The Impact of Privatization of Solid Waste Collection and Transportation in

Delhi : The Impact on the informal Recycling Sector

Background

Since the late 1990s, two important public interest litigations have been filed in the
Supreme Court, the highest court in India. Both demand greater accountability from the
municipality for cleaner cities. The first, B.L. Vadhera Vs the Union of India, resulted in
several court orders, even personal appearances of senior officials in the Court and
rules being created for Hospital Waste. The second case, Almitra Patel Vs. The Union of
India, has resulted in rules being made for Municipal Solid Waste. The case was also
focused on technology as a primary solution for a cleaner country.

Apart from their individual outcomes, both these cases resulted in great pressure on the
municipal authorities to perform their tasks in a more efficient manner. The media
keenly reported the proceedings and frequently mocked municipal inability to meet the
courts’ and public’s exacting standards.

Continuous court pressure and frustrated attempts to clean the city was an important
reason for the municipalities in Delhi to seek privatization as an opportunity to respond
to the courts. Subhash Chopra, a vocal member of the Delhi Legislative Assembly has
stated, “privatization of garbage collection and disposal will be for the city. The MCD
has been a total failure on this count.”
i

Other Roads to Privatization

Another reason was the change in Delhi’s own position as the capital of an increasingly
important player in the global economy. The Masterplan 2021 includes many new
features that are geared towards international conferences, entertainment etc. The
problem of waste handling and a filthy city remained an environmental and visual
impediment to the new city. With legislation that encouraged investment in services
and several developing countries seeking to privatize waste management, Delhi was
encouraged to do so too, as part of its quest to be what is often described as a ‘world
class city.”

Another important reason was Commonwealth Games, scheduled to be held in 2009 in

Delhi. The leader of the Delhi Parliament described the need, “All these measures would
enable Delhi to become a clean and neat city, which is the need of the hour in view of
the fact that the Commonwealth Games are due to take place in 2010 and thousands of
foreign tourists would be visiting Delhi. There is a need to give a complete facelift to the
Municipal Solid Waste Management System in MCD.” ii

Hence, privatization of waste collection and transportation (hereby referred to as

privatization) was not just a policy, but indicated a fundamental loss of confidence in the
ability of the municipality to supply the city with essential services. The decision also
indicated the perceived new needs of a rapidly changing Capital City.

This paper unpacks the interaction between the informal sector and the private waste
contractors and the impact of privatization on the informal sector in Delhi. It uses the
unfolding of privatization in Delhi and global experiences to understand the issue and to
suggest how waste can be handled in an equitable manner.

Framing Privatization
There have been several ways by which governments across the world have
approached privatization of services. The early ideas of privatization began in the
late 1970s and 1980s, with governments like that of Margaret Thatcher in the UK
and Ronald Reagan in the USA. In this context, privatization came to mean a shift in
activities or functions from the state to the private sector as well as the shift of
production of goods from the public to the private sector. iii Governments then began
to stop directly producing services, but enacting legislation and the framework for
these to be privately produced.

In this case, privatization has been ‘privatization by attrition,’ as the quality of

services was seen to be allowed to run down and in need of urgent reinvigoration.

In India, privatization of solid waste handling has two components, from the
municipal perspective. The first is related to transportation of the waste and the
second to its appropriate disposal, recycling or use in waste to energy projects.

Privatization of waste handling in Delhi is currently limited to the MCD. It has been
framed by officials here as a taking over of existing municipal systems for more
efficient functioning. Hence, the waste contracts demand efficient collection from
the dhalaos, transportation to the landfill and a stage wise segregation of the waste.

A few of the most significant clauses in the contract are as followsiv:

• Article 5.15 : Sale/distribution of recyclable substances
The concessionaire shall be free to sell or otherwise dispose of recyclable substances
and other materials recovered from the Municipal Solid Waste at such price and to
such persons and using such marketing and selling arrangements and strategies as it
may deem appropriate.

• Article 5.19d : Endeavor to improve the ancillary conditions and infrastructure

related to the project, including assistance to the project including assistance to
informal recycling workers
• Article 5.19l. Be responsible for all the health, security, environment and
safety aspects of the project at all times during the concession period.

• Article 5.19t :Endeavour to employ the informal Municipal Solid Waste

collectors within the concession area to carry out the work of collection and
segregation of MSW, in accordance with this agreement and applicable law.

