authorities.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
FRANCISCO NANAS alias “IKOT”, accused-appellant.
FACTS
- Francisco Nanas was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide.
- The prosecution presented four witnesses and the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution stated that
sometime in April, witness Beatisola and a certain Jumadron
attended a dance party and saw the victim at the gate of the
dance hall and even asked them to help her sister who was a
candidate in a fund raising contest.
- After this brief conversation with the victim, Beatisola went out of
the dance hall to urinate and there he saw accused-appellant
Francisco Nanas, alias “Ikot”, drinking beer at the store. The
appellant offered him a drink but he declined and instead he went
back to the dance hall.
- Beatisola noticed that the victim constantly went in and out of the
dance hall. She had no companions. He last saw her going out of
the dance hall and he was able to observe her passing the place
where accused-appellant was drinking on her way to the rice
paddies.
- Beatisola and Jumadron left the hall at around 12am and on their
way to his brother-in-law, he paused to urinate by the bushes
wherein he heard a thudding sound and when he looked around,
he saw a person lying face down on the ground.
- He assumed that the person was a girl as she had long hair and
was being beaten up by two other persons with the use of a
wooden bamboo pole. He was able to identify accused-appellant as
one of the persons beating up the girl.
- The companion of accused-appellant apparently saw the witness
hiding behind some cassava and banana plants and told accused-
appellant about it.
- Instead of running away, accused-appellant allegedly drew his bolo
and said “make them come because I will kill them.”
- Accused-appellant then hacked the girl twice. Beatisola and his
companion became scared and they ran to the house of his
brother-in-law.
- When they reached the house, Beatisola immediately told his
brother-in-law about what he witnessed and that accused-appellant
had killed a person.
- However, he did not initially report the incident he witnessed to the
vs.
- It was only in June 1996 that Beatisola became aware that the
person who was killed was Edna Fabello.
- She learned this from her sister Editha who apparently was the
aunt of the victim. He decided to testify on what he had witnessed
because of the pleas of his sister.
- Primitivo Fabello, the father of the victim, also attended the fund
raising dance. He left the dance hall at around 3:00 AM and began
looking for Edna whom he noticed was missing. He proceeded to
the cornfield and there he chanced upon the accused-appellant
who was apparently searching for something.
- When Primitivo asked what he was doing, accused-appellant told
him that he was looking for his knife. Primitivo then continued to
search for his daughter.
- Thereafter, while accused-appellant was still nearby, Primitivo
found the shoes, hairpin and handkerchief of his daughter.
- The accused-appellant suddenly became agitated and he
immediately fled the scene.
- After appellant was gone, Primitivo continued looking for his
daughter and he was able to see bloodstains on the dike and on a
bamboo pole.
- He followed the trail of blood and this led him to the dead body of
his daughter lying face down in a canal.
- Thereafter, he reported the incident to the Barangay Captain and
later on he turned over the personal effects of his daughter to the
police.
- Police Officer Serafin Feronilmo, who received the report about the
crime, went to the crime scene and there he found the dead body
of Edna Fabello in the canal. Edna’s neck was slashed and her
body bore stab wounds. Nearby, he found a bloodstained bamboo
pole, a pair of slippers, the scabbard of a knife, a toy gun and a
hair clip.
- As Primitivo Fabello had earlier told him that he had chanced upon
accused-appellant near the place where the body was found, he
proceeded to the place of accused-appellant to continue his
investigation.
- Accused-appellant was in his house and so the police officer
invited the accused-appellant to the police station for questioning.
- In the station, accused-appellant allegedly admitted to the police
officer that he owned the pair of red rubber slippers found at the
 crime scene but he denied responsibility for the crime.
- The body of Edna Fabello was retrieved and it was examined by Dr.
Mary Joyce M. Faeldan, the acting Municipal Health Officer of Miag-
ao, Iloilo.
