ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

Military Power of the

People’s Republic of China
2007

Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

A Report to Congress
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act
Fiscal Year 2000

Section 1202, “Annual Report on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, provides that
the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “on the current and future military strategy
of the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future
course of military-technological development on the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets
and probable development of Chinese grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy,
and of the military organizations and operational concepts, through the next 20 years.”
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 Executive Summary
China’s rapid rise as a regional political and economic power with global aspirations is an important element
of today’s strategic environment – one that has significant implications for the region and the world. The
United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful and prosperous China, and it encourages China to participate as
a responsible international stakeholder by taking on a greater share of responsibility for the health and success
of the global system. However, much uncertainty surrounds the future course China’s leaders will set for their
country, including in the area of China’s expanding military power and how that power might be used.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed
for protracted wars of attrition on its territory to one capable of fighting and winning short-duration, high-
intensity conflicts against high-tech adversaries – which China refers to as “local wars under conditions of
informatization.” China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance, at present, remains limited but, as
noted in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with
the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military
advantages.”

China’s near-term focus on preparing for military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility
of U.S. intervention, appears to be an important driver of its modernization plans. However, analysis of
China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also generating capabilities for other
regional contingencies, such as conflict over resources or territory.

The pace and scope of China’s military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by continued high
rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, acquisition of advanced
foreign weapons, and far reaching reforms of the armed forces. The expanding military capabilities of China’s
armed forces are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances; improvements in China’s strategic
capabilities have ramifications far beyond the Asia Pacific region.

China’s strategic forces modernization is enhancing strategic strike capabilities, as evidenced by the DF-31
intercontinental range ballistic missile, which achieved initial threat availability in 2006. China’s counterspace
program – punctuated by the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – poses
dangers to human space flight and puts at risk the assets of all space faring nations. China’s continued pursuit
of area denial and anti-access strategies is expanding from the traditional land, air, and sea dimensions of the
modern battlefield to include space and cyber-space.

The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key capabilities supporting
China’s military modernization. China’s leaders have yet to explain adequately the purposes or desired end-
states of the PLA’s expanding military capabilities. China’s actions in certain areas increasingly appear
inconsistent with its declaratory policies. Actual Chinese defense expenditures remain far above officially
disclosed figures. This lack of transparency in China’s military affairs will naturally and understandably
prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China I

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II Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Table of Contents

Chapter One: Key Developments 1

Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 6

Overview 6
Strategy with Chinese Characteristics 6
Comprehensive National Power 6
“Strategic Configuration of Power” 7
Stability, Sovereignty, and Strategy 7
Balance, Position, and Strategy 8
Resource Demands and Strategy 8
Other Factors Influencing the Future Direction of the Chinese Strategy 9

Chapter Three: China’s Military Strategy and Doctrine 11

Overview 11
Military Strategic Guidelines 11
Asymmetric Warfare 13
The Role of Secrecy and Deception in Chinese Military Strategy 14

Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 15

Overview 15
Emerging Area Denial/Anti-Access Capabilities 15
Strategic Capabilities 18
Nuclear Deterrence 18
Space and Counterspace 20
Information Warfare 21
Power Projection – Modernizing Beyond Taiwan 22

Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 25

Overview 25
Military Expenditure Trends 25
China’s Advancing Defense Industries 26
Foreign Weapons and Technology Acquisition 28

Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 30

Overview 30
China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait 30
Beijing’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan 32
Limited Force Options 32
Air and Missile Campaign 32
Blockade 33
Amphibious Invasion 33

Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 36

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China III

 Figures
1. China’s Critical Sea Lanes 9

2. The First and Second Island Chains 16

3. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles 19

4. Maximum Ranges for China’s Conventional SRBM Force 23

5. Comparison of Outside Estimates of PRC Military Spending 26

6. Chinese Defense Budgets and Estimates of Total Related Expenditures 27

7. Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage Over the Taiwan Strait 31

8. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces 36

9. Major Ground Force Units 37

10. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces 38

11. Major Air Force Units 39

12. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 40

13. Major Naval Units 41

14. China’s Missile Forces 42

15. China’s Space Assets 42

IV Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Chapter One
Key Developments
“Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today.”
– China’s National Defense in 2006
Several significant developments in China over the
past year relate to the questions Congress posed in
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65).
Developments in China’s Grand Strategy,
Security Strategy, and Military Strategy
• Beijing released China’s National Defense
in 2006 in December, its fifth Defense White
Paper since 1998, to describe China’s security
perceptions, national defense policies, and
the goals of its modernization programs. As
declaratory policy, the paper reflects a modest
improvement in transparency, but it does not
adequately address the composition of China’s
military forces, or the purposes and desired end-
states of China’s military development.
• Beijing released China’s Space Activities in
2006 in October – the previous edition was
published in 2000. The paper reviews the
history of China’s space program and presents a
roadmap for the future. The paper also discusses
China’s cooperation with various partners in
space activities. It remains silent on the military
applications of China’s space programs and
counterspace activities.
• In January 2007, China successfully tested
a direct-ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) missile
against a Chinese weather satellite, demonstrating
China’s ability to attack satellites operating in
low-Earth orbit. The test put at risk the assets
of all space faring nations and posed dangers
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
to human space flight due to the creation of an
unprecedented amount of debris.
• Evidence in 2006 suggests that China revised the
1993 Military Strategic Guidelines for the New
Period, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
guidance documents for military strategy and
forces development. The specific contents of the
guidelines are not known.
• PRC President Hu Jintao and Russian President
Vladimir Putin proclaimed 2006 as “The Year of
Russia” during their March meeting in Beijing,
the leaders’ fifth meeting in less than twelve
months. Building on their joint exercise in
2005, the two leaders agreed to increase military
exchanges and hold eight cooperative military
activities in 2007.
• Reflecting increasing concerns over energy and
resource needs, 2006 saw the largest annual
increase in new energy contracts signed by China,
including new agreements with Saudi Arabia
and several African countries. China’s effort to
court African nations in 2006 culminated with
a November summit in Beijing attended by 40
heads of state and delegates from 48 of the 53
African nations.
• In March 2006, China formally launched its 11th
Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which includes
ambitious calls for a 20 percent reduction in
energy consumption per unit of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) by 2010, a doubling of China’s
2000 GDP by 2010, and an overall GDP of $4
1
 trillion by 2020. The plan stresses coordinated
development, and greater investment and
urbanization in the rural interior, to address
income disparities and social unrest.
• In 2006, according to the World Bank, China
became the world’s fourth largest economy,
surpassing Great Britain by 0.004 percent in
national production as measured by the World
Bank’s “Atlas” model.
• Official reports claim the number of “mass
incidents” declined 22 percent in 2006.
Nevertheless, these incidents, directed mainly
at local policies and officials, reflect continued
popular dissatisfaction with official behavior
related to property rights and forced relocations,
labor rights, pensions, pollution, corruption, and
police brutality.
Developments Related to China’s Regional
Strategy
• China responded to North Korea’s ballistic
missile launches over the Sea of Japan in July
and nuclear test in October by voting in favor
of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and
1718 and by continuing efforts to use diplomatic
means, specifically the Six Party Talks, which
China hosts, to address North Korea’s nuclear
programs. The Talks, which involve the United
States, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and North
Korea, as well as China, produced agreement
in February 2007 on initial steps to implement
the September 2005 Joint Statement on
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.
• The visit of new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe to China in November helped to ease
somewhat tensions between Tokyo and Beijing.
However, issues such as territorial disputes in
the East China Sea, over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
islands, and China’s efforts to block Japan’s quest
2 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
for a seat on the UN Security Council remain
sources of friction.
• In October 2006, a People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) Navy SONG-class diesel-electric
submarine broached the surface in close proximity
to the USS KITTY HAWK aircraft carrier in
waters near Japan. This incident demonstrated
the importance of long-standing U.S. efforts to
improve the safety of U.S. and Chinese military
air and maritime assets operating near each other.
In 2006, these efforts produced a two phased
bilateral search and rescue exercise with the PLA
Navy (one phase off the U.S. coast, the second
off the PRC coast).
• In 2006, China conducted two counterterrorism
exercises with Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) partners, and hosted the
fifth anniversary of the founding of the SCO in
Shanghai in June.
• China is increasing its role in the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF). The United States has encouraged this
increased participation, and cooperated with
China to co-chair an ARF seminar on non-
proliferation. During the October 2006 ASEAN
Summit, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao proposed
expanded security and defense cooperation
between China and ASEAN.
• In November 2006, PRC President Hu Jintao
made the first visit to India by a PRC head of
state in ten years, demonstrating the importance
China places on improving ties with India
while preserving its strategic relationship with
Pakistan.
Developments in China’s Military Forces
China is pursuing long-term, comprehensive
transformation of its military forces to improve its
capabilities for power projection, anti-access, and
area denial. Consistent with a near-term focus on
preparing for offensive Taiwan Strait contingencies,
China deploys its most advanced systems to the
military regions directly opposite Taiwan.
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China is developing
and testing offensive missiles, forming additional
missile units, upgrading qualitatively certain
missile systems, and developing methods to counter
ballistic missile defenses.
• By October 2006, China had deployed roughly
900 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range
ballistic missiles to garrisons opposite Taiwan,
expanding at a rate of more than 100 missiles
per year. Newer versions of these missiles have
improved range and accuracy.
• China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic
missile force by adding more survivable systems.
The road-mobile, solid-propellant DF-31
intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM)
achieved initial threat availability in 2006 and
will likely achieve operational status in the near
future, if it has not already done so. A longer range
variant, the DF-31A, is expected to reach initial
operational capability (IOC) in 2007. China is
also working on a new submarine-launched
ballistic missile, the JL-2 (IOC 2007-2010),
for deployment on a new JIN-class (Type 094)
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine,
also in development.
• China continues to explore the use of ballistic and
cruise missiles for anti-access missions, including
counter-carrier and land attack, and is working on
reconnaissance and communication systems to
improve command, control, and targeting.
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
Naval Power. China’s naval forces include 72
principal combatants, some 58 attack submarines,
about 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels,
and approximately 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
• China received the second of two Russian-
made SOVREMENNYY II guided missile
destroyers (DDG) in late 2006. These DDGs
are fitted with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)
and wide-area air defense systems that feature
qualitative improvements over the earlier
SOVREMENNYY-class DDGs China purchased
from Russia.
• China is building and testing second-generation
nuclear submarines with the JIN-class (Type 094)
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and
the SHANG-class (Type 093) nuclear-powered
attack submarine, which began sea trials in
2005.
• China took delivery of two KILO-class
submarines from Russia, completing a contract
for eight signed in 2002. China operates twelve
KILOs, the newest of which are equipped with
the supersonic SS-N-27B ASCM, and wire-
guided and wake-homing torpedoes.
• The PLA Navy’s newest ship, the LUZHOU-
class (Type 051C) DDG is designed for anti-air
warfare. It will be equipped with the Russian
SA-N-20 SAM system controlled by the
TOMBSTONE phased-array radar. The SA-N-
20 more than doubles the range of current PLA
Navy air defense systems marking a significant
improvement in China’s ship-borne air defense
capability.
• The LUZHOU-class DDG complements ongoing
developments of the LUYANG I (Type 052B) and
LUYANG II (Type 052C) DDGs. The LUYANG
I is fitted with the Russian SA-N-7B GRIZZLY
3
 SAM and the YJ-83 ASCM. The LUYANG II
is fitted with an air defense system based on the
indigenous HHQ-9 SAM.
• In 2006, China began producing its first guided-
missile frigate (FFG), the JIANGKAI II (Type
054A). The JIANGKAI II will be fitted
with the medium range HHQ-16, a vertically
launched naval surface-to-air missile currently
in development.
• At the 2006 Zhuhai Air Show, PRC military
and civilian officials asserted China’s interest in
building an aircraft carrier.
Air Power. China has more than 700 combat
aircraft based within an un-refueled operational
range of Taiwan and the airfield capacity to expand
that number significantly. Many aircraft in the PLA
force structure are upgrades of older models (e.g.,
re-engined B-6 bombers for extended ranges);
however, newer aircraft make up a growing
percentage of the inventory.
• The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is deploying the
F-10 multi-role fighter to operational units. The
F-10, a fourth generation aircraft, will be China’s
premier fighter in the coming decades.
• China is now producing the multi-role Su-
27SMK/FLANKER (F-11A) fighter under a
licensed co-production agreement with Russia
following an initial production run of Su-27SKs
(F-11). China is employing increasing numbers
of the multi-role Su-30MKK/FLANKER fighter-
bomber and its naval variant, the Su-30MK2.
• Chinese aircraft are armed with an increasingly
sophisticated array of air-to-air and air-to-surface
weapons, satellite and laser-guided precision
munitions, and cruise missiles.
• China’s first indigenously produced attack
4 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
helicopter, the Z-10, is undergoing flight testing.
The Z-10 will fire the Red Arrow 8E anti-tank
guided missile, offering combat performance
equal to the Eurocopter Tiger, but below that of
the AH-64 Apache.
• Improvements to the FB-7 fighter program will
enable this older aircraft to perform nighttime
maritime strike operations and use improved
weapons such as the Kh-31P (AS-17) anti-
radiation missile and KAB-500 laser-guided
munitions.
Air Defense. In the next few years, China will
receive its first battalion of Russian-made S-
300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile systems. With
an advertised intercept range of 200 km, the S-
300PMU-2 provides increased lethality against
tactical ballistic missiles and more effective
electronic countermeasures. China also is
developing the indigenous HQ-9 air defense missile
system, a phased array radar-based SAM with a 150
km range. As noted above, a naval variant (HHQ-9)
will deploy on the LUYANG II DDG and a vertical
launch naval SAM (HHQ-16) will deploy on the
JIANGKAI II FFG.
Ground Forces. China has about 1.4 million
ground forces personnel with approximately
400,000 deployed to the three military regions
opposite Taiwan. China has been upgrading these
units with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
additional artillery pieces. In April 2006, China
made its first delivery of the new third generation
main battle tank, the ZTZ-99, to units in the Beijing
and Shenyang military regions.
Amphibious Forces. The PLA has deployed a new
amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and developed
a range of modifications for existing vehicles
including flotation tanks and mounted outboard
engines. Its newer amphibious vehicles have
greater stability and performance in open water.
Increased amphibious training, including multiple
training evolutions in a single year, is building
proficiency among China’s amphibious forces.
Developments in Chinese Military Doctrine
• China continues to focus on capabilities to
operate under “informatized” conditions with
an emphasis on integrated joint operations, joint
logistics, and long-range mobility.
• In June 2006, the PLA released new guidance
to increase realism in training and to expand the
use of simulators and opposing forces in training
evolutions.
• In December 2006, the leaders of the command
colleges for the PLA Second Artillery Corps,
the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA ground
forces signed a cooperative education agreement
paving the way for joint professional military
education.
• In December 2006, the National Defense
Mobilization Committee issued the “Outline of
National Defense Education for all Citizens,”
to standardize defense education across China.
The goals of such education include “arousing
patriotism … and raising the citizens’ awareness
of their national defense duty.”
Assessment of Challenges to Taiwan’s
Deterrent Forces
There were no armed incidents in the vicinity of
the Taiwan Strait in 2006 and the overall situation
remained stable, as it was for most of 2005.
Beijing reacted responsibly to Taiwan President
Chen Shui-bian’s decision to suspend the National
Unification Council and National Unification
Guidelines in early 2006. However, China’s
military modernization and the deployment of
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
advanced capabilities opposite the island have not
eased, with the balance of forces continuing to shift
in the mainland’s favor. Tension could also increase
as Taiwan prepares for its next presidential election
planned for March 2008.
• Taiwan appears to be reversing the trend of
declining defense expenditures. In 2005, Taiwan
leaders announced plans to increase defense
spending to three percent of GDP by 2008. In
2006, this figure was approximately 2.4 percent
of GDP. The 2007 defense budget requests funds
at a level of 2.8 percent of GDP, with a planned
2007 supplemental request expected to raise this
figure to 2.85 percent.
• Taiwan abandoned the strategy of using a
Special Budget to procure major defense systems
approved for sale by the United States in 2001. It
will attempt instead to fund the programs in the
regular defense budget and budget supplementals.
Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan has yet to pass these
funding bills, however.
• Consistent with the provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979), the
United States continues to make available
defense articles, services, and training assistance
to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability. In September 2006, Taiwan
accepted delivery of the last two of four KIDD-
class DDGs.
5
 Chapter Two
Understanding China’s Strategy

ಯ⑆槨屑⹮䵨䳂厩恮㼘䧏ㄣⅧ橻⏘␊㣵⠓ℝ⸗㕨公ₜ㇢⯃ರ

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time;
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”
– Deng Xiaoping’s “24 Character Strategy

Overview
Chinese leaders and strategists rarely use a Western
China’s leaders do not explicitly provide an
“ends-ways-means” construct to discuss strategy.
overarching “grand strategy” that outlines
Rather, they discuss strategy in terms of two central
strategic goals and the means to achieve them.
concepts: “comprehensive national power” (CNP)
Such vagueness may reflect a deliberate effort to
and the “strategic configuration of power.” These
conceal strategic planning, as well as uncertainties,
concepts shape how Chinese strategic planners
disagreements, and debates that China’s leaders
assess the security environment, gauge China’s
themselves have about their own long-term goals
relative position in the world, and make adjustments
and strategies. Still, it is possible to make some
to account for prevailing geopolitical trends.
generalizations about Chinese “grand strategy”
based on strategic tradition, historical patterns,
CNP. China’s strategic planners use CNP scores
statements and official papers, an emphasis on
to evaluate China’s standing in relation to other
certain military capabilities, and recent diplomatic
nations. These scores are based on qualitative and
efforts.
quantitative measures of territory, natural resources,
economic prosperity, diplomatic influence,
Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
international prestige, domestic cohesiveness,
military capability, and cultural influence. China’s
At the core of China’s overall strategy rests the
leading civilian and military think tanks apply
desire to maintain the continuous rule of the
slightly different criteria for CNP. A 2006 report
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A deep-rooted
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for
fear of losing political power shapes the leadership’s
example, used economic, military, and diplomatic
strategic outlook and drives many of its choices. As
metrics to rank China sixth among the world
a substitute for the failure of communist ideology,
powers.
the CCP has based its legitimacy on the twin pillars
of economic performance and nationalism. As
Since the early 1980s, China’s leaders have
a consequence, domestic economic and social
described their national development strategy
difficulties may lead China to attempt to bolster
as a quest to increase China’s CNP. They stress
support by stimulating nationalist sentiment which
economic growth and innovation in science and
could result in more aggressive behavior in foreign
technology as central to strengthening CNP. A
and security affairs than we might otherwise expect.
6 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
 The “24 Character” Strategy
In the early 1990s, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997) gave guidance to China’s foreign
and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the “24 character” strategy:
“observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time;
be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Later, the phrase, “make some
contributions (you suo zuo wei)” was added.

