with communal watercourses, farm channels, and field
ditches covering another 1.6 million km. In the Indus system, river water is diverted by barrages
and weirs into main canals and subsequently branch canals, distributaries and minors. The flow
to the farm is delivered by the watercourses (there are over 107,000 watercourses) which are
supplied through outlets (moghas) from the distributaries and minors.
The mogha is designed to allow a discharge that self-adjusts to variations in the parent
canal. Within the watercourse command (an area ranging from 80 to 280 ha), farmers receive
water proportional to their land holding. The entire discharge of the watercourse is given to one
farm for a specified period on a seven day rotation. The rotation schedule, called warabandi, is
established by the Provincial Irrigation Department, unless the farmers can reach a mutual
agreement.
The public sector operates the irrigation systems above the moghas. Each season, the
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) of the Federal Government estimates water
availability for the following season. Provincial Irrigation Departments (PID) inform WAPDA of
provincial water demands at specific locations. WAPDA releases water from the reservoirs to
meet demands as closely as possible. The limited reservoir capacity of the systems does not
allow the full regulation of rivers for irrigation.
The operation and maintenance expenditure is collected by levying water charges and/or
drainage taxes. In Punjab and NWFP, water charges are assessed by PID. In Sindh and
Balochistan, they are assessed by the Provincial Revenue Department (PRD). Currently, water
and drainage charges are not linked to operation and maintenance needs. They are, moreover,
collected in all regions by PRD, and are deemed to be part of provincial revenues. The gap
between operation and maintenance expenditures and recoveries through water charges is high
(44%) and increasing. The difficulties faced in cost recovery have resulted in very poor operation
and maintenance which, together with deliveries at less than the designed levels and illegal
diversion, has led to major inequalities in the distribution of surface water. In reality, water often
does not reach users toward the tail end of system, which can partly explain the increasing
groundwater extraction.
In March 1991, an agreement was reached between the provinces on the apportionment of
the Indus waters to replace a much older agreement. The new agreement has released the
provincial canal systems from the need to be in operation all the time so as to pro tect or establish
future rights. Now that the supplies have been apportioned, including the formula for sharing any
surplus river flows, the provincial systems are free to move toward more effic ient water use.
The first Water Users Associations (WUA) were created in 1981 under the World
Bank-supported On-Farm Water Management Program. They were formed at the watercourse
level, with a primary objective of rehabilitating the waterco urses. By 1991, there were some
17,000 WUA, representing about 16% of all watercourses, with a membership of 85,000 farmers.
Over the past 20 years, groundwater use has been a major factor in increasing
agricultural production. Groundwater tube wells not only supply additional water but have
provided flexibility to match surface water supplies with crop water requirements. However,
because of uncontrolled and rapid private sector development of groundwater (6% annual
growth), there is a danger of excessive lowering of water tables and intrusion of saline water into
freshwater aquifers. Within the IBIS, total water availability at the farm gate has significantly
increased in the last 15 years, and changed slightly in its composition, with a higher use of
groundwater extracted by tubewells. In 1975, surface water represented 70% of the total water
available, groundwater provided through private tubewells 22.5% and groundwater provided
through public tubewells 7.5%. In 1990, the figures were 63%, 27% and 10% respectively.
The Water Resources Section of the Planning and Development Division has estimated
average water losses from canal head to outlet at 25%, and from outlet to farm gate at 15%.
The increasing diversion of river flows has significantly changed the hydrological balance
of the irrigated areas in the past century. Initially, irrigation systems were developed without any
provision for drainage. Seepage from irrigation canals and watercourses, and the deep
percolation of this water have gradually raised the groundwater table, causing waterlogging and
salinity.
It is estimated that about 2.39 million ha had water tables within 1.5 meters of the surface level
in June 1989 (which resulted in 4.92 million ha in October 1989, just after the monsoon season),
such areas being considered as "disaster areas" by the government and given high priority for
drainage. Since the 1960s, great efforts have been made to provide drainage in the irrigated
areas. In 1992, the total drained area was estimated at 5.10 million ha.
