INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT OF NEPAL

INTRODUCTION
Nepal has witnessed an outburst of social movements, both violent and non-violent, since its formation,
particularly after the restoration of democracy in 1990. The social movements range from the largely
peaceful identity and gender movements to the violent Maoist movement (also called Maoist rebellion or
insurgency). The historical and contemporary discrimination of various groups by a small ruling elite
group mainly based in the center is one of the underlying causes for the eruption of many social
movements in Nepal. Those collectives with grievances were forced to target the executive at the center.
Exclusion, centralization, as well as rising inequality have contributed to contentious politics in the form
of protests, social movements, and support for rebel movements (the Maoist movement) (Lawoti 2007).
This paper attempts to deal with a subset of socio-political struggles of Nepal, known as identity
politics/movements, and therein the indigenous nationalities movement of Nepal, in particular.

Identity movements express two complementary types of collective demands – the defense of interests
and the promotion of rights of certain groups of individuals who feel discriminated against, and the search
for symbolic recognition by a significant other. Identity movements defend the interests, world visions,
and values of groups of individuals or communities defined by such characteristics as phenotype (or race)
and ethnicity; sex; language; sexual orientation; mythical origins and ancestral territory, in the case of
First Nations in the Americas and the South Pacific; and religion, in the case of certain societies (Langlois
2001). Melucci (1989) even posits that all social movements have an identity dimension (on the link
between social movements and identity, see Jasper 1997; Johnston, Larana and Gusfield 1994).

The indigenous nationalities (adibasi janajati, as the indigenous peoples are generally known in Nepal),
dalit (Hindu lowest caste group, traditional ‘untouchables’) and madhesi (people in the Southern plains
with Indian origin), who collectively form more than two thirds of the population, and women have been
excluded from influential realms of governance and social opportunities in Nepal (Lawoti 2007), wherein
the caste hill Hindu elite, occupying 31% of the population, have overwhelmingly dominated the state,
politics, economy and the society. The small ruling elite, dominated by high-caste Hindus, has
concentrated most of the state power at the center. The demands to end such dominance have fuelled the
identity movements (of indigenous nationalities, dalit and madhesi) and women’s movements, which seek
equitable inclusion in the state, politics, economy, and society. The movements can be analyzed in terms
of their mobilization process and structure, framing process, opportunity, and repertoires of contention for
the movement, and their interactions among the various collective political struggles. This paper attempts
to explore the identity movement of indigenous nationalities of Nepal to understand its significance,
background, reflections on the society, impacts and future expectations, including its criticism, among
others.

The indigenous nationalities movement of Nepal holds a particular significance among the country’s
identity movements for its historical background. Ethnic activism in Nepal holds a long history since the
formation of the country, older than other identity movements. Since the beginning of Gorkha conquest in
1765 that led to the unification of then existent numerous smaller states – mainly based on ethnicity – to
the present day Nepal, subsequently defeated or accommodated groups have led national (as the
indigenous groups were previously known as nationalities) or ethnic mobilization and rebellions against
the state. These mobilization and rebellions have today taken the form of a well-organized broad
indigenous nationalities movement. The history of ethnic activism will be discussed further in the general
background below.
Nepal’s indigenous nationalities movement is also significant for its substantial contributions to the
democratization process of the country, particularly after the reinstitution of democracy in 1990. Since
then identity politics became a major force in Nepali politics (Hangen 2007). Though the current identity
movements emerged from the backdrop of historical and contemporary exclusion, neglect and changing
social and political conditions, the open polity after 1990 facilitated the process by providing space for
mobilization. An open polity can encounter various forms of collective mobilization and conflict,
especially if its structures and norms, both traditional and modern, privilege some groups while
disadvantaging others.

Democratization of a polity then could broadly mean extending the political rights and civil liberties to
more citizens as well as increasing the responsiveness of rulers. In McAdam and colleagues’ (2001: 266)
words, democratization ‘means any net shift toward citizenship, breadth of citizenship, equality of
citizenship, binding consultation, and protection.’ In the context of Nepal, democratization could mean,
among other things, expanding and deepening democracy by reforming the polity to include the
traditionally excluded groups and extending civil liberties and political rights to them. Social movements
can contribute toward achieving those objectives.

The paper thus will intend to explore the importance of the indigenous nationalities movement, facilitated
by a democratic dispensation, towards strengthening the democracy. This study will try to demonstrate
that the changes Nepal’s indigenous nationalities movement seeks are necessary for further
democratization of the country: a redistribution and wider sharing of political power and the right to the
freedom of expression of political and cultural diversity. It will analyze the activities that ethnic
organizations have undertaken and the political meanings and effects of these activities.

Considered as a great achievement, the indigenous nationalities movement has been significant to change
the political discourse in Nepal for a dramatic shift in how the state and the politically dominant groups
regard ethnic political demands. Historically, the state has either viewed these demands as subversive or
dismissed them as peripheral to the real problems of the country. From the time of its establishment,
throughout authoritarian party-less Panchayat regime (1962-90) particularly and most of the 1990s,
suggestions regarding existence of ethnic inequality were considered politically contentious. The
Panchayat system promoted the “myth of inter-group harmony”, the idea that conflicts between Nepal’s
myriad ethnic groups were non-existent (Bhattachan 1995). It maintained the state had celebrated cultural
pluralism from inception, yet at the same time it pursued strategies of assimilation and homogenization in
its nation-building efforts. Ethnic organizations were perceived as threat to ethnic harmony and
democracy because they raised issues that were divisive or “communal”. Although ethnic demands were
once considered radical and illegitimate, they are now accepted as legitimate political concerns. The
current debates about the abolition of the monarchy and the restructuring of the state originated with
ethnic activists.