- She identified her medico-legal report in open court. However, she
was deemed by the trial court as not qualified to be an expert
witness and so she was not allowed to elaborate on her findings.
- Her report showed that the witness died from avulsion of the parts
of the brain and asphyxia secondary to a hack wound. Her body
bore contusions and hematoma and she was found to have been
stabbed and hacked twelve (12) times on different parts of her
body.
- The speculum examination on her sex organ revealed that there
were “positive multiple minute lacerations around the external
(opening) of the cervix” and “positive hymenal lacerations at (the)
3 o’clock and 10 o’clock positions.”
- For his part, the accused-appellant denied the charge against him.
He admitted that he was at the dance hall that night.
- He also admitted that he passed through some corn paddies on his
way home and saw the father of the victim. Howveer, he denied
the testimony of Primitivo that he was looking for his knife and that
he ran away when the shoes of Edna were found.
- He denied that he raped and killed Edna Fabello and that he
admitted in the police station that he owned the red rubber
slippers found at the crime scene. He likewise denied the
accusation of Bienvenido Beatisola that he beat up and hacked a
girl in the corn paddies. He claimed that Beatisola was a planted
witness who had a quarrel with him sometime in 1980.
- His testimony regarding his long standing fight with Beatisola was
corroborated with the testimonies of his sister and the barangay
captain who is a distant realtie of him.
- However, the said fighting incident was not even recorded in the
barangay nor reported to the police.
- The lower court convicted accused-appellant of the complex crime
of rape with homicide and sentenced him to the supreme penalty
of death. In his Appellant’s Brief, accused-appellant raises the
following assignment of errors.
- Due to the imposition of death penalty, the case was directly
elevated to SC.
ISSUES:
WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
APELLANT WITH SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
BY RELYING ON THE TESTIMONIES AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
RULING
The SC convicted the accused appellant for the crime of homicide
only.
- It is settled that in the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, we have
held that the crime of rape is difficult to prove because it is
generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for herself. It becomes even more difficult when the
complex crime of rape with homicide is committed because the
victim could no longer testify. Thus, in crimes of rape with
homicide resort to circumstantial evidence is usually
unavoidable.
- In the case at bench, there was no eyewitness to the crime of
rape allegedly committed on the person of Edna Fabello.
- Bienvenido Beatisola only witnessed the accused beating-
up and hacking a woman, acts which are consistent with
homicide but not with rape.
- The father of the victim Primitivo Fabello merely testified
that he saw accused-appellant near the scene of the crime
at the time of the incident. He did not actually witness
accused-appellant rape his daughter. As such, if the crime
of rape is to be proven, resort must be had to
circumstantial evidence.
- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction
if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which inferences are derived are proven;
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
*** In this case, none of the requisites is present.
- In the present case, the only evidence offered by the
prosecution which has any connection with a finding that
the victim has been raped is the report of Dr. Mary Joyce
M. Faeldan which stated that there were multiple
lacerations around the external opening of the cervix of the
 victim and on her hymen. However, it has already been
held that standing alone, a physician’s finding that the
hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not prove
rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence
proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to
have been established.
- In the case at bar, not only is there an absence of other
circumstances from which it might be reasonably inferred that rape
was committed, there is also no testimony that the hymenal
lacerations themselves may have been caused in the
course of coitus or by a male organ.
- It must be recalled that Dr. Faeldan merely identified the
medico-legal report which she executed. Because of her
lack of experience, the trial court, to which the
prosecution agreed, deemed her not to be an expert on the
matter and thus, she was prevented from giving expert
medical opinion on the implications of her findings.
- For their part, the prosecution did not present any other
doctor or witness who was qualified to render a medical
opinion that rape may indeed have occurred. As such, there
is no proof that the lacerations and ruptures found on the
sex organ of the victim were caused by sexual intercourse .
Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that rape was committed.
