Trustees of Princeton University

Quasi-War Between Japan and The U.S.S.R., 1937-1939

Author(s): Clark W. Tinch
Source: World Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Jan., 1951), pp. 174-199
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008951 .
Accessed: 28/01/2011 02:03

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to World Politics.

http://www.jstor.org
 QUASI-WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND
THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939
By CLARK W. TINCH

T HE scaleandintensity in Koreahavebeen
ofthefighting
such as Americans have, before 1950, associated only
with full-fledgedwar. How such a conflictcould fail to de-
velop intoWorld War III theyonly dimlyunderstand.They
had assumed that in the twentiethcenturywar, or at least
wars involvinggreatpowers,had to be total.
To theextentthatthisassumptionis incorporatedin the ex-
pectationsof therulingelite of eitherof two or morecontend-
ing powers,it is likely to be true; to the extentthat war is
made an end in itself,is conceptuallydivorcedfromthe politi-
cal ends it in factseeks to achieve, the organized violence of
warringgreat powersmustbe not only totallyorganized,but
totallyapplied, while theconsequencesgo hang. The weapons
and techniquesof the last war when handled non-politically
produced,therefore, as mighthave beenanticipated,conditions
singularlyunpropitiousto the realization of what were pro-
fessedto have beentheaims forwhichthewar was fought.
In his recent,widely quoted article in the Reader's Digest,
policy-plannerGeorge F. Kennan of the State Departmentat-
tacked the idea thatwar with Russia is inevitable and por-
trayedthe road to peace as a twilightregionpocked with un-
certaintyand edged with danger.' While subject to criticism
or skepticismin itsparticulars,Mr. Kennan'sargumentreflects
his realizationof twoimportanttruths:War is theextensionof
politicsby othermeans; and war need notbe total.
For the moment,with its soberingprospects,it is almost
enoughthattheAmericanpublic be persuadedonlythatthere
is no logic inherentin thingsthatmakesunavoidablethephysi-
cal obliterationof the opponent, and hence increases the
chances of one's own obliteration.The question of whether
and under what circumstancestotal war is desirable may
1 "Is War with Russia Inevitable?" Reader's Digest, LVI, No. 335 (March 1950), 1-9.
 k44 CL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4 -'-

Ex
-- -

'-

----.--- 4)~ ~~~~~~~~~~U

42 A

_ -~~~~ >~~~~~~~a 4 1~~

? 9~~~~~~c

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

* 4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~U
C)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i.

cC 4~~~~~~~D 4
~ ~
~~~~~~1 ~
AL
'4)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~c
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 175
be dealt withonlywhenthe premiseof choicelessnesshas been
shattered.Leaving the questionof desirabilityto others,con-
sequently,Mr. Kennan rummagedthroughmodern history
forevidencethateven a violentconflictof interests-whether
nationalor ideological or both-does notmean thattheremust
inevitablyfollowa twentieth-century saturnaliaof extermina-
tion.
What he came up with was a brief (and insufficient)re-
minderof a storyas absorbingas it is pertinentto the con-
temporaryscene and its greatunresolvedproblems-the story
of the undeclared "pocket war" between Soviet Russia and
Imperial Japan. The natureand backgroundof theirmilitary
strugglealong the far-flungbordersof Manchuria are pre-
sented and analyzed in this article for the meaningful,if
harsh,lightcast upon the distraughtworld of todayin which
Soviet Russia bulksso large.
THE FORGOTTEN WAR
In Septemberof 1931 the Japanese invaded Manchuria.
The Soviet government,aware that the invasion would be-
come a lastingoccupation,setabout acceptingthe factas phil-
osophicallyas possible.Almostalone amongthe greatpowers,
the U.S.S.R. voiced no formaldenunciationof the Japanese
transgression, but maintained a discreet diplomatic silence
whichwhollyfrustrated theeffortsof the LyttonCommission,
representingthe League of Nations, to ascertainthe Soviet
attitude.At thispivotal juncture,when joint action by the in-
terestedpowersmighthave seta precedentwithprofoundcon
sequencesforthefuturepeace of theworld,the Soviet leaders
rejectedboth in practice and in word the concept of collec-
tivesecurityin internationalrelations.(Ironically, thesesame
leaders were subsequentlyto be hailed in the League and
elsewhereas the foremostdefendersof thisconcept.) The So-
viet press,with a different missionto perform,emptied the
vials of itsvitriolalmostimpartiallyon Japan and theWestern
powers,whichwere denouncedas collaboratorsand instigators
in the alleged Japaneseschemeto invade the Soviet Far East
fromManchuria.2
2 For a work typical of the Soviet reaction, see C. Tul'skii and M. Fedorov, Man-
176 WORLD POLITICS
Fortunatelyforthesafetyof bothSiberia and the Maritime
Province,thenervouspolemicsof theSovietpresswerebacked
up withmilitarypreparations.The emergentindustrialecon-
omyof Russia was setthetaskof converting theFar Easternre-
gions into a veritablefort.3This policy reflectedthe govern-
ment'srealization that "the situationwith which the Soviet
Union is faced in the Far East requires that it strengthen
itsdefenses,protectits borderfromoutsideattack,in particu-
lar throughthe strengthening of the military garrison on
theFar Easternbordersof theU.S.S.R."4
The deterioration in Japanese-Sovietrelationsfollowingthe
Manchurian invasion advertiseditselfmost spectacularlyin
the mountingnumberand violence of armed border clashes.
These providedboth partieswith ample materialfor mutual
recriminationand vituperation.Usually termed"incidents,"
theyrangedfromthe seriousto the absurd.On one occasion a
large Japaneseborderinspectionparty,inexplicablyequipped
with machine guns instead of surveyinginstruments, crossed
intoSovietterritory and was promptlywiped out. On another,
the Japaneseprotestedratherplaintivelythat a Soviet steam-
boat had stolena large numberof fishinghooksfromthedang-
ling poles of theirJapaneseowners.Citing similarconflicts-
real and imagined, sanguinary and ludicrous-Japanese
spokesmencould declare in 1938 that2,400 separateincidents
had occurred.5The armed clashes invariablymoved the Jap-
aneseto deplorethe"ambiguousdemarcation"of the frontiers

chzhuriia: platsdarm dlia napadeniia na S.S.S.R. (Manchuria: Base for Attack on

the U.S.S.R.), Moscow, 1934. A much more comprehensivestudy on this period and its
background is V. Avarin, Imperializm v Manchzhurii (Imperialism in Manchuria),
2 vols., Moscow, 1934. A brief retrospectiveview may be found in V. Masslenikov,
"The War Front and the Peace Front in the Far East," Tikhii Okean (Pacific Ocean),
March-April 1938.
3 For a review of the electrifyingeffectof the Japanese invasion upon the Soviet
Far East, see G. Voiminskii, "Japanese Military Aggression in the Far East," in
Okupatsiia Manchzhurii i bor'ba kitaiskogo naroda (The Occupation of Manchuria
and the Struggle of the Chinese People), ed. by Voiminskii,Moscow, 1937.
4 From an editorial in Izvestiya, March 4, 1932.
5 For the most comprehensive coverage of these incidents through the battle of
Changkufeng (Khasan), see Noburu Hidaka, (ed.), Manchoukuo-Soviet Border Is-
sues, 1938; also, "An Outline of the Soviet-Manchoukuo Border Controversy," Con-
temporaryManchuria, July1937.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 177
and theRussiansto suggest,notwithoutsarcasm,thattheJap-
anese could avoid such difficulties
by returningto Japan.6
However, the present-day samuraiof Japan had designeda
New Order in Asia thatincludedno plans forwithdrawalfrom
Manchuria. As 1936 drew to a close it had become clear that
Japaneseexpansionismrestlesslysoughtnew outlets.The mil-
itary rode the saddle of governmentat home and honed its
spursforadventurein China. TensionwithSoviet Russia grew
apace. On November 25 Japan joined Germanyin the Anti-
CominternPact; on December 9 Soviet Russia retaliatedby
refusingto ratifya new eight-yearfisheriestreaty,vital to
Japan'stauteconomy.Most observersexpectedtroublebetween
the two nations,but no one anticipatedwhat was to follow.