Also the indigenous nationalities movement is arguably the most developed identity movement in the
country with a stronger network of organizations and that has advanced its demands in a more coherent
fashion than Dalit and Madhesi movements. This has provided greater recognition the movement greater
recognition by the state and more scholarships. The movement has thus also been crucial for its impact on
those movements.

Nevertheless, one may also argue whether these identity movements have promoted or hindered the
democratization process, which had provided space for them. Often the Nepali state and the fledgling
democracy appeared to be overwhelmed by those activities. Whether the fundamental democratic rights to
mobilize dissent and protest work against new democracies is another question. These issues also feature
in the indigenous nationalities movement of Nepal. Previously, the associations of different ethnic groups
have highlighted primarily cultural and political issues while their community members are concerned
about economic opportunities as well. With transformations in the state and development of the
movement, the demands have evolved to increase the social, economic, and political power of these
people and end the dominance of the high-caste Hindus in the state. Ethnic groups have viewed right to
self determination as guaranteed in international standards regarding indigenous rights as a means to
achieve those objectives. For this, federalism has been one of the core demands of the indigenous
nationalities movement, as well as of the Madhesi movement. The movement regards federalism as the
best way to grant ethnic autonomy to these groups, enabling them to exercise self-determination, gain
adequate representation in political systems, and support their own cultural traditions. While federalism is
widely supported among indigenous nationalities, madhesi activists and progressive (or some may call
them radical) political groups and sections of society, it has also become the major point of contention
between the indigenous nationalities movement and traditional political and social groups (ruling elite
groups that are argued to be favoring status quo). Thus, it can be said that the general view towards the
indigenous nationalities movement is divided mainly in regards to these political issues.

Hence, although identity movements have succeeded in changing the political discourse, they are
struggling to get political leaders to take concrete steps to end ethnic inequality. These movements seek to
create a more inclusive and representative polity. If these changes are not made, a large section of the
population will remain excluded from political processes and may seek to address their grievances outside
the structure of the state. The identity movements till now have not demanded secession, interpreting self-
determination rights as a demand for autonomy. Till now, national/ethnic movements have not launched
violent rebellions except for the Khambuwan National Front (KNF), now Kirat Workers’ Party (see
Sharma 2002, Shrestha 2004 for details on KNF; though various minor ethnic outfits have emerged
recently, their political purposes are not clear). Without serious efforts to resolve ethnic inequality,
conflicts centered on ethnicity, rather than class, are likely to continue in Nepal.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Ethnic Inequality in Nepal

Scholars have lamented that even after Nepal has been brought together territorially by the conquest for
more than two centuries now, it has not been unified psychologically and economically even after more
than two centuries (Gurung 2003). This is partly because the Nepali state was captured and has been
exploited by a small elite castes group headed by the King since its formation. The ruling group defined
the rights and duties of citizens toward the state by conflating it with its own interests and adopting
political institutions that concentrated power within the group. This disjuncture between the state and
society is the underlying cause for the eruption of many of the contentious activities in present day Nepal
(Lawoti 2007).

Ethnic inequality began when indigenous nationalities were incorporated in state-building process on
unequal terms. They were burdened by taxes and labor obligations, and often lost land to high-caste
Hindus (Hangen 2007). The historical discrimination and exclusion are rooted in the caste based Hindu
hierarchical order. The Civil Code introduced in 1854 codified the top positions of Bahun and Chhetri in
the society and the elite have further strengthened their position in the state and society since then. Till the
abolishment of the caste system in 1963, other groups were officially marginalized in the legal and social
systems. However, in spite of the judicial end to the caste system, the then partyless Panchayat system
undermined different native languages, religions and cultures through its assimilation (homogenization)
policies. It promoted one religion, language and values in a multicultural society based on “high caste hill
Hindu” culture speaking Nepali language on the pretension of modernization and development.
This was continued, though to a lesser extent, even in the post 1990 multi-party democratic period.
Nevertheless, even though 1990 ushered in extensive democratic rights, the marginalized ethnic groups
continued to face cultural discrimination and political exclusion. The 1990 Constitution defined the
Kingdom as ‘multiethnic, multilingual’ but the other articles and state institutions it adopted
discriminated against marginalized ethnic and caste groups (Gurung et al. 2000). Not only was the state
declared Hindu kingdom by the Constitution but the native languages and different cultures of indigenous
nationalities incurred unequal treatment by the state. Ethnic parties were banned and minority rights were
not recognized or protected. The indigenous nationalities faced many other forms of legal and social
discrimination (on the emergence and persistence of Ethnic Inequality, see Hangen 2007). The post-1990
indigenous nationalities movement of Nepal will be discussed in the following chapters in details while
the most recent developments (after 2006) will be analyzed in the impacts of the movement.

History of Ethnic Activism in Nepal

Various forms of social and political organizing and dissent by indigenous ethnic groups provide
evidence of a long history of conflict between them and the Nepali state. The table below attempts to list
some of the collective contentions and rebellions from 1770 onwards – mainly after the beginning of the
Gorkha conquest in 1765. The events are included on the condition that large number of people
participated in those collective public political struggles or rebellions that resulted into suppression and
executions.

