Inaugural IEEE PES 2005 Conference and Exposition in Africa
Durban, South Africa, 11-15 July 2005
Upgrading the Protection of Generators to Meet Current IEEE Standards
Charles J. Mozina, IEEE Member
Beckwith Electric Co., Inc., 6190-118th Avenue North, Largo, Florida, U.S.A.
Phone: 727-544-2326; Fax: 727-546-0121; E-mail: cmozina@aol.com
Abstract—Significant changes have occurred in the protection of
generators in the past ten years as discussed in IEEE guide C-37.102.
[1]. This paper discusses these changes as well as the risks of not
addressing them. It specifically addresses the risks in two functional
areas where 20+-year-old generator protection is inadequate. These
areas include: sensitive stator ground fault protection using schemes to
provide 100% winding ground detection, field ground fault protection,
and inadvertent (accidental) generator off-line energizing protection.
Most of these upgrade schemes were made possible through the use of
digital protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, generators do experience short
circuits and abnormal electrical conditions. In many cases,
equipment damage due to these events can be reduced or
prevented by proper generator protection. As generators
become older, the likelihood for failure increases as insulation
begins to deteriorate. Generators, unlike some other power
system components, need to be protected not only from short
circuits, but also from abnormal operating conditions.
Examples of such abnormal conditions are overexcitation,
loss-of-field, unbalanced currents, and abnormal frequency.
When subjected to these conditions, damage or complete
failure can occur within seconds, thus requiring automatic
detection and tripping.
In the late 1980's, the IEEE Power System Relay
Committee first issued its ANSI/IEEE C37.102 [Ref. 1] guide
for the protection of synchronous generators. This guide
outlines current recommended practices for the protection of
generators and documents the substantial changes that have
occurred in generator protection over the last twenty years.
These changes fall into two broad categories: improved
sensitivity and security as well as new protection areas. These
are the key functional areas that need to be addressed when
developing an upgrade program to bring the generator
protection up to current industry standards.
II. AREAS OF PROTECTION UPGRADE
ON OLDER GENERATORS
The areas of upgrade on generator protection that are
twenty years old or more fall into two broad categories:
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A. Improved sensitivity and security—in protection areas
where older relaying does not provide the level of
detection required. Examples of protection in this area are
the following:
1. 100% Stator Ground Fault Protection
2. Field Ground Fault Protection
3. Enhancing Generator System Backup Security
B. New or additional protection—areas that twenty years
ago were not perceived to be a problem, but operating
experiences have since proved otherwise. One key area is
inadvertent generator energizing.
III. IMPROVED SENSITIVITY AND SECURITY
A. 100% Stator Ground Fault Protection
Three basic methods of 100% stator ground fault protection
are widely used to provide ground fault protection over the
entire stator winding. Two methods use the 3rd harmonic
detection while a third method uses an injection of a sub-
harmonic signal at the stator neutral. This is an important
upgrade area because older generators do not have stator
ground fault protection for fault over the entire stator winding.
1. 100% Stator Ground Fault Protection Using
3rd Harmonic Neutral Undervoltage Methods
The most widely used conventional stator ground fault
protection scheme in high impedance-grounded systems is a
time-delayed overvoltage relay (59N) connected across the
grounding resistor to sense zero-sequence voltage as shown in
Fig 1. The relay used for this function is designed to be
sensitive to fundamental frequency voltage and insensitive to
third harmonic and other zero sequence harmonic voltages that
are present at the generator neutral. Typically, this overvoltage
relay has a minimum pickup setting of approximately 5 V.
With this setting and typical grounding transformer ratios, this
relay is not capable of detecting faults over the entire stator
winding as shown in Fig. 1 with typical 90-95% winding
coverage.
It is important to protect major generators with an
additional ground fault protection system so that fault
coverage for 100% of the winding is obtained. Generators that
are twenty years old or older typically have only 90-95% of
the stator winding protected for ground faults. One of the 3rd
harmonic methods uses a 3rd harmonic undervoltage relay
466
 connected as illustrated in Fig.2. Third-harmonic voltages are
present at the neutral of most generators to varying degrees—
it varies due to differences in stator winding pitch, machine
load and power factor. If present in a sufficient amount, this
voltage can be used to detect stator ground faults near the
generator neutral. For faults near the neutral, the level of 3rd
harmonic voltage measured at the neutral decreases.

