Redistricting AG Memo

Case 3:11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 1 of 28
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
JACKSON DIVISION
MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF

SUPERVISORS and JOHN W. ROBINSON, III PLAINTIFFS
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11cv119-WHB-LRA
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,
LEE WESTBROOK, in her official
capacity as MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT
CLERK and MADISON COUNTY REGISTRAR,
MADISON COUNTY REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, AND MADISON COUNTY
DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DEFENDANTS
______________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
______________________________________________________________________________
Jim Hood, Attorney General for the State of Mississippi (“Attorney General”), files this
Memorandum Supporting the State of Mississippi’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 15].
I. Introduction.
Every fifth county election cycle – for offices with four year terms – occurs in the same year
that population data is released in the decennial federal census cycle. The unavoidable combination
of those two cycles every twenty years does not yield an automatic “one person, one vote” violation
for anyone. Nevertheless, plaintiffs Madison County Board of Supervisors (“Madison Board”) and
John W. Robinson, III (“Robinson”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) have filed this lawsuit making that
faulty claim.
Plaintiffs, relying exclusively on that ill-reasoned “one person, one vote” argument, have
requested that this Court issue a judgment: (1) declaring its current supervisor district lines are
unconstitutional; (2) declaring that the Mississippi Legislature’s statutory qualifying deadline for
county candidates is unconstitutional, as applied to plaintiffs; and (3) enjoining the county candidate
qualifying deadline mandated by the Mississippi Legislature. The Court previously denied
plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order encompassing their requested relief. Now, the
Court should similarly deny plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary and permanent injunction and
dismiss all their claims.
The Madison Board does not have standing to bring this lawsuit. Additionally, federal courts
in Mississippi, and elsewhere, have ruled that actionable “one person, one vote” violations are not
produced when census cycles and election cycles converge. See, e.g., Bryant v. Lawrence County,
Mississippi, 814 F.Supp. 1346 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Fairley v. Forrest County, Mississippi, 814
F.Supp. 1327 (S.D. Miss. 1993). The same pattern which takes place every twenty years is at the
heart of plaintiffs’ claims here. It does not render the current county election districts, or the
Legislature’s established election deadlines, unconstitutional on account of “one person, one vote,”
or any other federal law. It does not warrant the declaratory and injunctive relief that the plaintiffs
seek.
This Court should follow the opinions from previous federal courts that have faced the same
issue, and deny plaintiffs’ relief, instead of interfering with Madison County’s political process.
Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory and injunctive relief should be denied and their claims should be
dismissed with prejudice.
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II. Facts.
A. Background and Procedural Facts.
1. The Madison Board’s Redistricting Committee and Statements to the Public.
The Madison County election cycle began on January 1, 2011 when qualifying for county
offices opened. See MISS. CODE ANN . §23-15-299(2). The Madison Board planned to use the
current supervisor district lines in its 2011 elections. [See Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2, 2011, Ex. “D”]. On February 4, 2011, the 2010
United States Census data became available to the county. [Complaint at ¶ 2, Docket No. 1].
On February 22, 2011, the Madison Board held a public meeting to discuss redistricting. [See
Steven G. Watson, County may redistrict before election, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , February
23, 2011, Ex. “A”].1 The meeting was a follow-up to an announcement that a committee had been
formed to consider redistricting of the county’s election districts. Members of the five-person
committee formed by the Board included supervisor Tim Johnson, supervisor Karl Banks, county
administrator Brad Sellers, Board attorney Eric Hamer, and Circuit Clerk Lee Westbrook. [See
Steven G. Watson, Residents ‘don’t trust’ supervisors, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , February 23,
2011, Ex. “B”]. The Madison Board openly acknowledged that putting more than two supervisors
on the committee would make committee meetings open to the public. [Id.].
At the February 22 meeting, some members of the public questioned the make-up of the
committee. The Board attorney responded to concerns by saying that the county could file a lawsuit
to move the qualifying deadline for the current election cycle. [See Steven G. Watson, County may
1
Unless otherwise noted, references to exhibits contained herein refer to those exhibits attached to the
State’s Response in Opposition to plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. __] filed at the same
time as this Memorandum.
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redistrict before election, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , February 23, 2011, Ex. “A”]. The Board
attorney explained that the Butler Snow firm had already filed a similar case in Hancock County and
could be associated so that Madison County would not have to “reinvent the wheel.” [Id.].
Following the public comments, the February 22 meeting culminated in a Madison Board vote to
file this lawsuit. [Id.]. The redistricting process was expected to take several weeks. Meanwhile,
the Madison Board promised to hold multiple public hearings and advise the public of any proposals
or considerations. [Id.].2
Madison Board’s vote to file a lawsuit, drew skepticism from the public and candidates for
office. [See Editorial, We don’t trust the supervisors either, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2,
2011, Ex. “C”; Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL ,
March 2, 2011, Ex. “D”]. As of this writing, the Madison Board still has not decided on a specific
plan for new lines. A public hearing is currently set for March 21, 2011 to discuss plans that might
be submitted to the Department of Justice for pre-clearance. [See Lucy Weber, Madison supes eye
redistrict options, THE CLARION -LEDGER , March 15, 2011, Ex. “E”].
2. The Similar Hancock County Lawsuit.
Long before this lawsuit was filed, on December 14, 2010, the Hancock County Board of
Supervisors (“Hancock Board”) filed a nearly identical challenge to the Mississippi Legislature’s
county election qualifying deadline. The case is pending before Chief Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. [See
Civil Action No. 1:10cv564-LG-RHW at Complaint, Docket No. 1]. The Hancock Board is
represented in that lawsuit by the Butler Snow law firm, and at least one of the Butler Snow
2
Official actions of the M adison Board at the February 22 meeting are also evidenced by the Board’s
minutes. [See Minutes of the Board of Supervisors, February 22, 2011, Ex. “I,” and online at <http://madison-
co.com/images/admin/pdfs/745_86447_Minutes_2-22-11_(Final).pdf>].
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attorneys in this case has appeared in this case and the Hancock County case. On February 10, 2011,
the Hancock Board filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment Permanent Injunction, and Preliminary
Injunction. [See Civil Action No. 1:10cv564-LG-RHW at Motion for Injunction, Docket No. 11].
On February 11, 2011, a hearing was set for February 25, 2011. [See Civil Action No. 1:10cv564-
LG-RHW at February 11, 2011 Text Order].
The Attorney General subsequently was allowed to intervene and filed a Motion to Dismiss.
[See Civil Action No. 1:10cv564-LG-RHW at Order, Docket No. 14; Motion to Dismiss, Docket