- However, though the court did not agree that the crime of
homicide was likewise not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
- In contrast with the evidence for rape offered by the
prosecution, the circumstantial evidence linking accused-
appellant to the death of Edna Fabello is sufficient to
convict him of the crime of homicide.
- There are overwhelming circumstantial evidence, which
together with the oral testimony of eye-witnesses Primitivo
Fabello and Bienvenido Beatisola point to no other logical
conclusion except that of the guilt of the accused Francisco
Nanas such as:
a. the finding and recovery of the personal effects of Edna Fabello by
her father who without doubt is very familiar with the personal
belongings of his daughter since they live under the said roof
b. the fact that as testified to by Bienvenido Biatisola, he saw the
accused hack twice a person lying in the canal whom he
suspected to be a girl with long hair that tapers to her shoulder
c. the fact that when Primitivo Fabello met the accused at the
cornfield at around 3 o’clock in the morning of April 26, 1994, he
was looking for his knife, the scabbard of which was likewise found
by Fabello in the cornfield together with the victim’s shoes,
hairpin, and handkerchief, and the fact that no other victim except
Edna Fabello was found dead in the canal the following morning
after her disappearance from the dance hall
- Aside from these pieces of circumstantial evidence cited by
the trial court, SC likewise have the testimony of Police
Officer Serapion Feronilmo who stated that accused-
appellant admitted in the police station that he was the
owner of the red slippers recovered from the crime scene.
- SC held that the circumstantial evidence in the case at bar,
when analyzed and taken together, leads to no other
conclusion except that of accused-appellant’s culpability
for the death of the victim.:
a. Accused-appellant admitted that he was near the crime
scene at the time the crime was being committed.
b. He was seen by a witness beating up and hacking a girl
with a bolo.
c. He was seen by the father of the victim lingering near
the crime scene apparently looking for his knife.
d. He ran away from the crime scene when the personal
effects of the victim were found.
e. The dead body of Edna Fabello was found near the
place where he was seen beating up and hacking a girl.
F
f. inally, he admitted before the police authorities that he
owned the pair of rubber slippers found at the crime
scene.
- Conviction based on circumstantial evidence will be upheld,
provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person, a conclusion adequately established in
this case.
- SC did not also give credence to the alleged motive of
witness Beatisola in testifying against accused-appellant.
Besides the fact that there is absolutely no record of the
fight between the two either with the barangay or in court,
the witnesses who testified on this matter were admittedly
biased and interested witnesses. Moreover, even if there
had been a fight between accused-appellant and Beatisola
sometime in 1980, it is incredible to believe that the latter
would be inclined to wait for fourteen (14) years before
 exacting his revenge if such indeed was his inclination.
- Moreover, as previously shown, the trial court did not
convict accused-appellant solely on the testimony of
Beatisola.
- The trial court likewise took into account the testimonies of
the father of the victim and the policeman who
investigated the killing.
- The Court notes that accused-appellant merely imputes a
motive against Beatisola for falsely testifying against him.
He cannot impute any ill motive against the other
witnesses as in fact, there was none.
- In the case at bench, no circumstance which would qualify
the killing to murder was sufficiently alleged in the
information charging accused-appellant with rape with
homicide. Consequently, considering that the evidence
presented fails to support the charge for rape, accused-
appellant may only be convicted of homicide.
HERNANDO GENER vs. GREGORIO DE LEON and ZENAIDA FAUSTINO
FACTS:
- This is a forcible entry case initiated by respondents herein
alleging that they are the original claimants and actual
possessors in good faith under a bona fide claim of
ownership of a parcel of agricultural land situated at
Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan with an area of
approximately Four Thousand Four Hundred Four (4,404)
square meters.
- The said parcel of land and the adjoining lots on the north and
south thereof were originally part of the course or bed of the Angat
River.
- During the big flood in 1978, the Angat River allegedly changed its
course by moving more than one hundred (100) meters which then
elevated and dried up.
- Thus the respondents extended their occupation and cultivation to
this elevated and dried up land, planting and cultivating thereon
coconuts, bananas and vegetables.