59 – Instantaneous Overvoltage Supervisory Relay

59N – Overvotage Relay Tuned to Fundamental Freq.
27Th – Undervotage Relay Tuned to Third Harmonic
2-1,2-2 – Timers
rd
Fig. 2 3 Harmonic Undervoltage Ground Fault Scheme

Fig. 1 Conventional Stator Ground Fault Detection

Thus, an undervoltage relay operating on 3rd harmonic voltage

measured at the neutral as illustrated in Fig. 2 can be used to detect
faults near the neutral. The ground faults in the remaining portion of
the winding are detected by conventional 59N protection, which
operates on fundamental frequency. The overlap of these two
protection zones provides 100% stator ground fault protection.

2. 100% Stator Ground Fault Protection Using

3rd Harmonic Ratio Method
The 3rd harmonic voltage is present at both the generator terminal
as well as at the neutral. For faults near the neutral, the 3rd harmonic
decreases when measured at the generator neutral as discussed above.
The terminal 3rd harmonic at the terminal, however, increases. The
ratio of terminal/neutral 3rd harmonic voltage can be used to detect
faults near the neutral. The ratio varies with generator winding pitch,
loading and power factor as illustrated in Fig.3 [2].
The ratio method is more secure than using just the neutral
undervoltage method, but does require a broken delta voltage
measurement at the generator terminal. This measurement requires
that terminal VTs be connected line-to-ground as illustrated in Fig.4.
The “blind spot” occurs at the mid-winding and is protected by the
conventional 59N relay.
Fig. 3 Typical Generator 3rd Harmonic Values
3. 100% Stator Ground Fault Using
Low Frequency Injection
The two 3rd harmonic schemes described above for 100%
stator ground fault protection have limitations in their
applications. The most common limitation being that there
may not be enough 3rd harmonic present to allow fault
detection. Since the 3rd harmonic varies with power factor and
load, a secure setting may not be possible. For these cases,
100% stator ground fault protection is still possible using a

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 subharmonic injection scheme that is widely used in Europe recent price reductions in the cost of the injection equipment
but not used much in North America. The scheme shown in have made this an attractive choice for many users.
Fig. 5 provides full coverage of the entire stator winding. It
also provides off-line detection of stator ground faults. The

59GN – Overvoltage Relay Tuned to the Fundamental (60 Hz) Frequency

59D – Overvoltage Ratio Relay Tuned to the Third Harmonic (180 Hz) Frequency

Fig. 4 3rd Harmonic Ratio Method

Natural Capacitance

V
*

Coupling Voltage MR-3425A

e la y
Filter Injector MM
eeasurements
a su re m e n ts

5 9ground
other N C ovoltage
n v e nelements
tio n a l P ro te c tio n
Notes:
Subharmonic injection typically at 15-20 Hz
Coupling filter low pass or notch tuned for subharmonic frequency
Measurement inputs tuned to respond to subharmonic frequency