• Article 6 : MCD Obligations : Give all assistance to the concessionaire to employ

the existing informal Municipal Solid Waste collectors including rag pickers and
assist the concessionaire in solving issues arising from the redeployment and
employment of such waste collectors by the concessionaire

Therefore, the contract shows that the MCD is aware of the sector.

In the context of this discussion, the following aspects of the contract must be kept
in mind:

• The private contractor is paid for the waste collected by weight

• The ownership of the recyclable waste lies with the contracting company
 • The private contractors have the right to manage the dhalaos as their own
spaces , with rights to advertise on the walls and to fence off the waste
dumped there
• Additional spaces to store the segregated dry waste will be allocated to the
contractors during the 8 year contract period. The contractor is expected to
segregate waste in a graded manner over time

Therefore, despite how it is framed in official discourse, privatization in Delhi is not a

direct transfer of a set of services from the government to the private sector. A new
role, in keeping with evolving thinking by technical experts, and the changing nature
of the city itself, was created for the private company. Both the collection and
disposal services provided by the government and the segregation services by the
informal sector, were handed over to the private contractor. Public assets of built
land and space were also handed over as part of the contract.

II. Implementing Privatization

In order to implement the process, the IDFC (Infrastructure Development and

Finance Corporation), was contracted to manage the process of privatization on a
turnkey basis. A global tender was put out and bids sought. There were no detailed
discussions or consultations with any other interest groups, except for an initial
meeting prior to the writing of the bid. During this meeting, there was intense
opposition by NGOs to the privatization on various counts. These included the in-
build disincentive for waste generators to segregate, the marginalization of the
informal recycling sector and the level of private involvement. The last point was
based on whether the contractor should also be involved in collecting waste from the
households or not. There was no further discussion.

Finally three companies were selected and their work was scheduled to begin in June
2005.
The most notable amongst the private companies, Delhi Waste Management (DWM),
is a consortium of transportation companies and financiers. What sets this company
aside is that it was allocated what were perceived by the competing companies and
the municipal workers as the most ‘lucrative’ zones. The others were allotted zones
that were less developed, or older and therefore, with poorer infrastructure and with
less influential residents.

Each contractor was to ensure that the waste in the dhalao (an intermediary transfer
point, often like a room ) was segregated, the dhalao and its defined surroundings
of 25 feet was clean and the waste was collected and transported at regular hours to
the landfill. Each contractor was given a list of existing dhalaos to ease their work.

Prior to this, for over two years, the Delhi Government initiated the Bhagidari (literal
meaning : partnership) scheme where middle and high income residential areas
were trained to understand the importance of segregation of waste into dry and wet
categories. This programme was well publicized and several hundred residents from
the more affluent parts of Delhi were invited to attend these trainings. This does not
seem to have been implemented, since the waste arrived at the bins in an
unsegregated manner, despite a law that made it mandatory for waste generators to
segregate. The task of the private company therefore was not impacted by the
Bhagidari scheme, underlying the failure of the exercise. This failure also drove
home the point that residents were unlikely segregate their waste and an external
agency would have to continue to do so for them. Traditionally, the informal
 recycling sector has always segregated the waste and sold it in the chain for
reprocessing.

A survey of the privatized areas undertaken in January 2006v, preceded by a

discussion with managers of DWM revealed that the company had sub-contracted
each area to smaller players, who acted as labour providers. Using this model, each
sub-contracted party would provide a fixed number of workers who would be called
bin guides. They would be stationed at a dhalao or bin, cleaning the bins,
segregating waste and helping load the compactors. Many of them would also live in
the bins overnight, as they were unable to find inexpensive housing neaby. Few of
them were waste pickers, but several were simply paid daily wagers. On an average,
they were paid appx. 1/3rd of the minimum daily wages, or Rs. 1000 and had no
social security. However the workers had informal access to dry waste, which was
sold to a junk dealer and significantly supplemented the income.vi

This model was only viable in high income areas where there was adequate
recyclable waste discarded. In lower income areas, the worker was forced to live off
the payments and often, undertake responsibility for a cluster of bins, in order to
optimize hisvii earnings. This resulted in lower quality of work and poorer work
conditions. It was also difficult to implement this in areas where large amounts of
organic waste were produced. In South Delhi’s Dakshin Puri area, the waste from
processing fruit and vegetables was so enormous that the workers were forced to
stay out of the dhalaos and work from a distance.

