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The U.S.

—Russia Relations
after the «Reset»:
Building a New Agenda.
A View from Russia
Report by the Russian Participants of
the Working Group on the Future of the
Russian—U.S. Relations
Report by the Russian Group

Sergei Karaganov is the head of the


Working Group, the main co-author and
executive editor. Dmitry Suslov is the
Coordinator of the Working Group and
the main co-author. The Working Group
includes: Pavel Andreyev,
Oleg Barabanov, Timofei Bordachev,
Maxim Bratersky, Sergei Karaganov,
Feodor Lukyanov,Yulia Nikitina,
Alexei Pilko, Marsel Salikhov,
Nikolai Silayev, Dmitry Suslov,
Mikhail Troitsky, and Alexei
Fenenko.
The Consultants of the project are:
Sergei Dubinin, Andrei Kolosovsky,
Sergey Ryabkov and
Yevgeny Savostyanov.
A version preceding the final copy of the
Report was discussed at the meeting of
the Working Group on the Future of the
Russian—U.S. relations of the Valdai Club
together with the American colleagues.
The meeting was held in the National
Research University–Higher School of
Economics on December 3—4, 2010. The
American participants in the discussion
included: Timothy Colton,
Jeffrey Mankoff, Alexandra
Vacroux, Rawi Abdelal, Randall
Stone, Henry Hale, Samuel Charap,
and Yoshiko Herrera. Their opinions
and comments highly contributed to
the Report. One of the final versions
of the Report was also discussed at
the February meeting of the Advisory
Council of the Valdai International
Discussion Culb. Some criticisms of the
Council members were also taken into
consideration. Still, responsibility for the
final copy of the Report is with its main
co-authors only.
Contents

2 0. Introduction

3 1. Summary

7 2. Russia and the U.S. in the World


of Today and Tomorrow
2.1. Whither the World:
Challenges to Russia and
the U.S.
2.2. Consequences for Russia and
the U.S.
2.3. T he Interests of Russia and
the Interests of the U.S.

20 3. The U.S.—Russia Relations at the


Present Stage: The Achievements and
Drawbacks of the «Reset»
3.1. T
 he Main Achievements of the
«Reset»
3.2. T
 he Main Drawbacks of the
«Reset»

26 4. Renewing the U.S.—Russiann


Agenda
4.1. Preamble
4.2. What Is to Be Done with the
Old Agenda?
4.3. T he Logic of the Renewing
and General Principles of the
New Agenda
4.4. T he New Agenda

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The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»:
Building a New Agenda. A View from Russia

0. Introduction

This project is aimed at preparing and publishing, upon discussions


with Russian authors and foreign specialists, a series of reports on the
elaboration of a strategy of Russia’s interaction with the main centers of
power in the contemporary world: the United States, the European Union,
China, the countries of the Middle East, and other regions of the world. This
strategy must be optimal for Russia while at the same time it must take the
interests of its partners into account.
Two reports in this series — Towards a Union of Europe* and a report on
the situation in the Greater Middle East** have already been published.
The present report is a follow-up to an earlier paper Reconfiguration,
Not Just a Reset: Russia’s Interests in Relations with the United States
of America***, which was prepared by the Russian Section of the Valdai
International Discussion Club and published in 2009. The present report
was discussed at a joint meeting of the Valdai Working Group on the
U.S.—Russian Relations, Harvard University and the National Research
University–Higher School of Economics.
Most of the authors of this report are less than forty years old. They
represent the new generation of scholars of international relations. Their
task was to avoid the paved ways of their predecessors and to try to break
out of the old paradigm of the U.S.—Russian and international relations
studies and analyses which have been established during last fifty years and
which by now seems clearly obsolete.

S. Karaganov

*  Sergei Karaganov, Timofei Bordachev, Fyodor Lukyanov. «Towards an Alliance of Europe.»


http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Alliance%20eng.pdf
** Alexander Aksenyonok, Fyodor Lukyanov. «The Development of the Middle East: Vision 2020.»
http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Iordaniya_doklad_ENG.pdf
*** Sergei Karaganov, Dmitry Suslov, Timofei Bordachev. «Reconfiguration, Not Just a Reset:
Russia’s Interests in Relations with the United States of America»
http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Doklad_eng_reset_june2009.pdf

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1. Summary

1.1. The U.S.—Russian relations have markedly 1.2. However, the U.S.—Russian relations have
improved over the past two years. The «reset» not yet reached a state of stable partnership;
of relations proposed by the Barack Obama they remain fragile and are prone to many
administration has been a success. The threat of risks of both home- and foreign-policy nature.
a retreat to a systemic confrontation has almost Prospects for preserving even the current level
disappeared. Many of the conflicts between the of partnership efficiency depend on the politi-
two countries have been either resolved or, cal positions of the Obama administration.
for the most part, reduced to a simmer. Both There is no mechanism that would prevent a
Russia and the United States have displayed rollback, and the relations have not reached a
pragmatism by lowering the importance of level where the rollback would be unlikely.
persisting conflicts in favor of the benefits of
cooperation. For the first 1.3. The main drawback
time in the post-Soviet The U.S.—Russia relations have of the «reset» is that it
era, the U.S. has partial- markedly improved over the past does not provide strategic
ly revised its position on two years. The «reset» of relations goal and perspectives for
Russia-related issues and proposed by the Barack Obama the U.S.—Russian rela-
its interests with regard administration has been a success tions. It is isolated from
to Russia for the sake of the main trends in inter-
gaining Moscow’s support national development
in matters of interest to Washington. Unlike and lacks regard for the opportunities that
the previous rounds, the current improvement these trends create for Russia and the United
of the U.S.—Russian relations rests on a more States now and will create in the future. In
solid foundation — namely, the parties have terms of content, the improvement of the
a clear and pragmatic understanding of their U.S.—Russian relations is largely retrospective
interests and the importance of constructive and is filled either with plots borrowed from
mutual relations for their implementation. the previous eras, reflecting the already non-

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existent threats (such as the problem of strate- bilization in Central Asia and, especially, in
gic offensive arms control), or with short-term the Greater Middle East; the creation of a rela-
needs of the parties (Iran, Afghanistan). tive «security vacuum» around non-aggressive
but increasingly stronger China (uncertainty
1.4. Although the atmosphere of the U.S.— around its foreign and foreign economic policy
Russian relations is improving, they are mak- objectively evokes apprehensions among its
ing no headway in terms of content or, at best, neighbors); and some others. If the U.S.—Rus-
are hanging up. The main reason for the low sian relations remain within the framework
sustainability of the current stage in the rela- of the present model and the present agenda,
tions is the absence of a strategic vision and they will hardly influence these trends.
complete subordination to short-term political
objectives. 1.7. To effectively address these and other
threats and challenges, as well as the decline
1.5. Retrospective in in the relative weight of
nature, the current To effectively address these and Russia and the United
improvement of the U.S.— other threats and challenges, as States in the international
Russian relations does not well as the decline in the relative system, they should adopt
affect present-day reali- weight of Russia and the United a new philosophy of rela-
ties; that is, it does not States in the international system, tions with each other. In
account for the impact — they should adopt a new philosophy particular, they should
largely negative — of the of relations with each other focus these relations on
fundamental shifts taking the task of overcoming
place in the international the growing world dis-
system. order and the ensuing threats to national,
regional and international security.
1.6. Both Russia’s and the U.S. foreign-policy
opportunities are shrinking due to the global 1.8. This goal implies building full-fledged
shift of power to new Asian centers, primarily friendly relations between Russia and the
China, and due to its general diffusion among U.S. which, in some cases, could even include
many states, not only the major ones. Rus- elements of a military-political alliance that
sia and the U.S. have come under the nega- would counteract a wide range of new threats
tive impact of global and regional challenges and challenges. It is very important that these
with which they are unable to cope either on close relations be open to engage other coun-
their own, or even jointly, without engag- tries. As the majority of these challenges are
ing other countries, above all new centers of of global or, at least, supranational nature,
power. These challenges include the growing they can be overcome only by comprehensive
number of nuclear states, not all of which will collective efforts of all interested and capable
be stable; the erosion of international law and members of the international community.
major international governing institutions; The reduction of Moscow’s and Washing-
the new submersion of Afghanistan into a ton’s leadership capabilities and foreign-
chaos more dangerous than before; the desta- policy opportunities makes the bilateral for-

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mat of their cooperation simply insufficient 1.11. If the parties resume bitter rivalry or even
for effective regulation of various aspects of confrontation, the weakening of Moscow’s
international life. This regulation requires and Washington’s international positions will
multilateral and broad interaction. grow faster. There can be no return of history,
as some conservative American authors would
1.9. This task prioritizes building tripartite like to see, if the larger part of the U.S.—
partnerships among the U.S., Russia and Chi- Russian agenda is again given to rivalry in
na and among the U.S., Russia and the EU. regional issues and disputes over global ones.
The U.S.—Russian partnership can serve as Russia will not «mobilize,» if its confrontation
an organic complement and link to allied with the United States grows, as many Russian
relations between Russia and the EU in secu- strategists hope. Engrossed in mutual con-
rity, economy and human ties (an «Alliance frontation, Moscow and Washington would
of Europe»5 //Sergei Karaganov, Timofei have to pay less and less attention to real com-
Bordachev, Fyodor Lukyanov. «Towards mon threats and challenges. In addition, they
an Alliance of Europe.» would not be able to build
http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/ a multilateral partnership
valdai/Alliance%20eng. This task prioritizes building tripartite to counter new challenges
pdf//); a new kind of rela- partnerships among the U.S., Russia collectively, which is so
tions between Russia and and China and among the U.S., Russia vital for themselves and
NATO; and strategic rela- and the EU the whole world.
tions between Russia and
China. For the time being, such constructs are 1.12. For Russia, a return to and — all the more
absent in the relations of all these actors. so — an aggravation of confrontation with the
U.S. is fraught with conservation of the stagna-
1.10. The building of friendly and, on some tion and of the authoritarian path of develop-
dimensions, allied relations does not require ment. It will also challenge the very possibility
that Russia and the United States overcome of its social, economic and political moderni-
some fundamental obstacles. Thanks to the zation. The conflict will significantly weak-
success of the «reset» of the U.S.—Russian en Russia’s positions with regard to Europe,
relations, U.S. policy — for the first time since China and former Soviet countries. Russia
the mid-1990s — does not undermine Russia’s could succeed as an anti-American center of
vital interests (for example, in the post-Soviet power only if the United States resumes the
space). The political challenge that U.S. policy aggressive, messianic and unilateral policy
continues to pose to Russia is much less danger- that was characteristic of the George W. Bush
ous to it than the threats and challenges that are administration in the first years of his stay in
common to both countries. Moscow, on its part, office. In this case, the U.S. policy will trigger
poses no threat to U.S. fundamental interests, resentment of the majority of countries. How-
and even facilitates implementation of some of ever, this scenario is unlikely in the short term
them. This factor offers a window of opportu- (if only due to financial/economic and social
nities in their relations that is unprecedented limitations in the U.S.); and, in the long term,
when one looks at the past two decades. it is disadvantageous for Russia because of the

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general destabilization of the international as worsen Washington’s relations with those


system that will unavoidably follow any new European and Asian allies that find confron-
surge of U.S. aggressive behavior. tation with Russia undesirable. Lastly, it will
increase the probability of a global confronta-
1.13. For the United States, a new confronta- tion between the U.S. and China — and the
tion with Russia is fraught with a failure to balance of power might be not necessarily to
implement many of its top-priority — both the U.S.’s advantage.
short- and long-term — national foreign-pol-
icy interests. It will result in a deterioration 1.14. The authors of the report realize that
of the situation in Afghanistan, reduction some of their proposals might look unrealistic.
of the opportunities for settling the nuclear Traditionalist views still prevail in the minds
problems of Iran and South Korea, and an of the elites of both countries. However, the
aggravation of the nuclear non-proliferation aim of this report is to start revising obsolete
regime crisis. It may threaten the strategic and inadequate intellectual paradigm which
stability and global military-political security, still frames the current U.S.—Russiann rela-
and make the international system more con- tions. So that in 5 — 10 — 15 years this para-
flict-prone and less governable. Also, it may digm would be rejected and a more realist and
facilitate the consolidation of anti-American modernist one would come in its place. In the
regimes in Asia and Latin America, as well hope that a policy change would then follow.

