The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical

Perspective
Author(s): Ian S. Lustick
Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 653-683
Published by: The MIT Press
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The AbsenceofMiddle EasternGreat
Powers:Political"Backwardness"in
HistoricalPerspective
Ian S. Lustick

Propelledbytheoil boomofthemid-1970stheMiddleEast emergedas theworld's

fastestgrowing werehighforArabpoliticalconsoli-
region.'Hopesandexpectations
dation,economicadvancement, andcultural Withfallingoil pricesand
efflorescence.
a devastatingwarbetweenIranandIraq,thesehopeshaddimmedsomewhat bythe
early1980s.In 1985,however,thespectacular imageof an Arabgreatpowerwas
A Pan-Arabstate,wrotetwoexpertson theregion,wouldincludea
stilltantalizing.
totalareaof 13.7millionsquarekilometers,
secondonlytotheSovietUnionandconsiderably largerthanEurope,Canada,
China,ortheUnitedStates.... By 2000 itwouldhavemorepeoplethaneither
ofthetwosuperpowers. Thisstatewouldcontainalmosttwo-thirds ofthe
world'sprovenoil reserves.It wouldalso haveenoughcapitalto financeitsown
economicandsocialdevelopment. Conceivably,itcouldfeeditself.... Access
to a hugemarket couldstimulate rapidindustrial
growth. Presentregionalin-
be lessenedandthemismatch
equalitiescouldultimately betweenlabor-surplus
andlabor-short areascorrected.The aggregatemilitary andpolitical
strength
influence locatedstatewouldbe formidable....It is easyto
ofthisstrategically
comprehend whythisdreamhas longintoxicated Arabnationalists.2
Withintenyears,however,thisassessmentsoundedmorelikea fairytalethana
scenario.Indeedthelasttwodecadeshavebeendispiriting not
forArabnationalists,
onlymeasuredagainsttheprospectofa greatnationalstate,butcomparedtolevelsof

I am gratefulforhelpfulcomments draftsof thisarticleby ThomasCallaghy,

made on preliminary
Melani Cammett, AveryGoldstein,StevenHeydemann, Kratochwil,
Friedrich SevketPamuk,and this
journal'sanonymous The paperon whichthisarticleis based was originally
reviewers. preparedfora
January 1996workshop on "RegionalismandtheMiddleEast" organizedundertheauspicesoftheJoint
NearandMiddleEastCommittee oftheSocial ScienceResearchCouncil.
1. El Mallakh1978,195.
2. DrysdaleandBlake 1985,225. ForsimilarexpectationsandscenariosofArabunity, and
prosperity,
power,see Kerr1982,2; and El Mallakh1978, 186-89. On thepotential fora greatArabstate,see, for
example,Waterbury 1978,53-55, 100; LucianiandSalame 1988,13; Salam6 1988a,264,278; andSira-
geldin1988,204.

International 51, 4, Autumn1997,pp. 653-83

Organization
andtheMassachusetts
? 1997byThe IO Foundation Institute
ofTechnology
 Organization
654 International

cooperation andinterstate integrationinEurope,Asia,andtheAmericas, wherehighly

developedcountries arejoiningwithrapidlyexpandingemergent economiesin re-
gionallybasedcommunities of wealthandgrowth. In theMiddleEast,on theother
hand,all integration schemeshavefailed.Intraregional traderemainsverylow,with
estimates ranging between2 and 8 percentoverthelastfifteen years.3MostMiddle
Easternstatesareexperiencing eithereconomicstagnation orabsolutedecline.From
1980to 1991theMiddleEast (including IsraelandIran,butnotTurkey)andNorth
Africaregistered almosta 3 percent decreaseinannualincomegrowth comparedtoa
1 percent decreaseinSub-Saharan Africaanda 1 percent increaseforall thedevelop-
ing world.4The regionsuffered a declineof almost2 percentin grossdomestic
product(GDP) per capitabetween1980 and 1993.5Unemployment in 1993 was
twiceas high(15 percent)as thatin anyotherregionoftheworld.6
Manyexplanations havebeenoffered fordisunity, economicstagnation, and the
failureof anyMuslimorArabstateto emergeas orto builda MiddleEasterngreat
power.Despitetherhetoric and sentiment ofArabnationalism andArabunityand,
morerecently, Islamicunity, contemporary MiddleEasternhistory is riddledwith
parochialhostilities,meaningless schemesformergers andfederations, anda raftof
regimesstrongenoughto suppressdissidents buttooweakandinsecureto riskinti-
mateformsof cooperation withtheirneighbors. With"artificial"colonialborders
virtuallyintact,energyandcapitalsurplusesaremostlyseparated fromdemographic
bulkandcentersofmilitary and administrative capacityandpoliticalappeal.These
conditions, itis oftenpointedout,haveprevented MiddleEasterners frombuilding
largeinternal markets andfromexploiting theirhomogeneity, resources, andadmin-
capacityfordynamic,
istrative-political long-term economicgrowth.7
Mostanalystswhohaveconfronted whatFouadAjamidubbedthe"Arabpredica-
ment"have implicitly or explicitlyused theprocessesand successesof European
integrationafterWorldWarII toidentify therequisites ofsuccessin theMiddleEast
andthereasonsforfailure.8 Thosewhohavethought theprospects werenotall bad
forArabintegration have stressedwhattheydeemedthegrowingself-confidence,
pragmatism, and flexibilityof stateswhose separatesovereignty was increasingly
recognized andacceptedas permanent bytheirneighbors. UsingWestern Europeas a
pointof reference, theseobserversexpectedArab governments wouldthereby be
able toleaveasideold feudsandcooperatewithout worrying aboutpoliticaldissolu-

3. See Miller1993,8; Shafik1995,17.

4. Shafik1995,15.
5. Ibid.,65. Annualgrowthin GDP in theregionalso decreased,froma peak of 6 percentin the
mid-1970stoless than1 percent inthelate 1980s.See ibid.,4.
6. Diwan 1995,3.
7. Fora usefullistoffailedArabintegration see Azzam 1993,227-28.
initiatives,
8. Despitetherecentemphasison Islamas a unifying in theMiddleEast,no frame-
politicalidentity
workhasbeenoris morepromising politicalandeconomicintegration
as a basisforachievingsubstantial
thanArabnationalism. Therefore,I focusmyanalysison thefailureof Arabintegration or Arabstate
building,whileacknowledging thatArabismhasneverbeencompletely divorcedfromIslamicmotifsand
suggestingattheendofthearticlethattheargument worksequallywellforMuslimschemesforpolitical
For a sampleof the "obituaries"written
integration. forArabnationalunity,see Brown1984,27-43;
Ajami1992;andTibi 1990,24-25.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 655

tionor subversion.9 Some analystshave stressedthefunctional necessityof close

economiccooperation andpoliticalintegration,arguingfromnecessity toinevitabil-
ityor likelihood.'0Otherstracethelarge-scalemovement of laborand remittances
acrossArabstateboundaries, recalling,intheiranticipationthatsuchinterdependen-
cies werebindingtheArabworldintoan economicwhole,theoriesassociatedwith
KarlDeutschandErnstHaas totheeffect thatincreasingtransactions acrossborders
andtheunintended spilloveroffunctionallyimportant requirements forcooperation
wouldleadEuropetowardbothpoliticalandeconomicintegration. "IMorepessimis-
ticanalystshaveused theEuropeanexperienceto explainwhytheArabworldhas
notintegrated Citingregimeheterogeneity
successfully. in theMiddleEast,theab-
senceofstrong democraticinstitutions, ofwealth,
theskeweddistribution andtheweakness
andinsecurity ofgovernments-these observersblamethefailure ofregionalintegration
on howdifferent theMiddleEastis intheserespectsfromWestern Europe.12
My argument beginsby suggesting that,whether optimisticor pessimistic,these
analysesare based on a misplacedanalogyof post-World WarII Europeanstates
withpost-World WarII Arabor,morebroadly, Islamicor MiddleEasternstates.A
muchmorefundamental appreciationofthepoliticalandeconomicquandariesfaced
bythepeoplesoftheMiddleEast is possibleifthedozensofstatesin theregionare
comparedtothescoresandevenhundreds ofEuropeanstatesandprincipalities that,
ingradually decreasing number,comprised Europe(andthelandsbordering theNorth
Atlantic)fromthe1200sthrough thelatenineteenth century. The questionthenbe-
comes:How is it thatpowerfulstates,suchas GreatBritain,France,Russia,Ger-
many,Italy,andtheUnitedStates,couldarisein theseregions-statesthatnotonly
combinedthenatural cultural
resources, demographic
affinities, bulk,militarycapac-
ity,administrative andeconomicwealthnecessary
integrity, foractivity on theworld
stageas greatpowers,butcouldalso serveeither as hegemonic leadersintheconstruc-
tionofregionalblocs(especiallytheEuropeanCommunity) oras dependable, confi-
dentpartners insuchendeavors? Thisrecaststheessentialquestiontobe askedabout
thecontemporary MiddleEast in a moreappropriate historicalcontext.Whyhave
therebeenno MiddleEasterngreatpowers?

Westphaliaand Versailles:War and StateBuildingin Europe

and theMiddle East

"The OttomanTurks,"wroteAlbertHourani,in one of his last essays,"may be

calledtheRomansoftheMuslimworld."13 Froma long-cycleperspective,focusing

9. See Noble 1991,52,78-93; andTaylor1982,108-20.

10. See Sirageldin1988,185-207; Kanovsky1968,350-76; Bani Hani 1984,184; andDrysdaleand
Blake 1985,225.
11. Ibrahim1982,17-70.
12. See Nonneman1993;Miller1993,3-6. Regarding see Barakat1993;andLucianiand
civilsociety,
Salame 1988,16-21.
13. Hourani1991,130.
 Organization
656 International

on theevolutionof statesand thecultural, military, and politicalframeworks that

incubatethem,theanalogybetweentheOttomans andtheRomansis foundedon the
gradualattenuation andeventualdisappearance ofan imperialcenter. BoththeOtto-
manEmpirein theMiddleEast and the Holy Roman Empire in medieval andearly
modernEuropeadvancedand upheld(sometimes in reality,sometimes as legal fic-
tions)claimsof authority overheterogeneous populations, complex arrays of mon-
archs,satraps,vassals,andenormouslandmassesdividedintogradually stabilizing
butneverfixedadministrative segments.For theemirs,sheikhs,and walis of the
Arabworld,thegradualdeclineandfinaldisappearance oftheOttoman Empirewas
equivalentto thegradualdeclineand eventualdisappearance of theHoly Roman
Empireforthelords,dukes,kings,andprincesofEurope.In bothcases enforcement
ofclaimsto authority overwidecultural andgeographic areas(MuslimMiddleEast
andChristian and
Europe)was abandoned replaced with parochial butlocallypotent
claimsto sovereignty over small piecesof the region by local elites.
In EuropetheWestphalian treatiesof 1648 gave formalacknowledgment to the
be
validityoftheseclaims(insofaras theycould upheld in the arena of international
politicalandmilitary competition)andtoreplacement oftheuniversal sovereignty of
theemperorwitha hostof separatesovereigns whose autonomous existence had
longsinceactedas themainspring ofEuropeanpolitics.In theMiddleEast,on the
otherhand,mostlocal elitesreadyto advancetheirownclaimsto ruleterritories no
longerincorporated within theOttoman Empire were, for the most part, castaside or
submerged beneath the superordinate power and imperial ambitions of European
states.ThisprocessbeganlongbeforeWorldWarI, butitwas theTreatyofVersailles
thatformally acknowledged replacement of theOttomanEmpire'suniversalsover-
eignty with rule by different
European "mandatory" powersundertheauspicesof
theLeagueofNations.In thiscontext, theLeagueofNationsstoodfornothing more
thantheEuropeanstatesystem, whichhad,in anycase, longsinceemergedas the
decisiveforceinMiddleEasternpoliticalaffairs.
Hereis revealedthemostimportant difference inthedevelopmental trajectoriesof
statesystems in EuropeandtheMiddleEast.Europeanstatesdeveloped,expanded,
madewar,gainedvictories, andconsolidated-orsuffered defeats,shrunk, failedto
consolidate, and disappeared-inan international contextof moderated butviolent
disorder. By onereckoning, in 1900 "therewerearound20 timesfewerindependent
politiesin Europethantherehadbeenin 1500.Theydidnotdisappearpeacefully or
decayas thenationalstatedeveloped;theywerethelosersin a protracted warofall
againstall."14 As CharlesTillynoted,earlymodern Europewasanarchic, but,"largely
as a resultof thepreviousunification undertheRomanEmpire,"it was, in broad
culturalterms, homogeneous.'5Thissetting
fairly required prudent rulersofstatesto
be ambitious andencouraged themtoconsiderabsorption (rather thandestruction) of
neighboring populationsand wealthydistricts as a routeto increasedpower.Even
moreimportantly, rulersoperating withinthissystemdid so freefromtheactualor

