G.R. No.

193854               September 24, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
DINA DULAY y PASCUAL, Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve an appeal from the Decision dated August 4, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
1 

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03725 affirming with modification the Decision dated October 8, 2008 of the
2 

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 194, Parañaque City, finding appellant Dina Dulay guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A. No. 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) 8353 as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation.

The records bear the following factual antecedents:

Private complainant AAA was 12 years old when the whole incident happened. AAA's sister
3 

introduced the appellant to AAA as someone who is nice. Thereafter, appellant convinced AAA to
accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they
went to a casino to look for appellant's boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Niño
at Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not there. When they went to Bulungan Fish
Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend. Afterwards, AAA,
appellant and the latter's boyfriend proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan
Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a
man known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to appellant and heard
"Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's
hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help when she saw the latter peeping
into the room while she was being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape, "Speed" and
appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.

AAA went to San Pedro, Laguna after the incident and told her sister what happened and the latter
informed their mother about it. AAA, her sister and mother, filed a complaint at Barangay San
Dionisio. Thereafter, the barangay officials of San Dionisio referred the complaint to the police
station.

The Parañaque City Police Office (Women's and Children Concern Desk) asked the assistance of
the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital, upon which the latter assigned the case
to Dr. Merle Tan. Consequently, with the consent of AAA and her mother, and in the presence of a
social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Dr. Tan conducted the
requisite interview and physical examination on AAA. Later on, Dr. Tan issued a Medico-Legal
Report stating that there was no evident injury in the body of AAA, but medical evaluation cannot
4 

exclude sexual abuse. During her testimony, Dr. Tan explained that such impression or conclusion
pertains to the ano-genital examination and also stated that she found multiple abrasions on the
back portion of the body of AAA.5

Thus, an Information was filed, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of July 2005, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with one alias "Speed," whose true name and identity and present whereabouts is still
unknown, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, the herein accused Dina P.
Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12 year old minor, to accused alias
"Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said minor complainant AAA against her will
and without her consent, which act is prejudicial to the normal growth and development of the said
child.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

With the assistance of counsel de oficio, on August 3, 2005, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty. Therafter, trial on the merits ensued.
7 

To support the above allegations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of AAA and Dr. Merle
Tan. On the other hand, the defense presented the sole testimony of appellant which can be
summarized as follows:

Appellant met AAA a few days before June 2005 when the latter was introduced to her by her cousin
Eglay Akmad during the wake of a relative of AAA at Palanyag. The cousin of appellant was AAA's
neighbor at Palanyag. Around 1 o'clock in the morning of July 3, 2005, appellant averred that she
was at La Huerta, at the Bulungan Fish Port in Parañaque City with her cousin Eglay and stayed
there for about thirty (30) minutes. They then proceeded to the house of appellant's cousin in
Palanyag. In the said house, appellant saw "Speed" and two (2) other male persons. She also saw
AAA who was engaged in a conversation with "Speed" and his two (2) companions. She asked AAA
what she was doing there and the latter said that it was none of her business ("wala kang pakialam
sa akin"). Because of the response of AAA, appellant left the house and went home to General
Trias, Cavite.

On October 8, 2008, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Accused Danilo guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and to pay the offended party the amount
of ₱ 50,000.00 by way of damages.

The period of her detention shall be considered part of the service of her sentence.

SO ORDERED. 8

Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, the appellant brought the case to the CA. The latter,
on August 4, 2010, promulgated its decision affirming the ruling of the RTC with a modification on
the award of damages, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱ 50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱ 50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱ 25,000.00)
as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, the present appeal.

In her Brief, appellant assigned the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF RAPE AS CO-PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AAA. 10

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the appellee, refutes the above assignment of
errors by stating the following arguments:

I.

CONSPIRACY WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.

II.

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

III.

