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ModernAsianStudies,15, 2 ( 98 ), pp. 311-338. Printed in Great Britain.
TheBerlin-TokyoAxis andJapanese
MilitaryInitiative
CARL BOYD
3II
312 CARL BOYD
From the beginning it was clear that Oshima would excel in his Berlin
assignment; he was extremely eager to pursue General Ueda's instruc-
tions. Shortly after Oshima's arrival in 1934, the American military
attache in Berlin estimated that there were as many as I50 Japanese
agents in Germany, working under the immediate supervision of the
office of the Japanese military attache. Though many of these alleged
agents were probably Japanese students in German universities, U.S.
Army Captain Rowan reported to his superiors in Washington that
some of the students were of unusually high caliber: one student at the
University of Berlin, for example, was actually a professor of chemistry
at Tokyo University.7 Furthermore, the American officer learned from
the chief of the German army armaments office that 'the Japanese
military attache visits the Waffenamtthree or four times more than any
other military attache.'8 Thus, if we are to assume that the 'special
students' mentioned were indeed agents, and considering the fact that
Oshima had ready access to the Waffenamt,a secret National Socialist
war office normally off limits to foreigners, it was with considerable ease
that he was able to keep his Tokyo superiors informed of significant
developments in the economic base of German rearmament. By Sep-
tember I934, when Oshima attended the Nurnberg rally, he was con-
vinced that the will of National Socialism had triumphed, that German
military strength was being rejuvenated. The observation and collection
of intelligence data concerning the Soviet Union, which was the other
major part of Oshima's assignment, proved to be a more difficult task.
The Japanese army had long watched the rise of Soviet military
strength with keen interest. In 1929 Oshima's predecessor in Berlin, then
Colonel Omura Yurin, hosted a conference of Japanese military
7
Captain Hugh W. Rowan, assistantmilitary attach6, American Embassy, Berlin, to
Military Intelligence Division, Office of Chief of Staff, War Department, 17 May 1934,
ONI Reports, 1886-1939, No. 13147-A, U-i-b, NA, RG 38.
8 Ibid.Rowan was convinced that
'theJapanese Military Attache is being given access
to important technical information in possession of the German army' (ibid.). The
growing technical and economic needs of Hitler's armed forces soon rendered the small
armaments office obsolete. Not long after Rowan's report was filed, Colonel, later
General, Georg Thomas headed a new office for Wehrwirtschaft- und Wafenwesen.
Through an elaborate military economic staff system he would become largely respon-
sible for organizing Germany's peacetime economy toward the requirementsof war. In
addition to considerable naval and air strength, by May I939 land forces of the Third
Reich 'had been increasedfrom seven to fifty-onedivisions, compared with an expansion
from forty-threeto fifty divisionsin the period from 1898 to 1914'. Alan Bullock, Hitler,A
Studyin Tyranny,rev. edn (New York: Harper and Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p.
511. See also Herbert Rosinski, The GermanArmy(New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1966), pp. 228-9, and Georg Thomas, Geschichte derdeutschen
Wehr-undRistungswirtschaft
(I918-g943/45) (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1966), particularly pp. 2-3,
5 -68.
BERLIN-TOKYO AXIS AND JAPANESE INITIATIVE 315
attaches in Europe. The representative from Tokyo was Lieutenant
General Matsui Iwane, a recent director of military intelligence at
Army General Staff Headquarters. The Berlin conference focused on the
Soviet Union, and topics discussed included sabotage, espionage, and
the employment of White Russians for intelligence purposes.9 There
seems to be little evidence that theJapanese actually collaborated with
Germany on such matters at that time, for the Weimar government's
attitude toward the Soviet Union was considerably different from
Hitler's attitude.
However, Oshima vigorously sought access to German information
concerning the Soviet Union in I934.10 Oshima approached the most
important German officials with proposals for Japanese-German co-
operation in obtaining intelligence about the Soviet Union. By at least
January 1935 he was working closely on the matter with the new head of
German central military intelligence (Die AbwehrAbteilung), then naval
Captain Wilhelm Canaris. Some time prior to June I937 Oshima
obtained similar free access to Lieutenant General Wilhelm Keitel
(Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmachtafter February 1938).
9 IMTFE, Proceedings,
pp. 28, 839-40 (Hashimoto) and pp. 33,884-94 (Matsui).
Japanese military attaches in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Poland, Austria,
Italy, and Turkey attended the Berlin conference. It included some figures important in
the events leading to the Second World War. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Hashi-
moto Kingoro, military attache in Turkey, was sentenced to life imprisonment at the
postwar Tokyo trial for his part in the I937 'rape of Nanking,' sinking of the U.S.S.
Panay, and shelling of H.M.S. Ladybird. Matsui, Hashimoto's commander-in-chief in
China, was sentenced to death.
A Japanese scholar has recently written that while Oshima was military attache in
Vienna (February I923-November 1934) he 'worked primarily on Russian espionage
activities'. Masaki Miyake, Nichi-Doku-I sangokudomeino kenkyu[A study on the tripar-
tite alliance Berlin-Rome-Tokyo] (Tokyo: Nanso-sha, I975), p. 43. I have not read this
elsewhere and Professor Miyake offers no documentation for the specific point; nor is
Oshima's military record of any help. Oshima had served in Siberia from August 19 8 to
February I919 and it is probable that he had considerable experience with Soviet
intelligence matters. See Walter Voigt, 'Begegnung mit Hauptmann Oshima in Sibirien
I9 8,' Das DeutscheRote Kreuz, 7 (February 1943): 32-3.
10 It was believed in the
Japanese Army General Staff that German military intelli-
gence on the Soviet Union was excellent at the time of Oshima's appointment. There-
fore, it was not unusual that a General Staff intelligence officer, Colonel Iinuma Minoru,
should privately request (irai) the new military attachi to explore the possibility of
working with the Germans in Soviet intelligence matters. The request was made
informally, almost by way of a suggestion, before Oshima left Tokyo in I934, but the
point was not included in his official orders. Oshima individually took the initiative. See
my article entitled 'The Role of Hiroshi Oshima in the Preparation of the Anti-Comin-
tern Pact,' Journal of Asian History, II, I (I977): 49-7I. Cf. Ohata Tokushiro, 'The
Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935-1939,' trans. Hans H. Baerwald, in Deterrent Diplomacy:
Japan, Germany, and the USSR, I935-1940, ed. James William Morley (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 23-4.
316 CARL BOYD
1935 than stated in most scholarly works dealing with the subject. This point is
confirmed in the diary of Bella Fromm, a diplomatic columnist for the Ullstein papers,
for on 6 April 1935 she recorded that 'it seems that Rib[bentrop] and the newJapanese
Military Attache, Oshima, are pretty thick these days. Something's brewing ... some
poison cup is being prepared' (Bella Fromm. BloodandBanquets:A BerlinSocialDiary
[New York: Harper, I942], p. I93). The recently discovered Hack Papers have been
used by Bernd Martin, 'Die deutsch-japanischen Bezierhungen wahrend des Dritten
Reiches' in Hitler,Deutschland
unddieMichte:MaterialienzurAssenpolitik desDrittenReiches,
ed. Manfred Funke (Diisseldorf: Droste, I977), pp. 454-70. They reveal only that
Oshima and Hack discussed German-Japanese collaboration on 17 September I935
and that by October 4th Oshima had prepared a draft treaty for Ribbentrop. Martin
suggests, however, that presumably the initial Oshima-Ribbentrop meeting was some
time earlier (pp. 460-I).
17 International Military Tribunal, Trialof theMajorWarCriminals,42 vols (Nurem-
berg: Secretariat of the Tribunal, I947-49), 10: 240.
18 Oshima to
author, 7 May 197 . See also Ohata, 'The Anti-Comintern Pact,' p. 24
and IMTFE, Proceedings, pp. 34, 076-77 (Oshima).
BERLIN-TOKYO AXIS AND JAPANESE INITIATIVE 319
impression that ifJapan desired a military alliance of some sort, it could
be concluded.'19 Although Ribbentrop was then unknown in Tokyo,
the Japanese General Staff speculated, correctly, that he was a very
important German official. News of such secret military-political discus-
sions between Oshima and the Fiihrer startled the Japanese General
Staff officers, who, although in favor of the idea of a Japanese-German
entente, particularly if it were aimed at a traditional adversary to
Japanese expansion in Asia, actually lacked jurisdiction in the political
aspects of the discussions and had no contingency plan of the magnitude
envisaged in Oshima's scheme.
These unprecedented activities of the Japanese military attache pre-
sented the Army General Staff with a dilemma. The Japanese military
had long been accustomed to influencing government foreign policy in
East Asia. The 193I Manchurian Incident, where independent local
action afforded the army headquarters in Tokyo an opportunity to
exploit it, was perhaps the most striking example of such influence. In an
era of European totalitarianism Oshima's exploits in distant Berlin
provided the Japanese military with limitless opportunities for promot-
ing its self-interest and influence. The General Staff's decision would be
a watershed forJapan's European policy in the 1930s, but before it was
taken there were many uncertainties in the way.
The question of how the army should deal with Oshima was a delicate
matter. It was placed in the hands of the Chief of the Army General
Staff, Field Marshal Prince Kan'in Kotohito. He trusted Oshima and,
as mentioned earlier, knew his family well. Kan'in personally instructed
emissary Wakamatsu, before he left for Berlin in November, to assess the
intentions of the German army and government while discussing the
possibility of concluding an anti-communist agreement. The terms of
Wakamatsu's special assignment, however, give us particular insight
into the General Staff's lack of preparation for dealing with the new
25
GD, ser. C, 1933-I937 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1957- ), 5: Doc. No. 509.
26
Article I of the Secret Additional Agreement to the Agreement against the Com-
munist International: 'Should one of the High Contracting States become the object of
an unprovoked attack or threat by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the other
High Contracting State obligates itself to take no measureswhich would tend to ease the
situation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (GD, D, I: Doc. No. 463, note 2a).
27 Cited by
Hugh Byas, New YorkTimescorrespondentin Tokyo, New YorkTimes,26
November I936, p. 26.
28 'Orthodox
Japanese administrative theory places great emphasis on the ringisei,a
system whereby reports and proposals are expected to be initiated at the bottom of a
bureaucratic pyramid and then to be pumped upward through the chain of command
until, when they reach the top, they representthe consensusof the institution which the
seniors can do little to influence and are expected to represent'.James William Morley,
introduction to Hosoya Chihiro, 'The Tripartite Pact, I939-1940,' trans. James Wil-
liam Morley, in DeterrentDiplomacy, p. 184.
BERLIN-TOKYO AXIS AND JAPANESE INITIATIVE 323
knew little of world conditions. They were answerable to no one for their
decisions and it suited them to swallow Oshima's views wholesale.... The Axis
policy of the Army, which in turn directed the Government, came eventually to
be Japan's fixed course.29
The first step had been the conclusion of the German-Japanese Anti-
Comintern Pact in November 1936; the Pact was symbolic of the new
rapprochement with Germany, which would culminate in the tripartite
alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1940.
After the conclusion of the Pact the Japanese Foreign Ministry
regained a certain amount of control in policy matters concerning
European states. Foreign Minister Arita wanted to remedyJapan's state
of isolation by concluding additional anti-Comintern pacts. In fact,
shortly before the Pact with Germany was concluded, Tokyo showed
some effort to negotiate similar anti-Comintern agreements with the
British and Dutch. The overtures of Japan's Ambassador to Great
Britain, Yoshida Shigeru, and the soundings of Yamaguichi Iwao,
charge d'affairs of the Japanese legation in Amsterdam, revealed that
the two European governments were not interested. Indeed, most West-
ern democracies, contrary to Arita's expectations, grew even more wary
ofJapan and Germany after the consummation of the Anti-Comintern
Pact.
A pact with Italy seemed promising. Just after the conclusion of the
1936 Pact with Germany, Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Count
Galeazzo Ciano, informed the Japanese Foreign Ministry that Italy
would consider negotiating a similar pact withJapan. Serious negotia-
tions, however, were delayed for nearly a year because of the change of
Japanese cabinets in February and July, the change ofJapanese ambas-
sadors in Rome, and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. With the
concurrence of theJapanese military, in the autumn and early winter of
I937, Foreign Ministry negotiations between Japan and Italy began
and proceeded smoothly. When Ribbentrop, in London, learned in-
directly from Ambassador Mushakoji of the proposed bilateral agree-
ment with Italy, he went to Rome to meet with Mussolini, Ciano, and
Japanese Ambassador Hotta Masaaki. He proposed to make Italy an
equal member of the year-old German-Japanese Pact.30 Thus, the
Japanese Foreign Ministry had seized the initiative in expanding the
anti-Comintern group of nations, although its bilateral intentions with
Italy had been subverted by Ribbentrop. Italy became a member of the
31 The Italians did not participate in the Secret Additional Agreement to the
Agreement against the Communist International, nor were they invited. Indeed, the
Italian government was not officially informed of the secret supplementary agreement.
See Gerhard L. Weinberg, 'Die geheimen Abkommen zum Antikominternpakt,' Viertel-
jahrsheftefiir Zeitgeschichte, 2, 2 (April I954): 196, and Miyake, Nichi-Doku-I, p. 116.
Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachir6 said at a Privy Council meeting in early I939
that he understood 'that Italy did not join the secret pact [annexed to the Agreement
against the Communist International] because she did not know of its existence'
(IMTFE, Exhibit 491 [minutes of the Privy Council meeting, 22 February 1939]).
32 A new periodical was sponsored by the tripartite powers. In the first issue of
Berlin-Rom-Tokio (often written in German, Italian, and Japanese) a tract-like item
described the mission of the new nations and emphasized their common purpose and
harmonious relations. The piece concluded with a map of Eurasia on which superim-
posed lines connected the countries involved in the following series of agreements:
I. Conclusion of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement: 25 November
1936
2. Italy's accession to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement: 6
November 1937
3. Conclusion of theJapanese-Hungarian Cultural Agreement: 15 November 1938
4. Conclusion of the German-Italian Cultural Agreement: 23 November 1938
5. Conclusion of the German-Japanese Cultural Agreement: 25 November 938
6. Conclusion of the German-Spanish Cultural Agreement: 24January I939
7. Joining of Manchukuo in the Anti-Comintern Agreement: 24 February I939
8. Joining of Hungary in the Anti-Comintern Agreement: 24 February 1939
9. Conclusion of the Italian-Japanese Cultural Agreement: 23 March 1939
Io. Joining of Spain in the Anti-Comintern Agreement: 27 March I939
See 'Die Sendung derjungen Volker/La missione dei popoli giovani,' Berlin-Rom-Tokio,
I, I (I5 May I939): II-
BERLIN-TOKYO AXIS AND JAPANESE INITIATIVE 325
Very little documentation exists concerning the first attempts to
strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact into a closer alignment with Ger-
many, but it is fairly clear that the initiative did not rest solely with
Oshima. The first indication of this is seen in a cable sent by the Italian
ambassador in Japan to Foreign Minister Ciano:
About two months ago [November I937] the Japanese General Staff offered to
sign a military alliance with Germany, an offer that was refused by the latter
because it feared the unstable situation in the Far East and possible initiatives
by Japanese extremists that might precipitate events for which Berlin was not
yet prepared.33
Doubtless, there were suggestions from within the bureaucracy of the
Japanese Army General Staff for strengthening ties with Germany, but
the historical record remains unclear until early 1938.
By then Hitler was ready to explore the possibility of concluding a
German-Japanese military alliance. The Fiihrer's plans for expansion
in Europe were more clearly formulated than previously, and in his
anticipated war with France he would, in fact, unlike the Kaiser in 19 I4,
take measures to avoid a two-front war at the outset. Hitler speculated
that a military alliance with Japan, perhaps including the option to
utilize the Kwantung army inJapan's puppet state, Manchukuo, would
serve to neutralize the Russians. Furthermore, Japanese naval strength
would serve as a deterrent against British readiness to assist the French,
or, at least, reduce British effectiveness in a Franco-German conflict. In
January Ribbentrop made advances toward Oshima suggesting a mili-
tary alliance between Germany and Japan. Oshima enthusiastically
reported this news of Ribbentrop's move and, typically Oshima was
instructed to proceed secretly with the new negotiations. He was to
report developments only to the Army General Staff. In this way
Oshima, as would have been expected, became a fervent spokesman in
Germany for strengthening the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern
Pact.
Ribbentrop's proposal encouraged theJapanese Army General Staff
to renew its earlier interest in such a military alliance with the Third
Reich. In June the Staff sent Oshima proposals which included the
suggestion that Italy be invited to join in a tripartite defense pact aimed
at the Soviet Union.34 Although details of the tortuous and prolonged
negotiations from January 1938 to August 1939 are not the concern of
this essay, it is relevant to note that after the anti-Comintern agreement
33
Auriti to Ciano, 21 January 1938, as cited in Mario Toscano, The Origins of the Pact
of Steel, 2nd edn rev. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 7. See also Miyake,
34
Nichi-Doku-I, pp. 143-8. Ohata, 'The Anti-Comintern Pact,' p. 50.
326 CARL BOYD
Togo and Oshima clashed bitterly in their views. Togo felt that a
German-Japanese military alliance would be of no help in Japan's
efforts to end her war with China, and that it would eventually involve
Japan in a conflict with Hitler's European adversaries. Oshima
obviously did not share the ambassador's feelings of foreboding.
Members of the embassy were divided on the question of the alliance.
Most importantly, in the context of this essay, a schism developed in the
embassy staff over the issue of military interference in diplomatic mat-
ters. The commercial attache wrote that
in March or April 1938 the Naval Attache of the Embassy sent a cable to the
Navy Ministrystrongly urging AmbassadorT5og's removal on the ground that
he was on bad terms with the German Foreign Minister and that his retention
in the circumstances of the time, when it was necessary to promote Japanese-
German cooperation, was not in the interest of the country. The cable stated
also that the matter had been talked over with the Military Attache. This
became known to us when the content of the cable was transmitted from the
Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Togo. Upon learning of this the members of
the staff were indignant, and, feeling that the conspiracy of [the] Army and
Navy to take over the Embassy could not be ignored, moved for the defence of
the Ambassador and the Embassy.37
48
Oshima to author, 21 November 1966.
49New York Times, 22 November 1938, p. 6.
50 Oshima tells this
story in Bungei Shunju (April 1940). 'Katte kabuto no o wo
shimeyo' [After winning, keep the string tight on your helmet] (Library of Congress,
Reel WT [War Trials] 2I, International Military Tribunal, Doc. No. 756). See P.
Ehmann, Die SprichwIrterund bildlichenAusdricke derjapanischenSprache,2nd edn (Tokyo:
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Natur- und Volkerkunde Ostasiens, I927), p. 133, where the
Japanese proverb is rendered in German: 'Nach dem Siege (muss man) das Helmbandfester
binden.'
332 CARL BOYD
officials he received a picture of a swastika, but the following dedication appeared on the
frame: 'To my friend Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima in grateful memory of the years of
untiring devotion to the creation of German-Japanese friendship' ('Ott, Eugen: Analy-
sis of Documentary Evidence,' IPS 324, Doc. No. 4045, 25 June I946, National
Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 331).
61 New fork Times, io November
1939, p. 8 and ibid., 13 December 1939, p. i.
62
'Interrogation of Ott, Eugen,' IPS 324, 5 March I947, RG 331.
63
Miyake, Nichi-Doku-I, p. 238.
64'Botschaft des Fiihrers an die japanische Nation,' Berlin-Rom-Tokio 2, I2 (15
December I940): I4.
BERLIN-TOKYO AXIS AND JAPANESE INITIATIVE 337
of Germany, Italy, and Japan signed on 27 September I940.65 Indeed,
Oshima regretted strongly that he had failed in German-Japanese
relations to achieve in six years what Matsuoka appeared to accomplish
in a few months. Oshima was envious. German Ambassador Ott later
recalled Oshima's reaction.
I rememberhim the day of the signing of the [ 1940 Tripartite] Pact in the house
of Mr. Matsuoka;it was an evening reception and we made a toast to the happy
conclusion of the Pact. Oshima was present and looked very angry obviously
being not used in these negotiations. Personally I think he was, after having
failed in former years with his own endeavors to come to a closer cooperation,
very envious that Matsuoka had succeeded in this respect.66
The Tripartite Pact was the denouement of Japanese military in-
fluence inJapan's policy toward Europe in the I 930s. There were many
complicated factors which contributed to the successful conclusion of the
Japanese army's drive for a military alliance with the victorious Axis
powers. Of no little consequence was 'a pervasive national mood for
action' which included a certain panicky tenor 'lest Japan "miss the
bus" in seizing Europe's lost colonies.'67
During Oshima's six-year tenure in Berlin a complex sequence of
events strengthened military and totalitarian tendencies in Japan, and
eventually produced the I940 treaty. The three Axis powers declared
they would
undertake to assistone another with all political, economic and military means
when one of the three Contracting Partiesis attacked by a power at present not
involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.68
With the encouragement and support of pro-Axis factions in Japan,
65 See
Lu, Fromthe MarcoPolo Bridgeto Pearl Harbor, pp. 106-I9, for a thoughtful
account of the negotiations leading to the I940 Tripartite Pact. See also Takeshi
Haruki, 'The Tripartite Pact and Soviet Russia: An Attempt at a Quadripartite Pact,'
in Hogakuronbunshu [A collection of law treatises] (Tokyo: Aoyama Gakuin University,
1964), pp. 1-27.
66
67
'Interrogation of Ott, Eugen,' IPS 324, 5 March I947, RG 33I.
Morley, introduction to Hosoya, 'The Tripartite Pact,' in DeterrentDiplomacy,p.
185. In the Tripartite Pact concluded over a year before the attack on Pearl Harbor the
Japanese navy and certain anti-Axis allies insisted, contrary to the text of the published
treaty, thatJapan reserveits independence to decide war. This was accomplished in the
secret protocol, a series of letters exchanged in Tokyo between Foreign Minister
Matsuoka and German Ambassador Ott, the latter who signed without the authoriza-
tion or knowledge of the German government. See Morley's explanations and his
discussion (pp. I8 1-90) of Hosoya's seminal essay (pp. 191-257). See also Johanna
Menzel Meskill, HitlerandJapan: TheHollowAlliance(New York:Atherton Press, 1966),
esp. pp. 12-25.
68 The text of the Tripartite Pact, in English in the original, is in GD, D, I I: Doc. No.
118.
338 CARL BOYD
69
IMTFE, Exhibit 560 (Ott to Ribbentrop, 13 December I940).
70
See, for instance, 'Botschafter Oshima an "Berlin-Rom-Tokio"/Un messaggio
dell'ambasciatore Oshima,' Berlin-Rom-Tokio, 3, 2 (15 February I941): 11-12; 'Bot-
schafter Oshima beim Fuhrer/L'ambasciatoreOshima ricevuto dal Fiihrer,' ibid., 3, 3
(I5 March 1941): 13; and 'Botschafter Oshimas Ankunft in Berlin,' OstasiatischeRunds-
chau, 22, 2 (February I941): 43-4.
71 Oshima surrenderedto United States armed forcesin May 1945. Later that year he
was returned to Tokyo to stand trial before the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East. His indictment included several counts, but he was found guilty only on Count
I, over-all conspiracy. Sentenced in November 1948 to life imprisonment, Oshima was
released from Sugamo Prison on parole in December 1955 and granted clemency in
April I958. Oshima Hiroshi died at his home in Chigasaki,Japan on 6June 1975. He
was 89 years old.