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2. Russia and the U.S. in the


World of Today and Tomorrow

2.1. W
 hither the World: Challenges to 2.1.2. There is a general diffusion of power in
Russia and the U.S. the international system — more and more
countries, even not big ones, now harbor ambi-
2.1.1. The world keeps changing at an unprec- tions for a bigger role in global governance. For
edented pace. First of all, there has been a example, Brazil and Turkey have come up with
redistribution of power from the Euro-Atlantic their own project for resolving the problem
region to Asia-Pacific. Asian centers of power, of the Iranian nuclear program. Governing
above all China, have been growing stronger initiatives of the traditional centers are being
both economically and met with increasing skep-
politically, while the tra- ticism, even within the
ditional centers, includ- There has been a redistribution of framework of their allies.
ing the U.S., have been power from the Euro-Atlantic region As a result, the interna-
losing their leadership to Asia-Pacific. Asian centers of tional system is becom-
capabilities. The Obama power, above all China, have been ing increasingly decen-
administration’s attempts growing stronger both economically tralized and fragmented,
to restore the U.S. global and politically, while the traditional while its governability by
positions by adapting the centers, including the U.S., have been major powers, both the
American leadership to losing their leadership capabilities «old» and «new» ones, is
the new «post-unipolar» declining.
international conditions
have not been an obvious success thus far. 2.1.3. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has
New non-Western centers of power are not apparently become irreversible. Iran will likely
willing yet to participate in global governance follow, in one form or another, in the footsteps
together with traditional leaders and to build of India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. The
some kind of universal order, even if some- question is whether this chain reaction can
what reformed. These factors limit the oppor- be stopped, for example, with regard to Arab
tunities to build a new global «Concert». states. There is uncertainty about long-term

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Countries with Nuclear Weapons Capability


The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968, but new members
continue to join
First nuclear test
USSR/Russia China
First thermonuclear test
1949 1953 1964 1967
Great Britain

1952 1957

France North
Unied Korea
States 1960 1968
2006
1945
1952 Israel Pakistan India
(allegedly)
1979 (?) 1998 1974

Nuclear states (obtained nuclear Obtained nuclear May have nuclear weapons within
weapons before the Non-Proliferation weapons after 1968
Treaty was signed in 1968)

prospects for the non-nuclear status of Japan can bring about a new «Great Migration of
and South Korea. If nuclear weapons are Peoples,» which will drastically change the
obtained by internally unstable countries, it is economic and political map of the world. Glo-
very likely that these weapons will fall into the bal warming, the industrial rise of new actors
hands of non-state actors. Along with nuclear in Asia, the increasing demand for food and
weapons proliferation, there is a proliferation mineral resources in the rapidly developing
of missile technologies. nations, environmental degradation in the
world and the ensuing reduction of arable
2.1.4. The escalation of economic competition lands all contribute to the competition for
will most likely increase the de-globalization food, arable lands, drinking water and mineral
trend and barriers to the movement of goods, resources. As a result, a new struggle is unfold-
capital and people. The growth of the world ing for control over territories.
economy may slow down. This trend will hit
China harder, but it will affect other countries 2.1.6. There is an ongoing renaissance of the
as well, including the United States and Rus- nation-state. The world economic crisis of
sia. Some members of the American political 2008-2009 has drawn a line under the era of
elite have recently started to suggest that economic deregulation. Faced by the growing
the U.S. will benefit from de-globalization chaos in international relations, states are
in the short term (that it will help solve the seeking to strengthen their sovereignty and
problems of foreign debt, trade and budget fence themselves off from the negative effects
deficits, unemployment and the redistribution of the globalization. However, nationally-ori-
of power in the world). But America will lose ented policies cannot cope with supranational
in the long term. Instability and the possibil- threats.
ity of conflicts in international relations will
continue to increase. 2.1.7. The effectiveness of the leading interna-
tional institutions continues declining. After
2.1.5. There are growing signs of climate the Obama administration came to power in
change, which will increasingly influence the the U.S., Washington has stopped deliber-
situation in the world economy and inter- ately weakening them; however, the decay of
national security. In the next few decades, it international institutions persists due to the

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Share of Asian countries in world GDP


South Korea India China Japan Others Asia

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 Estimates

Dynamics of the share of Russia and


the United States in global GDP (%)
25
23,78 23,63
23,20 22,97 22,99 23,09 23,49 23,37 23,14 22,91
22,81 22,99 22,61 22,37
21,88
21,27
20 20,76
20,42
20,22

15

10

4,21
3,77
5 3,19 2,96 2,89 2,95 3,01 3,08 3,17 3,25 3,02 3,02
2,75 2,68 2,47 2,54 2,67 2,74 2,79

0
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Source: IMF United States Russia estimated

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U.S. troops in Afghanistan


The start of withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan is planned for 2011

Number of troops (at the end of the year)

22100 24700 31800 60000 90000


2500 9700 13100 16700 17800

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Casualties

98 117 155 317 429


12 49 48 52 99

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Sources: icasualties.org, NYT, ISAF Number of troops Casualties

unwillingness of major states to coordinate States. However, there is a probability that


their policies. Russia will become an energy and raw mate-
rials appendage and, in the long term, a
2.1.8. Challenges to international security will «younger political brother» of rising China.
persist, such as international terrorism, organ- For the United States, strengthening of China,
ized crime, drug trafficking, piracy, cyber-ter- which formerly allowed the U.S. to maintain
rorism, and internal wars and conflicts. a high level of domestic consumption due
to mutual trade, is now
2.1.9. Uncertainty about becoming a burning issue
the future foreign, mili- Russia and the U.S. do not pose of economic security: it
tary and foreign-econom- direct military threats to each other, is a factor that boosts
ic policies of China in the either in the field of conventional unemployment, trade
conditions of its economic forces in Europe, or in the strategic and budget deficit, and a
and military-political rise sphere U.S foreign debt that may
is the largest regional soon equal U.S. GDP. The
challenge for Russia and rise of China also poses a
the U.S. China’s growing power is a source of challenge to America as the only superpower,
concern, regardless of its current restrained to its global leadership capability and posi-
and quite peaceful policy (although from time tions in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition,
to time China does resort to a more asser- the United States’ image as the most success-
tive policy, for example, when it proclaimed ful development model and the most dynamic
its sovereignty over the South China Sea). and competitive economy in the world has
As Russia keeps predominance over China been challenged, as well.
in nuclear arms and their political relations
remain friendly, the possibility of a military 2.1.10. Another serious challenge to the United
conflict or arms race between them will be States and Russia is posed by uncertainty about
ruled out. In the military-political sphere, the future of Afghanistan after the withdrawal
Moscow and Beijing have already achieved of NATO troops from the country and by pos-
the relations of «post-deterrence», which we sible destabilization in Central Asia. Since the
are going to offer to Russia and the United United States and NATO are unable to sta-

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bilize the situation in Afghanistan through a and the U.S. finds it more and more difficult
victory over the Taliban or an agreement with to keep Israel from delivering a strike against
it on stable terms that would be acceptable to Iran.// with disastrous consequences. It may
the Coalition, Afghanistan will continue to be also trigger a new round of nuclear prolifera-
a source of regional instability, international tion and increase tensions across the region
terrorism, and religious extremism. This is (many Middle Eastern countries view Iran as
already a serious threat for Pakistan and it can their rival).
become a big threat for weak states in Central
Asia and for other Afghanistan’s neighbors — 2.1.12. This short list of challenges shows that
Iran, China and India. As early as within the the main threats to Russia and the U.S. in the
next few years, Russia may face the threat of a world of today and tomorrow stem not from
new regional war in Tajikistan as a result of the each other’s policies but from external glo-
export of instability from Afghanistan — espe- bal and regional factors. Russia and the U.S.
cially as internal sources do not pose direct mili-
of instability are exacer- tary threats to each other,
Another serious challenge to the
bating in Central Asia: either in the field of con-
United States and Russia is posed
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan ventional forces in Europe,
by uncertainty about the future of
and Kazakhstan will soon or in the strategic sphere.
Afghanistan after the withdrawal
undergo a change in their A conventional «big war»
of NATO troops from the country
top leadership. Another in Europe is physically
and by possible destabilization in
Central Asian country, impossible. The preserva-
Central Asia. Since the United States
Kyrgyzstan, is a de facto tion by Russia and the U.S.
and NATO are unable to stabilize
failed state. of their ability to physi-
the situation in Afghanistan through
cally destroy each other,
a victory over the Taliban or an
2.1.11. The possible desta- while maintaining appro-
agreement with it on stable terms
bilization of the Greater priate confidence-building
that would be acceptable to the
Middle East will also pose measures and strategic
Coalition, Afghanistan will continue
a wide range of challenges stability, has a stabilizing
to be a source of regional instability,
for Russia and the United effect both on their own
international terrorism, and religious
States. It can be brought policies and the policies
extremism
about, for example, by the of other nuclear and non-
collapse of Iraq after the nuclear countries.
withdrawal of U.S. troops and the involve-
ment of Iran and Turkey in the conflict. Paki- 2.1.13. The new global and regional threats
stan may face destabilization too, in which make meaningless and irrelevant the U.S.
radical Islamists may gain access to nuclear strategy of ensuring «geopolitical pluralism»
weapons. Finally, the acquisition of nuclear in the post-Soviet space (a strategy when a
weapons by Iran or its becoming a thresh- support of centrifugal tendencies and anti-
old state would increase the probability of a Russian elites in the former Soviet Union
pre-emptive military strike by Israel against becomes a systemic goal of the U.S. policies in
it //The military policy of Israel is growing the region) and isolating Russia from political
increasingly unpredictable and independent, Europe.

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Dynamics of macroeconomic indicators


in the United States estimated

Year GDP (billions GDP per Inflation, consumer Unemployment State debt External
of USD) capita (USD)* goods (% against (% of available balance
the previous year) workforce) (billions of USD
billions % of GDP
of USD

2000 9951,48 35251,93 3,37 3,97 5450,47 54,77 -416,38


2001 10286,18 36064,52 2,82 4,74 5625,28 54,69 -397,15
2002 10642,30 36949,99 1,60 5,78 6072,10 57,06 -458,07
2003 11142,18 38324,38 2,30 5,99 6725,45 60,36 -520,68
2004 11867,75 40450,62 2,67 5,54 7281,65 61,36 -630,49
2005 12638,38 42680,64 3,37 5,08 7785,08 61,60 -747,59
2006 13398,93 44822,96 3,22 4,61 8182,34 61,07 -802,64
2007 14061,80 46577,19 2,87 4,61 8739,19 62,15 -718,09
2008 14369,08 47155,32 3,82 5,82 10220,53 71,13 -668,86
2009 14119,05 45934,47 -0,32 9,28 11896,59 84,26 -378,43
2010 14624,18 47131,95 1,42 9,73 13558,79 92,72 -466,51

Source: IMF * - by purchasing power parity

2.1.14. The U.S. policy still poses a serious be impossible. Meanwhile, Russia can lose its
political challenge for Russia as regards some position as an independent center of power
of its vital interests, primarily in the post-Sovi- in the new world. Despite the trend of recent
et space and in the field of European security. years to rank the Russian Federation as a
However, this challenge is much weaker now «new rising center» of the world economy and
than it was two years ago politics, it became obvi-
and less critical than the America will remain the strongest ous at the end of 2008
new global and regional state militarily, economically and that Russia and America
threats. politically at least until the middle of belong to one group of
the 21st century; however, the gap in weakening — albeit at dif-
aggregate might between the United ferent rates — centers of
States and other centers of power, power.
2.2. Consequences for above all China, will decrease
Russia and the U.S. 2.2.2. On the whole, the
year 2008 was a landmark
2.2.1. Russia and the U.S. will continue to for both Russia and the U.S., as each country
lose, although on a different scale, their rela- found itself in a fundamentally new situation.
tive weight in the global economy and poli- Both had gone through the «post-Soviet»
tics. America will remain the strongest state period, when the U.S. sought to consolidate
militarily, economically and politically at least the «unipolar moment,» while Russia tried to
until the middle of the 21st century; however, reassert its influence and prestige.
the gap in aggregate might between the United
States and other centers of power, above all 2.2.3. The U.S. in 2008 acutely felt the conse-
China, will decrease. The U.S. will find it quences of the Bush administration’s failure to
increasingly difficult to achieve advantageous use the «unipolar moment» and to complete —
decisions on the international arena, especially unilaterally and decisively — the rebuilding of
unilaterally. At the same time, effective global the international system, which had started
governance without the United States will still with the end of the Cold War, to make it meet

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U.S. interests and values. Embroiled in two modernization and total corruption — is much
prolonged and actually lost wars, faced with less sustainable than other major economies,
worsened relations with its allies and their whether developed or developing, and that it
shaken loyalty, and confronted by the much was hit the hardest by the crisis. The threat of
faster growth of new centers of power than Russia’s becoming a raw-materials appendage
previously expected, the United States has of not only Europe but also Asia, primarily
found itself in a far less favorable world and in China, is already looming large. The Russian
a much weaker state than it was at the begin- population continues decreasing. In terms of
ning of the decade. investments in education and science, Russia
is lagging behind not only developed coun-
2.2.4. In the economic field, in 2008 the tries but even behind less successful among
United States faced the gravest crisis since the developing ones. Siberia and the Russian
the 1930s, which exacerbated the problems Far East pose a separate problem. In those
of the U.S. budget deficit and external debt regions, the aforementioned problems are
and has made it impossible for Washington coupled with depopulation and the inevitable
to continue its costly foreign and military aggravation of international competition for
policies. The United States’ slow recovery from their resources.
the crisis attests to a decline in U.S. economic
dynamism, which had been the basis of its 2.2.7. All of these factors, both domestic and
strength and attractiveness and distinguished international, have already led to changes
it favorably from other developed countries for in the policies of both countries. In Rus-
many years. The slow eco- sia, «changes» are most-
nomic growth also means For Russia, the year 2008 saw ly limited to talk about
that the problem of the the peak of its recovery after the modernization (chiefly
U.S. budget deficit will 1990s. At the same time, it showed «technological») and the
have to be solved through the limits of its development and establishment of «mod-
cuts in spending, includ- strengthening within the framework ernization alliances» with
ing defense spending. of an «authoritarian/energy» model. developed countries for
The United States failed to oppose obtaining advanced tech-
2.2.5. For Russia, the Russia with anything in view of its nologies. In the United
year 2008 saw the peak military victory over a U.S. ally, States, a new president
of its recovery after the Georgia, but it even had to stop has come to power, he
1990s. At the same time, NATO enlargement to the post-Soviet has launched sweeping
it showed the limits of space reforms in the home and
its development and foreign policies. The new
strengthening within U.S. global strategy takes
the framework of an «authoritarian/energy» as a reference point not «America’s victory in
model. The United States failed to oppose the Cold War» but the recognition of the new
Russia with anything in view of its military vic- redistribution and diffusion of power in the
tory over a U.S. ally, Georgia, but it even had world. It assigns primary importance to the
to stop NATO enlargement to the post-Soviet organization of collective action by the most
space. However, the war with the former Sovi- capable members of the international commu-
et republic and the unwillingness of the other nity to counter common threats and challenges
CIS members to recognize independence of under the U.S. leadership and in the hope for
Abkhazia and South Ossetia showed that Rus- its preservation amid the new conditions.
sia’s strengthening in the post-Soviet space
had its limits and that classical hegemony is 2.2.8. However, despite its progressive nature,
simply impossible there. this strategy is unlikely to be fully implement-
ed — partly because of the insufficient aware-
2.2.6. Russia has effectively used the benefits ness of new threats by old and especially new
of its geopolitical and geo-economic position centers of power, and partly because of a heavy
and has begun restoring, on the new basis, its burden of accumulated problems and a sharp
military might, undermined in the past two division of the American elite. Finally, this
decades. However, it became apparent in early strategy is aimed not so much at solving the
2009 that the Russian economy — because main problems faced by mankind and over-
of its primitive structure, the ongoing de- coming the new world disorder, as at restoring

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The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»:
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Main Russia’s imports (%)


33,18
2009 Others

43,92
0,57 Machinery
0,63 and equipment
0,64
0,68
0,76
0,90
0,92
1,10
2,06
2,29
2,66
4,41
5,66
Automobiles

