Introduction

On December 8, 1941, the President of the United States of America, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt addressed the United States Congress in his famous „Day of Infamy“speech
asking for the declaration of war to the Japanese Empire. The speech came one day after
and in response to the sudden and unexpected attack of the Japanese Imperial Navy on
the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. With seldom seen unanimity of vote, only
one congresswoman opposed, the United States Congress supported the President. Three
days later, on December 11, 1941, Germany declared war on the United States, thus
drawing the USA into what will be later known as the World War Two, or WW2.

This development of the events brought about a complete and irreversible change in the
U.S. foreign policy. The national policy of abstaining from involvement in world affairs,
especially when it came to the possibility of being dragged into another armed conflict
between the European powers, dubbed Isolationism by some future historians, had to be
dropped and country had to brace itself for the greatest threat it had faced since its
inception. Still, several state policies promulgated prior to and continued after that fateful
date of December 7, 1941 point to a somewhat different overall picture I will endeavor to
depict here.

In this paper I will look at three distinct aspects of the U.S. entry into WW2. Firstly, I
will examine how the crucial historical facts and the underlying philosophical postulates,
combined with the unique geostrategic position of the United States, led to the
formulation of official state policies in the wake of WW2. Secondly, I will explain the
crucial policies giving shape to the U.S. diplomacy. Thirdly, I will touch upon the two
most important aspects of U.S. domestic policy which allowed President Roosevelt to
lead America into war with, as he proudly stated, „confidence in our armed forces“ and
„unbounded determination of our people“1: the pre-war propaganda and efforts to prepare
the armed forces for the impending conflict.

1
FDR’s “Infamy Speech” delivered on December 8, 1941 before Congress

1
 1. Historical influences on the creation of U.S. foreign policy

The U.S. foreign policy of the interwar period is difficult to describe and impossible to
explain without having in mind the premises of culture and philosophy which have been
ingrained in the notions of „America“ and „American“ since the time of the formation of
the union of the thirteen British North American colonies and before. The system of
values which defines what the pre-WW2 America was and, indeed, the America of today
is, needs to be traced to the very beginnings of the American society.

1.1. Ideological foundations

One philosophy which stands at the core of American society is Libertarianism. The basic
points of this philosophy are best exemplified in the second paragraph of the document
that laid the foundations of the United States, and they are „unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness“2. The principles of this
philosophy dictate that every person has the right to life and property and the right to self-
defense if these are in danger, but also forbid them to initiate violence unless imminent
danger is present. When applying such libertarian principles to foreign policy we arrive at
non-interventionism, which restricts the government’s use of force only to repelling
actual attacks on its territory.3 Libertarianism will play a major role in defining the extent
to which U.S. leadership will be able to justify and apply armed force in resolving
conflicts with other countries.

An even earlier source to which we can attribute certain properties of the U.S. foreign
policy that haven't changed during the entire existence of the USA as a sovereign country
is Puritanism. This philosophy imbued with religion will later on transform into an
American view of America as a „City on a Hill“, avoiding the European affairs often
marked by violence and impacting the world by the pure power of example of a
prosperous country thriving by respecting the freedoms and denouncing imperialistic
2
The Declaration of Independence
3
Stromberg, 79

2
intentions and ambitions. Due to the relatively large distance to Europe and preoccupied
with the territorial expansion towards the expanses to the west, this policy on non-
intervention into strictly European affairs will be predominant until the 20th century.4

1.2. Realpolitik in U.S. foreign affairs

Despite these peaceful, almost idealistic philosophies which bore a lot of influence on
American foreign policy, the economic pressure and population boom which ensued after
the first decades the new American country existed led to an increased need to settle new
areas to the west of the original 13 colonies. This need, accompanied by the belief in the
superiority of the U.S. form of government and American institutions will give rise to a
new idea which will constantly gain popularity over the years: the Manifest Destiny, „the
doctrine of inherent necessity and righteousness in U.S. territorial aggrandizement by
whatever means”5. Manifest Destiny as such will not be limited by the physical
boundaries of American expansion over the continent of North America. It will forever
remain an essential and integral part of any U.S. foreign policy. The belief, obviously
strongly colored by the American Puritan past, that it is the sacred task of the United
States to continuously spread what they believed was the best form in which a society can
be organized will, although changed over the past, remain very much present in the U.S.
politics.

In 1823 President James Monroe laid the grounds in his State of the Union Address for
what would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. The basis of this doctrine which
will take a prominent place in U.S. dealing with overseas powers was the assertion that
the USA was in the right to assume the position of the protector of the Americas and that
any intervention of European powers into the affairs of countries in both North and South
America was rightfully to be construed as an act against the U.S. security. The Monroe
doctrine would set the stage for creating the U.S. sphere of dominance in the Americas,
signaling „U.S. pretensions to hegemony over the Western Hemisphere“6.