Elements of this strategy have often been quoted by senior Chinese national security officials and
academics, especially in the context of China’s diplomacy and military strategy. Certain aspects of this
strategy have been debated in recent years – namely the relative emphasis placed upon “never claim
leadership” or “make some contributions.” China’s increased international profile, especially since the
2002 16th Party Congress, suggests Beijing is leaning toward a more assertive, confident diplomacy.
Taken as a whole, Deng’s strategy remains instructive in that it suggests both a short-term desire to
downplay China’s capabilities and avoid confrontation, and a long-term strategy to build up China’s power
to maximize options for the future.

key assumption of this strategy is that economic
prosperity and stability will afford China greater
international influence and diplomatic leverage as
well as a robust, modern military.
A commentary in the official Liberation Army Daily
in April 2006 shed some light on the relationship
between CNP, military modernization, and China’s
international status: “As China’s comprehensive
strength is incrementally mounting and her status
keeps on going up in international affairs, it is a
matter of great importance to strive to construct a
military force that is commensurate with China’s
status and up to the job of defending the interests
of China’s development, so as to entrench China’s
international status.”
“Strategic Configuration of Power.” The “strategic
configuration of power,” or “shi,” is roughly
understood as an “alignment of forces,” although
there is no direct Western equivalent to the term.
Chinese strategic planners continuously assess the
“strategic configuration of power” for potential
threats (e.g., potential conflict over Taiwan that
involves the United States) as well as opportunities
(e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) that might
prompt an adjustment in national strategy.
China’s leaders describe the initial decades of the
21st Century as a “20-year period of opportunity,”
meaning that regional and international conditions
will generally be peaceful and conducive to
economic, diplomatic, and military development
and thus to China’s rise as a great power. Closely
linked to this concept is the “peaceful development”
campaign to assuage foreign concerns over China’s
military modernization and its global agenda by
proclaiming that China’s rise will be peaceful and
that conflict is not a necessary corollary to the
emergence of a new power.
Stability, Sovereignty, and Strategy
The perpetuation of CCP rule shapes Beijing’s
perceptions of China’s domestic political situation
and the international environment. Regime survival
likewise shapes how Party leaders view instability
along China’s periphery – e.g., North Korea, Central
Asia – which could escalate or spill over into
China. Concern over maintaining legitimacy also

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 7

 influences how Beijing treats the status of China’s
land and maritime territorial claims, since any
challenge to Chinese sovereignty could undermine
the strength and authority of the Party.
China has settled territorial disputes with many of
its neighbors in recent years. However, disputes
with Japan in the East China Sea, with India along
their shared border, and with Southeast Asian
nations in the South China Sea remain. Although
China has attempted to prevent these disputes from
disrupting regional relations, occasional statements
by PRC officials underscore China’s resolve in
these areas. For example, on the eve of President
Hu’s historic October 2006 visit to India, PRC
Ambassador Sun Yuxi told Indian press, “the whole
of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is
Chinese territory . . . we are claiming all of that –
that’s our position.”
Balance, Position, and Strategy
Beyond China’s efforts to maintain stability on
its borders and assert its territorial claims, Beijing
seeks to advance its strategic interests into the
“greater periphery” encompassing Central Asia and
the Middle East. The security goals behind this
emphasis include maintaining access to resources
and markets, and establishing a regional presence
and influence to balance and compete with other
powers, including the United States, Japan, and
India in areas distant from China’s borders.
Similarly, China’s strategy for the developing
world seeks to secure access to resources and
markets, build influence in multilateral bodies
such as the United Nations, and restrict Taiwan’s
diplomatic space. To build these relationships,
China emphasizes its self-proclaimed status as
the leader of the developing world and one that
can sympathize with local dissatisfaction over
the effects of globalization and perceptions of a
8 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
widening “north-south” gap.
Resource Demands and Strategy
As China’s economy grows, dependence on secure
access to markets and natural resources, particularly
metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more urgent
influence on China’s strategic behavior. At present,
China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies
nor the routes on which they travel, including the
Straits of Malacca through which some 80 percent
of China’s cruse oil imports transit – a vulnerability
President Hu refers to as the “Malacca Dilemma.”
China relies on coal for some two-thirds of its
energy, but its demand for oil and gas is increasing.
In 2003, China became the world’s second largest
consumer and third largest importer of oil. China
currently imports over 40 percent of its oil (about
2.5 million barrels per day in 2005). By 2025, this
figure could rise to 80 percent (9.5 – 15 million
barrels per day). China began filling a strategic
petroleum reserve in 2006. By 2015, Beijing plans
to build reserves to the International Energy Agency
standard of 90-days supply, but with poor logistics
and transportation networks, this may still prove
inadequate.
Nuclear power and natural gas account for smaller,
but growing, portions of energy consumption.
China plans to increase natural gas utilization from
3 percent to 8 percent of total consumption by 2010.
Similarly, China plans to build some 30 1,000-
megawatt nuclear power reactors by 2020.
China’s reliance on foreign energy imports has
affected its strategy and policy in significant ways.
It has pursued long-term energy supply agreements
in Angola, Central Asia, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
and Venezuela. China has used economic aid,
diplomatic favors, and, in some cases, the sale of
Figure 1. China’s Critical Sea Lanes. China is heavily dependent upon critical sea lanes for its energy imports. Some 80% of
China’s crude oil imports transit the Straits of Malacca.

military technology to secure energy deals. China’s
desire to meet its energy needs, moreover, has
led it to strengthen ties with countries that defy
international norms on issues ranging from human
rights, support for international terrorism, and
proliferation.
In the past few years, China has also offered
economic assistance and military cooperation with
countries located astride key maritime transit routes.
Concern over these routes has also prompted China
to pursue maritime capabilities that would help
it ensure the safe passage of resources through
international waterways.
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
Other Factors Influencing Chinese Strategy
Economic Reform. Economic success is central to
China’s emergence as a regional and global power,
and is the basis for an increasingly capable military.
However, underlying structural weaknesses threaten
economic growth. Demographic shifts and social
dislocations are stressing an already weak social
welfare system. Economic setbacks or downturns
could lead to internal unrest, potentially giving
rise to greater reliance on nationalism to maintain
popular support.
Political Reform. In an October 2005 White
Paper on Political Democracy, China’s leaders
reaffirmed the “people’s democratic dictatorship,”
9
 and declared that China is “against the anarchic
call for ‘democracy for all.’” However, internal
pressures for political liberalization persist. Party
leaders criminalize political dissent, censor the
media and internet, suppress independent trade and
labor unions, repress ethnic Tibetan and Uighur
minorities, and harass religious groups and churches
not recognized by the regime. The Party is wary
of any unsanctioned organization in China, even
if non-political, fearing these organizations could
facilitate organized opposition.

Non-Traditional Security Challenges. Non-

traditional security challenges such as epidemic
disease (e.g., HIV, avian influenza), systemic
corruption (according to official Chinese press,
more than 17,500 government officials were
prosecuted for corruption in the first eight months
of 2006 alone), international crime and narcotics
trafficking, and environmental problems (e.g.,
pollution, water shortages, and renewable resource
depletion) could exacerbate Chinese domestic
unrest and serve as sources of regional tension and
instability.

10 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Chapter Three
China’s Military Strategy and Doctrine
“. . . resolutely and effectively carry out the sacred duty of defending national sovereignty, unification,
territorial integrity, and security . . .”
– Hu Jintao

Overview

Chinese military theorists have developed a Military Strategic Guidelines

framework for doctrine-driven reform to build
a force capable of fighting and winning “local
wars under conditions of informatization.” This
concept emphasizes the role of modern information
technology as a force-multiplier enabling the PLA
to conduct military operations with precision at
greater distances from China’s borders. Drawing
upon lessons learned from foreign conflicts,
particularly U.S.-led campaigns up to and including
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, Soviet and Russian military
theory, and the PLA’s own, albeit limited, combat
history, Chinese military planners are pursuing
transformation across the whole of China’s armed
forces.
The pace and scale of these reforms is impressive;
however, the PLA remains untested in modern
warfare. This lack of operational experience
complicates outside assessment of the PLA’s
progress in meeting the aspirations of its doctrine.
The same applies to internal assessment and
decision-making among China’s senior civilian
leaders who, for the most part, lack direct military
experience, giving rise to a greater potential for
miscalculations in crises. Such miscalculations
would be equally catastrophic whether based
on advice from operationally inexperienced
commanders or from “scientific” combat models
divorced from the realities of the modern battlefield.
China does not publish an equivalent to the U.S.
National Military Strategy. Outside observers
therefore have few direct insights into the
leadership’s thinking about the use of force or
into the contingencies that shape the PLA’s force
structure or doctrine. Analysis of authoritative
speeches and documents suggests China relies on a
body of overall principles and guidance known as
“Military Strategic Guidelines” to plan and manage
the development and use of the armed forces.
The PLA has not made the contents of the
“guidelines” available for outside scrutiny.
Scholarly research suggests that the current
“guidelines” most likely date to 1993, reflecting
the impact the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the
collapse of the Soviet Union had on PRC military-
strategic thinking, forming the basis for much of
the PLA’s transformation over the past decade.
However, speeches, authoritative commentary, and
new military training guidance suggest that some
elements of the 1993 “guidelines” may have been
revised recently. These revisions appear to reflect
China’s perceptions of its security environment
and the character of modern war (i.e. “local wars
under conditions of informatization”), progress
in and lessons learned from China’s military
modernization, a shift from “building” forces
for modern, information-age warfare to training

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 11

 to “win” such wars, as well as Hu Jintao’s own
ideological imprimatur.
The operational, or “active defense,” component
of the “guidelines,” appears to remain intact. The
“active defense” posits a defensive military strategy
in which China does not initiate wars or fight wars
of aggression, but engages in war only to defend
national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Beijing’s definition of an attack against its
sovereignty or territory is vague, however. The
history of modern Chinese warfare is replete with
cases in which China’s leaders have claimed
military preemption as a strategically defensive
act. For example, China refers to its intervention
in the Korean War (1950-1953) as the War to
Resist the United States and Aid Korea. Similarly,
authoritative texts refer to border conflicts against
India (1962), the Soviet Union (1969), and Vietnam
(1979) as “Self-Defense Counter Attacks.” This
logic suggests the potential for China to engage in
military preemption, perhaps far from its borders, if
the use of force protects or advances core interests,
including territorial claims (e.g., Taiwan and
unresolved border or maritime claims).
Once hostilities have begun, according to the PLA
text, Science of Campaigns (Zhanyixue) (2000),
“the essence of [active defense] is to take the

Is China Developing A Preemptive Strategy?

Over the past decade, as the PLA transformed from an infantry-dominated force with limited power
projection ability into a more modern force with long-range precision strike assets, China acquired weapon
systems and adopted operational concepts that enable military preemption (including surprise attack) along
its periphery.

• As of October 2006, the PLA 2nd Artillery Corps had roughly 900 short-range ballistic missiles in its
inventory. Acquisition of Su-30 strike aircraft and the F-10 fighter aircraft – both of which are equipped
with a variety of precision guided munitions – has improved China’s offensive air power. The PLA is
also building capabilities for information warfare, computer network operations, and electronic warfare,
all of which could be used in preemptive attacks.

• PLA authors describe preemption as necessary and logical when confronting a more powerful enemy.
Chinese doctrinal materials stress that static defenses are insufficient to defend territory based on the
speed and destructive power of modern forces. As a result, PLA operational concepts seek to prevent
enemy forces from massing and to keep the enemy off balance by seizing the initiative with offensive
strikes. According to PLA theorists, an effective defense includes destroying enemy capabilities on
enemy territory before they can be employed.