According to the Soil Survey of Pakistan (1985-1990), 1.78 million hectares are considered as
severely saline, and 0.18 million hectares as very severely saline, but the survey does not indicate
which part is due to irrigation. From 1959 onwards, about 50 Salinity Control and Reclamation
Projects (SCARPs) have been initiated to provide a lasting solution to the problem of
waterlogging and salinity through subsurface drainage.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_Waters_Treaty
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-
1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960.pdf
http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A138
http://www.tbl.com.pk/indus-basin-irrigation-system-of-pakistan/
http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=219695
There are about 5,200 km of flood control works, whose maintenance falls under the
responsibility of the PID.
Early Development
There is evidence that irrigation has been practiced along the Indus system of rivers from 3000
B.C.
In the beginning, only the narrow strips of land along the river banks were irrigated, but with
time, irrigation was extended to other nearby areas by breaching the banks or the natural levies
of the rivers to bring water to the low lying fields. This was done only during high water periods.
The first canals were constructed some five or six centuries ago and extended under the Mughal
Emperors. The early canals were inundation channels and delivered water to the fields when
rivers were in high flow during the summer. They tended to be unpredictable in operation and
subjected both to frequent breaches and serious siltation problems.
The NEXT STAGE in the evaluation of the Irrigation System was construction of perennial
canals having permanent head works. These head works either did not extend across the entire
stream or allowed the floods to pass over their crests.
The first evidence of perennial irrigation on any of the Indus rivers dates back to early
seventeenth century when a 80 Km long canal was constructed by the Mughal Emperor Jahangir
(reigned 1605-27) to bring water from the right bank of the Ravi to the pleasure gardens of
Sheikhpura near Lahore.
The irrigation system which exists today was stated in the nineteenth century under the
British administration. In the early 19th century, there were numerous inundation canals leading
from the Indus River and its tributaries.
The more important of these were the Uppe r and Lowe r Sutle j canals, the Shahpur canals,
the Chenab canals and the Indus canals in Punjab and Bahawalpur.
In the Sindh, where the Indus River flows more or less on a ridge, conditions were
particularly favorable for inundation canals. Among Sindh’s 19th century canals were the Desert,
the Begari, the Sukkur, the Fuleli, the Pinyari and the Kalri canals.
From the middle of the 19th century onwards, a large number of inundation canals were
remodelled and fitted with permanent headworks and new canals with weir controlled supply
were constructed for the Sindh, Punjab and NWFP areas.
The first permanent headworks constructed in 1887 was the Marala Barrage,
which started supplying water to the Upper Chenab Canal in 1915.
A similar scheme was sanctioned for the irrigation of the area between the Chenab and the
Jhelum (Chaj Doab) from a weir at Rasul on the Jhelum River. Construction was started in
1897 and the Jhelum Canal, now called the Lowe r Jhelum Canal was opened in 1901.
The Triple Canal Project was sanctioned in 1905 and became the first project to transfer
water from one river to another. The Triple Canal Project involved the diversion of the available
waters in the Jhelum River across the Chaj and Rechna Doabs.
The project consisted of a feeder canal from the Jhelum River at Mangla to the Chenab
River above Khanki (Upper Jhelum Canal), a feeder canal from Marala on the Chenab River to
the Ravi River above Balloki (Upper Chenab Canal) and construction of a barrage (level
crossing) on the Ravi River at Balloki to divert the transferred water into the new Lowe r Bari
Doab Canal (LBDC).
Canals are primarily feeder or link canals but they also provide considerable irrigation enrooting
the Upper parts of the Chaj and Rechna Doab.
Hasan Raza Khan 2007-Civil-203
Hasan Raza Khan 2007-Civil-203
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Irrigation_in_Pakistan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irrigation
Sukkur Barrage
After World War-I, the Sukkur Barrage Project, the first barrage constructed on the Indus
River was started in 1923 and was commissioned to irrigation in 1932.
The Sukkur barrage is a barrage across the Indus river near the city of Sukkur, Pakistan.
