Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

Review: Islam, Religiopolitics, and Social Change. A Review Article

Author(s): Jerrold D. Green
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 312-322
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Islam, Religiopolitics, and Social
Change.
A Review Article
JERROLD D. GREEN
The Universityof Michigan

Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, edited by Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (New York:
PraegerPress, 1982)
MilitantIslam,by G. H. Jansen(New York:HarperandRow, 1979)
Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, by EdwardMortimer(New York: Vintage
Books, 1983)
In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, by Daniel Pipes (New York: Basic
Books, 1983)
Althoughthe trade-offbetween relevance and intellectualismis hardlya new
one, the IranianRevolutionraisedthe visibility of Islam and moved studies of
it from the arcaneto the superficial. Despite the fact that the former is more
enlighteningthan the latter, it also necessitates a "blurringof genres." 1 For
the study of Islamic politics requiresunderstandingboth of Islam, its history,
theology, and so on (the realm of humanists)and of the dynamics and con-
cepts of sociopolitical change (the bailiwick of social scientists). Neither the
humanitiesnor the social sciences can boast a monopoly on wisdom. Yet
scholarsclaiming membershipin both unions, rarelythe two simultaneously,
have produceda pasticheof writings when in fact what is needed is a corpus.
The fact that Islamic politics falls at the nexus of the humanitiesand the
social sciences poses a significant epistemological challenge. Humanists, it
seems, are concerned with Islam, while social scientists are interested in
Muslims.2 Or, to escape this obviously false dichotomy, we might posit that

I would like to thank Dr. KhurshidAhmad and Dr. HassanTurabifor their graciousnessduring
my recent visit to Islamabadand Khartoum.Although this paperprovidedsubstantialfodder for
disagreement,I benefitted immensely from our discussions. I would also like to thank several
colleagues in the United States for their insights: Mumtaz Ahmad, Fouad Ajami. Said Amir
Arjumand,Zvi Gitelman, David F. Gordon, Donald Herzog, Daniel Levine, PeterMcDonough,
Augustus R. Norton, Barry Rubin, Peter Wallensteen, Aram Yengoyan, and Marvin Zonis.
Naturally,all the usual exemptions from responsibilityapply.
I See Clifford Geertz, "BlurredGenres: The Refigurationof Social Thought," in his Local
Knowledge:Further Essavs in InterpretiveAnthropology(New York: 1983), pp. 19-35.
2
Although this distinction is hardly a new one, it remains for many Muslims a quite
provocativeone. I am gratefulto a memberof the ulema in Bangladeshwho pointed it out to me
after a lecture I delivered at the Islamic Foundationin Dhaka on March 15, 1983.
0010-4175/85/2780-0923 $2.50 ? 1985 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History

312
 ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 313

the question confrontingscholars of Islamic politics is the same as that elud-

ing Islamic activists themselves-what is the relationship between what
should be (Islamic doctrine) and what is (Islamic political activism).3
A gap exists. Such gaps usually separate doctrine from practice and are
hardlyunique to Islam. Samuel Huntington, for example, considers this di-
lemma in a recent study of American politics. Looking at the 1960s, he
capturesthe spirit of this turbulentdecade, noting that widespreadpolitical
activism "was a reaffirmationof traditionalAmericanideals and values." A
studentleader of the time states that:
Wedo notproclaima NewTruthto challengetheold mythsof earliergenerations.
We
insteadinvoke the Old Truthsand chargeyou . . . with desertingthose truths.You are
the apostates,not we. You are, in effect, the subversives;we arethe loyalists,who
proudlyreaffirmthe principlesthatyou ignore.
Huntingtonattributesthis eloquent statement to what he terms the "Ideals
versus Institutions"(IvI) gap in Americanpolitics. For the Tantalusof ideals
impels its followers to "compare practice to principle . . . reality to ide-
al . . . behavior to belief."4 Every country in the Islamic umma (community)
claims politically significant numbersof citizens who, with referenceto their
own societies, would subscribe to the statement by the American student
leader. The IvI gap highlights tensions in many polities where the exigencies
of day to day politics obscure the dreamsof founding fathers. Profits obviate
prophets. This is usually the case in those states whose elites depend on
Islamic legitimacy (Saudia Arabia, Pakistan, Iran) and those who do not
(Iraq, Syria, Pahlavi Iran). For despite the orientationsof prevailingpolitical
elites, Islam is "still . . . part of the common sense of everyday life and
hence it is politically potent."5 Elites cannot ignore Islam, they also cannot
base all political life on it.

RELIGIOPOLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The journalistic (G. H. Jansen, Edward Mortimer) and historical studies
(Daniel Pipes) can usefully be compared, to the detrimentperhaps, of the
latter. All begin with surveys of Islamic history which are standardizedand
for the most part interchangeable.Is scholarshipin Islamic history really as
monodimensionalas they make it appear?Why do modernIslamic historians
rely solely on one another's books? Why are Arabic and Persian language
sources used so sparingly, if at all? A variety of cliches tend to characterize

3 Gustave E. von Grunebaum

points out this gap as well, writing: "The gap between what
ought to be and what is, is strong in any religion, but it seems to be particularlystrong in Islam."
Quoted in Pipes, p. 48. But von Grunebaum'sconcern here is with religion in a much more
narrowlydefined sense than is mine.
4 The preceedingquotationsare from Samuel P. Huntington,AmericanPolitics: ThePromise
of Disharmony (Cambridge:1981), p. 3.
5 Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From
Religious Dispute to Revolution(Cambridge:1981), p.
38.
314 JERROLD D. GREEN

such studiesas well. "Islam is not a religion but rathera way of life." "Islam
does not recognizedistinctionsbetween state and religion." These truismsare
fundamentallycorrect. Yet time and again they are breathlesslypresentedas
exciting new discoveries ratherthan well-known facts. And how these factors
explain contemporaryevents is left unclear. Furthermore,such superficiality
does not recognize that there exists in a more universal sense an engine for
social change which might be termed "religiopolitics."
Religiopolitics can be simply defined as those situationsin which relations
with God provide shape and meaning to one's political actions and orienta-
tions. As liberalism or socialism serve as political ideologies, so too can
Christianity,Islam, or Judaism, althoughperhapsin differentways. That this
theoreticalrelationshipreflects Islamic doctrinedoes not mean that it reflects
politics in Islamic societies. Also, there are other cases which can shed light
on the character of religiopolitics as a more broad-gaugedmeans of so-
ciopolitical change. LiberationTheology in Latin America, the Moral Major-
ity in the United States, Poland's SolidarityMovement, Apartheidin South
Africa, and Zionism in some of its many hues are all inspiredby religion with
political beliefs being mediated through man's spiritual relationship with
God. Are these cases all so different'?At one level they are. Yet why would
Hassan al-Banna concern himself with events in Latin America?6Was he
merely more cosmopolitan than are those who have studied him'?
Certainly, level of analysis here is crucial. Yet Max Weber, despite his
innumerableinsights into the relationshipbetween religion and politics, was
probablywrong when he wrote:
All politicsis orientedto the materialfactsof the dominantinterestof the state,to
realism,andto the autonomous endof maintaining theexternalandinternaldistribu-
tionof power.Thesegoals, again,mustnecessarilyseemcompletelysenselessfrom
the religiouspointof view.7
But is therea religious point of view? Does it not differ from faith to faith and
often within faiths? It seems almost tautological to note that religiopolitical
activists seek a greatersymmetrybetween temporaland spiritualconcerns in
state management.Perhapsmid-level theory may prove useful, for where on
one level macroanalysisis likely to forward certain useful generalizations,
microanalysiswill frame each case as unique. Seeking a balancebetween the
two is the essence of comparative research, after all. And the search for
paradigms, patterns, similarities and/or differences is certainly superior to
thin description.
This problem tends not to be recognized by those writings on Islam and

6 This
interestingfact was related to me by my late colleague Professor RichardMitchell, a
pioneer in the study of religiopolitical movements in Egypt. Personal communication, Spring
1982.
7 Max Weber. The Sociology of Religion (Boston: 1963), p.235.
 ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 315

