Abdolkarim Soroush: The Hesitant Rationalist

Ali Paya*

Abstract:
The main aim of this short paper is to discuss, in a brief and succinct way, a rather
important pitfall in the ideas of one the most well-known modern Muslim scholars,
Abdolkarim Soroush. To observe brevity, I have refrained from developing many
related themes which are introduced in the paper. My focal point is the tension
between rational and non-rational (or trans-rational) elements Soroush’s thought.
Having diagnosed an important inconsistency in the views of Soroush, I have tried, in
a very brief fashion, at the end of the paper, to suggest a research programme as a way
to overcome the inconsistency. The significance of the proposed programme lies in
the fact that, there are many other prominent thinkers in the Muslim world at present
time whose systems of thought are suffering from an inconsistency, more or less,
similar to that of Soroush. If the proposed research programme could be properly
developed, it would open the way for a smooth transition of Muslim communities into
modern times.
***

In this short paper I shall try to highlight what can be termed as the Achilles Heel of
Soroush’s system of thought. I will argue that this structural weakness has affected
some aspects of Soroush’s views including the one which is related to the issue of
democracy and its status in the Muslim world.
However, to begin at the beginning and before changing into the critical gear,
let me start by briefly appreciating the efforts of a friend, colleague and teacher whose
ideas and views have had significant impact on the intellectual and religious
discourses in Iran and in many other Islamic communities around the world1.
Dr Soroush’s ideas have not only inspired and intrigued many Muslim
scholars and Muslim intellectuals but have also educated and enlightened large
numbers of Muslims who are neither scholar nor intellectual in the technical sense of
these terms.2

1
 The list of the great achievements of Dr Soroush contains many prominent
entries. However, one item which requires especial mention is the role played by him
in a movement known as ‘Religious or Islamic Intelectualism’. It is in the context of
this notion that I would like to expand my critical assessment of Dr Soroush’s views
on democracy.
The movement of religious intellectualism is an important phenomenon with a
long history. However, its roots in modern times go back to the first encounters
between a triumphant West and a weakened Islamic Civilization in the early
nineteenth century.
The main question which has exercised the minds of great representatives of
this movement during the past two centuries has been, “How to make ‘Islam’
compatible with the requirements and necessities of modern times?”
Soroush’s main contribution to this debate has been the introduction of
‘critical rationalism’ as a powerful tool for providing a satisfactory answer to the
above question. Critical rationalism is an idea that Soroush has learnt from Karl
Popper and tried, with considerable skill, to graft it with the indigenous doctrines in
the corpus of Islamic thought.
As a Muslim critical rationalist, Soroush has urged his fellow Muslims to,
among other things, uphold the following conceptual distinctions3:

A distinction between ‘Islam’ and our understanding of ‘Islam’.

A distinction between ‘the essential and the accidental’ aspects of ‘Islam’.
A distinction between minimal and maximal interpretations of ‘Islam’.
A distinction between the values and norms which are internal to ‘Islam’ and those
which are external to it.
A distinction between religious faith and religious belief.
A distinction between Islam as a faith and a belief system and Islam as an ideology.

Soroush has suggested that adopting the critical rationalist framework would
help Muslims and Islamic societies to make a smooth transition to modern times.
Soroush himself, in his various writings, has tried to discuss many cases and examples
which would show such a transition from more traditional way of interpreting
‘Islamic’ conceptions and/or social relations in human echoniches to more modern
understanding of these issues is possible.

2
 A case in point is Soroush’s views on democracy where he tries to argue for
the compatibility of this social construct (or at least some of its versions), and
‘Islamic’ way of thinking (or at least some particular interpretations of this way of
thinking). Soroush’s views on democracy could be summarised as follows4:
While democracy cannot be derived from Islamic sources like the Quran and
the Ahadith (sayings and deeds of the Prophet and the Imams (in the case of Shi’ite
interpretation of Islam), it is not impossible to construct models of democracy which
are compatible with Islamic values and ideals.
Of the two main kinds of theories of democracy, namely procedural
democracies and liberal democracies, the latter is not compatible with Islam. By
procedural democracy, Soroush means a formal system in which the three main
powers, judiciary, executive and legislative, are fully separated and are acting
independently. He maintains that it is possible to find affinities and common grounds
between the approaches to this type of formal political system and the legal
procedures in Islamic Fiqh. As such, procedural democracies could serve as
promising templates for developing models of democracy compatible with Islamic
norms and values.
For example, independence of the judiciary is something that Muslims had had
no problem with that, from the days of the Imam Ali onward. Moreover, in recent
years some of the Fuqaha have argued that the separation of powers could be deduced
from main Islamic sources.
One of the aspects of modern democracies which cannot be easily inferred
from such sources is the issue of political representation. In traditional Islamic
theories of fiqh, there was no theory of representation, but only a theory of agency
(vekala) which is something significantly different. This, in contrast to European
ideas of the vox populi, or of the "general will", which can serve as theories of
representation.
Similarly, establishing the mandatory nature of the decisions of a constituent
assembly requires new ijtihads and intellectual efforts. Traditional assemblies in
Islamic societies have all had purely advisory consultative roles. Soroush maintains
that notwithstanding the opposition of more traditional Ulama, younger generations of
Muslim scholars, clergy or layman, are well disposed towards exercising their critical
judgment for paving the way for a better understanding of the meaning, role and
functions of ‘secular’ laws and rules in modern Islamic societies.