2007 51,40 2005 30,28


20,89
0,55 Others Machinery 0,52 Others
0,61 and equipment 0,71
0,71 0,86
0,74 0,86
0,78 0,88
1,18 0,91
1,26 1,11
1,62
1,49 1,92
1,80 2,74
2,89 4,13
3,00 8,33 44,44
12,70 Automobiles
Automobiles Machinery
and equipment
Fresh and Clothing Others Furniture Machinery
Ferrous metals
frozen meat and equipment

Alcoholic and Medicines Sugar Leather shoes


Automobiles
non-alcoholic beverages
Fresh and Citrus fruits Steel pipes Source: Federal
frozen poultry Customs Service

U.S. leadership in the new international con- and are largely targeted towards those areas
ditions. Instead of true collectivism, it offers where Washington believes its partner plays
selective and actually limited involvement of an important role and where it can provide
some or rather centers of power in the imple- essential assistance. Such «partnerships» can
mentation of a Washington-proposed agenda. neither restore U.S. leadership, nor stop the
Not surprisingly, the Obama administration’s onset of new disorder.
attempts to build or renovate partner relations
with a majority of the centers of power in the
world have failed, while in relations with some
of them, for example China, Washington is 2.3. The Interests of Russia and the
returning to a more traditional policy. The Interests of the U.S.
partner relations that have been a success so
far (for the time being only with Russia) do 2.3.1. A detailed analysis of the foreign-policy
not cover the entire range of new challenges interests of Russia and the United States,

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Main Russia’s exports (%)


2009 12,11
32,81
1,93 Crude oil
2,20
2,59
3,14
3,96

5,17

5,83
16,43
13,82
Natural gas

2007 2005
34,06 14,60
1,08 10,14 Other goods
34,25
1,60 Natural gas Natural gas
1,70 1,62
2,93 1,68
3,41 2,87
4,21
5,31
5,34
5,36

6,30 7,73
15,36 14,55
12,76
Natural gas 13,15

Machinery
Crude oil Natural gas Ferrous metals
and equipment
Non-ferrous metals Semi-processed and Coal Fertilizers
(aluminum, copper, nickel) rolled carbon steel

Wood and pulp Other goods Wheat and meslin Source: Federal
and paper products Customs Service

which we conducted in 2009 //See the report in relations with third countries and regions
«Reconfiguration, Not Just a Reset: Russia’s and in tendencies related to them. For Russia,
Interests in Relations with the United States this is the post-Soviet space, its place in the
of America», prepared by a team of authors European security system, and relations with
from the Council on Foreign and Defense Pol- China. For the U.S., this is the problems of
icy and the State University–Higher School East Asia and the Greater Middle East (China,
of Economics (Sergei Karaganov, Dmitry Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli con-
Suslov, Timofei Bordachev) under the aegis flict and North Korea) and Latin America.
of the Valdai International Discussion Club
in July 2009. http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/ 2.3.2. The larger part of the parties’ interests,
Doklad_eng_reset_june2009.pdf//, showed including those that are vital to them, coincide.
that they generally meet the above challenges These include: preventing the destabilization
and trends. The main interests of Russia and of international politics in the sphere of stra-
the U.S. lie not in their bilateral relations but tegic security; ensuring peaceful rise of China;

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limiting and preventing WMD proliferation; the persisting desire of the two countries’ elit-
stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, Paki- es to contain and balance each other, instead
stan and Iraq; settling the Indo-Pakistani and of jointly addressing problems of tomorrow, is
Arab-Israeli conflicts; finding a solution to the becoming an increasingly obvious atavism.
problem of the nuclear programs of Iran and
North Korea; fighting international terrorism; 2.3.6. There are strong sentiments in both
preventing climate change; and combating countries in favor of drifting further away
drug trafficking, piracy and organized crime. from each other. These sentiments belong to
the past. The elites in both countries must
2.3.3. However, the coinciding interests rank understand that the United States and Russia
differently in the hierarchy of the parties’ for- are important to each other, albeit in a new
eign-policy interests, and the spheres of their way — not as adversaries and the leaders of
vital interests are different as well. This cre- opposing camps, but as partners (sometimes
ates favorable prerequisites for the exchang- indispensable ones) in countering new chal-
ing of mutual respect of important interests of lenges and using opportunities offered by the
each other at the expense new world.
of less important inter- The main interests of Russia and the
ests. Each party can make U.S. lie not in their bilateral relations 2.3.7. Russia and the U.S.
concessions on matters but in relations with third countries no longer can — on their
that are less important and regions and in tendencies own or even jointly —
to it and step up coop- related to them. For Russia, this is direct the development of
eration on them with the the post-Soviet space, its place in the new world in the long-
other party, thus promot- the European security system, and term strategic perspective.
ing the implementation relations with China. For the U.S., At present, the parties
of the other party’s vital this is the problems of East Asia and have not only common
interests. This is what the Greater Middle East (China, Iran, global interests but also
has actually happened, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli quite frequent reasons of
in an undeclared way, in conflict and North Korea) and Latin their own that dictate the
U.S.—Russian relations America need and expediency of
recently. building a new relation-
ship between themselves.
2.3.4. Finally, the areas of conflicting interests
of Russia and the U.S. relate to the problems 2.3.7.1. For Russia, friendly relations with the
that are losing their relevance in the current U.S., even with elements of an alliance, would
international situation. The problem of the make it possible to:
restoration of the U.S. sole leadership in the • have stronger positions in relations with
world and the build-up of U.S. military superi- now-friendly China and less fears about
ority over all other countries is not really burn- prospects of these relations;
ing or relevant these days. (As the wars in Iraq • solve, sooner or later, the problem of the
and Afghanistan have shown, the U.S. military unfinished Cold War, the persisting mili-
superiority cannot be converted into political tary-political division between Russia and
successes, and the current economic problems the rest of Europe;
in the U.S. will bring it to naught). The same • address the key tasks of the country’s tech-
refers to the spread of democracy and the nological modernization, efficient use of
American model of development. Even if a Russia’s competitive advantages through the
new president in the U.S. attempts to conduct development of Siberia and the Russian Far
such a policy, it will only exacerbate still fur- East, modernization of the extraction and
ther the country’s international position. processing of minerals, and the develop-
ment of modern agricultural production,
2.3.5. All these factors are creating objective especially in the Asian part of the country;
prerequisites for the further consolidation by • The internal political and economic develop-
the parties of exchanging of mutual important ment of Russia in the coming years will like-
interests and for building eventually a friendly ly reduce the base of its political influence
or even selectively allied relationship with in the world. It is only allied and friendly
regard to threats and challenges that are exter- relations with the United States, as well as
nal to both Russia and the U.S. In this regard, with China and the EU, that can help the

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Atoms for peace or nuclear weapons?

CASPIAN SEA
Sahand

Bonab
Neka
Qazvin Chalus

Karaj
Tehran

Qom

Natanz
Anarak

Isfahan

Yazd
IRAQ
Darkhovin

Fasa
The United States and some
other countries suspect Iran of
developing nuclear weapons Bushehr
under the guise of a civilian
nuclear program
PE
RS
Iranian leaders claim that the IA Gachin
nuclear program is aimed at N
GU
peaceful purposes and at LF
meeting the energy demand

Research center Nuclear power plant

Uranium enrichment site Uranium production site

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The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»:
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Common challenges for Russia �


and the United States
Terrorism Economic Global Depletion of natural
crisis warming resources

International tensions

Iran Afghanistan
Middle North
East Korea

India and
Pakistan

country retain the rank of the third world on besides Russia. The Obama administra-
power and, in the longer term, maintain real tion has failed to qualitatively improve its
sovereignty; relations with anyone but Russia. Projects of
• Finally, close relations with the strongest building strategic partnerships with China
and most developed democratic society will and even India have either failed or stalled.
inevitably affect the moral and political con- Washington is unable to build an effective
dition of the country, prevent its further deg- partnership even with Europe.
radation and enhance • Whereas China is the
modernization impuls- main promising partner
es in the socio-political The elites in both countries must of the U.S. for discussing
and moral spheres. understand that the United States the world economy, Rus-
and Russia are important to each sia is objectively indis-
2.3.7.2. The United States other, albeit in a new way — not pensable for managing
is no less interested in as adversaries and the leaders of international security.
close and even friendly opposing camps, but as partners Thanks to its geostrategic
relations with Russia: (sometimes indispensable ones) in position, nuclear arsenal,
• Russia is ready and able countering new challenges and using status in the UN Security
to cooperate with the opportunities offered by the new Council, participation in
U.S. on global issues to world major international cri-
a much greater extent sis-settlement formats
than other «new» cent- and, finally, its strategic
ers of power. China, India and Brazil have culture and global vision of the world, Rus-
different visions of global threats. They want sia is a player who wants to play. Other
to change the status quo in the pattern of partners no longer want — or are not yet
global problems management and are not willing — to play.
ready for systematic cooperation. Traditional • Only close interaction with Russia (while
allies in Europe are increasingly «withdraw- engaging other centers as well) can help
ing into themselves» and becoming weaker. the United States stop further prolifera-
The United States has actually no one to rely tion of nuclear weapons, including a prob-

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able «chain reaction» in the Greater Middle effect on China’s policy — just as the friendly
East. Russian-Chinese relations have a stabilizing
• Without close friendly cooperation with effect on U.S. foreign policy. Building a sys-
Russia (with the participation of other coun- tem of trilateral cooperation and a discussion
tries), the U.S. will not stop the avalanche- format between the U.S., Russia and China
like destabilization of the Gulf region and on matters of Asia-Pacific cooperation and
the Middle East, which will almost inevita- security will be a win-win for all the three
bly become aggravated after the withdrawal parties and the rest of the world.
of the United States and
NATO from Iraq and 2.3.8. But most impor-
Afghanistan, and after America and Russia have many tantly, America and Rus-
Iran acquires a nuclear common interests related to global sia have many common
capability in this or that and regional problems. With the interests related to glo-
form. Russian assistance ongoing transformation of the bal and regional prob-
is essential for ensuring international system, the number of lems. With the ongoing
the U.S.’s withdrawal common interests is only increasing, transformation of the
from Iraq and, especial- whereas the number of conflicting international system,
ly, Afghanistan on more interests is objectively decreasing. the number of common
acceptable terms. With- It is the national interests of the interests is only increas-
out that, the outcome of parties in the new international ing, whereas the number
the wars will look like conditions that require that Moscow of conflicting interests is
an even heavier defeat. and Washington build friendly objectively decreasing. It
• Finally, friendly or even relations and selective alliance is the national interests
selectively allied rela- of the parties in the new
tions with Russia will international conditions
allow the U.S. to prevent Russia’s possible that require that Moscow and Washington
sliding (considering the current trends in its build friendly relations and selective alliance.
internal development) to the position of a Confrontation between Russia and the United
peripheral partner of China, which will boost States, their perception of each other as poten-
the latter’s geopolitical weight. The build- tial adversaries and rivals, and a policy of
ing by the United States of close friendly establishing balances against each other do
relations with Russia will have a stabilizing not meet their national interests.

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The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»:
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3. T he U.S.—Russian Relations
at the Present Stage:
The Achievements and
Drawbacks of the «Reset»

3.1. The Main Achievements of the «Reset» «big strategy» and meeting its key foreign
policy priorities //Improving relations with
3.1.1. The U.S.—Russian relations have improved the leading centers of power in the world and
considerably since the announcement of the building partnerships with them along the
«reset» in relations between the two countries. lines of common interests; demonstrating an
This improvement was not a result of and is not improving situation in Afghanistan by build-
accompanied by Russia’s ceding its political or ing up troops and military activity; imposing
geopolitical positions, as often happened in the new sanctions against Iran; resuming nucle-
past. Moscow and Washington have overcome ar disarmament, stepping up nuclear non-
the threat of a new confrontation that was proliferation by strengthening the Nuclear
quite real in late 2008. They have proven their Non-proliferation Treaty regime.//.This is
ability to produce positive «cooperation prod- what made groundwork for the «reset» policy.
ucts» and attain tangible results. As of now, Russia, too, has displayed understanding of
the major such «product» is the new Strategic the significance of cooperation with the U.S.
Arms Reduction Treaty (START). By achieving for the modernization of its economy, imple-
its ratification before the end of 2010 at the cost mentation of its interests in the post-Soviet
of enormous political efforts and even conces- space and in the sphere of European security,
sions on domestic issues, the Obama adminis- and for carrying out a more successful policy
tration has proven its interest in preserving the in relations with the European Union and
achievements of the «reset» and in continuing China.
the policy of building more constructive and
partner relations with Russia. 3.1.3. The prime indicator of the success of
the «reset» is that the U.S.—Russian relations
3.1.2. Washington has realized that it needs have acquired a balanced nature. Russia sup-
Russia’s support in implementing its new ports the U.S. in issues of the international

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New START – attempt three


Reduction of deployed strategic nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States
Russia 1 550 800
, = 50 pieces

3897 809 *U.S. State Department data,


July 2009

United States 1 550 800

5 916 1188
Warheads Launchers
Actual number Restrictions under Actual number Restrictions under
in 2009* the new treaty (2010) in 2009* the new treaty (2010)

The treaty relates to the following combat-ready weapons:

intercontinental ballistic submarine-launched ballistic heavy bombers (range of


missiles (range of more than missiles (range of more than more than 8,000 km) with
5,500 km) and missile 600 km) and missile launchers nuclear missiles
launchers

political agenda that are significant for Wash- sent to Ukraine’s non-bloc status. The United
ington, and even goes as far as to partially States took a calm and neutral stance on the
revise own tactical interests — as long as this strengthening of Russia’s positions in Ukraine
does not contradict its vital interests. For and Kyrgyzstan, and has stopped to view
its part, the U.S. reduces activities on those their rapprochement with Russia through the
foreign policy directions that cause the great- prism of «the zero sum game.» In addition,
est concern for Russia, makes less emphasis Washington downgraded the significance of
on those of its national interests that sharply the remaining differences with Russia in the
contradict Russia’s interests. In a number of region (over Georgia) and does not let these
cases, it adopts the Russia-proposed agenda differences block cooperation in other issues.
and contributes to the implementation of cer-
tain important Russian interests — provided 3.1.5. Russia and the U.S. have stepped up the
they do not pose a big threat to the positions dialogue over European security. Although
of the Obama administration. the United States still does not share the
Russian vision of how to resolve the problem
3.1.4. For example, the U.S. has reconfigured of Europe’s persisting geopolitical split and
its approach to and even its interests in the the uncertainty regarding Russia’s place in
post-Soviet space, which has softened the it, it has begun to acknowledge the problem,
rivalry between Moscow and Washington in in the least. By way of response to Dmitry
the region and moved it into «the latent Medvedev’s initiative on the European Secu-
phase.» The issue of NATO expansion to rity Treaty, Washington offered Moscow an
former Soviet republics has been taken off ambitious (although hardly feasible) project
the immediate agenda, and Washington — to create a cooperative Russia-NATO tactical
for the first time during the entire post- missile defense system. The U.S. offered Rus-
Soviet period — has officially stated its con- sia a trial idea (which largely agrees with its