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF DENIAL CANNOT BE GIVEN GREATER

EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT THAN THE POSITIVE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT. 11

An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision on the basis of grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors.
12

The appellant in this case was charged in the Information as having committed the crime of Rape
under Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of
R.A. 7610. She was eventually convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua as
provided under Article 266-B of the RPC.

In sustaining the conviction of the appellant as co-principal by indispensable cooperation, the CA,
ratiocinated:

To cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or purpose does not
necessarily mean previous understanding, for it can be explained or inferred from the circumstances
of each case. The cooperation must be indispensable, that is, without which the commission of the
crime would not have been accomplished. x x x
xxxx

The proven facts and circumstances obtaining in this case fall squarely on the above-cited example.
It will be noted that the cooperation of the accused-appellant consisted in performing an act which is
different from the act of execution of the crime committed by the rapist. Accused-appellant
cooperated in the perpetration of the crime of rape committed by "Speed" by acts without which the
crime would not have been consummated, since she prepared the way for the perpetration thereof,
convinced the victim to go with her under the guise of looking for her boyfriend and upon arrival at
the kubuhan, she pulled the victim inside a room where "Speed" was waiting, delivered the victim to
him, and then after receiving some amount of money from "Speed" she settled in another room
together with her boyfriend so that "Speed" might freely consummate the rape with violence and
intimidation, as he did.
13

However, this Court is of another view and does not subscribe to the findings of the trial court, as
sustained by the CA that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.

Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation,
14 

by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation,

one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and
cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not
have been accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that
15 

the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The
events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape.
Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for money and
AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for
monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect
of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the
testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by
"Speed." Thus:

PROS. R. GARCIA: Now, what happened after you met this Dina Dulay?

WITNESS AAA: She invited me to go with her boyfriend, Sir.

xxxx

Q: You went to the bulungan, what happened when you reached the fish port or bulungan, AAA?

A: Pumunta kami sa kubuhan, Sir.

Q: Where is this kubuhan located in relation to the fish port?

A: At the back portion, Sir.

Q: And, when you said pumunta kami, who was then your companion in going to that kubuhan?

A: Dina Dulay and her boyfriend, Sir.

Q: Do you know the name of the boyfriend of Dina Dulay?

A: No, Sir.

xxxx

Q: All right. After reaching the kubuhan, what happened next?

A: Pina-rape po ako, Sir.

Q: What made you say AAA that accused here Dina Dulay had you raped at the kubuhan?

A: Kasi po binayaran siya nung lalaki, Sir.

Q: Now, do you know how much this Dina Dulay was paid by that person who was you said raped
you?

A: No, Sir. I just saw them.

Q: And what did you see that was paid to Dina?

A: Pera, Sir.

Q: Aside from seeing a guy giving money to Dina Dulay, did you hear any conversation between this
Dina Dulay and that man who gave money to her?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court AAA, what was that conversation you heard between this Dina
Dulay and the person who gave money to her?

A: He said to look for a younger girl, Sir. 16

xxxx

PROS. R. GARCIA:

Q: Okay. After that conversation and the giving of money to Dina Dulay, what happened to you and
the man?

A: He raped me, Sir.

Q: Where were you raped?

A: At the Kubuhan, Sir. Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court how you were raped by that
person?

A: He tied me up, Sir.

Q: How were you tied up as you said?

A: He tied up both my hands, Sir.

Q: Then after tying your hands what happened next?

A: He raped me and he pointed a knife at me, Sir.

Q: When you said you were raped, are you referring to the insertion of his penis into your sex organ?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And, how did you feel at that time when the organ of this man was inserted into your organ?

A: It was painful, Sir.

Q: And, how did you react when as you said you were being raped by this person?

A: I cannot talk. He put clothes in my mouth, Sir.

Q: For how long did you stay in that kubuhan with this man? May isang oras ba kayo doon?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Now, tell us how AAA many times did this person insert his penis into your organ?