Identity-based ethnic contentious activities in Nepal before 1990 (Lawoti 2007)

Years Event Locality/region and remark
1770 Ten Limbuwan Rebellion and Pallo Kirant (Far East)
Expulsion
1773-81 Majh Kirant Rebellion Dudhkosi-Arun region
1778 Limbu language repression Pallo Kirant
1792-93 Nepal-China War: Limbus and Bhotes Arun-Tista (Limbus) & Nuwakot (Bhotes)
assist China
1793 Tamang (Murmi) rebellion Nuwakot
1790s Jumla Rebellion led by Sobhan Shahi Jumla
1808 Khambu Rebellion (2 executed, Bhojpur
property confiscated of 15)
1858 Sukhdev Gurung Rebellion (killed Lamjung
after 17 years in jail)
1867 Dashain Boycott (Ramlihang & Dhankuta
Ridima killed)
1870 Limbu language repression (Sirithebe Pallo Kirant
exiled)
1876 Lakhan Thapa Magar rebellion (7 Gorkha
hanged)
1877 Supati Gurung rebellion Gorkha (execution at Tundikhel)
1908 Atal Rai, Bharatsing Rai, Kanthabir Manjh Kirant
Rai executed
1925 Chiring Norbu Lama & 4 Buddhist Patan
monks expelled
1926 Nepal Bhasa Sahitya Mandal (Newar Calcutta
language movement)
1927 Buddhists monk expelled Kathmandu
1941 4 rebels given capital punishment (3 Kathmandu
 Newars)
1950-51 Kiranti movement Majh and Pallo Kirant (East)
1956 Movement against making Nepali the Tarai
only language of instruction
1961 Tamang rebellion Nuwakot
1964 Kirant movement against elimination Eastern hills
of Kipat (indigenous land ownership)
1979 Nepal Bhasa Manka Khalah (The Kathmandu, large public rallies etc. organized
Association of Nepal Bhasa Speakers)
established

At the beginning some of these rebellions were led by the recently defeated or accommodated groups. For
instance, after repeated defeats of the advancing Gorkha troops, the Limbus of East Nepal were brought
into the Gorkha Kingdom under a treaty that provided them with political, economic, and judicial
autonomy. However, as the Gorkhali state consolidated, it began to undermine the Limbus’ autonomy.
The Limbus, in various instances, resisted the erosion of their autonomy. Beginning in the 1900s, Limbus
have struggled against the state to retain their rights to their ancestral lands (Caplan 1970; Regmi 1976).
In the early 1950s, there were acts of violence against Bahuns in eastern Nepal (Caplan 1970); and in
1959, Tamangs in two districts rebelled against Bahun moneylenders and landowners, accusing them of
taking their lands through unfair practices. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all the events. It
will mainly focus on the post-1990 indigenous nationalities’ identity movement.

Prior to 1990, ethnic political demands were articulated primarily through social organizations that
focused on cultural preservation and revitalization. Those organizations were involved in direct political
action only periodically, using the political opportunities when the state became temporarily more
democratic during the 1950s and then in 1979 (Hangen 2007). It was in the 1950s when the indigenous
nationalities movement began organizing to become a major political force after 1990. Many
organizations that have played a key role in post-1990 ethnic movement were formed between 1951 and
1960, when the Ranas lost power and Nepal had its first brief experience with multiparty democracy only
to be snatched away again by the then King. In the period, those organizations sought to reform their own
communities rather than the state.

The Panchayat system introduced in 1962 also curtailed ethnic activism as overt forms of political
expression other than within state-sponsored organizations. However, in 1979, leading up to a referendum
to determine whether the Nepalese people wanted to continue the Panchayat system or institute a
multiparty system, the state allowed political parties and organizations to be openly active. Though the
referendum called for continuing Panchayat, thus the freedom was short-lived, ethnic activity increased
during this time with the establishment of more organizations that became more political, several of
which continued throughout the 1980s. Nevertheless, only after 1990s, such political activities became
more pronounced, utilizing the space provided by the open polity.

Framing the post-1990 Political Opportunities

Over the course of time, the expression of ethnic activism expanded and contracted as the legal forms of
political expression changed. Gamson and Meyer (1996) explained this in framing political opportunity as
need to recognize both the conditions under which movements generally rise and decline and the ways in
which movements can maximize their influence within a given context. The post-1990 democratic era
marked the first time that ethnic activism emerged as a political force that could put pressure on the state.
The open polity facilitated by the increasingly democratic political system after 1990, what Gamson and
Meyer (1996) view as volatility in political opportunities, provided space for mobilization and ethnic
organizing became more coherent and open than in the past. They began to organize and make demands
upon the state. If the polity had been responsive and met some of the progressive demands, it could have
contributed in the deepening and consolidation of democracy. However, when the polity did not respond,
the neglect led to alienation of the movement participants. Some of the activists began employing more
coercive methods such collective public protests as shutdowns, strikes, traffic-blockades, etc while with
high alienation, a few also turned violent against the government or in support of rebel movements
(Lawoti 2007). The various aspects of post-1990 indigenous nationalities movement are analyzed in
details in the following chapters.