14. Cohen,Brown,andOrganski1981,902.
15. Tilly1975,77.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 657

potentialinterference of outsidepowerswhosemilitary, economic,and administra-

tivecapacities,by dwarfing thoseof theyoungEuropeanstates,could have pre-
ventedthesystem fromoperating. Norweretheserulersconstrained byinternational
normsagainstacquiringnewterritory as a resultofvictory in warorthreatofwar.'6
In theMiddleEast, on theotherhand,and in theArabMiddleEast in particular,
or candidatesforrulership,
rulersof territories, foundthemselvesnotonlyover-
whelmedbythetremendous powerofindividual EuropeanorNorthAmericanstates
(especiallyBritain,France,Italy,andtheUnitedStates)butsubjectedtoan elaborate
arrayofinternational institutions andnorms(represented bythesystemofConcerts
andCongressesofthenineteenth century andtheLeague ofNationsandtheUnited
Nationsinthetwentieth century). In sharpcontrast tothewar-lubricatedWestphalian
system-whoseunitsexpandedintogreatpowers,sunkto middleor smallpower
status,or disappearedaltogether, as a resultof warswagedat thehighestlevelsof
forceavailableat thetime-thesystemofcolonialsubordination andexternallyen-
forcednormsto whichthenineteenth and twentieth centuryMiddleEast was sub-
jecteddidnotallowcross-border warfare bylocal rulersto effect
substantialchange
inthenumber, size,orinternal regimesofstates.
My claimis thatthesehistoricalsequence-linked in thegeopolitical
differences
context ofEuropeanandMiddleEasternstatesystem development notthe
constitute
onlybutthesinglemostimportant explanation for thecontemporary absenceofa
MiddleEasterngreatpower.Inpartthiscontention is inspired
byAlexander Gerschen-
kron'sfamousargument morethanforty yearsago. Gerschenkron pointedoutthat
becauseofcompetition fromstateswhoseeconomieshadalreadyindustrialized, Rus-
siaandotherlatecomers toindustrialization through
couldnotachieveindustrialization
freemarketcapitalism(as had earlycomerssuchas Britainand France).'7I argue
thatthiskindof historicalperspective can explainpoliticalas well as economic
"backwardness." 18In thisGerschenkronian sense,therouteavailablefortheachieve-
mentofgreatpowerstatusinEuropeandNorthAmerica,whichincludedlarge-scale
state-buildingwars,hasnotbeenavailabletothosewhosoughtandstillseektoenter
thegreatpowerclubafteritsestablishment.
Prevailingtheoriesof theconditions underwhichlargecentralized monarchical
and nationalstatescrystallized in Western Europeemphasizecompetition amonga
plethoraofpotential coreterritories, each possessingeconomicresources, adminis-
trative cultural
capacities, solidity,geographical advantages, and/ormilitary
capabili-
ties.'9These "conquering cores"or "conquestcenters,"weremotivated to expand

16. Finer1974,97.
17. Gerschenkron 1962.
18. Thequoteshereareofparticular importance sincebyinvoking Gerschenkron's argument I meanto
drawattention onlyto thelatecomerlogic of theargument kind-
as explainingfailureof a particular
politicalfailurebyall MiddleEasternstatestojoin theranksofthegreatpowers.I do notmeantoimplya
breakdown in theprocessofmodernization,anysortofintrinsic culturaloreconomicbackwardness, ora
backwardness in theformofthepolitythatemergedin theMiddleEast comparedto EuropeandNorth
America.
19. Fora widelycitedsurveytracing contemporary Europeanstatesto theiroriginal"core-areas,"see
PoundsandBall 1964,24-40.
658 International
Organization

and consolidatetheirprotostate apparatuses by aspirations to establishlarger"em-

pires"(thatis,sovereign states)oftheirownforthegreater gloryoftherulinghouse,
by a varietyof aggrandizing impulses,and by strategic worriesaboutthreats from
competitors whomightotherwise absorbmarchlandsorweakerneighbors. In Brit-
ain thewarsofAlfredtheGreatandofthePlantagenet andTudormonarchs forged
theheptarchy intoEnglandandtheBritishIsles intotheUnitedKingdom.In France,
warsconducted byCapetianandValoiskingsfromtheIle de Franceproduced, over
centuries, thegreatstatewe knowas France.In Russia theczars foughtwars of
expansionand repression westof theUrals and vast ex-
to join Slavic territories
pansesofAsia eastoftheUralstothedomainruledfromMuscovy.UsingPrussiaas
a base, Bismarckian diplomacyand a seriesof warsagainstAustria,France,and
othersproducedGermany. In Italy,Piedmont foughtwarsagainstAustria,sponsored
Garibaldi'slandingin Sicily,and marchedits armydowntheItalianpeninsulato
destroy theold Bourbonmonarchy, thereby eliminatingthejealous rivalriesamong
separateprincipalities and city-states thathad forso long dividedItalians.20 The
bloodystruggle betweenNorthandSouthin NorthAmericatransformed whatcould
havebeena loose confederation of states,or a continentdividedintothreeor four
states,intoa continental statedominated bya coherent political,economic,andcul-
turalelite.2lThe longhistories ofJapanandChinareflect thesamehardtruth-that
no greatstateintoday'sworldhas arisenpeacefully orlegally.22
Theargument is notoneofdesignordestiny, butofevolution andatleastpartially
unintended consequences."No dynasty setouttobuilda nation-state;" arguedV. G.
Kiernan,
each aimedatunlimitedextension... andthemoreitprospered themorethe
outcomewas a multifarious empireinsteadofa nation.The nationwas theem-
piremanque. It hadtobe largeenoughto surviveandto sharpenitsclawson its
butsmallenoughtobe organizedfromonecentreandtofeelitselfas
neighbors,
an entity.23

20. PrussiaandPiedmontfoughtfiercer, morepurposeful, andtemporally moreconcentrated warsof

nationalunificationpreciselybecause,intheEuropeancontext, Germany andItalywerelatedevelopers as
nationalstates.In otherwords,consistentwithmyargument abouttheobstaclestoachievinggreatpower
statusfacedbypoliticallatecomers outsideofEurope,theseEuropeanlatecomers themselves facedhigher
barriersto entryto thegreatpowerclub thandid theirpredecessors-barriers theysurmounted through
determined leadership,strategicplanning,large-scalemilitaryexertions,andfortuitous tacticalalliances
withexistinggreatpowers(Piedmontand FranceversusAustria;Prussiaand ItalyversusAustriaand
France).The contours ofItalywereinparticular constrainedbywhatTillyreferred toas the"filling-inof
thestatesystem."See Tilly1975,46. See also Finer1974,84,95.
21. Deudney1995,191-228.
22. Japan'sreemergence as a greatpowerafterWorldWarII, alongwiththatofGermany andChina,
owes a greatdeal notonlyto theimplementation of disciplineddevelopmentalistand neomercantilist
policies,butto thepriorcreationof unified, territorially
expansive,and demographically weighty states
through warsofsurvival, conquest,andexpansionamongcontending subunits(warsofGermanunifica-
tioninthenineteenth centuryandthewarring statesperiodsofChineseandJapanesehistory) as wellas to
theevolutionof strongstatesand powerfuleconomieslinkedto participation in warswithothergreat
powers,fromtheSino-Japanese Warof the 1890s and theRusso-Japanese Warof theearlytwentieth
centurytothetwoworldwars.
23. Kieman1965,35.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 659

fortheevolution
a moregeneralversionofthistheory
In 1902OttoHintzeoffered
oflarge,strong statesinEurope:
territorial
It was thesituationoftheEuropeanstatesystemthatmadetheformation of
greater necessary.
stateshistorically Francewas forcedintothisdirection
byher
struggle withtheHabsburgs;andonceFrancehadsettheexample,itbecamea
necessity fortheotherEuropeanstatestofollowherexampleiftheywishedto
preserve theirindependence. The development ofmilitaryandpoliticalpower
andconstant militarypreparedness werepossibleonlyon thebasisofa larger,
centrallyruledandadministrative The militarist
territory. system,withall thatit
entailedin politicalterms,proceededfromthepowerstruggles andrivalriesof
theContinental statesaftertheclose oftheMiddleAges.24
Ofall ofHintze'sdisciples,Tillyhasoffered thebestandmostinfluential formula-
tionoftheargument-that "warmadethestate,andthestatemadewar."25Atleast,
andthisis mypoint,thisis howitworkedinEuropeandNorthAmerica,andthisis
theonlywaywe knowthata "greatpower"canbe constructed inthemodernworld.
mechanisms
The institutional thatprovidedthislinkbetweensuccessfulprosecu-
tionof externalwarsand theexpansion(territorial and otherwise)of stateswere
political,administrative, it becamenecessaryforabsolutist
and fiscal.Politically,
monarchs toextendrights ofrepresentation ingovernment tothosecapableofpaying
thetaxesnecessary tofinance warstheywishedtofight orfeltcompelledtobe ableto
fight.26
Development of the"national"idea and theextensionof politicalrightsto
thegentry, thebourgeoisie, and latertheworkingclass thereby becameassociated
withstateswhoserelativelegitimacy permitted themtoraisemoretaxes,buildlarger
military andfight
capabilities, morewarstovictorious conclusions oratleastprevent
atthehandsofotherexpandedstates.27
theirdestruction Themuchlargerandtechno-
logicallysophisticated armiesand navies sponsoredby thesestatesalso required
moredevelopedand effective administrative structures to extractresources(con-
scriptsand taxes),directtheirgrowth, andcreatebroaderindigenous(or colonially
supervised) industrial
andagricultural basestoassurelogisticalsupport.28Theuse of
theseenhancedcapabilitiesto prosecutesuccessfulwarsthenled to even greater
administrativeandpoliticalcapacitiestotaxandextract Whilenew
otherresources.29
militarybureaucracies servedas modelsformorepowerful and ambitiousformsof
statecontrolovercivilaffairs,investments in military-related andagricul-
industrial

24. Hintze1975,174.
25. See Tilly1975,42; andTilly1985.Explaining Germany's risetogreatpowerstatus,Dehiowroteof
"dynamicdiversity" and "fertilefriction"amongtheHelleniccity-states, theprincipalities
of Renais-
sanceItaly,andin Europeas a whole.Thesewerethekeyfactors, in "theperpetual
he argued,reflected
motionof its struggles,"thatin a culturally dividedEurope"gave riseto an im-
unifiedbutpolitically
menseheightening ofall vitalenergies"andproducedthemodemgreatpowers.See Dehio 1962,21-23.
See also Finer1974,79-126; andZolberg1980.
26. See Ibid.,694,708,712; Tilly1975,23, 35; Finer1974,104-106;andTilly1990,96-126.
27. See Ardant1975,196-99;Braun1975;andTilly1990,183.
28. See Tilly1975,73-74; Tilly1990,67-95; Finer1974,98; andGiddens1985,111-16.
29. See Finer1974,98; Tilly1990,189-90.
660 International
Organization

turalgoods contributed to acceleratedgrowthof demandand production in the

economyas a whole.30
As statesbecamestronger, theirneighbors had to becomestronger-politically,
militarily,
fiscally, demographically, Forthestatesthatbecamegreat
andterritorially.
powers,all thesedimensions of powerwenttogether.31 Weakerstateseitherdisap-
pearedin the strugglesamongmoresubstantial powers(forexample,Burgundy,
Brittany, Scotland,Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover,Venice,theAmericanConfed-
eracy,Sicily,Lombardy, and Bavaria)or securedtheirindependence (forexample,
Belgium,theNetherlands, Switzerland,Luxembourg, Portugal, andPoland)ina web
of alliancesandneutrality agreements withgreatpowersunwilling, at leastforsub-
stantialperiodsoftime,toriskwarovertheirfuture.
A broaderbutweakerversionofmyargument is thatstates,anywhere intheworld,
thatcouldnotby theend of thenineteenth century crediblycontendat thehighest
strategiclevelandprojectpowerbeyondtheirowngeographical regionsweremuch
less likelyto gain thecapabilityto do so subsequently. A stronger but narrower
versionof theargument, and thatis whatI am advancinghere,is thatthisfactor-
latecomer status-is themostimportant elementexplaining thefailureofgreatpow-
ers,or a singlegreatpower,to emergein theMiddleEast. In eithercase, I attribute
thisdifferentiallikelihoodto thepotential forexistinggreatpowersto interrupt the
dynamicinteraction of warand statebuildingthathad helpedbringthemintoexis-
tenceas suchandtothenew,dense,andincreasingly constraining network ofantibel-
ligerency normsintheinternational arena.32
The argument is hardlynewthatthepredicament of weakthirdworldstatesis a
function of theirlate arrivalin an internationalsystemalreadydominatedby and
reflecting theinterests of establishedlargepowers.In theeconomicrealm,world
systemstheoryand dependency theoryarebothbased on thissequentiallogic.But
thesetheorieswereadvancedto explainenduring patternsofeconomicunderdevel-
opmentorunderperformance. Strongcritiquesofthisclusteroftheories, byempha-
sizingtherecordof EastAsianand LatinAmericannewlyindustrializing countries
(NICs), highlight thefactthatthedebateoverthecausesof "underdevelopment" and
therangeof opportunities thirdworldstateshave to improvetheirlot withinthe
international economyhas been severelyand instructively restricted.Even those
economists andotheranalystsassociatedwiththeWorldBankandtheInternational
Monetary Fund(IMF), whohavetrumpeted thepotential of "structuraladjustment"
as an escape routefrompovertyand underdevelopment, set theirsightsforthese

30. See Giddens1985,128-35;andZolberg1980,696.

31. Ibid.,691,693.
32. China,India,andBrazilareexamplesofverylargecountriesthatmaynow,orsoon,be legitimately
considered"greatpowers"butwhichdidnothavethisstatusat theendofthenineteenth century.These
countries exceptionsthatprovetherule.Chinawas constructed
can be considered as a unifiedstateas a
resultofmanywarsamongChinesestates-warsthatoccurred wellbeforeanyEuropeanorNorth American
and thecountry
greatpowerwas in a positionto intervene, was simplytoo vastto be occupiedby the
imperialpowerseven duringtheperiodof theOpen Door. India and Brazil,on theotherhand,were
fromextraregional
sheltered byBritishandPortuguese
interventions (andthenU.S.) imperialism.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 661

societiesno higherthanbringing economicperformance intoline withpopulation

growth, employment requirements, andmoderately increasing standardsofliving.33
Insofaras theorists workingalongtheselineshave soughtto explaintheabsence
of large-scalestateframeworks foreconomicdevelopment, theyhave simplyre-
ferredto theconsequencesofEuropeanimperialism andthe"artificial" fragmenta-
tionenforced bypost-colonial boundaries. Thisapproach, however, impliesthatsuch
fragmentation didnothavetobe overcomeinEuropeandthereby ignoresthecrucial
rolethatwarplayedin producing thekindof statesthatcouldbuildlargeinternal
markets, securenecessarytradingand investment advantagesabroad,and sustain
industrial development.34 Neitherdependency-world systemtheorists northeircrit-
ics imagineanyformofpoliticalexpansionforstatesnotalreadyestablished as great
powersapartfrompeacefulregionalcooperation orintegration.Implicitly,butmost
categorically, theyruleoutstatestrategies of forcibleexpansionthatcould,intend-
edlyor not,resultin imperialor nationaleconomiesand international military and
politicalcapabilitiessufficient to rivalthoseof theestablished greatpowers.When
suchscenariosaredescribed, as theyoftenarebyAmericanandEuropeananalystsin
regardto thepossibility of a largeArab or fundamentalist Islamicstate,theyare
presented as whollyillegitimate anddangerous.35
One schoolofthought thatmakesa clearconnection betweenthecharacter ofthird
worldstatesandtheconsequencesofhistorical sequencethatgivesthemthatappel-
lationis theclusterofstudiesproducedbyCarlRosberg,RobertJackson, andJeffrey
Herbst.36 Thesescholarshavedevelopedtheviewthatthesurvivalofso manyweak
statesin thethirdworldis due to thesupportof an international politicalorderthat
upholdsexistingboundariesand existingregimesagainstinternalthreats and chal-
lenges.Theyhave contrasted theactualweaknessand politicalincapacity of these
"quasi-states"to thestrength and politicalcapacityof theauthentically sovereign
statesthataroseinEuropeandNorthAmericabeforethiscentury. These"empirical"
or "real" states,inJackson'sterminology, earnedtheirstatusbyexercising effective
control, without external assistance, overtheterritoriesandpeopleswithintheirdes-
ignatedboundaries.
My contention is thatthesewriters havefailedtorecognizean equallyconsequen-
tialeffectof extraregional powersand international normson thirdworldpolitical
development. In theMiddleEast,perhapsmorethaninAfrica(wheretheJackson-
Rosberg-Herbst lineofanalysishasbeenmostthoroughly applied)theeffect ofgreat

33. WithregardtotheMiddleEast,see,forexample,DiwanandSquire1993,37.
34. SteinRokkanarguedstrongly that"theEuropeansequencesimplycannotbe repeated inthenewest
nations.The newnation-buildershaveto startoutfromfundamentally conditions;
different theyfacean
entirely world."He wenton tosuggestthatthesenewstatescouldlearnfromhisanalysisofthe
different
"manyfacets"of Europeanstatebuildingbutneverconsideredtheimplications of an environment-
present andlargelyabsentin themodernMiddleEast-tolerantofsuccessful,
in Europeanhistory preda-
torywar.See Rokkan1973,94. See also Rokkan1981.
see StephenVanEvera'smention
35. Fora rareexception, offuturewarsamongArabstatesas compa-
rabletothewarsofItalianandGermanunification in thenineteenth See VanEvera 1994,1In.
century.
36. See Jacksonand Rosberg1982; Jackson1987; Herbst1989.For applicationof theseideas to the
ArabMiddleEast,see Hudson1988,32-36.
662 International
Organization

powerintervention andenforcement ofinternationalnormshasbeennotonlytoprop

up otherwise regimesagainstinternal
vulnerable challenges,buttoprevent potential
regionalhegemonsfromexercising theirrelativecapacitiesbyconquering or other-
wisecoercively integrating To theextentthatone acceptstheargu-
theirneighbors.37
mentthatpoliticalviolenceon a grandscaleis howall developinggreatpowershave
weldedlargepopulations andextensivevaluableterritorieswithina singleadminis-
trativedomainand a singlemarket, one mustexpectthatinternational normsand
greatpowerpolicieshave been responsibleforblockingtheemergenceof a great
powerin theMiddleEastbydeterring orpreventing warsfrombeing
state-building
fought conclusionsacrossexisting
to successful MiddleEasternboundaries.38
Theimportance ofthisanalysisforexplainingpoliticalweaknessinthethird world
is evidentfromthecrucialbutunnoticedrelationshipbetweentwoobservations made
byJacksoninthecourseofhisargument. Jacksonclaimsthatiflefttothemselves,
mostexistingthirdworldstateswouldcrumbleintofarsmallerparticularisms.
Theseentitiesmightbe morecoherent domesticallythanexistingquasi-states,
andthereprobablywouldbe fewercivilconflicts. However,theywouldfragment
societyintoa fargreater
existinginternational number thanexist
ofjurisdictions
now.Insteadoffiftystates,Africawouldcontainmorethantenor twenty timesas
many... an unmanageable number and wouldexposethecontinent tofar
greaterrisksofexternalcontrolthanitfaces atpresent.39
Noteherehow theprospectof a thirdworldfragmented intohundreds of small
stateletsis consideredretrograde,"unmanageable," and apt to expose the smaller
unitstoeven"greater risksofexternalcontrol"(meaning, presumably,from outside
thethirdworld). Yet some pages as
later, Jacksonis describingEuropean conditions
in theseventeenth century underwhich"real" statesdeveloped,he mentions that
therewere"three hundred-odd independentsovereigntiesinGermany alone." Among
thesehundreds ofstatesandprincipalities,
proximity andpowermeanttherewas alwaysa strong ofwar:the
possibility
alliance,andthebalanceof
Deterrence,
classicalproblemofa states-system.
powerareresponsestoit.Butcompetition and
was also a spurto state-building
one ofthemainreasonsfortheeventualglobalhegemony ofEurope.40

37. In a 1990 articleHerbstdoes identify waras a keyelementin Europeanstateexpansion

interstate
and focuseson theabsenceof interstate war as a hindranceto statebuildingin Africa.However,he
peace inAfricatothevestedinterests
attributes andpoliciesofAfricaneliteswhodo notwishtorisktheir
holdon powerby destabilizing theprevailingdistribution andin
amongstates.Instructively,
of territory
sharpcontrastto hisemphasiselsewhereon international systemresponsibilityforpreventingsuccessful
internalchallengestoAfricangovernments, Herbstdoes notmention systemas a con-
theinternational
on successfulaggrandizing
straint warsinAfricaorthethirdworld.See Herbst1990.
38. Foran argument doesjoin thegeneralpointI am makingtoconsideration
that,howeverbriefly, of
Africa,see Ali Mazrui'scommentsaboutEuropean"disimperialization" largeAfrican
of potentially
states.See Mazrui 1984,307. For moretypicaltreatments of thethirdworldas havingsuffered from
"permissive" greatpowernormswithrespecttointerstate violenceandthatemphasizethedomesticlocus
of securitythreatsin thethirdworldwithoutreference system'sprevention
to theinternational of suc-
cessfulaggrandizing wars,see Ayoob1991;andDavid 1991.
39. Jackson1990,42 (emphasisadded).
40. Ibid.,51.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 663

In otherwords,a circumstance thatJackson identifiesas thebeginning ofa process

leadingtorealstatesandgreatpowersinEurope(hundreds ofsmallstates)is treatedas an
insuperableobstaclewhenlocatedin thethird world.ThusJackson acknowledges thata
keyelement in theproductionofbiggerandstronger Europeanstateswas a prolonged
periodofaggrandizing andbalancing warsamonga largenumber ofsmallstates.
However,
hisfocusonthesupport granted
tothird worldregimes against threats
internal leadshimto
misstheextent to which"external control" also prevents thekindofrough-and-tumble
violencethrough
interstate whichsomeofthosesmallstatescouldbecomethethird
worldequivalents ofMuscovy,Piedmont, Prussia,Wessex,ortheIle de France.
I nowturnto a briefaccountofthreeattempts byMiddleEasternstatebuildersto
use aggrandizing warsandsubversion toexpandtheirstates-accountsthathighlight
theimportance of extraregionalinterventions and firmly establishedinternational
normsas obstaclesto thesuccessfulconstruction of a newgreatpower.The impor-
tanceofthesecases is notinthefailureofEgyptian andIraqielitestoweldtheentire
ArabMuslimMiddleEast intoa singlestate.Afterall, despiteGerman,Austrian,
Spanish,andFrenchattempts to uniteall ofEuropeunderone politicalsovereignty,
thatneveroccurred.Rather,theimportance of thesethreecases is thattheyreveal
how,through relativelysmallexertions of their tremendous power,theexisting(Eu-
ropeanand North American) great powers repeatedly and decisively intervened to
prevent successfullyfoughtwarsfrombeingusedbyMiddleEasternstatebuildersas
a meansof doingwhattheirEuropeanandNorthAmericanpredecessors had done.
Althougha creativeanarchycould workin theEuropeanand NorthAtlanticstate
systemsto producegreatpowers,theMiddleEasternstatesystem-whoseleading
memberswerein absolutetermsat least as well organized,as populous,and as
militarilypotentas earlymodernEnglandorFrance-was notallowedtooperateby
thesamerulesas hadtheEuropeansystem.41

The FrustrationofPotentialMiddle EasternStateBuilders:

ThreeExamples42
Muhammad
Ali
Themostsignificanteffort
bya nineteenthcentury MiddleEasternrulertotransform
political,andeconomiccoreofa greatpowerwas
base intothemilitary,
histerritorial

41. Another way to expressthisargument is thatbarriersto entryintotheranksof thegreatpowers

weremuchlowerforpost-HolyRomanEmpireEuropeanstatesthanforpost-Ottoman MiddleEastern
states.Fundamentally,however, itwas becausean arrayofgreatpowersalreadyexistedinthelatter period
andnotin theformer thatthesebarriers toentry wereso substantial.
42. I willdiscusswhatI considerthethreemostinstructive examples,representingthreeof themost
ambitiousanddramatic attempts tobuildanArabgreatpower.Evidencesupporting myargument couldbe
drawnfroma hostof smaller-scale ventures whereexternalintervention or theexternalenforcement of
normsonbehalfofrecognizedsovereign
international statesortheprincipleofnaturalself-determination
blockedorbluntedstateexpansionbypotential regionalorsubregional hegemons. Theseventures include
SyriaunderAssad regarding Jordan in 1970 andLebanonsince 1975; Israelin Sinaiin 1948,1956,and
1975-1981,in Lebanonin 1982-1984,and in theWestBank and Gaza Stripin 1967-present; Libya
regardingChad; Somaliaregarding theOgaaden;Moroccoregarding theWestern Sahara;Iraq regarding
Kuwaitin 1963; and variousIranianinitiatives in the 1970s and 1980s. Concerning thepeculiarbut
fundamentally consistentcase ofIsrael,see Lustick1987,152-54.
 Organization
664 International

thatof MuhammadAli. MuhammadAli was governor(wali) of Egyptunderthe

sovereignty of theOttomansultan.This somewhatuneasyrelationship of powerful
vassal to sovereignlord,whenthevassal commanded and economic
moremilitary
wherewithal thanthelord,is morethana littlereminiscent be-
of therelationship
tweenpowerful medievalkings,suchas HenrytheII ofEngland,andtheir nominal
sovereign, theHoly RomanEmperor.DespitethefactthatHenry'smilitary power
andpoliticalpositionweremoresecureandmoredependablethanthoseoftheem-
peror,Henrypubliclyacknowledged evenas he
theemperor'ssovereignauthority,
proceededtoconsolidate hiskingdomas thekindof "empiremanque"(theAngevin
Empire)thatKiernan(quotedearlier)characterizedas theEuropeanroutetonation-
statehood.Considerthegreetings to theEmperorFrederickcontainedin a twelfth
century tohimfromHenryII:
letter
bythegraceofGod themostin-
dearestto hisheart,Frederick,
To thefriend
oftheRomans,Henry,
vincibleemperor kingofEngland,dukeofNormandy
andAquitaneandcountofAnjou,greeting andtheharmonyoftruepeace and
love....
We laybeforeyouourkingdomandwhatever is anywheresubjecttooursway,
andentrust ittoyourpower,thatall thingsmaybe administeredin accordance
withyournodandthatin all respectsyourimperialwillbe done... toyou,who
mayfalltherightto command,
excelsus in worth, whilewe shallnotlackthe
willto obey.43
Similarlanguagewouldhavebeenusedin official correspondence fromMuham-
madAli to theSublimePorte,evenas OttomansultanswerebeggingAli forhelp
putting downrevoltsin Arabia,Crete,and Greece.Indeed,as AfafLutfiAl-Sayyid
Marsothasdescribedinvividdetail,thewarsfought byAli andhissons,particularly
Ibrahim, whileformally at thebehestof thesultan,were actuallywagedas partofa
systematiceffortto expandtheircontrolof easternMediterranean traderoutesand
annexSyria.Territorialaggrandizement throughpredatory warwas thecornerstone
ofa policydesignedto winEuropeanrecognition as a greatpowerforthestatebeing
builtbytheAlbaniandynasty aroundanEgyptian demographic, military,administra-
tive,andeconomiccore.Thesewarsbeganin 1812 whenthesultanaskedhis "vas-
sal" in Egyptto sendtroopsto Arabiato crushWahhabipowerthereand occupy
Mecca and Medina.A secondwar,initiated by Muhammad Ali, was an invasionof
Sudan in 1820, listedby Marsotas the "second of thewarsof Egyptianexpan-
sion."44The purposeof thisexpeditionwas, accordingto Ali himself,"to provide

43. Folz 1969,196-97.

44. Marsot1984,205. Marsot'streatment FredLawson's recentstudy
is takenhereas authoritative.
(1992) arguesthatMuhammad Ali's expansionism strainsin thecoali-
was designedto alleviateinternal
tionofsocialgroupsthatgovernedEgyptrather thana coherent I am unpersuaded
exercisein realpolitik.
by Lawson's work,thoughI do notconsiderhis maincontentionsto contradicttheargument advanced
here.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 665

largenumbers ofslaves,tobringtheterritoryunderEgyptian dominion, andtosearch

foranddiscovergoldminesandother mineral resources."45
Withbothsides of theRed Sea now underMuhammadAli's control,Egyptian
powerwas directedelsewhere.Havingearliersupported Greekrebelsagainstthe
sultan,Muhammad Ali now entertainedpleas from thePorte to putdowntherebel-
lion.Usingthesultan'sdistress togainhisapprovalforEgypt'sannexation ofCrete,
Ali occupiedthatislandin 1824anduseditas a platform forlandingEgyptian forces
in Greecein 1825.A stringof EgyptianvictoriesagainsttheGreeksprompted the
Concertof Europeto takenoteof "a new PuissanceBarbaresquein Europe."46
Metternich himselfwarnedtheEuropeanpowersofAli's questtojoin theirranks.47
Meanwhile,Muhammad Ali, acutelyawareofEuropeanmilitary powerandfearful
of a Britishinvasionof Egypt,yetanxiousto be acceptedas an equal,wroteto an
Austrian diplomattodescribehisambitions a manner
in as soothing as possible:
I wantnothingbutEgypt.My wishesgo no further. Egyptis a smallcountry,
but
that,without
so productive thiswar,itwouldhavebeena pearl.Tenyearsof
peace andI willdrawfromitforty milliontalaris[riyals].Iftheyleavemeto
work,thiscountry thatbesidethefourgreatworldpow-
willbe so transformed
ers,England,Russia,Austria,and France,Egyptbyitsmoneywillbe thefifth.48
The existing wereclearlyunwilling
greatpowers,however, to allowEgypttojoin
theirranks,at leastnotthroughsuccessfulmilitarycampaignsin proximateareas.
AccusingMuhammadAli of fostering piracyin theAdriatic,France,Austria,and
Britaincombinedto attackandsinktheEgyptianfleetatNavarinoin October1828.
As faras Britishmotiveswereconcernedin thisincident,
Marsotcomments that
an independentAfrican,orratherMediterranean, was exactlywhatMu-
authority
hammadAli wishedEgypttobecome,andwhatEnglandwishedto denyhim.
Sucha statein controloverthetradeandcommerce oftheeasternMediterranean
wouldpose a threat commercial
toBritishexpansionist aims,in termsoftrade,
andwouldturnthesea intoan Egyptianenclaveoverhalfitsarea.49
was overbutnothisambitions
Ali's Greekexpedition an indepen-
forconstructing
dentMiddleEasterngreatpowerbasedin Egypt.He immediately setaboutbuilding
a newfleetandpreparing anotherarmyfortheconquestofSyria.In November1831,
an EgyptianarmyunderIbrahimPasha,MuhammadAli's son,invadedPalestine,
andcaptured Acrein May 1832 andDamascusin June.No longerwillingto accept
SultanMahmuddeclaredhiman enemyoftheempire,
of fealty,
Ali's protestations
buttwoOttomanarmiessentagainsttheEgyptians weredefeated.FearingIbrahim
wouldnextmarchon Constantinople thesultanappealedtotheEuropeanpow-
itself,
ersforhelp.WhenRussiaresponded bysendingwarshipsintotheBosporus,Britain
andFrancetooknotice.Pressured byBritainandFrance,waryofRussia'sintrusion,

45. Marsot1984.
46. Ibid.,208.
47. Ibid.,213.
48. Ibid.(emphasisadded).
49. Ibid.
666 International
Organization

and shortof supplies,Ibrahimconcludedan agreement withthesultanthatrecog-

nizedEgyptian ruleofSyria(including Palestine).
Syriahad alwaysbeenthecenterpiece ofMuhammad Ali's ambitionto establish
Egyptas a greatpower.Although he didnotimaginehimself as a leaderoftheArabs,
hissonIbrahimspokeArabic,identified himself as anArab,andusedpoliticalrheto-
ricchallenging rulebyemperors ormonarchs"on behalfoftheconsensus(ijma) of
theumma"thatcouldeasilybe interpreted in quasi-nationalist terms.50 In anycase,
in 1838 MuhammadAli announcedhis intention of secedingfromtheempireand
incorporatingSyriaintohishereditary domain.Thisprompted anotherOttomanef-
fortin 1839 to dislodgetheEgyptians fromSyria,resulting in yetanother Ottoman
defeatandEgypt'scaptureoftheOttoman fleet.On thedeathofSultanMahmud,the
new sultan,AbdulMejid,cameto termswithMuhammadAli in an agreement that
wouldhaverecognizedEgypt'spermanent acquisition ofSyria.
Thegreatpowerswouldnottolerate thisarrangement. Muhammad Ali,saidPalm-
erston,mustbe compelled"to withdraw intohis originalshellofEgypt."'51In July
1840 Russia,Prussia,Austria,andEnglandannouncedan agreement withthePorte
"forthepacificationoftheLevant."Themainthrust ofthisconvention wasanultimatum
to MuhammadAli to retract his bid forindependence andpermanent ruleof Syria.
WhenFrancebackedawayfromsupporting EgyptagainstBritainandtheotherpow-
ers,thestagewas setforendingMuhammad Ali's greatpowerambitions. "Coercion
ofMehemetAli byEnglandifwarbrokeoutmightappearpartialandunjust,"wrote
Palmerston, "butwe are partial;and thegreatinterests of Europerequirethatwe
shouldbe so."52BritishandAustrianshipscutEgypt'ssea linksto Syria;a contin-
gentof BritishmarinesdefeatedIbrahim'sforces,and bothBeirutand Sidonwere
taken.Whena BritishfleetthenappearedinAlexandria itself,Muhammad Ali agreed
to thetermsof theTreatyof London,includingevacuationof Syria,Arabia,and
Crete,returnoftheTurkish fleet,andsharpreduction in thesize ofhisarmy.
In additionto surrenderingterritories,military assets,and sovereignclaims,Mu-
hammadAli was also compelledto acceptcapitulation treatiesthatproscribed the
statemonopolieshehadestablished tostrengthen Egypt'sinfant industries.
Thetrea-
tiesdoomedEgyptto a subordinate rolein theworldeconomy. As Marsotexplains,
The granddesignofan empireandofhegemony overtheMediterranean evapo-
rated.... Without embargoes,a captivemarket,
anda largearmyto use up much
ofthemanufactured sloweddown,andmostof
goods,Egyptianindustrialization
thewar-relatedindustries weredismantled.
The Egyptian economiceffortfrom
henceforth becamegearedtoturning thecountryintoan exportmarket
foragri-
culturalproducts... to export[ing]
herrawmaterialstoEurope,wheretheywere
tobe manufactured andsoldbacktoEgyptas finished products.53

50. Ibid.,226. See also Dodwell 1931,257-58.

51. Marriott1917,240.
52. Marsot1984,240.
53. Ibid.,246-47. See also Ralston1990,90, 95.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 667

"was
putit,fromhisEuropeanperspective,
"The Egyptianquestion,"as Marriot
nowsettled."54

GamalAbdelNasser
"Settled"as itmayhavebeenin theearlynineteenth century,theEgyptianquestion
reappearedin the 1950s and 1960s. This timeanotherambitiousmilitary leader,
GamalAbdelNasser,soughttoestablisha greatArabstate,withEgyptas itsmilitary,
cultural,andpoliticalcore.He wrotethata worldhistoric roleexistedforEgypt-a
roleas leaderoftheMuslim,Arab,andAfricanworlds.TheAfricansideofNasser's
policy,however,was virtually nonexistent, and afterhis brutalcrackdownon the
MuslimBrotherhood athome,hisprojecttookon a distinctly Pan-Arabcast.Evoca-
tionsof a great,unitedArab state,fromtheAtlanticto theGulf,werea constant
refrainin thepopularSawtel-Arab(VoiceoftheArabs)transmissions fromCairo's
powerful newradiostation. Nasser'squestforEgyptian hegemony intheArabworld
was aided by thousandsof Egyptianteachers, and otherprofessionals
journalists,
working throughout theArabMiddleEast. Egyptianvernacular, Nasseristthinking,
Nasser's cadences,his visage,his alliancewiththe SovietUnion,his proudand
successful defianceoftheIsraeli-French-British invasionof 1956,andhissupport of
therevoltagainstFrancein AlgeriaestablishedEgyptin thelate 1950s and early
1960sas a potentcandidateforleadership oftheArabworldandas a possiblevehicle
foritsconsolidation intoa newgreatpower.
As MuhammadAli had alwaysbeen waryof Britishintervention to blockhis
state-building andstate-expanding ambitions, so was Nasseranxioustoremaininthe
good gracesof theUnitedStates-the new leaderof thegreatpowerclub.When
Nasser'sFree Officers overthrew theFaroukmonarchy in 1952,theUnitedStates
was notsurprised. Friendlycontactshad beenestablished in themonthsbeforethe
revolution betweenNasserandtheU.S. CentralIntelligence Agency(CIA). In 1954
theCIA channelto Nasserwas used to deliverfundsand explorea possibleU.S.-
Egyptian alliance.55
But as Palmerston and Metternich could notabide a powerfuland independent
Egypt,neithercould Dulles,Eden,Mollet,or,forthatmatter, Kruschevabide the
idea of a trulyindependent, powerful, and unitedArab state.In bothperiodsthe
overweening of thegreatpowersagainstany nascentMiddle Eastern
superiority
powerallowedpoliciestowardtheMiddle East to be guidedby mundane,often
casual,and usuallymarginal jealousies,inclinations, The British-
and preferences.
sponsored"League ofArabStates"andtheAmerican-sponsored BaghdadPactwere
twoschemesforthepoliticalorganization ofMiddleEasternstatesthatreflectedboth
thegreatpowers'enormous marginofsuperiority andthewayin whichgreatpower
policiesof majorimportance forMiddleEasternstatescould be fashionedrather
cavalierly bygreatpowerdiplomats andintelligence officers.

54. Maniott1917,244.
55. Eveland1980,96-105.
 Organization
668 International

In theimmediate postwarperiodGreatBritainhad helpedfoundtheLeague of

ArabStatesas an institution thatcouldat once preserveexistingboundaries within
theArabworldand enlisttheseparategovernments in cooperative ventures under
Britishauspices.Such limited notions of Arab unity were already suspect in the eyes
of theyoung militaryleaders and Nasserist and Baathist activists who were taking
politicalpoweror gaininginfluence in Egypt,Syria,Jordan, andIraq.Western sup-
portforIsraeland schemessuchas the Middle East Defense Organization and the
BaghdadPactreinforced suspicionsthat the great powers of the West were interested
onlyin organizing a dividedArabworldagainsttheSovietUnion.56 The American-
Egyptianrelationship soon souredas well. The UnitedStates firstpromised,then
withdrew offersof armsand aid forconstruction of the Aswan Dam afterNasser
demonstrated toomuchindependence in hisforeign policy.
WithArab-Israelitensionsheatingup in 1955,Nasserturned to theSovietUnion
for arms andmoved to nationalize the Suez Canal. Egyptian propaganda againstthe
Baghdad Pactintensified, and waves of Arab nationalistagitation swept through the
ArabEast.Pro-Nasser, anti-Western riots erupted in Jordan in January 1956, prompt-
ingyoungKingHusseintoorderhisBritishmilitary andpoliticaladvisersoutofthe
country.Whenantimonarchist Nasserists won elections in Jordanin October1956,
thenewprimeminister immediately placed Jordan's military underanEgyptian gen-
eral.Mass support for Nasser's leadership of a united Arab world rose to unprec-
edentedlevelsafterthefailureof theBritish-French-Israeli attackon Egyptin No-
vember1956.Facedwitha torrent ofpopularoutrage, Jordan canceleditstreaty with
Britainandterminated theBritishsubsidy.ButwhenJordan announceditsrejection
of proposalsforthe emergent Egyptian-Syrian union,pro-Nasserarmyofficers,
backedbyArabnationalist Palestinians, plottedtooverthrow themonarchy. In Syria
a Baathist(radicalPan-Arab)regimewas facedwithcommunist subversion from
withinand American-supported military threatsfromTurkey, Iraq,and Jordan.In
February 1958itdissolveditselfandmerged SyriaintotheEgyptian-dominated United
ArabRepublic(UAR). Nasserimmediately invitedall otherArabcountries to be-
comepartofthesinglegreatArabstatehe was constructing.
Nasserwellappreciated thathe couldnotachievethePan-Arabunityhe promised
bypoliticalappealsandinspiring rhetoric alone.Nasserhadalreadyprovidedpoliti-
cal anddiplomatic support to theFrontde Liberation Nationale(FLN) in itsviolent
struggletoendFrenchruleofAlgeria.In Lebanonin 1958a full-scale Arabnational-
istrevolt,animated byfervent support forNasseramongLebanon'sMuslimpopula-
tionanddrawing military support fromSyria(nowpartoftheUAR), seriously threat-
enedtheMaronite-dominated government. Meanwhilein Iraq,Nasser'spropaganda
andEgyptians in thatcountry wereagitating fortheoverthrow ofthemonarchy. In
July1958a Nasseritecoup,ledbyGeneralAbdal-KarimKassem,didoverthrow the

56. In a 1952lectureat theArabUniversityin Beirut,GeorgeHabbashargued"thatduringtheFirst

andSecondWorldWarstheArabshadadopteda policyofcooperation withtheAllies.He askedwhatthis
policybrought otherthanoccupation, anddisasterupondisaster.
partition, Besides,thepactswereclearly
designedto perpetuate and to inhibittheArabsfromchangingtheir
theconditionof semi-sovereignty
statusquo." See Conrad1989,231.
internal
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 669

explicitlypro-Western Hashemite regime.WhenthenewIraqirulerhada fallingout

withhis erstwhile hero,mass demonstrations occurredin Cairo and Damascusin
supportof a March 1959 revoltagainstthe Kassem regime.The followingyear
JordanaccusedEgyptofresponsibility fortheassassination of theJordanian prime
minister.In theearly1960s,withSyria'sabruptsecessionfromtheUAR, Nasser's
focusturned towardYemen,where ArabnationalistarmyofficershadoustedtheImamate
andinvitedEgyptto sendsupport. By 1965 seventythousandEgyptiantroopswere
inYemenhelpingtheregimeagainstroyalist tribesmensupported bySaudiArabia.
The Westerngreatpowersrespondedto whatappearedto be developingintoa
Pan-Arabnationalist juggernaut. Beginningin 1956 theUnitedStatesand Britain
sponsoredseveralclandestine operations designedto overturn theSyrianandEgyp-
tiangovernments through coupsor assassinations (similarto theoperation thathad
deposedMossadeghandreinstalled theshahofIranin 1953).57Earlyin 1957Wash-
ingtonpromulgated theEisenhowerDoctrineunderwhichAmericanmilitary and
economicresourcescouldbe committed to theMiddleEast to aid anygovernment
threatened byforcesdetermined to be associatedwith"international communism."
Bolsteredby clandestine financing fromtheUnitedStatesand thedispatchof the
SixthFleettotheEasternMediterranean, KingHussein,inApril1957,usedBedouin
troopsagainsthisopponents, dissolvedParliament, andimposedmartial law.Follow-
ing thearrivalof a contingent of Egyptiantroopsin Allepo laterthatyear,King
Husseincomplainedof anotherNasseristplotagainsthim.The UnitedStatesre-
spondedwithanairlift oftanksandartillery.58In July1958,fourteen thousand Ameri-
can soldierslandedin Lebanonto protectthegovernment thereagainsta Nasserist
rebellionthatatonepointcontrolled 75 percent ofthecountry.Atthesametime,with
logisticalsupportandaircoverprovidedbytheUnitedStates,twothousandBritish
paratroopers landedinJordan toforestalla Nasseristcoupthere.In languageremark-
ablysimilarto thatusedbytheEuropeanpowersin supportoftheOttomanEmpire
againstMuhammad Ali 120 yearsearlier, BritainandtheUnitedStatesbothwarned
of "thegraveconsequencesofanyconflict betweentheirforcesandthoseunderthe
controlofEgyptandSyria."59
Despitetheirexplicitfocuson whattheyperceivedas thethreat of Sovietexpan-
sionism,theUnitedStates,Britain, andFranceeachpursuedpoliciesthattreated any
independent Arabunityschemegoingbeyondthekindofcooperation amongexist-

57. See Eveland 1980; and Copeland1969. For a morerecenttreatment of extensiveAmericanand

Britishcovertoperations inthisperiod,see Rathmell1995.
58. Eveland1980,262.
59. TheMiddleEast and NorthAfrica1969-70, 1969,794. Although theSovietUnionhad supplied
armstoNasserbeforethe1956warandhadhelpedhalttheSuez operation, Kruschevsubsequently turned
againstNasserwhenEgyptianruleof Syriaresultedin persecution of Syriancommunists. To theextent
thatIsrael'sveryexistence,depriving with
Egyptof access by landto eitherJordanor Syria,interfered
Nasser'sabilitytoprojecthispowerandconsolidate Egyptian domination ofthosecountries-toprevent,
at least,Syria'ssecession-theargument madebymany,thatIsrael(andZionism)haveactedas a toolof
Western imperialism to keeptheArabworlddividedandweak,takeson a clear,perhapsdecisiveaspect.
Forvariations ofthisargument, see Shlaim1988,232-55; Nonneman1993,38-39; Safran1969,83-87;
andGause 1992,441-69.
670 International
Organization

ingstates(as exemplified bytheArabLeague)as contrary toWestern interests. These

in
policieswerereflected theBritish and French measures alreadymentioned as well
as Frenchhostility toward Nasser forhis inspirationand supportof rebels in North
Africa.TheUnitedStateswas concerned, notso muchaboutanyonecountry, suchas
Lebanon,Jordan, or Yemen, but about the prospect ofa large unitedArab stateunder
vigorous"revolutionary" leadership. FromtheAmerican perspective,inMilesCope-
land'swords,"Yemenwas onlya foothold";Nasser'srealinterest was in "thewhole
ArabianPeninsula."60Dulles warnedthata passive U.S. responseto Egyptian-
Syrianunitywouldresultin an expanding powerthat"wouldshortly takein Jordan
andtheLebanon and ultimately Saudi Arabia and Iraq leaving us with a singleArab
Stateostensibly under Nasser but ultimately under Soviet control."'6'In fact,U.S.
opposition to an Arab great power extended beyond concerns some did haveof So-
vietinfluence oversucha state.As Dulles toldtheNationalSecurity Council(NSC)
in early1958: "If thepolicyon thesupplyof oil fromtheArabstatesto Western
Europeweremadeuniform as a resultoftheunification oftheArabstates,[censored]
thethreat tothevitaloil supplyofWestern EuropefromtheNearEastwouldbecome
critical."62
In the1960stheUnitedStatesresponded toNasser'sextension ofEgyptian power
intoYemenwithclumsyattempts tomanipulate foodaid andmoreeffective military
including
efforts, stationing U.S. AirForceunitsinSaudiArabia.Overall,U.S. policy
towardEgyptintheyearspriortotheSix-DayWarwas designedtoconvinceNasser
and his lieutenants to call off"theBig Show."63Egyptwas to be instructed thatit
couldbenefit economically andpolitically fromrelations withtheUnitedStatesbut
onlyby abandoning efforts to bringaboutArabunityin theonlyway (as everyone
acknowledged) itcouldbe achieved,through aggressivecampaignsofpropaganda,
subversion, and military pressure.As had been MuhammadAli, Nasserwas to be
keptwithin"his originalshellofEgypt."

SaddamHusayn
Fromtheperspective suchas NormanJ.G. PoundsandSue
ofpoliticalgeographers
of Europeanstateformation
SimonsBall or historians suchas V. G. Kiernan,two
areas in theArabworldcan be seen to closelymeettheeconomic,demographic,
geographic, andcultural
administrative, of"conquering
requirements cores"or "con-
questcenters"aroundwhichgreatnationalstatescouldsuccessfully be constructed.
One areais LowerEgypt,surrounding theNile Delta andtheNile RiverValley.The
otheris Mesopotamia(now Iraq) centeredaroundtheTigrisand EuphratesRivers.

60. Copeland1969,266. See also JohnWaterbury's comment that"BothSaudiArabiaandtheUnited

StatescametobelievethattheEgyptian presenceinthesouthwestcorneroftheArabianpeninsulawasbut
thepreludeto a subversive on thepartofEgypttotoppletheSaudiregimeandsomehow'grab'the
effort
peninsula'soil. Fortheirpart,radicalArabregimessaw theUnitedStates(and,byextension,Israel)as the
impediment
principal ofArabresources."See Waterbury
to a rationalutilization 1978,79.
61. Froma memosummarizing a February 1958NSC meeting; citedbyMufti1996,100.
62. Froma memosummarizing a January 1958NSC meeting; citedbyMufti1996,102.
63. Copeland1969,256-57,267-73.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 671

Syriaas well has oftenemergedas an important forcein its own rightbutmore

commonly as a focusofcompetition betweentheseNiloticandMesopotamian states.64
UndertheOttomansbothIraq and Syriarecededintobackwaterprovincesof a
non-Arab, Muslimempire.Duringthecolonialand immediate postcolonialperiod,
neither HashemiteIraq norBaathistSyriamanagedto establishitselfas a powerful
player.Egypt,on theotherhand,in theearlynineteenth centuryand in themid-
twentieth, emergedas a realcontender forleadership oftheArabMiddleEast.After
Nasser'spassing,however, AnwarSadatmovedEgyptawayfromPan-Arabism to-
wardan Egypt-first foreign policybasedon alliancewiththeUnitedStatesandpeace
withIsrael.WhenSadat signedtheCamp David Accordsin 1978 without securing
thesupport ofanyothersignificant Arabcountry, he openedthedoorto Iraq andits
youngandambitious leader,SaddamHusayn,to advancethatcountry's claimto the
roleofanArabPrussiaorPiedmont toSaddam'sBismarckorCavour.
Beforeits overthrow in July1958,theBritish-installed Hashemitemonarchy in
Iraqhadfailedinvariousefforts toconsolidatethecountry as thecore,alongwiththe
otherBritish-installed Hashemitemonarchy in Jordan, of a largeunitedArabstate.
Furthermore, neither theBritishnortheAmericans-through theBaghdadPactand
theshort-lived Iraqi-Jordanian "Arab Union"-had succeededin usingIraq as a
dependableanchorfortheiranti-Nasserist and anticommunist policies.By thelate
1970s,however, Iraqbeganto comeintoitsown.65Followingthejumpin oil prices
in 1973,Iraq's enormousoil reservesgave thestatea solidrevenuebase. Saddam's
systemof government, thoughbrutally authoritarian at thetop,was also based on
offersof culturalautonomy to theKurdsand an extensivewelfarestate.Centrally
sponsoreddevelopment policies were effective enoughto raise livingstandards
throughout thecountry-especially in theruralareasand amongtheShiaArabplu-
ralityin thesouth.Partlyforthisreason,Iraq seemedless vulnerable to thekindof
sectarian strifethatafflictedLebanonandthreatened SyriaandJordan.
Saddam'sculturalpoliciescelebratedhis revivalof thecountry's worldhistoric
importance undertheSumerians, Assyrians,and Babyloniansin ancienttimesand
theAbbassidsduringIslam'sgoldenage. Saddamfostered imagesofa renascent Iraq
readytoexploititspoliticalstability, economicresources, substantialpopulation, and
closetieswiththeSovietblocforthebenefit oftheArabworldas a whole.66 Oil,Iraqi
officialsargued,was morevaluableforthe Iraqi and Arab nationif as muchas
possiblecouldbe leftinthegroundforfuture use inpetrochemical Mean-
industries.
whilepetrodollars, it was promised,wouldnotbe investedoutsidetheArabarea.
Thanksin partto a slightbutmeaningful moderation in itspositiontowardIsrael,
Saddam'sgovernment managedtopositionitselfin thecenterofnon-Egyptian Arab
attitudestowardIsraelandestablishIraq,atthetimeoftheIranianRevolution, as the

64. Concerning theusuallyunnoticed successof a Moroccanstatebuilderin theearlysixteenthcen-

tury,
see Cornell1990.
65. Concerning Iraq's ascendancein thelate 1970s,see Wright1979-80;Taylor1982,73-88; Salame
1988b,323-24; andDawisha 1988,272-74.
66. Regarding Saddam'sculturalpolicies,see Davis andGavrielides1991,116-48;Freitag1994,31;
andBaram1983,1984.
672 International
Organization

politicalcore of theArabworld.In November1978 an Arabsummitconvenedin

Baghdadunitedvirtually theentireArabworld,includingSaudiArabia,againstthe
Camp David Accordsand againstSadat.Egyptwas isolatedand expelledfromthe
ArabLeague.GulfsubsidiestoCairowereended.In 1979SaddammetwithAsad of
Syria.The two once and futureenemiesagreedto an elaborate(albeitunimple-
mented)federation schemebetweentheirtwo nominally Baathistregimes.Closer
tiesbetweenIraqandJordan andSaudiArabiasoonfollowed.
Since thedisappearance of theHashemiteMonarchyin 1958,theUnitedStates
hadcometodependlargelyonthePahlaviregimeinIranas an anchorforitspolitical
andmilitary positionintheGulf.Withtheshah'soverthrow in 1979theUnitedStates
turned toSaudiArabia;butas vitalas thatcountry's oil depositswere,andas helpful
as the Saudi familycould be in fundingU.S. military, political,and intelligence
activities,Saudi Arabiawas too smalldemographically and too weak militarily to
replaceIran.Egyptwas a possibility, butits isolationafterCamp David made it
almostas difficulttouse as a politicalorstrategicassetas Israel.Thisis thecontext of
a hesitantbutrealAmericantilttowardIraqattheendofthe1970sandthebeginning
ofthe1980s.The newpolicywas reflected in substantial AmericanandWestern aid
to Iraq duringthelong,Iraq-initiated, waragainstIran.67 Thiswar,farbloodierand
farmoredisruptive thanIraq'ssubsequent invasionofKuwait,was notconsidered by
theWestas a threatto civilizationor to Westerninterests. Indeed,it was regularly
observedbyWestern diplomats andpunditsthatthelongerthewarwenton,without
a decisivewinner, thebetter-henceaid toIraqwas enoughtoprevent butnot
defeat,
enoughtoproducea decisivevictory.
WhentheIran-Iraqwarendedin 1988Iraqwas economically exhausted-having
paidall itspetrodollarsforWestern andSovietarms-butmilitarily potentandpoliti-
cally cohesive.The stateswhose interests weremostdirectlyprotected by Iraq's
military machine-Kuwait,SaudiArabia,and theotherGulfoil monarchies-now
appearedtoBaghdadas tempting targetsandevenas itsrightful inheritance. Ultima-
tumsissued againstKuwaitin early1990, theinvasionof August1990, and the
subsequentbarrageof propagandachallenging thelegitimacy of all thesestatesas
obstaclesto thewelfareand destinyof theArabnationwerea full-fledged bid for
Iraqihegemony in theArabworld.As hadNasser,nowSaddamHusaynwas raising
theArabbanneragainstthelegacyof Europeanimperialism and theobjectivesof
Westernneocolonialism-anArabnation"dividedin orderto be mutilated, frag-
mented, andweakened."68 Although thegovernments oftheregion(asidefrom Yemen
andJordan) joinedtheanti-Saddam coalitionto protect theirowninterests, popular
opinion-fromBeirutto Nablus,Amman,Sana, andAlgiers-if unimpressed with
Saddam as a leader,was inspiredby thepoliticalambitionof his move and the
cogencyofhismessage.