A: Only one (1) AAA, Sir. 17

It must be clear that this Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed raped by
considering the credibility of the testimony of AAA. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court
and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case in its
18 

entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are
weighed, thus, avoiding general conclusions based on isolated pieces of evidence. In the case of
19 

rape, a review begins with the reality that rape is a very serious accusation that is painful to make; at
the same time, it is a charge that is not hard to lay against another by one with malice in her mind.
Because of the private nature of the crime that justifies the acceptance of the lone testimony of a
credible victim to convict, it is not easy for the accused, although innocent, to disprove his guilt.
These realities compel this Court to approach with great caution and to scrutinize the statements of
a victim on whose sole testimony conviction or acquittal depends. 20

In this light, while this Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a
principal by indispensable cooperation, she is still guilty of violation of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, or
the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which states
that:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:

(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution. 21

The elements of paragraph (a) are:

1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;

2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:

a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;

d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with

intent to engage such child in prostitution;

3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and

4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 22

Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution. It
contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under paragraph (a),
the child is abused primarily for profit. 23

As alleged in the Information and proven through the testimony of AAA, appellant facilitated or
induced child prostitution. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse. Thus, the act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was 12 years old at that time, to go
24 

with her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable under the
above-mentioned law. The purpose of the law is to provide special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is being done to
25 
her or him and may appear not to complain. However, we have held that a child who is "a person
below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental disability or
condition" is incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
26 

It must be noted that in the Information, it was alleged that appellant was accused of Rape under
Article 266-A, No. 1 (a) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 8353 in relation to Section 5 (b) of R.A.
7610, and then went on to enumerate the elements of Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610 in its body. The
Information partly reads:

x x x the herein accused Dina P. Dulay having delivered and offered for a fee complainant AAA, 12
year old minor, to accused alias "Speed," who with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge on said
minor complainant AAA against her will and without her consent x x x  27

Undoubtedly, the above-quoted falls under Section 5 (a) of R.A. 7610, the appellant acting as a
procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution. It must be remembered that the character
of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law,
but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. The
28 

sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in

the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which
adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 29 
1âwphi1

To dispute the allegation and the evidence presented by the prosecution, appellant merely
interposes the defense of denial. It is well settled that denial is essentially the weakest form of
defense and it can never overcome an affirmative testimony, particularly when it comes from the
mouth of a credible witness. 30

Anent the penalty, for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610, the penalty
prescribed is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. Therefore, in the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law. Notwithstanding
31 

that R.A. 7610 is a special law, appellant may enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Since the penalty provided in R.A. 7610 is taken from the range of penalties in the Revised
32 

Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, 33 

appellant is entitled to a maximum term which should be within the range of the proper imposable
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years) and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period
(ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). 34

As to the award of damages, the same must be consistent with the objective of R.A. 7610 to afford
children special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that
every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify
the latter for the same. Therefore, civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of
35 

Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in compliance with Article 100 of the RPC which
states that every person criminally liable is civilly liable. Hence, the amount of ₱ 50,000.00 civil
indemnity ex delicto as awarded in cases of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 shall
36 

also be the same in cases of violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of appellant Dina Dulay y Pascual is hereby DISMISSED. However, the
Decision of the CA is hereby MODIFIED as appellant is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, but of violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610, amended, for which she is
sentenced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay AAA the amount
of ₱ 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172707               October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO
Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants
Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal
y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette
Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.

The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal
information3 which reads:

Criminal Case No. 98-0928

For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659

That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release
amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the Civil Code.

The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which
were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998,
two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s
residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been
mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two
left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao),
returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon,
Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them
to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao
declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5

Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chan’s

residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the
stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan
(Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy
tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s
head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay
Police Headquarters to report the incident.9

Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two hours, the group
stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to
shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women,11 later
identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad).12 Chan was
brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and
Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless
she paid 20 Million Pesos.14

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van.
After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to
a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified
in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later
identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who
was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan
"Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim
(Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to
ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and
she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then
talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was
agreed upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue.20

Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were
assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were
informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s
release.21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed
that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors
and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth
Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage
was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the
abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at
Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and
strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light
blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and
headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the
van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The
team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.23

At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1,
resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified
in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24

During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his
desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous
pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it
has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty
provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that I
have explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of
entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and
explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas
they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood the consequence of changing
their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to
change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of
plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial
court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.