ISSUES OF THE INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT AFTER 1990

Diverse organizations of the indigenous nationalities movement share a key set of issues in two
interrelated categories: cultural politics and political demands (Hangen 2007). The earlier phases of the
movement emphasized cultural politics that involved transforming the cultural practices and identities of
groups of people. It targets society, yet feeds back into demands on the state to recognize and support
cultural diversity through a range of activities. The activities have included rejection of state imposed
high caste Hindu culture through boycott of major Hindu festival, among others. This accompanied by
efforts to redefine the Nepali nation through revival of own distinct histories, languages, religions and
other practices, such as adopting Buddhism or other native religions, promoting education of mother
tongues, using ethnic calendrical systems and observing ethnic festivals has become a major movement
activity.

Nevertheless, the movement has subsequently in the later stages focused explicitly on political demands.
This shift has occurred largely as a result of the changing political context: with the rise of the Maoist
movement in 1996, previously radical political ideas and strategies have been mainstreamed in greater
extent. The political demands include the call to change the state so that it is more inclusive and
representative of the population and more responsive to all citizens’ needs. This requires ending the high-
caste Hindu dominance of the state, thus the movement demands a new constitution and the restructuring
of the state through the establishment of a federal system to enable ethnic autonomy, reservations for
indigenous peoples in the government and other state-sponsored institutions, and the elimination or
reduction of the power of the Hindu monarchy. These changes would promote the capacity of indigenous
nationalities to determine their own path of development and their own identities.

Redefining the national identity of the state so that it reflects the cultural diversity of the population is
another core political demand of the movement. Indigenous nationalities groups propose that Nepal
should be a secular state rather than a Hindu state, and that national symbols such as the national dress,
holidays, anthem, and calendar should not be drawn exclusively from the high-caste Hindu culture.

While 1990 movement was focused on language, religion and culture, the current emphasis is on the right
to self-determination and ethnic autonomy, particularly after the 2006 democracy movement that turned
Nepal into a federal republic. This was centrally derived from the prominence of self-determination right
in the international indigenous movement and communist ideology. Right to self determination has been
emphasized as the mean to achieve ethnic autonomy over political and other aspects of life. The
movement could cash in on this wave of the international indigenous movement through creation of an
alternative “collective identity” for the heterogeneous group and the significant movement organizations.

The Construction of a Collective Identity

A collective identity created for diverse ethnic groups as “indigenous nationalities” has been an important
means of organizing those various minority groups. This provided these groups a recognized coalition
against the powerful state to take action to define and resolve common problems. The oppositional
relationship to the domination of the state by high-caste groups fifty-nine or so ethnic groups that
compose this category constitute a discrete section of Nepali society. The oppositional relationship of
these groups to the domination of the state by high-caste groups provided the primary common ground.
This shared identity was established by the very 1854 Civil Code that corralled many of these groups to a
lower caste label. These groups have “their own distinct tradition and original linguistic and cultural
traditions” (NEFIN 1990) and share no particular language, religion or culture.

This concept of “indigenous peoples”, when became a prominent way of mobilizing support for ethnic
political issues in the international arena in the 1990s, gained a much wider usage. Ethnic groups began to
emphasize their indigenous identity to trade in on the international initiatives to make the discourse of
indigenous rights a viable way for small marginalized native groups to claim rights within states. In
addition to bringing international recognition to Nepal’s indigenous nationalities, this notion became a
powerful tool to unify a heterogeneous population, excluding Hindu caste groups, by emphasizing their
common historical relationship to the land of Nepal. However, the movement’s representation of these
ethnic groups as indigenous nationalities has also been contentious to some extent on the grounds that
other groups have claimed indigeneity given Nepal’s complex history of migration while there is some
debate within the indigenous nationalities themselves about indigeneity of some of the groups. This will
be discussed in the criticisms of the movement.

As a result of the pressure of the indigenous nationalities movement to create institutions to address
ethnic issues and signalize the legitimization of ethnic politics, the government in 2002 established an
official definition of indigenous nationalities through the National Foundation for the Development of
Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN). It listed the fifty-nine groups on its official schedule of indigenous
nationalities (NFDIN 2003). But again conflict has emerged over boundaries of ethnic categories and over
the precise number of ethnic groups.

While indigenous nationalities has been the dominant way of framing a collective identity, among other
efforts to represent this identity in racial terms, it is worth mentioning a relatively minor discourse of an
ethnic political party, Mongol National Organization (MNO). MNO explicitly rejects the notion of
“nationalities” and instead calls this same group of peoples “Mongols” emphasizing a racial identity
against the Aryans, or caste Hindus (Hangen 2005). Whether this idea will be successful in the future is to
be seen. Nevertheless, the important contribution of MNO as a movement organization will be discussed
below.

Organizations within the Indigenous Nationalities Movement

Three main types of organizations participate in this movement: indigenous peoples’ organizations
representing (IPOs) single ethnic groups, a federation of these organizations called the Nepal Federation
of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN, set up in 1990) and the ethnic political parties. These organizations
bring in members from marginalized groups as a result of “modernization”; groups sensitive to modern
problems, herein human rights of indigenous peoples; represent middle class as well as intellectuals
(Klandermans and Tarrow 1988) of trans-class background of participants and form decentralized,
segmented and diffused organization (Johnston, Larana and Gusfield 1994).