politics. While some emphasize grand similarities (Pipes), others emphasize

differences (Mortimer).8Each fails however, as there is no single answer.
Both similarities and differences exist. Unfortunately, the descriptions on
which they are based in much of the currentliteratureare neither systematic
nor testable.
Whatis being arguedfor here is awarenessof the utility of religiopoliticsas
a conceptual variable. What is needed is an attemptto determinewhat sim-
ilarities and differences link/distinguish Islamic politics from these extant in
otherfaiths and even within Islam itself. Religiopolitics may be understoodas
a type of political mobilization. We can distinguishinstitutionalIslam which
attemptsto buttresselite legitimacy, frompopular Islam which is often geared
to challenging elites.9 There are even cases in which we find both at work.
The IvI gap exists in every country in the umma. No Islamic governmentis
acceptable to all Muslims and there is no universally recognized opposition
movement. The reasons for this are best pointed out by Mortimer,who notes
that Islam has developed differently in disparatesocieties. Although Islam as
a pristine belief structurecan claim a doctrinal purity and universality, the
introductionof Islam into a society of necessity makes it part of a complex
skein of pre-existent primordial and ascriptive ties defined by language,
culture, social class, generationaldifferences, history, and so forth. Islamic
activists themselves have repeatedlytried to operationalizeIslam with mixed
success. Khomeini the oppositionist generated far more popular support in
Iranand in the ummathan does Khomeini the head of state. Islamic doctrine
in the test tube is far betterdefined than is Islam as a guide for state manage-
ment. And Islam as an ideology becomes significantly less importantwhen it
is confrontedby the imperativesof a state's nationalinterest. SecularistSyria
quite comfortably supports the Islamic Republic of Iran which accepts this
supporteven as Hafez al-Assad slaughtersIslamic activists far closer to Iran's
worldview than is Assad himself.
Given the heterogeneity of the umma we might ask what factors unite
Muslims, which divide them? Or, again, what is the relationshipbetween
Islam and Muslims? Studies of Sufi politics in Senegal or Qaddafi'sviews on
Islam are intrinsically fascinating. Yet such narrow sketches of individual
cases have not markedlyadvancedour understandingof Islam's broaderrole
as a frameworkfor sociopolitical change. Studentsof religiopolitics, Islamic

8 On the whole, the Mortimervolume is the more

persuasive of the two.
9 For an analysis of the
relationshipbetween the two, see Daniel Levine, "The Institutional
Churchand the Popularin Colombia," mimeo., 1983. Fouad Ajami looks at this issue from a
different perspective. Relying on transcriptsof court proceedings from the trials of Islamic
activists, Ajami cites debates between supportersof popularIslamic groups (the defendants)and
de facto representativesof institutionalIslam (the prosecutors).The issue has never been present-
ed in quite this way and makes fascinatingreading. See his "In the Pharaoh'sShadow: Religion
and Authorityin Egypt," in Islam in the Political Process James P. Piscatori, ed. (New York:
1983), pp. 12-35.
316 JERROLD D. GREEN

or otherwise, must begin to refine their questions, typologize their cases, and
build/test theories. Ali Dessouki points this out in an excellent introductory
chapter to his edited volume where he notes that: "Islamic movements have
to be seen in relation to the specific process of social change taking place in
their societies, in particular to issues of the changing position of classes and
groups, political participation, identity crisis, the stability of regimes,
and distributive justice" (p. 8). Dessouki's prescriptions are both prudent and
sound. He does not advocate a mutually exclusive approach, but rather a more
well-rounded understanding of how the past influences the present, how re-
ligion becomes politicized and vice-versa. Islamic opposition groups are
products of the very sociopolitical orders they oppose. At the same time,
those elites who attempt to buttress their own legitimacy through reliance on
institutional Islam are at least as committed to political survival as they are to
the spiritual values they so fervently espouse. Max Weber notes that "the
man who is concerned for the welfare of his soul and the salvation of the souls
of others does not seek these aims along the path of politics. Politics has quite
different goals, which can only be achieved by force." 0 Although this max-
imalist view may seem unduly cynical, the record of those political elites in
the umma who rely on Islam for legitimacy seems to verify Weber's insight.
Can political leaders who claim high levels of religiosity maintain the same
level and character of commitment to their core spiritual values while in
power? Certainly there are many in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Islamic
Republic of Iran who question the "Islamic-ness" of their leaders. Weber is
no less skeptical about oppositionists, asserting that:
? . . emotional revolutionis followed by traditionalistroutine. The hero of faith, and,
even more, faith itself fades away or becomes . . . partof the conventionaljargon of
political philistinesand technicians. This developmenttakes place with especial speed
in ideological struggles, because it is usually conductedor inspiredby trueleaders, the
prophetsof the revolution.
As I note above, profits, political in this context, obviate prophets:
... as with every apparatusof leadership,so here, one of the necessaryconditions of
success is to empty the ideas of all content, to concentrateon mattersof fact, and to
carrythrougha process of intellectual(i.e. or spiritual)'proletarisation'in the interests
of 'discipline.' The followers of a warriorof faith, once they have achieved power,
tend to degenerateinto a thoroughlycommonplace class of office-holders.12

Although it appears that Weber may have recently visited Tehran, my point
here is not to denigrate religiopolitical activists/leaders or even to question
their commitment to the religious values they espouse. Rather, it is to argue

10 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in Weber:Selections in TranslationW. G. Run-

ciman, ed. (New York: 1978), p. 223.
" Ibid., p. 222.
12 Ibid.,
p. 222.
 ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 317

that religiopolitics is politics much like other politics. The two influence one
another, but claims by religiopolitical activists to have some sort of special
mandatefrom God which raises them above politics tend not to be persuasive.
For as Weber also notes ". .. he who meddles with politics, who in other
words makes use of the instrumentsof power and violence, concludes a pact
with infernalpowers."'3 That religiopolitical actors exaggeratethe religious
contentof theiractions, while denying the political content, makes the task of
the scholar somewhat more difficult. For it is in the relationshipbetween the
two that the IvI gap appears to be most critical and the objectivity of the
scholarmost unwelcome by those being studied. Those trying to interpretthe
political behaviorof Ayatollah Khomeini are subjectto charges of being anti-
Islamic. Their scholarlycredentialsand goals are either ignoredor dismissed.
Being a Westernerand a non-Muslim provides anotherreason for dismissal,
althoughthese flaws tend to evaporatewhen one praises the Imam instead of
trying to understandhim. Yet if Muslim activists and intellectualscan claim
to understandthe West, even if only to dismiss it, why is it that Westerners
are viewed as being unable to appreciatethe Middle East and beyond?
This issue, only tangentiallytouched upon here, raises questions about the
ability of scholars to study societies which are not their own. An important
correlate to this, although one that is usually overlooked, relates to one's
ability to study one's own society. Ideally, both issues should be raised. But
recognitionthatreligiopoliticsis a subset or a particulartype of politics allows
us to apply the tools of our craft to the study of such politics everywhere.
Despite the possible abuse of some of these tools (e.g., development, elite,
and dependency theories have all been debased, at times), it should be re-
membered that the ax murderer is sent to prison, not the ax. Certainly a
sensitivity to what makes each case unique is an importantas an ability to
glean useful generalizations. The problem with much of the literatureon
Islam and politics is the relative absence of the latter.

RELIGIOPOLITICS AS A CONCEPTUAL VARIABLE

The foregoing analysis suggests that religiopolitical activity is particularly

appropriatefor comparative political analysis. Religiopolitics can be con-
ceived of as a conceptual variable about which certain tentativepropositions
can be articulated.The purposeof the propositionsis to challenge the growing
group of scholars who are exploring specific religiopolitical experiences to
cast their analyses in a broader comparative mode. Such analysis would
permit the growth of scholarshipthat is intellectuallycumulativeratherthan
diffuse and idiosyncratic.All of the propositionsare applicableto both institu-
tional and popularreligion. And in fact, some of the points in the propositions
are touched upon in the studies reviewed here, but not in a particularly

13 Ibid.,
p. 220.
318 JERROLD D. GREEN

systematicfashion. Although not meant to be comprehensive,these proposi-

tions can serve as a useful startingpoint for understandingand comparingthe
role of religion in a variety of polities irrespectiveof faith.

1. Although religion is conventionally viewed as an element of tradi-

tionalism, recent cases of religiopolitics are often the productof mod-
ernization and social change. They are most likely to prosperduring
crises of identity, ideology, legitimacy, and/or participation.

Periodic outburstsof religiopolitical activity should not be allowed to ob-

scure the fundamentalrole of religion as a source of strengthand sustenance
for adherentsof innumerablefaiths over countless centuriesin all corners of
the world. In recenttimes, such commitmentshave been especially significant
byproductsof the modernizationprocess. For in societies undergoingrapid
transformation,religion frequently serves as a culturallyauthenticand spir-
itually satisfying anchorto the familiarand the understood.Furthermore,"in
light of the absence of conventional participatorymechanisms, formalized
religious organizationscan, and in the view of some religious leaders, should
serve as vehicles for improvingthe qualityof life for theiradherents."14 Such
sentimentsare recognized both by political elites and counterelites.
2. Religiopolitics is a common type of political mobilizationor counter-
mobilization, not merely a theological ritual.
3. Religion provides a particularperspective for evaluating social, politi-
cal, and economic conditions. The form of such politics is heavily
influenced by religious symbols, values, and idioms. Thus, re-
ligiopolitics may be analyzed in comparisonor in contrastwith other
ideologies, most of which are concernedwith similarsorts of issues that
are perceived and addressedin different idioms.
Religiopolitics provides a particularlens, which differs across faiths, for
evaluatingrelevantissues. These issues are usually not religious in a doctrinal
sense. That is, religion is more than doctrine or liturgy and in a political
context functions as an ideology not unlike other, more secular, ideologies.
Religious activists are concernedwith social, economic, political, and moral
questions. As a filter for processing such issues, religiopolitics may be per-
ceived as a rallying point for addressingthem.15 As a means for mobiliza-
tion/countermobilization,religion has obvious advantages. Yet such mobili-
zation is most definitely political mobilization for the accomplishmentof
political goals.