- On May 8, 1989, respondents claimed that petitioner
allegedly through force, threat and intimidation, unlawfully
entered the property and deprived respondents of the
possession thereof, removing the barbed wire fence placed
by respondents on the northern boundary of the land in
dispute and transferred it to the eastern boundary.
- Since the case was not amicably settled, respondents instituted
the complaint for forcible entry against the petitioner.
- Petitioner, as defendant in the ejectment case, denied the
material allegations of the complaint.
- Instead, he alleged that he is the real owner and lawful and
actual possessor of the land in dispute evidenced by a
notarized deed of sale executed on October 10, 1988 by
Benjamin Joaquin, heir of the previous owner, Proceso
Joaquin. U
- Upon acquisition of the land in dispute, he immediately caused the
declaration of the land for taxation purposes in the Office of the
Municipal Assessor of Norzagaray, Bulacan and paid realty taxes
thereon.
- Further, he claimed that the land is a private land which was
previously owned by Proceso Joaquin and that the said fact is
admitted and recognized by Gorgonio de Leon, the late father and
predecessor-in-interest of respondent Gregorio de Leon, in an
affidavit he executed on November 13, 1961 in which he
mentioned Proceso Joaquin as a neighboring landowner in the east
of his land.
- Petitioner further averred that it was respondents who
forcibly entered his lot in question as evidenced by two (2)
criminal cases which petitioner filed.
- Thus, considering that his occupation of the land in dispute
allegedly started on October 10, 1988, the Municipal Trial Court
has no jurisdiction over the action since the forcible entry
suit filed by respondents was filed beyond the one year
period.
- The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray, Bulacan rendered
judgment in favor of the respondents herein.
- On appeal, RTC of Malolos, Bulacan reversed the decision
of the MTC of Norzagaray and thereby dismissed herein
respondents’ complaint for forcible entry.
- In its decision, the Regional Trial Court sustained petitioner’s
claim of ownership of the property in dispute by virtue of
having bought such property from the heir of the former
owner thereof. The Regional Trial Court also declared that
petitioner has been in possession of the disputed property
since October 10, 1988.
- Insisting on the validity of their cause, respondents
interposed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
reinstated the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
- The petitioner essentially question the factual findings of
the appellate court as appearing in its assailed decision,
contending that such findings do not have any factual
moorings.
- He avers that the appellate court disregarded evidence
showing his prior possession of the disputed property
which negate the alleged cause of action of the
respondents for petitioner’s ejectment.
 ISSUES:
- WON CA erred in disregarding the evidence showing his
prior possession of the disputed property which negated
the alleged cause of action of the respondents for
petitioner’s ejectment.
RELATED TO THE TOPIC:
- WON the Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have
taken judicial notice of the said criminal cases involving the
subject parcel of land and pending in its docket.
RULING:
- SC held that in ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution
is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership set forth by any of the party-litigants.
- Anyone of them who can prove prior possession de facto may
recover such possession even from the owner himself.
- Ejectment does not depend on title for relief; the criterion is the
right to possession.
- Thus, priority in time should be the pivotal point in
resolving the issue of possession.
- Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court requires
that in actions for forcible entry the plaintiff is allegedly
deprived of the possession of land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and that the
action shall be filed within one year from the time of such
unlawful deprivation of possession.
- This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land
by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning as he acquired
possession thereof by unlawful means.
- The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in litigation until he was deprived
thereof by the defendant. The one year period within which to
bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date
of actual entry by the defendant on the land.
- To support their allegation of prior possession, herein respondents,
as plaintiffs in the ejectment case, primarily relied upon the
testimonies of Ignacio Cadungol, Teodoro Mendoza, Andres Palad,
Balagtas P. San Pedro, Marcelino Samson, Norman Maclang and
respondent Zenaida Faustino.
