Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
By
Senior Directing Staff Incharge – Rear Admiral IK Saluja, VSM, SDS (Navy)
CONTENT SHEET
1. Abbreviations ii-iv
2. Synopsis v-xii
3. Introduction 01-06
(a) Hypothesis
(b) Aim and Scope
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
FR - Flexible Response.
GZ - Ground Zero.
HE - High Explosive.
KT - Kilotons.
LC - Line of Control.
MT - Megatons.
Op - Operation
SF - Special Forces
SYNOPSIS
Introduction
Theorists of the Kenneth Waltz school had felt that nuclear symmetry would
at Lahore were prompted by this analysis. However, in May 1999, the two
countries fought a sharp limited war in Kargil. Two years later in Dec 2001,
2. Michel Kreepon and Chris Gagne have highlighted two opposing view
points:-
is most dangerous.
vi
the most dangerous phase to control comes in the year immediately after
nuclearisation. The nuclear balance is unclear and tolerance thresholds and red
Paradox. Chris Gagne defines it as “to the extent that the military balance is
stable at the level of nuclear war, it will become unstable at the lower levels of
violence”.
one of hubris. They felt their nuclear capacity totally negated India’s
levels. The strong Indian reaction in Kargil, however, had a major sobering
influence. Even as the Cuban Missile crisis had forced the USA to transit from
are dangerous and could lead to miscalculations. Our perceived restraint during
Op PARAKRAM could have sent the wrong message that could aggravate the
been acting from a base line presumption that India’s conventional superiority
has been totally negated by the nuclear symmetry. Nuclear weapons inject low
order instability and encourage the Pakistani military elite to intensify the
and Deterrence.
Deterrence in the Sub continental context and explore escalation models that
as the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back
would. Bayman and Waxman argue that coercion can be differentiated into two
distinct categories:-
that has failed to deter Pakistan from its Proxy War in J&K. India has to resort
to compellence strategies to force it to abort and roll back the Proxy War.
11. This chapter examines Herman Kahn’s theories on escalation and their
risk taking. In specific, it deals with the violation of “local” and “central
traces the precise series of steps that graduate from a cold start to skirmishes,
limited war, full scale conventional war and finally to a nuclear exchange.
12. This chapter surveys the impact of the current RMA with its transparency
revolution and Precision Munitions and the highly lethal impact of Air Power.
designation Binoculars, Micro and light weight UAVs and Fast Attack Vehicles.
articulated by Lt Gen Sardar FS Lodhi and shows this to be a very cautious and
Lodhi has now articulated precise and specific nuclear responses to an Indian
14. It then examines the Indian Escalation models in the form of Escalation
Ladders that could act as scenario generators. The basic options are:-
x
(b) Creep Model. Use of Special Forces (SF) to direct air strikes
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into major air battles, where AWACs and
the PAF, gain air superiority and thereby set the stage for ground
action.
could be taken, based upon the reactions by Pakistan and the response
15. This chapter examines the option of a Limited War in the subcontinent
this option was deliberately highlighted by India in the wake of the Kargil
conflict. This also examines the Chinese “Teach a Lesson” model of Limited
Wars against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979 and studies their
16. The current Indian failure to deter the Pakistani Proxy War in J&K stems
Pakistan. India will consciously have to embark upon an armament race that
generates such a conventional edge. Such an arms race could cause the
opt for the Deception War Model that leads to a seamless interface and
transition from low level strikes across LC to a Limited War in J&K and (if the
xii
backdrop.
INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR
Introduction
became overt nuclear powers with their series of explosions in May 1998. This
was an epochal event that has transformed the Paradigm of global security
forever. Theorists of the Kenneth Waltz School felt that nuclear symmetry
year later in May 1999, the two countries fought a sharp but limited
conventional conflict in Kargil. The Indian armed forces carried out a partial
mobilization and Pakistan suffered a tactical defeat. The situation was defused
with American mediation. Two years later, in Dec 2002, Pakistani terrorists
2. Michel Kreepon and Chris Gagne2 have highlighted the two opposing
make war too costly to contemplate. It was probably based upon this
1
Michel Kreepon and Chris Gagne (Eds). “Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia”. Henery.L.Stimson Centre,
2003. Published in India by Vision Books. Gagne quoted on pp.300.
2
Ibid’ Chris Gagne. pp.53.