On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao,
Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Hence, they appealed to the CA.

In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL
y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y
KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages.

It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29

Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the
appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs
and manifestations will be discussed collectively.

Insufficiency of Evidence

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan,
was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.

This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chan’s testimony
credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants.
If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact,
the participation of these accused-appellants was further established through the testimonies of the
other prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for
the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great
respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered.31 In People v. Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of
fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that the
briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant
particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witness Chan.

Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her
argument bereft of merit.

The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended
when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 14 August
1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence working
against her defense of denial.

Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is
established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive identification of the
accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
commission of the crime.35

The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses
and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give
due weight to the findings of the lower courts.

Improvident Plea

As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the
accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They subsequently
entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in
People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense. The trial court is mandated:

(1)

to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the plea of guilt,

(2)

to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability, and

(3)

to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do
so if he desires.38

The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of
an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court
and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court
on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40

Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a
free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating
from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:

Ascertain from the accused himself

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;

(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is
intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a
state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.

Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a
free and informed plea of guilty.

Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the
certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope
of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the
accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.

Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
against him and a denial of his right to due process.

All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused
must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.

It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The
questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully
understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records43 that
Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and
that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the
penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial court
judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected
by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed
statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:

Atty. Ferrer:

Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim
we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please,
considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.

Court:

You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no
condition attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.

Atty. Ferrer:

Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting

Court:

Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached.
We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this Court will still not
set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s shortcomings, we still agree
with his ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court,
however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on
evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46

Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of
their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was
properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-
appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.

Degree of Culpability

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy,
insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on
the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of
Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact that they
had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.

We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the
rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one
of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols
Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and
Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before
that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary,
since all the conspirators are principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-
appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of
this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred
from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-
appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were
testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to
the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the
victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered
and when the rescue operation was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered
evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s attention to the manifestation made by
the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned.55 However,
pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no
Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.

The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several times
under oath during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her real name, age,
address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several
times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other accused-
appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong
are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being
committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.

As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her
responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony59 of
Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this
Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an
accomplice to the crime.

Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be
community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or
simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in
an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.  Assuming
1âwphi1

arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she
acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in
the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and would have reported
such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even
spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime
committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and company were not
indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only
liable as an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et
al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered
as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the
evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in the crime, no
doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for
ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we
modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of
R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance,
but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid
provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of
only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This
leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled
that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the
penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law (Reclusion
Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision
Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent
any aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court
imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in

accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the
child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What
matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This Court,
however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual
served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may
be immediately released from detention.

We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary evidence
offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina
Perpenian.

In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and
pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death72 having occurred before rendition of final
judgement.73

There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00
as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this case,
the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75

1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and

3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted
by the facts but is not imposable under present law.

The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be
apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each principal
accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages
than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for
the total amount of ₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or
₱32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into
₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67 moral damages and ₱10,666.67 exemplary damages for
each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary
damages for the lone accomplice.

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863
is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL,
EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI,
THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL
and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are
ordered to indemnify the victim in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the
principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while
the accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on
several and subsidiary liability.