- The appellate court made much of the testimony that it was
petitioner who forcibly excluded respondents from
possession of the land on May 8, 1989.
- However, the Municipal Trial Court and Court of Appeals
totally overlooked the fact that while petitioner was his
own sole witness, his testimony of prior possession was
substantiated by several documentary evidence, which were
quite damaging to the existence of respondents’ alleged cause of
action for forcible entry.
- SC noted that there were two (2) incidents that occurred
on October 24, 1988 and March 12, 1989 which resulted in
the institution by herein petitioner of criminal complaints
for malicious mischief.
- These two (2) incidents, are the subject of:
(a) Criminal Case No. 3998 for malicious mischief against Rosendo
Buen and Ignacio Cadungol alias Lolong, two (2) alleged
helpers of the land of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who
allegedly entered the disputed land on October 24, 1988 and
destroyed coconut trees, papaya and langka trees which
allegedly belonged to the petitioner
(b) Criminal Case No. 4043 against Hugo de Leon and Rolly de
Leon, brothers of respondent Gregorio de Leon, who allegedly
entered the disputed land on March 12, 1989 and destroyed
mango trees and other plants which allegedly belonged to the
petitioner.
*** These twin incidents, evidenced by "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" and Complaint show that prior to May 8, 1989,
the alleged date of forcible entry of petitioner, petitioner
was already in possession of the disputed land.
- SC held that ss against the mere testimonial evidence relied upon
by respondents that they were forcibly ejected from the land by
petitioner on May 8, 1989, the documentary evidence of
petitioner’s prior possession, more particularly the
evidence of the two (2) incidents of October 24, 1988 and
March 12, 1989, must prevail.
- Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence, especially when said documentary evidence is not
opposed.
- The Municipal Trial Court of Norzagaray should have taken
judicial notice of the said criminal cases involving the
subject parcel of land and pending in its docket.
- While, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
 cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge, this rule is subject to the exception that
"in the absence of objection and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of the case filed in its
archives as read into the records of a case pending before
it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it, by name and number or in some
other manner by which it is sufficiently designated."
- In this case, respondents did not impugn nor object to the
evidence of petitioner on the existence of the said criminal
cases of malicious mischief that sprung from the alleged
forcible entry of petitioner’s alleged property.
- Thus, the said Municipal Trial Court should have taken
judicial notice of these facts in resolving the issue of prior
possession.
- In view of the evidence on the possession of petitioner
prior to May 8, 1989, as shown by the incidents on October
24, 1988 and March 12, 1989, the cause of action of
respondents for forcible entry against the petitioner has
already prescribed when they filed the complaint for
ejectment on April 30, 1990. Because forcible entry cases
must be filed within one year from the date of actual entry
on the land. Forcible entry is a quieting process and the
one year time bar to the ejectment suit is in pursuance of
the summary nature of the action.
- Consequently, since respondent’s cause of action for
forcible entry has prescribed, the Municipal Trial Court was
without jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject
ejectment case.
T’BOLI AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC. (TADI) vs. ATTY.
NEPTHALI P. SOLILAPSI
- This is a complaint for disbarment filed by T’Boli Agro-
Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) against Atty. Nepthali
P. Solilapsi on the grounds of forum-shopping and violation
of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
- TADI, a corporation with principal office in Surallah, South
Cotabato, is engaged in the production, processing, marketing,
exporting and selling of pineapples and other agricultural products.
B farmholding and the harvesting, hauling, delivery and disposal of
- Because of the large volume of pineapples needed to support the
viability of its business, TADI entered into contracts with
various growers who agreed to grow fruits on their lands
and sell their entire produce to the corporation.
- Among the contract growers are Multi-Fruit Growers
Cooperative of Surallah, Eduards Small Coconut Farmers
Cooperative and their individual members.
- They agreed that the cooperatives and their members would
grow pineapples and sell them exclusively to TADI.
- The cooperatives and their members may sell their
produce to third persons only with the prior consent of
TADI.