2
Waltzian paradigm that India made the bold Lahore Peace initiative in
subcontinent. 3
far outweigh any stabilizing effect they may usher. The initial phase
3. The Initial Phase Syndrome. Michel Kreepon5 also highlights that the
immediately after nuclearisation of both adversaries. This initial phase has the
following characteristics:-
3
Ibid’ Chris Gagne. pp.54.
4
Ibid Chris Gagne pp.54
5
Ibid’ Michel Kreepon pp.300.
6
Ibid’ Chris Gagne. pp.54.
3
(a) “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of
all out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of
violence.
escalation”7.
South Asia, is the highly subjective Pakistani military mindset. Very high
Pakistani military planning in the last half century8. Both in 1965 and 1971 and
Indian response. The dominance of the Pakistani Army in that nation polity,
unfortunately stifles any objective debate and analysis and competing view
of striking terror into the hearts of enemies. They theorized that the Indian’s
would be so terrified of a nuclear holocaust that they would not dare to exercise
7
Ibid’ Michel Kreepon. pp.300.
8
Brian Cloughly. “A History of the Pakistan Army” Reprint by Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1998.
9
Stephen. P.Cohen. “The Pakistan Army” 2nd ed. Oxford University Press 1998 pp141-68.
4
Conflict (LIC) level. This Pakistani mindset was further fuelled by her
experience in Afghanistan where the Soviets failed to punish Pakistan for its
support to the Mujahideen. Media reports indicate that the plan for the Kargil
intrusions had been drawn up almost a decade earlier (when Gen Musharaff was
the Commanding General of the Frontier Command Northern Area and later
executed it, the moment he was in charge (as COAS). Reeta Choudhari
Tremblay and Julian Schofield have speculated that the Kargil adventure was
therefore is this Pakistani military mindset about the correlation between the
belligerent fashion. The Pakistani military elite have a very high risk
initially aggravated this high risk orientation of the Pakistani military elite (Gen
Musharaff even recently refused to rule out the occurrence of more Kargil type
the Indian subcontinent and clearly establish the interface between nuclear and
conventional deterrence.
been acting from a base line presumption that India’s conventional superiority
has been totally negated by the nuclear symmetry. Nuclear weapons inject low
order instability and encourage the Pakistani military elite to intensify the
and Deterrence.
Deterrence in the Sub continental context and explore escalation models that
CHAPTER I
11. The behavioural aspects of a nation state entity is guided by its historical
experience. The traumatic defeat of 1971 had been a highly traumatic and
surrogate of the USA. The apparent “victory” of the ISI in the Afghan war gave
the Pakistani military elite a triumphalist mindset. In the Low Intensity Conflict
genre of Jehad, they found a new foreign policy force multiplier that was
Emboldened by its Afghan experience, the Pakistani military-ISI elite went all
states of Punjab and J&K. Subsequently this Jehad based terrorism was sought
to be spread to the Indian depth areas as far afield as Bombay and Chennai in
the South. This has amounted to an ideological cum sub conventional assault
11
Brig GD Bakshi, VSM “Afghanistan the First Fault in War” Lancers Publishers, New Delhi, 2002 pp.80. For
a fuller treatment of the impact of the Afghan war on the Pakistani military mindset and the onset of hubris and
triumphalism.
8
upon the Indian nation state, culminating in a highly symbolic attack on the key
12. Given the nuclear backdrop, the most prudent course for India has been to
coerce Pakistan into ceasing/calling off this proxy war by the threat of
conventionalizing the conflict. This coercive threat has so far failed to carry
conviction. India has experimented with a series of options short of war (or
coercion as the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force
otherwise would. 12
14. Bayman and Waxman argue that coercion can be differentiated into two
distinct categories:-
from occurring (eg. The USA forcing Iraq not to invade Kuwait).
