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/I

G I

/I G I T HE UNITED STAT ES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY & L "it "'~ ',.

T HE UNITED STAT ES

STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

&

L

"it

"'~ ',.

~j

~

UABJN£ C .BPS S 1.0"",8

AIR FORCES

ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE

,

WAR AGAINST JAPAN

AIR FORCES ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE , WAR AGAINST JAPAN Military Analysis Divi,sion

Military Analysis Divi,sion

February 1947

AIR FORCES ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE , WAR AGAINST JAPAN Military Analysis Divi,sion
AIR FORCES ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE , WAR AGAINST JAPAN Military Analysis Divi,sion
AIR FORCES ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE , WAR AGAINST JAPAN Military Analysis Divi,sion
Thi~ report 'II'U "-rillen primllrily for the u<w of the United States Stratel'i( Bambin,

Thi~ report 'II'U "-rillen primllrily for the u<w of the United States

Stratel'i( Bambin, SUTI·e)' in the preplITlltion of further I"cport.~ of H mor~

tomprehens;\"e ~ture. An)'

report mun be ronftidered all limited to the ~pec::ilic material covered and

U wbjtct to further intt'rpreUition in the light of lurther studies con-

ducted by the Surwy.

thi.'!

conclusion:! or opi nions

in

exp'·e

q~

thi.'! conclusion:! or opi nions in exp'·e q~ • n FOREWORD The United SUlles Strlltegic Bombing

n

FOREWORD

The United SUlles Strlltegic Bombing Sur\'eY was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, I)UrSullnt to II directive from

Its miuion ""liS to

conduct an

effect.!l of our lIerilll attack on Germany. to be IIlIcd in connection with air IIttliCks on Japau and to elltablish a bllsill for evalnating the illl-

the lale P,'esident Roosevelt,

impartial and expert study of the

portanee and potentialities of air power as an instrument of mililllry strategy for planning

the futUl·e development of the Uni ted Stales armed forces aud for determining future eco- nomic policies with respect to the nationlll de-

fense.

llOrting repol'ls containing the findings of the

A summary report and !!Orne 200 sup-

Survey in Cennllny ha" e been published, On 15 Augullt 1945, Pl"ClIident Truman re- quested that the Survey conduct a similar study

of the effects of 1111 types of lIir attllck in the wllr

against JalJan, lIubmitt ing

'"{' llOr b in dupJiCflte

to the Sec reta ry of War aud to the Secretary of the NHvy. The o!llcers of the Survey during ill'!

,JII]lanese phase were:

Franklin l)'Olier, Cll(lirmall.

Paul H. Nitze, Henry C, Alexllnder, ViC#' Chltirmtll.•

Harry L, Bowman, J. Kenneth Galbraith, I{enllis Likert, Frank A. McNamee. Jr., Fred Searls, Jr" Monroe E. Spaght, I)r. Lewis R. Thompson, Theodore P. Wright, D ireclf)~~, Walter Wild!:!, Ser,'ctary,

The Survey', complement prol·ided for 300

civili!!nll. 350 oflice r 8. lind 500 enli~ted mell.

militArY segment of the organization was drllwn from the Army to the extent of 60 per_ cent, nnd from the Navy to the extent of 40 percellt. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all I)Osgible IIs~istance in furnishing men, SU I'pl ies, trnnsport. and information. The Survey operated from headquarters establilthed in Tokyo enrly in September 1945, with sub- headquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hil"Oll.hima, and NagllSllki, lind with mobile teams ollCrating in othe,' pari.!! of Japan, the island!! of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. It 11'11:1 possible to reconst ruct much of war- time JHIJaneSe lIIilitary planning and execution, engllgement by engagement. and campaign by camllllign. and to secure reallOnably accurate ~tatisties on Jupan's economy and war produc- tion. 1)ll1nt by plllnt. and industry by industry, In IIddition. studies we re conducted on Japan's ove r _all st rategi c plan >t and the background of her entry into the WHr, the internal discussion >t lind negotiation~ lellding t o her acceptan ce of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among the ci"ilian population, the effectil'eness of the Jllpanel!e civilian defense orglfnilllltion. lind the e,recti! of the IItomic bombs. Separllte reporti! will be iuued covering each phase of the study. The SUl'vey interrogllted more than 700 Ja p- allelIC military, governmenl, and industrial ofli- ciala, It alllO recovered lind translated mllny documents which not ouly have been useful 10 the Survey. but also will fu"nish data vllluabh:

for oth er IIludie~. Arrangementil have beeu made to t!lrn ol'er the Sun·ey'/! files to the Central Intelligence GI·OUp, through which they wili hI! IlVllil/lbll! fol' further eXllminlltion lind

di~lribution,

T he

'"

GI·OUp, through which they wili hI! IlVllil/lbll! fol' further eXllminlltion lind di~lribution, T he '"
GI·OUp, through which they wili hI! IlVllil/lbll! fol' further eXllminlltion lind di~lribution, T he '"
TABLE Of coNTENTS II OrIaAnoNI a. TIP RoYAL AUna.uJA N AIR FORCB ••. Ill. OraATIONI

TABLE Of coNTENTS

TABLE Of coNTENTS II OrIaAnoNI a. TIP RoYAL AUna.uJA N AIR FORCB ••. Ill. OraATIONI OF

II

OrIaAnoNI a. TIP RoYAL AUna.uJA N AIR FORCB

••.

Ill.

OraATIONI OF THI RoUL NEW Z&\I

AND

Am FORCE .•

IV. ()pa.a.TlONI or THI

Foaca

ROYAL

NBTHBlU.A. N D8

EAsT

INDIES

"

AIR

I. Inuod ucrion

The Anny Air Corps and the Naval Air Arm of the United States received active a8!listance from the air forces ot !leven nations in defeat- ing Japan. One of the!le, the Chinese Air Force, had been in combat with the Japanese since the hMarco Polo Bridge Incident" of 7

- I July 1937 and its "American Volunteer Group" formed the nucleus of the American air forCe!!

I in China; the British Royal Air Force, thc Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal New

8 Zealand Air Force3, the Royal Netherlands East lndie~ Air Forees and the Phi1!ppine Common- wealth Ail' Force all joined the war within 24

hours after the bombing of Pearl Harbor; and
II

Philipl)ines

the M(.'xiean Air Force engaged in combat fly-

ing against

from 4 June 1946 through

render on 14 August 1946.

these air

thc Jall!lnese

forces,

in

the

the Japan e!!C sur-

with

the exception

All of

of the BI'itish

most entirely on the aircraft industry of the United States for combat type planes. The Australian government, however, was able to manufacture trainers and light attack aircraft ("\\'ir raways") in increasing numbers as the war I)rogres.;ed. together "'ith spare parts for Ameriean tYllCS. Great Britain also supplied >!Orne Illanes to the Itoyal Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Forces. Both of these air forces at the start of the war with Japan wen' little more than training orl1anizations for pro- viding piloU! and airerews for the war with Germany. They successfully undertook expan. sion programs of considerllble SCOIJe and gave important nssistance to the Allied forces in the Pacific. I~xcepl fo r a few obsolete airerllft in rear "rea~ and the plane~ of the "AmeriClm "ohm- teer GroUI)," the Chin(.'sc Ail' ~~orcc existl'{]

only on PIII)(,I' at the time of Pearl l1arl)O I·. La t er, considerable numbers of Chinesc pllotll