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The U.S.—Russia Relations after the «Reset»:
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position of the 1990s) on giving some more over creating a mechanism for the exchange
authority to the Organization for Security and of information on launches of ballistic mis-
Cooperation in Europe (creating a conflict siles and space launch vehicles.
prevention mechanism, etc.).
3.1.9. Russia and the U.S. have stepped up
3.1.6. Moscow and Washington have intensi- interaction at many levels, including through
fied their economic dialogue, including on a newly created Presidential Commission. Its
high technology, innovations and moderni- activity, although somewhat formal at times,
zation, and signed agreements on science is becoming more meaningful.
and technology partnership (although the
discussion of the possible use of the U.S. as 3.1.10. One of the main achievements of the
an external source for Russian modernization «reset» is that the Russian elite no longer has
has been largely formal and demonstrative the reasons to present the U.S. as nearly the
so far). By October 2010, Russia and the U.S. greatest threat to Russia’s security and inter-
had declared that they had completed the national political positions, as was the case in
WTO talks (later it turned out that it was not the second half of the 2000s (although such
entirely true) and removed one of the main attempts — hopefully, subsiding — are still
obstacles to Russia’s join- being made). Tradition-
ing this organization and ally anti-Russian forces
One of the main achievements of the
an irritant in the U.S.— in the United States are
«reset» is that the Russian elite no
Russian relations. Lastly, also yielding their posi-
longer has the reasons to present the
the Obama administra- tions. As a result of the
U.S. as nearly the greatest threat to
tion has lifted the unilat- changes in the U.S. policy
Russia’s security and international
eral sanctions against a in the post-Soviet space
political positions
number of Russian organ- and the U.S. stance on
izations which had been Russia’s participation in
imposed for their coop- the European security
eration with Iran. system, the threats and challenges common
to Russia and the U.S. now obviously out-
3.1.7. For its part, Russia withdrew its demand weigh the challenges posed by the U.S. policy
for imposing limitation on the U.S. missile towards Russia. The U.S.—Russian relations
defense policy within the framework of the have acquired the logic of pragmatism and are
talks over the new START, and thus ensured now driven by the parties’ interests — the way
that it be signed before the nuclear secu- they are understood by the political leader-
rity summit convened by Washington in April ship of the two countries.
2010 and before the May 2010 NPT Review
Conference. It thereby made a sizable con- 3.1.11. However, there remains a value gap
tribution to the implementation of the new between the two countries, which stands
U.S. nuclear strategy. Russia supported new in the way of their rapprochement. Amer-
UN sanctions against Iran and reversed its ica is suspicious about the model of an
decision to supply advanced S-300 missile authoritarian corrupt state, which has by
systems to that country. Lastly, Russia has now emerged in Russia, even though the
intensified cooperation with the U.S. over latter has proclaimed its desire to build a
Afghanistan (ground and air transit corridors, developed democracy. Russia takes the U.S.
training of police and drug police for Afghani- rhetoric and efforts to spread its model in
stan, supplies of armaments, etc). the world as a cover for expanding the zone
of American political, economic and even
3.1.8 The re-launching of the «frozen military (before the suspension of NATO
projects» in nuclear power engineering came expansion) influence. But this gap is incom-
as a benchmark in the improvement of the mensurable with the abyss that divided the
U.S.—Russian relations. An Agreement for two countries during the Cold War, while
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear mutual suspicions that the other party wants
Energy (Agreement 123) came into force; the to expand the sphere of its influence are an
parties signed for the second time an accord increasingly obvious atavism and the inertia
committing each to recycle 34 tons of weap- of the past rivalry which prevents the coun-
on-grade plutonium and resumed discussion tries’ rational rapprochement.

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3.2. The Main Drawbacks of the «Reset» relations and inevitably implies that Russia
and the U.S. secretly pursue a hostile policy
3.2.1. The main drawback of the «reset» is towards each other is but groundless old-style
that it is facing the past in terms of its con- thinking. Mutual deterrence remains, but the
tent, while the improved U.S.—Russian rela- civilizing role of the strategic nuclear poten-
tions lack a strategic perspective. Conceptu- tials comes to the foreground today.
ally, these relations stand apart from the
new trends in and challenges to international 3.2.3. Essentially, many achievements of the
development that are gaining momentum. «reset» policy came as a result of «clearing the
The greater part of the achievements of the debris» of the 1990s and the 2000s, i.e. imple-
«reset» and the persisting menting (and making
differences between Rus- certain additions to) the
The main drawback of the «reset»
sia and the U.S. reflect plans that had not been
is that it is facing the past in terms
the old agenda and the realized then. For exam-
of its content, while the improved
old paradigm, according ple, Moscow and Wash-
U.S.-Russia relations lack a strategic
to which Moscow and ington reanimated the
perspective. Conceptually, these
Washington had to bal- agreement on recycling
relations stand apart from the
ance — including by arms weapons-grade plutoni-
new trends in and challenges to
control — each other’s um, the project to set up a
international development that are
military-strategic might. center for the exchange of
gaining momentum
This paradigm suggesting information about missile
that the greatest threat to launches and the agree-
Russia and the U.S. emanates from each other ment on cooperation in peaceful atom. Wash-
has lost relevance. ington now tries to reanimate CFE Treaty. One
cannot fail to notice that the joint statements
3.2.2. The theoretical capability of Russia or made at the Russia-U.S. summit in Washing-
the U.S. to destroy each other makes a stabiliz- ton on June 24, 2010, repeated many points of
ing impact upon their relations and excludes, the Declaration on Strategic Framework of the
rather than creates, the possibility of the U.S.—Russian Relations adopted by Vladimir
emergence of a real military threat to Russia Putin and George Bush at the Sochi summit in
from the U.S. or vice versa. Mutually assured April 2008, when the U.S.—Russian relations
destruction (MAD) has been and will be part were already at a downturn.
of the reality of the U.S.—Russian relations.
But the assumption that MAD «constitutes the 3.2.4. Although much of the present-day
material and technical foundation» for these U.S.—Russian agenda is the response to the

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threats that emerged after the end of the Cold the problems that no longer exist or do not
War and they have an important significance deserve the attention they are being paid.
in international politics, these threats no • Russia continues to view as an irritant, if
longer belong to the most dangerous funda- not a threat, the Obama administration’s
mental challenges. And even if they do, the policy to build a missile defense system in
U.S.—Russiann response to the new challeng- Europe. Washington’s refusal to take a truly
es is often based on the admittedly obsolete multilateral approach to this issue and the
or incorrect premises that do not match the insufficient transparency of its actions do
present-day realities. For example, such are not enhance mutual confidence, but it would
the attempts to strengthen the non-prolifera- be incorrect to say that these plans pose
tion regime by traditional a danger to the Russian
methods (demonstration strategic nuclear deter-
by the nuclear superpow- Russia continues to view as an rence potential. The same
ers of their commitment irritant, if not a threat, the Obama holds true for Russia’s
to nuclear weapons reduc- administration’s policy to build a concern over U.S. plans to
tion or punctual strength- missile defense system in Europe. deploy long-range ballis-
ening of the International Washington’s refusal to take a truly tic missiles equipped with
Atomic Energy Organiza- multilateral approach to this issue non-nuclear warheads
tion). At present, these and the insufficient transparency of (Prompt Global Strike),
measures are insufficient. its actions do not enhance mutual which are hardly feasible
More coordinated pres- confidence in the foreseeable future.
sure on Iran and North Anyway, they are unlikely
Korea is needed, along to pose a serious threat to
with the efforts to work out models for pro- Russia’s strategic deterrence potential.
viding stability in the conditions of nuclear • For its part, the United States raises the
multipolarity. issue of cuts in the Russian arsenal of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons — which by no means
Another crucial achievement of the «reset» is threatens it or NATO countries in Europe —
less competition in the territory of the former only for the reason that Russia has a quan-
Soviet Union. It is impossible to skip it while titative superiority and because it just needs
trying to secure friendly Russia-U.S. relations. to continue — somehow — the process of
Yet viewing it as an ultimate achievement is nuclear weapons reductions. As a result,
unjustified either, because an improvement Russia and the U.S. trade accusations and
of the U.S.—Russian relations with regard to claims which start to live their own life that
the CIS without stepping up cooperation in has nothing to do with the real international
confronting new challenges and threats does situation and cause serious damage to their
not make Russia or the U.S. more influential relations.
and will not ensure their security in the new
world. 3.2.6. Russia and the U.S. have not overcome
their obsolete geopolitical controversies. The
3.2.5. The greater part of the remaining contra- solution of many of them has been postponed
dictions between Russia and the U.S. involve or they have become latent. For example, the

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U.S. has not changed its basically negative as a junior partner, at best. In Russia, the
stance on Russia’s strengthening its positions majority of the ruling elite call for creating a
in the post-Soviet space and on the develop- bipolar Euro-Atlantic space represented by
ment of the Russia-led integration project. NATO and the EU on the one part, and the
Today this stance has less tactical influence on CSTO and the CIS, on the other, with both
the practical agenda of the U.S.—Russian rela- parties being equal. This kind of order would
tions than before. The accumulation by Russia mean a revival of bipolar Europe and appear
of a «critical mass» of successes in the post- as a farce after the Cold War tragedy. It must
Soviet space or the emergence of new instabil- be noted though that Russia’s idea of a new
ity in the Caucasus or Central Asia may again European Security Treaty still aims at building
put the parties’ rivalry in the region on the top a whole Europe. Our idea of creating an Alli-
of the agenda of their relations. On the part of ance of Europe also has the same aim.
Russia, the logic of geopolitical confrontation
with the U.S. is manifest- 3.2.8. Therefore, despite
ed in its policy towards the past two years of
some anti-American states Both parties, and especially the improvements, the U.S.—
(Iran, Venezuela and U.S., while declaring the objective Russian relations remain
Syria), which Russia has to build a Whole Europe with an fragile and unstable in
been pursuing largely in indivisible security space, in actual the face of international
revenge for Washington’s fact contribute to its persisting political and especially
support of anti-Russian split. Guided by the old geopolitical domestic political risks.
regimes and groups in the conceptions, the U.S is still The relations may wors-
post-Soviet space. apprehensive of a whole Europe en if Russia and the U.S.
with a strong Russia, and therefore again change the priori-
3.2.6.1. Meanwhile, even stands for the strengthening of the ties in their foreign-policy
a limited success of inte- NATO-centric order there, to which interests and downgrade
gration projects in the Moscow might be «fastened» as a the significance of those
former Soviet Union will junior partner, at best of them that have ensured
not turn Russia and its their political will to coop-
potential allies in these erate and minimize the
projects into a challenge to the United States, negative impact of their disagreements. It may
especially into a military-political challenge. occur as a result of a sharp aggravation of one
No less senseless and even counterproductive or several contradictions between Russia and
is Russia’s symbolic counteraction to the U.S. the U.S. (i.e. escalation of violence in the Cau-
where the latter has already lost or is losing casus), changes in domestic policies in one or
its dominance due to objective circumstances. both countries, or a failure of the current U.S.
Indeed, Washington will never be able to «Big Strategy» and a change to the «new-old»
return to the Monroe Doctrine, while Russia foreign-policy course.
will not dominate Eurasia, which geopolitics
of the past century feared so much. 3.2.9. This multiplies with the parties’ persist-
ing low mutual confidence and great mutual
3.2.7. Both parties, and especially the U.S., suspicion regarding each party’s motives and
while declaring the objective to build a Whole actions. This is especially characteristic of
Europe with an indivisible security space, in Russia, which is very suspicious of not only
actual fact contribute to its persisting split. U.S. policy in the CIS, but also the motives
Guided by the old geopolitical conceptions, behind its involvement in Afghanistan and its
the U.S is still apprehensive of a whole Europe counteraction to Iran’s policies. For the U.S.,
with a strong Russia, and therefore stands for the rejection of many elements of the Rus-
the strengthening of the NATO-centric order sian political system will remain a permanent
there, to which Moscow might be «fastened» negative factor.