In earlyJulyof 1937 open warfareflaredalong the Amur
River, the great streamwhich formsmost of the northern
border of Manchuria. The dispute centered about several
strategicislands of questionableownershipjust south of the
importantSoviet river city and defensebastion,Blagovesh-
chensk.A pretextsufficedto precipitatean engagementin
whichtroops,artillery,and rivergunboatsof bothnationspar-
ticipated.Once again chargesand countercharges travelledbe-
tweenMoscow and Tokyo.The publishedSoviet and Japanese
versionsof the affairare of little aid in determiningwhat
actuallyhappened or why.' The mostsatisfactory explanation
6 A relatively complete account of border incidents and their causes as viewed by
the Soviet press is provided by Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945,
Princeton,Princeton UniversityPress, 1945.
7 See the editorial "Provocations of Japan in China and on the Far Eastern Borders
of the Soviet Union," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika (World Economics and
World Politics), August 1937, p. 138. The editorial states that "after the Soviet Union
on July4 offeredpeacefully to settle the dispute and recommendedthat evacuation of
troops of both countries from the islands be carried out, the Japanese renewed their
attacks." Hidaka (op. cit., pp. 88-94), on the other hand, records the above agreement
as having occurred on July 2, and mentions neither the withdrawal of Japanese
troops nor the subsequent attacks. The Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book (Tokyo, 1937,
p. 687) confuses the matter yet furtherby stating that Litvinov informed Japanese
Ambassador Shigemitsuof his agreement to withdraw Soviet troops; that he did not
do so precipitatedthe gunboat incident.Finally, according to the Year Book report,the
Japanese secured a withdrawal agreement and withdrew their troops, leaving un-
solved the problem of possession of the islands. Ambassador Joseph E. Davies in
Mission to Moscow (New York, Simon & Schuster,1941, pp. 164-66) gives yet another
unverified story in which, among other things, Japanese-Manchurian cutters, not
Soviet, were sunk. Davies became so alarmed over what he believed to be the danger-
ous tensionthat he paid an unofficialvisit to Shigemitsuin the hopes of averting war.
The Ambassador plainly was in unfamiliar surroundings.The world press, in gen-
178 WORLD POLITICS
is thatofferedinformallyto AmbassadorJosephE. Davies in
Moscow by a "high Japanese official,"who stated that the
Amurfighting had beentouchedoffto testSovietresolutionand
preparedness.The Japanese commanders,it appeared, were
bothsurprisedand impressed.8
While theirdiplomatsin Moscow were in the midstof the
Amur cease-firingnegotiations,the Japanese began their as-
saulton China.The ensuingstruggle,moreprolongedand diffi-
cult than foreseenin Tokyo, largely precluded a unilateral
Japanesewar on Russia. A year later,as Soviet Foreign Min-
isterLitvinovconfidedto AmbassadorDavies, such a war had
becomevirtuallyimpossible.9This was not,it should be noted,
the attitudeexpressedby the Soviet press,which continued
to anticipatealmostmomentarilya Japanese attackon Russia
becauseof "reversals"in China.
The elite of the Japanese military,the Kwantung Army,
meanwhilewas rusticatingin Manchuria as the war in China
pickedup momentum.It could noteven join in thesportof ex-
terminatingManchuria's numerous "bandits" (resistance
forces,disgruntledpeasantry,and plain criminals), in whom
boththeChineseNationalistgovernment and the Russiansdis-
played a more than paternal interest;"Otherewas a separate
and formidableinternalsecurityestablishmentto deal with
this problem.Apparentlyto heightenits fightingesprit and
relieve the tedium,the KwantungArmybegan to enlarge on
its policy of needlingthe Russians.It was not long beforethe
Japanesewenttoo far.In thesummerof 1938 casual clashesin
the vicinityof strategicPoset Bay at Changkufenggot out
of hand and developed into unmistakable,mechanized war-
fare.11If it had notbeen forcertainpeculiar arrangements to
eral, displayed no less naivete. Perhaps due to its obfuscationby propaganda, the inci-
dent was completelymisinterpretedas a threat to peace, a matter for international
concern, etc. The above accounts have been reviewed at such length simply to illus-
trate the difficultyof gettingat the facts when in totalitarian hands facts are weapons.
8 Davies, op. cit., p. 166.
9 Ibid., p. 299.
10 For a descriptionof guerrilla activities,see N. Glebov, "The Japanese Aggressors
and the Manchurian Rear," Miro'voe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, July-August
1938.
11 It is still not clear whether the Changkufeng battle was set off purposefullyby
the Kwantung Army or whether it simply grew out of increasingly severe fighting.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 179
be describedbelow,thenearbyvital portof Vladivostokmight
have beenendangered.
As describedby the Soviet Commander,Gregori Stern,the
battle began July 29 and continueduntil August 11. Two
Soviet rifledivisions finallyparticipated,opposed by a nu-
mericallygreaterforceofJapanesewho were supported,how-
ever,by a considerablysmallerand less effectiveair and tank
force. Catching the Soviet borderguardsunaware, Stern re-
ports,the Japanese managed to drive the Russians fromthe
volcanic heights of Zaozernaia and Bezymiannaia, which
dominatedthearea. The strugglethenseesawedinconclusively
while bothsides rushedup men and equipment.By August 6
enoughSoviet reinforcements had arrivedto permita counter-
attackto be setforthefollowingday. An especiallyinteresting
considerationwas to enterintothisplan forcounterattack.The
enemy occupied the commandingheights in a position, as
Sternsaid, "to counteveryone of our guns,everytank,almost
everyman"; yet, although other approaches were tactically
possible,theattackwould have to be carriedstraighton to the
heights throughJapanese barricades and a witheringfire.
Flanking operationswere out of the question,it seems-but
not for militaryreasons.Stern'sexplanationof this is worth
quoting:"There was no chancewhatsoeverofhidingthelocale
and directionof our attack.The fightingwas restrictedto the
districtof Lake Khasan, the volcanoesZaozernaia and Bezy-
miannaia,and theheightsbelongingto thoseplaces only."12
Since Stern commentedon this "restricted"aspect of the
fightingwithouteven casual elaboration,it can only be in-
ferredthat these unusual arrangementsappeared so natural
eitherto Stern,the editorsof Pravda, or the reading public
that no qualificationsor explanationsseemed necessary.It
mustalso be concludedthatsuch restrictionswere possibleonly
throughat least a tacit agreement between the Soviet and
Japanese high commands. Nothing could illustrate more
graphicallythecalculatingnatureof thispocketwar thanthese
dispassionatearrangements. They could be paid for only in
Russian blood.
Inasmuch as the Russians were not prepared for the engagement and the Japanese
lost it, the clashes, from any standpoint,"got out of hand."