12
Daniel L.Byman and Mathew. C. Waxman. “Confronting Iraq: US Policy and the use of Force Since the Gulf
War”. National Defence Research Institute RAND-2000. Arlington USA, pp.xi. Paper is useful for its
analysis of theoretical concepts against the backdrop of a live crisis situation in Iraq.
9
that has already taken place. (eg. Forcing Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait)13.
Bayman and Waxman argue that coercion is a dynamic process. Even as the
USA or India or any other coercers tries to shape the adversaries behaviour, so
too the adversary tries to reduce the pressure imposed on it. Adversaries
16. Measuring Coercive Success. They point out that measuring coercive
success is often very difficult. The same action can have both positive or
negative effects, particularly when long term ramifications are taken into
PARAKRAM in coercing Pakistan. The full scale Indian mobilization for war
did force Pakistan to publically condemn terrorism and ban the LET/JEM and
for a period, scale down its support to the terrorists. However coercion being a
13
Ibid pp.xi
14
Ibid pp xii
15
Ibid pp.xii
10
mobilization was not for coercive purposes but had an actual offensive design of
available in open literature or are likely to appear in the foreseeable future. Any
17. Factors Effecting the Coercive Process. Bayman and Waxman have
highlighted some key factors effecting the coercive process. These are:-
were simply bribed off by the CIA and Iraq’s military resistance
evolving process that must take into account the adversaries reactions
16
Ibid. pp. xviii
17
Ibid pp. xviii
11
Iraq.
by the adversary. Thus the decision not to cross the LC was a self
18. Risks of Coercion. The risks of coercion are identified as the “potential
unwanted behaviour.
18
Ibid pp. xviii
19
Ibid pp. xviii
20
Ibid pp. xviii
21
Ibid pp. xviii
12
19. The Israeli Analyst Zeev Maoz has highlighted the triad of
Communicability
Deterrence
Credibility Feasibility
threat namely:-
that threat.23
capability and intent. The political will to carry out the threat must be made
22
Zeev Maoz “Paradoxes: On the Art of National Self Entrapment”. Unwin Hyman, Boston; 1996, pp.32.
23
Ibid pp. 33
13
22. Feasibility. This defines the extent to which the deterring nations can
respond to a given violation of the status quo. Historically this has generally
failed with low order threats to the status quo e.g. the USA in Vietnam and the
USSR in Afghanistan.25
Pakistan from challenging the status quo in Kashmir through its low cost/no
Credibility
24. As far as the Proxy War is concerned, therefore, Indian deterrence has
failed in Kashmir because Pakistan has already launched its Proxy War. India,
therefore, has to adopt a compellence strategy. The reason for the failure of
24
Ibid pp. 33
25
Ibid pp. 34
14
of capability and intent. Pravin Swahney writes “Few understand the reality
that the conventional forces of India and Pakistan are matched or nearly
matched”. In all the wars fought between the two, Pakistan has never been
defeated in the Eastern Sector by India. This explains why military officers from
both sides rarely take the impending nuclear holocaust Scenario painted by the
scholars very seriously.26 The Indian conventional forces currently do not have
threaten to press it home. The next question is against what do we apply this
conventional force? What are the Pakistani centres of gravity that if addressed
nodes).
delivery.
26
Pravin Swahney. “The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India’s Image” Sage Publications, New
Delhi, 2002. pp.175.
15
(c) The Punjabi heartland with the core cities of Lahore and
Sialkot.
his power base, viz the 12 corps commanders is also a key Centre of
CHAPTER II
On Escalation
for strategic Nuclear thought. However, Kahn’s other seminal work, “On
27. Escalation. Kahn cites Thomas Schelling who coined the phrase
29. Intensifying Escalation. Herman Kahn cites the example of two nuclear
27
Herman Kahn. “On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios”, Pall Mall Press London 1965.