China’s acquisition of power projection assets, including long-distance military communication systems,
airborne command, control, and communications aircraft, long-endurance submarines, unmanned combat
aerial vehicles (UCAVs), and additional precision-guided air-to-ground missiles indicate that the PLA is
generating a greater capacity for military preemption. PLA training that focuses on “no-notice,” long-
range strike training or coordinated air/naval strikes against groups of enemy naval vessels could also
indicate planning for preemptive military options in advance of regional crises.

12 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

initiative and to annihilate the enemy . . . . While
strategically the guideline is active defense, [in
military campaigns] the emphasis is placed on
taking the initiative in active offense. Only in this
way can the strategic objective of active defense be
realized” (emphasis added).
In addition to developing the capacity to annihilate
opposing forces, the PLA is exploring options for
limited uses of force. Chinese campaign theory
defines these options as “non-war” uses of force
– an extension of political coercion and not full-
scale acts of war. The 1995 and 1996 amphibious
exercises and missile firings in the Taiwan Strait
are examples of “non-war” uses of force. However,
the concept also includes air and missile strikes,
assassinations, and sabotage. Such writings
highlight the potential for China to miscalculate,
given the likelihood that the target of any such
actions, if not the broader international community,
would view them as acts of war.
Asymmetric Warfare
Identifying and exploiting asymmetries is a
fundamental aspect of Chinese strategic and military
thinking, particularly as a means for a weaker
force to defeat one that is stronger. Since the 1991
Persian Gulf War and Operation ALLIED FORCE,
Chinese military strategists have emphasized using
asymmetric approaches to exploit vulnerabilities
of technologically superior opponents. A 1999
Liberation Army Daily editorial suggested
this explicitly: “a strong enemy with absolute
superiority is certainly not without weakness that
can be exploited by a weaker side. …[O]ur military
preparations need to be more directly aimed at
finding tactics to exploit the weaknesses of a
strong enemy.” Elements of China’s exploration of
asymmetric warfare options can be seen in its heavy
investment in ballistic and cruise missile systems,
including advanced anti-ship cruise missiles;
undersea warfare systems, including submarines
and advanced naval mines; counterspace systems;

A Comprehensive View of Warfare

Over the past two decades, Chinese civilian and military strategists have debated the nature of modern
warfare. These debates draw on sources within the Chinese strategic tradition and its historical
experiences to provide perspective on the “revolution in military affairs,” “asymmetric warfare,” and
“informatized” war. Such debates highlight China’s interest in non-kinetic means of warfare and the
increased role of economic, financial, information, legal, and psychological instruments in Chinese war
planning. Underscoring the PRC military’s comprehensive, multi-dimensional view of warfare, the PLA
Academy of Military Science text, the Science of Military Strategy (2000), notes that “war is not only a
military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law.”

Recently, PRC military strategists have taken an increasing interest in international law as an instrument to
deter adversaries prior to combat. In a Taiwan Strait context, China could deploy an information campaign
to portray third-party intervention as illegitimate under international law. China is also attempting to
shape international opinion in favor of a distorted interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea by moving scholarly opinion and national perspectives away from long-accepted norms of freedom
of navigation and toward interpretations of increased sovereign authority over the 200 nautical mile
Exclusive Economic Zone, the airspace above it, and possibly outer space.

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 13

 computer network operations; and, special
operations forces.

The Role of Secrecy and Deception in Chinese

Military Strategy

The stress on seizing the initiative in conflicts

and keeping the adversary off balance in Chinese
military strategy gives rise to a strong emphasis on
deception at the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels. Chinese doctrinal materials define strategic
deception as “[luring] the other side into developing
misperceptions . . . and [establishing for oneself] a
strategically advantageous position by producing
various kinds of false phenomena in an organized
and planned manner with the smallest cost in
manpower and materials.”

In addition to information operations and

conventional camouflage, concealment, and
deception, the PLA draws from China’s historical
experience and the traditional roles that stratagem
and deception have played in Chinese statecraft.
Recent decades have witnessed within the PLA a
resurgence of the study of classic Chinese military
figures Sun-tzu, Sun Pin, Wu Ch’i, and Shang Yang
and their writings, all of which contain precepts on
the use of deception.

The Chinese Communist Party’s heavy reliance

on secrecy acts in tandem with military deception
to limit transparency in national security decision-
making, military capabilities, and strategic
intentions. However, over-confidence may result
from military leaders enamored with the uncertain
benefits of stratagem and deception. In addition, the
same skills commanders use against adversaries can
be used to cover up or slow the transmission of bad
news internal to the PLA system, a chronic problem
in the PRC. Secrecy and deception may therefore
be a double-edged sword, confusing China’s leaders
as much as China’s adversaries.
14 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
 Chapter Four
Force Modernization Goals and Trends
“China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense . . . . The first step
is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is
to basically reach the strategic goal of building informatized armed forces and being capable of winning
informatized wars by the mid-21st century.”
– China’s National Defense in 2006

a number of exercises designed to develop the

Overview
PLA’s joint operational concepts and demonstrate
new capabilities, command automation systems,
China’s leaders have stated their intentions and
and weapons. The PLA hopes eventually to fuse
allocated resources to pursue broad-based military
service-level capabilities with an integrated network
transformation to enable joint operations that
for command, control, communications, computers,
encompasses force-wide professionalization;
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
improved training; more robust, realistic joint
(C4ISR), a new command structure, and a joint
exercises; and accelerated acquisition of modern
logistics system. However, it continues to face
weapons. For the moment, China’s military is
deficiencies in inter-service cooperation and actual
focused on assuring the capability to prevent
experience in joint operations.
Taiwan independence and, if Beijing were to decide
to adopt such an approach, to compel the island
As PLA modernization progresses, twin
to negotiate a settlement on Beijing’s terms. At
misperceptions could lead to miscalculation or
the same time, China is laying the foundation for
crisis. First, other countries may underestimate
a force able to accomplish broader regional and
the extent to which Chinese forces have improved.
global objectives.
Second, China’s leaders may overestimate the
proficiency of their forces by assuming new systems
The Intelligence Community estimates China will
are fully operational, adeptly operated, adequately
take until the end of this decade or later to produce
maintained, and well integrated with existing or
a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size
other new capabilities.
adversary. In building such a capability, China’s
leaders stress asymmetric strategies to leverage
Emerging Area Denial/Anti-Access Capabilities
China’s advantages while exploiting the perceived
vulnerabilities of potential opponents using so-
In the near term, China is prioritizing measures
called Assassin’s Mace programs. The January
to deter or counter third-party intervention in any
2007 ASAT test could be viewed in this context.
future cross-Strait crises. China’s approach to
dealing with this challenge centers on what DoD’s
The PLA’s ambition to conduct joint operations
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review report refers to
can be traced to lessons learned from U.S. and
as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational
Coalition operations since the 1991 Persian
concepts aimed at preventing an adversary from
Gulf War. Since 2004, the PLA has conducted
deploying military forces to forward operating
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 15
 locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical
military balances. In this context, the PLA
appears engaged in a sustained effort to develop
the capability to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft
carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might
deploy to the western Pacific. Increasingly, China’s
area denial/anti-access forces overlap, providing
multiple layers of offensive systems, utilizing the
sea, air, and space.
PLA planners have observed the primacy of
precision strike in modern warfare and are
investing in offensive and defensive elements of
this emerging regime. China is pursuing improved
ISR assets ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles,
satellite constellations, and “informatized” special
operations forces which could provide targeting
data for long-range precision strikes when linked
with robust communications. The PLA envisions
precision strike capabilities sufficient to hold at risk
western Pacific airbases, ports, surface combatants,
land and space-based C4ISR, air defense systems,
and command facilities.
To prevent deployment of naval forces into western
Pacific waters, PLA planners are focused on
targeting surface ships at long ranges. Analyses of
current and projected force structure improvements
suggest that in the near term, China is seeking the
capacity to hold surface ships at risk through a
layered defense that reaches out to the “second
island chain” (i.e., the islands extending south and
east from Japan, to and beyond Guam in the western
Pacific Ocean). One area of apparent investment
emphasis involves a combination of medium-
range ballistic missiles, C4ISR for geo-location of
targets, and onboard guidance systems for terminal
homing to strike surface ships on the high seas or
their onshore support infrastructure. This capability
would have particular significance, owing to the

Figure 2. The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists conceive of two island “chains”
as forming a geographic basis for China’s maritime defensive perimeter.

16 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

preemptive and coercive options it would provide
China in a regional crisis.
Chinese military analysts have also concluded
that logistics and mobilization are potential
vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the
heavy requirements for precisely coordinated
transportation, communications, and logistics
networks. To threaten in-theater bases and logistics
points, China could employ its theater ballistic
missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, special
operations forces, and computer network attacks.
Strike aircraft, enabled by aerial refueling, could
engage distant targets using air-launched cruise
missiles equipped with a variety of terminal-homing
warheads.
Advanced mines, submarines, maritime strike
aircraft, and modern surface combatants equipped
with advanced ASCMs would provide a supporting
layer of defense for its long-range anti-access
systems. Acquisition of the KILO, SONG,

Building Capacity for Conventional Precision Strike

Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) (< 1000 km). According to DIA estimates, as of October 2006
the PLA had roughly 900 SRBMs and is increasing its inventory at a rate of more than 100 missiles
per year. The PLA’s first-generation SRBMs do not possess true “precision strike” capability, but later
generations have greater ranges and improved accuracy.

Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) (1000-3000 km). The PLA is acquiring conventional
MRBMs, apparently to increase the range to which it can conduct precision strikes, to include their
possible use in targeting naval ships operating far from China’s shores.

Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs). China is developing LACMs for stand-off, precision strike
capability against hard-targets. First- and second-generation LACMs may be deployed in the near future.

Air-to-Surface Missiles (ASMs). China is believed to have a small number of tactical ASMs and
precision-guided munitions, including all-weather, satellite-guided and laser-guided bombs, and is
pursuing foreign and domestic acquisitions to improve airborne anti-ship capabilities.

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs). PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen varieties of ASCMs,
from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2/STYX to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-
27B/SIZZLER. The pace of indigenous ASCM research, development and production – and of foreign
procurement – has accelerated over the past decade.