14 Jerrold D.
Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics of Countermobilization(New York:
1982), p. 150.
'5 R. Stephen Humphreyslooks at the historicaldimension of this issue in "The Contempo-
rary Resurgence in the Context of Modem Islam," in Dessouki, pp. 67-83.
 ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 319

4. The political component of religiopolitics becomes at least as signifi-

cant as the religious one as the goals of the participantsare not religious
per se.
5. Religious doctrine grows more malleable as the role of religion in
politics increases
As religiopolitical activists increase their involvement in the day to day
political life of a polity, the agenda of issues and problems with which they
are confrontedis not likely to be resolved on the basis of religious doctrine
alone.16 Religious dogma provides guidanceon economic and political issues
only in the most general terms. And the complexity of twentieth-centurylife
frequently compels religiopolitical leaders to go beyond conventional doc-
trinal sources in search of formulas for state management. Pursuit of the
national interest is likely to supercede strict adherenceto religious canons.
Given the necessity of makingtelephones work or defendingthe state, narrow
compliance with religious doctrine often becomes a luxury rather than a
possibility. The exigencies of day-to-day life exacerbatethe gap between the
spiritualand the temporal. Religiopolitical leaders either consciously or sub-
consciously will attemptto obscure this exacerbationon the basis of the very
doctrinalfactors which they rely on to enhance their legitimacy. In a conflict
between the profane and the spiritual, particularlywhen questions of power
and dominanceare at stake, the profane is likely to win out, yet in a fashion
that will be disguised, not highlighted.
6. Religiopolitics redefines the criteria for and natureof elite legitimacy
while changing the form more than the content of governmental
activity.

Religiopolitics changes the form of political life. Different symbols and

idioms are relied upon while the standardsfor elite legitimacy will be modi-
fied. Yet despite the emergence of a new political elite, its appearancewill
differ far more than will the contentof its actions. The problemsconfrontinga
society change far less frequently than do the personnel managing it. The
rules of the political game may be transformed,but the game remainsbasical-
ly the same.

7. Religiopolitics brings an assortmentof moral issues to public life and

then proceeds to ignore many of them.

Due to the flexibility of religious doctrine and the complexity of state

management, the religiopolitical activist's stated concern with moral issues
16 For an excellent analysis of the relationshipbetween political thoughtand
practicefrom the
perspective of the thinkers themselves, see Charles E. Butterworth, "Prudence Versus Legit-
imacy: The PersistentTheme in Islamic Political Thought," in Dessouki, pp. 84-114.
320 JERROLD D. GREEN

will be outstrippedby his eagerness to preservehis political power-a power

he attributesto his moral superiorityyet which is more dependenton the use
of force.

8. Religiopolitics is frequentlyan intense statementof some form of na-

tionalism and/or ethnicity.

Thereis no such thing as purereligion. Religiopolitics is as much a product

of historical and culturaldevelopments in a society as it is of narrowerspir-
itual ones. 17 It is often indistinguishablefrom more seemingly secularfactors
such as nationalismor ethnicity. While pan-religiousstatementsand actions
may seem to contradictthis, all states, even those managedby clergy-politi-
cians, feel that their interpretationof religion is the best one and such in-
terpretationbecomes synonymous with a particularisticethnic or national
interest.

9. Social class is a relatively weak explanatoryvariablefor understanding

the growth of religiopolitics.