Nos. 19 & 20].3 The February 25 hearing was canceled and the case was stayed pending a ruling
on the Motion to Dismiss, which is currently in the briefing process. [See Civil Action No.
1:10cv564-LG-RHW at February 22, 2011 Text Order & February 25, 2011 Text Order].
In addition to the pending Motion to Dismiss, a Motion to Consolidate cases has been filed.
[See Civil Action No. 1:10cv564-LG-RHW at Motion to Consolidate, Docket No. 27]. The Motion
to Consolidate seeks to combine the Hancock County lawsuit, this lawsuit, and several others that
have been filed by NAACP organizations in some Mississippi counties.4 As of this writing, no
3
The Attorney General’s Memorandum Supporting his Motion to Dismiss filed on February 23, 2011 in the
Hancock County action [Civil Action No. 1:10cv564-LG-RHW , Docket No. 20] explains the numerous reasons that
Hancock County’s Board has no valid claims in that case. Many of those arguments likewise explain why plaintiffs’
claims in this action have no merit. Indeed, the defendant Madison County Republican Executive Committee has
seen fit to essentially duplicate that February 23, 2011 brief in support of its own arguments in opposition to the
plaintiffs’ complaint in this action. [See MCREC Mem., Docket No. 13].
4
Various local branches of the NAACP and some individual voters have filed at least eight lawsuits in the
Southern District and eight lawsuits in the Northern District, as of this writing. The NAACP suits have been filed
against respective Mississippi county Boards of Supervisors, and others, as defendants. The plaintiffs in the
NAACP cases have made virtually the same allegations and requests for relief as those advanced by the Madison
Board and the Hancock Board in their cases. The only substantive distinctions are the alignment of the parties, and
the statistical numbers before the courts with respect to each county involved. Notably, even though only a small
number of the county boards and other named defendants have responded to the NAACP complaints in those cases
so far, several counties reportedly intend to resist the relief requested (i.e., moving the qualifying deadline and
requiring the counties to re-draw their supervisor district lines in the middle of the current election cycle). [See, e.g.,
Civil Action No. 3:11cv121-HTW -LRA, Answer and Defenses of Copiah County Board of Supervisors, Docket No.
13; Civil Action No. 5:11cv30-DPJ-FKB, Answer and Defenses of Adams County Board of Supervisors, Docket No.
13]. Meanwhile, other county boards have been weighing their options behind closed doors. [See, e.g., John Suratt,
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decision on the Motion to Consolidate has been issued by Chief Judge Guirola.
3. This Lawsuit and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO.
Meanwhile, the Madison Board filed this lawsuit on February 25, 2011. [Complaint, Docket
No. 1]. The named defendants are the State of Mississippi, the Circuit Clerk/County Registrar, the
county Republican Executive Committee, and the county Democratic Executive Committee. [Id.].
The only substantive difference between this lawsuit and the Hancock County lawsuit is that
the Board has been joined by an additional plaintiff, individual Madison County voter and attorney
John W. Robinson, III. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction along with their Complaint. [Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, Docket No. 2]. On March 1, 2011, the Court held a telephonic conference on the motion.
The Court subsequently entered an order denying the plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and setting a briefing schedule on plaintiffs’ claim for a preliminary injunction. [Order,
Docket No. 3]. The parties are scheduled to appear for a hearing on April 1, 2011. [Id.].
The March 1, 2011 qualifying deadline established by the Mississippi Legislature has now
passed. Candidates have qualified under the existing district lines. The names of candidates for
office have been published under the current election boundaries. [See Qualifying deadline for
county elections passes, all five supervisor races are contested, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March
1, 2011, Ex. “G”].
B. Facts Specific to the Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claims.
The facts relevant to the merits are undisputed. Madison County maintains five supervisor
Amite hearings on new district lines set, E N TER PRISE -J O U RN A L , March 8, 2011, Ex. “F”].
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districts as required by state constitution and statute. See MISS. CONST., art. 6 § 170; MISS. CODE
ANN . § 19-3-1. Those district boundaries are established by the county Board of Supervisors. See
MISS. CODE ANN . §§ 23-15-281 & -283. The current Madison County supervisor voting district
boundaries were drawn by the Madison Board. The boundaries were adopted and pre-cleared by
the Department of Justice in March 2003, based upon 2000 census population data. [See Plaintiffs’
Motion for TRO and Injunction at Ex. “A,” Docket No. 2]. The districts have not since been
adjudged to violate constitutional, or state or federal law.
The Census Bureau released its 2010 population data on or about February 4, 2011.
[Complaint at ¶2, Docket No. 1]. The plaintiffs allege there has been an increase and shifts in
population and voting age population in Madison County evidenced by the 2010 data. [Id. at ¶¶ 17-
18]. As such, plaintiffs claim use of the current district boundaries in the current election cycle
would violate the “one person, one vote” principle. [Id. at ¶ 20].
Madison County’s compliance with the “one-person, one-vote” principle – derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment – depends, in part, upon the percentage deviation of the population among
the five supervisor districts. According to the plaintiffs, the 2010 census data shows an overall
maximum deviation among the five supervisor districts of thirty-eight point twenty-one percent
(38.21%). [Id. at ¶ 18]. More specifically, the plaintiffs’ proffered numbers show there is a high
deviation of nineteen point thirty-seven percent (19.37%) in district three and a low deviation of
eighteen point eighty-four percent (18.84%) in district five. [Id. at ¶¶ 16-21].
Certain regulations and deadlines pertaining to county elections, are prescribed by the
Mississippi Legislature. See MISS . CODE ANN . § 23-15-1 et seq. The qualifying period for
supervisor candidates in each district is established by statute. County-wide district qualification
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began on January 1, 2011 and the deadline is March 1, 2011. See MISS. CODE ANN . § 23-15-299(2).
Party primary elections will be held in August 2011 and the general election will take place in
November 2011. See MISS. CODE ANN . §§ 23-15-191 & -193.
If new district lines will be used for 2011 elections, the lines must be re-drawn and pre-
cleared by June 2, 2011. See MISS. CODE ANN . § 23-15-285 (mandating any change in lines must
be done at least two months prior to any election). Other time considerations are relevant. Absentee
ballots must be prepared and printed. Absentee ballots must be available forty-five (45) days in
advance of the August 2 primaries (i.e., June 18, 2011). See MISS. CODE ANN . § 23-15-649.
Department of Justice regulations require any new lines to be pre-cleared pursuant to Section
Five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Department of Justice can take up to sixty (60) days to
approve lines. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(a). Department of Justice also may extend that time if it requires
more information before pre-clearance, or if it objects to any part of the redistricting plan. 28 C.F.R.
§ 51.9(c).
Based on these facts, plaintiffs now seek a judgment: (1) declaring that the current supervisor
district lines are unconstitutional; (2) declaring that the Mississippi Legislature’s statutory qualifying
deadline for county candidates is unconstitutional, as applied to plaintiffs; and (3) enjoining the
Mississippi Legislature’s county candidate qualifying deadline. [Complaint at pp. 9-10, Docket No.
1]. Additionally, and implicit in plaintiffs’ relief, the Court would have to establish a new qualifying