28
Ibid. pp.3
29
Ibid. pp.4
17
going on. There are three possible ways in which one antagonist can escalate
crisis or conflict in an area other than in the local area. Thus the
30
Ibid. pp4
31
Ibid. pp3
32
Ibid. pp3
18
to scare the adversary into backing off. (Pretend to be highly emotive and hence
make rational calculations unreliable for the adversary). This raises the level of
uncertainity and forces a rational actor to back down. Pakistan initially tried to
war.37 However Bayman and Waxman feel that escalation could involve limited
33
Ibid. pp.3
34
Ibid. pp.9
35
Steve.J.Brams and D.Marc Kilgour “Game Theory and National Security”. Basil Blackwill, New York, 1988.
36
Ibid. pp.11
37
Ibid. pp.12
19
gunships and use field artillery and mortars while tackling terrorist
and resources for this stated aim would also set the stage for more
38
Pravin Swami. “The Hype and the Folly”, Frontline Magzine 04 Jul 03 issue. pp.4
20
to own side of the LC. This entailed heavy casualties and time
even extend terrorist violence to other states of India. The next major
stand off occurred in Dec 2001 with the attack on the Indian
provocations, Indian is now left with no option but to violate the local
India had launched major corps sized offensives across the IB. The
21
level). As such, this option will not become credible till India
33. Perhaps one of the most valuable contribution of Herman Kahn has been
drawn Escalation Ladders for a hypothetical conflict between the USA and
USSR that highlighted the various rungs, event plateau levels and decision
39
Praveen Swahney. “The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that shape India’s Image”. Sage Publications, New
Delhi 2002. pp.175
22
points where the national leadership could decide to move up or down the
escalation ladder options. These will constitute the multiple war gaming
Proxy War. It is argued that Escalation Ladders trace the evolution of any
theatre that proceeds to full fledged conventional war and the possible nuclear
escalation ladders that detail each step of the graduated responses and counter
moves. The Escalation Ladder is, therefore, a most valuable theoretical tool in
CHAPTER-III
IN THE SUB-CONTINENT
enemy rear and reduce the fog of war.41 AWACS flying deep in own
precision and lethality of aerial attacks from altitudes well beyond the
40
Michel.L.Brown in “Revolution in Military Affairs”. Paper in “Cyber Wars Security Strategy and Conflict in
the Information Age”. Ed by Alan.D.Campen. Indian reprint by Book Mart Publishers, New Delhi, 2000.
41
Ibid. p.43.
24
This RMA itself could generate for us the conventional edge that we
campaigns e.g.
emerge from the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the
Advanced Mini Eye-safe Laser Range finders, a very light weight but accurate
GPS based laser range finder and target designator ) could operate in the
enemies rear and paint targets for precise and lethal air attacks. It highlighted
that backed by precise and responsive airpower, very small ground forces could
37. AWACs. Catering for the Chinese frontier’, the conventional ground
forces of India and Pakistan are at near parity levels. The Indian Air Force
however, with its SU-30, Mig-29, Mig-27, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft has a
distinct edge over the Pakistani air fleet. However, even with this current edge,
our Air Force can achieve only local air superiority for limited durations. Iraq,
potential of air superiority. For any conventional threat to be credible, the IAF
must be given this decisive edge over the PAF. The greatest force multiplier for
them would be AWACs. Media reports indicate that India is about to receive
the Israeli Phalcon radar. This could be mounted on IL-76 platforms and
44
Brig GD Bakshi, VSM. “End Game in Afghanistan: Military Lessons from the Campaign”. Indian Defence
Review, Vol 16(4) Oct-Dec 2001. pp.63. For a fuller treatment of the enabling impact of such force multipliers
on combat.
26
provide our Air Force with a most significant force multiplier that can usher in
targets for the US Air Force in Afghanistan and Iraq are the very light weight
accurately measure distance and bearing of targets and uses GPS to instantly get
their precise eight figure grid references. These enabled the precision attack
Forces teams equipped with TAMER binoculars could infiltrate across the LC
and accurately designate targets (Terrorist Camps) for engagement by own Air
Force and/or artillery of 155 mm and higher calibers. Equivalent Israeli System
exponentially with this capability. Small tactical teams could thus have a huge
strategic impact.
caliber Russian MRLS has a range of upto 70 kms.47 It could be used to engage
terrorist training camps across the LC as well as command and control centres
45
Rahul Bedi. “Divided Interests” Janes Defence Weekly. 21 May 03 Issue, pp.22.
46
John Barry, “A New Breed of Soldiers”, Article in Newsweek. 10 Dec 2001. pp.20-21.
47
Nicholai Makorovets. “Multiple Rocket Launchers” Indian Defence Review, Vol.16(4) Oct-Dec 2001. pp.43.
27
like divisional and corps headquarters and launch pads for infiltration. This
system is within the existing restraint envelope as both sides have been using
artillery for trans LC engagements. Its far higher throw weight and range would
constitute a new rung on the escalation ladder and clearly make a statement of
intent.
40. Mini UAVs. The American DAPRA is currently working on hand held
Micro UAVs, Weighing between 200-500 gms, with a range of upto 10 kms and
endurance of upto one hour. These could be mass produced and issued down to
the infantry battalion level on the LC. These would greatly enhance
The Israeli’s Firm Elbit Systems have produced light weight UAVs (5.5 kgs,
41. Fast Attack Vehicles. These are very light weight but high mobility
They carry two/three man crews, a Machine gun, Automatic Grenade Launcher
and Antitank Missiles. They have long endurance and range (500-700 kms) and
power to weight ratios that are higher than those of all Main Battle Tanks. They
have low noise and heat signatures which give them virtual stealth capabilities.
Their cross country mobility is superior to that of MBTs and ICVs. These
could be used by our Special Forces in the plains/desert sectors for acquiring
targets (tagging strategic reserves) and for lethal raids/ambushes deep in the
48
Craig Hoyle. Israels Elbit System. Janes Defence Weekly. 18 Jun 2003. pp.31.
28
enemies rear. They could be effectively employed in the plains sector of J&K.
Such enhanced capabilities with our Special Forces can open up a whole range
of options for trans LC/IB raids/missions that can be employed as new steps in
the escalatory ladder that utilize smaller number of troops but have a vastly
lethal violence could send a strong signal of political intent that is far more
coercive than mere deployments on own side of the border. There is an urgent
49
Dr Bhashyam Kasturi. “Military Special Forces in the Indian Context” Indian Defence Review. Vol 16(4)
Oct-Dec.2001.
29
CHAPTER-IV
42. To generate various war gaming scenarios and define the precise
ladders define the precise space between conventional and nuclear war in our
context and help us to chart the steps that span the transition between these
conflict modes.
seemed to stem from a belief that India’s conventional superiority was totally
negated. During the Kargil conflict, the Pakistani military pegged the sub-
However, the strong Indian response in Kargil was highly sobering for the
50
Rear Admiral K.Raja Menon. “A Nuclear Strategy for India”. Sage Publications, New Delhi 2000. pp.197
30
of recent Pakistani military literature now suggests that this may no longer be
the case.
44. Pakistan has clung to its “first use doctrine”. However, the sobriety
engendered by the Kargil war is now clearly visible. Pakistani strategists are
spasmodic release. Thus Lt Gen Sardar FS Lodhi of the Pakistan Army writing
ladder as under:-
through our defences or has already breached the main defence line –
51
Lt. Gen (retd) Sardar FS Lodhi. “Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine”. Pakistan Defence Journal, Karachi. Apr 1999.
31
(e) Third Step. Use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil
45. Lt Gen KM Arif has stated that both India and Pakistan are not crazy
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid
55
Ibid
56
Ibid
57
Ibid
58
Ibid
32
would use nuclear weapons against each other.59 Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai of the
Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan Army defined the nuclear threshold as
under:-
conditions:-
subversion in Pakistan.60
escalation options.
59
Lt Gen KM Arif. “Working with Zia” Oxford University Press Karachi, pp.362-363.
60
Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai cited in Landau Report on Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in
Pakistan. Prepared by Prof PC Ramusino and M Matellini.
33
“breaching the main defence line to actual breach. It next graduates to major
nuclear threshold therefore has a very elastic bandwidth. The absurdity of the
massive response strategy was highlighted to the USA in the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962. The Kargil war has similarly forced Pakistan into a flexible
commences with a “nuclear shot across the bow” and then graduates to a purely
military use of nuclear weapons, first on its own soil and only then on ours. The
47. Macro Models. India has four major escalation models to respond to
PARAKRAM.
34
use of Smerch MBRL strikes against terrorist camps and launch pads
would obviate the time pressure which can force a weaker antagonist
Analysis of Models
48. Mobilisation Model. This model has already been employed twice by
to a raging limited war in Kargil where Indian military and air power
and said that coercion was not likely to work as Pakistan’s stake in
(c) Future Potential. The full mobilization model is costly not just
in terms of financial implications but also wear and tear on men and
unplanned escalations.
(a) The creep model seeks a low order violation of the LC by large
The SF actions would have a low media profile, whereas a very high
mask the location of subsequent main thrusts and tie down Pakistani
reserves.
(d) Indian Armed Forces would carry out a Partial Mobilisation all
Limited War Model that could result from this “creeping escalation”.
War in J&K.
(a) Catering for Indian force levels that have to be deployed against
China, India has a virtual parity with Pakistan in land forces. India’s
edge exists primarily between the two Air Forces and Navies. (The
38
Navy in fact has a 5:1 edge). This model seeks to exploit the existing
as the Model. Israeli Air Force launched air attacks on Syrian Sam
Syrian Air Force rose to the defence of the beleaguered Sam battries.
Directed by AWACs they were able to shoot down over 80 Syrian Mig
(c) In this model the Indian Air Force would launch air strikes on
their defence. The actual target would not be the terrorist training
could enable the IAF to manage a major air battle across the LC and
exploit this to press home ground attacks in selected sectors of the LC.
(g) The payoffs and impact of such operations would be far higher
than in the creep model. However escalation may tend to spiral out of
51. Deception War Model. This model would seek to synthesise and
harmonise our responses. Instead of disjointed low key actions that seek to
engender minor violations of the status quo to achieve escalation, this model
subcontinent is premised upon the base line assumption that neither India or
leaks. Wresting and gaining control of the air is an essential precursor to any
under:-
(b) The IAF attacks these trans LC Camps. This is merely a pretext
to draw in and decimate the PAF in major air battles across the LC
mobilization by the Army (along the IB) and the Navy (both Eastern
(d) Once air superiority is gained over PoK probing attacks are
prevent infiltration.
gained on the LC. This is the first stage of decision. Depending upon
(h) This would be the second event plateau phase where India could
situation.
towards Punjab and J&K. Pak media had reported such Northwards
62
Pravin Sawhney. “The Defence Makeover:10 Myths that Shape India’s Image”. Sage Publications. New
Delhi-2002 p.190, p.207 and specifically pp.212 to 215.
41
(l) India could exploit this by launching both her strike corps in the
kind.
(n) India should keep the bulk of its nuclear arsenal in reserve to
(o) This high risk model aims to seek a decisive victory even
escalation ladder based upon the resultant situation at the regional and
global level.
42
1971 war. Pakistan was convinced that India would not go for Dacca
total victory.