12 Gregori M. Stern, "The Sixth of August," Pravda, Aug. 6, 1939. Author's italics.
180 WORLD POLITICS
Beforethe counterattack was launched,Soviet artilleryde-
livered a surprisinglybriefbombardmentof the enemyposi-
tions.Since theRussianArmytraditionallyhas relied strongly
on its artilleryand used it with great skill and energy,Stern
attemptedto explain why the counterattack had not been pre-
ceded by the usual heavy artilleryassault. Observing that
the "prolonged preparations"of the Imperialist War (i.e.,
World War I) caused an enormouswasteof valuable artillery
shells on a narrowfront,Sternpointedout the contrast:The
Red Armywould attackafterno more than a two-hourbom-
bardment.His reasoningseemedto be thatwithoutcapitalist
munitions-makers to urge prodigality,Soviet troopswould be
freefromunnecessary and exorbitantartillerypreparations!
This remarkablestatement can perhapsbe relatedto another
thatSternmade elsewhere.An attackwas imperativethe mo-
mentreinforcements arrived on August 5, he explained, be-
cause "the people and governmentdemandedthatthe aggres-
sors be immediatelyevicted." If governmentpressuredid in
factcoincidewith an admittedlyforeshortened artillerybom-
bardment,a decidedlyunpleasantpicturecan be painted: Al-
thoughthe militarysituationcould have permitteda fairly
indefinitedelayin offensive operations,theRed Armyattacked,
despite a shortagein artilleryshells, simplybecause of pol-
itical considerations-attacked,it should be remembered,
along the line of greatestJapanese resistance!If this recon-
structionof eventsis valid, thenthe Red Armyagain deserves
a hero's name. Actually,theremay have been an additional
threehoursof bombardment, althoughplans originallycalled
only for a total of two. Rain preventedthe air cover from
gettingoffon scheduleand theattackwas thereforepostponed.
Stern unfortunately did not indicate whether the artillery
bombardmentwas thereforeprolongedor also postponed.If
therewas a shortageof shells, as would seem the case, the
bombardmentwas unquestionablydelayed and hence lasted
but two hours.
In spite of these unfortuitouscircumstances,according to
General Stern,the Soviet forcespushed the invadersfromthe
heights.SubsequentJapanese counter-thrusts, thoughdesper-
ate and powerful,were beaten off.This proved to be the
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 181
hingeof theentirebattle.Sternfeltthatvictoryresultedfrom
the high morale of the troops,the professionalcompetence
and loyaltyof the officers,the excellenceof Red Armyequip-
ment,the active supportof the neighboringcivilian popula-
tion,but above all fromthefactthat"in theholocaustof battle
thesoldiers,commanders,and politicalworkersfeltnear them
thepresenceof comradeStalin.""3
Stern'sreport,which was writtenon the 1939 anniversary
of the battle,filled a notable hiatus in Soviet releases on the
Khasan affair.On August 15, 1938, shortlyafter fighting
stopped,an editorial in the partyjournal Bol'shevik had re-
viewed theboundarydisputeand thebattle,but failed to men-
tion the "Great Attack of the Sixth.""4Instead, the editorial
insistedthateach timethe Japanesecrossedinto Soviet terri-
torytheywere summarilyrepulsed.Moreover,Izvestiya car-
ried no banner headline about the victoryof August 6 but
merelyannouncedon August9 that"The Great Soviet People
UnanimouslySupportthe Firm Policy of the Soviet Govern-
ment."
Another interestingaspect of the publicity accorded the
Khasan fighting was the heavy stressplaced throughoutupon
the significantrole played by "bolshevikagitation"and "pol-
itical work,"upon thejoy withwhich the soldiersrushedinto
battlewithcriesof "For Stalin! For Party! For Motherland!"
It is pertinentto recall the internaldifficulties with which
theArmy,theparty,and Stalinwere confrontedat thetime.It
could suggestthe possibilitythat the difficultiesat Khasan
serveda nationalunifyingfunctionof no small value.
All cavil aside,however,theSovietAutonomousFar Eastern
Army,in spite of the purgeswhich had decimatedit and the
obstacleserectedbyitspoliticallyconsciousleadership,did win
a convincingvictoryat Lake Khasan. The Japanese com-
mandertacitlyadmitteddefeat-and doubtlessexaggerated-
whenhe praisedhis armyfor"standingup againstattackssup-
portedby 200 tanksand 100 aeroplanes."15 Emperor Hirohito
toldtheArmyChiefof Staffof his gratification thattheArmy,
13 Ibid. All the facts and interpretationsattributedto Stern are drawn from this
same article in Pravda.
14 "The Soviet Repulse of the Japanese War Instigators,"Bol'shevik, Aug. 15, 1938.
15 Hidaka, op. cit., p. 215.
182 WORLD POLITICS
"under a difficultsituationand despite their small strength,
acted with prudence and patience, fulfillingtheir duties."16
The new de factosituation,theresultof Soviet armedstrength,
producedon August11 a new agreementtocease fire.
The severefightingat Khasan and the defeat administered
bytheSovietsdid not,however,diminishforlong theJapanese
appetiteformilitaryexperimentation and opportunism.Spo-
radic gunplaycontinuedto troublethe Manchurian frontiers.
The basic differencesin nationalpolicies remainedunresolved
and theboundlessdetermination of both armiesremainedun-
corrupted. Moreover, the elite Kwantung Army had lost
prestigein the mire of Changkufeng.Its leaders would not
be long in seekingrevenge.
No Russian with a normal memoryof eventsand a slight
understanding oftheJapanesecould have beensurprised,there-
fore,whenalarmingreportsbeganto circulatethroughout her-
metic Russia in the springof 1939. Soviet troops,it was ru-
mored,had gone into action along the Outer Mongolian bor-
der; a diplomaticcrisisin Japanese relationswas developing
along with the borderwar; great air battleswere occurring
daily; thousandsof men,hundredsof tanksand cannonwere
turningthe Mongolian Steppe intoa vast battlefield.Had the
war come at last?
While war had come again, thewar had not,as eventswere
to make plain. The Soviet people did not receivethisfirstdi-
rectreporton renewedborderwarfarewiththeJapaneseuntil
morethana monthafterit had brokenout.On June27 Tass re-
viewed a two-hourengagementover Outer Mongolia between
sixtyJapanese and fiftySoviet-Mongolianaircraft.Twenty-
fiveof the enemyand threefriendlyplanes were reportedde-
stroyed.The next day Tass reportedeight Japanese pursuit
planes and thirtybombersin action over the border; losses:
seven Japanese, six Soviet-Mongolian. On June 29 Tass
claimed two enemyplanes downed by antiaircraftfire.Then
the news curtaindropped again forover two weeks,and they
musthave seemedominouslyquiet weeksto the average Soviet
citizen.
On July 14 Izvestiya at last broke the silence to review
16 Ibid., p. 220.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 183
thesituation.Matter-of-factly it announcedthatin heavyfight-
ing near the river Khalka (where northwestern Manchuria
borderson Outer Mongolia), during July 6-12, over 2,000
Japanese-Manchuriantroops had been killed, another3,500
wounded,and 254 takenprisoner.Large storesof enemyequip-
ment-including cannon,armoredcars, and machine guns-
had been captured.The hostileforceswere described,but the
Soviet-Mongolianwere not; nor were the Soviet-Mongolian
battle casualties mentioned.Air engagementssince May 28,
Izvestiya continued,had cost the enemy199 planes as against
a loss of 52 Soviet-Mongolian.
There was in thisreporta statementreleasedby the Soviet
command:"In theopinionof theSoviet-Mongoliancommand,
the Japanese infantrydoes not fightbadly, althoughit could
fightmuchbettersincebothJapanesedivisions,the23rdas well
as the7th,are ratedthebestones." It is difficult
to findan ac-
curateequivalentof thisobservationin its context.But it may
notbe too farwrongto suggestthatit is as though,following
the Japanese attackon Pearl Harbor, therehad appeared in
all American newspapersonly a box wire dispatchreporting
thelossesoftheattackingforcesand includingthebriefmilitary
commentthat Japanese bombingproved fairly accurate, al-
thoughit could have beenbetter.To theAmericanpublic such
an approach would, of course, have been incomprehensible,
had it been possible. A nationwhich rose in wrath over the
sinkingof the Maine and demandedvengeancefor the Lusi-
tania could not normallybe expected to understandhow the
Soviet Governmentcould treatwhat was in effecta small war
as thoughit were tournamentchess. But the Soviet govern-
ment,with its business-likesenseof profitand loss, could and
did.