deadline. The relief should be denied and their claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Legal Analysis.
A. The Madison Board Has Not Presented Any “Case or Controversy.”
The Court should first decline to hear Madison Board’s case. Federal courts may not
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consider a lawsuit that is not an “actual controversy,” pursuant to Art. III of the Constitution and the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458
(1974). The Madison Board has the burden of establishing an “actual controversy,” i.e., its standing.
See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). The standing doctrine’s core inquiry is
“whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular
issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). To prove standing, “a plaintiff must show: (1)
it has suffered, or imminently will suffer, a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) a favorable judgment is likely to redress the
injury.” Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. City of League City, Tex., 488 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir.
2007). None of these elements are present here.
1. The Madison Board Does Not Have Standing to Represent Voters or Sue the
Defendants on Fourteenth Amendment Grounds.
As an initial matter, federal law says that the Madison Board – as a political subdivision of
the State – does not have standing here to challenge Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-299(2) on behalf of
voters, or to sue the State and other political subdivisions. As explained by the Second Circuit,
“[p]olitical subdivisions of a state may not challenge the validity of a state statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment.” City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 950. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held the same. See Town of Ball v. Rapides
Parish Police Jury, 746 F.2d 1049, 1051 & n. 1 (5th Cir. 1984) (political subdivison did not have
standing to sue the state or another political subdivision under the Fourteenth Amendment); Appling
v. Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, 621 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (5th Cir. 1980) (political
subdivisions do not have same constitutional rights as individuals); City of Safety Harbor v.
Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (5th Cir. 1976) (municipal corporation could not assert
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constitutional civil rights challenge as a plaintiff). For this reason, the Madison Board does not have
standing to bring this action, whether it be allegedly on behalf of voters, or simply against the state
or other political subdivisions like the defendants.
2. The Madison Board Has No Injury-in-fact.
Even if Madison Board is allowed to bring Fourteenth Amendment challenges against the
state or other political subdivisions, the Madison Board’s claims specifically do not meet the well-
established three-part test for standing. The Madison Board has no injury-in-fact. It is only
concerned about a possible voter challenge to the 2011 elections if the legislatively mandated
qualifying deadline is not moved. The Madison Board has not been sued. Rather, the Madison
Board claims there is a threat of future constitutional challenges to its 2011 elections, and costs that
the Board might incur if future special elections are held. [Complaint at ¶ 38, Docket No. 1]. That
is not an “injury-in-fact.” It is a merely a conjectural harm.
The Madison Board’s injury claim is insufficient. Federal law does not require it to
implement 2010 census data, in the middle of the 2011 election cycle, to avoid a “one person, one
vote” violation. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi previously
addressed an actual controversy that is virtually identical to the circumstances here. That court
determined that the use of existing boundary lines in county elections would not violate the “one-
person, one-vote” principle when receipt of the “new” census data left insufficient time to redistrict.
Bryant v. Lawrence County, Mississippi, 814 F.Supp. 1346 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
In Bryant, citizens of Lawrence County challenged a supervisor districting plan formulated
in 1984. Id. at 1348. The plan was utilized for supervisor elections in 1991 just after the 1990
census data was available. Id. at 1352. The County had attempted to redistrict based on the 1990
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data, but was unable to gain pre-clearance from the Department of Justice prior to the 1991 elections
in the four year cycle. Id. Voters sued Lawrence County on “one person, one vote,” and other
grounds, to require special elections with districts devised using the fresh 1990 data. Id.
After reviewing other federal decisions where similar census-timing issues were involved,
and resolved in favor of the local governments, the court flatly rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that
special elections were required due to a “one person, one vote” violation. The court explained
when a political body is operating under a constitutional plan (one pre-cleared by the
Justice Department and not challenged in Court, or either agreed to by the parties to
litigation and then pre-cleared by the Justice Department as is the situation in this
case) that such body must have a reasonable time after each decennial census in
order to develop another plan and have it pre-cleared by the Justice Department.
Elections held under such a previously pre-cleared plan, in the year that new census
data becomes available, but before redistricting can take place, should not be set
aside and new elections ordered.
Id. at 1354 (emphasis added). The Court ultimately held there was no actionable “one person, one
vote” claim alleged by the plaintiffs in Bryant. Id.5
Here, the same reasoning applies to the facts facing the Madison Board. The current
supervisor districts conform to a 2003 pre-cleared plan based on 2000 census data. If the Board
complies with the Mississippi Legislature’s directive, and proceeds on the statutory timetable for
the current 2011 election cycle, then elections on lines drawn under the 2000 census will not
produce a valid “one person, one vote” claim against the county. Using the current lines would not
cause it any injury.
5
The plaintiffs may argue Bryant and the other cases regarding special elections are not relevant here, just
as they argued before the Court denied their Temporary Restraining Order. That argument is wrong and relies on a
distinction without a difference. The plaintiffs filed this suit in the middle of the current election cycle before any
elections have actually taken place. Special elections are thus not part of the relief at issue. However, the reason
why special elections were not ordered in Bryant, and the other cases directly on point, is the same reason why the
relief requested by plaintiffs here is not warranted. Elections on current lines, the same year as census data becomes
available, are not susceptible to a valid “one person, one vote” challenge.
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3. The Madison Board Has No “Fairly Traceable” Injury.
The Madison Board claims its injury is a fear of expensive lawsuits and other costs
associated with election challenges. Even assuming that injury satisfies Article III, which it does
not, there is no proof that the injury has been (or would be) perpetrated by the defendants here. The
Madison Board is responsible for drawing the district lines and compliance with “one person, one
vote,” not the defendants. The Census Bureau collected the county census data and released it in
the middle of the current election cycle. The Attorney General is not aware of any challenge, or
threat of any challenge, the defendants would make if the current lines are not re-drawn
immediately. The Madison Board has not come forward with any proof that such a challenge is
intended. The defendants are not the cause of the supposed injury the Madison Board complains
it is facing.
4. A Favorable Judgment Would Not Remedy the Madison Board’s Alleged