According to several media reports, the performance of DWM in handling waste has
been poor, based on the quality of visual cleanliness. Other companies have
received less flack and none of it is reported as yet in the media. viii

The NDMC is also now preparing to privatize the waste handling, on the same lines
as the MCD.

Initial cost comparisons are known only informally and via discussions with the
private operators. According to a former official of DWM, ix the cost per truck to the
company was only $ 40, which is significantly less than that of the MCD’s $. 140 or
the NDMC’s $ 180 per truck. Greater efficiency and stricter monitoring is likely to be
one cause for this significant drop, as are, possibly, different approaches to
calculating the cost, which may hide some costs. A recent World Bank report x
suggests that this difference is an India wide phenomenon, and that the difference
can be in the range of 20-40%. Comparing the costs of waste collection and
transportation in 10 towns in the southern Indian state of Karnataka, the report
shows the trend of cost reduction across the board. However, the Bank suggests that
“One of the reasons for the relatively lower costs incurred by the contractor is
quoted as differential wages, particularly when private contractors tend to pay lower
than minimum wages to their sanitary workers.” The government, on the other
hand, cannot indulge in such practices and therefore would incur much higher costs
for the same labour performed by the same number of workers. It also pays social
security to many of them.

Comparing these findings, it is likely that the privatization process is economically

viable only at the cost of underpaying the workers.

III. The Impact on the Informal Sector Waste Recyclers

According to the former Municipal Commissioner of Delhi, Rakesh Mehta, the design of
the privatization system was intentionally different from that of other cities in that the
contract did not start at the doorstep of the generator. Instead, this space was left open
for informal players, so that they could access the waste that they wanted. Another
reason was also that this was likely to prove too complex for the private contractors
themselves. xi

Despite this, a study of the contract signed with the private contractor reveals that the
work of the informal sector, as it is being actually performed, has not been taken into
account. Although their role has been acknowledged by various government bodies for
well over a decade prior to privatization, it finally excludes them. This is likely to be for
three reasons. Firstly, that the sector has not been well appreciated in the past to merit
adequate inclusion. It is not on the radar of government bodies. Second, the working of
the sector is poorly understood by those involved in designing the process and its
inclusion is therefore unlikely to have a good fit, should it be undertaken. Thirdly, the
vision of a city with an efficient system of privatized waste does not include
wastepickers or other informal sector recyclers, since they are in contradiction to the
idea of the modern and the ordered. A former Chairperson of the NDMC expressed the
imagined city succinctly when he remarked, “I want our streets to look like
Singapore.”xii

The following sections analyze the impact of privatization on the various levels of the
informal sector.

Wastepickers

Many of the workers are not wastepickers, but other informal sector workers or wage
labourers. This indicates a gradual displacement of the wastepickers from their work. It
also indicates an artificially increasing competition for a limited resource. By itself, this
fall out is clearly an undesirable one.

But there are several other ways by which the means of privatization is breaking down
the waste picking system.

A recent survey showed that in such sites where a wastepicker was on duty, it was
often to the exclusion of all other wastepickers.xiii Usually, most wastepickers move from
bin to bin at peak hours along a fixed territorial route which is shared by other
wastepickers. Alternatively, a few wastepickers take over dhalaos, from where they
mine the waste as it is thrown in. This is then their monopoly. Wastepickers find several
ways to both collaborate and compete through unwritten codes of conduct and
community and peer pressure. As a result, a complex and evolving system of resource
sharing comes into play, resulting in one of the highest rates of recycling in the world.
xiv
This informal system therefore plays out not as the tragedy of the commons but
remarkably, the opposite of it.

By breaking the existing system and replacing it with ‘bin guides,’ waste is no longer
able to be shared amongst a vast community of the poor. It is instead monopolized via
an individual. Moreover, by hiring persons who are inherently entrepreneurial, the
incentive to seek out waste to segregate and sell is killed, as a new debilitating
dependency is fostered. Many such people are stuck, because refusing an underpaying
job may result in job loss or a lost opportunity to leverage better terms of work.