Its reasonswere excellent.There were at hand other,more
desperateissues,on which the destiniesof the Soviet Union
clearlyturned.On April 17, 1939 the Russian Ambassadorin
Berlin, Merekalov, had visited Baron von Weizsacker, State
Secretaryin the German Foreign Office,to suggestthe possi-
bilityof improvedSoviet-Germanrelations.On May 3, Lit-
vinov,commonlyidentified witha policyfavoringtheWestern
democraciesat the expense of Nazi Germany,was abruptly
184 WORLD POLITICS
replacedas ForeignCommissarby Molotov. The new Foreign
CommissarmetwithSchulenburg,theGermanAmbassadorin
Moscow, on May 20 and June28, and discusseddelicatelythe
prospectsof easing Soviet-Germantensions.The Kremlin,in
short,was maneuveringwith infinitetact, patience, and no
littleskill to removethe German threatby joining it. A war
with Hitler's ally,Japan, at thistime-that is, a formal,pro-
claimedwar could onlybringruinto Soviet plans. If, on the
otherhand, the negotiationswith Germanycould be nursed
intobloom,thenthe Japanesequestionwould take care of it-
self.To gain a basic understandingwith Germanywould be
to staggerand perhapsimmobilizeJapan's designson Russia.
The Soviet press,as ever sensitiveto high affairsof state,
unobtrusively dropped the entirematterof invasionand con-
flictin theFar East whilethreevitalweekspassed.On August6
Pravda casuallymentionedthatcontinuingand severeJapanese
attackshad beenconsistently repulsedand thatair combatcon-
tinued.In thatsame issuewas celebratedthe"Great Victoryof
August 6" at Lake Khasan a year before. Red Army men
who had shared in the victorydescribed their experiences;
partyworkersexalted the role of the political commissars;
poetssangof Red Armyvalor againstthehated foe. But of the
disturbingfactthatthissame valorousRed Armystoodlocked
in combatwiththe same hated foe therewas slightmention-
a communique,terseand colorless.
Then foranotherthreeweekssilenceshroudedthe battleat
Nomonhan. Negotiationswith the Germanswere moving to
theirworld-shakingclimax. On August23, 1939 Molotov and
Ribbentrop,the Reich Foreign Minister,signedthe notorious
Treatyof Non-Aggressionwithits SecretProtocol. Four days
laterPravda permitteda briefglance at developmentson the
Mongolian border. Thirty-oneJapanese aircraft had been
downedsinceAugust 6. Seven Soviet-Mongolianaircrafthad
failed to return.
Anotherprolongedsilence by the Soviet press slipped be-
tween the world and Nomonhan. Finally, on September 1,
theday thatthe GermanArmyinvaded Poland, Izvestiya un-
emotionallybroughtits readersup to date. On August 17 the
Japanese had launched an offensivewhich had momentarily
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 185

threatenedto break through;rallying,the Soviet-Mongolian

forceshad stemmed,thenstalled the onslaught.On the twen-
tieththeRussianshurleda full-scalecounterattack againstthe
entireenemyline to theeast of the riverKhalkha. Pinningthe
Japanese between two convergingwings, the Red Army
crushed them on the night of August 28. The Soviet-Mon-
golian forcesthendug in alongtheborderofOuterMongolia.17
Marshal Zhukov, later to gain internationalfame, received
thecovetedaward "Hero of the Soviet Union" for command-
ing this brilliantoffensive.
Back in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and
JapaneseAmbassadorShigemoriTogo, bothofwhomhad been
closely followingthe course of the battle,negotiateda new
cease-firingagreementon September15. Fightingwas to end
the followingday, troopswere to remain along the frontier
line theyheld, and prisonerswere to be exchangedat once."8
Hostilitieswere consequentlybroughtto an end on September
16, the day beforeSoviet troopsin the West invaded crumb-
ling Poland.
Japaneseaccountsof thisstruggleat Nomonhan in which
men and machineswere sucked into grindingwarfare from
May 4 untilSeptember16-differedradicallyfromthe Soviet
versionon almosteverycount.One thing,however,could not
be obscured: Japan had suffereda stunningdefeat.Japanese
Foreign Officespokesmen,admitting18,000 casualties from
the fighting,termedit "a disastrous,bitterbattle."19Soviet-
17 Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, Sept. 1939, pp. 247 f. The reports on
Nomonhan, like those on other border clashes, are open to question. If the Japanese
were "beaten back" and "ejected from Soviet soil" almost before they set foot upon
it (as the Soviet press invariably insisted), how then was it possible to mount
a prolonged and successful counterattackof the kind just described without at the
same time crossing over into enemy territory(which act the Soviet press invariably
denied) ?
18 Ibid.
19 New York Times, Sept. 4, 1939. Three books in Japanese are available at the
Library of Congress, each describing a differentphase of the engagement. For the
non-user of Japanese, the works are nevertheless valuable for their collections of
photographs,battle orders, maps, etc. The most comprehensiveof these is Kwantung
Army Headquarters, Nomonhan Bidauroku (A Record of the Nomonhan Incident),
1941. Valuable for its report on tank warfare is Sakae Kusaba, Noro Kochi (Hill
Noro), Tokyo, 1941. For a personal narrative, see Eiji Tanaka, Nomonhan Senki:
Tokon (Nomonhan Battle Report: The Spirit of Battle), Tokyo, 1941. The foregoing
documentswere reviewed and highlightedfor the author by Dr. Ardath Burks.
186 WORLD POLITICS

Mongolian lossescannotbe enumerated,since the Soviet press

referredonly to aircraftlosses and published no figureson
personnelcasualties.Regardlessof Soviet losses,however,and
theyunquestionablywere high, a small-scale war had been
foughtin whichtheJapanesehad receivedthemostpunishing
militarydefeat of their modern history.But an even more
paralyzingshock had run throughthe structureof Japanese
power: Hitler and Stalin had become virtual partners,a war
was on in Europe, and Japan stoodisolatedin the Orient.

BEHIND THE FIGHTING FRONTS

The border warfare just described both reflectedand in-

fluencedthe course of other developmentsin Soviet and
Japanese foreignand domesticpolicy. Unfortunately it is at
presentimpossibleto determine with the
finality evolution of
eitherthe warfareor the non-military aspectsof the struggle.
The SovietUnion and Japan,each in itsown totalitariantradi-
tion,filteredthe pertinentfactsthroughthe living membrane
of political opportunism.Foreign correspondents and diplo-
matsof the othergreatpowersof necessitygatheredtheirin-
formationonly in Moscow and Tokyo, where it was subject
to the same basic laws of double thinkas the mosteruditeof
journals. Nevertheless,althoughconsiderableobfuscationre-
mains,a numberof importantthingsseem fairlyclear about
what wenton behindthe fightingfrontsand a fairlyaccurate
reconstruction is possible.The disputedissuesand the interact-
ing forcesmay forconveniencebe categorizedinto fourmain
problems:thoseof borders,fisheriesand concessions,strategy,
and politics.
The casual natureofTsaristRussia's relationswithManchu
China had produceda numberof verycasual treaties,in which
thebordersof Manchuria receivedequally casual treatment."