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4. R enewing of the
U.S.—Russiann Agenda

4.1. Preamble U.S.—Russian Bilateral Presidential Commis-


sion which has already started working and
4.1.1. We believe that U.S.—Russiann rela- prepares decisions to be taken at the top level
tions can and should be radically restructured and implements them.
within the current decade or next 10—15 years.
However, the proposed 4.1.3. Meanwhile, one
new philosophy of their should not forget about
Russia and the U.S. should maintain
relations cannot be intro- objective limitations,
and develop those mechanisms that
duced overnight by sim- either. The two countries’
make their mutual relations more
ply leaping over conflicts interests simply do not
robust and rich already now. These
persisting from the past. intersect in many areas.
mechanisms include informal and
New elements should be In the foreseeable future,
trust-based dialogues between the
introduced along with a the value gap between
elites and public groups and, most
constructive solution of them will persist, which
importantly, the U.S.-Russia Bilateral
problems inherited from will prevent their rap-
Presidential Commission which has
the past, while trying prochement, especially on
already started working and prepares
not to aggravate them by the U.S. part. At the same
decisions to be taken at the top level
using outdated solution time, it would be incorrect
and implements them
mechanisms. to overemphasize the dif-
ferences between the two
4.1.2. Russia and the U.S. should maintain and countries. Such attempts often conceal Russo-
develop those mechanisms that make their phobia and anti-Americanism, persisting from
mutual relations more robust and rich already the Cold War times. The United States main-
now. These mechanisms include informal tained in the past or maintains now de-facto
and trust-based dialogues between the elites allied relations with countries such as Iran
and public groups and, most importantly, the under the Shah, Spain under Franco, Pakistan,

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Saudi Arabia and many others, the value gap the current conditions Russia’s hegemony in
with which was/is much broader than the gap the region is neither feasible nor needed. Per-
with Russia of today. In contrast, Russia is haps, such a dialogue should be conducted at
building relations with some democratic states the expert level and with the use of the «sec-
in Europe, which increasingly really (although ond track diplomacy.»
not formally) resemble allied relations, and is
seeking to build such relations de jure. 4.2.1.4. In the short term, it is expedient to
invigorate cooperation between Russia and
the U.S., involving also the EU, to resolve the
Trans-Dniestria and Nagorno-Karabakh con-
4.2. W
 hat Is to Be Done with the Old flicts. This will demonstrate the ability of both
Agenda? parties to overcome the logic of «zero-sum
game» and to settle regional conflicts.
4.2.1. The Post-Soviet Space
4.2.1.5. With respect to Georgia, Abkhazia and
4.2.1.1. Since interaction by Russia and the South Ossetia it is expedient to promote the
U.S. in the post-Soviet space remains a deter- conclusion of agreements not to use military
mining factor for bilateral relations, the par- force against each other. The more so since a
ties should begin honest consultations over number of EU countries (such as France) came
the models of relations in the region and out for them lately. These agreements will not
the development of posi- ultimately institutionalize
tive cooperation there. A Since interaction by Russia and the the independence of Abk-
joint review of threats to U.S. in the post-Soviet space remains hazia and South Ossetia,
security and development a determining factor for bilateral but serve as a precondi-
opportunities in the region relations, the parties should begin tion for their dialogue
may become a positive honest consultations over the models with Georgia in general.
guideline. Many estimates of relations in the region and the Finally, it is worth think-
may coincide, while many development of positive cooperation ing about expanding
differences and suspicions there access for international
may be smoothed over. observers to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia — on
4.2.1.2. After that it would be advisable for the condition that a separate agreement be
Russia and the U.S. to have an open and ear- concluded, which would either not qualify
nest dialogue about what interests they have their status at all or would declare them as
in the territory of the former Soviet Union — independent entities subject to the operation
and not just in general categories, but with of international law. This measure will not
regard to specific countries in the region. For change the status quo in the region, but will let
example, it makes sense to discuss the bounds the White House declare progress on a foreign
of Russia’s strengthening in the CIS (which, if policy issue important for the U.S. (and the
trespassed, would be regarded by the Ameri- Republicans). Today this proposal might seem
can political elite as inadmissible), as well as unrealistic. However, in the contemporary
to define what kind of U.S. involvement — in world what is unrealistic today might turn out
specific actions — in the CIS region Russia will evident overnight.
regard as critical. This will not only help draw
the «red lines» in relations in the post-Soviet 4.2.1.6. There is a need for a frank dialogue that
space, but also identify shared interests. is currently nowhere in sight. If the U.S. says
that even tacit consent to Russia’s violation of
4.2.1.3. As a result of this dialogue it may Georgia’s territorial integrity is unacceptable,
appear that the U.S. will find as unacceptable because it views it as a precedent for restoring
not just any strengthening of Russia in the a «Russian empire» by force, it will be a clear
former Soviet Union, but only the establish- argument and create greater prerequisites for
ment of its full hegemony there. It may also the two parties to produce sustainable con-
turn out that support of explicitly anti-Russian tacts. The currently used arguments, such as
regimes in the Post-Soviet space is not in the respect for the «internationally recognized»
U.S.’s national interests. This would create territorial integrity and «consequences of
preconditions for cooperation, for indeed in aggression,» merely multiply suspicions. After

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NATO, CIS and Russia

NATO countries

Russia

CIS countries

all, the U.S. quite often (including the recent the right of nations to independently choose
past) resorted to overt aggression (Yugoslavia, ways to ensure their security, measures that
Iraq) or to realigning territories in bypass of would guarantee a transparent arms control
procedures envisioned by international law system, etc.//, although the Treaty per se does
(Kosovo). not help overcome the split in the European
security system, it is rather oriented at a lim-
iting NATO’s activity and creating a bipolar
system (NATO-CSTO) in Europe, even though
4.2.2. European Security a cooperative one.

4.2.2.1. The gradual 4.2.2.2. It is worth expand-


removal of the problem It is worth expanding cooperation ing cooperation between
of Russia’s partial exclu- between Russia and NATO, as Russia and NATO, as well
sion from the military/ well as NATO and the CSTO, and as NATO and the CSTO,
political Europe and the strengthening the NATO-Russia and strengthening the
Euro-Atlantic region, as Council. Russia—NATO cooperation NATO-Russia Council.
well as its isolation from on Afghanistan might serve as a Russia-NATO coopera-
the NATO-oriented sys- foundation for this. It makes sense tion on Afghanistan might
tem of decision-making to revert to the idea of turning the serve as a foundation
on European security is NATO—Russia Council into the main for this. It makes sense
possible through promo- decision-making instrument on Euro- to revert to the idea of
tion of a dialogue with the Atlantic security issues, especially turning the NATO-Rus-
U.S. along three lines. It those that have vital significance for sia Council into the main
would be reasonable to Russia decision-making instru-
further discuss Russia’s ment on Euro-Atlantic
initiative concerning a security issues, especially
new European Security Treaty and impart those that have vital significance for Russia.
new ideas and proposals to it //For instance,
the draft treaty might include provisions 4.2.2.3. One of the ways to overcome the
like the guarantees of territorial integrity, European split would be to build a de facto

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allied relationship between Russia and the EU 4.2.2.5. The problems of control over con-
in the long term (and involve other countries ventional armed forces in Europe and the
of an «Alliance of Europe»), which would form reanimation or readjustment of the Treaty on
a significant security component. Building a Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
relationship of this kind requires at least pas- requires much caution on the part of both
sive support on the part of the U.S. The latter Russia and the U.S. Although the step may
should rid itself of the residual willingness to seem justified //It was Russia that advocated
keep Europe divided. a conclusive ratification of the CFE. Besides,
if one proceeds from the
4.2.2.4. Russia and the traditional logic of secu-
U.S. might undertake a The CFE treaty’s two core functions — rity, the current NATO
series of practical steps averting a major war in Europe superiority over Russia in
aimed at consolidating and maintaining a military balance conventional armaments
security and trust in the there — do not seem to be pressing makes Russia objective-
Euro-Atlantic region. For today. The real threats to military ly more interested than
instance, they might offer security in Europe have either a NATO in the presence of
cross guarantees of ter- supra-regional or a sub-regional conventional arms con-
ritorial integrity and secu- character and are linked to the trol regime in Europe and
rity to non-bloc countries conflicts in the Balkans and in the transparency rules. If the
of the CIS (like Ukraine) Southern Caucasus. Accordingly, it latter are absent for a
as an alternative to the would be much more prudent to long period, Russia and
accession to NATO, and devise sub-regional mechanisms of NATO may start look-
thus support their non- security and arms control in problem ing at each other with
block status. Moscow and regions suspicion again//, it may
Washington might also consolidate the tradition-
put forward an initiative al philosophy of balances
urging the OSCE member-states to reaffirm existing in Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO rela-
their commitment to the non-use of force, or tions. Resuming the negotiation process will
threat of the use of force, against one another. again position Russia and NATO as potential
Besides, they might jointly initiate the signing enemies and will fuel militarization of Euro-
of a full-format peace treaty with Germany, pean politics. Furthermore, the reanimation
thus reinforcing the Russia-U.S.-EU trilat- of the CFE may fertilize the soil for launch-
eral cooperation on the problems of European ing Russia-U.S. talks on the reduction of the
security. tactical nuclear arsenals //Washington could

Collective Security Treaty Organization


Date of establishment
May 15, 1992

Purposes
strengthening peace,
international and Russia
regional security and
stability
Belarus
protecting the Kazakhstan
independence,
Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan
territorial integrity and Armenia
sovereignty of member Tajikistan
states by political and
military means

Emblem and flag

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make at least a small step to meet Moscow same time, it has created new risks. The par-
halfway on conventional armed forces in ties face the problem of further reductions
Europe (for instance, by removing the “flank of nuclear weapons, in which their positions
restrictions” and lifting the demands on the differ significantly. The difference is obvious
“Istanbul Commitments”) and say that it if one compares the resolutions on ratification
is time to get down to slashing the tactical of the New START Treaty by the Russian State
nuclear weapons now that Moscow’s con- Duma and the U.S. Senate, which are in many
cerns have been eliminated//. Finally, the ways opposite. The United States view the
discussions of the CFE as such may weaken ratification of the Treaty as a step towards fur-
Russia’s initiative on drafting a new European ther reduction of nuclear weapons, above all,
Security Treaty, which also contains a certain towards «addressing the disparity» between
vision of a new regime of Russia and the U.S. in
control over conventional tactical nuclear weap-
armed forces in Europe. The ratification of the New START ons, i.e. towards unilat-
Treaty emphasized achievements eral reduction of Russian
4.2.2.6. The CFE treaty’s of the “reset” of the U.S.-Russia tactical nuclear weapons.
two core functions — relations; at the same time, it has Moscow considers the
averting a major war in created new risks. The parties face levels set by the Treaty for
Europe and maintaining the problem of further reductions strategic nuclear forces to
a military balance there — of nuclear weapons, in which their be sufficient for the com-
do not seem to be pressing positions differ significantly ing 10 years; it also seeks
today. The real threats to to delay as much as it can
military security in Europe the launch of negotiations
have either a supra-regional or a sub-regional on tactical nuclear weapons and links them
character and are linked to the conflicts in with unilateral withdrawal of American tacti-
the Balkans and in the Southern Caucasus. cal nuclear warheads from Europe (although
Accordingly, it would be much more prudent they threaten no one and even help stabilize
to devise sub-regional mechanisms of security the military-political situation there).
and arms control in problem regions, and con-
fine pan-European security measures to the 4.2.3.2. Contradictions between the sides with
maintenance of confidence-building measures regard to further reductions of nuclear weap-
and transparency, including those envisioned ons (after the New START) could be brought
in the operational CFE. They can be singled to a minimum if Russia and the U.S. revise the
out into a separate treaty. very philosophy underpinning their approach-
es to their relations in the field of nuclear
weapons and their own nuclear arsenals (for
more detail see Paragraph 4.4). Neither Rus-
4.2.3. Further Reductions of Nuclear sia nor the U.S. has a clear idea of the specific
Weapons quantitative level of nuclear weapons arsenal
sufficient for guaranteeing military security
4.2.3.1. The ratification of the New START and for maintaining strategic stability includ-
Treaty emphasized achievements of the ing for keeping the gap between the size of
«reset» of the U.S.—Russian relations; at the the Russian and the U.S. nuclear arsenals and

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those of other countries. By de facto renounc- facto exclusion from the NATO-centric secu-
ing the morally attractive but essentially det- rity system in Europe. Last but not least, Rus-
rimental idea of a nuclear-free world, the U.S. sia needs tactical nuclear weapons to avert the
seems to be turning to the conservative poli- rise of fears over the «Chinese threat» in the
cies as regards the qualitative and quantitative future. Attempts to slash Russia’s advantage
parameters of its own strategic nuclear forces. over NATO in the tactical nuclear weapons
Russia, on its part, is allegedly considering will only strengthen the logic of suspicions in
the creation of new-generation heavy inter- Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO relations.
continental ballistic missiles to hypothetically
counteract still more hypothetical U.S. missile 4.2.3.5. It would be reasonable to consider the
defense system. introduction of a unified system of account-
ing of strategic nuclear
4.2.3.3. It might make forces and tactical nucle-
sense for both Russia and Most importantly, it would make ar weapons (although this
the U.S. to launch an ear- sense to seek a format for Russia- might involve a range of
nest discussion of these NATO relations that will make the technical difficulties) and
issues. Then they might problem of Russia’ superiority in their possible reduction
arrive at the conclusion tactical nuclear weapons and NATO in a single pool rather
that it would be more pru- superiority in conventional weapons than separately. The dif-
dent for Russia and the disappear, as this superiority would ferences between them,
U.S. to determine their not be viewed as a military threat introduced in the Cold
policies on their strategic War years to facilitate
nuclear forces not by each negotiations, are largely
other’s potentials and not by the idea of «par- artificial and probably outdated. As for the
ity,» which is becoming obsolete, but by the limits on such categories of weapons as inter-
capabilities and intentions of third countries. mediate-, medium- and short-range missiles,
As a compromise solution, Russia and the they certainly belong to the past.
U.S. might make a new round of nuclear arms
reductions «after the START treaty,» pro- 4.2.3.6. Most importantly, it would make sense
vided China, France and Britain sign a legally to seek a format for Russia-NATO relations
binding agreement that would pin down their that will make the problem of Russia’ supe-
commitments to refrain from building up their riority in tactical nuclear weapons and NATO
nuclear arsenals above the current levels. superiority in conventional weapons disap-
pear, as this superiority would not be viewed
4.2.3.4. It is much more difficult to minimize as a military threat (in reality such a threat is
the differences between Russia and the U.S. in non-existent already now). This format could
the sphere of tactical nuclear weapons, which be provided by a military/political alliance
Washington would like to cut on a first-prior- between Russia and the U.S., Russia’s acces-
ity basis in the framework of a new round of sion to NATO in the long term, the signing of
nuclear arms reductions. The problem hinges a new European Security Treaty on the condi-
on NATO’s quantitative advantage over Russia tion that profound amendments are made to
in conventional armed forces, the uncertain- it, or the creation of the Alliance of Europe
ties in Russia-NATO relations and Russia’s de with a strong component of security.