4
Ibid., 80
5
Ibid., 82
6
Ibid., 80

3
The Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine will form the ideological core of the
future American efforts to spread their influence and guard their interests in the Western
hemisphere. The American „economic empire“7 to be was based on the idea of economic
supremacy in the Americas and in the growing markets of the world, mainly East Asia.
Such an empire would benefit the American industrial might and would satisfy the need
for further expansion and allay the crisis of overproduction in the USA. The Open Door
Notes of 1899 and 1900 „represented a statement of American determination to have
access to world markets, whether the peoples of the world willed it or not”8. The one-way
so-called free trade would mostly benefit the domestic production capacities while the
developing countries of East Asia and south from the U.S. border would not have nearly
as much use of the free access to U.S. markets. Critical to the foreign policy, the Open
Door policy would pit U.S. national interests against any country or regime in the world
who opposed the access to free market.

2. U.S. pre-WW2 approach to foreign affairs in light of U.S. history

7
Ibid., 83
8
Ibid., 83

4
In the period between the outbreak of WW2 in Europe and December 7, 1941, President
Roosevelt was “determined not to repeat his predecessor’s mistake of presuming too
greatly upon the readiness of Congress and the public to follow a President’s lead in
foreign policy”9, namely he was afraid that if he pushed for a course of action which the
public and Congress didn’t approve of, his agenda would fail just as had been the case
with the President Wilson’s two decades before. He was aware of the imminent danger
the European war posed to the security of the USA, but at the same time he had to get the
public behind his agenda.

2.1. Traditional values in the shaping of the foreign policy

FDR strongly believed that America cannot allow itself to stand by and watch the
developments in Europe which was quickly succumbing to the Hitler’s Nazi regime.
However, facing the popular sentiment for non-intervention he needed to portray the
threat to U.S. security in a way that would capture the ears of the people of the USA. In
1938 he told the press that “As a result of scientific advancement in waging war any
possible attack has been brought infinitely closer than it was five years or twenty years or
fifty years ago.10” The threat of a marine invasion of the American soil and especially of
an air attack, however, was all but non-existent, since such an attack would not be
technologically feasible, as corroborated by the testimony of the famous aviator and
social activist Charles Lindbergh before Congress.11

In fact, the real threat Roosevelt thought was embodied in the dictatorial regimes was
best outlined in his speech before Congress in early 1939: “There comes a time in the
affairs of men when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of
faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments and their very civilization
are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy and of good faith among nations is all
the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all”. 12 Here we can
see the true motivation Roosevelt had to oppose the recent events in Europe and support
9
Thompson, 676
10
Ibid., 674
11
Ibid., 682
12
Thompson, 676

5
its allies in fight against Hitler’s Germany. The connection to the basic principles of
Libertarianism is undeniable; the difference is, however, that the notion of self-defense
was substantially expanded to include attacks on those countries which shared
civilizational values with the USA. It is therefore, based on their shared history and
culture, quite logical that the United Kingdom would be the first to receive very generous
support from the USA to fight the Nazi regime in Europe.

2.2. Allies and enemies: shared values and irreconcilable differences

The confirmation of the special relationship the USA had with the UK came in the form
of the Atlantic Charter, a joint document signifying the unity of purpose and
determination the two countries shared in face of the Nazi threat. Although Roosevelt
intended the Atlantic Charter to assure the American citizens that the British Empire they
were supporting respected the same values as Americans, like the right to self-
determination of the peoples, it was also a true testament to American belief that their
opposition to Nazi regime is a righteous fight, not only a fight for strategic supremacy.
This fact was proven several times during the talks on HMS Prince of Wales when FDR
argued over the case of Indian self-determination to the point of collision with his British
ally.13

On the opposite side of the world, the Americans could witness an expansion of yet
another dictatorial regime – the Imperial Japan. The takeover of Manchuria by Japan in
1931 marked the initial phase of the implementation of what the Japanese called the
“Asian Monroe Doctrine”14. Such a doctrine reserved the markets of East Asia for the
exclusive use by the Japanese. As pointed by the name, it was thought by the Japanese
that they were simply emulating the American model, and therefore their expansion was
justified. The American establishment could not tolerate such policies of Imperial Japan.
They were in stark contradiction to their Open Door policy in China and, furthermore,
they were also not in line with the view of Americans as racially superior and sole
claimant to the right to teach and promote democracy in the less developed regions held
13
Graham, 10
14
Murnane, 511

6
by some notable key people in American establishment, like Stanley Hornbeck, the then
chief of state Department Division of Far Eastern Affairs15. The same values promoting
the free market were at the same time endangered by the Nazi dictatorship in Europe.

3. State policies in the period preceding WW2

15
Murnane, 513

7
Until the very outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the USA the U.S. government
spearheaded by FDR was relentless in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis that was
engulfing the world. United States were involved in diplomatic efforts to contain Japan's
rapid expansion in the Eastern Asia and although openly aiding Great Britain and
supplying the British with the war material, the USA was still neutral and not at war with
Germany, though the diplomatic relations had by then been sour for a while.
Campaigning for his third term in office, FDR promised not to involve United States in
any foreign war, although leaving sufficient room for the contingency that the USA was
directly attacked.16 Neutrality in what had been, up until the events in Pearl Harbor
unfolded, two separate forceful expansions by the means of war in the Far East and
Europe, was the official American stand.