Injury.
Again assuming the Madison Board could prove the other requirements for standing, which
they cannot, a declaratory judgment and injunction would not solve the problem the Madison Board
claims to face for at least three reasons. First, the Madison Board has not named any defendants that
might file suit against it. If – as it claims – the Madison Board’s desire is to immunize itself against
a future suit filed by anyone who is not a defendant, a judgment from the Court would not be
binding. See, e.g., Fabela v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas, 2010 WL 4610143, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 15, 2010) (rejecting res judicata defense to voting rights claim based on prior litigation of issue
against different parties).
Second, and similar, to the extent that the Board is concerned that it might be sued for “one
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person, one vote,” no order of this Court can prevent that contingency. An injunction or declaration
may provide a persuasive but not a legally binding defense to a future action. It would not save the
Board from having to respond to a suit, if such an event ever occurs.6
Third, there is no proof – aside from speculation – that if the qualifying date is moved by this
Court, the Madison Board will be able to redraw its districts and get pre-clearance from the
Department of Justice in time for the planned elections. The Court should not simply assume that
modification of the Mississippi Legislature’s statutorily mandated deadlines will produce a pre-
cleared plan in time to meet new deadlines prescribed by the Court. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(a) & (c)
(sixty (60) days for Department of Justice consideration of redistricting plans, and additional time
if objections are lodged or further information is requested).
Additionally, public discord created by the Madison Board’s assembly of its Redistricting
Committee, and other public comment issues, may cause further delays in putting together a valid
redistricting plan. [See, e.g., Steven G. Watson, Residents ‘don’t trust’ supervisors, MADISON
COUNTY JOURNAL , February 23, 2011, Ex. “B”; Editorial, We don’t trust the supervisors either,
Madison County Journal, March 2, 2011, Ex. “C”; Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, Madison County Journal, March 2, 2011, Ex. “D”]. There is no assurance the relief
sought by the Madison Board would remedy the problem it has invented for itself.
In sum, the Madison Board does not have any right to sue the defendants based on the
Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the elements required for Article III standing are not present.
6
Additionally, and ironically, if the M adison Board obtains a declaration that its current district lines are
unconstitutional, that would be an open invitation for suits should it be unable to secure a pre-cleared plan from
Department of Justice before June 2. Its choice to essentially advocate against itself in that regard relies on a
haphazard gamble that Department of Justice will approve any new lines in time to hold timely primary elections this
Summer.
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The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to the Madison Board’s dispute. Accordingly, the
relief sought by the Madison Board should be denied and its claims should be dismissed by way of
summary judgment.
B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Should be Denied and Their
Case Dismissed With Prejudice.
As explained above, the Madison Board’s claims should be dismissed altogether because it
has no standing to assert them. Additionally, and even assuming the Madison Board does have
standing, both of the plaintiffs’ claims for relief should be denied, and their claims dismissed on the
merits.
1. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Declaratory Relief.
As a starting point, under Count I of their Complaint, the plaintiffs have asked for a two-fold
declaration that holds: (1) the current Madison County supervisor lines are unconstitutional if used
in the 2011 elections; and (2) the Mississippi Legislature’s March 1 qualifying deadline is
unconstitutional as applied to Madison County. Under federal law, declaratory relief on either front
is inappropriate. Madison County’s use of the current supervisor district lines in the 2011 election
cycle would not create an actionable “one person, one vote” problem. Therefore, the Court should
not alter the Legislature’s election time table. The Court should not legislate from the bench for
Madison County by declaring the current lines, or the Mississippi Legislature’s qualifying deadline,
unconstitutional.
In Reynolds v. Sims, the United States Supreme Court’s landmark case regarding “one
person, one vote” rights, the Court pointed out that reapportionment of election districts is primarily
a concern for the legislative branches and explained judicial relief is only appropriate when a
governmental unit fails to reapportion “in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity
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to do so.” 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (emphasis added). Nobody can validly argue that Madison
county has had an adequate opportunity to draw new lines, or could be faulted if new lines are not
used in the August and November 2011 elections. Even so, plaintiffs have inappropriately asked
this Court to stretch the “one person, one vote” principle to achieve a desired political result.
The crucial issue is whether, if this federal Court does not legislate new election deadlines
for Madison County, would the county violate “one person, one vote” in holding elections under the
current lines? Stated differently, given the facts which plaintiffs forecast will play out if the current
supervisor lines are used, would they produce a valid “one person, one vote” challenge? The prior
federal courts that have examined the same issue, on identical facts, have flatly said “no.” See
French v. Boner, 963 F.2d 890, 891 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954; Ramos v. Illinois,
976 F.2d 335, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1992); Republican Party of Oregon v. Keisling, 959 F.2d 144, 145-46
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 914; Kahn v. Griffin, 2004 WL 1635846, at *6 (D. Minn. July
20, 2004), certified question answered by 71 N.W. 2d 815 (Minn. 2005); Fairley, 814 F.Supp. at
1343-46; Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354.
The same reasoning of all these other federal courts applies to the plaintiffs’ Complaint.
Madison County’s current supervisor district lines conform to a pre-cleared plan based on 2000
census data. If the Madison County supervisor elections proceed under the current lines, and the
county continues to comply with the Mississippi Legislature’s statutory timetable for the ongoing
2011 election cycle, then nobody has a valid claim for “one person, one vote.” The entire basis for
plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief (Count I) is misguided. Their motion should be denied and
its declaratory judgment count should be dismissed by way of summary judgment.
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2. The Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Injunctive Relief.
In order to be awarded preliminary and permanent injunctive relief (Count II), plaintiffs must
prove: (1) they are entitled to actual success on the merits; (2) they would suffer irreparable injury
due to no adequate remedy at law; (3) their alleged threat of injury is not outweighed by potential
harm to defendants and other interested parties; and (4) the public interest would be served by the
injunctive relief. VRC, LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 2006). See also Loisel v.
Epps, 2008 WL 1925177, at *1 (S.D. Miss. April 30, 2008) (denying permanent injunctive relief);
Arista Records, LLC v. Stanley, 2007 WL 627839, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 26, 2007) (citing DSC
Comms. Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). None of the requirements
for an injunction weigh in plaintiffs’ favor.
a. No Claim on the Merits.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s “one person, one vote” principle is not a rigid, absolute right
to vote in a supervisor district with a deviation of less than ten percent (10%) population for every
election. Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief rests entirely upon that faulty premise. Plaintiffs do
not account for timing issues caused by the release of census data while the current election cycle
was already underway. There is no “one person, one vote” violation if candidates run on existing
pre-cleared district lines in the same year decennial census data becomes available.
In Bryant, discussed above, “one person, one vote” claims were not actionable when “old”
lines were used in a Census release year in spite of a total deviation of over twenty-three percent
(23%). Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354. The court held that elections under a previously pre-cleared
plan, in the year census data became available, were not subject to a “one person, one vote”
challenge. Id. Numerous other federal courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., French,
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963 F.2d at 891 (no valid “one person, one vote” claim in year census data became available);
Ramos, 976 F.2d at 340-41 (no constitutional violation in four year delay of implementing new
Census data); Republican Party of Oregon, 959 F.2d at 145-46 (redistricting causing temporary
dilution of voting power did not merit constitutional violation or require special elections); Kahn,
2004 WL 1635846, at *6 (alleged “one person, one vote” deviation did not require special elections);
Fairley, 814 F.Supp. at 1343-46 (no “one person, one vote” violation requiring special elections in
same year as new census data became available).
The same “one person, one vote” controversy arises every twenty years for elected offices
involving four year terms. Federal courts have recognized that the issue is bound to occur every
fifth election cycle, yet uniformly have held that the phenomenon does not create the automatic “one
person, one vote” violation as claimed by plaintiffs here. For example, in Ramos, the court analyzed
that issue and held against the plaintiffs there:
[t]he four-year terms that Chicago aldermen serve merely indicate that every fifth
election (i.e. when the election year falls on the same year that the new census data
becomes available) likely will result in a four-year delay in using the new census
data. But this simple consequence of the two different schedules (i.e. census every
ten years, elections every four) does not diminish the voting power of any protected
minority; there is merely a four-year time lag that occurs every other decade between
redistricting and elections. Thus, accepting their allegations as true, we hold that the
plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would lead us to believe that the Illinois
redistricting scheme denies any class of citizens full participation in Chicago's
political process.
Ramos, 976 F.2d at 339-41. Similarly, as another example, the Kahn court observed the problem
was a consequence of the combination of the election and census cycles and maintained the court
should not interfere with state regulation of elections:
[o]f more concern to the Court, however, is the probability, recognized by plaintiffs
at oral argument, that awarding plaintiffs the relief they seek in this instance would
effectively require a similar action at least every 20 years when the current situation
-17-
is repeated. It could require similar action every 10 years in order to ensure that new
census data is incorporated and put into action as soon as possible, and could require
more frequent action if Minnesota decides to redistrict on a more frequent schedule.
As the Sixth Circuit noted, the only way to avoid such a problem would be to order
the City to limit terms of office and the election cycle-a significant interference in
the State's right to regulate its elections that would be inappropriate absent greater
provocation.
Kahn, 2004 WL 1635846, at *6-7 (citing French, 963 F.2d at 891-92). Established federal law does
not allow anyone to run to the courthouse every twenty years to claim “one person, one vote”
violations. Precedent says the four year time lag between new census data and the next election
cycle does not diminish anyone’s constitutional voting rights.
Moreover, the size of the alleged deviation does not render elections under the current
Madison lines per se invalid, as the plaintiffs erroneously believe. In French, where a total
deviation of over one hundred nineteen percent (119%) between two districts was at issue, the court
explained
in any system of representative government, it is inevitable that some elections for