Anti-Radiation Weapons. The PLA has imported Israeli-made HARPY UCAVs and Russian-made anti-
radiation missiles, and is developing an anti-radiation missile based on the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17)
known domestically as the YJ-91.

Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is deploying the A-100 300 mm multiple rocket
launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and developing the WS-2 400 mm MRL (200 km range). Additional
munitions are being fielded or are under development.

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 17

 SHANG, and YUAN-class submarines illustrates
the importance the PLA places on undersea warfare.
The purchase of SOVREMENNYY II-class DDGs
and indigenous production of the LUYANG I/
LUYANG II DDGs equipped with long-range
ASCM and SAM systems demonstrate a continuing
emphasis on improving anti-surface warfare,
combined with mobile, wide-area air control.
PLA air defense has shifted from point defense of
key military, industrial, and political targets to a new
Joint Anti-Air Raid Campaign based on a modern,
integrated air defense system and offensive and
defensive counter-air operations. These operations
extend beyond the defense of Chinese airspace
to include strikes against an adversary’s bases
(including aircraft carriers) and logistics to degrade
the adversary’s ability to conduct air operations.
The air defense component of anti-access/area-
denial includes SAMs such as the SA-10, SA-20,
HQ-9, HQ-15, and extended-range C2 suites such as
the S-300PMU2. Beijing will also use Russian-built
and domestic fourth-generation aircraft (e.g., Su-27
and Su-30 FLANKER variants, and the indigenous
F-10). The PLA Navy would employ recently
acquired Russian Su-30MK2 fighters, armed with
AS-17/Kh-31A anti-ship missiles. The acquisition
of refueling aircraft, including the Russian IL-
78/MIDAS and the indigenously developed B-6U
refueling aircraft, will extend operational ranges for
PLAAF and PLA Navy strike aircraft armed with
precision munitions, thereby increasing the threat
to surface and air forces distant from China’s coast.
Additionally, acquisition of UAVs and UCAVs,
including the Israeli HARPY, expands China’s
options for long-range reconnaissance and strike.
A final element of an emerging area denial/anti
access strategy includes the electromagnetic, or
information, sphere. PLA authors often cite the
need in modern warfare to control information,
18 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
sometimes termed an “information blockade.”
China is pursuing this ability by improving
information and operational security, developing
electronic warfare and information warfare
capabilities, and denial and deception. China’s
concept of an “information blockade” likely
extends beyond the strictly military realm to
include other elements of state power. Secrecy,
information controls (including internet security),
and propaganda remain hallmarks of CCP rule.
In 2006, several independent researchers used a
U.S.-based commercial imagery service provider’s
archive of overhead imagery to identify several
Chinese military-related facilities including a
submarine base, a facility that appeared to replicate
a contested portion of the Sino-Indian border, and a
mock Taiwan airfield. Shortly after the publication
of these studies, Chinese state-run media in August
2006 claimed that foreign map makers had illegally
surveyed Chinese territory and threatened China’s
security. The article referenced China’s 2002
Surveying and Mapping Law and quoted the PRC
State Bureau of Survey and Mapping as stating that
“foreigners who illegally survey, gather and publish
geographical information on China will be severely
punished.” This sequence of events may indicate
that China is attempting to lay the groundwork to
extend the concept of the “information blockade”
into space.
Strategic Capabilities
Nuclear Deterrence. China is qualitatively and
quantitatively improving its legacy strategic
forces. These presently consist of approximately
20 silo-based, liquid-fueled CSS-4 ICBMs (which
constitute its primary nuclear means of holding
continental U.S. targets at risk), approximately
20 liquid-fueled, limited range CSS-3 ICBMs,
between 14-18 liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate
range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and upwards of
50 CSS-5 road mobile, solid-fueled medium range
ballistic missiles (MRBMs) (for regional deterrence
missions), and JL-1 SLBMs on the XIA-class
SSBN.
By 2010, China’s strategic nuclear forces will
likely comprise a combination of enhanced CSS-4s;
CSS-3s; CSS-5s; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31s
(which achieved initial threat availability in 2006,
and will likely achieve operational status in the
near future, if it has not already done so), and DF-
31A ICBMs (expected IOC in 2007); and the JL-1
and JL-2 SLBMs (expected IOC between 2007-
10). The addition of the DF-31 family of missiles
and the JL-2 and JIN-class SSBNs will give China
a more survivable and flexible nuclear force. New
air- and ground-launched cruise missiles that could
perform nuclear missions will similarly improve
the survivability and flexibility of China’s nuclear
forces.
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper states that: 1)
the purpose China’s nuclear force is to “deter other
countries from using or threatening to use nuclear
weapons against China;” 2) China “upholds the
principles of counterattack in self-defense and
limited development of nuclear weapons;” and, 3)
China “has never entered into and will never enter
into a nuclear arms race with any other country.”
The paper reiterated China’s commitment to
a declaratory policy of “no first use of nuclear
weapons at any time and under any circumstances,”
and states China “unconditionally undertakes
not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear
weapon-free zones.” Doctrinal materials suggest

Figure 3. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. China currently is capable of targeting its nuclear forces
throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A,
and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 19