To ensure the neutrality of the USA in any foreign wars, the predictions that they would
break out in the foreseeable future usually having been unanimously bleak, the United
States Congress passed the Neutrality Act in 1935. The Act, the first in series of
Neutrality Acts, was intended to limit the possibility of U.S. involvement in any foreign
war by stipulating that after declaring neutrality in a war, the USA could not sell war
material to any of the belligerent countries. The Neutrality Act was passed at the height
of the non-interventionist popular sentiment in the USA, but will do little to stop FDR
having his way with his agenda of disrupting the war effort of the Nazis by aiding his
allies.

Despite the legislative restrictions and the public opinion which was still in favor of
neutrality in the armed conflicts that didn't directly threaten the USA, FDR pursued a
three-fold foreign policy. Although having a sole purpose in mind – preparing America
for what he though was an inevitable conflict with the Nazi Germany - his foreign policy
can be separated into three directions geography-wise: his relations with the Latin
America, relations he nurtured or tightened with the nations in Europe and the policy
towards Japan.

16
Jones, 170

8
 3.1. Relations with Latin America

Prior to WW2, the USA under FDR pursued the so called Good Neighbor Policy with the
countries of Latin America. Due to the removal of trade barriers, like lessening trade
tariffs and duties and signing bilateral agreements on reciprocal trade with over 20
countries, in just several years the U.S. share in Latin America trade rose from one third
to almost a half.17 In addition to the economic benefits of such a policy, it also
indisputably led to improvements in diplomatic stance of USA with those countries.

In 1940, this diplomatic advantage the USA enjoyed with the countries of Latin America
was expended to the sphere of international affairs and it culminated in the Act of Havana
in 1940, of which the USA was a signatory. This act stated that an attempt by a power
outside the Americas, in essence referring manly to belligerent European countries, to
take over one other's possessions in the Americas would be thwarted by the countries of
the Western Hemisphere. This policy was essential to FDR's agenda since it prevented
Germany to acquire territories literally in the neighborhood of the USA by conquering
their owner in Europe. This Act also marked an evolution of the Monroe Doctrine, since
the USA now took a multilateral approach to the defense of its sphere of power18.

3.2. Relations with the European powers

On November 12, 1940, the Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Stark sent the the
President a now famous Plan Dog memorandum. In it, the admiral advised the President
that should the nation face a war with both Japan and Germany, the majority of efforts
should be focused on defeating Germany first19. This memo initiated what would
eventually become the Allied strategy of Europe first. Admiral Stark also noted that while
in case Britain fell to the Germans America might not lose the war, it definitely could not
win the war everywhere, thus defining the future Allied policy which was best summed
up in the words of the Chief of staff of the Army, George C. Marshall: “No compromise

17
Jones, 136
18
Ibid., 137
19
Plan Dog memo, 1

9
is possible and the victory of the democracies can only be complete with the utter defeat
of the war machines of Germany and Japan“20. The President explained why it was
necessary to continue aiding Britain in one of his famous fireside chats on December 29,
1940, when he said that: „If Great Britain goes down, all of us in the Americas would be
living at the point of a gun.”21

The initial effort to send the badly needed supplies to Great Britain was undertaken when
Congress, after 6 weeks of discussion, barely passed the changed Neutrality Act in
November 1939, allowing the USA to lift the embargo on war materials trade with
France and Britain.22 In early 1941 Lend-Lease Act was passed which gave the President
broad powers to sell, transfer, lend or lease war materials, and the president had also the
discretion to decide how the loans would be repaid. This enabled him to continue aid to
the British with whom the trade could not be continued due to them lacking financial
assets.23 In November, Lend-Lease would include Soviet Union, and by the end of the
war, some 50 billion dollars worth of aid would be allocated to almost all allies of the
USA in WW2. This Act had other positive effects: the emerging U.S. economy could
benefit from foreign orders24 and it allowed FDR to continue naval enlistment which was
less detrimental to public opinion of his presidency than the expansion of the Army25. It
was FDR's strategic decision to aid Britain until German economy crumbled under the
strain of the war. All estimates made by American experts greatly underestimated
German ability to wage war, but the strategy was the best one FDR could implement to
contain Germany, short of war.26

The pre-Pearl Harbor war in the Atlantic as promulgated by FDR through admirals Stark
and King, founded upon an offensive strategy of protecting a US proclaimed zone of
interest, could have led to an early US engagement in WW2. The initial protective zone
of only 25 miles from the coast of the Americas will gradually be extended and will
20
„Prelude to War“
21
O’Connor, 1
22
Jones, 165
23
The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th Edition
24
Bell, 140
25
Ibid., 141
26
Ibid., 139