Given that religiopolitics is part of a melange of factors resulting from

economic, political, ethnic, nationalist, and other stimuli it is difficult to link
religiopoliticalcommitmentsto any particularsocial class. Differentcontexts
promotedifferentoutcomes; to assume that religiopolitics is the productof a
clever clergy manipulating unsophisticated peasants/workers is simply
incorrect. 18

CONCLUSIONS

Throughoutthis essay it has been argued that Islamic politics should be

understoodunderthe largerrubricof what has been termedreligiopolitics, a
type of political activity common to numerous faiths in a wide variety of
polities. The crop of books reviewed here tend, with some notableexceptions,
to promote narrow description rather than broad-gaugedunderstanding.19
Empirically,ratherthan spiritually, there is no such thing as a single Islam.
To study Islamic politics with a greateremphasis on religion than politics is
foolhardy. As Fazlur Rahmannotes:
... an importantproblem that has plagued Muslim societies . . . is the peculiar
relationshipof religion and politics and the pitiable subjugationof the former to the

17 For a discussion of this issue see "Pakistan:Islam as

Nationality," in Mortimer,pp. 186-
229.
18 Saad Eddin Ibrahimhas paid
particularattentionto this issue. See, for example, "Islamic
Militancyas a Social Movement:The Case of Two Groupsin Egypt," in Dessouki, pp. 117-37.
Membersof the groups looked at by Ibrahimare primarilymiddle class in origin.
19 The exception is the Dessouki volume, which claims several excellent chapters.
 ISLAM, RELIGIOPOLITICS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 321

latter . . . For, insteadof setting themselves to genuinely interpretIslamic goals to be

realized through political and government channels . . . what happens most of the
time is a ruthlessexploitationof Islamfor partypoliticsand groupintereststhat
subjectsIslamnotonlyto politicsbutto day-to-daypolitics;Islamthusbecomessheer
demagoguery. Unfortunately,the so-calledIslamicpartiesin severalcountriesarethe
mostblatantlyguiltyof suchsystematicpoliticalmanipulation of religion.Theslogan,
'in Islamreligionandpoliticsareinseparable' is employedto dupethecommonman
intoacceptingthat,insteadof politicsor the stateservingthelong-rangeobjectivesof
Islam,Islamshouldcome to serve the immediateand myopicobjectivesof party
politics.20
The hypocrisy lamented by Rahman is reminiscent of that discussed by
Weber. But the problem is less attributableto Islam than to those who abuse
it. Just as political practiceeverywhereoften results in a betrayalof the very
ideals cynically put forth by the betrayersthemselves, Islamic politics are not
necessarilyin accordwith the fundamentalpreceptsof Islam. The IvI gap may
well be universal.
As I note at the outset, the study of religiopolitics, or for our purposeshere,
Islamic politics, falls at the nexus of the humanitiesand the social sciences.
Yet, the common denominatorfor the study of Islamic politics seems to lie at
least as much with the political as with the Islamic-this point is strongly
emphasizedby Rahman. Historiansand their proteges in journalismcan trace
the growth and development of Islam. They seem less adept at the study of
societies and politics, at least in the studies reviewed here. Perhapsthe prob-
lem lies in historicalscope and method. Some historiansexhibit a remarkable
ambivalence towards their own craft. Pipes, for example, claims to "rely
heavily on language skills, philology, and the study of texts" in researching
his book (p. 24). Yet to approachtwentieth-centurypolitics armedonly with a
medievalist's understandingof philology and texts seems inadequate at
best.21 As for language skill, the volume's notes claim only a handful of
perfunctoryreferencesto works in Arabic (none in Persian, Urdu, and so on),
while The New YorkTimes appears with depressing regularity. Finally, the
section on contemporaryIslamic politics is superficial in the extreme, with
Jordanbeing "analyzed" in three sentences (p. 220) and the entire Persian
Gulf in only eight sentences (p. 230).
A field as diverse as Middle East history cannot be judged by its weaker
components. But it is evident that political writing on Islam is of a standard
lower than that on politics elsewhere, as well as that on other aspects of
politics in the Middle East, such as political development or economy. Al-
though no one will argue that the social sciences are an intellectualpanacea,
20 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity:
Transformationof an Intellectual Tradition(Chi-
cago: 1982), p. 150.
21 In concert with the tools of social science
they can be quite valuable, however. For the use
of philology, for example, see Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight,"
in his, The Interpretationof Cultures (New York: 1973), pp. 412-53.
322 JERROLD D. GREEN

they are certainly superiorto no analytical perspective at all. The problem

may be that the more traditionalhistorians,who know little of the systematic
study of contemporarypolitics, have a vested interest in portrayingIslam as
the independentvariablein religiopolitics. Weber, Rahman,and others argue
that it may well be the dependentone. Presumably,the true relationshiplies
somewherebetween these extremes. Explorationof this question alone could
sparkan interestingdebate. An importantchallenge awaitsboth historiansand
social scientists. Let us hope they rise to it.