The poor typically harness their social capital to get through difficult times. Systems
such as the one described above are likely to break up this social capital because they
rupture the basis on acting like a community and instead, seek to create a new
‘professional’ individual outside this system. This considerably weakens the individual
and the community, which is seen to provide valuable services where the
state/government fails or is unable to.

The model above is indicative of the many problems with this form of privatization. The
system of contracting to the lowest bidder has a ripple effect at the dhalao level, where
underpayment to workers becomes the only economically viable form of functioning.
Sub-contracting places priorities on cleanliness, but does not lay safety standards for
workers. Moreover, it continues to operate along the same degraded quality of work,
involving standing in waste, and exposes the worker to the same hazards as previously.

In some areas, a quid pro quo system appears to have been established. A site visit to a
small dhalao in Delhi’s elite Gulmohar Park Area xv suggested that in smaller and more
discreetly located bins, a wastepicker may access the waste in return for helping with
loading the compactors. In other parts of Delhi, municipal workers were seen at the bin
sites supervising wastepickers who were loading waste into receptacles installed for the
purpose. A discussion with the workers indicated that their role was both unclear at that
point as well as in transition. In the meantime, they were still responsible for overseeing
the waste handling by the private operator. Given that on site cleanliness was linked
with efficient supervision, the officials continue to use existing linkages of coercion to
carry out the task at hand.xvi

The ownership of space-the dhalaos and bins-has also negatively impacted

wastepickers. Earlier, they would segregate their waste in these dhalaos, as the only
available space to undertake such work. Now, DWM does not allow this and has
therefore taken away the only ‘work space’ available to such persons. The decision to
take away public spaces and make such assets available exclusively to a single private
player therefore disincentivizes recycling.

A newer trend is that of DWM beginning to make rightful claims on the recyclable
waste.xvii. A clash between the black letter legal owners and the customary legal owners
is inevitable. Recent documentation shows that the contractors usually intimidate,
abuse, harass and even beat wastepickers who attempt to ‘break into’ a newly
privatized space to carry out their work. In a more recent series of events, wastepickers
who were simultaneously engaged in collecting waste from the doorstep to access the
recyclables also found themselves disallowed from entering bins for segregation and
even disposal of waste that is depleted of it recyclables.

It would therefore seem that by not explicitly defining the rights and role of the
wastepickers, and by not clearly identifying them as legitimate players in the process of
waste management, they are perceived as a category without rights.

Junk Dealers

In the recycling hierarchy, junk dealers buy waste from the waste picker and itinerant
buyers, further segregate it and sell it ahead to specialized dealers or directly to
reprocessing factories. In this, they are dependant on the materials flow from the
wastepickers.

The previous section showed that privatization, as it is unfolding in Delhi, has begun to
fracture the wastepickers’ work and access to recyclables. This clearly impacts the junk
dealers as well. According to DWM officials, their own short term plan is to sell the
waste directly to the reprocessing factories. In the medium term, they hope to recycle it
themselves.xviii

Unless they begin to expand and compete for other, alternative sources of waste, junk
dealers are likely to be badly hit by privatization, as they cannot even be hired, unlike
some of the wastepickers.

Reprocessors

Reprocessors are unlikely to be impacted by privatization significantly, as they will

receive most of the waste they require. Even recycling operations will not absorb the
entire amount generated. Much of it is likely to be in an aggregated form, from a single
source, thereby making it only marginally harder for them to negotiate prices. Within
this group, the smaller, semi-legal or ‘illegal’ factories may face greater uncertainty
about supplies and the sector will require to upgrade itself.

It is clear that the current form of privatization is fracturing the informal recycling
sector. Waste, which was till now a public good, handled by the government as part of
its public duty, has been transferred to the private sector. There has been no public
discussion about giving off public assets in this case. Moreover, along with this, the
dhalaos, which were similar to common public spaces in that they were manned on
behalf of the public by government agencies, have been privatized and the waste
contained therein fenced off. The ramifications of this have been described in this
section already, but further include:

• An lowering of incentives to pick out the lowest grade recyclables. Once

ownership is removed, wastepickers as employee will no longer feel compelled to
mine the waste of its least lucrative recyclables. This will result in more residual
recyclables reaching the landfill and an increase, not decrease in the space
required for landfills in a city. The cost of new landfills is mounting, with an
estimate budgetary requirement of $ 2 billion in the next 10 years.
• An associated concern with reduced recycling rates is the problem of sustainable
use of resources.
• Currently, wastepickers are estimated to pick up between 15% to 59% of the
total waste generated in Delhi. This waste is segregated into several categories
along the chain, before it is accepted by any reprocessor. The schedule set for
the private operator, on the other hand, demands 20% segregation only in the 8 th
year of operation. Prior to that, and even during this period, the operator is paid
by the weight that is delivered at the landfill. This creates a disincentive to
segregated. Seen in the light of Article 5.15, giving the operator rights over the
recyclables, the contract ‘creates competing interests between the private
operator and the wastepicker.’

Table 1 : Segregation Requirements from Private Operators

Year of Months from COD Segregation Applicable penalty
operati benchmark for for corresponding
on corresponding months (in %terms)
month (in %
terms)
Year 1 1-12 0 -
Year 2 13-24 5 15%
Year 3 26-36 10 15%
Year 4 37-48 12 15%
Year 5 49-60 15 15%
Year 6 60-72 18 15%
Year 7 73-84 20 15%
Year 8 85 onwards 20 15%
onwards

Source : Contract signed between the MCD and Private Operator, 2005
• Waste recyclers, particularly at the lower levels of the chain, are
characteristically poorly educated, earning less than 2 dollars a day, and self
employed. Recycling is one of the few occupations open to them, where they
provide themselves with employment and contribute essential services to the
city. They typically do not have the access to resources that allow them upward
mobility, and are particularly vulnerable. A system that does not take them into
consideration is likely to increase urban poverty and place greater stress on the
recyclers. The impacts of this can be felt by the entire family; Reduced parental
income amongst the poor require children to contribute to the family income,
differential priorities for children’s education come into play, increase the
pressure of work on women, reduce available nutrition, reduced expenses for
medical care and differentiated access within the family to health care, the
breaking up of social capital and the consequences of that. This in turn violates
the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals, to which India is also
committed
• Waste, which is a mixture of discards, is no longer able to lend itself to a
developmental, social role but becomes a purely commercial object

IV. The Global Experience

It is useful to examine comparable global experience and to determine to what extent

the experiences have been similar. In general, the three regions about which the most
information is available are Africa, East Asia and Latin America.

In Central Africa, unlike in Egypt and South Africa, there are little informal waste
recycling activities. This is because of the low level of industrialization, particularly of
the recycling sector. Where factories exist, they are able to reprocess the waste of
several countries, leaving little scope and viability for other units.

However, in Egypt, privatization has resulted in a loss of livelihoods for the Zabaleen, or
the traditional waste handlers. Estimates are that in 1997, the Zabaleen handled one
third of Cairo’s waste, which was almost 3000 tons. Of this, 85% was recycled directly
through the Zabaleen’s self-owned and operated micro-enterprises that were constantly
upgraded.xix Despite this, officials did not wish to include them in their privatization
plans as their work was considered unhygienic and the new private investors seemed to
be a better prospect for Cairo.

When privatization began here in the early years of 2000, it included waste collection
from the doorsteps. The Zabaleen were additionally impacted as many of them earned
by pelletizing plastics. Loss of access to waste plastics resulted in an additional loss of
income.

Some estimates put the number of job losses at 75,000. After a period of being
displaced, and an international campaign, the Zabaleen were able to regain some lost
ground by being involved in the waste collection. Researchers have concluded that their
inclusion was related to the fact that implementing the contract became impossible
without the help of the Zabaleen and their skill sets. Moreover, in Egypt, the
privatization companies used mechanical means to collect waste, which was unviable in
the old city with narrow roads. It was here that the Zabaleen with donkey carts were
able to help the companies to fulfill their legal obligations.xx

Currently, several, but not all the Zabaleen have been able to regain their former work,
but they claim to earn less than they used to. xxi Additionally, local NGOs say that while
they were organized, after prolonged negotiation, to work on a more equal footing with
the traditional middlemen, Wahiya previously, they have now been re-hired as workers
under the same middlemen.xxii The picture is unclear, as others assert that they are
now free of the Wahiya, who, ironically, paid them more than the private companies
currently do. Private contractors now claim , “ It is our strategy to employ the local
Zabaleen. We want to avoid conflict and this satisfies the social component of our
contract.” On their part, the Zableen have constantly emphasized that their earnings
are not based on payment as much as access to the recyclables. The companies have
therefore turned a blind eye to the fact that the Zabaleen now additionally take the
waste and are not characteristic employees.