10
finally reach as far as Iceland after the incident when U.S. destroyer Greer engaged a
German U-boat in September 1941. This incident also led to the order to U.S. Navy to
shoot on sight if they should spot a German vessel in the protective zone. 27 In October
1941, after U.S. destroyer Kearney was damaged, the U.S. Congress passed further
changes to the Neutrality Act, altering the stipulation that the merchant ships could not be
armed. Through all these measures FDR gradually escalated the relations with Germany
and constantly kept the country at the brink of war. In august 1941 he explained his
intentions to Churchill when he said he would become „more and more provocative“and
that „if the Germans did not like it, they could attack American forces“ 28. The situation at
sea is best seen in the words of Admiral Stark who said: „The Good lord knows if the
Germans want and excuse for war, they have plenty“.29

By 1941 all pointed to the fact that America was headed on the path of open military
alliance with Britain. From January until March 1941 The USA and the UK
representatives participated in the ABC-1 strategic planning conference in Washington.
Here the joint strategy was agreed upon in the case America entered war against
Germany and presumably also Japan. The strategy confirmed the Europe first policy of
concentrating on defeating Germany first before dealing with other threats30. In August
1941, the Atlantic Charter included a public condemnation of the Nazi regime. This
meant that the USA would continue its undeclared naval war in the Atlantic against
German shipping and that the country was at the brink of war. After December 7, 1941,
FDR told his Cabinet on several occasions that he didn't want to declare war on Germany
since he expected the desperate Germany to declare war on the USA.31 This came to be
on December 11, 1941, and the war seemed to be thrust upon him.

3.3. Relations with Imperial Japan

27
Jones, 180
28
Trachtenberg, 23
29
Ibid., 23
30
Bell, 141
31
Ibid., 143

11
Until 1854 and before the Western powers intervened in its domestic affairs32, Japan had
been an isolated country refusing diplomatic and economic ties with the West. With the
restoration of the Emperor in mid 19th century, Japan embarked on the path of
westernization and rapid industrialization, which can for the most part be contributed to
the U.S. diplomacy. The USA, during the administration of the first President Roosevelt,
can also be accredited for mediation to end the war between Russia and Japan in 1905 in
which Japan gained Sakhalin from Russia. In many other ways the rise of the Imperial
Japan, its aspirations and its expansionist policies in the 19th and early 20th centuries can
be linked to the U.S. diplomacy in the Far East.

After the end of WWI, in which Japan fought on the side of the Allies, it became clear
that the conflict would not bring any significant benefits to Japan. If anything, then the
Open Door policy the USA propagated in their relation to China meant decreased
opportunity for Japan to get involved in the Chinese market and decreased economic and
industrial growth. Coupled with the effects the Great Depression had on Japanese
economy, the hardships will lead Imperial Japan to resolve the need for raw materials by
territorial expansion.

The initial U.S. response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria was incoherent and
inconsistent. In the early 1930's the non-interventionism was still highly popular with the
American public and government. The U.S. government led by President Hoover and
after 1933 by FDR did not want to provoke Japan, especially so because they were
uncertain if they would have the backing of the British Empire for any harsh and firm
policies.33 Having in mind that the self-sufficient Japanese economy was in a far better
position than the Chinese economy which could acquire crucial industrial and war
supplies only through trade, the USA did not recognize a state of war between China and
Japan, allowing FDR not to proclaim an embargo on arms trade which he feared would
cripple the Chinese war efforts. This decision nonetheless was interpreted by the Chinese
as the sign of the U.S. reluctance to get involved in their expansion in the Far East.

32
Miller, 19
33
Tierney, 30

12
This U.S. foreign policy towards Japan which the Japanese were right to consider non-
threatening to their interests was about to change in less than a decade. The new
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt will conceive the Japanese expansion as a
direct threat not only to U.S. economic and trade interests in the Far East, but to the
security of American territories, primarily the de facto colony of Philippines and the
Central Pacific. Therefore, in 1940 the increasingly adamant stand against the Japanese
aspirations culminated in the fateful embargo on oil and steel.

The embargo was intended to reduce the Japanese capability to wage war by depriving it
of basic war materials. The initial embargo on high quality scrap metal and plane
gasoline was soon to be extended to all raw iron, steel and oil. Such U.S. policy was a
gamble since FDR and his advisers were quite aware of the fact that Japan could sustain
its war effort for only between a year and 18 months on the existing oil reserves.34 The
embargo would lead to a definite change of course in Japanese policy – it would either
cease war in China and plead for armistice, or it would look for alternate sources of oil,
the most apparent choice having been the oil rich Dutch Indies. The risk the U.S. policy
makers undertook was either going to contain the Japanese expansion or bring about the
escalation of violence and possibly bring America to war. In the end, the Japanese will
opt for the second solution.