NEFIN, the dominant voice of the movement, and the IPOs initially focused on cultural revitalization, yet
they have increasingly advanced political demands since 1990 and largely on issues such as right to self-
determination and federal state after 2006. For example, during the 1990 Constitution drafting, NEFIN
made recommendations to the Constitution Commission; later it opposed government initiatives to make
Sanskrit languages compulsory part of school curriculum while since 1992 it continuously lobbied for
policy reform demands, including declaring Nepal secular state, constitutional reforms, linguistic
equality, ratification of international conventions on indigenous peoples, federal governance system,
among others (Tamang 2005).

While these organizations are slowly becoming more representative of the entire population of indigenous
nationalities, as women and smaller ethnic groups become more active and these organizations expand
work in rural areas, they have also made considerable growth in regards to resource mobilization.
Originally, these organizations’ modest expenditures were funded through donations of time and money
from individuals (members of ethnic groups in case of indigenous peoples’ organization). This still
continues to be the major basis of resources for the movement with more varied sources now like ethnic
organizations of migrants abroad and social (I)NGOs, among others. Sources of funding for NEFIN
activities have expanded dramatically since the late 1990s. Government funding for NEFIN became
available after 1997 and international donors also began supporting indigenous peoples’ organizations
since 2000. Whether the movement’s extension into these powerful arenas will limit its capacity to define
its own goals remains a concern. Cultural programs on their ethnic festivals and other fundraising
programs are some sources of funding of grassroots organizations. This has provided international
recognition to the issues of indigenous nationalities movement; however, unlike the mainstream NGOs of
Nepal, the indigenous nationalities movement has been able not to be diverted from its core issues for the
sake of funding.

In the meantime, ethnic political parties have been marginal in the movement, partly because explicitly
ethnic parties were banned till the 2007 interim constitution. Though some parties like Rastriya Janamukti
Party (initially Rastriya Janajati Mukti Morcha with the term “Janajati or indigenous” in its name) were
established with broader agenda to represent oppressed peoples and had participated in parliamentary
elections, they had not won any seat in the parliament till then. Yet then another party, the Mongol
National Organization (MNO) at least had won seats in village governments in an eastern district in the
1994 elections. It was a much smaller party that participated in elections despite lacking registration from
the Election Commission. It had threatened to take over the state by armed revolution if it could not gain
power through elections and have been aimed at restructuring of Nepal in federation of states where
ethnic languages are used with a true democracy without monarchy, a buttress of Hindu dominance. It
also raised awareness about ethnic issues in some rural areas where other ethnic organizations were not as
active (Hangen 2001).

Besides these ethnic parties, mainstream parties have mixed record on ethnic issues. Immediately after
1990, these parties failed to address ethnic grievances (Bhattachan 1995) but they gradually began to deal
with these issues through their party manifestos, other policy documents and specific party wings.
Overall, however, these mainstream parties have done little to end ethnic inequality. Nevertheless, a total
of fifteen regional liberation fronts were set up by 2005 which have boycotted elects, arguing that ethnic
group should control a region of the country. Initially they existed largely by virtue of their vocal leaders
and the occasional pamphlets they produced. Some of these organizations, however, became aligned with
the Maoist revolution, as discussed further below.

The Maoists and the Indigenous Nationalities Movement

These two movements have a complex, mutually influential relationship. Many indigenous nationalities
(and other marginalized groups) participated in the decade-long Maoist insurgency while the Maoists
have included many issues of indigenous nationalities movement, inter alia, ending high-caste Hindu
dominance, demands of secular state and language rights and ethnic groups’ right to self determination
shortly before launching its war in 1996 and have raised ethnic issues with more force than other political
parties. This alliance can be looked at close proximity with what Johnston, Larana and Gusfield (1994)
suggest about identity politics’ distrust in traditional paths of participation such as parties and interest
groups and their search for alternative ways (for the preference of direct participation). Though they have
implied that such new movements often adopt radical tactics of protest challenging established norms like
non-violent civil disobedience, some parts of the indigenous nationalities movement here seem to have
opted for violent rebellion in association with the Maoists (KNF, mentioned above in this paper, provides
an example of the case).

The Maoists, in their movement, announced plans to form autonomous regions in Nepal that would give
ethnic groups the right to self –determination (Sharma 2002) and also established several ethnic liberation
fronts while some other ethnic fronts also have subsequently joined the Maoists in their insurgency. The
Maoist’s direct approach to address ethnic inequality may have appealed to appealed to indigenous
peoples (Lawoti 2005) that seeks immediate political and economic change through the use of violence.
The Maoists have so far pressured the political center to take ethnic demands more seriously. However,
indigenous nationalities leaders question whether the Maoists will continue to prioritize ethnic issues,
particularly after the changes of 2006.

2006 DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PEACE PROCESS –

IMPACTS OF THE INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT
The relative lack of political opportunities during the royal takeovers of the country’s executive powers
for brief periods in 2002 and 2005 pushed the political demands of the indigenous nationalities movement
to a backburner over democratic issues to some extent. However, after the April 2006 people’s uprising,
the political space for indigenous nationalities movement became wider than ever. The indigenous
nationalities movement, during the periods of royal rule, also shifted its strategies in the changing
political climate. This is partly attributed to the interests of NEFIN’s political leadership in the period
whereas it also reflects its shift from a lobbying group in the 1990s to more of a political force by then.