The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN
A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her
further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the
Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the
action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 230619, April 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ANGEL GURO Y COMBO

ALIAS "JASON," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an appeal1 filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
from the Decision2 dated October 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Second Division
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07721, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated September 2, 2015 of
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. 2007-
9546-MK, finding herein accused-appellant Angel Guro (Guro) guilty of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

Guro was charged with Murder of Jesus Sangcap, Jr. (Jesus). The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:
That on or about (the) 12th day of February 2007, in the City of Marikina, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and (sic)
attack, assault and stab one JESUS SANGCAP, JR. y SUNGAHID, by stabbing the latter
twice on his back while the latter was sprawled on the ground, thereby inflicting upon
him fatal injuries which caused his death soon thereafter, the said killing having been
attended by the qualifying circumstances (sic) of treachery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, Guro pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

Version of the Prosecution5

The prosecution presented Jefferson Sangcap (Jefferson), Joemarie 6 Sangcap

(Joemarie), Police Chief Inspector Felimon Porciuncula (PCI Porciuncula) and Jocelyn
Loardo (Loardo).

Jefferson, the first witness for the prosecution, is the son of Jesus. He testified that
while at their home in Cubao, in the early evening of February 12, 2007, his father
received a call from one Venus de los Santos, Jefferson's cousin. According to Jesus, a
group of male persons were waiting for Joemarie, Jesus' brother, in Marikina City.
Jefferson, by invitation of his father, went to Marikina City. They arrived at Joemarie's
school at 9:00 in the evening on board their respective motorbikes. Joemarie rode with
Jefferson.

While they were on their way home, more particularly at the intersection of CM. Recto
and del Pilar Streets, Parang, Marikina City, Joemarie saw the group composed of
around five persons waiting for him at the computer shop. Joemarie wanted to talk to
them. Joemari, Jefferson and Jesus alighted from their respective motorbikes and
approached the group. When they reached the group, Jefferson asked a certain Yayi
what their group's problem was with his uncle Joemarie. Yayi stood up together with
one of the members of the group and without saying any word, pushed him in the
chest. Jefferson fell to the gutter. When he was about to stand up, he saw his father
kneeling and was about to stand when a group of persons lifted a chair and threw the
same at his father. His father was hit and fell to the floor. He saw three persons
continue to maul his father. At that time, he was about 15 meters away from his father
who had fallen to his right side. While these persons were mauling his father, the latter
was just kneeling with his hands on the ground. Suddenly, a male person arrived from
the direction of the church and stabbed his father twice at the back. The members of
the group who stabbed and mauled his father then fled together.

During the hearing, the person who stabbed his father was identified as Guro. Jefferson
admitted that at the time of the incident, he did not know the identity of Guro and that
he came to know the name of the latter only from his uncle Joemarie.

Joemarie, the second witness for the prosecution, is the youngest brother of the victim.
He testified that there was this cult/fraternity with whom he had a previous encounter,
just three days prior to the stabbing incident of Jesus. He said that this group,
composed of Yayi, Niki and Lucky, had a "trip" (nakursunadahan) on him wherein he
was boxed on his right ear and eventually mauled by these persons. He said that this
group was known at their school for being notorious in creating trouble. He further
stated that he did not even know the reason why he was boxed by these persons.
Thereafter, he reported the incident to the guidance counselor, who, in turn, requested
for the police to guard the gate of the school. He also reported the incident to the
barangay which blottered the incident.

Joemarie further testified that on February 12, 2007, he was informed by his classmate
that the group he previously encountered was waiting for him. He immediately texted
Jefferson and asked the latter to fetch him because the group might have another "trip"
on him. At around 8:30 in the evening, his brother Jesus and Jefferson arrived. He then
rode the motorbike of Jefferson and his brother then followed them on his own
motorbike.

When they reached the corner of CM. Recto Street, after the church, he saw the group
playing at the arcade. He recognized them because of the previous incident. This time,
Jerry and Guro were also with the group. Joemari, Jefferson and Jesus approached the
group and after a little conversation with Yayi, the latter pushed Jefferson who fell to
the ground. The other members of the group were standing side by side. When
Joemarie was about to help his nephew, Yayi ran after him and boxed him. He was hit
very slightly by Yayi and the latter ran away. He saw his nephew standing up. He also
saw Niki was about to hit his brother with a long bench. His brother moved back and
was able to evade the chair and fell to the gutter. He was in front of them and was
about five steps away. When his brother was about to stand, Guro jumped on top his
brother and stabbed him twice in the back and ran away.