By the time the embargo was imposed on Japan, the diplomatic relations between the
USA and Japan had been continually worsening. An important person in maintaining and
managing these relations was Stanley Hornbeck, a key adviser on East Asian affairs to
the then Secretary of State Cordell Hull. This man's view of the Japanese government and
the animosity he felt for it impacted the U.S. - Japanese relations significantly 35. Hull
relied on and trusted Hornbeck in his assessment of the willingness of the Japanese
government to pursue the negotiations which were taking place on the issue of Japanese
actions in the Far East. Although there were some incentives by certain elements in
Japanese government to find a solution to U.S. – Japanese disagreements that would
avoid war, Eugene Dooman from the American embassy in Tokyo in that period would
34
Jones, 169
35
Libby, 138

13
later on claim that Hornbeck's influence on the decisions made by Hull and FDR led to
the diplomatic relations being almost severed only two months prior to Pearl Harbor
attack.36 Whether it was only Hornbeck's influence that is to blame for the lack of will to
continue the negotiations with the Imperial Japanese government is debatable, but the
fact remains that American leadership passed on the opportunity to ease the tensions in
the Far East. The reasons for this might include the obligation the USA had to supporting
their European allies in the condemnation of the Japanese war efforts and the fact that
Japanese military „being bogged down“37 in China was in line with the U.S. interests.

According to some respected historians and scholars, among which is George Kennan,
the diplomat who laid the foundations to American approach to the Soviet Union in Cold
War, the escalation of disagreements with Japan by FDR was a back door to European
war.38 The reasoning is the following: since the constraints in the political system of
democracies make it all but impossible to enter a preemptive war, the leaders need to
justify their decisions of bringing a country to war. This has led many conspiracy
theorists to claim that that the Pearl Harbor disaster was imminent was known to the top
U.S. government officials, if not planned by them. However, detailed investigations led
by Congressional committees have reached the conclusion that the Pearl Harbor disaster
was a result of a faulty intelligence network and erroneous assumptions about Japanese
intentions and military capabilities.39 The events of December 7, 1941 can be traced back
to the ill conceived policies of U.S. State Department and military, especially its
intelligence branch, but it is ludicrous to suggest that the Pacific Fleet, which was to
serve the purpose of deterring Japanese from reckless actions, thus lending credence to
the official U.S. policy, would be sacrificed to promote some secret agenda.

36
Libby, 137
37
Ibid., 144
38
Trachtenberg, 27
39
Jones, 136

14
 4. Propaganda: shaping the public opinion

In the changing world of modern warfare where civilians are at the core of the war effort,
never before so needed for sustaining the war effort and never so much in direct way of
the hazards of war40, a certain degree of the use of propaganda is a prerequisite, especially
in the forms of government based on the principles of democracy. As John Schuessler put
it in his book41, „democratic leaders resort to deception when they anticipate opposition
to an open declaration of hostilities“. If the public does not consider a threat grave
enough or if they are faced with the prospects of a long and indecisive fight, then in
40
Finch, 372
41
Schuessler, 1

15
democracies they have the right to oppose government policies leading them into war.
Since a democratic government is restricted in its options of suppressing such dissent, it
has to find alternate means of persuading the public to rally behind its agenda. In the
years preceding WW2 American public was exposed to an incredible amount of
propaganda which aimed at increasing the acceptability of the U.S. policies which didn't
always strive towards peace.

A special regards had to be paid to the fact that the American public harbored extreme
resentment towards all forms of propaganda. This resentment in large part was due to the
misinformation campaigns and the fabrication of spectacular atrocity stories allegedly
committed by the Germans in WW1 which were used to swing the American opinion
towards entering the war in Europe42. In the interwar period, the public was being trained,
in part by the government afraid of the Nazi propaganda affecting Americans, to resist all
forms of propaganda. This made the already difficult task of re-shaping American
popular sentiment yet more difficult a task.

4.1. Foreign influences

The British were the most responsible for bringing pro-war propaganda to America. In
his address to the world in February 1942, Churchill proudly and somewhat carelessly
stated that he had „dreamed of, aimed at, and worked for“43 the American entry into
WW2. This is understandable from a political point of view: by the time of Pearl Harbor
attack, the Nazi war machine had already either conquered or was in the process of
storming countries of Europe, and Britain was under constant air raids. By December
1941, there were few areas where the British did not rely on American supply convoys.44

42
Finch, 382
43
Cull, 3
44
Krome, 4

16
Their only hope was for the Americans to actively engage the Nazi threat and come to
their aid.

The main British outpost for propaganda in the USA was the British Library of
Information, NY. The main modus operandi of this propaganda service will be the new
strategy called „No propaganda, only truth“45. Sensible to the way propaganda can make
Americans react, they adopted the policy of disseminating only true facts and news from
the European theater of war and the world. Naturally, this form of truth they presented to
the American public was carefully prepared and the news selectively presented. No
information that would have detrimental effect on the American views they tried to build
was authorized for distribution. In England, London became the hub in which reporters
from the USA clustered to transmit news to the American public who were eagerly
waiting to hear the latest developments in Europe. This made it that much easier for the
Britain’s Ministry of Information (MoI), its propaganda ministry, to feed them with the
information they wanted the Americans to hear46.