Fig. 5 100% Stator Ground Fault Using Low Frequency Injection

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 B. Field Ground Fault Detection (64F) recently, it was not available in a multifunction relay. As
The field circuit of a generator is an ungrounded (typically illustrated in Fig. 7, a 15-volt square wave signal is injected
600- 800 V) dc system, as shown in Fig. 6. into the field through a coupling network. The return signal
waveform is modified due to field winding capacitance. The
injection frequency setting is adjusted (0.1 to 1.0 Hz) to
compensate for field winding capacitance. From the input and
return voltage signals, the relay calculates the field insulation
resistance. The relay setpoints are in ohms, typically with a 20
K ohm and a 5 K ohm critical alarm or trip.
The injection scheme provides a major improvement over
traditional voltage schemes in terms of both sensitivity as well
as security. In addition, digital relays can provide real-time
monitoring of field insulation resistance so deterioration with
time can be monitored. The scheme can also detect grounds on
an off-line generator, allowing the operator to determine if the
field circuitry is free of a ground before start-up. An added
benefit of the injection scheme described above is that it
operates at a low voltage (15 V) compared to the scheme it
Fig. 6 A Basic Generator Field Circuit
typically replaces (120 V), thus improving operator safety
when changing brushes with the unit on-line.
A single field ground fault generally will not affect the
operation of a generator, nor will it produce any immediate
damaging effects. However, the probability of a second
ground fault occurring is greater after the first ground fault has
established a ground reference. When a second ground fault
occurs, a portion of the field winding will be short-circuited,
thereby producing unbalanced air gap fluxes in the machine.
These unbalanced fluxes produce unbalanced magnetic forces,
which result in machine vibration. A field ground fault also
produces rotor iron heating from the unbalanced short circuit
currents. The tripping practices within the industry for field
ground relaying are not well established. Some users trip
while others prefer to alarm, thereby risking a second ground
fault and major damage before the first ground is cleared.
The existing practice within the industry has been to use
voltage detection systems. These voltage schemes have been
prone to false operation—especially during start-up. Unit
operators routinely reset the alarm and continue with start-up
procedures. If a persistent alarm occurred, operators attempted
to locate the problem. If the ground could not be found within
a reasonable time, the unit was supposed to be tripped
manually. However, the many nuisance alarms and the very
few legitimate ones caused some unit operators to lose
confidence in the field ground voltage scheme. Therefore, the
alarm lost credibility. Operators continued to keep the units
on-line, hoping that a second ground would not occur.
Catastrophic rotor failures have occurred due to a second
ground in the field developing very quickly after the first Fig. 7 Field Ground Protection Using an Injection Voltage Signal
ground. In these instances, the operators were not able to
isolate the cause of the first alarm, nor were they able to bring C. Enhancing Generator System Backup Security (21-2)
the units off-line in an orderly fashion before the second A mho distance relay characteristic is commonly used to
ground occurred. detect system phase faults and to trip the generator after a set
Clearly, a more secure field ground relay is desirable if time delay. These relays, however, have frequently operated
automatic tripping is being considered. Such a relay is shown improperly during major system disturbances—unnecessarily
in Fig. 7 and uses an injection principle. This principle has tripping generators and thereby exacerbating the disturbance.
been widely used in Europe with great success, but until This was the case during the 1996 West Coast blackout.