It was built during the British Raj from 1923 to 1932 as the Lloyd Barrage to help alleviate
famines caused by lack of rain. The barrage enables water to flow through what was originally a
network of canals 6,166 miles (9,923 km) long, feeding the largest irrigation system in the world,
with more than 5 million acres (20,000 km²) of irrigated land.
The retaining wall has sixty-six spans, each 60 feet (18 m) wide; each span has a gate which
weighs 50 tons.
The Kalabagh dam was a mega water reservoir that the Government of Pakistan was
planning to develop across the Indus River, one of the world's largest rivers. The proposed site
for the dam was situated at Kalabagh in Mianwali District of the north-west Punjab province,
bordering the Province. The proposal is halted due to political reasons. However there is a
barrage at the same location which is also known as Jinnah barrage. Details of which are
mentioned here.
Thal canal:
The amount of water that it carries is 2.534 MAF. It is divided into 2 different divisions.
Thal canal main line lower:
It is a main canal located in bhakkar. Its reduced distance is 502500. And length in miles
is 100.50.Its authorized head discharge is 4100.Its authorized tail discharge is 228.00.Its Gross
command area is 3534.Its Culturable command area is 2966.
Chashma Barrage is located on the Indus River near the village Chashma in Mianwali
district. The project was built between 1967 and 1971. It is one of the many major engineering
works that form a part of Indus basin treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan. According to
the project reports, 34 villages were displaced with the population of 22,400 people during the
mid 60’s. The installed capacity of power station is 184MW. Chashma Barrage is the 3rd largest
water reservoir of Pakistan.
Kotri Barrage
Phuleli
Pinjari
Akram Wah
Terbela
Chenab River
MARRALA BARRAGE
The Marala headworks is situated at the Chenab River near the city of Sialkot,
Punjab, Pakistan. It is a massive hydro engineering project and is used to control water flow and
flood control in river Chenab.
Chenab is a 1,086 km (675 mi) long river which originates in the Kulu and Kangra
Districts of Himachal Pradesh in India and is fed by the tributaries Chandra and Bagha as it
enters Jammu & Kashmir near Kishtwar.
After cutting across the Pir Panjal range, it enters the Sialkot District in Pakistan where
the Marala Barrage was built across the river in 1968 with a maximum discharge of 1.1 million
ft³/s (31,000 m³/s). Two major water channels originate at the Marala headworks. The Marala-
Ravi Link Canal and the Upper Chenab Canal. Proposals are under consideration to build
Mangla Link Canal to overcome any shortage of water in future.
Head Marala is also a picnic spot, wildlife sanctuary and unprotected wetland. Many
people come here and enjoy the landscape and natural beauty.
Trimmu Barrage
The Trimmu Barrage, located below the junction of the Jhelum and the Chenab Rivers
was started in 1837 and completed in 1939, was the last barrage completed prior to World War
II.
HEAD QADIRABAD:-
Head Qadirabad is a hydroelectric plant and wildlife game reserve located on the river
Chenab in the Punjab province of Pakistan. It is lies in Phalia tehsil of Mandi Bahauddin
District.
The plant is a hydro engineering project and is used to control water flow in the river
Chenab.
Khanki Barrage
In 1889, a project was prepared for the irrigation of part of the Rechna Doab. The project
envisaged the diversion of the Chenab waters by means of a weir at Khanki. The project was
sanctioned in 1890 and the Chenab Canal, now called the Lowe r Chenab Canal, was opened in
1892.
It provides water to three million acres (12,000 km²) of agricultural lands by one main
distributaries is Lower Chenab and 59 minor distrtributeries. Its bridge is in shambles now a day
and is posing serious threat to adjoining population of 100,000. In last 118 years there were 11
occasions when water was 730 foot higher in it than sea level at times of high floods. There were
16 occasions in last century when flood flow was 400,000 and 600,000 m³/s in it
Jehlum River
RASUL BARRAGE
Rasul Barrage is located on the Jehlum River, 4 km downstream of the Rasul Weir and 72 km
from the Mangla Dam. It was constructed in 1968 and has a discharge capacity of 24070 cubic meter per
second. Water is drived from this point to Chenab River at Qadirabad through Rasul-Qadirabad link
canal, then ultimately transferred to Sulemanki Barrage on the Sutlej River. Rasul-Qadirabad link canal
has the second largest water discharge capacity after Chashma-Jhelum link canal. It has 538-cumce
discharge capacity while Chashma-Jhelum link canal has 615-cumec capacity.