four-year or longer terms will occur on the cusp of the decennial census.
The terms inevitably will last well into the next decade; and, depending on shifts in
population in the preceding decade, the representation may be unequal in the sense
that the districts no longer meet a one-person, one-vote test under the new census.
...The principles of mathematical equality and majority rule are important, but we
should not allow them to outweigh all other factors in reviewing the time of
elections.
...We do not believe that considerations of mathematical equality in representation

or the presumption in favor of redistricting every ten years outweigh the
considerations outlined above concerning the validity of four-year terms, the settled
expectations of voters and elected officials, the costs of the elections, and the need
for stability and continuity of office....
French, 963 F.2d at 891-92. The one hundred and nineteen percent (119%) in French simply did
not create a valid “one person, one vote” claim given the release of the census data was during the
-18-
election cycle.
Here, the facts are the same this time around. The current Madison County supervisor
district lines were approved by the Madison Board and pre-cleared by Department of Justice in
2003. Those lines have never been determined to violate anyone’s “one person, one vote” right, or
any other constitutional rights. Just like in all the other federal cases involving similar facts, it
would not violate anyone’s rights to use the current lines in the 2011 Madison County supervisor
election cycle that is well underway.
More specifically, plaintiffs allege the population distribution of Madison County has
changed since the 2000 Census. The 2010 figures came out little more than a month ago, and after
the 2011 election cycle commenced. Based on their numbers submitted to the Court, the plaintiffs
claim Madison County currently has a deviation of thirty-eight point twenty-one (38.21%) given the
current supervisor lines. An alleged high deviation of nineteen point thirty-seven percent (19.37%)
exists in district three and a low deviation of eighteen point eighty-four percent (18.84%) in district
five.7 These deviations are far smaller than French and akin to the deviations in Bryant and Fairley.
In any event, the timing of the release of the 2010 census data is actually dispositive here. The Court
should follow the guidance provided by all the prior opinions on the subject and hold that plaintiffs
do not have a legally valid claim.
There is no credible argument that using the current supervisor lines would create an
actionable “one person, one vote” violation. The plaintiffs consequently cannot succeed on the
merits of their claims that the current lines are unconstitutional, or that deadlines must be moved to
7
In Fairley, Judge Pickering offered a statistical analysis explaining why deviations similar to the
percentages offered by the plaintiffs here actually reveal only a minimal variation in voter influence. 814 F.Supp. at
1336-38. The math used in Fairley is equally applicable here and shows why the deviation claimed by plaintiffs is
not as drastic as they complain.
-19-
accommodate them. Therefore, plaintiffs’ injunctive relief should be denied.
b. There is no Threat of Irreparable Injury.
Even assuming plaintiffs might succeed on the merits, which is not true, the plaintiffs also
have not shown they would suffer irreparable harm from the use of the current supervisor district
lines in the current election cycle, or if the Court does not change the deadlines applicable to the
2011 elections. The reasoning of the cases cited above explains why plaintiffs have no likelihood
of success on the merits and equally demonstrates why plaintiffs do not face any threat of irreparable
injury here. See French, 963 F.2d at 891; Ramos, 976 F.2d at 340-41; Republican Party of Oregon,
959 F.2d at 145-46; Kahn v. Griffin, 2004 WL 1635846, at *6; Fairley, 814 F.Supp. at 1343-46;
Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354. Additionally, in Reynolds, cited above and repeatedly by plaintiffs,
the Court explained the reasons why plaintiffs have no irreparable injury here:
[r]eallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the prescribed