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4.3. The Logic of the Renewing and the 4.3.4. By adopting a new philosophy and
General Principles of the New Agenda agenda, Russia and the U.S. would develop a
new «positive mutual dependence.» It would
4.3.1. Making the U.S.—Russian relations be based not on their internal factors and
stable, positive and capable of withstanding manifested not in their economic cooperation,
changes in the international and domestic but on the need for each other in an effective
political situation directly depends on the collective response to the challenges of the
parties’ ability to markedly renew the phi- international environment. In the foreseeable
losophy and content of their relations. The future, the U.S.—Russian economic coop-
current relations still have elements of con- eration is unlikely to reach a level that would
frontation, along with elements of coopera- make it a major stabilizing factor for their
tion done according to the old agenda. The relations. Rather, it will play an auxiliary role,
essence of the renewing is to set a strategic for example, by facilitating the much needed
goal making the relationship between Rus- modernization of the Russian economy.
sia and the U.S. friendly — and, in certain
cases — allied, and open to engage other 4.3.5. Focusing on the new global and regional
countries. The new model must be based on problems suggests not so much U.S.—Russian
correct estimation of own and common inter- bilateral cooperation or even an alliance, as
ests, joint adaptation to their cooperation in cre-
new international devel- ating various formats for
The essence of the renewing
opment trends, joint multilateral interaction
is to set a strategic goal making
counteraction to new between major centers of
the relationship between Russia
challenges and threats, power, with the participa-
and the U.S. friendly — and, in
and joint use of the new tion and possible leading
certain cases — allied, and open to
opportunities. role of Russia and Amer-
engage other countries. The new
ica. Since neither the
model must be based on correct
4.3.2. Currently Russia U.S., nor — all the more
estimation of own and common
and the U.S. are not ene- so — Russia, nor both of
interests, joint adaptation to new
mies or potential antag- them together can act as
international development trends,
onists (although part of the sole leader any more,
joint counteraction to new challenges
the elites of both coun- it appears impossible to
and threats, and joint use of the new
tries continues to regard overcome the growing
opportunities
them as such due to the disorder of international
old-style thinking). Fur- relations and resolve the
thermore, Russia and the U.S. act as allies in key regional problems only within the frame-
the face of new challenges and threats and work of the U.S.—Russian bilateral coop-
the growing disorder in international rela- eration. It would be more productive for
tions. Yet it would be incorrect to set a goal Moscow and Washington to co-organize col-
of the U.S.—Russian relations evolving into lective actions in broader formats, such as
a full-fledged alliance. An equitable alliance tripartite interaction in Russia-U.S.-China or
would rather be an exception for U.S. political Russia-U.S.-EU formats. These formats may
identity and history. For Russia, which views fit perfectly into Russia’s relations with the
itself a center of power in its own right and an EU //An Alliance of Europe, which would be
independent strategic player, a position of a expedient for Russia and the EU to create on
«junior ally» is unacceptable. the basis of common economic, energy and
human spaces and close foreign-policy coop-
4.3.3. It would be more correct to talk about a eration, might be one of the pillars of Russia-
friendly relationship between Russia and the U.S.-EU tripartite relations. On the concept
U.S. with elements of alliance wherever it is of the “Alliance of Europe” see: http://vid-1.
possible or expedient, not about a full-fledged rian.ru/ig/valdai/Alliance%20eng.pdf// and
alliance between the two countries. Seeking China, the way they are envisioned by Russia.
ways to respond to new challenges and threats
will revive the philosophical bond of the U.S.— 4.3.6. Focusing on the collective response to
Russian relations with both major trends in new challenges and threats will help Russia
the international development and objective and the U.S. facilitate the settlement of existing
interests of Russia and the U.S. contradictions. The latter may appear insur-

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mountable only if the old paradigm prevails. must have a clear understanding that the
According to this paradigm, Russia and the very existence of military potentials and the
U.S. are the main threats to themselves; MAD physical capability to destroy each other do
is the material and technical basis of their rela- not automatically program their relations
tions, and the parties must look for balances towards deterrence. It only emerges when the
and countermeasures. Switching Moscow and availability of military hardware assumes the
Washington to addressing new threats and nature of threat, which is basically a feeling,
challenges will make the need for these bal- political and psychological. Importantly, the
ances and countermeas- parity in, or approximate
ures less prominent. Focusing on the new global and numerical equality of the
regional problems suggests not strategic forces does not
4.3.7. The renewing of so much U.S.-Russia bilateral imply either the presence
the Russia-U.S. agenda cooperation or even an alliance, as or absence of a hypothet-
includes three elements, their cooperation in creating various ical threat. For example,
in the least. First, it sug- formats for multilateral interaction having slightly less than
gests forming a new between major centers of power, 2,000 nuclear warheads
agenda that would reflect with the participation and possible now, the parties cannot,
the new challenges and leading role of Russia and America even theoretically, pose
threats, and adapting the a real military threat to
current guidelines for each other. And when
cooperation between the two countries to the they have 200 warheads each, placed, for
real international environment. Second, the example, on 40 ICBMs (minimum deter-
parties need an optimal approach in order rence), they will have to fear a preemptive
to resolve Russian-U.S. contradictions //Of disarming strike; and certainly the impor-
course, it is hardly possible to renounce the tance and danger of third countries’ poten-
old agenda and adopt a new one on short tials will grow. Such «minimal deterrence»
notice. An overwhelming majority of the might be the worst possible nuclear posture
elites of the two countries find themselves for both sides.
within the scope of the traditional paradigm
of Russian-U.S. relations. Also, the current 4.3.9. Objectively, neither Russia nor the U.S.
agenda of Russian-U.S. cooperation is impor- is a threat to the other today. Being a politi-
tant for improving the climate of their rela- cal and psychological, rather than a mate-
tions and forming a tradition of constructive rial and technical problem, deterrence can be
cooperation//. Third, they should overcome overcome not by the cuts in nuclear arsenals,
the philosophy of military deterrence, which which is becoming increasingly difficult, but by
continues to prevail in the U.S.—Russian rela- building new friendly and allied, and not hos-
tions and interferes with the parties’ efforts to tile, relations between Russia and the United
develop a long-term partnership on the basis States. To this end, each country first should
of shared interests. convince itself that Russian or U.S. nukes are
no longer a threat, improve the climate of their
4.3.8. To overcome the deterrence philoso- relations, overcome mutual suspicion and the
phy, the Russian and U.S. political elites tradition to view the other party’s moves

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through the prism of competition and «zero 4.4. The New Agenda
sum game,» and, lastly, develop a tradition of
mutual confidence. 4.4.1. Increasing Governability of the Inter-
national Relations
4.3.10. Ideally, the U.S.—Russian relations in
the nuclear weapons field should acquire the 4.4.1.1. Collective efforts to reduce the disor-
nature of relations between the United States, der in international relations and to increase
France and Britain, or between China and their governability should be a long-term
Russia. In this case, nuclear weapons will con- guideline for the new agenda of the U.S.—
tinue to play a civilizing and stabilizing role. Russian relations. Moreover, a better govern-
ability and less disorder will be a prerequisite
4.3.11. Russia and the U.S. need to enter into for building a friendly relationship between
an in-depth strategic dialogue to define the Russia and the United States, and, in some
role of nuclear weapons in respects, a relationship of
the new world and in bilat- alliance. In case interna-
eral relations. As a result Ideally, the U.S.-Russia relations in tional relations, includ-
of this dialogue, many of the nuclear weapons field should ing relations among the
the old dogmas may turn acquire the nature of relations great powers, grow more
out to be counterproduc- between the United States, France contradictory and con-
tive — not only the dogma and Britain, or between China and flict-prone, the chances
of «mutual containment Russia. In this case, nuclear weapons for positive interaction
through deterrence» but will continue to play a civilizing and between Russia and the
also a morally attractive, stabilizing role U.S. will be minimal
although unrealistic and //For example, one can
probably counterproduc- hardly expect the emer-
tive, dogma of «nuclear abolitionism,» and gence of friendly or allied relations between
even the old model of arms control, based on Russia and the U.S., if there is escalating
the assumption that weapons must necessarily confrontation between America and China//.
be reduced. We need a new model of approach Russia and the United States may contribute
to the Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals, and to strengthening international governability
their joint reorientation to the maintenance in any of the following ways.
of political and military stability in the world.
As they rethink the role of nuclear weap- 4.4.1.2. Easing tensions and conflicts in rela-
ons, the parties may come to the conclusion tions between the great powers, above all, the
that the preservation of significant nuclear U.S. and China. Both parties in their dialogue
potentials is needed for «self-containment.» with Beijing should emphasize the feasibility
(When such «self-containment» weakened, of collective cooperation to address common
the United States started its Iraqi adventure.) challenges of global and regional scale, and
And certainly significant nuclear potentials push it towards a variety of trilateral and mul-
are needed to restrain a conventional arms tilateral formats. In their bilateral dialogue,
race and attempts by small nuclear powers to Russia and the U.S. should steer clear of any
be on a par with the U.S. and Russia. hints at an «encirclement» of China and its

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prospective deterrence. It will make sense to on the most conflict-prone regions of the
seek «trilateral dialogues» whenever possible. world, and those regions which are prob-
lematic in terms of nuclear proliferation. A
4.4.1.3. Preventing degradation of strategic nuclear alliance of Russia and the United
stability in the world due to both the emer- States may become a new support structure
gence of «nuclear multipolarity,» and the U.S.- for a system of strategic stability in the world
suggested concept of «new strategic stability» (instead of their mutual nuclear deterrence),
(a significant reduction in strategic nuclear one of the main tools to combat the spread of
forces and simultaneous development of mis- nuclear weapons and, finally, an important
sile defense) and the Prompt Global Strike factor for stabilization in conflict regions
program. To this end, the parties should, as a around the world.
minimum, maintain their
nuclear arsenals at lev- 4.4.2.2. Such an alliance
els many times above the Easing tensions and conflicts in may suggest provision
arsenals of other nucle- relations between the great powers, by the U.S. and Russia —
ar powers, and to more above all, the U.S. and China. Both and possibly by engaging
actively discourage the parties in their dialogue with Beijing some other countries —
proliferation of nuclear should emphasize the feasibility of nuclear security guaran-
weapons (for more detail collective cooperation to address tees to states in conflict
see paragraph 4.2.2.). common challenges of global and regions, especially, in
Above all, the parties regional scale, and push it towards a the Greater Middle East.
should see the basis of variety of trilateral and multilateral Cross nuclear guarantees
strategic stability in the formats for the non-nuclear and
world not in the strategic non-bloc countries, espe-
deterrence of Russia and cially in regions where the
the U.S., but in «cooperative bipolarity» in the problem of nuclear proliferation is the worst
strategic nuclear sphere, which means that may become a critical tool for reinforcing
Russia and the U.S. retain their prevailing the nonproliferation regime. These guaran-
arsenals of strategic nuclear forces and coop- tees must be accompanied by much tougher
erate in preventing nuclear proliferation and concerted sanctions against the abusers of the
limiting the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear non-proliferation regime than those existing
countries. now, and guarantees of their inevitability,
which requires direct participation by China,
France, Britain and other countries.

4.4.2. The U.S.—Russian Nuclear Alliance 4.4.2.3. A nuclear alliance of Russia and the
U.S. could become the basis for them, as well
4.4.2.1. One of the most effective ways of as for China, the EU and Japan, to put more
overcoming strategic deterrence for Russia pressure on Iran and North Korea, which
and the U.S. will be to build allied or quasi- are currently the most dangerous «prolifera-
allied relations in the nuclear field focusing tors.»

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4.4.2.4. If nuclear arms continue to spread, coordinated policy will be needed for nuclear
a U.S.—Russian nuclear alliance will furnish deterrence of Iran.
the basis for a preliminary discussion of the
new rules and models of multilateral nuclear 4.4.2.8. Providing security guarantees, includ-
stability and for achieving a new level of coor- ing nuclear ones, imposing harsh sanctions
dination of nuclear policy. In particular, this against violators of the non-proliferation
may require revision of a number of interna- regime, not to mention aggressors, and build-
tional agreements which were elaborated over ing on this basis a security system for the
the years of the Cold War and the subsequent Gulf region and the Middle East would be the
decade and which were based on the NPT, best, if not the sole, solution for reducing and
such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, eliminating Israeli nuclear weapons. Reliable
the treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- nuclear guarantees from Russia and the Unit-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). It ed States and a regional security system seem
may also require the development of new to be the only guarantee of the survival and
agreements. security of the state of Israel, and an alterna-
tive to the preservation of its nuclear arsenal.
4.4.2.5. At the regional
level, the Greater Middle A nuclear alliance of Russia and 4.4.2.9. There is a pro-
East may prove a «pilot the United States may become a found and still increas-
project» in the activity of new support structure for a system ing security vacuum in
a Russia-U.S. nuclear alli- of strategic stability in the world the Gulf region. Moscow
ance. Providing nuclear (instead of their mutual nuclear and Washington should
security guarantees to deterrence), one of the main tools actively contribute to the
countries in the region, in to combat the spread of nuclear establishment of a multi-
conjunction with their fur- weapons and, finally, an important lateral forum, with a view
ther nuclear-free status, factor for stabilization in conflict to building a regional
would contribute to solv- regions around the world security system. It is only
ing the problem of Iran’s Russia and the United
nuclear program and the States that could become
risk of further proliferation of nuclear weap- external guarantors. Of course, it would be
ons in the region. also desirable to involve China, India and the
EU or its individual members in these efforts.
4.4.2.6. Finally, a nuclear alliance of Rus-
sia and the U.S. could become the basis of a
broader cooperation of the sides on the Middle
East. In particular, Moscow and Washington 4.4.3. Cooperation on Missile Defense
should begin a discussion of the risk of Iraq’s
disintegration after the pullout of U.S. troops, 4.4.3.1. Today, the missile defense-related
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear capability or of a issues are one of the controversies on the
«threshold» status, the internal destabiliza- agenda of the U.S.—Russian relations. How-
tion of several Arab countries in the region, an ever, it is worth trying to transform missile
escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, or defense into a new sphere of the U.S.—Russian
a conflict between Israel and Iran. cooperation, which could even lay the founda-
tion of an allied relationship.
4.4.2.7. The risk of the most dangerous con-
flict in the long-term perspective — between 4.4.3.2. To this end, both parties must realize,
Iran and Israel — can be reduced if Rus- first of all, the virtual nature of the current
sia and America offer both countries secu- controversy on this issue. The United States
rity guarantees, including nuclear ones, on should develop the awareness that there is no
condition that Iran not cross the «nuclear real threat which could require building such
threshold.» (Iran’s achieving the «threshold a system, and that devising a plan to preempt
status» and capability to produce nuclear the emergence of a possible future missile
weapons is more than likely). But if Iran threat should be adopted in cooperation with
deploys nuclear weapons, nuclear guaran- Russia, not unilaterally //The chances that this
tees will be required not only for Israel but recommendation will be followed are low in
also for other countries in the region, and a short term in view of U.S. domestic political

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U.S. missile defense system in Europe


Possible deployment of elements of a new missile Standard Missile-3
defense system (SM-3)
Earlier the United States planned to station ground-based missile defense Lightweight composite
systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Washington later renounced nosecone
this plan
The new program involves a more economical mobile option for Europe
Warhead
Poland
RUSSIA Third stage
There is an agreement to deploy SM-3 guidance section
missiles by 2018
BELARUS
Third stage
Romania rocket engine
POLAND
On February 4, 2010, Romanian
UKRAINE President Traian Basescu announced his Staging assembly
agreement to the deployment of U.S.
anti-missile systems in Romania Dual thrust rocket engine

Bulgaria
ROMANIA
On February 12, 2010, Bulgarian Prime Steering control section
Minister Boyko Borissov said that there
would be negotiations about certain Booster
BULGARIA
U.S. missile defense elements being
deployed in Bulgaria
Range: up Altitude
Deployment is planned to 500 km of attack:
in four phases 250 km

Elements to be deployed
Aegis sea-based systems SM-3 (Block IB) interceptor SM-3 (Block IIA) SM-3 (Block IIB)
SM-3 (Block IA) interceptor missiles missiles interceptor missiles interceptor missiles
AN/TPY-2 sea-based mobile radar Advanced sensors
warning system

Targets
Defense against short and medium-range Defense against medium- and
missile threats long-range missile threats and
Defense against regional missile threats intercontinental ballistic missiles

2010 2011 2015 2018 2020

constraints (the desire of most Republicans defense system is created, it is unlikely to pose
to attain utopian “absolute security,” which, a threat to Russia’s strategic deterrence poten-
they think, can be achieved with the help tial. The parties need a serious and frank dia-
of a missile defense, and the Iranian fac- logue; otherwise a new arms race may emerge.
tor blow up as a convenient “threat"”), and Some in Moscow have already begun to talk of
the factor of Israel. Nevertheless we believe the need to deploy the next generation of heavy
this recommendation is logical and reason- ICBMs to overcome a possible future strategic
able//. Moscow should realize that the Obama missile defense system. Such plans, as well as
administration’s proclaimed goal of creating a talk of a multi-layered missile defense system,
multi-tiered missile defense system is unlikely damage relations between the two countries,
to ever be achieved even in its European ver- and throw them back to the old paradigms.
sion — at least because the U.S. will be forced
to slash military spending due to the accumu- 4.4.3.3. The problem of the emergence of tac-
lated budget deficit. And even if such a missile tical missile defense elements near Russia’s

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borders (or speculations about their emer- but, on the contrary, increase missile defense
gence) can be easily resolved through Russia’s efficiency, without undermining the sover-
participation in these discussions and in the eignty of Russia and the United States, as both
process of the immediate deployment of such parties will retain the right to make independ-
infrastructures. Russia’s proposal to build an ent decisions to launch interceptor missiles.
interconnected «sectoral» missile defense sys-
tem seems constructive at least as one of the 4.4.3.5. As the first steps towards initiat-
starting point for discussion. An agreement ing such a dialogue one might make use of
on coordinated simultaneous development the United States’ declared commitment to
of «sectoral» missile defense systems, which allow Russian observers to its future missile
would provide for the interception of mis- defense facilities in Eastern Europe (should
siles flying over either party towards the other these ever appear), creation of a mechanism
and the protection of each other’s territories, to exchange information on launches of bal-
would create de-facto listic missiles and space
allied relations. Missile vehicles, as well as the
The United States should develop
defense would thus cease Obama administration’s
the awareness that there is no real
to be a separating prob- proposal to revitalize Rus-
threat which could require building
lem and become a unit- sian President Vladimir
such a system, and that devising
ing factor. Such coordina- Putin’s initiative of 2007
a plan to preempt the emergence
tion of efforts and mutual for the joint use of the
of a possible future missile threat
commitments in missile Russian radars in Gabala
should be adopted in cooperation
defense would also be and Armavir. Russia may
with Russia, not unilaterally
effective in keeping other use all of these initiatives
countries from develop- for not just gaining access
ing long-range missiles. to the United States’ and NATO’s future plans,
but also for building a de facto alliance rela-
4.4.3.4. Implementation of this proposal tionship in this sphere and attaining a genuine
would require great political will and readi- joint strategy.
ness for compromise. in particular, Russia
could at a certain stage waive its demand for 4.4.3.6. It makes sense to put before the U.S.
«two keys» for activating the U.S./NATO or again the question of recognizing the 1997
Russian missile defense (so that a decision New York Protocol to START-2 (which has
to launch interceptor missiles could be taken never taken effect) on the differentiation of
only with the consent of the other party). This strategic and tactical missile defenses, or to
requirement is inefficient and not applicable press for signing a new agreement — albeit in
in practice. In turn, the United States should the form of a declaration — with the United
revise its approach, under which exchange of States and/or NATO to regulate the develop-
information is the highest form of coopera- ment of missile defense systems in Europe.
tion with Russia. Moscow’s proposal to create This could ease tensions over the Obama
a joint U.S.—Russian/NATO missile defense administration’s deployment of a tactical mis-
headquarters, a joint early warning center and sile defense system and open up a window of
information analysis center will not weaken opportunity for closer cooperation between

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Russia and the United States and Russia and ing effects Afghanistan will be radiating after
NATO in establishing a non-strategic missile the pullout of U.S. and NATO troops. It is
defense. advisable to start drafting joint or at least con-
certed action plans for ensuring the security of
countries in Central Asia and for strengthen-
ing internal stability in Pakistan.
4.4.4. Cooperation on Afghanistan and
Pakistan 4.4.4.3. In view of the risk of Pakistan’s col-
lapse and of Islamic radicals laying hands on
4.4.4.1. In the short term, its nuclear arms or mate-
it is advisable that Rus- rials, it might be expe-
In the short term, it is advisable
sia and the U.S. and its dient for Russia and the
that Russia and the U.S. and its
European NATO allies United States, with possi-
European NATO allies intensify
intensify cooperation to ble involvement of China
cooperation to combat the Afghan
combat the Afghan drug and India, to initiate a
drug trafficking. As the United
trafficking. As the United dialogue on the prospects
States has no immediate interest in
States has no immediate for that country’s devel-
actively suppressing the production
interest in actively sup- opment and stabilization,
of opium by destroying plantations,
pressing the production on the safety and secu-
such cooperation may take the
of opium by destroying rity of its nuclear weapons
form of sharing with Russia and the
plantations, such coop- and materials. Given the
CSTO more complete intelligence
eration may take the form recent serious deteriora-
information on drug producers in
of sharing with Russia and tion in U.S.-Pakistani rela-
Afghanistan and the routes of supply
the CSTO more complete tions, it would be impru-
through Central Asia
intelligence information dent to hope that the U.S.
on drug producers in can protect that country’s
Afghanistan and the routes of supply through nuclear facilities on its own. It may be advis-
Central Asia. Also, it would make sense for able for Moscow to build up its involvement,
Russia to expand the supplies of arms and including technical and advisory assistance to
military equipment for the Afghan army. Mos- Islamabad, promotion of the Indo-Pakistani
cow, perhaps, should also increase economic dialogue (there was this sort of experience in
and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. the past), and the development of an action
Finally, it would be reasonable to increase plan in case of an internal political destabili-
Russia’s participation in the restoration of zation and possible loss of control of nuclear
Soviet-built facilities in that country. materials there.

4.4.4.2. Given the fact that the U.S. and NATO


have practically lost the war in Afghanistan,
Russia and the U.S., together with China, 4.4.5. Tripartite Cooperation with China
India, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and the EU/NATO, should hurry to enter into 4.4.5.1. It would be expedient for Russia and
a dialogue in order to minimize the destabiliz- the United States to consider the question of

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establishing bilateral and multilateral coop- Asia and the Pacific as a whole. With the con-
eration on China and the problems associated struction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean
with its strengthening, and to do so with that pipeline and the development of cooperation
country’s participation in order to avoid any with Malaysia and Thailand in space explora-
anti-Chinese overtones in this dialogue and tion Russia is becoming a more significant
make it more efficient. The dialogue should player in East Asia than ever before. Russia,
be started with evaluations of China’s fur- China, Japan and South Korea should discuss
ther economic, political, and military-political the possibility of creating a free trade zone in
development and its impact on the regional the northern part of the Asia-Pacific region (a
situation in Asia, Russia, the U.S., the EU, and second center of economic integration in the
the global economic and political situation. region — after ASEAN).
• A tripartite Russia-U.S.-China dialogue on
4.4.5.2. Even the slightest hints at the possibil- the world finance, climate change, nuclear
ity of the U.S.—Russian cooperation in contain- non-proliferation, North Korea, and integra-
ing China should be avoided. A vast majority tion processes in the Asia-Pacific Region.
of China-related issues, as • Discussions on the
well as broader issues of It makes sense to complement the possibility of the United
international stability and bilateral U.S.—Russia dialogue on States joining the SCO —
global governance, can be China with activities within the at the early stages, as an
solved only on the condi- tripartite U.S.—Russia-China format observer — with the res-
tion of China’s construc- (thus building up a permanent ervation that Washington
tive engagement. Accord- Dialogue of the Three or D-3, as should abandon any ideas
ingly, it makes sense to Chinese experts put it). It is also of creating any geopoliti-
complement the bilateral advisable to bring into to this cal configurations in Cen-
U.S.—Russian dialogue dialogue the European Union, India, tral Asia without Russia’s
on China with activi- ASEAN countries, Japan, and other and China’s participa-
ties within the tripartite centers of power tion.
U.S.—Russian-China for- • Reinforced U.S.—
mat (thus building up a Russiann and Russian-
permanent Dialogue of the Three or D-3, as American-Chinese cooperation in the APEC,
Chinese experts put it). It is also advisable including that on the agenda of Moscow’s
to bring into to this dialogue the European presidency of the APEC in 2012.
Union, India, ASEAN countries, Japan, and • Intensification — with U.S. support — of
other centers of power. trading and economic relations and political
cooperation between Russia and U.S. allies
4.4.5.3. The creation of a multilateral security in East and Southeast Asia.
and development system in the Asia-Pacific • A broader dialogue between Moscow and
region must be the key area of Russia-U.S.- Washington on the economic development
China cooperation. It will eliminate the risk of of Siberia and the Far East, including raising
a security vacuum that may objectively emerge resources from both the U.S. and its Asian
as a result of the uneven development of the allies (for detail see paragraph 4.4.6.).
countries in this region. There are indications
that China is beginning to realize the impor-
tance of creating such a system in order to
forestall apprehensions of its growing power 4.4.6. The Siberia Project
among its neighbor countries. The conception
of such a system can be initiated by Russia and 4.4.6.1. One of the most promising areas of
China, but a constructive approach to it on the economic cooperation between Russia and
part of the U.S. is highly desirable also. the U.S. with the participation of China and
other countries of the Asia-Pacific region and
4.4.5.4. It also looks expedient to start U.S.— even the EU may be the development of Sibe-
Russiann cooperation along the following spe- ria and the Far East. Among other things,
cific bilateral and multilateral lines: this may help prevent the risk of these areas
falling under the economic (and, eventually,
A tripartite Russia-U.S.-China dialogue on political) domination of China and the weak-
economic development and security in East ening of Russia’s sovereignty over the region.

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In actual fact, China is not interested in this farming targeted towards fast-growing Asian
domination as it may bring consolidation and markets. This will help reduce the influence of
counteraction of external powers. The regions the anti-Russian lobby in the U.S. and create
of Siberia and the Far East need external a group of influential businessmen and politi-
sources of modernization. Russia will not be cians interested in strengthening cooperation
able to promote their revival on its own. Yet with Russia.
the development projects offered by China are
semi-colonial and resemble those proposed 4.4.6.4. Multilateral participation of Ameri-
to African countries. In can, Chinese, Asian and
the meantime, the U.S. One of the most promising areas of European companies in
and other countries in economic cooperation between Russia the development — under
Asia and the Pacific Rim and the U.S. with the participation Russian control — of
are interested in access to of China and other countries of the resources in Siberia and
natural resources in that Asia-Pacific region and even the EU the Far East, as well as
region. may be the development of Siberia the supply to China of fin-
and the Far East ished agricultural, pulp
4.4.6.2. It would make and paper and energy
sense for Russia to come products which it needs
out with an initiative to launch an international for growth and development, may have far-
project for the development of Siberia and the reaching positive geopolitical effects. Namely,
Far East to draw companies and capital from this may ease U.S.-China rivalry on foreign
the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, India, markets (in Africa, the Greater Middle East
ASEAN and the EU. It might be appropriate to and Latin America) and on the global scale in
launch this project within the framework of the general, minimize the need for China to «win
APEC, using Russia’s presidency of that organ- over» the needed resources through a build-
ization in 2012. The meaning of this project is up of the armed forces, and, consequently,
to create Russia-controlled competition among encourage peaceful rise of China — beneficial
many countries and companies in Siberia and for all.
the Far East and thereby strengthen Russia’s
sovereignty over that territory. And also to
provide increased international access to the
resources of that territory. 4.4.7. The Arctic Project

4.4.6.3. The new rules of access for foreign 4.4.7.1. There is a vast potential in the Arctic for
companies should not resemble the produc- positive interaction by Russia and the United
tion sharing agreements (PSAs) Russia con- States (again, with the involvement of other
cluded in the 1990s; rather, they should con- countries — Canada, Norway, and Denmark).
tribute to the influx of new technologies into They should abandon the current philosophy
the region and to launching — with the help of competition for unexplored resources of the
of foreign capital — of processing, mining and Arctic and prevent militarization of the region.
high-tech industries there, including modern They should get ready to use — jointly with

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Sea routes in the Arctic: the Northern Sea