43
CHAPTER-V
A NUCLEAR BACKDROP
52. In the wake of the Chagai nuclear tests, the Pakistani military elite
showed clear signs of “strategic hubris”. Nuclear parity for them translated into
threshold at absurdly low levels and undertook the intrusion in Kargil, confident
53. The Kargil conflict therefore is analogous to the Cuban Missile crisis of
1962 between the USA and USSR. The Americans had premised their
of the status quo by the USSR was to be responded to by an all out nuclear
attack. The actual crisis of 1962 showed the massive response strategy to be
54. The Kargil conflict seems to have had a similar sobering effect on the
highlighted that the sub-continental nuclear threshold was far higher than
55. In the wake of the Kargil conflict, the Indian strategic community thought
it essential to send clear signals to Pakistan that any further violations of the
seminar by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in Mar 2000,
where the Defence Minister Shri George Fernandez, further held out the veiled
threat of a limited war below the nuclear threshold. These clear signals were
designed to convey the threat that Pakistan sponsored terrorism could escalate
into a limited war.64 Mr George Fernandez reminded Pakistan that Kargil has
demonstrated that India can fight and win a limited war even at a time and
56. Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta wrote that these articulations amounted not
only to a new doctrine of fighting a limited conventional war but also expressed
obvious that the Indian threat was meant to disabuse Pakistans “serious error of
judgement” that its nuclear shield would paralyse Indian response to its proxy
war.66
63
Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta “Limited War: Reflection of Frustration” . Pioneer 16 Mar 2000 issue.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
45
57. In pursuance of this approach India held large scale conventional military
exercises (Ex Shiv Shakti) under considerable media glare and has gone ahead
with massive purchases of conventional weapons (eg. SU-30 and T-90 deals and
others in the pipeline). These have brought about ample misgivings in the
Pakistani higher command echelons. Like the USA in the Cuban missile crisis,
challenges are not viable. Hence they have been forced to strengthen their
a nuclear response to a limited provocation. The nuclear response could risk the
annihilation of the weaker state.67 In purely rational terms it would be safer for
it to accept the damage inflicted by a conventional war, rather than risk total
Nuclear response becomes a ‘logical’ consideration only when the weaker state
59. Is a Limited war below the nuclear threshold viable in the subcontinental
context? Kargil showed it was viable. However Kargil was confined to own
67
Steve J.Brams and D.Marc Kilgour “Game Theory and National Security” Basil Blackwill New York 1988.
46
restraint in the crisis leading to Op PARAKRAM could have diluted the signals
of Political resolve and will clearly communicated in the Kargil crisis. The
frontline state in this global war against terrorism. It did this to save itself from
American retribution and safeguard its strategic nuclear assetts. The American
interpreted as tacit American approval and permit it to continue its Proxy War in
J&K at current scales (albeit in a less visible fashion that seeks to carry on the
India has no option but to make the threat of Limited War credible.
60. In the wake of the Wars in Korea and Vietnam, much doctrinal work was
done on the aspect of Limited Wars. American Strategists talked of three kinds
of Limited Wars68:-
68
Swaran Singh “Limited War: The Challenge of US Military Strategy” . Lancer Books.New Delhi. 1995
47
Kaufman theorized that the Communists would test the limits of Amercian
Kaufman developed the theory of limited wars that gave options short of a
brainchild. It is pertinent to point out that the USA suffered 1,37,000 casualties
thresholds which defined the most sensitive line of demarcation between limited
war and all out nuclear war.71 In the US-USSR confrontation however, limited
and primarily with proxies. A direct US-Soviet clash was avoided at all costs.
The Indo-Pakistan context is direct and hence markedly different. The only
69
Bernard Brodie and William Kaufman quoted in Swaran Singhs Book. Refer to note 65.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
48
Amur-Ussuri clash between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969. The
release?
may not be credible to talk of a thin red line or “Lakshman Rekha”. Rather we
Islamabad-Rawalpindi.
(c) The Pakistani Nuclear arsenal and its means of delivery. If these
(e) The defeat of its Army Reserve North (ARN) or South (ARS)
equally act as a restraint against crossing the nuclear threshold in any form.
highlight that none of the Pakistan’s targets mentioned in para 62 (a) to (e) in
49
Indian strategic circles to give undue credence to the emotive volatility and
True, they are prone to subjective planning in situations where they deem their
this score, the Pakistani Military bureaucracy exhibits all the traditional caution
of bureaucracies the world over. It must be kept in mind that even a maniac like
Hitler was deterred from using Chemical and Biological weapons in the Second
World War due to the threat of retaliation in kind. Here was a maniac who had
and Biological restraint even when the fighting was pushed home to Berlin and
the Feuherers’ Bunker (Wolfs Schanze) itself. Hitler committed suicide but did
not order a Chemical or Biological release. The Pakistani Military Brass cannot
Syndrome.
limited war model that has been practiced successfully by the Chinese. They
50
launched limited conventional wars against India (In 1962) and against Vietnam
(in 1979). Major Chinese ground offensives were accompanied by loudly stated
war aims of just teaching a lesson. This implies a primary and clearly
articulated limitation in the aim/scope of the war. It also enunciates that capture
of territory will be temporary and the war will be limited or confined in space
and time. The Chinese attack in 1962 deterred any Indian support for the
War to teach a lesson to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese defence was skillful
and tenacious and the Chinese ended up learning a lot of lessons themselves.
However, Vietnam was clearly deterred from any further adventurism against
China. Relations have been peaceful since then. It was a superb demonstration
role model for a similar limited war by India to “teach Pakistan a lesson”, for
66. The loudly stated aim of just “teaching a lesson” serves to limit
capability or the coercer would be the one that learns unpleasant lessons. To
overmatching capability in the air. We must acquire AWACs and increase our
that such signals of resolve, capability and intent are conveyed to all sections of
Limited War Doctrine, that lays emphasis on teaching a lesson. Large scale and
doctrine.
52
CHAPTER-VI
Conclusion
absurdly low levels. That explains the Kargil adventure just one year
after nuclearisation.
subcontinent.
Recommendations
68. Need for Conventional Build Up. The interface between conventional
defining precise escalation ladders. The current Indian conventional edge has
failed to deter Pakistan from launching and proceeding apace with its Proxy
at forcing Pakistan to abort and roll back the Proxy War. This implies a clearly
visible Indian programme to seek a conventional military edge. This alone will
make the threat of a conventional response to the Proxy War credible. India
must focus on maximizing its Air Power (with Force Multipliers like AWACs)
of:-
the Escalation ladder must neatly set the stage for the next.
55
further. AWACs are the most potent force multiplier and their
designed to lure the PAF in to air battles with the IAF. Our
would mask the projected thrust lines for major offensives and
footholds gained.
model.
India could call off the escalation at any of the above two
Northwards.
operations.
from intervention.
70. The Indian Escalation Ladder therefore, must be designed for a smooth
transition from preliminary Special Forces actions and air strikes, to a limited
J&K centric war and if the opportunity presents itself, a decisive Conventional
disjuncts in our escalation ladder. Each move must be carefully calibrated and
designed to graduate smoothly to the next level of conflict. India must strive to
pace in such an arms race, its economy could collapse. If it fails to match up, it
would provide India an opportunity to press home its conventional edge. It was
58
the post 1962 military build up that paid such dividends in the 1971 war. Today
yield payoffs in a three to five years time frame. India may need to stabilize the
Pakistani front before China acquires the status of a super power. Otherwise it
will face the strategic nightmare of a two front war scenario in the future.
59
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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the use of Force Since the Gulf War” National Defense Research Institute
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36. Kasturi Bhasyam (Dr) “Military Special Forces in the Indian Context”.
37. Khalid Kidwai (Lt Gen) cited in London Report on “Nuclear Safety,
41. Naqvi M.B. “In the Shadow of Kargil: Security Inferences” Pakistan
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http/www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/inral/nuchist.html.
bulletin.org/index.html.
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http//www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/jfo2nukenote.html.
“Escalation is a competition in risk taking”
Thomas.C.Schelling
Move of DT FMAS
Escalation Ladder
Issue Demarche
14 Dec 02
DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003
DP 6
Naval Strikes 2xMech
Karachi Strike Corps
Harbour Launched in
Desert/Semi
ESCALATION INTENSITY
desert
DP 5
Corps sized
Attack across
LC
Div Sized
Attacks DP 4
across LC
Partial Mob DP 1
along IB
TIME AXIS