67. See Hiro1991,119-21;andMillerandMylroie1990,143-48.

68. SpeechtotheFourthConferenceoftheArabPopularForces,Baghdad,1 June1995,BaghdadIraq
Service,Daily Report:Near East and
bytheForeignBroadcastand Information
Television,transcribed
SouthAsia. 6 June1995. 1.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 673

An enormousamounthas been written aboutIraq's invasionand occupationof

Kuwaitin 1990andthemassiveAmerican andalliedinterventionin 1990and1991
DesertShieldandDesertStorm-thatexpelledIraqiforcesfromKuwait,destroyed a
substantialproportion andindustrial
of Iraq's infrastructure capacity,imposedcrip-
plingeconomicsanctionson theBaghdadregime,andseverelylimiteditssovereign
controlover a substantial portionof northern (Kurdish)Iraq. The overwhelming
majority ofthismaterialcastsSaddamas aninternational outlawanda brutaldictator
whoseruthlessuse of military forceagainsthis neighbors was an outrageagainst
internationallaw and an intolerable security.
threatto international Arguments ad-
vancedby theBaghdadgovernment or by its manysupporters in theArabworld
duringtheheady(forPan-Arabnationalists) daysoflate1990-about theparalyzing
of boundariesimposedby Europeanimperialists,
artificiality abouttheplutocratic
regimeswhosecontrolofArabianpeninsulaoil wealthwas an insuperable obstacle
to thebalanceddevelopment of theArabworldas a whole,aboutdoublestandards
usedbytheUnitedNationswhendealingwithbelligerent occupationofterritoryby
Israelas opposedtoIraq- areignoredinthisliterature ordismissedas cleverpropa-
gandadevicesthatdeflectattention fromtherealfactsofthematter.
As an exampleofplausibleandhistorically validIraqianalysis,heardin theWest
as floridrhetoricandemptypropaganda, considertheresolutions oftheArabPopular
ForcesConference in Ammanon 17 September1990.These resolutions character-
ized "theU.S. colonialinvasionofa partofourhomeland"as "a linkinthechainof
thehistoricalconflictbetweenourArabnationandthecolonialWest"andcompared
itdirectlytotheWest's"defeat oftheMuhammad 'AllPashaexperience whichsought
to
bringaboutunityandprogress."The largermotivesfortheintervention areidenti-
fieddirectly witha refusaltoallowthekindofpoliticalandeconomicunityachieved
byJapanandtheWesttobe achievedbyArabs.The resolutions includedthefollow-
ingdescription ofthemotivesthatlaybehindOperation DesertShield:
Thisinvasionwas prompted byeffortsto seize controlofAraboil andpreclude
itsuse as a weaponin thehandsoftheArabnationto secureitsdevelopment and
modernization, to defenditssovereigntyandsanctities, andtorealizetheslogan
"Araboil is forArabs,forthewholeArabnation."Likewise,thisinvasionwas
also prompted bya desireto controlthefuture ofmankind, consider-
particularly
ingthatwe areon thethreshold ofthe21stcentury, thatGermany is goingtobe
reunited, thatJapanis achievingan unprecedented andthatEurope
renaissance,
willbecomea unitedentity. Moreover, thisinvasionwas drivenbyan attempt to
thwart theArabculturalandunionist planinitiatedbyIraq strongly andcapably
aftertheendoftheGulfWar.69
a verydifferent
discussionsof theGulfWarand itsaftermath
In Western master
whatclaimswere "thefactsof thematter"and whatclaims
determined
narrative

69. Al-Ra'ay,Amman,18 September1990. Translatedby theForeignBroadcastand Information

Service,Daily Report:Near East and SouthAsia,18 September1990, 16. For a brief,clear,and conve-
of Kuwaitand of Saddamas a possiblesaviorof theArab
nientversionof theinvasionas a liberation
nationfromtheimposedfragmentation ofcolonialborders,see Kuttab1990.
674 International
Organization

were"distracting propaganda." A centralelementin thisdiscursive framework was

theterritorialintegrityof existingstates,at leastthosewho weremembersof the
UnitedNations.Within theWestern masternarrative, thiswas a sacrosanct principle,
norm,thathadbeenviolatedin an obvious,outrageous,
a well-institutionalized and
intolerablemanner.70 Not since Hitler,it was repeatedly said, had such a blatant
threatto civilizednormsand to therightsof smallnationspresented itself.In this
case,loyaltytothesedoctrines was strong enough,American leadership deftenough,
andavailablemilitary capabilities overwhelming enoughthatthetheory ofcollective
security on whichtheUnitedNationsis putatively based was successfully putinto
practice.
Without condoning SaddamHusayn'sadventure, theargument in thisarticlepro-
videsa different contextforunderstanding Iraq's seizureof Kuwaitand theAllied
response.Not surprisingly, the alternative narrative presented heredoes partially
overlapwithBaghdad'spropaganda claims.Moreimportantly, itfocusesattention on
the "normality" (froma latemedievaland earlymodernEuropeanperspective) of
Iraq's behavioras an administrative, military,and economic"conquestcenter"ex-
ploitingitsparticularadvantages to achievea widerhegemonic rolein theconstruc-
tionofa greatnationalstate.Nordoes Saddam'swell-documented brutality,includ-
ingthehorrors of his torture chambersand thegenocidalcampaignshe has carried
outagainsttheKurdsand others,sethimapart,in anyqualitativesense,fromthe
"heroes"ofthoseEuropeanandNorthAmericanstruggles thatwe nowcelebrateas
the"state-building" workthatcreatedgreatcountries. I am thinking hereof Sher-
man'smarchthrough Georgiaandtheextermination ofNativeAmericans, theAlbig-
ensianCrusadeand theslaughter of theCatharisthathelpedCatholicFranceadd
Provencetoitsterritory, theaggrandizing warsofEdwardI (in ScotlandandWales);
orElizabethI orCromwellinIreland.7'
The contextpresentedhereforinterpreting theGulfWar also casts theAllied
responsein a radicallydifferent lightfromthatin whichtheseeventsarebathedby
theofficialversion,whichportrays DesertShieldandDesertStormas a farsighted,
heroic,andcreativeeffort to securea post-ColdWarworldsafefrombarbaricdicta-
tors.Throughthelensof latemedievaland earlymodernEuropeandAmerica,the
greatpowers'aggressiveself-interestedness comesintofocus.Theirenforcement of
normsofpeace and security amongsovereignstates,normswhosedirecteffect was
to denyArabsentryintothegreatpowerclubbytheonlyrouteevertakenintothat
club,is visibleas a "vitalinterest" in preserving petrodollarmonarchies and sheik-
domsin theGulfwhoseverysurvivalrequiresthemostfavorableand intimate of
relationshipswiththeWestern powers.On thisview,justas theacquisition ofwealthy
butmilitarily weak principalities, such as Burgundy, Venice,or Alsace, by major

70. Concerning therole of masternarratives

in theframing of newsitemsand episodesto produce
apoliticallyconvenient decisionrulesfortheseparation
accounts,including of "facts"from"irrelevan-
cies," see HermanandChomsky1988.
71. Fora contemporary portrait
ofHenryVIII describing
his "state-building" policiesintermsno less
horrific thanthoseused to describeSaddam'streatmentof his politicalopponentsin Kuwaitand else-
where,see Fitzpatrick1922,299.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 675

powersin Europewas tobe expectedas a desiderata ofthedozensofwarsthesmall

statesofthatcontinentfought withoneanother on thewaytobecominglargerstates,
so shouldone expectthatKuwait,Bahrain,theUnitedArab Emirates,and Saudi
Arabiawouldrather quicklysuccumbtothepredatory ofdemographically
ambitions
andmilitarily powerfulArabor Muslimneighbors whocouldputtheeconomicre-
to moreefficient
sourcesof thesestatelets use. Fromthisper-
politicalandmilitary
in thesameneighborhood
spective,itis thesurvivalofthesecountries, as Iraq (and
nottheIraqiwalkoverintoKuwait.
Iran),thatis theanomaly,

Conclusion

In historical itis notSaddam'sferociousness,

perspective hisuse ofa war-strength-
orhiswillingness
enedstateto seize valuableterritories, touse forcetochallengeor
destroy theindependence ofneighboring statesthatis so distinctive.It is hisfailure.
The mostimportant factorexplainingSaddam'sfailureis thesame thingthatex-
plainsthefailureof MuhammadAli and GamalAbdelNasser-theyfailednotbe-
cause of thepolitical,national,economic,geopolitical,or culturalinadequacyof
Arabsor Arablands(a view oftenputforward by orientalists wondering whythe
Arabshave notregainedtheworldstaturetheyachievedin theeighthand ninth
centuries or economicfunctionalists wondering whyno Arabcommonmarkethas
succeeded),butbecauseofa fundamental factofsequence.Whentheferocious men
andwomenwhobuiltBritain, theUnitedStates,Germany, Italy,France,andRussia
usedadvantages overtheirneighbors forterritorial
aggrandizement andtheconstruc-
tionof greatnationalstates,therewas no externalclubof preexisting greatpowers
able to penetratetheircontinents andenforcea paralyzingly fragmented statusquo
on behalfof "civilized"normsof interstate behavior.WhentheOttomanEmpire
crumbled, however,andautonomous or semiautonomous Arabpowercentersbegan
to emergein theMiddleEast,an external clubofpreexisting greatpowerswas fully
preparedto do exactlythat,conveniently seeingtheirinterest in a dividedMiddle
East as correspondingto a morefundamental necessity forthe"ruleoflaw."
Political"backwardness" in theMiddleEast,reflected in theabsenceof an Arab
greatpowerforwhichall otheringredients havebeenpresent, is thusexplained,but
onlyfroma muchlongerhistoricalperspective thanprevailinginterpretations of
contemporary MiddleEastpoliticspermit.72 Suchanexplanation turnsona recatego-
rizationoftheobjectofexplanation-areframing oftheproblemofthestability of
post-Ottoman boundaries in theArabMiddleEast thatunderstands consolidation of

72. Manyare theanalystswho have comparedMuhammadAli, Nasser,or SaddamHusaynto Bis-

marckandEgyptor Iraq to Prussia.Theircomparisons almostalwaysfocuson propertiesof theMiddle
that,insomecrucialway,do notmeasureuptotheskillsofthegreatGerman
Easternleadersandcountries
athisdisposal.See, forexample,Kimche1970,233; andKerr1971,154-55.
statebuilderortheresources
Analysesthatemphasizeoutsideinterference andpressuresfromtheinternational systemas responsible
forthefailureofArabunityattemptsdo notputtheseattemptsinthesamecategory as EuropeanandNorth
American Nordo theydiscussthedecisiveness
statebuilding. oflatenessintheseattemptstojoin thegreat
powerclub.See Gause 1992.
 Organization
676 International

statepowerinEuropeandNorthAmericaandexpansioninthesize ofstatesinthose
regionstohavebeen,in largemeasure(thoughcertainly notonly),a consequenceof
wartime exertions andvictories. To be sure,itis notuncommon forWestern observ-
ers,especiallypolemicallyinclinedobservers, to makedirectcomparisons between
aspiringMiddleEasternhegemonsandEuropeanprecedents. Butthesecomparisons
use HitlerandMussolini,notBismarckand Cavour, as referents;thus,Nasserwas a
"tin-horn Hitler,"a "MussolinibytheNile." Similarthings were saidofSaddamby
President GeorgeBush.73
In general,Western observers makethreekindsofcategory mistakes whencontem-
platingprospects forMiddleEasternpoliticaland economic performance orArabor
Islamicintegration. First,fewconsiderfailure of a Middle Eastern great powerto
crystallizeas a puzzletobe explained. Insteadof Italy, Germany, France, Britain,the
UnitedStates,andRussia, the reference group used by most World Bank, Agency for
InternationalDevelopment, and IMF "development" experts to measure Middle East-
ernstateperformance is composedof SouthKorea,Taiwan,Chile,Singapore,and
otherNICs. From this perspective, ArabandIslamicstateshavefailedbecausethey
have adopted economically sloppy and politicallyundisciplined responsesto the
international market. This line of analysis clearly identifies the internationalsystem
as a keyconstraint on ambitious governments in the Middle East, butwhy individual
MiddleEasternstatesdidnotrespondtothoseconstraints as theAsianTigersdid,by
adopting and successfully implementing export-led, state-dominated, labor-control-
lingstrategies, thoughinteresting in itsownright, is a fundamentally differentques-
tionfromwhyno greatpoweremergedin theMiddleEast. The moreinstructive
questionis whyhavetheseanalystsfoundtheAsianTigersand notthelargeEuro-
pean andNorthAmericanstatesto be theappropriate measureof success?Whydo
they insiston Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria as the appropriate scale forcomparison and
evaluation, measuring themagainstChile,Taiwan,and SouthKorea?Whydo they
treatas unworthy ofconsideration theeconomicandpoliticalpotential ofa consoli-
datedAraborMuslimMiddleEasternpower,a statethatwouldbe measuredagainst
theEuropean,NorthAmerican, andAsiangreatpowers?