Unite<l

States. Pilotll a lso we l'e trllined in the Uni t e<l

Stales for the Netherlands East Indies Air

Royal

Ail' Force, dep'ended al-

wcre trnined lit /lying schools

in the

Forces. These forces had been wiped out en- tirely in the early montha of the war. b~t before the Jallllnese lIurrender, they llgain were

Pilots of

the Philippine Commonwealth Air Foree took part in the defen!le of the Philippine" and !!Orne who escaped l!ef\'ed throughout the war \\'ith American unit!l. In thc following sections. operation~ of the ROYIII Au stralian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Foree and the Roynl Netherlands East Indies Air Forces are discus~ed. The records of the Chinese Air Foree lind the Chi- nese-American Composite Wing an> included in the USSBS publication, "Air Operations in Chinn." lind the British Royal Air Force record is included in the study. "The War in Sou th-

cast Asin."

1 indicatell till! relatil'e extenl of the

taking active roleJl in

the fighting.

Table

operations of eHeh nil' force in the Pacific Will'; ellch contributed to the fune~t extent of its

re:"OurCe~ and capllbilities.

II. Opera ti ons of the Ropl AU5tralian Ai r Force

I. Rur/(groulld. [n 1939 the Royal Austra- lian Air Force consisted of 12 :<Quadrons com- mande<1 by an expe rienced officer of the British Royal Air Foree. Air Marshal Sir Chllrleli Burnett, who had been 1011ned lit the reque.~t of the Australian gOI'ernment to modernize and IITOmOtl'! greater emcienc)' in the force. Thc lotal personnel consisted of 3 10 officers and 3,179 "other rank~." After the outbreak of war with German}" Auslralin agreed to ]»Ir- ticipatc in the Briti~h Commonwealth Air Trllining Program by IlTOviding partly-trained air crews for dillpatch to Canada. where the crew~ would complete their trRining. The first batch reache<1 Cllnnda in September 1940 and under all agreement of J anuary 19·11 Austrfl- lia'K mouth!)' (Iuota WRS to be 100 pilots. 52 obsel""er~ and 72 wircleS>l ail' gunnllTS. In addi- tion. Au~tr!llill agrC(!d to !)lIild up lin orgllniza_ lion in tht' Dominion cHIllible of IIcCl'pting fOI"

RESTIH CTED

tramna: e.eh month a.16 pilot>!, 184 ob

and S20 runnert.

erver~

the combined output the RA AF was

From

enttled to retain for its own requirementse:ut~ fid,nl personnel to ma n lIquad rolUl form

atetrdante with the allocation }. Ultra li a,

in

of ail'craft to

2.

Ar f(l " f Opfl'l'ltiolls .

cbe

ar

,

The RAA F opera~

throughout the Southweat Pac.ltic

mIles

fr',," Port Da rwin.

laTi e _

ro n l inent C<I\' e n almQ$t a" much territory a s co ntinental Un i ted State~ but ha ~ a I lO pulation

o f onl\' 7.000.000 loca tl'il chi e fl y along th e

ll re.t

within

II

radius of roughly 2,500

The territory -

altho~gh

W M s par -"! Iy poplliall.'d. The Au ~trahan

u:he~n COll~t and on th e e asl e rn p]aleau.

'

~x ci ti e 8 1i3t p'JPu]ation~ e x c eeding 100 . 000

And all bul one of th rse Are commercial porta

lIn~ manufacturin g center ~ . M o ~t o f th e north-

r rn half of Australia i~ hot

no inhabitant, except 1I11ci v iliz t

In ]941 t here were no road or railroad con -

Port

i n o n t he n orther n ~"{IIIsl. but a def e n se

hi_wa y \\'as completed during th e war. 'nIe i~1ancb north of Au " t ralia likewi se lir e

, exlmple, (half of Which, togethe r wilh ="'ew Brtain a nd New Il"Olland, was under Au stral ian

for

gererallr ~pan<elr :<ettled. New Guine

Il "

nedifllls betw~n southern Au st r alia lind

and

dr y a nd has

aboriginea.

mounlainous

a rtafl of the world and hll~ o nl y a ~mllll nati ve

IlLJIIdate)

one

of

t he

i~

most

RAAF

in

po, latlon

t

Ft>ru.

A ra ila!ll

1939

had

16£ lin:rafl ( AnllOn!l, Seagull!!. Demons and Wrnw8J's) in operational lIquad rons and th e inwed iate reRn'e, pl u8 a n additional 82 tra ill _

illl type a in:raft. Allotmenlr! of va r io us t)'fle !! of aircraft were nuuko by the United S tates

IIOme

wire lllallufaetured in Aust ralia a t Fisherman'" BOld and other factorlea. Br F ebruary 1945 th- fon:e tonI isted of t he fol lowing :

am to a laser degree by Britain , while

Ficbten

• 1Id

Att.dt ( .MCpII

( Spltti

nllp )

Killy

h

Boaton.

a lld Beaatlch~n)

u"",

bcaben (.ltchdl•.

Bea llforta. R aobono a

V tn l u

~)

and s.pl la)

( A _

.

Re

,

n(

and Ubenton)

c.~Unaa

~

''''

UI98

600

'"

'"

"

2

4,

P h.a llt~ o f

Op e1oa tio M.

Th e

RAAF.

I IUI

licipated in t he fo llowing phll!Ws of IVaI" III th ,

Pa cific:

(1)

Defense of Malaya.

.

.

(2)

(3)

The Air Battles over Darwlll. Defenge of New Gui nea.

(4)

The Allied Li m ited Olfen>uve

lIud I-I ol d

ing P hase.

(6)

The All-Out Allied Off ensive.

s

5.

l im i ti n y

F c! cl o r M.

Aus t ra li a

w

s

h 'II'"

prejl.'!Cd after Pearl Harbor to obtain su.fliciell '

and

DU I'IIi I

an d th is ser io lllll y li m ited opera tion s.

uppli e~ o f

a ir c r aft

aviation

eqUlpm ~ 1l 1

1940

it had become clear t hat the demands

01

the

E UTOIJoeli n

war

wo uld

prevent

the

Uni t e,

Kingdom

c tion~ equ ipment an d

w

counting.

i n g

of

from

f urni

which

hi ng

a ircraft, commu n i-

mater ia l-

mllny

the

local

other

r

o r

upon

beel

A good start had been made in crell t

Dominion

production

had

of

th

e

~,

eXl)and i ng

a dolltio n of r reve nti\'e measures. By mid_1 945.

however, an organiziltion had been built up which pl-o\'ed so SUCCessful in combattirig tl'opi- cal disease t hat the sick J'ate in New Guillea

a mong RAAF peraonnel \\'a8 lower than in ~ome o f th e a r eas on the Australiall mainland.

the

to

the

Au s tra lian

Austl'alia

could contribute to the reinfOI'cement of Britain in the Far Enst. Two reconnllisance

H ud-

sons and one fighte r squadron equipped with

Australian-buill

Wirrllll'a ys were

sent to Malaya dUl'ing 1940_

Ameri ca n-built Buffaloes and

SQ u a dr ons

6.