practice in 41 of the States, often honored more in the breach than the observance,
however.... Limitations on the frequency of reapportionment are justified by the
need for stability and continuity in the organization of the legislative system,
although undoubtedly reapportioning no more frequently than every 10 years leads
to some imbalance in the population of districts toward the end of the decennial
period and also to the development of resistance to change on the part of some
incumbent legislators. In substance, we do not regard the Equal Protection Clause
as requiring daily, monthly, annual or biennial reapportionment, so long as a State
has a reasonably conceived plan for periodic readjustment of legislative
representation. While we do not intend to indicate that decennial reapportionment
is a constitutional requisite, compliance with such an approach would clearly meet
the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative
representation.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 583-84. Even the analysis of plaintiffs’ best case explains they do not have
a valid “one person, one vote” concern just where new census data was released during this year’s
ongoing election cycle. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any irreparable injury. The factor merits
denial of their claims for injunctive relief.
-20-
c. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Threat of Injury is Outweighed by Harm to Other

Interested Parties.
The balance of harms first weighs against injunctive relief because there is no threat of injury
to plaintiffs, as explained above. Beyond that fact, the defendants and other interested parties would
suffer more than plaintiffs if any injunction is imposed.
Candidates have already qualified under the existing lines. The names of candidates for
office have been published and classified according to the current election boundaries. [See
Qualifying deadline for county elections passes, all five supervisor races are contested, MADISON
COUNTY JOURNAL , March 1, 2011, Ex. “G”]. Moving the qualifying deadline or mandating that new
lines be used in 2011 would create confusion for the defendants, and all residents of Madison
County. Meanwhile, there is no certainty that any qualifying delay, or other modification of
deadlines and a mandatory injunction, would produce a new pre-cleared plan in time. If new lines
are hastily put in place, all of the voters the plaintiffs claim to protect would suddenly not know who
is qualified, what district they will be voting in, and may not be able to have their input regarding
redistricting considered.
The Department of Justice regulations and Mississippi statutes applicable to the redistricting
and 2011 election processes evidence this point. Primaries are due to be held on August 2.
Therefore, the lines must be re-drawn and pre-cleared by June 2, 2011. See MISS. CODE ANN . § 23-
15-285 (explaining any change in lines must be done at least two months prior to any election).8 The
Department of Justice can take up to sixty (60) days to approve any plan. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(a). The
8
Other time considerations are also at issue and demonstrate why accelerating the Madison County
redistricting process would be problematic. Absentee voter ballots must be prepared and printed. Those ballots
must be identical in form to the ballots used in the election and available forty-five (45) days in advance of the
August 2 primary election (i.e., June 18, 2011). Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-649.
-21-
Department of Justice also may extend that time if it requires more information, or if it objects to
any part of the plan. 28 C.F.R. § 51.9(c). While that process is in motion, the candidates (and the
voting public that the plaintiffs claim to be protecting), would not know their district lines or the
candidates. Moreover, before Department of Justice even gets involved, if the Court usurps the
Mississippi Legislature and endorses a mad rush to reapportionment, public input would be
diminished.
In other words, shrinking Madison County’s redistricting time frame – essentially self-
inflicted by its Board – is more likely to create confusion and harm everyone, rather than fix any
problems. There is no proof, aside from speculation, that if the supervisor qualifying date is moved
by an order from this Court or immediate redistricting occurs, the Board will be able to re-draw its
districts, keep the public informed, hold sufficient hearings, and get pre-clearance from the
Department of Justice in time for the elections. The Court should not simply assume that ordering
more time for qualifying, or mandating a new time frame in which the process must be complete,
will equate to approval of a new plan from Department of Justice. Defendants and everyone else
(including the plaintiffs) will be better served if the Madison Board takes its time to get Madison
County’s redistricting correct.9 Reasoned analysis of the balance of harms injunction factor weighs
heavily against granting plaintiffs’ requested relief.
4. The Public Would be Harmed by an Injunction.
In addition to all the other factors that weigh against plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief,
9
Additionally, plaintiffs have failed to recognize or address the fact that the Department of Justice likely
requires pre-clearance of any injunction issued by this Court that would disrupt the election cycle. 28 C.F.R. § 51.18
(explaining changes affecting voting ordered by a federal court and/or subsequent changes by governmental body
necessitated by court order subject to pre-clearance requirements). Obviously, this lawsuit, and the plaintiffs’
motion for an injunction, have come way too late to derail the current election cycle.
-22-
and contrary to the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their claimed interests, all of the citizens of
Madison County, and Mississippi, would be better served if the Court does not interfere in the
county’s 2011 election cycle. In a situation where the timing of the election cycle was at issue, a
three-judge redistricting panel of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi explained why the public interest would be harmed if it enjoined a qualifying deadline
to enable the Legislature to get pre-clearance from Department of Justice. See Smith v. Clark, 189
F.Supp.2d 529 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
In Smith, the Court was faced with a request to enjoin the qualifying deadline for
congressional elections in 2002, but the public interest factors identified there are equally relevant
now in the scenario involving Madison County:
...we are convinced that a postponement of [the qualifying] deadline would likely
create confusion, misapprehension and burdens for the voters, for the political
parties, and for the candidates. As we said in our [previous] order, many voters may
want to participate in the election process to a greater extent than mere voting. They
want to know the candidates personally, to select their choice, to give money to their
selection, and to organize the people in their precincts or counties in the campaign
for their choice. Given that all previous districts are being cross-mixed by the loss
of one congressional representative, resolving these new problems will take all the
pre-primary time that the present statute allows. If we delay the establishment of
election districts and advance qualifying dates, such voters who want to become
fully involved in the process will not timely know in which district they are going
to be placed, and thus will not timely know where and with whom to become
involved. The same situation will exist for the candidates. Postponing the election
schedule means that the candidates and political parties would encounter campaign
and election burdens – that is, significant time constraints on getting acquainted with
new voters, establishing organizations in new election districts and the multiple new
precincts and counties therein, raising campaign funds within the new districts,
developing strategies for particular geographic areas, etc.
189 F.Supp.2d at 535-36. Just like in Smith, extending the qualifying deadline in Madison County
would be problematic and risks confusing voters and candidates. A candidate who qualifies after
the current deadline (which has already passed) would be at risk of coming off the ballot. Voters
-23-
who plan to vote for her, or give money to the campaign, would be harmed by such a measure.
The same type of reasoning applies to any proposal to have new supervisor districts in place
by a specific date in the middle of Madison County’s current election cycle. Shrinking the time
frame in which voters and candidates can be certain of who is running, where they are running, and
who candidates will represent, would inappropriately cause much more harm than it would good.
Specifically, uncertainty already exists because of the Madison Board’s actions and would
only be exacerbated by giving plaintiffs an injunction. Originally, “[s]upervisors had planned to
delay the redistricting and use existing district lines in the 2011 election because the 2010 census
numbers did not become available until [February].” [See Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2, 2011, Ex. “D”]. On March 1, 2011, the public
was told that the qualifying deadline passed and candidates were set to run under the current district
lines. [See Qualifying deadline for county elections passes, all five supervisor races are contested,
MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 1, 2011, Ex. “G”]. Meanwhile, the Madison Board changed
its mind and now wants to rush to re-draw new lines. [See Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog
redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2, 2011, Ex. “D”].
Some view the Madison Board’s flip-flop decision and this lawsuit as “erratic behavior [that]
is nothing more than a desperate ploy to help Karl Banks maintain his reign while sticking it to D.I.
Smith – and there’s no easy way to do that.” [See Editorial, We don’t trust the supervisors either,
MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2, 2011, Ex. “C”]. Others are concerned because re-drawing
the lines will impact the districts where candidates may run, and where they must campaign. [See
Steven G. Watson, Candidates watchdog redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2, 2011,
Ex. “D”]. Candidates have even said publicly that lines should not be re-drawn before the upcoming
-24-
election because of the confusion new lines would create. [See Steven G. Watson, Smith could face
Redd in remap, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 16, 2011, Ex. “H”].10 If the Court grants
injunctive relief, there are more potential problems than there would be in maintaining the status
quo. The Court should head off the problems by denying plaintiffs’ requested injunctive relief,
rather than causing more problems by granting it.
Additionally, the public interest of Mississippi as a whole cuts against granting plaintiffs’
requested injunctive relief. As discussed and noted above, a similar case filed by Madison County’s
lawyers is pending in Hancock County. There are also currently at least sixteen other cases filed in
the Northern and Southern Districts by branches of the NAACP that involve the exact same
arguments and seek the same legal relief. Allowing Madison County – or any other counties – an
unwarranted exception to the Legislature’s qualifying deadline, or laying down an ill-founded
precedent that Mississippi counties’ election boundaries are unconstitutional (and must be redrawn
and pre-cleared immediately) in the middle of the current election cycle, would throw elections
across the state into disarray. Moreover, given that this issue recurs every score of years due to the
intersection of four year terms of office and the release of decennial census data, uncertainty will
envelop Mississippi’s local elections every twenty years if the plaintiffs are permitted to succeed.
In sum, the public – in Madison County and state-wide – will be better served here if the
Madison Board follows the law established by the Mississippi Legislature, the county’s voters have
10
The March 16 news story also goes on to explain cite comments from the Board attorney that the
Madison Board may not agree on a proposed plan at the upcoming March 21 hearing, but that the M adison Board’s
chances in this Court will improve if an approved plan can be sent to Department of Justice before the Court’s April
1 hearing. Obviously, the M adison Board’s recent rush to re-draw lines and push them through the process
unfortunately runs the risk of skewing the process and short-cutting around public review and input.
-25-
the certainty of elections under the current pre-cleared lines, and the Madison Board takes adequate
time to get its redistricting correct. The public interest weighs against an injunction in this case and
that is another reason the count for injunctive relief should be denied.
IV. Conclusion.
In sum, Madison County cannot be faulted under “one person, one vote” for being caught
in the convergence of the current election cycle and release of official census data. But, by the same
token, its Board and one of its residents cannot abuse that phenomenon that occurs every twenty
years to undo an act of the Mississippi Legislature or manufacture a private election time table.
The Court should deny the Madison Board’s motion, and dismiss its claims, because it has
no standing. Similarly, and even assuming the Madison Board has standing, both of the plaintiffs’
counts for declaratory and injunctive relief have no merit. The motion for preliminary injunction
should be denied, and for the same reasons, the Court should dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims with
prejudice by way of the Attorney General’s separately filed motion for summary judgment.
THIS the 18th day of March, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI ON BEHALF
OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
By: S/Justin L. Matheny