Sutluj River
Bhakra Dam
During 1921 the Sutlej Valley Project was sanctioned for the development of the Punjab,
Bikaner (now in India) and Bahawalpur states areas.
Ferozepur
Sulemanki
Islam
Panjnad
TAUNSA BARRAGE:
This barrage is situated on Indus River near Taunsa at a distance of 180 miles from the Jinnah
barrage. It provided the much needed rail link between Kashmor and Kot Addu as a parallel
route to the main railway lines from Karachi to the north.
The canals which originate from this barrage and their details is given here under;
Kachhi Canal
Muzaffargarah Canal
It is a main canal located in D.G KHAN. It is categorized in the zone of D.G KHAN. It is a
non- perennial canal.
perennial canal.
Its reduced distance is 191000.00. And length in miles is 38.20.
Its authorized head discharge is 12000.00.
Its authorized tail discharge is 12000.00
Its Gross command area is 2150000.00.
Its Culturable command area is 20000000.00
GUDDU BARRAGE
It has been constructed on Indus River at Guddu, 90 miles upstream from Sukkur
and ten milesfrom Kashmor. The canals that branch out from here irrigate about 31 lakh acres of
land inSukkur, Jacobabad and Shikarpur areas. It is located near Sukkur in Pakistan. The project
was completed in 1962. The maximum flood level height of this barrage is 26ft (8meters).
Guddu Barrage supplies water for irrigation to 2.9million acres of agricultural lands in the
Districts of Jacobabad, Larkana and Sukkur of Sindh and the Nasirabad District of Balouchistan.
The cost of the project was 474.8 million rupees.
Pat feeder
Desert Feeder
Ghotki canal
http://www.defence.pk/forums/current-events-social- issues/69510-rivers-barrages-pakistan.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guddu_Barrage
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukkur_Barrage
http://travelingluck.com/Asia/Pakistan/Sindh/_1171974_Lloyd%20Barrage.html
Taunsa Barrage
Taunsa barrage consists of 53 weir bays;
Left and right Unde rsluices are having 7 and 4 bays, respectively.
http://www.uet.edu.pk/export/sites/UETWebPortal/research/researchinfo/journal/volume5/5-
PHYSICAL.pdf
Jinnah Barrage
Jinnah barrage consists of 42 weir bays;
Clear span of 60 ft. The barrage width between the abutments is 3781ft,
Whereas clear waterway for the weir and undersluices sections is 2520 ft and 420 ft,
respectively.
Two divide walls bifurcates weir and undersluices sections of the barrage.
http://www.uet.edu.pk/export/sites/UETWebPortal/research/researchinfo/journal/volume5/5-
PHYSICAL.pdf
Trimmu Barrage
No of all Gates Weir Potion 37 Gates,
http://paki-history.blogspot.com/2011/01/trimmu-barrage.html
Chasma Barrage
No. of bays 52
No of standard bays 41
http://pecongress.org.pk/images/upload/books/Vol.40(No.15-2).pdf
Wuller Barrage
http://www.southasianmedia.net/magazine/journal/7_legal_purview.htm
Ghazi Barrage
Standard bays 20
Undersluices 8
Head regulator 8
http://www.wapda.gov.pk/htmls/ghazibarotha.html
2010-2011
TENTATIVE DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMME RABI 2010-11
Average System Useage 1977-82: 19.750 MAF
TOTAL: 7.262
TOTAL: 10.295
However subsequently IRSA updated the forecast of water availability on the basis of actual
river flows and actual storage available at Mangla and Tarbela upto 30th September 2010 and
enhanced the Punjab share from 16.95 MAF to 17.39 MAF reducing the shortfall to 12%.