In Tanzania’s Dar-es-Salaam, the impulse to privatize was driven by the poor impression
of that country. The privatization of waste was undertaken in collaboration with UN
HABITAT and was deemed a resounding success, because of the noticeable cleanliness.
The scale of privatization was unique. Rather than foreign companies, it was the local
community based organizations and small local businesses that were facilitated to
provide waste collection services from households. The savings by the municipal bodies
was used for road construction and maintenance. xxiii

We do not have any known information about the informal sector operations here prior
to this. Based on the available information, this kind of privatization is noteworthy
because it built upon existing structures. After this phase, as larger players entered the
scene, the scenario may have been altered. In sharp contrast, in Kenya, an Italian
company, Jacorossi International, was invited to take over waste management amidst
wide spread protests.

In Accra, Ghana, researchers point out that privatization has achieved nothing that a
revitalized private sector could not have done, had it complied by the country’s laws
and enforced existing regulation. Instead, the authors point out, the privatization effort
is “structured to benefit private interests by excluding the public.” xxiv

In Columbia, local initiatives have borne results. The results of organized waste
recyclers are already visible. Across the country, 10,000 wastepicker families have
formed 118 cooperatives that are allowing them to bring in over 300,000 tons of
recycled materials into the market. The strength of the groups lie in their ability to
federate under the National Association of Recyclers, which helps them to enhance their
business activities through capacity building and credit. They also offer waste handling
services to various institutions. Although privatization has been challenging for the
sector, they have been able to negotiate for niche work, such as fees based service
provision.xxv More recently, in 2003, under Decree 1713, part 1505, wastepickers have
been included and their rights to participate in solid waste management plans , at the
development and follow up stages, has been made formal. xxviIn Argentina, a Zero
Waste Decree makes it mandatory for private waste handlers to provide facilities for the
informal sector to segregate and store recyclable waste. In this case, the wastepicking
sector has consciously not pushed for a strict implementation of the rule, since many of
them see themselves in the work only temporarily, due to economic hardships. xxvii
A common experience in several countries has been that of formal sector workers
organizing against privatization, for fear of job losses. From Singapore to Pakistan,
reports show that agitating workers are able to negotiate with the government to retain
their employment, often even scaring them to delay privatization. In Singapore, one of
the suggested ways to handle the fallout was to set up a fund for displaced workers.
xxviii
In Pakistan, workers were forced to take to the streets. xxixFrom this, it becomes clear
that formal sector workers, already in the formal realm, are able to organize themselves
to protest more effectively. It is therefore critical that the informal sector also be
organized.

Based on these experiences, it is clear that:

• Waste recyclers must be organized if they are to negotiate in the event of

privatization
• The access to waste is a critical part of any waste recyclers work. Being
employed is more a means than a desired end
• Where the informal sector activity is already very low, the impact of privatization
will not be easy to discern

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis in the preceding sections makes it clear that it is economically and socially
desirable to include the informal recycling sector in any waste management initiative.
The errors, experiences and the studies detailed previously throw light on the possible
ways by which this can be done.

This author believes that privatization of waste is inevitable in the developing world,
because of the overriding trust that policymakers and multilateral donors globally have
in this path. As cities become more global and require competing for visibility, funds,
investments, expertise and drawing in economic prosperity, many more city planners
and policy makers will be under pressure to take this path of seemingly, the least
resistance. Much of the citizenry and the media sees privatization as a good step and
has created a demand for this market driven form of services.

In several cases, privatization has come to mean the right to exclude others.
xxx
Proponents of this argue that if this is not the case, the tragedy of the commons will
kick in. We have seen that that the contrary holds true in the case of Delhi. The fencing-
off of common resources and transferring of public property into private hands is
indicative of poor policy making. The informal waste recycling sector is also a private
player, offering important environmental services to the city. It is therefore important to
see its work as already operating in the private sector and therefore, follow similar
policies to promote it.