 additional missions for China’s nuclear forces
include deterrence of conventional attacks against
the Chinese mainland, reinforcing China’s great
power status, and increasing its freedom of action
by limiting the extent to which others can coerce
China. China’s assertion of a nuclear “no first use”
policy, therefore, is ambiguous. This ambiguity
is compounded with the juxtaposition of the “no
first use” declaration and the stated commitment
to adhere to the principle of “counter attack in self
defense.”
Periodic military and civilian academic debates
over the future of China’s nuclear doctrine have
questioned whether or not a “no first use” policy
supports or detracts from China’s deterrent, and
whether or not “no first use” should remain in place.
The Chinese government has provided public and
private assurances that its “no first use” policy has
not and will not change. Nevertheless, coupled
with the debates themselves, the introduction of
more capable and survivable nuclear systems in
greater numbers suggest Beijing may be exploring
the implications of China’s evolving force structure,
and the new options that force structure may
provide.
Space and Counterspace. China’s space activities
and capabilities, including anti-satellite programs,
have significant implications for anti-access/area
denial in Taiwan Strait contingencies and beyond.
China further views the development of space and
counter-space capabilities as bolstering national
prestige and, like nuclear weapons, demonstrating
the attributes of a world power.
China has accorded space a high priority for
investment. Premier Wen Jiabao, marking the
50th anniversary of China’s aerospace industry
in October 2006, stated that “China’s aerospace
industry is standing at a new starting point and
facing a new situation and tasks.” It is now
20 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
necessary, he said, “to implement the principle
of independent innovations, leaps in key areas .
. . carry out major state science and technology
special projects in manned space flights and a lunar
probe, and achieve new breakthroughs in research
and development [of] aerospace equipment and . . .
space technology.”
Reconnaissance. China is deploying advanced
imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource
systems with military applications. Examples
include the CBERS-1 and -2 satellites and the
Huanjing disaster/environmental monitoring satellite
constellation. China is planning eleven satellites in
the Huanjing program capable of visible, infrared,
multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar imaging.
In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field
radar, ocean surveillance, and high-resolution
photoreconnaissance satellites. In the interim,
China probably will rely on commercial satellite
imagery (e.g., SPOT, LANDSAT, RADARSAT, and
Ikonos) to supplement existing coverage.
Navigation and Timing. China has launched four
BeiDou satellites with an accuracy of 20 meters
over China and surrounding areas. China also uses
GPS and GLONASS navigation satellite systems,
and has invested in the EU’s Galileo navigation
system.
Manned Program. In October 2005, China
completed its second manned space mission and
Chinese astronauts conducted their first experiments
in space. Press reports indicate China will perform
its first space walk in 2007-2008, and rendezvous
and docking in 2009-2012. China’s goal is to have
a manned space station by 2020.
Communications. China uses foreign providers, like
INTELSAT and INMARSAT, for communications,
but is expanding indigenous capabilities in this
area. China may be developing a system of data
relay satellites to support global coverage, and
has reportedly acquired mobile data reception
equipment that could support more rapid data
transmission to deployed military forces and units.
Small Satellites. Since 2000, China has launched
a number of small satellites, including an
oceanographic research, imagery, and environmental
research satellites. China has also established
dedicated small satellite design and production
facilities. China is developing microsatellites
– weighing less than 100 kilograms – for remote
sensing, and networks of imagery and radar
satellites. These developments could allow for a
rapid reconstitution or expansion of China’s satellite
force in the event of any disruption in coverage.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons. In January
2007, China successfully tested a direct-ascent
ASAT missile against a Chinese weather satellite,
demonstrating its ability to attack satellites operating
in low-Earth orbit. The direct ascent ASAT system
is one component of a multi-dimensional program
to generate the capability to deny others access to
outer space.
In a PLA National Defense University book, Joint
Space War Campaigns (2005), author Colonel Yuan
Zelu writes:
[The] goal of a space shock and awe strike is
[to] deter the enemy, not to provoke the enemy
into combat. For this reason, the objectives
selected for strike must be few and precise
. . .[for example] on important information
sources, command and control centers,
communications hubs, and other objectives.
This will shake the structure of the opponent’s
operational system of organization and will
create huge psychological impact on the
opponent’s policymakers.
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
China’s nuclear arsenal has long provided Beijing
with an inherent ASAT capability. However,
in recent years Beijing has pursued a robust,
multidimensional counterspace program. UHF-band
satellite communications jammers acquired from
Ukraine in the late 1990s and probable indigenous
systems give China today the capacity to jam
common satellite communications bands and GPS
receivers. In addition to the direct ascent ASAT
program demonstrated in January 2007, China is
also developing other technologies and concepts
for kinetic (hit-to-kill) weapons and directed-energy
(e.g., lasers and radio frequency) weapons for ASAT
missions. Citing the requirements of its manned and
lunar space programs, China is improving its ability
to track and identify satellites – a prerequisite for
effective, precise physical attacks.
Information Warfare. There has been much
writing on information warfare among China’s
military thinkers, who indicate a strong conceptual
understanding of its methods and uses. For
example, a November 2006 Liberation Army Daily
commentator argued:
[The] mechanism to get the upper hand
of the enemy in a war under conditions of
informatization finds prominent expression in
whether or not we are capable of using various
means to obtain information and of ensuring
the effective circulation of information;
whether or not we are capable of making full
use of the permeability, sharable property,
and connection of information to realize the
organic merging of materials, energy, and
information to form a combined fighting
strength; [and,] whether or not we are
capable of applying effective means to weaken
the enemy side’s information superiority and
lower the operational efficiency of enemy
information equipment.
21
 The PLA is investing in electronic countermeasures,
defenses against electronic attack (e.g., electronic
and infrared decoys, angle reflectors, and false
target generators), and computer network operations
(CNO). China’s CNO concepts include computer
network attack, computer network defense, and
computer network exploitation. The PLA sees
CNO as critical to achieving “electromagnetic
dominance” early in a conflict. Although there is
no evidence of a formal Chinese CNO doctrine,
PLA theorists have coined the term “Integrated
Network Electronic Warfare” to prescribe the use
of electronic warfare, CNO, and kinetic strikes to
disrupt battlefield network information systems.
The PLA has established information warfare
units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer
systems and networks, and tactics and measures to
protect friendly computer systems and networks. In
2005, the PLA began to incorporate offensive CNO
into its exercises, primarily in first strikes against
enemy networks.
Power Projection – Modernization Beyond
Taiwan
In a speech at the March 2006 National People’s
Congress, PLA Chief of the General Staff Liang
Guanglie stated that “one must attend to the
effective implementation of the historical mission
of our forces at this new stage in this new century. .
. preparations for a multitude of military hostilities
must be done in concrete manner, [and] . . .
competence in tackling multiple security threats and
accomplishing a diverse range of military missions
must be stepped up.”
Consistent with this guidance, China continues to
invest in military programs designed to improve
extended-range power projection. Current trends
in China’s military capabilities are a major factor
in changing East Asian military balances, and could
22 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a
range of military operations in Asia – well beyond
Taiwan. Given the apparent absence of direct
threats from other nations, the purposes to which
China’s current and future military power will be
applied remain unknown. It is certain, however,
that these capabilities will increase Beijing’s options
for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage,
advance interests, or resolve disputes.
The principal focus of, and driver for, China’s
military modernization in the near term appears
to remain preparing for potential conflict in the
Taiwan Strait. However, official documents and
the writings of Chinese military strategists suggest
Beijing is increasingly surveying the strategic
landscape beyond Taiwan. Some Chinese analysts
have explored the geopolitical value of Taiwan in
extending China’s maritime “defensive” perimeter
and improving its ability to influence regional sea
lines of communication. For example, the PLA
Academy of Military Science text, Science of
Military Strategy (2000), states:
If Taiwan should be alienated from the
mainland, not only [would] our natural
maritime defense system lose its depth,
opening a sea gateway to outside forces, but
also a large area of water territory and rich
resources of ocean resources would fall into
the hands of others. . . .[O]ur line of foreign
trade and transportation which is vital to
China’s opening up and economic development
will be exposed to the surveillance and threats
of separatists and enemy forces, and China
will forever be locked to the west of the first
chain of islands in the West Pacific.
China’s 2006 Defense White Paper similarly raises
concerns about resources and transportation links
when it states that “security issues related to energy,
resources, finance, information, and international
shipping routes are mounting.” The related desire
to protect energy investments in Central Asia
and could also provide an incentive for military
investment or intervention if instability surfaces in
the region. Disagreements that remain with Japan
over maritime claims and with several Southeast
Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly Islands
in the South China Sea could lead to renewed
tensions in these areas. Instability on the Korean
Peninsula likewise could produce a regional crisis
in which Beijing would face a choice between a
diplomatic or a military response.
Analysis of China’s weapons acquisitions also
suggests China is looking beyond Taiwan as it
builds its force. For example, new missile units
outfitted with conventional theater-range missiles
at various locations in China could be used in a
Figure 4. Maximum Ranges for China’s Conventional SRBM Force. China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile
forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
variety of non-Taiwan contingencies. Airborne
early warning and control and aerial-refueling
programs will permit extended air operations into
the South China Sea. Advanced destroyers and
submarines reflect Beijing’s desire to protect and
advance its maritime interests. Expeditionary
forces (three airborne divisions, two amphibious
infantry divisions, two marine brigades, about seven
special operations groups, and one regimental-size
reconnaissance element in the Second Artillery) are
improving with the introduction of new equipment,
better unit-level tactics, and greater coordination of
joint operations. Over the long term, improvements
in China’s C4ISR, including space-based and
over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to
identify, track and target military activities deep
into the western Pacific Ocean.
23
 Finally, analysis of PLA training activities provides extremism, and national separatism, including:
an additional indication that the PLA is exploring
contingencies other than Taiwan. For example, the • “Tianshan-1 2006,” a bilateral exercise with
July-August 2006 North Sword-07, a simulated, Kazakhstan in August 2006, which took place
opposing-forces exercise, involved for the first time in Almaty, Kazakhstan and Yining, China
two fully equipped PLA divisions with the support improved cooperation between law enforcement
of the air force, Second Artillery Corps, and the and security departments.
People’s Armed Police. The exercise focused on
• “Cooperation 2006,” a bilateral exercise with
long-distance maneuver, intelligence acquisition,
Tajikistan in September 2006, featured 150 troops
and mobile counterattack operations.
from China and 300 troops from Tajikistan in a
scenario for coordinated responses to terrorist
China in 2006 also conducted a series of exercises
attacks.
with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
with the stated objective of fighting the “three
evil forces” of international terrorism, religious

Status of Aircraft Carrier Developments

In October 2006, Lieutenant General Wang Zhiyuan, vice chairman of the Science and Technology
Commission of the PLA’s General Armament Department stated that the “Chinese army will study how to
manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own . . . . [A]ircraft carriers are indispensable if
we want to protect our interests in oceans.”

China first began to discuss developing an indigenous aircraft carrier in the late 1970s. In 1985, China
purchased the Australian carrier the HMAS Melbourne. Although the hull was scrapped, Chinese
technicians studied the ship and built a replica of its flight deck for pilot training. China purchased two
former Soviet carriers – the Minsk in 1998 and the Kiev in 2000. Neither carrier was made operational;
instead, they were used as floating military theme parks. Nevertheless, both provided design information
to PLA Navy engineers.

In 1998 China purchased the ex-Varyag, a Kuznetsov-class Soviet carrier that was only 70 percent
complete at the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Recent deck refurbishment, electrical work, fresh
hull paint with PLA Navy markings, and expressed interest in Russia’s Su-33 fighter has re-kindled debate
about a Chinese carrier fleet. The PLA’s ultimate intentions for the Varyag remain unclear, but a number
of possibilities exist: turning it into an operational aircraft carrier, a training or transitional platform, or a
floating theme park – its originally-stated purpose.

Regardless of Beijing’s final objective for the ex-Varyag, PLA Navy study of the ship’s structural design
could eventually assist China in creating its own carrier program. Lieutenant General Wang stated that,
“we cannot establish a real naval force of aircraft carriers within three or five years.” Some analysts in
and out of government predict that China could have an operational carrier by the end of the 12th Five-
Year Plan (2011-2015); others assess the earliest it could deploy an operational aircraft carrier is 2020 or beyond.

24 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Chapter Five
Resources for Force Modernization
“ . . . uphold the scientific development concept as the important guiding principle in strengthening
national defense and army building; push national defense and army building forward in a faster and
better way . . .”
Overview
Sources for PLA modernization include domestic
defense expenditures, indigenous defense industrial
developments, and foreign technology acquisition
– all of which are driven by the performance of the
economy. China’s economic growth has enabled
Beijing to invest ever increasing resources in its
defense sector over the past 15 years.
As its domestic defense industry matures, China
is acquiring foreign weapons and technology,
primarily from Russia, to fill near-term capability
gaps. In the long term, however, Beijing seeks
a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector.
China’s defense industries benefit from foreign
direct investment and joint ventures in the civilian
sector, technical knowledge and expertise of
students returned from abroad, and state-sponsored
industrial espionage. The EU arms embargo not
only remains an important symbolic and moral
restraint on EU countries’ military interactions with
the PLA, but a lifting of the embargo would expand
China’s access to military and dual-use technology
to improve current weapon systems and develop
indigenous capabilities to produce future systems.
Military Expenditure Trends
On March 4, 2007, Beijing announced a 17.8
percent increase in its military budget, bringing
its official defense budget figure for 2007 to
approximately $45 billion. This development
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
– Hu Jintao
continues a trend of annual budget increases that
exceed significantly growth of the overall economy.
Analysis of PRC budget data and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) GDP data for the period
of 1996 to 2006 shows average annual defense
budget growth of 11.8 percent (inflation adjusted)
compared with average annual GDP growth of
9.2 percent (inflation adjusted). Of note, China’s
2006 Defense White Paper contains a similar
analysis in stating that between 1990 and 2005 the
defense budget grew by an average of 9.6 percent
between, while China’s GDP over the same period
grew in constant prices an average of 9.7 percent
yearly, according to the IMF. The 1996-2006 data
is a more useful measure, however, as it covers
the period following the 1995 and 1996 Taiwan
Strait crises and incorporates the 9th and 10th Five
Year Plan periods (1996-2000 and 2001-2005,
respectively) in which the post-Persian Gulf War re-
invigoration of the PLA modernization drive would
be fully reflected.
Substantial growth in China’s defense budget aside,
China’s published defense budget does not include
large categories of expenditure, including expenses
for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military-
related research and development, and China’s
paramilitary forces. The Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) estimates China’s total military-
related spending for 2007 could be as much as $85
billion to $125 billion.
25
 Accurately estimating Chinese military expenditures
is a difficult process due to the lack of accounting
transparency and China’s failure to comply with
international standards for reporting military
expenditures and funding. As a result, outside
estimates of China’s military spending vary widely.
For example, select government and independent
calculations for the PLA’s expenditures for 2003
– the most recent year for which a significant
number of institutions published estimates – ranged
from $30.6 billion to $141 billion based on official
exchange rates or purchasing power parity (PPP)
models. China’s declared budget in that year, in
contrast, was $22.3 billion.
The United States and other countries have, for
many years, urged China to increase transparency
in defense spending. To date, Beijing has provided
only highly aggregated military budget data in its
Defense White Papers. Moreover, some Chinese
officials remain opposed to candid dialogue on
the subject. In response to an August 2006 press
question on transparency in PLA budgeting, the
PRC’s UN Ambassador in Geneva, Sha Zukang,
asserted bluntly that “it’s better for the U.S. to shut
up and keep quiet” about it.
China’s Advancing Defense Industries
Defense industry modernization accelerated in the
mid-1990s based on reforms to rationalize military
procurement and increase innovation among China’s
state-owned defense companies. These reforms
have enabled the development and production of

Figure 5. Comparison of Outside Estimates of PRC Military Spending. Government and research institutes have developed
various – but often incompatible – methods to account for the PLA’s off-budget expenditures and sources of income, and other factors.
Two different exchange rate models – official exchange rate and purchasing power parity indices – further complicate estimates of
China’s defense spending. Estimates above are in 2003 U.S. dollars based on official exchange rates unless otherwise indicated.