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 Investigation revealed that these relays were improperly set
for the system conditions they encountered and were expected
to “ride through.” They operated due to stable power swings
or load encroachment during low system voltage conditions.
The IEEE Power System Relay Committee, through the
latest revision of C-37.102 [1], provides guidance on setting
this relay. The relay’s impedance reach and delay settings
must be coordinated with transmission backup protection and
breaker failure to allow selectivity. Typically, the phase
distance relay’s reach begins at the generator terminals and
ideally extends to the length of the longest line out of the
power plant transmission substation. Some factors impacting
the settings are as follows:
1. In-feeds: Apparent impedance due to multiple in-
feeds will require larger reaches to cover long lines and will
overreach adjacent shorter lines. The apparent impedance
effect occurs because the generator is only one of several
sources of fault current for a line fault. This causes the ohmic
value of the faulted line to appear further away and require a
larger ohmic setting to cover faults at the remote end of the
line.
2. Transmission System Protection: If the transmission
lines exiting the power plant have proper primary and backup
protection, as well as local breaker failure, the need to set the
21-2 generator relay to respond to faults at the end of the
longest lines is mitigated since local backup has been provided
on the transmission system.
3. Load Impedance: Settings should be checked to
ensure the maximum load impedance (ZLoad =kV2/ MVAG)
at the generator’s rated power factor angle (RPFA) does not
encroach into the 21-2 relay setting. A typical margin of 150-
200% is recommended [1] to avoid tripping during power
swing conditions. Due to recent blackouts caused by voltage
collapse, the 21-2 distance setting should be checked for
proper operating margins when the generator is subjected to
low system voltage. Note that the impedance is reduced by the
square of the voltage. System voltage under emergency
conditions can reduce to planned levels of 90 to 94 percent of
nominal ratings. Utility transmission planners should be
consulted for worst-case emergency voltage levels. In almost
all cases, the loadability considerations limit the reach of the
generator 21-2 backup relay setting.
Setting generator backup distance protection with adequate
margin over load and stable power swings is an art as well as a
science. The 21-2 relay element is typically set at the smallest
of the following three criteria:
1. 120% of the longest line with in-feeds.
2. 50 to 67% of the generator load impedance (Zload )
at the rated power factor angle (RPFA) of the
generator. This provides a 150 to 200% margin over
generator full load. This is typically the prevailing
criteria.
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3. 80 to 90% of generator load impedance at the
maximum torque angle of the 21-2 impedance relay
setting (typically 85°).
The capability curve for the generator and settings are
plotted on the R-X diagram as shown in Fig. 8. The time delay
for the 21-2 relay should be set longer than the transmission
lines’ backup and breaker failure protection with an
appropriate margin for proper coordination.
To enhance security and safe load margins while still
providing the necessary 21-2 relay reach, it is possible to use
both load encroachment and out-of-step blocking techniques.
Out-of-step blocking uses a 21-3 impedance element that
completely surrounds the 21-2 trip element to provide
blocking logic.
JX
Z2 Reach 120% of Longest Line but
Must be Less then 80 to 90%
Z2
of Capability Curve
Generator
Capability
Curve
Max.
Torque
Angle
Z1
Z2 Reach at 50 to 67% of
Generator Capability Curve
RPFA
R
Fig. 8 Generator Phase Distance Backup Protection Settings
The zone 3-distance element must be set less than the
capability of the generator as illustrated in Fig. 9. For power
system swing conditions, the impedance locus will first enter
into zone 3 before entering zone 2. For fault conditions, the
impedance will instantaneously enter the zone 2-trip
characteristic. Out-of-step logic is provided such that if zone 3
operates prior to zone 2, a power swing condition exists and
zone 2 is blocked from operating. To enhance steady-state
loadability, a notch blinder is used as illustrated in Fig. 9. The
part of the zone 2-trip circle is blocked from operating to
increase loadability at the generator’s rated power factor angle
(RPFA). Both these techniques are available in multifunction
digital generator relay packages.
 Z 3 out of step blocking
widely used to detect inadvertent energizing is the voltage-
JX
Z3 supervised overcurrent scheme shown in Fig. 10. An
Z2 Reach 120% of Longest Line but undervoltage element with adjustable pickup and dropout time
Must be Less then 80 to 90%
Z2
of Capability Curve
delays supervises an instantaneous overcurrent relay. The
undervoltage detectors automatically arm the overcurrent
Generator tripping when the generator is taken off-line. The undervoltage
Capability
Curve detector will disable or disarm the overcurrent relay when the
Max. machine is returned to service. Great care should be taken
Torque
Angle Z2 Reach at 50 to 67% of when implementing this protection, so that the dc tripping
Generator Capability Curve
Z1 power and relay input quantities to the scheme are not
Load Encroachment
Blocking
removed when the generator is off-line.
RPFA

Fig. 9 Security Enhancements for

Generator Phase Backup Distance Protection

IV. NEW OR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION AREAS

Inadvertent Generator Energizing (27/50)

Inadvertent or accidental energizing of synchronous
generators (27/50) has been an industry problem in recent
years. A number of machines have been damaged, or in some
cases, completely destroyed when they were accidentally
energized while off-line. The frequency of these occurrences
has prompted generator manufacturers to recommend that the
problem be addressed through dedicated protective relay
schemes. Operating errors, breaker contact flashovers, control
circuit malfunctions, or a combination of these causes, have
resulted in generators becoming accidentally energized while
off-line. In industrial applications, the major cause of
inadvertent energization of generators has been closing the
generator breaker through the mechanical close/trip control at
the breaker itself—thereby defeating the electrical interlocks.
Due to the severe limitation of conventional generator
relaying to detect inadvertent energizing, dedicated protection
schemes have been developed and installed. Unlike
conventional protection schemes, which provide protection
when equipment is in service, these schemes provide
protection when equipment is out of service. One method
Fig. 10 Inadvertent Energizing Schemes
V. CONCLUSIONS
There are several functional protection areas on generators
twenty years or older which have significant shortcomings
when compared to current IEEE-recommended generator
protection practices. This paper identifies a number of these
protection areas and the risks of not addressing these
shortcomings. It also points out the advantages of using
multifunction digital relaying to upgrade generator protection as
a technology that offers many advantages over older
electromechanical relays.
REFERENCES
[1] IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection, ANSI/IEEE C37.102-2005.
[2] Pope, J.W., “A Comparison of 100% Stator Ground Fault Protection
Schemes for Generator Stator Windings”, IEEE Transactions, Power
Applications, April 1984.

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