Route and the Northwest Passage

United
Canada States

cle
Cir
tic
Arc
Iceland
Iceland

Norway

Sweden

Finland Northern Sea Route


Northwest Passage
Russia

other countries — the opportunities of unob- the Bering Sea and the North Pacific in gener-
structed shipping in the Arctic that, according al, which is one of the least developed regions
to some estimates, will emerge within five to of the world, may prove an important part
seven years as a result of global warming and of this project. Its development will intensify
the melting of Arctic ice. The Northern Sea trans-Pacific trade, become a visible symbol of
Route project may be revived, which will be positive cooperation between Russia and the
a powerful incentive for United States and may
broadening U.S.—Russian
There is a vast potential in the become one of the most
economic cooperation.
Arctic for positive interaction by important contributions
Russia will also obtain
Russia and the United States (again, to the expansion of trad-
an additional, external
with the involvement of other ing and economic rela-
resource for the economic
countries — Canada, Norway, and tions between the parties
development of its north-
Denmark). They should abandon the in general. Creating a free
ern territories. Finally, the
current philosophy of competition economic zone of Kam-
development of undersea
for unexplored resources of the chatka-Alaska or, more
resources in the Arctic, if
Arctic and prevent militarization of generally, of the Bering
they do exist and are eco- Sea, may prove a promis-
the region
nomically accessible, will ing idea.
be possible only through
extensive international cooperation, with due
regard for the sovereignty of Arctic states.
Today is the right time not for a tug of war 4.4.8. Cooperation in Combating
(which in the present circumstances looks like a International Terrorism
farce), but for devising a project for joint peace-
ful exploration of the Arctic — perhaps with The agenda of cooperation between Russia
greater involvement of the Arctic Council. and the United States in combating interna-
tional terrorism also needs expansion. First
4.4.7.2. Cooperation between Russia and the and foremost, it will make sense to narrow
United States, involving Canada, in developing differences between Russia and the U.S. in

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their understanding of who should be brand- in Russia objectively holds back foreign direct
ed international terrorists. This will help investment, Moscow should probably resume
intensify efforts to establish an international the idea of investment insurance and support
legal framework for combating international by delegating these functions to state-owned
terrorism (the UN Convention). Also, it will bank or institutions.
be possible to step up exchange of intelligence
information and coordinate special opera- 4.4.9.2. It would be appropriate to consider
tions against terrorist networks. It is advis- again the possibility of opening branches
able to conclude special of foreign banks in Rus-
agreements on coopera- sia, including U.S. banks,
Given the transnational nature of
tion by the security and based on internation-
the threat of international terrorism,
intelligence agencies of al banking standards,
Russia-U.S. cooperation in this area
Russia and the U.S. Given which will help improve
should be made part of multilateral
the transnational nature the Russian banking sys-
efforts by the international community
of the threat of interna- tem.
in the broadest possible format
tional terrorism, Russia-
U.S. cooperation in this 4.4.9.3. It is in Russia’s
area should be made part interests to build broader
of multilateral efforts by the international cooperation with the U.S. in the field of high
community in the broadest possible format. technology and innovation, rather than attract
American companies to Skolkovo. It is advis-
able to expand cooperation in space explora-
tion (with particular emphasis on the period
4.4.9. New Guidelines for Cooperation in the after 2020, when the lifecycle of the current
Economy International Space Station will expire) and
to actively involve the two countries’ univer-
4.4.9.1. It is important to invigorate the stag- sities, research centers and companies into
nant dialogue between Russia and the United a dialogue on innovation. Russia and the
States in the field of investment //Washing- U.S should expand cooperation on energy
ton is blocking talks on a bilateral agree- efficiency — above all, by creating precon-
ment on mutual guarantees and investment ditions for broadening the participation of
promotion, because it doubts that in the American companies in upgrading Russian
context of domestic problems with the rule of infrastructures (the utilities, water supply and
law such an agreement will fail to become a transport), which is a major cause of wasteful
reliable tool to ensure the interests of Ameri- spending of electricity and thermal power in
can companies//. It is worth discussing the Russia.
possibility of creating additional guarantees
for American capital, and foreign capital in 4.4.9.4. Russia and the U.S. should be more
general, above all in Siberia and the Far East. active in coordinating policies within interna-
Given the fact that even technological mod- tional financial institutions (the IMF, World
ernization of Russia is impossible without a Bank) and regulatory forums (G20 and G8).
massive influx of foreign capital, and bearing Russian gold and foreign currency reserves are
in mind that corruption and the abuse of law big enough for Russia to expect the G7 mem-

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ber-states to take its opinion on world finance may also eventually develop joint interna-
issues into account to a greater degree. tional commercial projects in the markets of
third countries. Secondly, the U.S. (as well
4.4.9.5. It would make sense to expand the as France and Britain) might furnish great-
agenda of Russian-American dialogue on er assistance to the International Uranium
trade. Alongside work for Russia’s acces- Enrichment Center that Russia and Kaza-
sion to the WTO, it would be appropriate khstan have established in Angarsk. These
for major economies of the world to enter efforts would contribute, among other things,
into a dialogue on the future of a new world to strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation
trading system. Indeed, we are likely to see regime.
a gradual weakening of universal rules and
institutions governing international trade and
the strengthening of regional trading and eco-
nomic blocs and alliances. 4.4.10. Interaction in Science and Education

4.4.9.6. Finally, Russia and the U.S. should 4.4.10.1. Science and education are among
expand the agenda of cooperation in the the most promising areas of U.S.—Russian
sphere of peaceful atomic cooperation. The U.S.
energy. This is one of the remains the world leader
It is in Russia’s interests to build
few areas where Russia is in research and develop-
broader cooperation with the U.S.
holding leading positions. ment, primarily in the
in the field of high technology
Cooperation in this field sphere of high technology
and innovation, rather than attract
was for many years held and innovation, as well
American companies to Skolkovo. It
back by the U.S. which as in the humanities. The
is advisable to expand cooperation
feared the strengthening leading American univer-
in space exploration (with particular
of Moscow’s positions. sities (Harvard, Stanford,
emphasis on the period after 2020,
This policy did not work Yale, Columbia, Georget-
when the lifecycle of the current
and damaged the U.S. own, Princeton, etc.) will
International Space Station will
itself. Now great oppor- for long yet remain the
expire) and to actively involve
tunities are opening up best in the world. Mean-
the two countries’ universities,
as the U.S.—Russiann while, Russia has serious-
research centers and companies
Agreement for Coopera- ly weakened its positions
into a dialogue on innovation
tion in the Peaceful Uses in these fields over the
of Nuclear Energy, called last 20 to 30 years. Hav-
the 123 Agreement, has come into effect. ing greatly destroyed the Soviet system of sci-
Yet, the countries should go beyond com- ence and education, it has failed so far to cre-
mercial cooperation now taking shape in this ate a new, competitive model and is already
sphere (trade in nuclear fuel). Firstly, it will lagging behind countries that are developing
be expedient to combine efforts to develop a fast in these fields, for example China. In this
new-generation nuclear reactor, which would respect, close scientific and educational coop-
substantially reduce Russia-U.S. competition eration with the United States in the fields
in this area and enhance trust. The partners of technology and the humanities would be

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exceptionally important for overcoming Rus- confidence in each other. Close R&D coopera-
sia’s current backwardness in technology and tion would weaken the inertial tendency of the
mentality, for modernizing the Russian econ- elites to fence themselves off from each other
omy and society, and building up the Russian and prevent a spillover of knowledge, and
economy’s innovation potential. would thus become another basis of friend-
ly relations between Russia and the United
4.4.10.2. First of all, it would be advisable States in the new world.
to intensify university cooperation, which
has so far been sporadic and which is insuf- 4.4.10.4. Finally, R&D cooperation also
ficiently financed. This cooperation must be requires creating an appropriate financial
made permanent. To this end, the parties may and institutional infrastructure. The estab-
set up a special U.S.—Russiann foundation lishment of a U.S.—Russiann Foundation for
and a special intergovernmental commission. joint fundamental and applied studies would
There should be extensive student and fac- be positive in this respect.
ulty exchanges and internships. In addition to
improving skills and competence and provid-
ing new expertise, they will create a basis for
human and professional contacts required for 4.4.11. Cooperation in Managing Effects of
building the proposed model of friendly and Climate Change
selectively allied relations
between the two coun- 4.4.11.1. It is desirable
tries. The parties should
In this respect, close scientific and
for Russia and the U.S.
systematize and intensify
educational cooperation with the United
to activate a serious dis-
efforts to analyze, dis-
States in the fields of technology and
cussion of the economic,
cuss and harmonize their
the humanities would be exceptionally
demographic and other
educational programs,
important for overcoming Russia’s
impacts of global climate
including the study of
current backwardness in technology
change. It should encom-
the curricula by the other
and mentality, for modernizing the
pass such issues as the
party’s specialists. These
Russian economy and society, and
geographic drifting of
efforts should first of all
building up the Russian economy’s
agricultural production
involve the leading Rus-
innovation potential
and its consequences for
sian universities, which the world economy and
would later share the experience with other the international division of labor; intensifica-
universities in Russia. Amidst the fast-chang- tion of international competition for food and
ing world economy, politics and increasingly water; forecasting of natural and, perhaps,
complicated and complex environment, it man-made cataclysms associated with global
would make sense to work out, jointly and on warming; the forecasting of migration vectors
a permanent basis, new educational stand- and, consequently, of socio-economic, ethno-
ards and new curricula, and to develop new religious and political issues in different coun-
avenues of research. tries. It would be expedient to give thought
to elaborating new rules to govern the global
4.4.10.3. Much importance should be market of food and drinking water, and also
attached to broader and deeper R&D coop- to take measures to prevent man-made dis-
eration between Russian and U.S. universi- asters and eliminate their consequences and
ties and research institutes and centers. In the effects of climate change-related natural
the field of the humanities, this cooperation disasters.
will help Russia consolidate prerequisites for
the emergence of a strong civil society, the 4.4.11.2. If scientific analysis produces con-
culture of law and the rule of law, and for the clusions about the possibility of a marked
recognition of the value of the personality and increase in food production in Russia, prima-
human rights, which fully meets the national rily for Asian nations experiencing food short-
interests of both countries. In the field of the ages, it would be appropriate to obtain massive
natural and exact sciences, cooperation will investment and technological assistance from
help strengthen the two countries’ leadership the U.S. — along with other countries (China,
in areas where they are still leaders, extend Japan, South Korea, etc.) to the development
this leadership to new spheres and build up of modern agriculture in Russia.

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4.4.12. Freedom of Movement 4.4.13. Year of the United States in Russia,


Year of Russia in the United States
Although Russia and the United States have
already pledged to discuss measures to facili- Holding Year of the United States in Russia
tate traveling, which is essential for building and Year of Russia in the U.S. would give a
up mutual trust and developing cultural, eco- strong boost to efforts to improve the politi-
nomic and trading coop- cal atmosphere, build up
eration, the objectives of practical interaction in
Holding Year of the United States in
such cooperation — the many areas, and intensify
Russia and Year of Russia in the U.S.
way they are set now — political dialogues and
would give a strong boost to efforts
look insufficient. Despite contacts between business
to improve the political atmosphere,
the United States’ nega- and civil society of the
build up practical interaction in
tive attitude to the idea of two countries. Tradition-
many areas, and intensify political
liberalizing border cross- ally, such events involve
dialogues and contacts between
ing, Russia already now a series of activities that,
business and civil society of the two
should raise the question first, symbolize a friendly
countries
of transition to a visa-free nature of mutual relations
regime in the long term. and bring the two socie-
This will be an important indicator of trust ties closer together, and second, help broaden
and Russia’s wish to qualitatively change the the agenda of positive interaction. Holding
«spirit» of the U.S.—Russian relations. such a Year in 2012 would reduce the negative
impact on the U.S.—Russian relations from
election campaigns in the two countries.

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Credits

Russian Authors of the Report

Sergey Dean of the School of the World Economy and International


KARAGANOV Affairs at the National Research University–Higher School of
Economics (NRU-HSE); Chairman of the Presidium, the Council
on Foreign and Defense Policy (CFDP); Chairman of the Editorial
Board, Russia in Global Affairs journal. The main co-author and
executive editor of the report

Dmitry Deputy Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and


SUSLOV International Studies, NRU-HSE; Assistant Dean for Research,
the School of the World Economy and International Affairs, NRU-
HSE; Deputy Director of Research Programs at CFDP. The main
co-author of the report and coordinator of the working group

Pavel Head of the International Projects Center at RIA-Novosti


ANDREYEV

Oleg Head of a Department at the European Studies Institute of the


BARABANOV Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO);
professor of the School of the World Economy and International
Affairs, NRU-HSE

Timofei Director, Center for Comprehensive European and International


BORDACHEV Studies, NRU-HSE; Deputy Dean, the School of the World
Economy and International Affairs, NRU-HSE; Director for
Political Studies at CFDP

Maxim Professor of the Department of World Politics, School of the World


BRATERSKY Economy and International Affairs, NRU-HSE

Fyodor Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs journal


LUKYANOV

Yulia Research Fellow, Center for Post-Soviet Studies of the MGIMO


NIKITINA

Alexei Associate professor at the World Politics Department of Moscow


PILKO State University

Marsel Head of the Economic Department of the Institute of Energy and


SALIKHOV Finance

Nikolai Senior Research Fellow of the Center for Caucasian Studies at


SILAYEV MGIMO

Mikhail Associate professor of the International Relations and Foreign


TROITSKY Policy Department, MGIMO

Alexei Leading research fellow at the International Security Institute of


FENENKO the Russian Academy of Sciences; senior lecturer at Moscow State
University

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Consultants of the Report

Sergey Member of the Board of Directors of VTB Capital, the investment


DUBININ business of VTB Group; former head of the Central Bank of Russia

Andrei President, Interconsult Company; former Deputy Foreign Minister


KOLOSOVSKY of the Russian Federation

Sergey Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation


RYABKOV

Yevgeny Former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Russia


SAVOSTYANOV

U.S. Participants in the Evaluation of the Report

Rawi Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School


ABDELAL

Alexandra Executive Director, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies,
VACROUX Harvard University

Timothy Professor and the Chair of the Department of Government,


COLTON Harvard University; former Director of the Davis Center for
Russian and Eurasian Studies

Jeffrey Associate Director, International Security Studies at Yale


MANKOFF University

Randall Professor and Director of the Skalny Center for Polish and Central
STONE European Studies, University of Rochester

Henry Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs;


HALE Director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian
Studies, Harvard University

Samuel Associate Director for the Russia and Eurasia Program, Fellow
CHARAP in the National Security and International Policy Program at the
Center for American Progress

Yoshiko Associate Professor in the department of Political Science,


HERRERA University of Wisconsin

48 М arch 2011