Against this backdrop, privatization needs to be reconsidered in fundamental ways. It

should not be seen as a solution to a dirty city, or a formula held exclusively in the
private sector. Rather, it must be viewed as one of many possible solutions to specific
aspects of the waste management cycle. One of the important aspects is developing
disposal facilities, a section not discussed in this paper, but one that requires large
investments and technical know-how.

Nor should privatization be privileged over other indigenous forms of waste handling,
whether they be waste recycling through the informal sector or community based
innovations. Instead, it should be clearly accepted that complete corporatized
privatization will result in more asymmetrical outcomes. It should be clear that the
informal recycling sector is also providing private services to the city and should be
viewed as such.

A central shift in understanding must inform policy on privatization. Currently, waste

management companies involved in privatization are typically accountable in highly
quantitative terms, such as the amount of waste collected, the response time to
complaints and the fleet efficiency. However, in a developing country, in whose cities
almost 1% of the population is dependant on waste recycling for a living, this must be
dovetailed into all practices. As previously explained, the sector is based on a complex
system of cooperation and competition, which is still not entirely understood and which
itself seems to be constantly evolving. Therefore, instead of trying to de-construct this
sector, it is more practical to follow guidelines that are likely to encourage it to develop
and incentivize its participation in the process, instead of alienating it.

Clearly, then, the social efficiency of privatization must be considered too. Not doing
this fractures the social fabric, particularly amongst the poor and the most vulnerable,
leading to irreparable losses of social capital and of their increased vulnerability, and in
theory at least, increasing the burden on the government. This is the single most
important lesson learnt from the Indian and International experiences of privatization of
waste services.

Some recommendations that flow from this conclusion are described below :

• The central site of conflict is the ownership of recyclable, or dry waste. In both
the Indian cases as well as the international case of Egypt, it is clear that access
to waste, not payment for working at site, remains central to the wastepickers.
Hence, any contract must necessarily include a clause specifying that right over
recyclable waste belongs to the wastepickers first. Access to waste for
wastepickers is the backbone of any policy made for waste in India
• Global experiences show that privatization must not begin even at the dhalao
level, and must be restricted to transportation. Bids should be for the
transportation and dumping sector, and not prior to that. A lesson should be
drawn from the decision of the MCD not to enter the household level for
privatization. This is an example to follow.
• Some wastepickers work at the landfills. Although this is unsafe work,
privatization should include their rights over waste that reaches here. In the
medium term, the wastepickers and their organizations should examine other,
safer ways to earn through recycling activities
• Any plan for solid waste management in India must necessarily be informed by
an understanding and an appreciation of the informal recycling sector. This
implies designing systems that can strengthen an existing system and ride on it.
In this case, the bid should have included a section on including the sector and
allow the bidders to suggest how they would want to do this, after helping them
to understand the issue. Understanding the sector must be made a part of the
bidding process, just as several other aspects are explained and clarified. It is
critical not to leave the bidders without this understanding on their own
• The informal sector must be treated as a tightly knitted chain, and one that must
not be fragmented, if the city is to reap the benefits it offers. Hence, the chain
should not be tampered with or be modified to become ‘modern’ except where
consensual use of newer technologies or new design can be offered, though not
 imposed. The case of Egypt, where plastic is recycled by the Zabaleen, is a case
in point.
• In order to be able to participate gainfully in a shifting city, waste recyclers must
organize themselves as a tangible, legal entity that can enter into contracts and
negotiations on behalf of its members. It is often difficult for policymakers to find
ways of including a sector that exists through individual or family enterprise, but
without any defined collective organization and indeed, it is beyond the
imagination of defined structures to work with these
• Taking a cue from the policies in place in Columbia, such recyclers’ organizations
should be recognized and be privileged through the cycle of waste handling.
Studies have shown that allowing the sector to work legitimately significantly
impacts their poverty levels and improve their work conditions.xxxi
• One commonly observed trend in community level waste management is that of
local resources, such as volunteer time, subsiding the lives of waste recyclers
and detailed networks, creating innovative kinds of social security for workers in
the urban context. Instead of overriding those, privatization should let them be
and not attempt to meddle with them for homogeneity. A study of Churchill
County, in the United States, calculated that privatization of waste handling could
result in 279 less jobs, reduction in county household income by $36.171 million,
14,735 hours of voluntary time, and $ 85,233 in charitable donations. These
unaccounted for costs are only in the developed world. xxxiiThey are likely to even
higher in the developing world and should be left undisturbed
• The MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) should be mainstreamed into waste
handling, because of the opportunity this provides in tackling poverty through
micro enterprises, individual enterprise and demonstrated low capital and
running costs.