Prior to Pearl Harbor attack, the American government was very lenient towards the
activities of the British MoI, whose main task was to influence American public towards
intervention, sometimes with the tacit consent of an officially neutral American
government47. After the USA had entered war, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI)
would continue this prolific cooperation with the British propaganda office by
cooperating on joint projects, like filming the war documentaries.

4.2. Domestic policies

On the domestic front, FDR used whatever means to move the American sentiment
towards intervention. His use of radio as a means of communication was unparalleled in
political history, allowing him to steer the public opinion of himself and his policies in
the desired direction, often manipulating information to reach his goals. In his famous

45
Cull, 10
46
Ibid., 16
47
Krome, 1

17
collection of 13 radio addresses, called the fireside chats, the American public could, for
the first time in its history, feel they had a personal connection to their president 48. One of
the most memorable fireside chats was delivered on December 29, 1940. It was entitled
„On National Security“, but will be better know as „The Arsenal of Democracy“. In it,
FDR urged the American public to support the American policy of supplying the UK
with the ammunitions they required to fight off the German onslaught. FDR used this fast
and reliable medium to talk to his citizens on a daily basis, enabling him to promote his
controversial social policies during the Great Depression and quench rumors. People
almost saw him as their close friend, and there was something reassuring in the President
himself taking the time to speak to ordinary people.

Another important medium for the dissemination of propaganda were the movies.
Hollywood movie advertising was very cautious and contradictory at times when it came
to the movies featuring the theme of war. This reflected the desire to maximize profits,
both at home and at seas, within the interventionist and the isolationist audience.
However, in 1941, as the markets in Europe declined and the public sentiment moved
steadily away from isolationism, the movies became more explicit in their endorsement
of the Allied effort and their warnings about the need for American armament if not
intervention49. Many people had, however, pushed for a more open condemnation of the
Hitler’s regime even before 1941. A well known independent producer Walter Wanger
promoted open anti-Nazi movies and Alfred Hitchcock, responding to the British consul,
was involved in the British propaganda effort by introducing in his movies English
characters favorable to the British reputation and who the Americans would find amiable
and could sympathize with.50

After the USA entered the war the aims of the propaganda changed, but not its intensity.
An example of the propaganda supported by the government but not produced by any
governmental agency was the Writers’ War Board (WWB). Only two days after Pearl
Harbor, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. approved an initiative

48
Yu, 90
49
Rostron, 95
50
Cull, 18

18
to seek civilian writers who would promote the war effort, and within a month the
Writers' War Board was organized. This private organization received governmental
funding and functioned as an arm of the government.51 It consisted of many influential
writers, journalists, novelists and media figures, one of whom was Rex Stout, famous for
creating the fictional character Nero Wolf, and also the chairman of the organization.
During the war they would utilize their good standing with their audiences and numerous
contacts with famous Americans to promote important governmental polices, like the
anti-inflation campaign, campaigns done for the Air Force and the Army for increasing
enlistment, racial equality, anti-German sentiment and international cooperation after the
war. Although they were very autonomous and free to decide in which form to conduct
the campaign – which was usually through influencing the content of the popular
newspaper columns, books, articles, movies, theatre shows and through advertisement
campaigns – they always backed the official government policies. WWB is a prime
example of the FDR’s government circumventing its own official position of refraining
from the use of propaganda.

5. Rearming America

In the eve of WW2 the U.S. government initiated several plans to rearm America and
prepare it logistically and strategically for the outbreak of war. These plans effectively
signaled a determined break with the official U.S. policy of neutrality which nonetheless
had remained in place until the Imperial Japan declared war on the USA. While it is
understandable that a country in face of such a threatening prospect of war will
undoubtedly attempt to strengthen its defenses, many aspects of these plans indicated that
the U.S. neutrality was not the policy that the growing defense capabilities were meant to
protect, but that it was the policy of intervention that was in FDR's mind when he
formulated and implemented his strategic plans.

51
Howell, 1

19
 5.1. War planning for the Pacific

The most crucial document for the U.S. strategy in the Pacific was the War Plan Orange.
It was one of the color-coded war plans which elaborated on the possible contingencies of
the USA waging war with world powers. War Plan Orange (WPO) dealt with the
potential attack by Japan on U.S. territories and it set out the major guidelines as to what
strategic approach to such a conflict would be most beneficial to the United States. WPO
was in creation since the end of WW1 and it was constantly reworked to encompass the
changes in the geo-political relations.