D e/Pllse

0/

Mulu!Ju.

During

1940,

gove r nment

gal'e

consideration

whic h

Lockheed

most ('!ftoetive

of

means by

Amedcan-built

The next rear a second flghler siluadron waH formed in Austl'alia and sent to SingallOre to operate unrler control of the I~oyal Air Force.

During t he last half of 1\141 a RAAF station

Singapore

\\'1I.'j

formed

at

Sembnwnng

on

w;th a total of about 193 combat aircraft. 80me of which were obsolete and all of which were inferior in per folTnance and armament to J apanese aiJ'craft of a similar type. Enemy air attacks wel'e frequent, and poor communi. cations and equipment caused an early loss of air sup,eriol'it}'. During J anuary 1942, while the Australian

ground forces in i\lalaYII, with little ail- sup-

llOrt, were retl-eating down

nese

They

increasingly heavy.

mainly

became

the peninsula, Ja pa-

laland

air

attack!! on

Singapore

were aimed

at Allied ail"]lO l"ta, docks and naval and mili - tary installations. It was decid<.'d to move all !SQuadrons to l'enr bases in Sumatril. On 20 January, operations were begun from airporll'l neal' Palembang and a few reinforcements ar- riv<.'d from Australia. Ground facilities wel'e inadequate, howe\'er, and scrl'iceability became

a great problem.

ite m ~ . Th e speed o f t h e J apaneRll advanc e dll r

ing the first

RAAF

either the hom e cont inent 0 1' its outposts .

defen'

hal f of

1942, however, found th

aiJ'cl'aft

to

withou t

.<l.Ifficient

Island

6

10

administer

these SQuadrons,

which

On 14 Febl'twry, Ihe Japanese began a land-

engaged

in

operlltional

training

and

patrols

ing operation north of Palembang from n con-

o\'e r t he

Ma lar Peninsula .

"oy of

approximately

40 ships.

On!}'

a

few

On

December 194 1 a

recoml<tissance air-

enemy

fighter

aircraft

were

present and

the

After

ri\'e iu

I

American-built aircraft beg

rge

n

to

al

numbers. therc were shortages 01

lool~ aud

S()are

pa rts ,

It

manufacture

United

Au s t r alia

State~ t y pe a i rcraft

in

necessary

wa~

co mponents

uillil

th e

e n d

t,

01

01

the WiU'.

T he le ngthening of au ppl}' lines di ll

ing th e all- o ut Alli e d o trell ~ iv

wi t h s hort

delar~ in delivel'Y o f equipm en t t o nni ts oper- at i ng from ad vanced bases .

Tropical d ise"sl's causcd diflicultie~ t hro ugh out t h e war and we r e /I major limitiug f act Oi r in New Guinea. T he southern coast of Nell Guinea iu t he vicinity of Milne Bay tlnd P ort

])ha se , co m b i n p<'

ges

of ~hippillg, caused co nti nu ;L

raft of

_the

c

IM're Japa-

nese co n voy consisting of 13 warships and 22

but

In the

eal'ly

gan lan ding on thc beach near Kol:l Bharu, The Aust r al ian pilot., attack ed with maximum strength until dawn, when the second Hudson aqundron from Kuantan ainlOl·t joined the

fight.

headed fo r t he eastern

hours of 8 December, Cnemy forces be-

tran spor ts.

Bharu on

th e

R AA F' based at

K ota

to

Malaynn

Peninsula sighted a

about

250

miles

out

gea

Malayan coast,

T ogethel',

t hey

succeeded

ill

inllicting

hea vy Io.~~es on t he JapH nese in personnel and

eq uipme nt, but enemy fig hte rs were operating

over

Aus-

t he area

a nd

by

midday . half

t he

Mo r ellby, the only

portio n

w h ic h

t

he

Alli l"

t

ralian aircraft were lost or badly damaged.

wer e a bl

to hold du ring

1942.

is

o

ne of

t h'

At

t

he end

of th e

day,

I'emaining unit.~ ,'e-

most

mAl a r ious

in

t he world.

ti red

10 Kua ll la n . tak ing all pel"sonnel, equip-

At

th e sta rt of t he New Guinea cam paig n.

men t "nd

O llC n ,Uon~ w e r e continued

aircraft t h at cou ld

f r om

be flown

away .

I'oads,

railroads and sanitation

facilities wen

t h is base u ntil

al m os t no n -exi s tent.

T he ~i ef s ourc e of

labo r,

9 Dece mbe l". when e nemy advances

forced an

t.he

Mela n esian

native s , wer e highl y

 

eva cu a tio n to Se mbnwnng on Singapo re Island_

hzed a nd this limil<.'d thei r

dil\eaS('s in order of

f e\'er.

typh us.

k

uflCfull1ess.

impo r tance we r e detl g\\\

~crlll'

in

Oll,.,r

dy se nt e r y .

~

di Se a s e s

nnd

As the war p r ogr essed nort hward :lnd lIorlh

weatwa r d, new disea ses from time to t ime \)0"

came

a

problem

and

constantl y

fo rced

t~i

DlII'in g

sq uadron at

t o

\\' as

t.e mpting

a ll

this

lig h ting, t he

t h e

RAA F'

c o \"c 1"

as

figh t cr

t-

I llOh on provi d e

west CO;lst. was

f"l"

fighte r

a~

poss iblc .

At th e o utbr ea k of 11''''', th e A ll ied air fOl"ce~

ill

AU Hlrali a n s

S in ga po r e

and

a nd

1\ 1; , 1>1), 11 ,

Dut c h ,

i nclud i ng

h ud

] 2

Bri ti sh, sqlUl.d r ons

rem nants of the

and personnel on the beaches f rom dllyligh t to

dark

could be accomplish ed . At t he end of t h e day,

however, all bombs a nd ammunition sUllplics

were

Aust ralian squad rons were withdrawn to Ba_ tavi a ai r port at the capital of the N ether!and~

East Indies. F rom this location and from various other airports in Java. t hey partici- pated in the defense of the Indies. When it becHme appa rent th at JavlI was lost, all re-

we re

22

Feb r uary 194 2 and !'etur ned to Australia,

halt in

the dis pa tch of air crew trai n1*!S overseas fol- lowing Pearl Harbor and concentrated iu. efforts towar d expanding RAAF Ol)(!rations in the Pacific. Four months later t he A ustralian War Cabinet set its gOlll at 53 ope rating squad_

ro n s in the Paci fi c by 1945 an d lit the sa m e

ma ini ng emba r ked

the

rearmament

RAA F' blaste d enemy barges

as

often

as

refuelling and

and

on

15

exhausted,

February,

Aust ralian

in

ai r

fon:e

pe rsonnel

17 and

All ied ships betw1*!n

The goveJ'n ment called a tempora ry

time decided to contin ue scnding some to Canada and England.

trall'1*!S

7.

b

The Air NnW.:s Ov(:",. 0")"1611 .

Au stralia's

on ly

im llOr tnnce

to

Inrge

t he

a

po r t.

pa l'lic ular ly

Om'wi n.

se t t leme n t .

a ll

duriug t ht,

r thel"!l

nD

wall

ni

l'

of grent

sl'

IIl1d

Al lies as

3

~Dth. of

in New

G

W

the •• r.

A"ide (rom

Port

_l¥

it

WIUI the only for-

th

ern

ward Allied air bale from Yo hich the IOU

~

flank If die Japuaeee IIwuioD !0f'C\!:t could be

.~~ 1\140 \he f\nt two bomber·rewn-

nal8llllDce

uadrol\.~to be !lent to the new'i~

built .ir stlltion .rrind at

(rom

O,""n equipped ,,· Im ArnHiean·bui lt nud!lOn~ oombld and atr.fed the Japanese o~ T ob1 Islam northll\'!<t of :"ew Guinea. In mld·Feb- ruary 1942 tbe ~mall Alatralian air unit.~ Sl'nt

·

1~n.beT 1941 a n Auatralian ,.quadron

Darwin.

On

to .di,need bues at Ambon and Timor we

foreet by Japanese adnll1ce~ to return t~ Dar-

an important IlI r and

win

hich

had berom

_ lllagioa- .rea.

As the Japanese offen~in'gathered 5trength.

captuing

Ambtn. enem)' air reconnai~."ance o,'cr DarwlIl

Ih,-

ftnt ~nemy air .uack flU tht> port took pl.e!', Bee.ue of poor intelligence and inadequate

rada, protection it came II~ a complete tacticill

the

frequent.

Celebes.

On

the

lIalmaheraM

19

February

1942

a~d

becane

nrpri8e.

A format ion of 27 Japane"" medium

boIden f~ b) :;0 dil'e·bomber~ lind

ftPtaa attatked an Allitd conl'or which had Jult arriv.d frum thE' bland of Timor. St.-etl Allild !<hips ""'re ~unk and SCI"en dnmaged,

ADoIber loaded with high t'xpl(l;liH'~ hlew UII

~r bei.1II' ~lnICk b} 00rnto. and cllu

'(1

fur-

formation of 27

earrier"""'" JaTNInelie bomber~ later that

am· ~ 1Itrucli. RAAF hllngar~ anti rCllail'

aIIOfoI tauaiDl: 110'111)' llama1ft' lind I

An une>ll

,rted

ther~.

of lif

Air IUlib then in th

Darwin art'1l cunHi~\('(1

01

two

reoall

below-lItrenJth

Au~tralian bomber-

"'IlWironH. one Aml'riean IIgh""!'

lfIu.Uon equlPPftl with P-4o,. and a RAAt·

IflIiIdroa of P'M1'&I- ptll'pDIIIt' \\'irrawII)~.

Aitied

were II P-40a.7 Hud!lon

and

I

Within

aevtraI. Ha.,. PBY '1)'lnK boat. delltroved'

Hliboa and

I Wirraway dalllaJ't'd.

of

the Aa.trat\u umb at D.,.Wirr had rt'turnffi

thne .,.

~

the au.ck

f"iceability

to the ~

I'III1ntained prior to th

raid~

t.t. thret r.

S. Kitt ,bawk ftJhter I(]uadron~

were

at Darwia a!WI it became pouibJt.

\0 live ral OJIIQiboa to the ftIfmy'. bomber

,

~~~ -

med

by IUJJIe of hi.

---- 1IIq( Ilrmen.

mOlit t'X-

.1fter die faD of the Netherlandl .Eut In.

tiles ear) In

on

.

1"

",reh an all-out Japaneae .' at ta cli

ared

to

be an

Iflcrea5 1fl

re

ere

g por P08- ted

:

arWI,O .'

D

.

Ibility'

of the Celebes an d nine transports

w

~r

c

Firl' aircraft carners .

.Ighted In KoepallR" harbor o~ Ambon,

, »OlIsible b)' Allied bombers.

Au~tnllian. Americnll alld Dutch I)Ilots de-

wh ic h

immediate\).

a~1 stre ngth

By April ~9t12, th e

we

attacked

With

fl'lIding

Japane

defensilc ~o rtie.~. and to mlhet conslde r abl,

Darwin

were

able

to ~unter each

air attack with ~p~roxlmat~IY 10~

att riti on on the

nemy.

 

The

frequency

of

JapalLese

lIi l' lI~taeks 01 1

I)arwin

d('Crea!Ot'(1

1111

the

enem), s.

 

mounted.

On

22

Allril

19~2 the

Allied

All'

Forees

of

the

Southweat

Pacillc

area

wen

formed a number of additi onsl air bases wel't COlIstl'U'Cted in the Darwin area and more air·

crllft began to anh·e. The Allied foree!! defending DHrwin inclu ded Kith'hawk" Bellufighter~, WfrrnwaYlI Il ntl ,'ullee Vengeancc;I. During December 194

,'lIuug-h

II wing

I!riti>lh-built Spitftres arrived to cqui j

(three squadrons) of AUHtralian figh tel

.

.

.

pilots.

Up

10 this

time

Darwin

had been

III

tacked

about 50 times

by the enem), .

Ev en ·

tUally .ix Australilln »quadronll of Spit fir e.·

were ba.•ed in the Darwin area. This ti g h te r

strength. togethe r with the efficiency of rada r

made a

units

Japane~ air attack on Darwin a rare even l

Allied claim!! of enemy 1000ICs over Darwin be·

17 :1

tween January 1942 and April 1M 3 were

destroyed. :m probably destl'oyed and 7::

damllg

.,('t

up

during

the

year.

!lOOn

od.

t(.

1)//(1/.'1

ui Sew

Gl1inw.

Hying

th.·

boat squ a d rOll'

r eeo l\ '

In

1939

RAAF e~tul)1i"hed two

P orI

ance

Mort'sby

to

at

nai"-

baoot's

Tulngi and "ila in the Solomon~. and Noum!';' in Fr\!nch Ncw Caledonia. all equipped wit h wirel(·"l<. mooring~. fuel lind bomb!!.

carry

Rabaul

out

aerial

in the Pacific.

built

at

Advanced operation al

in

:ofew

B rita in

Wt'rt·

At

th('

tim('

of

Pearl

Hnrbor,

th e

enti f(

northern Nt'w Guinea area wa ~ d e f ended b )

un l.l' tWI) ~qlll\dron~ ('(Iu ipped with four E ml)i ""

12 American_built Catlilinll !<.

but on IC I)('("(' mb,:r a lIQuadron o f II ud sonl! /I ud Wirrll\loll~" n\()wd to Rabaul.

H1J2 the J/ipane lW begun air

IIttack~ again~t Rabuu l and on 20 Janua ry l SI;

l'nemy

ail· I)Ofl$.

tlying boal~ and

On ~ Janullr)'

aircraft

blsl!\.cd

the

ltabaul

destroying so me of t he AUst ralian aircraft on

the

ground.

W irrawnys

went

aloft

to

engage

the

l<'ive e nemy ;

all

we re

shot

do wn

ill

names. Three da~'s la ter. Japllnese ground

forces landed f rom s h illS /lnd occu llied Rabaul.

Glou-

later

lipread ing

to

Gasmata

and

Clipe

lI(luadron~ equiPIle<i with Ki ttyhawh wen:

stationed a t the eastern tip of New Gu inea.

On 24 Au glls t a BtLy lind landed

strips from which the Australian pilots oper-

ated. The Australilln

tighter lIQuadronll s t-

J npa nellC co nvoy ente red Mil ne trOOJ)ll eas t of th e th ree lighte r

cester.

tlleked

enemy

landing

barges.

dum ps,

On

7

~larch. the dllY

after the fall

of Ba_

lind

'Inything

else

in

sight

white

Au st rslilln

ta\'ia. capital of the Nethel'lands East Indi~,

a JalJanese convoy upproached

Lac and Sula_

maua

in

n Ol 't her n

New

(;uinea "nd

 

by du~k

of

the

follo ll'iug

(IllY

both

were

in

enemy

hands.

a joint carrier-borne and laud-based /li r attack

of 10 March a t !ca~t thr~ Japanese ships wen'

sunk,

t h ('

became

the last Allied IItronghold on New Guinea. and

the nA AF' had exclusil'e I'e~ponsibility fOl' air

dcfen.'!C of th e I)OI·t un t il t he nr.-iv"l of Ameri_

can nir uni ts in May.

force ~i ved its fi r s t tighter aircraft-Aml'ri-

can-built Ki tty lllllYks.

T he Japan ese the Netherlands

made a special e!for't to captu re intnet all air- fields. established ports and harbor~ /Inti other ingtllilntions wh ich would nlll ke possible thf'

ill

It was ob\'iou~ thll t the enemy's

chief Ilroblem w us su pply and reinforcement!'.

B AA F available were

ordered to llttempt to dis ru pt enem~' 8u pp l,I'

bom bing lind "trafi n j(

Therefore,

jungle te rrai n.

The A lHe~ retaliated. how·ever. and in

Port

southern

~foresby, t h e

coast of

Nel\

only

lurge

Guinea,

town

then

on

On 21

" l arch

19~2 the

for ces in their ijurg(! through En!lt IndieH ,Illd :of!"'W Guinen

!l upplying o f

fr ont-li n e

un it~ of

t h e

t r oop

\l n it~ f i ghting

and commun icationll by the following ta rgets:

a.

II' at'd

b.

Jal Ja ncse

I1rCI1S.

Sup ply

shi ppin g

a nd

storage

Imd

aircraft

dump~ ut

in

for_

fo r wu.-d

uirtlelds.

c.

Personnel n reas.

d. Airfield ru nwn y~ li n d !lO r t in~tnlln tion".

The HAAF jo ined i n the atta ck on t he J apn-

nc-'IC e o nvo},

which on 6 May Ifl.l21eft Ilabanl a nd attempwd

to approach Po rt Moresby th rough the Jomll1'd

re turn C{1 home wi t hout

attempting t o m a ke 11 I/ln di n g after the Co r al

Sea battle in wh ich the J llpanese 1000t t he car-

rier ShollO an d th e Un it e d S t ille>< lo~t the Le.-

iflOlol!.

PaSgllge.

of

IIp p roximately

20

tranS llOrB

Thi s con voy

By the end of July l!loI2 two HAAV fighter ,

infantr), engaged in hand _to-hand lighting w it h.

the enemy. By 6 September a1l J apa nese for<:eg had been wiped out or evaeuuted. During t he fighting !llong the Kokod u Tn,j] and in the Owen-Stanley Moun tai ns of Nl'w Guinea, Australian Beaufighters nnd Beauforts

su pported

enemy supply tnlins a nd st r ong poi nta. w hi le

Wirmwn)'s

and equillment to Allied forces.

to rpedo !!Quadrans of th e

Port

t he sea Innes OJ)l'n for Allied ~hipping nnd a t

the same time di~located J a pnnese sea com- munications.

RAA F BOMt o n s.

the

Marc h. the action

Japanese offensive efforts in t he Southwest

Puc itic for t he l'emaind er of t he wa r .

the

a nd

ground

othe l'

and

forces

by

aircraft

RAA F

attacking

f ood

drop ped

helped

Bomber an d stationed at

to keep

Moresby

~1ilne Bay

lSqua drOIlS Be: IU f o l·ts a

nti

desu'uction

of

t he

w'hieh

in

t his

Bisma rck

equipped

with

ClI tnlinns.

pn r t early end

i n

in

of

Hu dso n s took

Lae

convoy

marked

t he

Sea

Ene my

engugement a re

e~timated \.0 ha \"e bocn fou r dest royers a nd :~O.OOO tons of shiP lling. 2.900 men a nd 62 air· ernft.

P r o m exercised

H eadqu a rt er s

RAAF . lI e a d-

On () September 19 4 2

Ilnarter~ was establis hed in Brisbane, wit h the

u nder

the

Southwest !'ucitic Area. to Australia n oper- ational units and s uch other Allil'll u nits lUI were nssigned to ·it. When ope r a t io ns moved

lo~

30

A pr il

19012.

A llied

of

Ol)('ra tio nal

of

giv ing

cont r ol

th e

R A A ~~ Co mm and

fu ncti o n

o per at io nll l co ntr ol

Genera l.

A lI il'll

Ai r

Commandin g

F orc

e

~.

furth cr ntleld. th e "Command ing Ge neral. For_

Ila1'd Echelo n" beenme the accredi ted rellre- K('ntati\'e of the Chief of the RAAF Air StaIr

with the com m ander of the Allil'll A ir Sout h Paci fic ArCH.

}o'o r ce"~ .

Ilis·dirt!cti,",~ s ta tl

was

o f

:!

th a t the mission o f the

t o the

force~ n n d e

BA AF

l<{\mmand

"'egt I' ncific

Its t e rr i t ories; t h e p r o tec ti on o f II hipping

Australia

'" t o con t ribu t e

the Are n .

r Com ma nde r in Chief, Sou th _

i n dc fcn ~e o f

IHI I I MId

rreII over.tinK in

th~

lhe delta' of entmy fo

Sooth,

'unction With the

l!ilber bdrpendtont1y ord I~ CO:lrecl cooperation

ADied Air

To carry out this

lhorm-d to act

was aU

In

.,-at foRe!.

g

Pacific Aru.

• L_ RAAF

FoJ'CIN an

,'lJ'ent.

with th.' A\lied AnnY and N,

9

A'lild

·

Pluut (Mlln'

Li","td

Off",,"Fr

J

" ' -S,ptf'lllbtr

-

--" "" exlstllli a,r""

ex.--

ones ir ne",ly.conque

(lilt!

I''"'

HoldillQ

After

t efforts towards

Marcll1943 J.~n ma~_I~nd buildlnl new

d the

red territory \)(> In

. rd uIIIOI remained

front \'IIe8- ~up~lyof fO~~ One method de-

u

,-elopet b)' the J,apane.oe ~erdl&nt 3hip~ into

";'I\-e thi" problem

the memy" No. I pro I

COIlllPL-d of takmg large

=with theIIe ahiJIII' cargoes along the ooa~t

1 and

We,,"'alI

and then

-

gmll'

berge~

.

ed

·

b}

I~t into

II

,

tben attac

e

·ard

the

~urnl ~~.pe~ on enemy airerdt at for.

\be

11>

ro

' oil

.r('IUI.

Allie>!

concentrated

d

at

ward ~irfteld4.aupplil'1l and Mtora~~de::~:nd

101l1!".nlll)(I'

niKhl lllUlCk~

\ina.! Joined

and mine laying

in with

ed Offtlliril'c I'hn l C (SOl/ em·

10.

AlI.()lIt AliI

5

ber 19-"- AuguRI 19\).

In

ed LIIe following n

Septemb<'r

1!)4:1

Allied ground fo~elI s.Of1llbombardmellt.

>\IIftening·UP b)' lIIten.sl\~

marked t

,·ance westward

four

ge general catei"Or"l a~ of l'llemy ~treIlKth.(Ita-

ManokwaTi rllll!

Th ill

1111·

II

H'

of the

,·_1

AU k d

.,

unt!

.

he

real

bef(lIInlllg

which did not hall

had been reoccu I",·

th.

t

Pacific

Sou

wet<

·ea·

w

. k

e'Wa.

Taet ielll tar ·

fell

into

Philippines

ta

in

the

a.

bauI,

By·passed.

Bougain\"1Ue,

Halmahera).

b.

,

t

Neu ra IZ

,K ai, . Ar oe ' Tllnil""b u r

r ed Arellll

utch New Guinea area) .

and the southern

D

c.

Forward

Arell"

(Soem\)1l

'

Timor

ami

C~ram).

d. Zone of major land war

f

lire (the Philip·

pinell). RAAF Spitfires were sent to

t cted KITlWllla . alr"u .

II

1C

11

ewly

(;

Ol1·

rt ill October ]!)43, und

.

the II&l!II' lIeldl!, barges and barre Japall!&e .hipping.•

I

Beaaftghten and SOlIton. of the RAAF spe- eializtd in dilrupting Japane/IC

thiS pe-

·00 _rebed the cOBllt1in~, riven and beach~

IIItnll. and from dawn to du~~ durllllr

~hip.ping ~ove.

~f Nf1Ii Britain. Th_ activitiell ffljulted In the IBItnKtion of about 200 J apanetoe barge.

_th.

0

;:111

Kay

and

Ju~ of

1943

8t>aufOtU,

BoIt.RIa. Kittybawka and BHuftghten of t~e R.AAF moved on to the nl'wlYoCOMtructed air·

strip M Goodenough I,land. They to~menced rep.ar attach &pintt \be Japanete air t.u.

at Gaamata. Cape HoUina and Cape GIooceat.er,

Durinl

JUDI 1!MlI Allied I_landed on Klriwina and woanan bIaDda to obtain further IwoH fnr

"IridI the object of nelllral~lng them.

---.

huwldJe.

air

POll. DvwIa J.d _

operationa

oortbweat

of

to be thl' rapotlRlbilit.l'

of iIe KAAF••hbough Bomb Group 380 of tbeAmerican AAF arrived In the atu in June

1M aDd provided htav~'bomber .upport. The

the

ara CID\ered on biJ buN. on Timor and Am· bot w- whk:h were attacked Increuinrly.

the New Guinea operations

aU. bI ccmfue the eaemy rep.rdlnr Allied In.

,

,

IblIltr to muter

air

power

In

In order te

MUIGu. bomber alren.ft

ran~ far

f_ ~

Allltrall.a, and RAAF

aaeld

cat

~~t~ Austrlllian.piloted Kittyhllw~~, \)ega:~l~.lr

ull

0 surfuce

coast

1943.

f

enemy

tratlic

IIOSltlons

In

mOvillg nlon g

o ·

f '

,\1

I

neutrllhzEabon

range.

the

nemy

B

·

n

,·n

N

ew

prllelu:ully .

,

cell.~e<

ward~ the

end of

Du·ring October

19·13 aircraft of the RAA e

and the USAAF combined to curry o.lIl a d ·

structi\.e attack on shipping installatIOn s

alrcra

rapi .d

It 1088el1 which the enem)· attempted to re· ~'::e thereb)' weakening his air d e fen ses els~·

whe~. Towards the end of Dece.mbc.r 1 9· 1 3 IU ~

attacka

Gloucester and

u

mo,.ement to "'adub Airport in the Mnrkham

\'alieyof 12 RAAfo' Ol)('rlltionlll !lqua d ro ll s I1l1d

during

ftquadron~, one Arm)· co-operation >l(llIndro n Illd auxiliary unilll wer moved to ('a pe G loll'

eeater

All·

NegrOli

fighter

.

rl

II I

"-baul

Se,·eral

more auack!!

a~ (1

m

. SUCCessl ·,n ~aused · heav\" .

.

Jap!ll1C!IC aif-

rllcilitated

Allied

the

landlnlP!

a t

CaP(~

of

Arawe.

Februar~· 1944 !laW

the

the

rollowing

in

Allied

New

of

Britain.

Lo6

complet ion

three

month

After th e

Islllnd

in

se i zu r e

t he

b~

miraltieJl

two

RAAF'

fightel"

~qUlHlrons li nd

admin"'t~ative and main1enaIl C ( ' unit.~ fr om

Klriwina were sent there. On 18 April 1944 air hendqUlI.rten I)CrSo

together with ground per~onnel and e qnil )lll Cn l

of firMer squadrons, depllrted in hllulin g crll ft aa part of the combined Allied force \\Ih\ch 011

l1ne l.

22 April 8UC<:C88 fu\l y In Ya ded Aitn])e (b e tween Hol1&ndill and We wllk i l\ Il ol·th er n New Brit-

the

An RAAF a irfi eld construction winl{

mat ·

ter 01

r e p n i red

landed with

aJn)

Ja

and

nl'lM'.

captured

the ta s k

hll d

Tadji

airport

f rom

fo r ce a nd

and

within a

extend ed

hourJl

th~'

("aptured lIirlitrip. TilI'e(' RAAF ligh t el· ~Iuadrons became f ully

and

II\Wt'ral

A short t ime lifter