If there is to be privatization of solid waste management services, it must be designed

to be equitable for everyone. It can offer answers for urban poverty and the increasing
urban environmental problems we face. If urban policy makers are to use this for the
optimal benefit of a city, then privatization should be seen as a means of enabling the
urban poor, not disempowering them. This requires a paradigm shift and visionary
leadership, but there are rudimentary examples to build up from.

Endnotes
i
Jha, Ajay. Removal, Disposal of Waste Must be Privatized . Gulf News. November 26 1999

ii
Jha, Lalit, K. Govt.-MCD tiff leads to garbage problem. The Hindu. Oct 7, 2004

iii
Starr, Paul. “The Meaning of Privatization.” Yale Law and Policy Review. 1988
iv
Contract between MCD and Private Operator, signed in 2005. Original copy denied, current copy informally
obtained
v
The survey was undertaken by the author of this paper, as part of an exploratory research survey of the post
privatization scenario for a film
vi
Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group. Unpublished Survey. Delhi. 2006
vii
The pronoun ‘he’ has been used because there were no women seen in this scheme
viii
Hindustan Times. August 27, 2006
ix
Personal discussions with Mr. Satyavir Chauhan, DWM. June 2006.Delhi
x
The World Bank. Improving Management of Municipal Solid Waste in India : Overview and Challenges. May
2006
xi
Bhargava, Vishal and Chaturvedi, Bharati, film, 60 kilos. Delhi February 2006
xii
Personal Discussion with B.P. Misra, Chairperson, NDMC. May 2001. Delhi.
xiii
Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group. Unpublished Survey. 2006 Delhi.
xiv
Ghosh et al. A Partnership for a Decarbonized Energy Future. World Affairs : The Journal of
International Issues. Volume Ten, Number One, Spring 2006.
xv
The survey was undertaken by the author of this paper, as part of an exploratory research survey of the post
privatization scenario for a film
xvi
Bhargava, Vishal and Chaturvedi, Bharati, film, 60 kilos. Delhi February 2006s
xvii
Email from S.A. Rizwee et al, Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group. December 2006
xviii
Personal discussions with Mr. Satyavir Chauhan, DWM. June 2006.Delhi
xix
Fahmi, Wael Sala. “ The Impact of privatization of solid waste management on the Zabaleen garbage
collectors of Cairo.” Environment and Urbanization. Vol 17. No. 2. October 2005
xx
Iskander, Laila. Presentation at ASMARE Conference, Belo Horizonte. August 2006
xxi
, Wael Sala. “ The Impact of privatization of solid waste management on the Zabaleen garbage collectors of
Cairo.” Environment and Urbanization. Vol 17. No. 2. October 2005
xxii
Iskander, Laila. Presentation at 5th Festival of Lixo and Cidadania. Belo Horizonte. August 23, 2006
xxiii
Pan African News Agency (PANA). UN-HABITAT Policies work miracles for Dar es Salaam June 23. 2004
xxiv
Demanya, B.K. Remapping Garbage : The privatization of waste management in Accra, Ghana. MA
Dissertation, Queen’s University, 2001. Canada
xxv
Medina, Martin. Supporting Scavenger co-ops. Biocycle. Vol 38, Issue 6. June 1997
xxvi
Padilla, Nohora and Grisalez, Ruiz Silvio, National Association of Recyclers. Presentation at 5th Festival of
Lixo and Cidadania. Belo Horizonte. August 23, 2006
xxvii

xxviii
Yap, Sonny. Set up a venture fund for displaced workers The Straight Times. August 25, 2001. Singapore
xxix
The Pakistan Newswire. Sanitary workers kick off protest against privatization. February 16, 2006.
Karachi
xxx
Rose, Carol. The Comedy of the Commons : Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property. The
University of Chicago Law Review. Volume 53. Issue 3. Summer 1986
xxxi
Medina, Martin. Presentation at CWG International Conference on MDGs and Waste. Calcutta. 2006
xxxii
Burkley, et al. Impacts of Privatization : Use of Multimodal Survey. Social Science Journal. Volume 43,
Issue 4. October 2006