73. GilbertBurck'sinfluentialarticleaboutNasser'shegemonicambitionsin theMiddleEast is an

excellentexampleof thisgenre.DescribingNasser's "divinefrenzy to makeEgyptgreatagain,"Burck
demonstrateshow naturally he and his audienceare accustomedto categorizingambitiousArableaders
withthedemonsof Europeanhistory ratherthanwithitsstate-founding heroes.He does thisby distin-
guishingNasserandhispartners fromHitlerandhiscronies,butonlyinthemostmarginal andtemporary
ofwaysorinwaysthatcastNasseras actuallymorepotentorthreatening thanHitler:
UnlikeHitler,who was able to conquertheemotionsof onlyhis own countrymen, Nasserhas con-
queredtheemotions ofa greatareaoutsidehisowncountry. He hasdoneitbyexploiting Arabneuroses
andfrustrations....Evenas Goringusedtocow Germany's neighbors withdisplaysoftheLuftwaffe,
Nasseramazesandheartens hisArabbrothers byshowingofftheeconomicprogress Egypthasmade....
arein thehandsofthesecretpolice,runbyZakariaMohieddin,
Civilliberties MinisteroftheInterior.
Although Mohieddinis as yetnoHimmler, he is doingverywellatwiretapping,atencouragingJewsto
leavethecountry,andatkeepingminutedossierson suspectedenemiesofthestate.
See Burck1958,109-11.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 677

Fromthestandpoint ofthisarticle,theexplanation forthelimitedfocusof these

analystslies in thecategoricaleffectiveness of constraintswithinthecontemporary
internationalsystem thatprevent theuse ofwaras onekeyingredient intherecipefor
attaininggreatpowerstatususedbyall ofthosestatesthathaveenjoyedit.In other
words,establishing SouthKoreaorChileas modelsofsuccess,rather thanBritainor
Germany, reflectsjusthowimpossibleithas seemedto contemporary analyststhat,
absentthepossibility andthreatof successfulaggrandizing wars,geographical and
culturalregions(suchas theMiddleEast) nowdividedbypoliticalboundaries could
be constructed intogreatpowers.
A secondcategory erroris madebymostofthosewhoaskwhether theAraband/or
IslamicMiddleEast couldmovetowardthekindofeconomicregionalism currently
underway inEurope,EastAsia,andtheAmericas.Theseobservers searchforMiddle
EasternMonnetsand theinterdependencies, spillovers,and patterns of transaction
flowsthattheirtheoriesof "regionalintegration" amongsovereignstatestellthem
willbe critical.Thisapproachignoresthedistinction madebyDeutschinhisanalysis
of thehistory of politicalintegration in theNorthAtlanticregion.The largestates
whosedestinieswerebeingjoinedin a pluralist NorthAtlanticeconomicand secu-
ritycommunity werestructures thathad achievedstrength, self-confidence, andef-
fectivenessthrough longhistorical processesof "amalgamation"-processes deter-
minedespecially bytheactionsandeffect of"strong coreareas."Thus,notedDeutsch,
had England,Germany, France,Italy,andtheUnitedStatesemergedovercenturies
fromcongeriesofsmaller, oftenhostilegroupsofstatelets. Thosewhomeasureinte-
grationefforts amongtwentieth century MiddleEasterncountries accordingto stan-
dardsDeutschassociatedwithintegration amonglarge"amalgamated" statesshould
expecttobe disappointed.74
A thirdcategory erroris madebythosewhoask whether theAraband/or Islamic
MiddleEast will everbe able to fulfill thedreamsof unionand greatpowerstatus
thatfiredtheimaginations of Jamale-dinel-Afghani, MichelAflaq,GamalAbdel
Nasser,or SaddamHusayn,without subversion, coercion,and waror thethreatof
war.These observerssearchforMiddleEasternleaderswho can accomplishsuch
spectacularpoliticalfeats,ignoring thefactthatsuchleadersneverexistedinEurope
ortheAmericasandthatno theory ofpoliticalamalgamation existsthatcouldjustify
suchan expectation.
SinceNasser'sdemise,prospects havedimmedforPan-Arabnationalism to real-
ize thepoliticalpotentialassociatedin themodernworldwiththekindof large,
concentrated,
territorially linguistically unified,historicallyestablished, economi-
callyblessed,and culturally endowedimagined community representedby theArabs.
Although Saddam'sadventure in Kuwaitdid showthatArabnationalist embersstill
glow,atleastatthemasslevelandamongmanydisaffected Arabintellectuals, Islam-
ist formulasforlegitimizing a unitedpoliticalorderin theMiddle East are now

treatment
74. Deutschet al. 1957.Fora systematic oftheprocessofgrowth in thepowerofEuropean
size andan increasing
betweenincreasing
statesintermsoftherelationship towardandpartici-
disposition
pationin war,see ChoucriandNorth1974.
678 International
Organization

substantiallymorepromising as thebasisfora large-scalereorganization ofpolitical

space in thatarea.AlthoughI have notattendedspecifically to thisalternative, the
argument I havemade-identifying historicalsequenceandexternally enforced inter-
nationalpoliticalcultureas crucialinpreventing state-buildingwarsandmaintaining
theconcomitant politicalfragmentation of theregion-wouldbe as applicableto
efforts byambitious Islamistleadersas ithasbeenforexplaining secularfailures.
My argument is notthatin theworldsuchas itis theroutesto greatpowerstatus
thatwereopento theprogenitors ofFrance,Britain,Germany, Russia,Italy,andthe
UnitedStatesmustnowbe madeavailabletoMiddleEasternversionsofHenryVIII,
Bismarck, Lincoln,orCavour.The technologies ofwarhavechanged,andtheworld
is a differentplace. It makeslittlesenseto insistthatpowerful countries withvital
interestsavoidpursuing thoseinterestsoutofa Rawlsianattachment tothelaw ofthe
junglethat,amongotherthings, producedthemas greatpowers.Nonetheless, aware-
ness of thecrucialrole of war and coercionin theproduction of greatstates,and
appreciating theimplications ofthisfactforlatecoming nationalstatebuilderswho
seektoutilizethoseinstruments, cango fartowardreducing theself-righteousness of
publicdiscoursewithrespectto contemporary warsin theMiddleEast andin other
regionswherethecontradictions betweeninternationally recognizedlegal arrange-
mentsandactualmatrices ofbelief,interest,andpoweraresharpest. Itcan also help
prepareus fora post-ColdWarworldin whichstatescapableof projecting power
globallyhavesuchlittleinterest in doingso thataspiringhegemonsin someregions
findthemselves almostas freeas theirEuropeanpredecessors wereto use forceto
buildandexpandtheirstates.75
Additionally, theargument presented herecan help qualifyor correcta hostof
casualmisattributions thatflowfromthecategory errorsI haveidentified. Theseare
claimsthatfind, inthefailureofefforts tomovetoward Arabunity, something instruc-
tiveaboutArabnationalcharacter, thepedigreeofArabnationalism, theunnatural-
ness of a largeArabstate,theabsenceof visionary leadership, thedecisivenessof
economicjealousiesin preventing Arabunityor theeventualdecisivenessof eco-
nomicfunctionality in achievingit,and theneedforstability ifaid flowsfromrich
Arab statesto poor ones are to increase.76 Otherauthors,attributing thepolitical
organizationofthecontemporary MiddleEasttotheinexorable logicofcapitalism in
a worldeconomyand/or to differencesin thedialecticofparticular imperialist lega-
cies indifferent
countries, endupcrediting thesefactorswithconsiderably morethan
theycan explain.In particular theyfailto notetheroleofwarin theconstruction of

75. CompareBernardLewis' representative comment in 1989 thattheboundariesof MiddleEastern

states,howeverfluidtheymayhavebeenearlierin thiscentury, are nowpermanent, withBarryBuzan's
suggestionthatnotonlyspecificthirdworldboundaries, buttheverynormof post-colonial boundary
in Africaand theMiddleEast," is likelyto comeunderincreasing
"particularly
integrity, pressure.See
Lewis 1989;andBuzan 1991,440-41.
76. Forexamplesofsuchmisattributions, see Ajami1992;Kramer1993;Haim 1964;Kanovsky1968,
350-76; Sirageldin1988; and Rubinstein1991, 62. Nonnemanprovidesa list of thirteen factorsex-
plainingthefailureofArabunityschemes,without evenmentioning ofwaras a tech-
theunavailability
niqueforpoliticalamalgamation ortheactiveextraregional enforcement ofnormsagainstpredatory war.
See Nonneman1993,37-40; andMiller1993.
 AbsenceofMiddleEasternGreatPowers 679

largenationalstatesin Europeand thepoliticaland military relevanceof sequence

and externalenforcement of normsagainstsuccessfully prosecutedstate-building
warsintheMiddleEast.77
Of course,manyanalystsof theArabworlddo recognizethattheexistenceof a
largeterritorially
concentrated ethnicor nationalsolidarityis itselfnotenoughto
producea corresponding state.Some also emphasizetheroleof "politicalwill" in
theconstruction of largenationalstates.Theynonetheless haveseemedreluctant to
takecognizanceofthecrucialrolecoercionmustbe expectedto playas partofthis
"politicalwill" andthedecisivenessofbarriers to itsuse erectedbythecontempo-
raryinternational system.78 GhassanSalame,forexample,offersan explanation of
thefailureofArabnationalism by describingArabsas tornbetweenseparatestates
seekingtomaintain theirindividual andanArabnationalprojectseekingto
integrity
dissolvethoseseparateidentities intoa unitedwhole.CitingItalyin thenineteenth
century,he askshowthatstatecouldeverhavecomeintobeingifithadbeendivided
in similarfashionbetween
ofItalyas a singlestate[and]
forthere-unification
someItalians... struggling
withina Europeanframework.
others... lookingforintegration The two
projectswouldhavehampered eachotherandan impassewouldhavebeenthe
likelyoutcome.Thisdilemmais stillrealin theArabworld.79
Salameneglectstomention thatarethebasisofmyargument
twocrucialelements
here-Piedmont'sforcibleunification of theseparateentitiesthatpreviously
com-
prisedItaly,Sicily,andSardiniaandtheabsence,innineteenth-century
Europe,ofan
externally enforced wars.Theimpasse
setofnormsagainstsuccessfulstate-building
in Italy,in otherwords,was overcome,neitherby nationalsentimentnoreconomic
rationality,butbywaras an instrumentofpoliticalwillappliedwithina permissive
international environment.TheimpasseintheMiddleEast,ofwhichSalamespeaks,
is unlikely tobe overcomein anyotherway-neitherbyArabsnorbyMuslims.

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