3
Well! So far so good!
I shall now move on to some critical remarks. To make my points more
informative, on occasions I will compare Soroush’s views with those of the Austrian-
British philosopher Karl Raymond Popper5.
While Popper is a thorough and consistent critical rationalist, Soroush, as I
shall argue, has not been able to develop a fully-fledged interpretation of critical
rationalism in the context of Islamic thought. As a result of this lack of success, some
of his proposed conceptual solutions for the ills of modern Islamic societies, including
his own model for democracy, notwithstanding their novelty and imaginativeness,
suffer from an acute inconsistency.
The root cause of the problem seems to be Soroush’s failure in producing a
credible synthesis of the rationalist doctrines he has learnt from the West and the
mystical doctrines he has found in the Islamic culture.
As a critical rationalist who is also an epistemological realist (with some
qualifications when it comes to the realm of the social6), Sroush views the reality as a
many-layered totality or whole whose secrets could, in principle, be revealed by
means of collective cooperation of many individuals who put forward various fallible
conjectures as tentative explanations for the mysteries and problems they encounter.
These explanations are subsequently criticised by objective reason in the public
sphere and are replaced with more effective explanatory theories.
This process of producing conjectures and refuting them by empirical and
conceptual means is modern man’s best tool for producing knowledge about different
aspects of a multi-layered reality which consists of physical, mental and social facets.
Such knowledge for ever remains conjectural and therefore open to revision and
improvement.
Critical rationalism however, is not the only tenet of Soroush’s thought. He is
at the same time a competent disciple of great Muslim mystics and sages like Molana
Jalaal Uddin Rumi, Al-Ghazzali, Hafiz, and Ibn-Arabi. He lives and breathes with the
ideas of these eminent thinkers.
When Soroush wears his mystical glasses and looks around through the eyes
of Rumi and other Muslim sages he, once again, sees a world full of mysteries.
However, these mysteries, contrary to the mysteries of the first type, can only be
known to those individuals who are endowed with exceptional powers and cognitive

4
faculties not available to the ordinary folks. These individuals, of which, the Prophets
are the prime examples, are the producers of true wisdom and the teachers of the best
forms of life.
Soroush maintains that genuine intellectuals are also in the same league as the
Prophets and the true mystics. Like a loving father, intellectuals go out of their ways
to guide and assist their people, to warn them about the dangers ahead, and to make
them aware of the more appropriate choices in their private and public lives.
What I would like to argue is that while as a critical rationalist and a Muslim, I
can understand and endorse the mystical and conjectural ways of making sense of
reality, the way Soroush has tried to interpret the former and combine it with the latter
in order to create one unified system of thought has left much to be desired and has
given rise to quite a few unwanted consequences.
Let me very briefly refer to some such outcomes. Like Popper, Soroush begins
with the assumption that all human beings are fallible. However, in the light of his
mystical theory, Soroush soon comes to advocate the view that there are many super-
humans amongst us who are capable of acquiring indubitable knowledge. Although,
ordinary mortals may never appreciate the significance of the achievements of these
larger-than-life individuals.
Now, it may be asked, what is wrong with this view? After all many believers
subscribe to such a view and they do not seem to be unhappy about it or sense any
contradiction in holding it. The answer is that such a view, in the context of Soroush’s
interpretation of the mystical views and quite contrary to his own intention, not only
paves the way for the creation of an undemocratic situation in which some are
regarded as superior to others and better equipped than them to decide about the
public good, it also provides grits for the mill of those intellectuals who want to
justify their own social inaction and self-pitying. They would blame the ignorant
multitude who could not appreciate and understand the greatness of these unfortunate
souls.
Like Popper, Soroush also believes in the power of criticism in the public
arena. However, while Popper never lowers his critical guard, Soroush under the spell
of his understanding of the mystical teachings tends to forget the important fact that in
the social life it is only through constant critical assessment of socially constructed
entities, including all man-made institutions, in a publicly accessible and assessable
way, that we will be able to improve our lot in a piecemeal and gradual way.