As a result,if no one knew preciselywhere the borderswere,
at least no one cared. But when the meticulousJapanese-as
20 For excerpts from these treaties where they relate to the border question
and a discussion of them as they affectedthe Japanese position,see "An Outline of the
Manchoukuo-Soviet Border Controversy," Contemporary Manchuria, July 1937. A
large map is included to show the disputed borders; also, a table of border-markers,
their historyand condition.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 187
theyso conscientiously put it-assumed China's international
obligationsin Manchuria, the situationchanged drastically."
Japan based itsborderclaims on the Sino-Russiantreatiesun-
til and includingthe Treaty of Peking in 1860. The Russians
retortedthatthesetreatieshad been supplementedby the later
and secretTreaty of Hunchun in 1866. Professingto know
nothingof such a secrettreaty,the Japaneserefusedto be af-
fectedby it. (As a matterof fact,none of thesetreaties,pub-
lished or secret,could provide more than an informedguess
as to theactual locationof theborders).22
Since theRussiansappeared contentwiththisstateof affairs
and the Japanese did not,the onus of aggressionmustbe as-
signed the Japanese for attemptingpersistently to revise the
bordersunilaterally.The Soviets cannotescape blame, how-
ever, because of their unwarrantedsatisfactionwith wholly
questionableboundaries.23On the other hand, they may at
least be creditedwith the clear realization thatJapanese de-
mands reallyhad littleto do with "ambiguousborders."The
Japanesewere insteadseekingto findand exploitSovietweak-
nesses.
If the Russians were on the defensivein regard to the
border question,theymost assuredlywere not in the matter
of fisheriesand concessions.Among the many contestedeco-
nomic issues snarlingJapanese-Sovietrelations,none seemed
so crucial to Nippon as did the questionof Japanese fishing
rightsin Sovietwaters.24 As viewed fromTokyo,thewatersof
Okhotsk and Kamchatka belonged historicallyto the natural
Japanese sphere of influence.Further,the Japanese felt that
theirindustriousness and skill had been responsibleforwhat-
ever success the Russians had achieved in exploiting these
21 Ibid., p. 26.
22 For example, see Izvestiya, Aug. 6, 1939, for the Hunchun Treaty Map. This map
was reproduced by the Soviet press to support Soviet claims in relation to the battle
at Changkufeng (Lake Khasan) the previous year. For the map applied to the
Nomonhan conflict,see Izvestiya, July 14, 1939. This map is a cartographical ques-
tion mark. The scale is 1-2,500,000and there are no co-ordinateswhatsoever.
23 The Soviet governmentinsistentlymaintained that the borders had been proper-
ly demarcated and made it clear that all attemptsto revise the existing borders would
continueto meet armed resistance.
24 For a detailed discussion, see Shintaro Shindo, "Fishing in Soviet Waters,"
ContemporaryJapan, Sept. 1938.
188 WORLD POLITICS
waters-that Japan had developed the techniques,equipment,
and basic know-howwhichmade Russianoperationsprofitable.
They concluded thereforethat they should receive a larger
share in the industrythan the Russians,to whom the fishing
industrywas notof virtuallife-and-deathimportance.
StatingitsconvictionthattheAnti-Comintern Pact marked
thetrue"crisisof capitalism"so regularlypredicted,theSoviet
governmentrefusedto renewthe eight-yearfisheriesconven-
tion which expired in 1936. Nor did the Russians look with
favor upon the renewedJapanese effortsof 1937 to achieve
anotherconvention,particularlysince the Japanese govern-
menthad just welcomed Italy into the Anti-Cominterncon-
stellation.Instead,onlyone-yearextensionswere granteduntil
1941 in spite of the repeatedJapanese complaintthat it was
"the consistentpolicyof the Soviet government to exterminate
all Japanese economic rightsand interestsin these northern
regions."25
The Soviets meanwhile went on accusing Japanese mili-
taristsof attemptingto arouseanti-Sovietopinionoverthefish-
eriesquestion,of breakingthe fishingagreements,and of con-
ductingespionagethroughthe fishingfleets.26 (These claims,
likeJapanesecountercharges, undoubtedlypossesseda substan-
tial residuumof truth.)In view of thisattitude,the statesmen
of Japan, whatevertheir words, were hardly so lacking in
25 Ibid., p. 246. Shindo, like his government,pretended to believe that the Soviet
government had refused to renegotiate the 1928 treaty "for no good reason."
Japanese authorities at this point had become highly sensitive to legal and verbal
niceties. Since Moscow, equally concerned with form to the exclusion of content,had
repeatedly insisted that the Comintern and the Soviet Union were connected by no
more than the gossamer of mutual sympathy,the Japanese blandly maintained that
the Anti-CominternPact could in no way be construed as an anti-Soviet instrument.
They concluded thereforethat Soviet-Japanese relations should be in no way affected
by the Axis alliance. Both powers appear to have been somewhat entranced by the
resonance of their own sounding boards.
26 The Soviet attitude on fisheries during the latter thirties was expressed of-
ficiallyin the sharp reply of the Narkomindel to the Japanese request of early 1939.
See Pravda, July24, 1939, for text; also applicable portionsof Iu. Davydov: "Economic
Relations of Japan and the U.S.S.R.," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia Politika, Sept.
1938. Useful in describing Soviet views on the fisheriesdispute in its wider context is
E. Zhukov: "The New Japanese Governmentand the Foreign Policy of Japan," Tikhii
Okean, Oct. 1939. Japan's case is available in the statement of the Foreign Office
spokesman concerning the fisheriesnegotiations (March 15, 1939) and the statement
of the Foreign OfficeInformationBureau concerning fisheriesnegotiations (April 4,
1939), in ContemporaryManchuria, May 1939, pp. 436-37.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 189
sophisticationas to be surprisedthat the fisheriescontract
offeredby the Soviet Union was determined,in the finalanal-
ysis,by theexistingover-allpolitical situation.27
The questionofmineralconcessionson the Soviet-controlled
northernhalf of the island of Sakhalin proved to be no less
capable of generatingfriction.Once again the controversy
centeredon critical resources: oil and coal, but especially
upon the former.And like the fisheries,Soviet-Japaneseoil
and coal operationswere underpinnedwith mutual distrust
and hostileintent,to the dissipationof which the Anti-Com-
internPact in no way contributed. Their Japanesepartners-in-
enterprise,the Sovietsbluntlyannounced,had practiced"un-
paralleleddeceit"in breakingtheconcessionstreaties.Japanese
operatorswere accused of wilfullyand maliciouslyviolating
Soviet labor legislationand in generalof "takingthe law into
theirown hands."28The Soviet governmentdenied categori-
cally thatit had been coercingJapaneseoperatorsor otherwise
interfering with theirfreedomto extractcoal and oil within
thestipulationsof thetreatyarrangements.29
Whateverthefactsofthecase,and theyaredebatable,thecon-
cessions,like thefisheries,had become a matterforpoliticians
-not foroil men coal operators.Productionfromthe con-
or
cessionsvaried directlyas the stateof relationsexistingat any
giventimebetweenthetwogovernments. Once again theSoviet
governmenthad implicitly reaffirmedits belief that while
peace may not be indivisible,foreignpolicy,if it is to avoid
frustration and perhaps disaster,mustbe. Nor were the Jap-
anese less alert to the power factorthan the Russians. When
Russo-Japaneserelationsbecame severelystrainedduringthe
bitterdays at Nomonhan in mid-Julyof 1939,Japanesewar-
ships were reportedassembledin northernwatersto head off
a Soviet threatto confiscatethe Japanese oil concessionson
27 Before the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet, May 31, 1939, Molotov remarked
characteristicallythat the new extension (for one year) had "the greatest political
significance."