Until 1924, this document had been drafted mainly by the mid-level officers of the U.S.
armed forces, primarily Navy, and it served as a kind of a theoretical practice, since the
higher ranking officials in the armed forces would usually give the task of updating the
War Plans as assignments to the officers in time of peace. However, since 1924 War Plan
Orange had been approved and signed by the Secretaries of War.52

The reason why such a contingency plan as WPO attracted attention of the U.S.
government will become obvious in less than two decades. From the first days of U.S.
engagement in WW2, the War in the Pacific will be fought according to the principles
and planning laid out in WPO. Although the initial phase of WPO predicted that Hawaii
and the U.S. fleet stationed there would remain intact, and the final stage called for the
naval and air blockade to end the war by starving the population of Japan, these were the
only discrepancies between WPO and how the war against Japan was fought. Most of
WPO's premises still held53 - the USA would, in reality, have to fight this war without
much help from the allies in the Pacific; since air force could not operate from mainland
in Asia the maritime strategy of attack was adhered to and the estimates of the industrial
and production capacities of Japan and the USA were incredibly accurate. This all points
to the fact that the strategic outlook of the United States had never been the neutrality so

52
Miller, 14
53
Miller, 28

20
often cited by the U.S. officials, but in effect a very elaborate and carefully prepared
offensive strategy of all-out war.

5.2. Preparing for the war in Europe

The strategy of dealing with the advance of the Nazi Wehrmacht in Europe is equally
revealing when it comes to the real strategic aims of the FDR's government. In addition
to the gradual escalation of the naval war in the Atlantic and the Lend-Lease Act which
pitted the American industrial power against that of the Nazi Germany even before the
declaration of war, certain U.S. policies reflected the intent to eventually win the war in
the direct clash of the U.S. armed forces with those of Adolf Hitler. One of these was the
Destroyers-Bases Deal of 1940. In return for aiding the British navy with 50 aged
destroyers, the USA gained the right to use the British territories to establish bases for the
army and navy.54 These bases will prove to be crucial in the deployment of the U.S.
armed forces during WW2. Other policies reflected the need to increase the volume and
preparedness of the U.S. armed forces.

The first of those was the Selective Service and Training Act which was the nation's first
peacetime draft. It allowed the government to increase manifold the number of men in the
armed forces and reserves who counted a mere 200,000 before the Act was passed. The
Two Oceans Navy Act doubled the authorized size of the fleet and the President was
given broad power to accelerate the war production, putting in motion the 10-year ship
construction program a year before the entry into WW2.55 Even though the core of the
U.S. strategy of fighting the Japanese and the Germans depended on a strong navy and air
force, FDR did not neglect the army. Although the papers were very sympathetic to the
idea that the USA contributes to the war effort with air and naval power and
manufacturing only56, FDR requested his Chief of army staff George C. Marshall to
initiate a military planning effort which will result in Victory Plan. In Victory plan,

54
Jones, 169
55
Stackley, 20
56
Bell, 142

21
Marshall would revise his assessments of the required size of the armed force from
2,000,000 in 1940 to 8,800,000 in 1941.

All the decisions relevant to the state of the nation's defense capabilities made in the pre-
war period by the FDR's administration do not build a picture of a country eager only to
defend itself, since the planning and implementation of these policies were several times
more extensive than what was required for the continental defense promoted by the
isolationists. It is very clear from the extent and volume of the preparations and the
diplomatic overtures of the USA that the view of FDR as an isolationist who had been
forced into war cannot be entirely correct.

Conclusion

The Pearl Harbor attack which happened more than two years after the European phase of
WW2 had started and a full decade after the Japanese encroachments in China had begun
to take place put the USA on the course of events which will enable the future historians
to connect all the wars going on at the time and the ensuing conflicts and correctly call
them World War Two. Moreover, not only did „the day which will forever live in
infamy“ serve as the casus belli which will openly involve the last remaining great power
in the world in the war, but it also led to the final alignment of all major powers in the
world in two camps. The U.S. Vice President Henry A. Wallace said in May 1942 of
WW2: „This is a fight between a free world and a slave world“.

22
In its propaganda material recorded by the OWI for the „Why we fight? “series of
informational films the U.S. views will constantly reiterate the position of the U.S.
government that Germany, Japan and Italy were not only partners in their military
expansion, but that they all formed, in spite of the enormous differences between their
social systems, a unified Axis of evil. In these countries, it was emphasized, the people
had given up their rights as individuals and joined the „human herd“, the constitutional
institutions had given up their power and the leaders assumed the role of the worshipped
deity after having destroyed the religious institutions and made their country atheist. It
was evident, from the U.S. point of view, that America with its allies, „a free world“, was
indeed in a gargantuan struggle against the countries constituting „a slave world“.

Most of the policies adopted by the pre-war U.S. government with FDR as the President
reflected such a view. The countries which will after December 11, 1941 openly ally
themselves against America had been considered a civilizational threat to the very
existence of the USA long before the violence erupted in the Pacific. The expansion of
these new empires was not only threatening the U.S. economic and political interests, but
it was seen as undermining the fabric of world democracy which the Americans were
bound to protect in realizing their Manifest Destiny.
The specific policies undertaken by the American administration all add up to the general
picture which does not coalesce with the idea of the isolationist America being left no
choice but war. The deliberate escalation of relations with Germany in the Atlantic and
the decision to expand the protective zone at sea almost to the shores of Europe while at
the same time setting up a system of supply convoys to support the British war against
the Germans were not decisions made by a country abstaining from provocation. The
harsh and unrelenting policy towards the Japan, especially in the year preceding the Pearl
Harbor attack, could not have been implemented with the aim of easing the tension with
that country. Although officially the USA never wavered in their resolve to remain
neutral and avoid joining the war, the diplomatic endeavors of the FDR's administration
diverged from this stance.

23
The aforementioned management of U.S. foreign affairs was complemented by the
domestic policies which can hardly be attributed to isolationist interests. The extent of the
foreign and domestic propaganda aiming at changing the American sentiment from
isolationism towards intervention and the calculated war preparations conducted in the
eve of the U.S. entry into WW2 all suggest that while FDR and his cabinet did try to keep
America out of war by directing their anti-Axis efforts into sending material aid to their
allies, it also planned and prepared for the unavoidable armed confrontation with the Axis
powers.

While the conventional thinking places the relations America had with the world powers
against the seemingly black and white backdrop of world affairs, it seems that the role
and actions of the U.S. establishment prior to WW2 give ample reason to reassess this
period in American history from a different angle. The fact remains that the American
entry into WW2 constitutes much more than the initial American reluctance and a forced
response to the world crisis. A turning point in American and world history, this event
deserves and demands to be approached thoroughly and with utmost scrutiny through the
understanding of the wider picture of American foreign and domestic affairs in mid 20th
century.

Works cited

Books:

Cull, Nicholas John. Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against
American "Neutrality in World War II”. Oxford University Press US, 1996

Heinrichs, Waldo H. Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American entry into
World War 2. Oxford University Press, US, 1990

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Jones, Howard. Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897.
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001

Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945.
Naval Institute Press, 2007

Tierney, Dominic. FDR and the Spanish Civil War: neutrality and commitment in the
struggle that divided America. Duke University Press, 2007

Articles:

Bell, Michael S. “Reappraising FDR’s Approach to World War II in Europe”. JFQ: Joint
Force Quarterly, Spring 2008, Issue 49, p138-145

Finch, Lynette. „Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas During the First
Half of the Twentieth Century”. Armed Forces and Society, Spring 2000, Vol.16 Issue 3,
p367-412

Graham, Sarah Ellen. „American Propaganda, the Anglo-American Alliance, and the
“Delicate Question” of Indian Self-Determination”. Diplomatic History, April 2009, Vol.
33 Issue 2, p223-259

Howell, Thomas. ”The Writers’ War Board: U.S. Domestic Propaganda in World War
II”. Historian, Summer 1997, Vol. 59 Issue 4, p795

Krome, Frederic. “Tunisian Victory and Anglo-American film propaganda in World War
II”. Historian, Spring 1996, Vol. 58 Issue 3, p517

Libby, Justin H. “Rendezvous with disaster”. World Affairs, Winter 1996, Vol. 158 Issue
3, p137

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Murnane, John R. “Japan's Monroe Doctrine? Re-Framing the Story of Pearl Harbor”.
History Teacher, August 2007, Vol. 40 Issue 4, p503-520

O'Connor, Jerome M. „FDR's Undeclared War”. Naval History, February 2004, Vol. 18
Issue 1, p24-29

Rostron, Allen. „No War, No Hate, No Propaganda“. Journal of Popular Film and
Television, Summer 2002, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p85

Schuessler, John. „Democracy, Deception, and the Use of Force: FDR's Undeclared
War”. Conference Papers - International Studies Association, 2007 Annual Meeting, p1

Stackley, Sean, Greene, Creighton. “Managing Defense Resources: A Congressional

Perspective”. Armed Forces Comptroller, Fall 2007, Vol. 52 Issue 4, p20-22

Stromberg, Joseph R. “Imperialism, Noninterventionism, and Revolution: Opponents of

the Modern American Empire”. Independent Review, Summer 2006, Vol. 11 Issue 1,
p79-113

Thompson, John A. „Conceptions of National Security and American entry into World
War II“. Diplomacy and Statecraft, December 2005, Vol. 16 Issue 4, p671-697

Trachtenberg, Marc. “Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy”. Security Studies,
January 2007, Vol. 16 Issue 1, p1-31

Yu, Lumeng. „The Great Communicator: How FDR's Radio Speeches Shaped American
History”. History Teacher, November 2005, Vol. 39 Issue 1, p89-106

Internet sources:

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Plan Dog memo, a digitalized image. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library and
Museum. 22 June, 2010 <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box4/a48b01.html>

Franklin D. Roosevelt's Infamy speech, a transcription. The University of Oklahoma

College of Law. 13 June, 2010 <http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/infamy.shtml>

The Declaration of Independence, a transcription. The National Archives. 12 June, 2010

<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html>

Encyclopedias:

„Lend-Lease Act“. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2008. Encyclopedia.com.

June 4, 2010 <http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/lend-lease.aspx>

Documentaries:

“Prelude to war”. Why we fight? Frank Capra. Office of War Information. 1942.

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