In 2004, NEFIN staged a street demonstration involving 10,000 people to protest the 2002 royal takeover
while it also coordinated with the political parties during the 2006 movement for restoration of democracy
(supported by the Maoists) to participate in many rallies and marches in defiance of curfew (Tamang
2005). NEFIN also protested outside the venue of first meeting of reinstated parliament to demand an
unconditional constituent assembly and a secular state (Ibid.). By engaging in these protests, the
organization demonstrated that it is willing to act as a political force to create changes in the state. Thus,
the indigenous nationalities movement has continuously built upon mobilizing the volatile elements of
political opportunities, herein shift in alliances (the political parties and Maoists) and breakdown of social
control and elite unity (Gamson and Meyer 1996) to maximize its influence in given context.

Since April 2006, the indigenous nationalities movement has come closer to seeing its goals realized as
mainstream political discourse increasingly addresses issues that the movement has raised. During the
nineteen-day popular movement that month, which forced the king to relinquish his control of the
government and reinstate the parliament that he dissolved in 2002, people across the country demanded
changes that once only radical ethnic and leftist political groups had voiced: the end of the monarchy, a
secular state, and a new constitution. The reinstated parliament repealed the political power of the
monarchy, declared the country a secular state and pledged to hold Constituent Assembly elections in
May 2006. Though Maoists are largely accredited for these innovations and the sweeping changes the
state is embarking upon, the history of the indigenous nationalities movement provides evidence for its
role in these transformations (as discussed above Maoists adopted ethnic concerns only in 1996, well after
the indigenous nationalities movement was in full swing).
The subsequent 2006 peace agreement between the Maoists and interim government and the 2007 interim
constitution addressed some ethnic issues, yet indigenous nationalities have rejected these documents for
failing to fulfill their demands for ethnic federalism and proportional representation. They have not been
well represented in the decision making process yet. The failure of the peace accord to even include the
term “indigenous nationalities” suggested that the signing parties (mainstream political parties) do not
respect and recognize the identity. Though the interim constitution upholds many of the decisions of the
peace accord and represents a significant advance over the 1990 constitution, it failed to meet the
demands of the indigenous nationalities. Aside from the statement that Nepal is a secular state, it does not
include any of the demands of indigenous nationalities movement. The issues regarding provisions
guaranteeing the right to use ethnic languages in education and government offices, the restructuring of
the state into ethnic and regional autonomous regions, the right to ethnic self-determination, and
proportional representation for indigenous nationalities in all sectors of the state were left to be resolved
by the constituent assembly (Hangen 2007).

Since issuing the constitution, the interim government faced the most sustained protests by marginalized
ethnic groups in the country’s history. Expressing their dissatisfaction with the Interim Constitution,
NEFIN launched a series of general strikes and other protests in the capital and in district centers since
January 2007. The talks held between NEFIN and the interim government around four minimum demands
of ethnicity-based proportional representation in the constituent assembly elections, an immediate
decision on how a federal system would be set up, linguistic freedom and a new national emblem were
inconclusive. NEFIN pressed forward with a new series of protests, largely peaceful but it tended to turn
to more coercive forms of political action.

At the same time, the Madhesi movement’s response to the Interim Constitution was equally critical and
their protests in the south turned violent, resulting attention from the center. Regional ethnic groupings
went on for their own agitation against the government, through politically stronger coalitions with other
marginalized groups, to advance their specific ethnic interests along the broader demands. While it could
not be termed as deviation from indigenous nationalities movement, NEFIN’s primary role was pushed to
the backdrop. In the run-up to the Constituent Assembly Elections, the Interim Government signed
various agreements with the Madhesi movement and those groups addressing some of their demands, or
assurances thereof, including commitment to abolition of monarchy, provision for ethnicity-based
federalism after study through a commission and arrangements for proportional representation, among
others.

The 2008 elections to Constituent Assembly brought Maoists as the largest political group from the
elections. The first sitting of the Assembly declared the country a federal republic. The Interim
Constitution had lifted the barring on ethnic political parties and some ethnic parties have been
represented in the Constituent Assembly. Dual system of election through proportional representation also
increased number of parliamentarians belonging to indigenous nationalities to 33 percent, along with
better representation of other marginalized groups than in previous parliaments. The ongoing
constitutional debate has made this a critical period in Nepal wherein diverse ethnic nationalities that have
been neglected over the years are eager to be heard and to benefit from the changes and the restructuring
of the state.

However, two years passed the constitution writing process started but has fallen back in the face of
various political differences. The drafts of various thematic committees for the new constitution have
partially addressed demands of the indigenous nationalities movement, including in regards to right to
self-determination, but they are yet to be finalized and far from coming into effect to date. The
proportional representation of indigenous nationalities and other marginalized groups in decision-making
processes is unseen so far. Indigenous movement participants are still wary of fulfillment of their
demands, mainly ethnic federalism and proportional representation and hence have been continuously
active in various forms of non-violent contentious activities such as sit-ins outside the constituent
assembly, petitions, among others while some parts of the movement have continued with coercive forms
of contentious activities such as shutdowns and violent rebellion in some parts too. Scholarships on the
post-Constituent Assembly are relatively scarce.

The sole significantly concrete response of the state so far to basic demands of the indigenous
nationalities movement can be the establishment of the NFDIN to recognize ethnic grievances as
legitimate political concerns. Composed of representatives from NEFIN’s member organizations and the
government, the Foundation has performed a wide range of activities to achieve its goals, including
supporting research about indigenous nationalities, participating in cultural preservation activities, and
performing development activities, such as generating income (Onta 2005). It however has not been able
to become fully effective due to political instability and lack of adequate budget. Nevertheless, the history
of previous government bodies on ethnic issues shows that the government uses these bodies “to ward off
popular demands” (Tamang 2005) while largely ignoring their recommendations or even acting against
them. For example, in 1994, the National Languages Policy and Recommendation Commission,
recommended the state should adopt three-language policy, but the government banned use of Maithili
and Newari in municipal governments (Ibid.). The government policies since 1992 have increasingly
addressed the indigenous nationalities issues, but the fulfillment of these plans is rare.

In the meantime, as mentioned earlier, international funding to the ethnic organizations has also recently
started though later than that for other NGOs. This may be attributed to the inconsideration of
international organizations towards importance of ethnic inequality in planning projects (Hangen 2007).
High-caste Hindus who represent the state also discouraged donors from focusing on ethnic inequality
(Bhattachan 2001). Nevertheless, after the legalization of ethnic politics in Nepal and development of new
paradigm of “social inclusion”, several ethnic organizations began receiving funds from international
donors, mainly for empowerment and capacity/institution building activities.

FUTURE OF THE INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT

The current transitional phase of the country provides a situation of indecision wherein the indigenous
nationalities movement can only wait and watch. The movement is continuing to draw attention to its
issues. The response strategy of the state seems to be one that of postponement. The interim government,
including the Maoists, decided that these issues should be determined by the Constituent Assembly. Now,
the thematic draft of the Constituent Assembly provides for ethnic federalism, the parties have again
agreed to form another commission for the purpose. The core demands of the movement have thus far
been met with assurances and only that.

The implementation of these demands posits a number of challenges not only from the state, as described
above, but from other dominant social groups as well – that are increasingly becoming more cautious of
the changing context and do not agree with the political agenda of the movement. The efforts to
incorporate this agenda into the structure and policies of the state look highly likely to be met with stern
resistance by those groups. This was evident in the backlash to the May 2006 parliament’s declaration of
Nepal as a secular state: Hindu religious organizations, led by the World Hindu Federation, held several
days of protests and strikes in opposition of the move. Many high-caste Hindus from the hills are unlikely
to support the plan of ethnic federalism, particularly as most draft proposals of new constitution have not
allotted them a state. Particularly, after the abolition of monarchy, various minor outfits have also been
waging violence for revival of monarchy, Hindu state and against federalism.

If ethnic demands are not met, further violence is possible while the major indigenous nationalities
movement organizations shall continue in a largely peaceful manner. The success of the Maoists in
coming to share power in the government after staging a violent revolution has set a dangerous precedent:
radical, underrepresented political groups will feel they can gain attention and achieve their political goals
through violence. Inspired by Maoists, small political organizations have increasingly engaged in or
threatened to adopt violence. KNF, as mentioned earlier, provides a good example. The movement may
join the Madhesi organizations in using violence to achieve their goals.

CRITICISM OF THE INDIGENOUS NATIONALITIES MOVEMENT

Federalism has been the main contentious issue of the indigenous nationalities movement. While the idea
of federalism is widely supported to achieve the goal of decentralization, the critiques of indigenous
nationalities movement advocate administrative rather than ethnic federalism. It is unlikely that
indigenous nationalities (including Madhesi movement) would accept this form of federalism, however,
as it “will not address the ethnic aspirations” (Lawoti 2005). Besides, within the movement itself, there is
a general consent that with such a large number of ethnic groups, wherein many groups are mainly only
the sub-groups of larger groups, ethnic federalism might is almost impossible, unless also based on
language, historical relationship with the land and majority in population.

The movement’s representation of these ethnic groups as indigenous nationalities has also been
contentious. High-caste Hindus and some other people argue that everyone in Nepal is indigenous
because the country was settled in waves of migration (Bhattachan 1995). There is also some debate
about whether all groups that fall under the category of indigenous nationalities are truly indigenous;
some ethnic groups in the mountain region arrived relatively recently (Tamang 2005). Thus, more in-
depth study on these groups is required to form a collective identity. Multiple organizations representing a
single ethnic group within the movement posit the challenge of making divisions within the group that
may weaken the overall movement.

Leaders in the indigenous nationalities movement should increase the representation of women and
marginal indigenous nationalities groups within their main organizations to advance their agenda of
creating a more inclusive state. In addition, indigenous nationalities should work in coalition with Dalits,
Madhesis, and other marginalized groups in order to ensure that politics and institutions adopted by the
state are as inclusive as possible. The indigenous nationalities movement and Dalit and Madhesi
movements all view domination of the state by high-caste Hindus as a problem. However, activists in
these movements have rarely emphasized connections between or sought common solutions to their
problems, and coordinated political action has been limited. Collaboration has not been adequately
pursued, but it will be key in bringing long-term stability to the country.

CONCLUSION
The indigenous nationalities movement that began organizing in the 1950s and became a major force after
1990 thus far has made substantial contribution to the democratization process of Nepal. Although ethnic
activism has been viewed to as destabilizing and divisive, the indigenous nationalities movement has
abided by the norms of democratic political action: they have worked within the framework of the
democratic state, making demands peacefully rather than through armed revolution as the Maoists did.
Through the IPOs and ethnic parties, which provided new avenues for political participation, the
movement has mobilized segments of the society that are underrepresented in the political sphere. Unlike
most of the NGOs that proliferated after 1990, ethnic organizations did not cater to the prerogatives of
international donors. Rather, the ethnic political agenda was defined from within Nepal.

Indigenous nationalities activists have worked to create a more democratic system by transforming the
dominant political discourse, creating awareness of ethnic issues in society, pressuring the state into
addressing ethnic inequality. It has challenged restrictions that remained in the post-1990 system, such as
limitations on ethnic parties and lack of religious freedom. The movement has also implemented some
new rights that were granted in the 1990 Constitution (and have been continued in the Interim
Constitution) but were not supported by state programs, such as the right to primary education in one’s
mother tongue. The political changes the movement demands, a redistribution and wider sharing of power
and the freedom of express political and cultural diversity, are necessary for further democratization.

The movement should continue with its rightful issues and further build and strengthen coalitions with
other marginalized groups to identity common grounds and achieve their political demands. The state
should adopt policies that create an inclusive political system to create political stability and strengthen
democracy. Indigenous nationalities must be adequately represented in all decision-making bodies,
through appointments, reservations, or a proportional electoral system. A proportional election system
would ensure that small parties are give a voice in the legal political system and are dissuaded from taking
up arms. The diversity of Nepal should be recognized in representations of the national identity.
References

Bhattachan, Krishna. 1995. “Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment: An Emerging Paradigm in Nepal.” In

Kumar, D., ed. 1995. State, Leadership and Politics in Nepal. Kathmandu: Center for Nepal and Asian
Studies, Tribhuvan University.

--. 2001. “(I)NGOs and Disadvantaged Groups in Nepal.” IN Bhattachan, K., D.R. Dahal, S. Rana, J.
Gyawali, M.B. Basnet, K.R. Bhusal, and R.R. Pokharel, eds, 2001, NGO, Civil Society and Government
in Nepal, Kirtipur: Central Department of Sociology and Anthropology: Tribhuvan University.

--. 2003. Indigenous Nationalities & Minorities of Nepal. A Final Report submitted to the Minority Rights
Group (MRG) International. London: Minority Rights Group (MRG) International.

Caplan, Lionel. 1970. Land and Social Change in East Nepal. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Gamson, William and David Meyer. 1996. "Framing Political Opportunity." Pp. 275-290 in Comparative
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing,
edited by M. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gurung, Harka. 2003. Trident and Thunderbolt: Cultural Dynamics in Nepalese Politics. Paper read at
The Transformation Agenda: Inclusion in Nepali Democracy, at Kathmandu.

Gurung, Harka, Malla K. Sunder, Krishna Bhattachan, and Om Gurung, eds. 2000. Janajati Bikasko Jukti
(Ideas for Nationalities' Development). Kathmandu: Janajati Bikash Samanoya Kendra.

Hangen, Susan. 2001. Debating Democracy at the Margins:The Mongol National Organization in East
Nepal. Kathmandu: Himalayan Research Bulletin XXI (1)

--. 2005. “Race and the Politics of Identity in Nepal.” Ethnology 44(1): 49-64

--. 2007. Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension. Washington: East-West Center.

Johnston, Hank, Enrique Larana and Joseph R Gusfield (eds). 1994. New social movements: From
Ideology to Identity. Texas: Texas University Press.

Klandermans, Bert and Sydney Tarrow. 1988. From Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movements
Across Cultures. Greenwich: International Social Movement Research I.

Langlois, Simon. 2001. Identity Movements. Prepared for Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds),
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier (aut 2001)

Lawoti, Mahendra. 2005. Towards a Democratic Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a
Multicultural Society. Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage Publications.

--. 2007. “Contentious Politics in Democratising Nepal”, Chapter One in Contentious Politics and
Democratisation in Nepal, M. Lawoti, ed., Sage Publications.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of Contention: Cambridge
University Press.
Melucci, Alberto. 1989. Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in
Contemporary Society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

NEFIN. 1990. Nepal Janajati Mahasangh ko Bidhan 2047 (Nepal Federation of Nationalities
Constitution 2047). Kathmandu: Nepal Janajati Mahasangh.

NFDIN. 2003. National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN): An

Introduction. Kathmandu: National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities.

Onta, Pratyoush. 1996. “Ambivalence Denied: The Making of Rastriya Itihas in Pachayat Era
Textbooks.” Contributions to Nepalese Studies 23(1): 213-54.

Regmi, Mahesh Chandra. 1976. Landownership in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rucht, Dieter. 1988. Themes, logics, and arenas of social movements: A structural approach.
International Social Movement Research.

Sharma, Sudheer. 2002. “The Ethnic Dimension of Maoist Insurgency.” Kathmandu.

Shrestha, Damber Krishna. 2004. Kirant Rastriya Morcah ra Maobadi Gathbandhan. In Bandukko Bojh,
edited by R. Dahal and M. Mainali. Lalitpur: Himal Books.

Tamang, Mukta Singh. 2005. “Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN): Policy Reform
Appeals for Social Inclusion. Gender and Social Assessment Report.” Kathmandu: DFID, UK and The
World Bank, Kathmandu, Nepal.