- Sometime in July or August 1996, TADI received reports
that Multi-Fruit Cooperative, Eduards Cooperative and their
members were intending to sell their pineapples to a third
party, in violation of their agreements.
- Hence, on August 15, 1996, TADI filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Surallah a complaint against the two
cooperatives and the respective members of their boards
of directors for damages for breach of contract.
- The complaint prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction to compel the
cooperatives and their members to cease and desist from
harvesting their pineapples and selling them to third
parties without TADI’s prior consent and instead to honor
their obligation to deliver their harvests to TADI.
- It appears that a day before, Multi-Fruit Cooperative filed
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah
an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 179, against TADI for
damages with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction, directing TADI to "desist
and refrain from doing acts which would in any manner
interfere, meddle and hinder the harvesting, hauling and
disposal by [Multi-Fruit Coop] and/or any of its members of
the pineapple fruits from their lands."
- The complaint was prepared and signed by respondent. The
verification and certification annexed to the complaint
were also notarized by him.
- Thereafter, a series of suits was instituted by Eduards
Cooperative and some of its members, as well as by some
of the members of Multi-Fruit Cooperative, against TADI.
- All the complaints were prepared and signed by respondent
as the complainants’ counsel.
- Each complaint uniformly prayed that TADI be ordered to "[vacate
plaintiff’s land and specifically to] desist and refrain from doing any
act/s which would in any way interfere, hamper, impede and/or
disturb the plaintiffs in the exercise of their rights of ownership
over their lands in the planting and growing of any crop on their
any fruits therefrom."
- Because of the failure by the cooperatives and their members to
state under oath the pendency or the termination, as the case may
be, of other civil cases earlier filed, the MCTC of Surallah
dismissed Civil Case Nos. 184, 186, 187 and 188 for litis
pendentia and for violation of Administrative Circular No.
04-94.
 - For the same reasons, the TROs issued in Civil Case Nos. 191, 192,
193, 194, 195 and 196 were also lifted, and, later, the cases
themselves were also dismissed on the ground that the complaints
for forcible entry had no basis since the plaintiffs therein were still
in possession of their lands.
- In this complaint, TADI alleges that respondent abused the
judicial process by repeatedly engaging in forum-shopping
in violation of Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
- It also alleges that he violated his oath as a lawyer, as well
as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and therefore
should be disbarred.
- In his answer, respondent denies the allegations against
him. He contends that he could not have concealed the
pendency of Civil Case earlier filed when he subsequently
filed the subsequent Civil Cases because the fact is that all
the prior cases, except Civil Case No. 594-S, were filed in
the same MCTC of Surallah, presided over by the same
judge, Judge Sollesta, and therefore should have been
judicially noted by him.
- Moreover, respondent says, the cases do not involve similar
issues and causes of action.
- In a resolution the Court referred this case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant which, in its recommended the investigation of
respondent by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
- Hence, on June 15, 1998, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
- On September 14, 2000, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommended that respondent be disbarred.
- Its report was adopted and approved, with modification, by
the IBP Board of Governors in a resolution which found
respondent to have engaged in forum-shopping.
- However, instead of disbarment, the IBP Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two years.
ISSUES:
WON respondent is guilty of forum-shopping.
RELATED TO THE TOPIC:
WON MCTC Judge Sollesta should have taken judicial notice of the
pendency of Civil Case Nos. 179 and 180 since all the cases were
filed before the same court.
RULING:
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to be well taken.
- Respondent claimed that he could not have concealed the
pendency of Civil Case Nos. 179 and 180 since all the cases were
filed before the same MCTC presided over by Judge Sollesta, who
should have taken judicial notice of such cases.
- Yet, SC held that this contention is erroneous.
- As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them of
the contents of other cases even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge.
- Courts may be required to take judicial notice of the
decisions of the appellate courts but not of the decisions of
the coordinate trial courts, or even of a decision or the
facts involved in another case tried by the same court
itself, unless the parties introduce the same in evidence or
the court, as a matter of convenience, decides to do so.