28 See Davydov, loc. cit., pp. 60-62, for a full discussion of the concessions and
alleged Japanese anti-Soviet conduct. For the text of the governing treaty of 1925
and attached Protocol (B), see Harriet Moore, op. cit., pp. 179-81.
29 Izvestiya declared emphaticallythat all fishery,oil, and coal concessionaires and
workerscontinuedto enjoy the full rightto engage in theirbusiness withoutinterference
so long as they abided by the Soviet regulations and did not violate the concessions
agreement.Davydov reiteratedthis claim (op. cit.,p. 61).
190 WORLD POLITICS
Sakhalin.30The threatdid not,however,materialize.
In additiontotheforegoingproblems,therewas thatof trade
relations.Throughoutthe period followingthe resumptionof
diplomaticrelationsin 1925untilthetradepact of 1941,Russo-
Japanese commercial exchange coincided with the pattern
alreadydescribedin connectionwithfisheries, concessions,and,
of course,borderdisputes.3"The mostimportantsingle trans-
actionoccurredon September21, 1934,when the Soviet gov-
ernmentsold out its interestin the Chinese Eastern Railway,
despitethe fact thatthe Chinese governmentvigorouslypro-
testedthe illegalityof the sale as contradictingthe contract
underwhichtheSovietshad originallyenteredintojointoper-
ationof the railwaywith the Chinese. Ignoring Chinese pro-
tests,the Soviets proceeded to complete the transactionat a
relativelysmall part of the investment's worth.32Politics was
stilldictatingpolicy,economicor otherwise;the Russianshad
doubtless concluded that joint managementof the Chinese
EasternRailway withJapan would providetheJapanesewith
endless pretextsfor more anti-Sovietagitation,which would
in turnproducemorediplomaticwranglingand perhapsfight-
ing. And in 1934,it will be recalled,the Soviet Far East was
still relativelyundefended.Actually, however,relationsbe-
tweenthe two powers could scarcelyhave deterioratedmore
had the railwaynotbeen sold. Far fromremovinga sourceof
friction,thesale led to seriouscontroversyin later yearswhen
the Japanese refusedto meet their obligations.Shortlyafter
his appointmentin 1939, Foreign Minister Molotov angrily
warned theJapanesethatthe Soviet Union would not permit
When paymentwas finallymade
thisviolationof itsinterests.33
in January1940,theefficacy of Soviet power politicswas once
again manifest.Desperately in need of a fisheriesagreement
30Necw York Times, July 22, 1939.
31 The figures on total trade and trade turnover between Japan and the Soviet
Union from 1931 throughthe firstquarter of 1938 illustratemost clearly the inevitable
subordinationof economicconsiderationsto political ones. See Davydov, op. cit.,pp. 53-
55, for a summaryof trade relations between the two countries.
32 124,000,000yen, one-third of which was to be paid in cash and the remainder
in goods.
33 A. Ziuzin, "The Situation in Manchuria," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo i Mirovaia
Politika, No. 4-5, 1940, p. 171. Ziuzin's article presents perhaps the best and most
comprehensiveRussian surveyof Manchuria as of early 1940.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 191
and bewildered by the German-Russianrapprochement,the
Japanesecould findno alternativeto liquidatingthe debt.
To sum up, economic relationsin general betweenRussia
and Japanhad, fromtheSovietstandpoint, symptomatic rather
thancausativesignificanceand comparativelylittleto do with
economics. They were linked inextricablywith the Man-
churianfighting, thewar in China, and thesituationin Europe.
But theydid reveal an attitudetoward foreignpolicy which
was grounded in an empirical realism as tough as it was
pliable.
Interwovenwith the questionsof bordersand economicre-
lationswas still a third: thatof strategy.To the Soviet Union,
Manchuria poses a directand seriousmilitarythreat.From it,
the Soviet Far East and the Maritime Province can be iso-
lated or chopped up in a numberof ways. Armies can move
throughOuter Mongolia to the Trans-Baikal region.Others
can proceedfromHeiho to fanoutnorthwardfromBlagovesh-
chensk. Still others can head northeastwardthrough the
Sungari Valley to Khabarovsk and thence up along the
broad Amur basin to its delta at Nikolaevsk opposite Russian
Sakhalin. The key port and naval base of Vladivostokis also
vulnerableto attack fromManchuria. In regard to the Far
East as a whole, Manchuria is perhaps even more crucially
important.It provides a militarypivot which controlsthe
strategicdestiniesofnortheastern China. Historically,themas-
ter of Manchuria has also held sway over much of northern
China. It was no accidentthatthe decisive battlesof the civil
war betweenthe Communistsand Nationalistswere foughtin
the northeastern provinces-Manchuria.
These considerations werenotloston theSovietgovernment,
which responded by undertakinga rapid strengthening of
border defenses,the constructionof a Far Eastern military
force,theimprovement of communications(includingdouble-
trackingtheTrans-SiberianRailway), and theencouragement
of the Russian people to endurethe hardshipsentailed in the
program.34The Japanese, similarly proclaimingthemselves
34 See Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. 316-31
for a personal account of the developmentof heavy industryin Siberia and the part
played by the Japanese threat in expediting the process. For a general discussion of
192 WORLD POLITICS

menacedbySovietpreparations, hastenedtocompletemeasures
of theirown.They erecteda formidablewar industryin Man-
churia.They builtthousandsof milesof railwaysand countless
airfieldshavingonlystrategicvalue. They strovetobringunder
theircontroltheMongolian racesof northwestern Manchuria,
hoping to drive a subversive ethnic wedge deep into Soviet-
controlledOuter Mongolia. Concerned over the securityof
theirsouthwestern and westernflanksin Manchuria, the Jap-
anese occupied Jehol and Chahar and Inner Mongolia. In
ordertoconsolidatetheirpositionin Manchuria and to prepare
forfutureaggression,theymobilized industryand cultivated
fanaticismin thehomeislands.
Both Japan and Russia acted as thoughtheyexpectedwar.
But onlyJapan acted as thoughshe soughtit.35
The hard core of Japanese-Soviethostilitieslay, however,
not in disputedborders,commercialcompetition,nor in the
strategicpositionof Manchuria alone. It lay insteadin the in-
ternationalpolitical and economic anarchywhich in the Far
East as elsewherewas at once a functionand by-productof the
Soviet Union's search for securityand Japan's drive toward
empire.
In the contextof the immediateinternationalsituation,the
Japanesepolicy of aggressionwas moulded by the renascence
ofNationalistChina,unfettered by theparalysisof theLeague
of Nations, encouragedby the successesof revisionistItaly
and Germany,canalized by the decline of Imperial Britain
and the isolationismof the United States,excused by the dis-
ruptive activities of the Communist Internationaland its
Soviet sponsor,and acceleratedby the returnto world-wide
economictribalism.
Following the emergenceof the Japanese menace on its
easternflankand the German in theWest, the Soviet Union's
foreignpolicywas markedby co-operation,real or attempted,
the Soviet Far East and its turbulenthistory,see M. Gubel'man, "Our Heroic Far
East," Tikhii Okean, March-April 1938.
35According to Ziuzin (loc. cit., p. 171), railroad mileage in Manchoukuo almost
doubled during the Japanese occupation. Ziuzin emphasizes that this developmentwas
directed against the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic as well as
against the areas of partisan resistance. For a complementarystudy,see A. Gal'nerin,
"The Military-EconomicPreparation of the Manchurian Base," Mirovoe Khoziaistvo
i Mirovaia Politika, September1939.
 JAPANAND THE U.S.S.R.,1937-1939 193
withtheWesterndemocracies.But even thenthe Soviet press
did notdistinguishbetweenthetotalitarianand thenon-totali-
tarian"capitaliststates"in pointingout the dangersof "capi-
talistencirclement."The Soviet leaders dedicated themselves
to theprimarytaskof securingSovietsafetyfromwhatseemed
to themthe mountingthreatof aggression.These were also
years freightedwith significantinternal developmentsin
Soviet Russia-especially industrializationand the purges-
whichreactedupon externalpolicywithpersistenceand force.
World eventsand a pervasivesenseof insecuritycombinedto
forceRussia intothemainstreamof world politics.Collective
security,universal disarmament,and co-operationwith the
democraticWest were the unimplementedand oftenhypocri-
tical Soviet themesuntil Russia at last turnedto her "natural
ally," Germany,for the securitythatproved illusoryand the
friendshipthatprovedshort-lived.
Reflectingupon these years of diplomatic march and
counter-march, it is easyto condemnthestatesmenof theWest,
whose lack of perspicacityat timesseemed matchedonly by
their ineptness;it is equally simple to maintainthat among
the prospectivevictims of Hitler the Soviet Union alone
grasped the necessityfor concertedaction in stiflingthis ap-
palling menace to civilization. But to do so is to overlookor
ignorethe natureof the Soviet stateand its policies as inter-
pretedbytheWest,to be blind to thedilemmaof thesmall and
relativelyhelplessstatescaughtinexorablybetweenthe upper
and nethermillstonesof Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism, to
disregardthe numbinguncertaintyand growingalarm with
which theWesternpowersreactedto the confluenceof Soviet
militarymightwithideologicaldynamism.Whateveritsintent,
whateverits sincerityin seekingcollectiveaction againstAxis
aggression,the Soviet Union remainedone of the principal
forcesof disruptionin a world sadlyin need of stability.
The conclusionof the Soviet-Nazi Pact in late August of
1939 seemedto manyobserversa negationof thoseprinciples
forwhichtheSovietUnion ostensiblystood; and thesuccessful
completionof the negotiationswith the Japanese threeweeks
later to end the fightingat Nomonhan deepened the riddle.
Actually,however,thecomplexof conditioninghistoricaland
194 WORLD POLITICS

ideological forceswhichenabled Sovietleadersto adjustto the

not-so-coldwar withJapan (and the peril of Germany) made
it virtuallycertainthat theywould adjust to it. Threatened
elsewhere,the Soviet governmentwas willing to carryon an
armedstrugglewithJapanon preciselythatscale whichwould
repulseinvasionand discourageJapanese aggression.It exer-
cised extremevigilance in preventingthis strugglefromde-
veloping any furtherthan practical considerationsmightre-
quire and theoreticalconsiderationspermit.These considera-
tionscoalescedand foundunifiedexpressionin termsof politics
and were modifiedonlyby the necessityof retainingprestige.
Japanese militaristsgrasped these subtletiesas well as their
ramifications. Safe in the knowledgethattheirenemyunder-
stoodand practicedthe realitiesof power,the Japanesecould
continueto experimentwithoutfearinga greaterinvolvement
thantheywerepreparedto undertake.The Sovietgovernment,
on theotherhand,could and did balance thepowerequationby
manipulatingitseconomicrelationswithJapanaccordingtothe
dictatesof pure expediency.To the Japanese,these relations
wereeverybitas vital as werethe"sacred Sovietborders"to the
Russians.
In assessing the currentsignificanceof the Manchurian
border warfare in its broader implications,particular note
mustbe made ofthreethings.First,Japanand theSovietUnion
were inherent,natural enemiesin almost every political, so-
cial, economic,and historicrespect.Second, theirgeographic
positions,especially in an age when distanceand terrainare
demolishedby flight,presentedeach power with essentially
insolubleyet inescapable problemsof strategy.Finally, until
August of 1939 they were nominallyor openly aligned in
world political and militarycoalitionsthat were destinedto
war fortheworld.
Yet inspiteofthesefundamental and ubiquitousantagonisms,
the two governmentsjointly achieved a near miracle. They
happenedupon a modusvivendiwhichtranscendedall motiva-
vationssave thoseof power,all moralitysave thatof Machia-
velli. Significantly,thatmodusvivendi,attainedthroughcon-
flictand hard-headeddiplomacy,was nevertheless one of peace.
Japan and Russia did not go to war. Their cities were not
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 195

reduced to rubble nor theirpeoples annihilated.The war in

Manchuria repaid the relativelysmall investments of blood
with the incalculable dividendsof peace. With the firingof
thelastshell at Nomonhanthereensueda scrupulouslycorrect
relationshipapproachingamitybetweenthe Soviet and Jap-
anese governments which was to freeeach to pursueits third-
powerpolicieswithoutfearor hindrance.This firstSovietcold
warwas broughttoitssuccessfultermination withthesigningof
thePact of NeutralitybetweenJapan and the Soviet Union on
April 13, 1941,a pact whichwas to endureuntilthe objective
conditionswhichhad broughtit intobeing-i.e., the equipoise
of power in the Far East-had been decisivelyalteredby the
crushingdefeatsadministeredto Japan by the armed forcesof
theUnited Statesand to Germanyby theAllied powers.36

THE LESSON
The foregoinganalysishas notbeen offeredwiththeimplicit
suggestionthattheUnited Statesusurptheprewarprovocative
roleofJapan in itsrelationswithSoviet Russia. That would be
as alien as it would be corruptingto the Americanspiritand,
in a two- insteadof a multi-powersystem,probably fatal to
theprospectsof anysortof real stabilityin theworld.
But thiscase studyhas mostemphaticallyindicatedtheneed
for a thoroughoverhaul if not reconstruction of the tradi-
tionalAmericanassumption,imbeddedfirmly in constitutional
historyand practice,that a stateof war or peace effectively
existsonlyby virtueof legislativeaffirmation and is, in either
case, an exclusive phenomenonof inescapable totality.37 As
T. A. Taracouzio has demonstratedin an exhaustiveexamina-
tionof Soviettheoryon thesubject,theleadersof theU.S.S.R.,
on theotherhand,adhereto theconvictionthatwar and peace
are notin fact"diametricallyopposed and mutuallyexclusive,"
36 For the text of the Treaty, see Iz'vestiya, April 15, 1941, with the appendaged
Frontier Declaration which guaranteed the "territorial integrityand inviolability of
Manchoukuo, and .. . the Mongolian People's Republic."
37 As Nathaniel Weyl put it in Treason: The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in
American History (Washington, Public AffairsPress, 1950, p. 474): "The Constitution
was drafted in a comparatively simple era when nations, as a rule, either went to
war or remained at peace." The institutionalmeans at the disposal of the govern-
ment remain, despite the many ad hoc decisions of recent administrations,ill-designed
to cope with the unique demands of quasi-war.
196 WORLD POLITICS
but are instead"two equally importantmeans,supplementing
each otherin the communists'advance towardtheirfinalrev-
olutionarygoals."38The Soviets,in short,have recognized,as
Americanstoo frequentlyhave not,the validityof Aristotle's
observationthatwar is nothingbuta meansof securingpeace-
though the Soviets have correctlyelaborated the dictum to
mean a peace which servesone's political objectives.
Conversely,of course, the Soviet approach bars as senti-
mentaland uselessor worse a war which does not furtherthe
purposesof the State. Since survival is obviouslyessentialto
thosepurposesa defensivewar is of course a sine qua non in
the eventof attack.But the urge to offensivewar mustwait
upon a carefulbalancingof anticipatedadvantageand disad-
vantage.This balancingis, withina totalitarianstate,a highly
bureaucratizedprocessand thereforedependentin itsaccuracy
and wisdom upon the nature of institutionalizedprocedure,
bothformaland informal,as well as upon theabilitiesand pre-
dispositionsof the individualswho have to do both with the
gatheringof informationand its interpretation. It is difficult,
however,to imagineanyimportantgovernmental apparatusin
the contemporary world which is incapable of understanding
thattheweaponsoftodayvirtuallyassuregraveifnotmortalin-
jurynotonlyto a nationsubjectedto eitheran all-outassaultor
counterassaultbut also-and this is a revolutionarydevelop-
mentin world history-to the governmentalapparatus itself.
This last is so because the directionand executionof highly
organizedwar demandsno less organizationand centralization
on thepartof thewarringgovernment. The resultis a complex
political nerve-center of high vulnerability.Hence any policy
based on a rationalcalculus,even giventhesubjectivizationof
thatcalculus,mustexcludethelaunchingoftotalwar againstan
antagonistunless an overwhelmingvictorywithoutchance of
smashingreprisalis almostcertain.
While it may be argued successfullythat states,like men,
mayat crucial or evenprosaicmomentsact withsingularirra-
tionality,thereis, as this studycontends,substantialevidence
thatthe Soviet government, at least in regardto war, does not.
This is in spiteof the factthatthereexistwithinthe U.S.S.R.
38 War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy, New York, Macmillan, 1940, p. 295.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 197
fewif anyinternalobstaclesto thewagingof an aggressivewar
-as exemplified,for instance,in the Soviet invasion of the
Baltic States,Poland, and Finland. It should be equally clear,
fromrecenthistoryas well as fromthe nature of the body
politicitself,thattheUnited Statesis and will in all likelihood
continuetobe incapableofinitiatingthekindof calculatedwar
discussedabove. AssumingthattheAmericanabilityto retali-
ate drasticallyis not sapped by ineptnessor internalfission,
therefore,it would seem that total war with the U.S.S.R. is
not apt to breakout as a resultof an outrightattackby either
power.How, then,could a full-scaleconflictcome about?
It has been remarkedthata war will resultwhen one power
feels that its capacity to wage war is seriouslythreatened.
While subjectto thequalificationsapplicable to mostgeneral-
izations,thisadequatelydescribesthe conditionsunderwhich
the United Statesand Russia are mostlikelyto resortto war.
Hence it is at thisfocusthatattentionmustbe directed.
Marked innovationsin weapon developmentnecessarilyaf-
fect,in proportionto themilitaryweightof theinnovation,the
relativecapacitiesof nationstowage war. A significant innova-
tionwill act as a casus belli, or a provocationto prophylactic
war,however,onlyso longas itis assumedthatwar mustbe total
and thattheenemywill in factattemptto use his own weapons
of total destructionfirst,withoutregard to the consequences.
A SovietmiscalculationofAmericandetermination and ability
to retaliatemassivelyseemshighlyimprobable.Thereforethe
developmentby the U.S.S.R. of anyweapon which would not
completely reduce to ashes America's retaliatorycapacity
would appear mostunlikelyto encouragean attackupon the
United States-so long,thatis, as the Politburodid notbelieve
thatatomicbombsor theirequivalentwere about to explode
over Moscow.
There are,of course,a numberof factors,relativelydifficult
to calculate,which react decisivelybut unobtrusively upon a
nation'swar-makingpotentialand consequentlythe balancing
of power-an increasedstandardof living, improvedpublic
health,the exploitationof untapped resources,an increasein
industrialproduction,and so on. These factorscannotbe ig-
198 WORLD POLITICS
nored; theyare not,however,readilyassessedas threatssuffi-
cientlydirectand grave in themselvesto provokewar.
There is, however,one outletthroughwhich thereseemsto
course the cumulativeexpressionof national and ideological
strengthand ambition-politico-economicand territorialex-
pansion.Here lies thetruepointof concentration-andof com-
bustion.Thus it is thatAmericanforeignpolicyhas come to be
directed to the "containment"of Soviet territorialaggran-
dizementand the castrationof movementswhich seek to ex-
tend the domain of Soviet influence.The Korean experience
has,amongotherthings,demonstrated theunwisdomof pursu-
ing an unlimitedpolicy of containmentwithoutthe means to
implementthat policy. But this experiencehas also brought
intofocusonce again theflexible,opportunisticattitudeof the
Soviet governmenttoward peripheral clashes of interest,no
matterhow severe.
It is particularlysignificantthat the Soviet press, despite
world tensionsvergingon overload and despitethe proclama-
tionof a nationalemergencyin the United States,gives no in-
dication of fear that the presentcrisis will debouch into a
generalwar. Instead, Soviet analystsexpressconcernthatthe
United States refusesto recognize the practical implications
of itsKorean defeatand theemergenceof a drasticallyaltered
powersituationin theFar East.39In otherwords,the Russians
seem to be tellingthe United States as pointedlyas theydid
the Japanese that it is essential to deal with the reality of
power,the ultimaratioof politics,whetherone likes it or not,
and thatany discussionswhich ignoreor obscure this reality
are butone removefrommetaphysics.
However one may evaluate such an attitude,it can never-
theless be dealt with. There is in the Soviet mentalityno
irrational,heroic urge to Gotterddmmerung,no chiliasticex-
pectationthatall historyis about to pour througha breach in
the presentto transformthe future.When the vital interests
of the Soviet State demandedit in the late 'thirties,the Polit-
buro proved eminentlycapable of co-operatingin a back-
handed way to localize and subsequentlyto resolvediplomati-
39 Harrison E. Salisbury, New York Times, International Edition Supplement,Dec.
17, 1950,p. 5.
 JAPAN AND THE U.S.S.R., 1937-1939 199
cally even violent armed clashes on Soviet territory.Soviet
leaders have subsequentlyproved equally adept at exacerbat-
ing peripheral conflicts,particularlywhen the formalityof
non-intervention could be maintainedand possiblereprisalde-
flectedto the nominal agent of aggression.This fact,it must
be insisted,representsno dramatic change in Soviet opera-
tional procedures,long-rangeexpectationsor aspirations,but
simply the existenceof a new power situationfavorable to
more energeticmanipulation.
The successof thatmanipulationcan yet provokethe cata-
clysmif American statesmendo not soon recall that interna-
tionalpoliticsis at besta shadyand imperfectbusiness.It is not
susceptibleto theverbatimapplicationof principle,no matter
how loftyor inspiring.One principle in particular,neither
loftynor inspiring,mustat once be laid to restif substantial
portionsof mankindare notto be. It is thegreatand disastrous
illusion thatwar and politicslead privatelives of theirown,
thatto save our mortalsouls we mustnever be found simul-
taneouslyin the embraceof both,and thatwe mustemptythe
full reservoirof our strengthand of our passion on one to the
utterexclusionof the other.We can no longeraffordto act as
thoughwhat is expedientis necessarilyimmoraland what is
immoral must thereforebe expedient, or we may shortly
findthecivilized worldplungedintotheagonyand darknessof
a new Volkerwanderung.
If, on the otherhand, the United States can recapturethe
flexibilitythathas been so alarminglyabsentfromits policies
and theirimplementation, and iftheAmericangovernment and
people can avoid attributingto the Russians a home-grown
convictionthatwar and peace are and should be total condi-
tionswithno bridgebetween,thenall is notlost.The provoca-
tions may well be unending,the beat to quarters incessant.
Neverthelessthere can yet be in our time a peculiar but
effectivepeace which will permitthe enflamedpassions and
traumaticdogmas of the presentto be replaced gradually,if
with infinitepatience and vigilance, by the emergenceof a
world communityin which men can at last get on with the
businessof living.The plea is forcommonsense.