Harold E. Pizzetta, III (Bar No. 99867)
hpizz@ago.state.ms.us
Justin L. Matheny (Bar No. 100754)
jmath@ago.state.ms.us
Special Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the Attorney General
-26-
P.O. Box 220

Jackson, MS 39205
Telephone: (601) 359-3680
Facsimile: (601) 359-2003
-27-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been filed electronically with the Clerk of
Court and thereby served on the following persons:
Mark W. Garriga
Tommie S. Cardin
Malissa Winfield
Butler Snow O’mara Stevens & Cannada, PLLC
P.O. Box 6010
Ridgeland, MS 39158-6010
Eric Hamer
Hamer & Associates
P.O. Box 2185
Ridgeland, MS 39158
John W. Robinson, III

Law Offices of John W. Robinson, III
618 Cresent Blvd., Ste. 200
Ridgeland, MS 29157
Cory T. Wilson
Willoghby Law Group
P.O. Box 2305
Madison, MS 39130
James H. Herring
Herring, Long & Crews PC
P.O. Box 344
Canton, MS 39046
THIS the 18th day of March, 2011.
S/Justin L. Matheny
Justin L. Matheny
-28-

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Case 3:11-cv-00119-WHB -LRA Document 16 Filed 03/18/11 Page 1 of 28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF

VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11cv119-WHB-LRA

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING

Memorandum Supporting the State of Mississippi’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Preliminary Injunction [Docket No. 15].

dismiss all their claims.

dismissed with prejudice.

A. Background and Procedural Facts.

1. The Madison Board’s Redistricting Committee and Statements to the Public.

2. The Similar Hancock County Lawsuit.

LG-RHW at February 11, 2011 Text Order].

3. This Lawsuit and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO.

1, 2011, Ex. “G”].

B. Facts Specific to the Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claims.

adjudged to violate constitutional, or state or federal law.

eighteen point eighty-four percent (18.84%) in district five. [Id. at ¶¶ 16-21].

supervisor candidates in each district is established by statute. County-wide district qualification

November 2011. See MISS. CODE ANN . §§ 23-15-191 & -193.

III. Legal Analysis.

A. The Madison Board Has Not Presented Any “Case or Controversy.”

2007). None of these elements are present here.

or other political subdivisions like the defendants.

2. The Madison Board Has No Injury-in-fact.

is not an “injury-in-fact.” It is a merely a conjectural harm.

In Bryant, citizens of Lawrence County challenged a supervisor districting plan formulated

vote” claim alleged by the plaintiffs in Bryant. Id.5

cause it any injury.

3. The Madison Board Has No “Fairly Traceable” Injury.

4. A Favorable Judgment Would Not Remedy the Madison Board’s Alleged

against different parties).

Board from having to respond to a suit, if such an event ever occurs.6

if objections are lodged or further information is requested).

1. Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Declaratory Relief.

1343-46; Bryant, 814 F.Supp. at 1354.

its declaratory judgment count should be dismissed by way of summary judgment.

2. The Plaintiffs are not Entitled to Injunctive Relief.

for an injunction weigh in plaintiffs’ favor.

a. No Claim on the Merits.

same year as new census data became available).

that issue and held against the plaintiffs there:

should not interfere with state regulation of elections:

cycle does not diminish anyone’s constitutional voting rights.

in any system of representative government, it is inevitable that some elections for

...We do not believe that considerations of mathematical equality in representation

election cycle that is well underway.

do not have a legally valid claim.

accommodate them. Therefore, plaintiffs’ injunctive relief should be denied.

b. There is no Threat of Irreparable Injury.

[r]eallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the prescribed

denial of their claims for injunctive relief.

c. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Threat of Injury is Outweighed by Harm to Other

suffer more than plaintiffs if any injunction is imposed.

heavily against granting plaintiffs’ requested relief.

4. The Public Would be Harmed by an Injunction.

F.Supp.2d 529 (S.D. Miss. 2002).

now in the scenario involving Madison County:

only be exacerbated by giving plaintiffs an injunction. Originally, “[s]upervisors had planned to

redistricting, MADISON COUNTY JOURNAL , March 2, 2011, Ex. “D”].

rather than causing more problems by granting it.

unwarranted exception to the Legislature’s qualifying deadline, or laying down an ill-founded