26 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

Figure 6. Chinese Defense Budget and Estimates of Total Defense-Related Expenditures. The graphic depicts China official
defense budget since 1994, and associated Defense Intelligence Agency estimates of actual defense expenditure. All figures in 2006
US Dollars.

select weapon systems, such as missiles, fighter jets,
and warships, approaching performance parameters
comparable to Western systems.
Missile and Space Industry. China develops
and produces a broad range of ballistic, cruise,
and surface-to-air missiles. Improved production
capabilities will enable China to more efficiently
address force modernization goals by enhancing
production of existing missile designs and
supporting the development of new cruise and
ballistic missiles with longer ranges and precision
strike capabilities. China’s space launch vehicle
industry is expanding to support the national
emphasis on satellite launch capability and the
manned space program. China hopes to have more
than 100 satellites in orbit by 2010, and to launch
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
an additional 100 satellites by 2020.
Shipbuilding Sector. In the last five years,
China’s shipyard expansions, mainly in the
commercial container ship market, have increased
China’s overall shipbuilding capacity. Dual-
purpose (military/civilian) shipyards are capable
of supporting construction of major combatants,
large amphibious ships, and supertankers. China
is capable of serial production of modern diesel-
electric submarines and is moving forward with
new nuclear submarines. China continues to rely
on foreign suppliers for propulsion units, and to a
lesser degree for weapons systems, sensors, and
other advanced electronics- and materials-based
ship-borne technologies.
27
 Aircraft Production. China’s commercial and
military aviation industry has advanced from
producing direct copies of early Soviet models
to developing and producing indigenous aircraft.
China is producing improved versions of older
aircraft as well as modern fourth generation fighters,
and is developing a fifth generation combat aircraft.
China continues to seek Russian and other foreign
assistance in areas such as engines and avionics.
China’s commercial aircraft industry has imported
high-precision and technologically advanced
machine tools, electronics, and other components.
This dual-use technology can also be used in the
production of military aircraft.
Beijing is decreasing reliance on foreign assistance,
improving business practices, streamlining
bureaucracy, shortening development timelines,
boosting quality control, and increasing production
capacity for military orders. As part of these efforts,
China’s 11th Five-Year Plan aims to strengthen the
defense-related scientific, technical, and industrial
bases. These defense-related industries will
continue to reap benefits from:
• Transfers of technology and skills from foreign
joint ventures.
• Increased government funding for research,
development, and procurement.
• Legal and illegal acquisition of foreign military
and dual-use technology.
• Increased partnerships with academic institutions,
which improve student recruitment and technical
training for existing staff.
• China’s reverse brain drain. Many of China’s
new generation of scientists, engineers, and
managers are returning to China after receiving
training and gaining experience abroad.
28 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
Foreign Weapons and Technology Acquisition
In 2005, China signed arms agreements with
foreign suppliers worth almost $2.8 billion,
making it the third largest arms recipient among
developing countries. Russia remains China’s
primary weapons and materiel provider, selling
it advanced fighter aircraft, missile systems,
submarines, and destroyers. China is currently
negotiating the purchase of additional surface-to-
air missiles, combat aircraft, aircraft engines, and
assault and transport helicopters. China relies on
Russian components for several of its production
programs and has purchased production rights to
Russian weapon designs. Russia cooperates with
China on technical, design, and material support for
numerous weapons and space systems; for example
China’s Shenzhou manned space module is based
on the Russian Soyuz capsule.
Israel has also historically been a supplier of
advanced military technology to China. The
Israelis transferred HARPY UCAVs to China in
2001 and conducted maintenance on HARPY
parts during 2003-2004. In 2005, Israel began to
improve government oversight of exports to China
by strengthening controls of military exports,
establishing controls on dual-use exports, and
increasing the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in export-related decisions. In January 2007, Israel
implemented new dual-use export controls, based
on the Wassenaar Arrangement. As of February
2007, legislation pending in the Knesset would
adopt Wassenaar controls on munitions list exports.
It remains unclear to what extent the new export
controls will prevent additional sensitive military-
related transfers to Beijing in the future.
Despite their history of strong arms trade
relationships with China, Russia and Israel have
usually refrained from transferring their most
sophisticated weapons systems to China. To
diversify its arms supplier base and acquire
advanced technology, the PRC is looking to
alternative suppliers such as Europe. Since 2003
China has been pressuring EU states to lift the
embargo on lethal military sales to China that
the EU imposed in response to the PRC’s 1989
crackdown on Tiananmen Square demonstrators. In
their Joint Statement following the 2004 EU-China
Summit, European leaders committed to work
towards lifting the embargo, a pledge they repeated
in 2005 and 2006. Although the issue officially
remains on the EU agenda, the current political
sentiment among most Member States remains
opposed to lifting the embargo in the near future.
Some Member States have advocated eliminating
the embargo in the context of making the EU’s
enhanced “Code of Conduct” on arms exports
binding; the Code governs arms transfers to third
countries but is currently a voluntary instrument.
Although some in the EU have argued that ending
the embargo and instead subjecting exports to
China to the terms of the Code of Conduct would
result in no qualitative or quantitative increases in
China’s military capabilities, other EU members
remain concerned, as does the United States, that
the provisions of the Code remain inadequate.
systems, advanced space technology, radar systems,
early-warning aircraft, submarine technology, and
advanced electronics for precision-guided weapons
– would advance PLA operational capabilities.
China continues a systematic effort to obtain
from abroad through legal and illegal commercial
transactions dual-use and military technologies.
Many dual-use technologies, such as software,
integrated circuits, computers, electronics,
semiconductors, telecommunications, and
information security systems, are vital for the PLA’s
transformation into an information-based, network-
centric force. Several high profile legal cases
highlight China’s efforts to obtain sensitive U.S.
technologies (e.g., missile, imaging, semiconductor,
and submarine) illegally by targeting well-placed
scientists and businessmen. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials have rated
China’s aggressive and wide-ranging espionage as
the leading threat to U.S. technology. Since 2000,
ICE has initiated more than 400 investigations
involving the illicit export of U.S. arms and
technologies to China.

Lifting the EU embargo would likely contribute

significantly to the PLA’s modernization goals. An
end to the embargo would raise the possibility of
competitive pricing for arms sales to China, giving
Beijing leverage to pressure its existing suppliers
– including Russia, Israel, and Ukraine – to provide
even more advanced weapons and favorable terms
of sale. Increased military-to-military exchanges
consequent to arms sales resulting from lifting the
embargo could also give the PLA access to critical
military management practices, operational doctrine,
and training. Finally, the transfer of sophisticated
military and dual-use technologies that China most
likely desires from the EU – C4ISR components and
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 29
 Chapter Six
Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait
“The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for ‘Taiwan independence’ and their activities
remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for ‘Taiwan independence,’ the Taiwan authorities
aim at creating ‘de jure independence’ through ‘constitutional reform,’ thus still posing a grave threat to
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. ”
– China’s National Defense in 2006

Overview Department of Defense, through the transformation

The security situation in the Taiwan Strait is largely
a function of dynamic interactions among policies
and actions taken by the mainland, Taiwan, and
the United States. China’s emergence as a global
economic force, increased diplomatic clout, and
improved air, naval, and missile forces strengthen
Beijing’s position relative to Taipei by increasing
the mainland’s economic leverage over Taiwan,
fostering Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, and
shifting the cross-Strait military balance in the
mainland’s favor. Taiwan, meanwhile, has allowed
its defense spending to decline in real terms over
the past decade, creating an increased urgency
for the Taiwan authorities to make the necessary
investments to maintain the island’s self-defense
capabilities. The U.S. Government has made clear
that it opposes unilateral changes to the status quo
by either side of the Taiwan Strait, does not support
Taiwan independence, and supports peaceful
resolution of cross-Strait differences in a manner
acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait.
In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act [Public
Law 96-8, (1979)], the United States has taken steps
to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the
region. In addition to making available to Taiwan
defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, the U.S.
30 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
of U.S. Armed Forces and global force posture
realignments, is maintaining the capacity to resist
any effort by Beijing to resort to force or coercion
to dictate the terms of Taiwan’s future status.
For its part, Taiwan has taken important steps to
improve its joint operations capability, strengthen
its officer and non-commissioned officer corps,
build its reserve stocks, and improve crisis response
capabilities. Taiwan has bolstered its defensive
capabilities by taking delivery of the final two of
four KIDD-class DDGs in September 2006. These
improvements have, on the whole, reinforced
Taiwan’s natural defensive advantages in the face of
Beijing’s continuing build-up.
However, Taiwan has yet to acquire other major end
items offered for sale by the United States in 2001,
namely, Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems, P-3C
Orion anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel electric
submarines. These systems would enable Taiwan to
make necessary improvements to its air and missile
defense and anti-submarine warfare capability. In
the six years since the offer was made, China has
continued to make significant advances, some
unexpected, in the capability areas these systems
are designed to protect against.
China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait
Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long
as it believes trends are advancing toward that goal
and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits.
In the near term, Beijing’s focus is likely one of
preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure
independence while continuing to hold out terms
for peaceful resolution under a “one country, two
systems” framework that would provide Taiwan a
degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification
with the mainland. Beijing is pursuing these goals
through a coercive strategy – with elements of
persuasion – that integrates political, economic,
cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military instruments
of power.
Although Beijing professes peaceful resolution as its
preferred outcome, the PLA’s ongoing deployment
of short range ballistic missiles, enhanced
amphibious warfare capabilities, and modern,
long-range anti-air systems opposite Taiwan are
reminders of Beijing’s refusal to renounce the use
of force.
The sustained military threat to Taiwan serves
as an important backdrop to the overall
campaign of persuasion and coercion. Exercises,
deployments, and media operations all contribute
to an environment of intimidation. For example,