- Besides, judicial notice of matters which ought to be known
to judges because of their judicial functions is only
discretionary upon the court. It is not mandatory.
As to forum-shopping:
First. Respondent contends that there was no identity of parties involved in
the cases.
- The cases do involve identical parties. In Civil Case No. 594-
S, TADI’s complaint is directed not only against Multi-Fruit
Cooperative, Eduards Cooperative and the respective
members of their boards of directors but also "their pole
vaulting members, and John Does and Peter Does."
- Although the caption of the case filed by TADI did not
enumerate all the individual members who later on filed
their individual complaints, the case filed against the two
cooperatives actually concerned their individual members.
- The latter’s cases are similar to the case filed by TADI
against them.
- In any case, litis pendentia does not require a literal
identity of parties. It is sufficient that there is identity of
interests represented, which is clearly shown by the
allegations in the complaints.
Second. Respondent contends that the causes of action asserted in the
cases filed by him as counsel are different.
 This contention has no merit. Based on the allegations on the
complaints, the identity of the causes of action in the cases is
apparent. The cause of action of the cases is grounded on whether
TADI has the authority to oblige the cooperatives and their members to
deliver pineapples to it. In resolving the issue, the lower court would
necessarily look into the agreements entered into by the parties, to
wit, the Memorandum of Understanding between TADI and LBP, the
PNTR between LBP and the cooperatives and their members vis-à-vis
the contracts (Production and Marketing Agreements; Grower’s
Agreements with Contract to Buy) executed between TADI and the
cooperatives and their members in order to decide the cases.
Third. The claim of respondent that TADI is guilty of forum-shopping is
misplaced.
At all events, even if TADI were itself guilty of forum-shopping, it would not
make respondent less guilty for his own infraction.
Fourth. SC found respondent to have violated the rule on forum-shopping.
Violation of the circular on forum-shopping is a ground for disciplinary
action against an erring lawyer.The rule against forum-shopping and the
necessity of a certification of non-forum shopping under Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 are basic requirements in remedial law. Failure to
comply with them constitutes gross negligence. For being grossly
negligent, not only in isolated instances but repeatedly, respondent should
be held liable.
Moreover, under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
respondent, as a lawyer, is duty-bound to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. In this connection, Rule 12.02 states that a lawyer
shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. By doing
precisely the foregoing, regardless of whether or not he intentionally and
brazenly resorted to such legal subterfuge to mislead the court,
respondent should be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Nepthali P. Solilapsi is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective upon the finality of this
decision for violation of the prohibition against forum-shopping as provided
in Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is WARNED that a repetition of similar misconduct will be
dealt with more severely.
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
FACTS:
- The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines,
Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,
to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the
vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano
Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the
harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine
Roxas through the Orinoco River.
- The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered
the San Roque Channel at mile 172. The vessel proceeded on its
way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was
a result of the shallowness of the channel.
- Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some
vibrations. These occurred at 4:12 a.m. It was then that the watch
officer called the master to the bridge.
- The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and
verified that it was in the centre of the channel. He then went to
confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel on the chart. He
ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to
check all the double bottom tanks.
- At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the
Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
- As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by
herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to
sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
- Subsequently, Wildvalley sued Philippine President Lines and its
underwriter for damages.
- The trial court ruled in favour of Wildvalley but was reversed on
appeal, hence this petition.
-
ISSUE:
The primary issue to be determined is whether or not Venezuelan
law is applicable to the case at bar.
RULING:
- It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved.
- A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written
and an unwritten law. The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132
 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision of which is
quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is
"unwritten," the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible,
as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the
courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
- Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
provides:
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy,
and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary
of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal
of his office." (Underscoring supplied)
- The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law.