the Allied forC('~ ca ptu red lI o\landia, RAAF

to the 1»I se from

to Tadji durin g ea rly MIIY.

Nadzab

operational

nt

Ta rlji

o n

2·1

April

1!).I4

more sq uad rons

mon~d f rom

ftPter squadr o n ~ w e r e m o\·~

Both the Tadji and Hollandia units

joiMCi in the large scal e air attacks on Wewllk.

north -

I'rn

lltol'll

took part in the a ttack s. the ad vance of the

A\\ied

New Guinell coast ,

(·atalhl1l. gquadr o nll s t atio ned il1 nor t hwest Australia mad e n maximum eff o r t to aSlli~t b~' mining enem )' IlOrlJl aud hllr bo r s a ll fn r afi eld 1\.8 Soerllbajn in no rth c rn Ja va li nd T II!·I.kHU

lind Ealikpnpal\

u nder

the

Molucca Islands.

At fir a! enemy a ir a tta cks in

(;eneral

M('flnwhile. with forces along th e

Liller·

tbe remaining J ll pa nese Mr onghold in

rear areas.

Nt'w

Guill e ll .

For

the

fi r st

tim e

IH_24 J1)

ma nned

by

northern

A ust ralian

crew~

in

Borneo .

1944

Durin!\"

S e l)tem bc l·

th e

A\li es

Morotai

MacArthur land ed a t

in

trH l l lk

tncked

·d

r~

\hN·I '.

lIn y

o f

nl\'

mediumll ~ o u s is tell tly at -

e ll em y tll r gets a nd we re

df'M t rllction s of cO ll side ra b l e

MuitalJle

1·('8llOn ~ ib lt' for thc

n

lug·

gers lIud othel·

In IIdditioll, HAAF Liberlltor~ opera t ing

f rom blll!ol.'~ in uorth Aus tralia s truck ta rgets

Nl'"the rlsnds

IIreas

in

the ('entral Celebes to East

~:sst Indie~ from

~ ma\1 c argo

I"essels,

barges,

mh e

u

ty pes of coastal s h ippi ng.

of

the

wide ly·

'lmated

J a\"ll

I II

the

lati e l· area th e

bombers carried

out

~t rlltegic alt" e k ll n n

the

important power

s tlltions lit l\ali. Konto, IIppro:lCimately 50 mi les

tr ip s t h e

,)Ian ts.

o f

car ried out long-rllnge sea

!!Outhwellt

of Socrabajn,

nauti c al Thl'.\' 111110

involving ro.und

wrec k ed

1.!:I00

mile ~. These

r()ConnllilWlncc in se arch of J upanese ~hippi ll g which res u1te<1 in t he sinking or da maging of

mllll}'

could not "fford such losses.

Jap ll ne.se

lellllCl a

at

a

time

w h en

t h e

DU l"ing

Allril

19· 15

Be a ufort .'!qu a drons

wit h

inll tn llll ti onll and t roops in

19 45 Aus tr a li a n

a nircra ft, ma de

n d

flye

werl'

maximum "t reng-th t he Wewn k area.

J{ r OU II ( i Rri lis h

lI~sembled ut T adji

On

li nd

bombed

Au st r a l ian

14 Mill'

fo r ce", ~u PllOr t('(1 by

\Hl\'nl u nit{l nnd

Al1ied

H

co mb ined l!l nd a nd amph ibiou s atta e k which

I·e~u lte d i ll t he

hold.

capt ur e of this J ll p a n ese ~t rOl\ g ·

The mOllt im l)(lrtant Mtrategic targets in t he

this

arell we r e f l·eq ue nt.

To a ssist in com bnl·

Pacific

area

we r e

t h e

oil

iU!lta lla .

ting

thelle IIttac ks three S p itfire ~lullilron~ were

tions of Hornt'O. notably t hose at Tarakan and

moved fl·om Dllrwin to Morotai.

ference ~oon ended. By thi~ time RA A F units i n t he Southwe;t

Pacific

Th\!y

miles .

were able to ca rry out ope rations wit h

Enemy inte r-

wer e

~pread o\·er

.some

2.000

Balik l)a pall

bombed

ing

of J al mne>!e "hippi ng

lII.'a

Oil

t he

ea~t coast.

we re Allied lIi r crllft d uro

becauflt' of

li nd

t he

A I1ie<1

th e d ecli n e lIiT

s nd

t he J llpa nese

Th ese

intermi ttently by

li n d

19 ~4 . bUl

I !:I I ;)

blocklldl' after October 1944

a hirh degree of e ificiencr under these condi.

no lo ng<' r "'ere a ble to m ll ke extens ive expor! '!

tionR·.

10

t

he ho m e islllnd\l,

Alii@(I Mtrat e g y had dic t ated the bY llassing

T

he oi l "till re mained in enem y hll nds, how-

of areu containing s lrong force~

troop>! in orde r to speed the ad l'anee we!ltward. J~use of th e d i fli c ul Uell of SUI )ply. l h e H AAF

'

a nd provi d ing di ·

fe<:t sUllllOrt Jor

galred

ope r ating f r om t h r

Dllrwin aren were emine nth· ~uccell"ful in lIre-

nn~' co n s id e rabl e a~ lOlInl." of SU PI) lie"

or

lind neutrllliZNI lIreall lind in g n,dulIlI y \\"enk .

c ninl'

Alls lr"lill n g round forees en-

arelUl under cons tHnt at tack

retein'd th\' I)rlma rl' task of kee ping t he

of enem)"

in

reducing

them .

Mediu m

bom\);>r"

(Mitche1\s and

I ' cllting

r

lnforcem\'nl~

the

power

Vf' niura s )

from

to

I"(.nchin g

resist

of

t he \).I' pasl!C(l

enemy

force~

~'\"el·. a n d u \1a \"l\illlble to t he Alli es. In the

" p ring of 1!:1 15 HAA f' Libe rll to r s ope rati ng

in western Au stl·alia n o rthwest Au s tr alia

hel(l<n

tlO

Inndi nlC

ill Borneo . AIIJlt n liinn Li be rator ~ fr o m th e

lIi11t)' of an

from thl' \·icilllt)" of Pel·lh

through ~tagin g b ll !Sl'~ in

r t.'!

b l >lllkl'ti ll g

wi t h

bo

m

b~

11 11

Ja p an ese

a i r·

i n

J UI ·II f rom whic h the re WIlS an y llO&I i-

air

relic ti on

to an

Alli ed

])>1. 1"\, ill

II I·. ·" und

B

of

th e U. S. Thirtet.llth

AI' uillo J)ul· t idl)lI((od.

 

TI lt'

 

>I i I" 1It\l< c k

IlItel· wa ~

" h if t cd to

tll c Hc ul

 

at

Tllrnkan

1111 11

ullj ll ce ll t 1"·1''''' ill Hil l·ll l'O !llI d tlu) Celebc~.

On

7

I MHI

I~J 1(; Al li . ·d 11"1·0111111 f()l·c('~, ~\lIl]lOrted b.,·

5

Alred lIiT uni~ opo.ratmg

Au~tra]j8l\ and United Statell naval umts, l~'

, Foree mtde no appearance ~uring the. hmdmg. Soon lfterwards. follo\\'lOg oee&Slollai at- tacks by the enem)'. II squadron of Spitfire,s was mo,'ed into Tllukan. Borne(J. In .Jui}. after all intensil'e air attaCk by all a\'flliable hell'T bombers, aUack air.:raft lind .fighter~. AuSI~alilnground troops !lInded at BahkplIplIll. In all Borneo lanriings the caaualties were

,-aded Tarakan Island.

.

f

1'1I1awan and

.'

Japanese

IT

rom

The

light.

Durin,

August

til"

main RAA~

,

t

a I'en

h

was mo,ed \0 LaUblill with fig?ler squadron~

stationeG

at

Tarakan

and

BahkpaplIll.

Aus-

tralill-\)aied Catalinlls sUlging .thr,ough

Luzon

lind Leyte were mining the shlppmg lanes at

Halnan, Formo;;lI, Hong Kong. Amoy lind

Swatow

II. ()Irrational Ree(Jrd. From Pearl Har·

bor thrcugh the end of the war, the RAAF car-

ried out 92,26;; sor ties and

of bombs.

dropped 23,249 tons

It lost 694 aircraft in combat.

12. Conclusions (A Summation). The RAAF "lUIde the following major contributions

conclusion of the war against

to the !!IIcce Japan:

s.ful

in

tralia turing the early months of the war and

scored an important