5
However, in the mystical approach, which Soroush seems to subscribe to, institutions
are not of great importance. It is the chosen individuals who are beyond criticism that
are capable of changing the fate of nations.
In his discussion of democracy, as indicated earlier, Soroush suggests that it is
not impossible to combine Islamic values with democratic principles in order to create
models of democracy which are suitable for Muslim countries. Moreover, in
Soroush’s view the paradigmatic cases of the Islamic values are those suggested by
the great mystics like Rumi and Hafiz. Like the first thesis, this is also a thesis with
which many people may have no qualm. However, the snag seems to be with the
gloss Soroush provides for the views of these mystics. His interpretation is largely in
line with the traditional interpretations and commentaries. Interestingly enough, it
seems whenever Soroush discusses these mystical teachings, he becomes so
infatuated with the subject under discussion that he let himself to be carried away by
the force of it. As a result, on many occasions, during such discussions, he replaces
his Popperian mantle of critical rationalism with Kierkegaardian cloak of ‘leap of
faith into the unknown’, ‘entertaining a paradoxical state of mind’ and ‘living
dangerously like a true-born gambler’.
While for a thorough critical rationalist like Popper a healthy sceptical attitude
must always be upheld in all epistemological issues and all such issues must be
discussed in public arena and in the light of the pubic reason, in Soroush’s theory the
two realms of faith and reason, and the spheres of inner experiences and publicly
accessible thoughts are not always satisfactorily separated. The entanglement of these
realms could give rise to non-cognitivist approaches towards faith. However, as Goya
has famously depicted, ‘the sleep of reason produces monsters’. And this is a plain
fact that Sroush, himself an advocate of cognitive approaches, should know better.
Soroush’s mystical theory has also encouraged him to drive a wedge between
liberalism and democracy. He maintains that in constructing a democratic model
which is more suitable for Islamic societies, it is possible to reject the value system
uphold by liberalism and replace it with an Islamic value system. While this thesis, on
the face of it, seems to be utterly justifiable, in reality, within Soroush’s conceptual
framework it tends to become more vulnerable than he would have us believe. In the
first place, as many writers, like David Beetham (19997) and Marc Plattner (19988),
have shown, despite the fact that from a logical and conceptual point of view the two
concepts of democratic rule and liberalism are not identical, however, historically,

6
liberalism has given rise to democratic rules in modern times. Moreover, the overlap
between the principles of democracy and liberalism are so extended that it will not be
practically possible to have one without the other. Furthermore, as Soroush himself
has pointed out, both democracy and liberalism, as socially constructed systems, are
constantly evolving and overcoming their inconsistencies and weaknesses. In this
respect, some modern interpretations of liberalism of the kind advocated by for
example, Popper or Rawls seem to contain many of the values endorsed by Muslims.
Soroush’s separation of liberalism and democracy, along with his
interpretation of the mystical theory, could pave the way for an elitist model of
democracy, perhaps not dissimilar to the one propounded by Schumpeter. However,
such a model, as the students of democracy have discussed at length, is the rule of the
few in disguise and not a genuine democracy.
So far I have tried to highlight, in a very brief and bullet-point like fashion,
some of the undesirable consequences of an inherent inconsistency in Soroush’s
system of thought. Now, as a way of summing up, let me discuss some wider
implications of Soroush’s project. In line with the general sentiment of this short
paper, I shall not dwell on the positive and fruitful aspects of Soroush’s project which
are many and varied. I shall limit myself to those aspects which in my view are in
need of further attention and improvement.
Joseph Conrad in one of his lesser known novels called Under Western Eyes
(1911) masterfully explores, among other things, the disastrous consequences of the
overwhelming influence of uncritical mystical views in the context of Russian society.
Such views were also influential in Germany and we are aware of their undesirable
impact. Mystical views, of all types and sorts, are deeply rooted in all Muslim
countries. In all schools of mysticism, one can find great moral and humane teachings.
However, the snag is that in many of these schools strong tendencies to belittle the
role of intellect are also prevalent.
Moreover, while in the context of Western cultures, brave souls like Marx,
Nietzsche, Webber, and Simmel explored the relationship between economic,
bureaucratic and cultural necessities and forms of life of the people, and therefore
tried to explain many aspects of life in a rational way, Islamic communities have not
been fortunate enough to benefit from the endeavours of the indigenous examples of
such trailblazer thinkers.