- SC did not dispute the competency of Capt. Oscar Leon Monzon,
the Assistant Harbor Master and Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz,
Venezuela, to testify on the existence of the Reglamento General
de la Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela) and the
Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco (rules
governing the navigation of the Orinoco River). Nevertheless, we
take note that these written laws were not proven in the
manner provided by Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
- The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the
Gaceta Oficial of the Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the
Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official
publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
- The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco is
published in a book issued by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of
Venezuela. Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise
presented as evidence.
- Both of these documents are considered in Philippine
jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the written
official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
Venezuela.
- For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible,
the following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy;
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or
consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his
office.
*** The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is
intended to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the
genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
- It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the
Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela, was presented as
evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that
Captain Monzon, who attested the documents, is the officer who
had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by the seal
of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No
such certificate could be found in the records of the case.
- With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a
foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires
that it be proved by a duly authenticated copy of the
statute.
- SC pointed out that the Venezuelan law was not pleaded
before the lower court.
- A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in
the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and
legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
- A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never
alleged or invoked despite the fact that the grounding of
the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of Venezuela.
- SC held that a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the
laws of a foreign country, or state, will be presumed to be
the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO
FACTS:
- On May 17, 1994, respondent Guerrero filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner Bank with the RTC of Manila. Guerrero
sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld
taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature
verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his
account.
- Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
- On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter
alia, that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by
New York law and this law does not permit any of
Guerrero’s claims except actual damages.
- Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerrero’s claims for
consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged in its
Answer.
- The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the
issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
- The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney,
supported the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for
brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account
stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that
this law bars all of Guerrero’s claims except actual
damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York
authenticated the Walden affidavit.
- The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and its motion for reconsideration.
- The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders.
- The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and the MR was also
denied. CA ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as
proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by
the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals
considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public
documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence.
- Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred in HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH
PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY
‘CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON
BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Arguments:
- The Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it
was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the
stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral,
temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these
claims is warranted.
- It also argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing
affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he
failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other
than actual.
RULING:
The petition is devoid of merit.
- The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court
- A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a
case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no
important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
- In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the
issues raised in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown
by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?
- A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial.
- A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show
that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate
formal trial.
- Guerrero’s complaint before the RTC contains a statement
of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for
damages.
- He is seeking damages for what he asserts as "illegally
withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank, a returned check worth
US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and
unauthorized conversion of his account."
- In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed
foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the
recovery of damages other than actual.
- Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerrero’s complaint
while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out
in the Bank’s answer.
- True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in
a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled
by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s motion for partial summary
judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does not
demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or
contrived.
- On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and
material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and
there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
- There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in
issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.
- The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of
actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is
concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
courts.
- Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any
other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the
conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or
Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear
dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only
by a trial on the merits.
- Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by
(1) an official publication thereof or
(2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
thereof. Such official publication or copy must be
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
- Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in some cases.
Yet, SC held that The Bank cannot rely on these cases to
support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in
open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the
particular foreign laws sought to be established.
- On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad
ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The
Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York
law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also
because it does not state the specific New York law on
damages.
- The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s
personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a
vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in
particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S.
court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or
decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of
some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit,
these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of
official records or decisions of foreign courts.
- The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to
prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the
failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a
foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did
not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New
York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
- Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an
opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent
provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not
make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory. It is
axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is
only permissive and not mandatory.
- Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the
Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden
affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit.
Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment,
although he did not present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may
not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for
one, because the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank
intended to prove.
- Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the
veracity of the statements in the Walden affidavit. The Bank still
had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even if
Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit. As the party
moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the burden of clearly
demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that
any doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the
movant.

- Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for

Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the
Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of the
complaint.

- Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden

affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the matters set
forth in the Bank’s motion and the Walden affidavit.

- A party should not be made to deny matters already averred in

his complaint.

- There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the

courts a quo correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial
summary judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation
of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing
and if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws.