Entrepreneurship (http://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Entrepreneurship)
Definitions of Entrepreneurship on the Web:
• Entrepreneurship is the act of being an entrepreneur, which is a French
word meaning "one who undertakes an endeavor". Entrepreneurs
assemble resources including innovations, finance and business acumen
in an effort to transform innovations into economic goods. ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entrepreneurship
• An entrepreneur is a person who has possession of a new enterprise,
venture or idea and assumes significant accountability for the inherent
risks and the outcome. The term is originally a loanword from French and
was first defined by the Irish economist Richard Cantillon. ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ENTREPRENEURSHIP
• the art or science of innovation and risk-taking for profit in business; the
quality of being an entrepreneur
en.wiktionary.org/wiki/entrepreneurship
• entrepreneur - someone who organizes a business venture and assumes
the risk for it
wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn
• The Entrepreneur - Peter Douglas Molyneux OBE, born 5 May 1959 is an
English computer game designer and game programmer. ...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Entrepreneur
• One special form of human capital that is important in an economic setting
is entrepreneurship (often thought of as the fourth factor of production).
Entrepreneurial abilities are needed to improve what we have and to
create newgoods and services. ...
www.enotes.com/business-finance-encyclopedia/economics
• entrepreneur - a risk taker in the business world. Usually applied to a
person who sets up as a business owner using their own money or an
obligation on borrowed money.
www.tuition.com.hk/geography/e.htm
• entrepreneur - Individual or group of individuals who take on the risk of
starting a venture.
www.sbaloans.com/sba-glossary.php
• entrepreneur - A person who engages in the process of entrepreneurship.
www.mvp.cfee.org/en/glossary.html
• entrepreneur - An innovator of business enterprise who recognizes
opportunities to introduce a new product, a new process or an improved
organization, and who raises the necessary money, assembles the factors
for production and organizes an operation to exploit the opportunity.
www.powerhomebiz.com/Glossary/glossary-E.htm
• entrepreneur - someone who is willing to assume the responsibility, risk
and rewards of starting and operating a business.
www.cfdccariboo.com/glossary.htm
• entrepreneur - A person who is innovative and takes the risk of bringing
the other factors of production together in a business concern to try and
 profitably satisfy the needs and wants of a particular segment of a market.
www.business2000.ie/resources/Glossary_E.html
• entrepreneur - An individual who starts his/her own business.
www.sme-fdi.gc.ca/eic/site/sme_fdi-prf_pme.nsf/eng/01068.html
• entrepreneur - A venturer that also carries primary responsibility for
operating a venture.
igniter.com/post56
• entrepreneur - French word which translates roughly as "enterpriser." In
capitalism, a speculator who invests capital in stocks, land and machinery,
as well as the exploitation of wage labor, in the pursuit of profits.
www.workers.org/marcy/perestroika/glossary.html
An entrepreneur is an individual who owns a firm, business, or venture, and is responsible
for its development. Entrepreneurship is the practice of starting a new business or reviving
an existing business, in order to capitalize on new found opportunities.
Entrepreneurship is the act of being an entrepreneur, which is a French word meaning "one
who undertakes innovations, finance and business acumen in an effort to transform
innovations into economic goods". This may result in new organizations or may be part of
revitalizing mature organizations in response to a perceived opportunity. The most obvious
form of entrepreneurship is that of starting new businesses (referred as Startup Company);
however, in recent years, the term has been extended to include social and political forms of
entrepreneurial activity. When entrepreneurship is describing activities within a firm or large
organization it is referred to as intra-preneurship and may include corporate venturing, when
large entities spin-off organizations.[1]
According to Paul Reynolds, entrepreneurship scholar and creator of the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor, "by the time they reach their retirement years, half of all working
men in the United States probably have a period of self-employment of one or more years;
one in four may have engaged in self-employment for six or more years. Participating in a
new business creation is a common activity among U.S. workers over their course of their
careers." [2] And in recent years has been documented by scholars such as David Audretsch to
be a major driver of economic growth in both the United States and Western Europe.
Entrepreneurial activities are substantially different depending on the type of organization
that is being started. Entrepreneurship ranges in scale from solo projects (even involving the
entrepreneur only part-time) to major undertakings creating many job opportunities. Many
"high value" entrepreneurial ventures seek venture capital or angel funding (seed money) in
order to raise capital to build the business. Angel investors generally seek annualized returns
of 20-30% and more, as well as extensive involvement in the business.[3] Many kinds of
organizations now exist to support would-be entrepreneurs, including specialized government
agencies, business incubators, science parks, and some NGOs. In more recent times, the term
entrepreneurship has been extended to include elements not related necessarily to business
formation activity such as conceptualizations of entrepreneurship as a specific mindset (see
also entrepreneurial mindset) resulting in entrepreneurial initiatives e.g. in the form of social
entrepreneurship, political entrepreneurship, or knowledge entrepreneurship have emerged.

Creativity, Innovation and Entrepreneurship By Alicia Castillo

http://ezinearticles.com/?Creativity,-Innovation-and-Entrepreneurship&id=1885973
Part of the romanticism of entrepreneurship is the thought that entrepreneurs are creative,
innovative, go-getters, risk takers, driven. All of that implies a high self-esteem and
determination. In reality, having a clear understanding of creativity, innovation and
entrepreneurship allows managers of institutions and corporations, as well as individual,
manage each area differently to get the best results.
People like creativity simply because it is fun. We reconnect with the pure pleasure of getting
something that did not exist before. When we create we forget our problems, we are just
being, the child comes out, we connect with ourselves and it simply feels good. Our energy
pours from the inside to the outside and leaves our imprint, the object of our creation
becomes an extended part of ourselves. Creativity also lives in a time and purpose vacuum.
The worst enemy of creativity is a good idea.
People like innovation because it implies progress. When we innovate, we have a structure.
Innovation becomes change. To change we need the reference, the constraints, the structure,
the present, what is there. When we do things differently, we are also creating, but we create
with a purpose, fun stops until we reach our goal. Thus, innovation has less power as a self-
expression than creativity.
Then we come to the field of entrepreneurship, one of my favorite topics. Entrepreneurship is
more about creating wealth than it is about creating a company. It is closely linked to
creativity, entrepreneurs MUST have something NEW to offer. It is related to innovation,
entrepreneurs MUST find new ways of getting in the market, making something new, doing
things differently.
When we check most new businesses, they are me-too's, and most so-called entrepreneurs are
people who have bought themselves a job. They don't create, innovate or add wealth. They
shift what exists to a different person.
Entrepreneurship then is the process of exploring how to add value to others in a new or
different way. Entrepreneurs capture that value in the form of wealth, and then that wealth
with others: clients, users, employees, suppliers, community, governments, etc. To
understand that being creative and being innovative is not enough and to be aware that there
is a maximized value waiting to be discovered or created, is what entrepreneurs do best when
they plan, then they take action, and finally, they evolve.
It is not a matter of luck as most people link entrepreneurship with creativity and innovation.
If you don't have anything, you create. If you have an unwanted present, you innovate. If you
want to create wealth, you give that creation or innovation, the best chance. You don't need
money to create wealth, you need creativity and innovation.
It is by thinking and taking action, by consciously discovering where the creations or
innovations have the highest perceived value that entrepreneurs build their wealth... and by
doing so, create prosperity beyond themselves. It is not about becoming rich but building
wealth.
Without the notion of creating wealth, creativity and innovation can't find a place in the
market. To be able to distinguish where the highest value is, who is the ideal customer or
client is to bring prosperity to our communities, and to act upon that thought, is what
entrepreneurs thrive at.
There are many tools and methods that capture how entrepreneurs create wealth. It is not an
art, or a science. It is the conscious effort of making the best of a product or a service, to find
those who value it best, and capture that value, what lies inside the entrepreneur.
Creating wealth escapes the obvious, and creates new valued propositions. Sometimes we use
innovation to improve what is there, but most likely, the best results come from a free,
playful, fun exercise of creating wealth. Whatever you do to create wealth will improve your
skills and build up that wealthing muscle. Even if you compose a song in tribute to your
wealth when you are showering!
Here is to your wealth and joy,
Alicia Castillo Holley is an international expert on entrepreneurship and innovation. She has
started 9 companies and one not-for-profit, raised millions of dollars and trained thousands of
people. She's a recognized author, speaker and seminar leader.

The Relationship between Entrepreneurship and Economic Development:

Is it U-shaped?
Sander Wennekersa, André van Stela, d, Martin Carreeb,
and Roy Thurikc, a, e

Following a centuries-long decline in the rate of self-employment, a

discontinuity occurred in this
downward trend for many advanced economies starting in the 1970s and
1980s. In some
countries the rate of self-employment appears to increase. Weighing the
evidence, it is too early
to conclude that the historical, decreasing relationship between economic
development and the
level of business ownership has become U-shaped. Nonetheless, a trend
break is beyond doubt,
and this discontinuity is all the more remarkable as there is no obvious
reason why independent
entrepreneurship should not continue decreasing. Yet we know that
powerful new driving forces
are at the fore since the mid 1970s. These include the rapidly growing
services sector with its
smaller scale and lower entry barriers, an increasing differentiation of
consumer preferences,
declining transactions costs, and a trend in occupational preferences
toward more autonomy and
self-realization. Additionally, globalization in concert with the spread of ICT
(information and
communication technologies) enables solo entrepreneurs and small firms
to reap the fruits of
scale economies through loosely organized networks. And last but not
least new technologies
create opportunities for new technology-based business start-ups.
Early-stage entrepreneurial activity may be an even more important
measure of entrepreneurship.
Although there are no long time series for any measure of gross entry,
cross-sectional analysis for
recent years shows a significant U-shaped relationship between early-
stage entrepreneurial
activity and levels of economic development. Two ‘revolutions’ seem to
drive the upward trend
of this U-shaped curve. If we distinguish between solo self-employed at
the lower end of the
entrepreneurship spectrum, and ambitious and/or innovative
entrepreneurs at the upper end,
advanced economies show a revival at both ends. In sheer numbers the
rise of self-employment
without employees appears dominant. This trend has strong implications
for the labor market and
for the external organization of the business sector. However, at the upper
end of the
entrepreneurship spectrum an apparent positive correlation between the
prevalence of ambitious,
export-oriented and innovative business start-ups on the one hand and
average per capita income
on the other may be dominant in qualitative terms. This stylized fact
represents the onset of an
innovation-driven stage of economic development while marking a regime
switch in the
relationship between entrepreneurship and innovation. In addition, this
correlation probably
masks bidirectional causality.
Entrepreneurship has become a key policy issue. Insight in the
relationship between
entrepreneurship and economic development across countries is
important for policymakers
because it provides them with a beacon for their endeavors. Insight in the
two revolutions driving
the reemergence of entrepreneurship is especially valuable. First, the rise
of solo self-employment
is important because it increases the flexibility and productivity of the
economic system and
contributes to a higher degree of job satisfaction, although it also
increases insecurity for those
involved as well as income inequality. Second, the upward trend of
innovative and/or ambitious
entrepreneurship is of particular importance for competitiveness,
economic growth and job
creation. Policymakers in advanced economies should be aware of both
revolutions, recognize
their determinants and implications, and tailor policies accordingly.
Barriers to Entrepreneurship
Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven, and Raghuram Rajan*

Entrepreneurship is a critical part of the process of creative destruction that Joseph

Schumpeter (1911) argued is so important for the continued dynamism of the modern economy.
That it affects economic growth has been documented in previous work. 1 However, much less is
known about the business environments that promote new firm creation. This is an important
concern for policymakers, who in country after country are trying to implement policies that will
foster entry – witness, for example, the debate in Continental Europe on the lack of home-grown
venture capital in promoting new firm creation in high tech industries.2
A first step is to understand what the cross-country picture really looks like. We use a
comprehensive, recently available database of firms across a number of developed and transition
countries in Europe to address this question. Some facts are striking. For instance, one might
believe that Italy, with its myriad small firms, should have tremendous new firm creation (we use
“new firm creation”, “entry”, and “entrepreneurship” interchangeably). Actually, new firm
creation in Italy (the number of firms less than two years of age to the total number of firms) is
only 3.8 percent compared to 13.5 percent on average for other European countries in the G-7.
Two important aspects of the business environment are regulations and access to
resources, especially finance. Let us start with regulations, especially bureaucratic regulations on
setting up limited liability companies, in explaining varia tions in patterns of entrepreneurship.
The early debate on such corporations emphasized the possibility that crooks might register with
little capital and dupe unsuspecting investors or consumers. For instance, the Times of London
thundered against the principle of free incorporation through limited liability thus in 1824:
“Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in wealth to offer a portion of their
excess for the information of a company, to play with that excess for the information of a
company – to lend the importance of their whole name and credit to the society, and then should
1 For example, Hause and Du Rietz (1984), Asplund and Nocke (2003), Black and Strahan (2002).
2 “Europeans Now Seek to Revive Start-Up Spirit”, Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2002.
2
the funds prove insufficient to answer all demands, to retire into the security of their unhazarded
fortune, and leave the bait to devoured by the poor deceived fish.” 3
According to this view, entry regulations serve the public interest by preventing fraud.
By contrast, a long literature describes regulations as devices to protect the private
interests of industry incumbents (see Smith 1776, Olsen 1965, or Stigler 1971) or the regulators
(Bhagwati 1979, Krueger 1974, McChesney 1997, Shleifer and Vishny 1998). For example,
Smith (1776) 4:
“To widen the market and to narrow the competition is always the interest of the dealers…The
proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always
to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted, till after having been long
and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious
attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the
public, who generally have an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who
accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.”
The evidence in Djankov et al. (2002) that countries with heavier regulation of entry have
higher corruption and larger unofficial economies certainly is consistent with the private interest
view of regulation. But it does not rule out other possibilities – for instance, regulations could be
less burdensome in corrupt countries because officials can be bribed to ignore them (we do find
evidence for this) so there is no strong demand to streamline them, or regulations may be
promulgated in corrupt countries precisely because it is more important for an even more
untrustworthy corrupt private sector to be screened. At present, the case against such regulations
is primarily based on aggregate impressions modulated by theory rather than by actual detailed
evidence on their microeconomic consequences.
This suggests a number of steps. First, one has to show that these regulations do affect
entrepreneurship. One cannot, however, ascertain this simply from a cross-country regression of
actual firm creation against the size of regulations. If the coefficient estimate on regulations is
3 Asquoted in Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull, 1980, “An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporate Law”, University of Toronto Law Review 117: 30.
4 Adam Smith 1776 ed. Edwin Cannan 1976. The Wealth of Nations Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Book 1, Chapter XI, p. 278.
3
negative, the skeptic could argue that causality could go the other way – that in countries with
generally low entrepreneurship, people are not sufficiently motivated to press for the repeal of
archaic regulations that impede entry. Thus even though the regulations themselves may have no
direct effect on entrepreneurship, there could be a negative correlation between regulatory
restrictions and entrepreneurship.
To address this sort of problem, we focus on cross-industry, cross-country interaction
effects (that is, we ask if entry is more likely in an industry with a particular need when the
country scores strongly on a characteristic that facilitates meeting the need) rather than on direct
industry or country effects. In particular, if we can somehow proxy for the “natural” rate of entry
in an industry, we test whether entry is relatively lower in “naturally high entry” industries when
they are in countries with high bureaucratic restrictions on entry.
This methodology, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), enables us to address a number
of other issues as well – for instance the problem that a healthy economy scores well on a number
of cross-country variables, so it is hard to estimate the direct effect of each variable in a
crosscountry
regression (and equally hard to correct for all possible country variables that might
matter). By focusing on interactions, we can absorb country level variables and instead examine
the differential effects of country level variables across industries that might respond most to
them. Also, some industries may be technologically more predisposed to entry. By correcting for
industry effects, we also correct for the fact that average entry rates depend on the industries
present in a country.
The downside of this methodology is, of course, that while it can tell us whether the
country characteristics work in predicted economic ways, it cannot tell us the overall magnitude
of the effect of the characteristics, only the relative magnitude.5 But since our primary interest is
5 Of course, we could revert to cross-country regressions for that, but we cannot tell how much of the
estimated effect is likely to be because of causal relationships and how much is simple correlation. See,
however, Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003).
4
to examine the validity of theories that suggest bureaucratic entry regulations should affect entry,
this is not a major concern.
Turning to results, we find that “naturally high-entry” industries have relatively lower
entry in countries that have more onerous bureaucratic entry regulations. This also suggests an
explanation for the low level of entry in Italy: the average direct cost associated with fulfilling the
bureaucratic regulations for setting up a new business in Italy is 20 percent of per capita GNP
compared to 10 percent of per capita GNP on average for other G-7 European countries.
It may be that countries with large “high natural entry” industries and a strong
entrepreneurial culture choose to have low entry regulation. To address this potential
problem, we check whether the result holds when we restrict the sample to industries that
are relatively small. These industries are unlikely to be responsible for the entry barriers
since they have limited political clout. We still get a strongly significant interaction
coefficient. This suggests that industries that are unlikely to be responsible for the entry
regulations are equally affected by it.
Finally, it may be that countries with untrustworthy populations erect higher bureaucratic
barriers so as to screen their fellowmen (though why the bureaucrats should be deemed more
trustworthy is a relevant question). If this were true, bureaucratic barriers might affect entry, and
might cause incumbents to become fat and lazy, but this is necessary because the alternative of
unrestricted entry by charlatans would be much worse. This is a harder proposition to refute but
our analysis offers some evidence that is inconsistent with it. More developed countries have
better developed information systems, better product inspections and quality control, better
contract and law enforcement, and consequently, an entrepreneurial population less subject to
misbehavior.6 If bureaucratic rules were meant to screen entry efficiently, we should expect them
6 The underlying population in richer countries may also be socialized to be more honest (fewer rogues) but
all that is relevant is that the richer infrastructure gives them more incentive to behave, so there is less need
for screening.
5
to be particularly effective in low-income countries relative to high-income countries. Similarly,
we should find them particularly effective in corrupt countries.
It turns out that entry barriers are more effective in preventing firm creation in high
income countries, suggesting their purpose is not to screen out the untrustworthy (or that low
income countries have other natural barriers that prevent firm creation). More interesting, entry
barriers are effective in retarding entry only in the least corrupt countries. On the one hand, this
suggests that bureaucratic entry barriers in corrupt countries may be ineffective roadblocks,
meant solely for extracting bribes (see, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Djankov et
al. (2002)). However, their existence and effectiveness in less blatantly corrupt countries suggests
that their purpose may well be to protect incumbents and their rents (see, for example, Acemoglu
(2003), Perotti and Volpin (2003), and Rajan and Zingales (2003a)).
All this does indicate that these bureaucratic regulations on entry work as intended but it
does not help us distinguish between the views that these entry barriers are socially harmful and
that they are socially beneficial. If these entry barriers screen appropriately as in the view that
they are framed in the public interest, we should find that incumbent older firms in naturally high
entry industries should grow relatively faster (than similar firms in similar industries in countries
with low entry barriers) because efficient ex ante bureaucratic screening takes the place of
growth-retarding wasteful competitive destruction.
By contrast, the private interest view would be more ambiguous in its predictions. By
setting up protectionist entry barriers, incumbent firms might ensure themselves more growth, but
the lack of competition may make them inefficient. A finding that incumbent firms in naturally
high-entry industries grow relatively less fast in high entry barrier countries would be consistent
with the private interest view rather than the public interest view.
The evidence is more consistent with the view that entry regulations are framed with
private interests in mind rather than for the public interest. Growth in value added is relatively
6
lower in naturally high entry industries when the industry is in a country with higher bureaucratic
barriers to entry.
The details of this result are particularly suggestive. The slower growth could be
attributed to incumbents having more monopoly power and restricting quantities, or to them
being
less efficient as they are less subject to the discipline of competition. One piece of evidence
suggests the latter explanation. Older firms in naturally high entry industries grow relatively more
slowly in countries with high bureaucratic barriers while the relative growth of young firms is
indistinguishable. Since age should not affect the incentive to restrict quantities, this is consistent
with older firms, who have had to survive greater competition in countries with low entry
barriers, becoming relatively more efficient and continuing to grow.
In this regard, the comparison between high-bureaucratic -entry-barrier Italy and lowentry-
barrier United Kingdom is particularly telling. Across all industries, firms start out larger
when young in Italy, but grow more slowly so that firms in the United Kingdom are about twice
as large by age ten. This suggests Italy has small firms not because there is too much entry but
perhaps because there is too little!
Turning to the effects of financial development, we would expect that new firms would
be particularly benefited by access to finance in industries that require a lot of external financing.
We do find that entry is relatively higher in industries that depend heavily on external finance in
countries with greater financial development. What is particularly interesting is that we find entry
is relatively higher in industries that depend on trade credit financing in countries with greater
extension of trade credit, even after controlling for the traditional effects of financial
development. This suggests that supplier credit is an important aid to entrepreneurship.
For completeness, we also examine the effects of regulations that protect intellectual
property, labor regulations, and the effects of education and taxes. Entry is higher in R&D
intensive industries in countries with better protection of intellectual property, and higher taxes
on
corporate income relative to personal income tends to reduce new entry in high entry industries
7
(that is, higher taxes work much as regulatory barriers). Labor regulations do not, however, have
significant effects. Taken together, our results suggest that while bureaucratic entry requirements
seem to be motivated by private interests, it is by no means obvious that the best way to
encourage entry and competition is to eliminate all regulation. The absence of some regulations
can also be an effective entry barrier (see Rajan and Zingales (2003, a, b)). Regulations that
expand access to finance and strengthen property rights seem to help entry even while those that
directly screen entrants hurt entry.
In a related paper, Desai, Gompers, and Lerner (2003) use a cross-country approach and
also find that entry regulations have a negative impact on firm entry. The cross-country approach
has a number of limitations. In particular, variations in coverage in the database across countries
could affect findings, a problem that a within country, cross industry approach is more immune
to. Nevertheless, their findings are complementary to ours. Another related cross-country study is
Scarpetta et al. (2002), who use firm-level survey data from OECD countries to analyze firm
entry and exit. They find that higher product market and labor regulations are negatively
correlated with the entry of small- and medium-sized firms in OECD countries. Bertrand and
Kamarz (2002) examine the expansion decisions of French retailers following new zoning
regulations introduced in France. They find a strong relation between increases in entry
deterrence (such as rejection of expansion or entry decisions) and decreases in employment
growth.
Others have found that financial development seems to foster entry (see Black and
Strahan (2002) or Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) examine whether
entry is higher in informationally opaque industries in Italian regions that have a more
concentrated banking sector (they find it is). Their use of the Rajan and Zingales methodology is
similar to ours, but the environmental variables they focus on, as well as the data they use, are
very different. Finally, Fisman and Love (2003a) find that industries with higher dependence on
8
trade credit financing exhibit higher growth rates in countries with relatively weak financial
institutions.
There is also work related to other aspects of our study than entry regulation or financial
development. Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2000) find that the average size of firms in human
capital intensive industries (and in R&D intensive industries) is larger in countries that protect
property rights (patents). Using survey data from five transition countries on the reinvestment of
profits by entrepreneurs, Johnson et. al. (2002) examine the importance of property rights. They
find lower investment by entrepreneurs in countries with weak property rights. Claessens and
Laeven (2003) find that growth of industries that rely on intangible assets is disproportionately
lower in countries with weak intellectual property rights. Our finding that there is less entry in
R&D intensive industries when property is weakly enforced echoes their findings.
There is a substantial literature on entry into an industry (possibly by a firm from another
industry) as distinguished from firm creation or entrepreneurship. It is the latter sense in which
we use the term “entry”. It would take us too much out of our way to describe the literature on
industry entry, so we refer the reader to Gilbert (1989) for a comprehensive survey. Note that
there are technological determinants of entry into an industry such as minimum scale, etc., which
also affect firm creation. We assume these determinants carry over countries so they are absorbed
by industry indicators. Our focus then is on environmental determinants of firm creation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I we describe the data and in Section II we
present the empirical methodology. We present the empirical results in Section III. We conclude
in Section IV.

Factors affecting entrepreneurship?

Moral responsibility ,lack of individual determination and unsustainablilityare
some factors of individual person. When we take as organisation, change in the
market, change of government policies and growth of competitors technology
are some reasons.
One factor is definitely the lack of "cheap money" that is so very much found in
US. Unlike US, interest rates in India are very high and that raises effective cost
of raising capital. This also prevents Angels and VCs from investing long term in
companies that dont show prospects of producing quick cash flows and profits.

Theory of Achievement Motivation

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0 11 most powerful women Entrepreneurs in India

Author: The King Khan | Posted at: 3/26/2010 11:56:00 AM | Filed Under Labels: India, Indians |

The educated women do not want to limit their lives in the four walls of the
house. They demand equal respect from their partners. However, Indian women
have to go a long way to achieve equal rights and position because traditions are
deep rooted in Indian society.
Despite all the social hurdles, many women have become successful in their
works. Recently, Forbes, one of the famous international business magazines,
has published a list of most powerful women in various fields such as, politics,
business. Indian women were also included in the list. Here are the names:

Indra Nooyi- 4th position- Chief Executive—designate, Pepsi Co.

This Madras born woman was a straight “A” student in her school. Nooyi did her
bachelors from Madras Christian College and MBA from Indian Institute of
Management, Calcutta. Nooyi then went to USA and attended Yale University.
From Yale, she obtained degree on management. This brilliant corporate woman
started her career in Boston Consulting Group and moved on to Motorola and
Asea Brown Boveri. She joined Pepsi Co. in 1994. She turned the company into a
bold risk taker. In 1998, Pepsi acquired Tropicana. In 1997, Pepsi started its own
fast food chain. In 2001, she became President of Pepsi Cola. Wall Street Journal
included her name in their top 50 women to watch in 2005. Fortune magazine
declared her 11th most powerful women in business.

Sonia Gandhi-13th position—President, Congress Party

She was born in Italy and had a normal upbringing. In 1964, she went to
Cambridge to study English and met Rajiv Gandhi. The two fell in love and got
married in 1968. Sonia’s entrance into politics was accidental. In 1991, after the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, she was approached by the Congress Party
leaders but she refused. She finally joined politics in 1998 by taking over the
charge of Congress Party. Her opponents tried to ruin her image by labeling her
as a foreigner, but with her timely decision to give up the position of Prime
minister to Dr. Manmohan Singh, after winning the general election of 2004, she
outmatched her opponents.

Lalita Gupte & Kalpana Morparia—93rd position—Joint Managing

Directors, ICIC Bank
Kalpana Morparia and Lalita Gupte are Joint Managing Directors of ICIC Bank, the
second largest bank of India. Lalita Gupte holds a Master’s Degree in
Management Studies from Jamnalal Bajaj Institute of Management Studies. She
joined ICIC Bank in 1971. Her reason behind success is her supportive family.
She got great support from her husband and in laws.
Ms. Kalpana Morparia is a graduate in law from Mumbai University. She joined
ICIC in 1975 as a senior legal officer. In 1996, she became General Manager. She
became Executive Director in 2001. In 1999, for her contribution in Finance and
Banking sector in India, Indian Merchants' Chamber awarded her.

Vidya Manohar Chhabria—95th position—Chairman, Jumbo Group

The wife of late Manohar Rajaram Chhabria, is now leading Jumbo Group, a Dubai
based $1.5 billion business conglomerate. She became chairperson of the
company after the death of her husband in 2002. She runs the business with the
help of her three daughters. She was ranked 38th most powerful women by the
Fortune magazine in 2003.

In another article, Forbes also mentioned some other names:

Anu Aga- Chairperson (former) Thermax Group
Like Vidya Manohar Chabaria, this woman also became the Chairperson of
Thermax Engineering after the death of her husband Rohinton Aga. The
company’s condition was critical at that time. Its share price dipped to Rs. 36
from Rs. 400. Anu Aga, the then Director of Human Resource, Thermax, was
compelled to take charge of the company. In order to make the company
profitable, she brought a consultant from abroad and restructured the company.
The strategy worked and the company saw profit again. She stepped down from
the post of chairperson in 2004. Now, she spends most of her time in social
activities. Bombay Management Association awarded her Management Woman
Achiever of the Year Award 2002-2003.

Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw—Biocon

She is the first female master brewer and the richest woman in India. Her father
was a master brewer and he encouraged her to get into this profession. Shaw
obtained her Honors degree in Zoology from Bangalore University. Then she
went to Ballarat University to study brewery. Her first job was in Carlton & United
Beverages in 1974, as a trainee brewer. She started her firm Biocon India in
1978 in her garage. When she applied for loan to the banks, she was turned
down. At that time, biotechnology was not known in India and she was a female
and her company did not have much assets. With her hard work and
determination she overcome all these obstacles and turned Biocon into the
biggest biopharmaceutical firm in India.

Simone Tata—Managing Director (former) Lakme

With her visions, she changed a small unknown cosmetics company, one of the
subsidiaries of Tata Oil Mills, into one of the leading cosmetic companies of India.
Lakme changed the face of Indian fashion and cosmetics forever. For her
success, Simone N. Tata is also known as Cosmetic Czarina of India. Simone
joined Lakme in 1961 and became Chairperson in 1982. The company is now
sold to Hindustan Liver. Simone is now heading Trent Limited another subsidiary
of the Tata Company.

Indu Jain- Chairperson (former) The Times Group

Indu Jain has many identities: spiritualist, entrepreneur, humanist, educationalist,
great lover of art and culture. She was the Chairman of the The Times Group, the
biggest and the most powerful media house in India. The company was bought
from a British group. Now, her two sons Samir and Vineet are running the
company. Among the major products of the company, The Times of India, the
largest selling English daily newspaper of the world. In 2000, Jain delivered
speech at the Millenium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual Leaders.
Priya Paul—Apeejay Surrendra Group
Priya Paul finished her Bachelor’s in Economics from USA. She got into her family
business at the age of 24 after her father Surrendra Paul was assassinated in
1990. Appeejay Surrendra Group has several subsidiaries such as, tea, hotel,
shipping, retail, real estate and financial services. At present, Priya is the
Chairperson of Appeejay Park Hotels.

Sulajja Firodia Motwani— Kinetic Motor

This beautiful woman is the Joint Managing Director of Kinetic, and the Managing
Director of Kinetic Finance. Her grandfather founded this company. He was a
very well known figure in the Indian auto industry. Sulajja did her MBA in
America. Later, she worked in Barra International, a California based investment
consultancy firm, for four years and then returned to India and joined her family
business. She travels a lot around India and likes to deal face to face with
people. This is how she tries to understand the market in her country.

Neelam Dhawan—Managing Director, Microsoft India

She has become a pioneering figure in the IT industry of India. Neelam Dhawan
has been working in the Indian IT field for the last twenty two years. She is the
new Managing Director of Microsoft India. Before coming to Microsoft, she
worked in all the top IT companies in India such as HP, IBM and HCL