The canal distribution program was discussed in the meetings of the Chief Engineers held on
21st October 2010 participated by the Director General (Extension), Agriculture Department
and was finalized incorporating the changes / suggestions made the participant.
A copy of the final distribution progam is available on website herewith for information and
further neccessary action.
Internal distribution program for each canal system may please be prepared in consultation with
the FOs and farmer's representatives and may be given wide publicity among the farming
community both through the print, electronic media. Copy of this distribution program may also
be supplied to Deputy Commissionar and District Heads of the Agriculture Department for their
information and further action.
http://irrigation.punjab.gov.pk/index.aspx
http://irrigation.punjab.gov.pk/Entitlement.aspx
http://irrigation.punjab.gov.pk/Search.aspx
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Irrigation_in_Pakistan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irrigation
http://irrigation.punjab.gov.pk/Search.aspx
Channel is running less than designed discharge at head and tails are short
Head Discharge is less than 95% of Design Discharge and Indent
And Tail Gauge is greater than 30% and less than 90% of Authorized Tail Gauge
Channel is running less than designed discharge at head and tails are as per Authorized Discharge
Head Discharge is less than 95% of Design Discharge and Indent
Tail Gauge is more than or equal to 90% and less than or equal to 115% of Authorized Tail Gauge
Closed Channel
Head Discharge is zero
River ravi
Jassar bridge
Ravi syphon
Balloki barrage
Balloki Sulemanki Link Canal
LBDC
Sidhanai Barrage
Sidhnai melsai bahawal link canal (Ravi and Sutluj Link)
Sidhnai canal (on downstram side river ravi falls into Chenab river.
Zone Multan
Zone Multan
Trimmu Barrage
One from right (Rangpur Canal)
One from left
I. Trimmu sidhnai
II. Haweli canal
Rangpur canal
Length 64 miles
Zone Multan
Zone Multan
Haveli Canal
Length 12.6 miles
Zone Multan
Pungnet Barrage
Left side
Abassia canal
Punjnet canal
Abassia canal
Length 44.915 miles
Zone Bhawalpur
Abbassia Feeder
Length 44.915 miles
Zone Bhawalpur
Punjnet Canal
Length 5 7.267 miles
Zone Bhawalpur
Sutluj River
1)Sulemanki Barrage
Left side
I. Eastern sadiqia
II. Fordwah canal
Right side
Zone Multan
Division Sulemanki
Fordwah Canal
Length 8.97miles
Zone Multan
Division Sulemanki
Zone Multan
Division Sulemanki
Islam Barrage
Left canal
Qaim Canal
Bhawal canal
Karam branch
Qaim Canal
Length 7.43 miles
Zone Multan
Karam Branch
Length 4.132 miles
Zone Multan
Bhawal canal
Zone Multan
Melsai Syphon
S.M.B.L (Sidhnai Mailsi Bahawal Link) Canal
Pakpattan Islam Link
Zone Multan
Zone Multan
Hasan Raza Khan 2007-Civil-203
Hasan Raza Khan 2007-Civil-203
Jhelum
Mangla Dam
Mangla Head works (upper Jhelum Canal)
Rasool Barrage
Left side
I. Rasool Qadirabaad
II. Lower Jhelum Canal
Zone Sarghodha
Indus
Tarbella dam
Downstream of Tarbella
Ghazi barotha
Hasan Raza Khan 2007-Civil-203
Hasan Raza Khan 2007-Civil-203
Left side
Ghazi bhrotha Poer Channel
Thal Canal
Chashma Barrage
Right side
Left side
Tounsa Barrage
Right Side
Khachi Canal
Dera Ghazi Khan
Left Side
3 on right 2 on left
Zone D G Khan
Zone D G Khan
Zone D G Khan
Sakkar Barrage
Maximum Capacity
1.5 Million Cusecs
Still have the volume capacity of 1.0 million Cusecs
7 Canals
4 on Right
3 on left
Kotary Barrage
4 Canals
1 on right side
3 on left side
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