in\"asion force at !>lilne Bay in esstern Nell Guinea in August 194.2. (ii) Built up, with the aid of the United States and Britain, 11 halanced ai r force ulti- mately ha,·ing 53 ;;quadroM, and capable of both tactical and strategic air support of Al-

0)

)efend€d Dar

and

northern

Aus-

victory over a Japanese

lied o~erations in the Pacific.

(iii) Had an

importan t role in \·arious oper-

ations of the Allied offensive, notably the ai r bombwdment. ,,·hich made possible Ihe storm-

ing

Borne) oil fields in 1945. Ov] In collaboration with the Royal New Zealald Air ForC(' and the Royal Netherlands E8IIt Indies Air Force, kept bypassed a reas contaming strong forcell of enemy t roops under constlnt attack, and permanently neutrali2ed. (vI Made numerous attacks against Ja pa- nese Ihipping, the most vital link in J apan's war tconomy, at a time when acute shortage~ were developing.

01

Lae

in

1943 and

the

invasion of the

13. St4t~tie8.

01 Lae in 1943 and the invasion of the 13. St4t~tie8. Ill. Operations of the Royal

Ill. Operations of the Royal New Zealand

A ir Fo rce

Bl.lckgr(Jllml.

New

Zealand·s

peaC<!time

(P~~_1939) Air Foree had a pl~nnedstren~h

of only 100 officers and 900 aIrmen. Its l e- serve consisted of members of civilian Aero Clubs tlying light airplanes. After t~e start (jf war with the ~:uropean Axis, a conSIderable expansion of airport facilities ·be~an, but it was agreed that New Zealand's primary fu~c. tion w(juld be the training of pil(jts and au - crew personnel in connection with the British Commonwealth Air Training Program. For this reason, military aviation in New Zealand

at the time of Pearl Harbor consisted mainly

of a training organization distributed over both N(jrth and South Island with n(j provi·

si(jn for offensive operations in the Pacific or

even for repelling an invasion.

squadron was operati(jual in the Dominion .

Zealand Air Force uni l

outside the Dominion was a detached flight of

a bomber-reconnaissance squadron (jperating

from

e(jm·

Zealanders

missi(jns in the British RAF.

Not a fighter

The only Ro:yal

Nandi,

New

Fiji, although

held

so-called

nearly 1.000 New

"short term"

2. Area. of Operalioll8.

After Pearl Harbo r

New Zealand underto(jk, with the aid of its allies, the building of an air force capable of both defensive and offensive action in a huge

area of water space dotted with islands that

populations and li ttle in-

dustr~'. (RNZAF operations were carried ou l within a radius of 4.000 miles from Auekl::md. Dominion capital.)

had backward native

New Zeala nd itself is primarily an agricu l- tural country with 11 popUlation of less tha n 1,700,000. Before the war its principal eXp<lrts

were

food

(meat

and

dairy

products)

an d

wool.

Most

manufactured

articles,

includin g

8

those neceSSAry

tiolll, eame from the United Kingdom.

in

transp<lrt and communica_

reserve aircra!t , aircl·aft s pares, tools and ex- perienced personnel were lacking. For a time

8.

F orce8

A vailable.

At the

beginning

of

ground

staffs

at

all

stations

worked

double

1940, the RNZAF had 109 aircraft of

variou s

shifts.

types Including T iger Moths, a light biplane

When

the

Allied

Combined

Chiefs of Staff

uBed (or spor t and training. A few month s

agreed to place the air force under American

bef o re P earl H

arbor, the !lir force received it~

autho rity

for

command !lnd supply

and

allo-

Drst

moder n

planes -

34

Lockheed

Hudson

cated

540

U.

S.

aircraft

fot·

delivery

before

reconna issance bombers, Although for a time plllM called for the RNZAF to become a bal- anced force having all types of aircraft, it was decid ed t hat greate l· efrectiveness would result if lighter activities were stressed. In 1942 American-built Kittyhawks were introduced

squadrons

Zealand

and

in the fo r ward areas were rearmed with Cor- sairs. By July 1945 the air force had 13 fighter squadrons, each manned by 27 pilots, the p<llicy hei n e- to keep eight SQuadrons actively engaged at a ll ti m es with the enemy in forward areas. On I July 1945 the aircraft svailable were

apportioned as follows:

April 1944, s uppl y became

prob-

lems

curin g specialized tools still exi sted. Different

threads and unfamiliar types of gauges served to puzzle insufficiently-trained technical per-

sonnel.

frames and engines developed.

Local manufactul·ing was resorted to where

In some

cases, parts originally intended for one aircraft

But as

late as March 1945 it was necessary to decom- mission a bomber-reconnaissance squadron be- cause the squadron's Ventura aircraft were needed by other squadrons operating further

type were adapted for use on another.

s pares were unobtainable elsewhe re.

Shortages of spare parts for both air-

a

conside rably less of

problem

were

but

many

new

maintenance

difficulty

in

created.

Extreme

se-

in

1944

New

fighter

Fighters

Bomber

Flying boat

Tran.ports .

Torpedo bombers

Dive bornoora

Training

Mi

'" '"

re<:onn"i.Ii>lMe

" forward without reserves.

"

"

"

'"

"

Shipping difficulties

limited

RNZAF opera-

tions until the end of the war.

Early in 1945

the

United

States

Navy

Commander,

South

Pacific,

agreed

to

release

for

service

under

ellaneous

Total

1.301/

The RNZAF par-

ticipated in the following phases of war in the Pacifi c:

Defense Against the Japanese Of-

4. Phu3eS of Operatiolls.

(I)

The

fe nsive

(December 1941_March 1943).

(2) The Allied Limiled Offensive and Hold- ing Phase (March 1943--September 1943) .

(3 )

The All-Out Allied Offensive (Septem- ber 1943-August· 1945).

6.

Limitil!g Facto/·s. From the outset, th e

RNZAF had supply difficulties and these never WCft! solved completely. Rapid expansion was necessary at a time when the European Thea- ter and other nir forces in the Pacific had higher ptiorities for receiving new production. During 1942 and 1943 this created a condition best described as "equipment starvation.'· Considerable difficulty was exp.erienced during this pe r iod in maintaining ill an airworthy con- dition the aircra ft which were available, since

General MacArthur two bomber-reconnaissanC<! SQuadrons operating in the Solomons area, but

shipping

difficulties

prevented

the

movement

from

taking

place

before

the

Japanese

sur-

render.

During certain

periods disease was an

im-

portant limiting !actOl·. In Malaya early in

1942 the incidence of malarial infection among