7
 The result of this absence is that the rational and critical culture is not strong
in many if not all Muslim countries. In such a situation and in view of the fact that
mystical views and tendencies are deep rooted in all these societies, any project of
intellectual enlightenment which does not do two things simultaneously cannot expect
a long-lasting and positive outcome in Muslim countries. The first thing is a sensible
insistence on critical and rational approaches, and the second one is a concerted effort
for establishing a tradition, an intellectual school, a cultural institution.
Religious intellectualism which Soroush, is one of its most prominent figures
in Iran and in the Islamic world, has not yet achieved the above two goals in the
context of that country despite the fact that Muslim intellectuals have been busy
producing ideas for the past two centuries. Soroush’s project, notwithstanding all its
positive aspects, has not yet resulted in a comprehensive national and inter-
civilizational dialogue and has not been able to make rational thinking an integral part
of the outlook of even Soroush’s close friends and colleagues.
Among many mystical schools which have flourished within the Islamic
culture, it is not impossible to come across some trends and tendencies in which the
role and status of reason as the final arbiter in matter epistemologic have been
recognized. (Paya 20009) In these trends it is emphasised that it should be the reason
itself which determines its own limits. This task should not be given to any other
faculty or agency.10 It seems Soroush, with his admirable knowledge of Islamic
mysticism and his close familiarity with the rational schools of thought both within
and without Islamic civilization, is well placed to promote a new interpretation of
Islamic mysticism based on these trends.
Equipped with such a view as a source of moral and ethical values, religious
intellectualism will hopefully be able to move more successfully in establishing itself
as a viable school which could be embraced by a wider cross section of the believers.
Such a school would constructively respond to both rational and spiritual needs of
those who subscribe to it and in this way would prepare the ground for finding a
satisfactory answer to the two-century old quest of the Muslim intellectuals.

8
1
* Associat Professor of Philosophy, National Research Institute for Science Policy (Iran); and Centre for the Study of

Democracy, University of Westminster (UK)

NOTES

. For a complete list of Soroush’s works and the texts of some of his lectures and interviews visit his website at

http://www.drsoroush.com/. Useful biographical material on soroush could also be found at the same site.
2
. I have discussed some aspects of Soroush’s thought in the following paper: Paya, Ali. “Recent Developments in Shi'i

Thought” in Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory, Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives ed. By M.A. Muqtedar Khan,

New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006.

3
. ibid. (Paya 2006).
4
. Paper presented by Soroush to a one-day round-table conference on Religion & Democracy, Tehran, Ministry of Science,

Research and Technology, Thursday, 2 December 2004. I was charring this conference. A brief account of the conference

could be found at the following website (http://justworldnews.org/archives/001019.html) which belongs to Helena Cobban

who was present at the conference. I have used some part of her report in my paper. A full, Persian version of the papers

presented at the above conference and another related event few days earlier at the University of Mashad, has been edited by

Abdulaziz Sachedina and will be published in Qom-Iran.

5
. For Popper’s views and his extensive bibliography visit http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/~tkpw/.

I have discussed Popper’s influence on Iranian intellectuals in the following papers:

Paya, Ali. “Popper in Iran,” in Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment. edited by Ian Jarvie, Karl Milford, David

Miller, London: Ashgate, 2006.

“The Philosopher and the Revolutionary State: How Karl Popper’s Ideas Shaped the Views of Iranian Intellectuals,” Ali

Paya and Mohammad Ghanei-rad, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 2, July 2006

“Karl Popper and Iranian Intellectuals,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 20, No.2, 2003, pp. 50-79.

Soroush, has played a significant role in introducing popper’s ideas to Iranian public and intellectuals.

6
. In recent years and in dealing with issues concerning socio-political and ethical subjects Soroush has moved closer to the

position of pragmatist philosophers like Richard Rorty and particularist moralist like Jonathan Dancy. Such positions are not

compatible with a realist stance. However, a critical discussion of Soroush’s relativist tendencies are beyond the scope of

the present short paper. I have dealt with this issue elsewhere. (Paya, Ali, “Why relativism is not good for Islamic

Intellectualism?” (forthcoming), Paya, Ali. “Open System-Closed System Distinction, Ethical Particularism, and Dancy’s
Progress”, Modares: International Journal for Human Sciences, 2007, and Paya, Ali. “A Critical Assessment of Dancy’s

Particularist Approach to Ethics,” Dr Jahangiri’s Festschrift, Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 2007)

7
. Beetham, David, Democracy and Human Right, London: Polity Press, 1999.

8
. Plattener, Marc, “Liberalism and Democracy: Can’t Have One Without the Other,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, 1998.

9
. Paya, Ali. "Muslim Identity and Civil Society: Whose Islam? Which Society?” in Muslim Identity in the 21st Century,

edited by: M. S. Bahmanpour & H. Bashir, London: Book Extra Publications, 2000. A revised version of this paper could be

found at the Centre for the Study of Democracy (University of Westminster) website: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/page-152
10
. As an example of such trends within the wider context of Islamic mysticism consider the following couplet by Hafiz, the

great Persian mystic poet of fifteenth century. Here Hafiz emphasises the leading role of reason: it is the reason which

should its own limits, “I consulted the reason, and it advised me to drink the intoxicating (spiritual) wine; therefore, Saqi,

pour me wine, on the advice of such a trustworthy advisor.”