Figure 7. Taiwan Strait SAM coverage. This map depicts notional coverage based on the
range of the Russian-designed S-300PMU2 system equipped with the SA-20 SAM. Actual
coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 31

 in a March 2006 speech before military deputies
to the National People’s Congress plenary,
China’s Minister of National Defense, General
Cao Gangchuan, noted that the Taiwan Strait
situation was “still very grim and complicated,” and
proclaimed that, “all PLA officers and men must
enhance their sense of imminent danger as well as
their sense of mission and sense of responsibility,
lose no time in making military preparations for
military struggle, and resolutely safeguard national
sovereignty and territorial integrity!”
The circumstances in which the mainland has
historically warned it would use force against the
island are not fixed and have evolved over time
in response to Taiwan’s declarations and actions
relating to its political status, changes in PLA
capabilities, and Beijing’s view of other countries’
relations with Taiwan.
These circumstances, or “red lines,” have included:
a formal declaration of Taiwan independence;
undefined moves “toward independence”; foreign
intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs; indefinite
delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue
on unification; Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons; and, internal unrest on Taiwan. Article
8 of the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” states
Beijing would resort to “non-peaceful means” if
“secessionist forces . . . cause the fact of Taiwan’s
secession from China,” if “major incidents entailing
Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if “possibilities for
peaceful reunification” are exhausted.
The ambiguity of these “red-lines” appears
deliberate, allowing Beijing the flexibility to
determine the nature, timing, and form of its
response. Added to this ambiguity are political
factors internal to the regime in Beijing that are
opaque to outsiders.
32 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
Beijing’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan
The PLA’s capabilities to pursue a variety of
courses of action are improving. In the absence of
direct insights into PLA contingency planning, some
analysts hold that Beijing would signal its readiness
to use force imminently in an attempt to menace
Taiwan in accordance with Beijing’s dictates.
Others assess that the likely Chinese course of
action would be designed to create military and
political pressure toward a rapid resolution on
Beijing’s terms before the United States or other
countries would have a chance to respond. If a
quick resolution is not possible, Beijing would seek
to deter U.S. intervention or, failing that, delay such
intervention, defeat it in an asymmetric, limited,
quick war; or, fight it to a standstill and pursue
a protracted conflict. Rough outlines for these
courses of action are presented below.
Limited Force Options. A limited military
campaign could include computer network attacks
against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic
infrastructure to undermine the Taiwan population’s
confidence in its leadership. PLA special operations
forces infiltrated into Taiwan could conduct acts of
economic, political, and military sabotage. Beijing
might also employ SRBM, special operations
forces, and air strikes against air fields, radars,
and communications facilities on Taiwan as “non-
war” uses of force to push the Taiwan leadership
toward accommodation. The apparent belief that
significant kinetic attacks on Taiwan would pass
below the threshold of war underscores the risk
of Beijing making a catastrophic miscalculation
leading to a major unintended military conflict.
Air and Missile Campaign. Surprise SRBM attacks
and precision air strikes against Taiwan’s air defense
system, including air bases, radar sites, missiles,
space assets, and communications facilities could
support a campaign to degrade Taiwan defenses,
 Factors of Deterrence
China is deterred on multiple levels from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not
yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island,
particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed
against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would
also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the
cross-Strait dispute.

Beijing’s calculus would also have to factor in the potential political and economic repercussions
of military conflict with Taiwan. China’s leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic
development. Taiwan is China’s single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended
campaign would wreck Taiwan’s economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs.
International sanctions could further damage Beijing’s economic development. A conflict would also
severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project in the post-Tiananmen years and would
taint Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics, for which China’s leaders would almost certainly face
boycotts and possibly a loss of the games. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland,
a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, China’s leaders recognize
that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship
between the two nations – a result that would not be in China’s interests.

neutralize its military and political leadership, and
rapidly break its will to fight while attempting to
preclude an effective international response.
Blockade. Beijing could threaten or deploy a naval
blockade as a “non-war” pressure tactic in the pre-
hostility phase or as a transition to active conflict.
Beijing could declare that ships en route to Taiwan
ports must stop in mainland ports for inspections
prior to transiting on to Taiwan. It could also
attempt the equivalent of a blockade by declaring
exercise or missile closure areas in approaches
and roadsteads to ports to divert merchant traffic,
as occurred during the 1995-96 missile firings and
live-fire exercises. Chinese doctrine also includes
activities such as air blockades, missile attacks,
and mining or otherwise obstructing harbors and
approaches. More traditional blockades would
have greater impact on Taiwan, but tax PLA
Navy capabilities. Any attempt to limit maritime
traffic to and from Taiwan would likely trigger
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
countervailing international pressure, and risk
military escalation. Such restrictions would have
immediate economic effects, but would take time
to realize decisive political results, diminishing the
ultimate effectiveness and inviting international
reaction.
Amphibious Invasion. Publicly available Chinese
writings offer different strategies for an amphibious
invasion of Taiwan, the most prominent being the
Joint Island Landing Campaign. The Joint Island
Landing Campaign envisions a complex operation
relying on supporting sub-campaigns for logistics,
electronic warfare, and air and naval support,
to break through or circumvent shore defenses,
establish and build a beachhead, and then launch an
attack to split, seize, and occupy the entire island or
key targets.
Amphibious operations are logistics-intensive, and
their success depends upon air and sea superiority
33
 in the vicinity of the operation, the rapid build-
up of supplies and sustainment on shore, and
an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter. An
amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in the
Joint Island Landing Campaign would tax the
capabilities of China’s armed forces and almost
certainly invite international intervention. Add
to these strains the combat attrition of China’s
forces, and the complex tasks of urban warfare and
counterinsurgency – assuming a successful landing
and breakout – and an amphibious invasion of
Taiwan would be a significant political and military
risk for China’s leaders.

34 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

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Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 35

 APPENDIX
China and Taiwan Forces Data

Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

China Taiwan
Total Taiwan Strait Area Total
Personnel (Active) 1.4 million 400,000 130,000
Group Armies 18 8 3
Infantry Divisions 25 9 0
Infantry Brigades 33 12 13
Armor Divisions/Brigades 9 4 0
Armor Brigades 11 4 5
Artillery Divisions 3 3 0
Artillery Brigades 15 5 3+
Marine Brigades 2 2 2
Tanks 7,000 2,700 1,800
Artillery Pieces 11,000 3,200 3,200
Note: The PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry,
armor, and artillery units are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades
deployed throughout the PLA’s seven Military Regions (MRs). A significant
portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the
Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan military regions. Figures for the Taiwan Strait area
do not include the 15th Airborne Corps and garrison units. In 2004, Taiwan began
transforming motorized rifle and armored infantry brigades to mechanized infantry.
Taiwan has seven Defense Commands, three of which have Group Armies. Each
Army contains an Artillery Command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus.

Figure 8. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces

36 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Figure 9. Major Ground Force Units

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 37

 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces
China Taiwan

Within range
Aircraft Total Total
of Taiwan

Fighters 1,550 425 330

Bombers 775 275 0
Transport 450 75 40

Note: The PLAAF and PLA Navy have a total of around 2,325 operational combat aircraft:
air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers.
An additional 470 older fighters and bombers are assigned to PLA flight academies or
R&D. The two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 90 surveillance
and reconnaissance aircraft with photographic, surface search, and airborne early warning
sensors. The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern part of the
country. Currently, more than 700 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan
without refueling.

Figure 10. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces

38 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Figure 11. Major Air Force Units

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 39

 Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces
China Taiwan
East and South Sea
Total Total
Fleets
Destroyers 25 16 4
Frigates 47 40 22
Tank Landing Ships 25 22 12
Medium Landing Ships 25 20 4
Diesel Submarines 53 28 4
Nuclear Submarines 5 0 0
Coastal Patrol (Missile) 41 34 50

Note: The PLA Navy has a large fleet that includes 72 principal combatants, 58 submarines,
some 50 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships, and about 41 coastal missile patrol craft.
In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea Fleets would be expected
to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleet would be
responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coasts, but could provide
mission critical assets to support the other fleets. Taiwan completed delivery of four KIDD-
class DDGs in 2006.

Figure 12. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces

40 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China

 Figure 13. Major Naval Units

Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 41

 China’s Missile Forces
China’s Missile Inventory Launchers/
Estimated Range
Missiles
CSS-4 ICBM 20/20 12,900+ km
CSS-3 ICBM 9-13/16-24 5,470+ km
CSS-2 IRBM 6-10/14-18 2,790+ km
CSS-5 MRBM Mod 1/2 34-38/40-50 1,770+ km
JL-1 SLBM 10-14/10-14 1,770+ km
CSS-6 SRBM 70-80/300-350 600 km
CSS-7 SRBM 110-130/575-625 300 km
JL-2 SLBM DEVELOPMENTAL 8,000+ km
INITIAL THREAT
DF-31 ICBM 7,250+ km
AVAILABILITY
DF-31A ICBM DEVELOPMENTAL 11,270+ km

Note: China’s SRBM force has grown significantly in the past few years. China’s Second
Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; another brigade is deployed with the
PLA ground forces garrisoned in the Nanjing Military Region and a second brigade is forming in
the Guangzhou Military Region. All of these units are deployed to locations near Taiwan.

Figure 14. China’s Missile Forces

China’s Space Assets

Inventory Total
Communications Satellites 14
Navigation Satellites 3
Meteorological Satellites 3
Remote Sensing/Imagery Satellites 6
Scientific Satellites 8
Manned Space System 1
Total 35
Note: China seeks to become a world leader in space development and maintain a leading role in
space launch activity. Beijing’s goal is to place a satellite into orbit “within hours upon request.”
With increasingly capable satellites, China is becoming competitive in some markets, but is not
yet among the world’s technological leaders.
Figure 15. China’s Space Assets

42 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China