PCI Porciuncula, Medico Legal Officer and Chief of the Northern Police District (NPD)
Crime Laboratory of Caloocan City, testified that he conducted the examination of
Jesus' body. His report mentioned that the wound sustained by Jesus was caused by a
knife and that the culprit came from the back of the victim.

The last witness for the prosecution was Loardo who was presented to establish the
expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim. 7 When she was presented, the
prosecution and defense merely stipulated that as a result of the death of the victim,
expenses were incurred in the amount of P20,222.00 for the burial and interment as
shown by the Statement of Accounts issued by Loyola Memorial Park and P5,000.00 for
the expenses during the wake of the victim.

Version of the Defense8

The lone witness for the defense was Guro. He testified that on February 12, 2007 at
around 8:45 in the evening, he was at the corner of CM. Recto Street, Parang, Marikina
City together with Jomar, Chay and Gabriel to buy burgers and shakes. While waiting
for their orders, two motorbikes arrived and parked in front of them. There were three
persons on board these motorbikes and one of them was Joemarie. He admitted
knowing Joemarie because he had a previous altercation ("girian") with him. The
"girian" incident happened sometime in January and happened only once.

When the three alighted from their motorbikes, they approached his friends who were
inside a video shop beside the burger stand. Niki, Yayi and Jerry were at the video shop
and according to Guro, it seemed that Joemarie did not notice him at the burger stand.
Jefferson then inquired about the name of one of his friends, and when the latter
answered that he was Yayi, Jefferson suddenly hit the face of Yayi. He noticed that
these three persons were attacking his friends because two of them were carrying 2x2
coco lumber wood and the other was carrying a lead pipe. When he tried to pacify
them, Jefferson hit him in his shoulder using the piece of wood. His friends then
entered the video shop and they carried a bench in order to block the attack made by
the three. He was holding the bench together with Yayi and Nikki. Jerry was looking for
something that he could throw at Joemarie's group while Jomar, Chay and Gabriel went
out to ask help from their friends at the billiard hall. Their friends from the billiard hall
comprised of less than 10, arrived carrying billiard sticks. Thereafter, there was a
commotion and he, together with Yayi, Nikki and Jerry, was able to get out from the
video shop. They threw stones at Joemarie, Jefferson and Jesus. When they were
retreating, he saw one of the companions of Joemarie fall down and according to his
companions, a certain Peping stabbed that person.

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC found Guro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder. It held that there being
treachery in Guro's sudden and unexpected attack, the killing was qualified to Murder.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, accused ANGEL GURO y COMBO is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery. And there being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, said accused
is hereby sentenced reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay the heirs of Jesus
Sangcap Jr., the sums of:
a.] P 25,222.00 representing actual damages; and
b.] P 50,000.00 as civil indemnity
The period during which the herein accused was in detention during the pendency of
this case shall be credited to him in full provided that he agree [s] to abide by and
comply with the rules and regulations of the Metro Manila District Jail, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City.

SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the CA

The CA dismissed the appeal. The CA held that there is no question that Guro killed
Jesus. It also found that the RTC was correct in ruling that there was treachery as Guro
attacked Jesus in a swift, deliberate and unexpected manner and that Jesus was
completely deprived of a real chance to defend himself. The dispositive portion of the
CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 02
September 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272 in Criminal
Case No. 2007-9546-MK, finding accused-appellant Angel Guro y Combo alias "Jason"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and awarding actual damages in the amount of
Php25,222.00 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the amount of civil
indemnity is hereby increased to Php75,000.00. In addition, accused appellant Angel
Guro y Combo alias "Jason" is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Jesus Sangcap, Jr.
the amount of Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and 6% interest per annum on all damages, from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.10
The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of Guro but for the
crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
not present in the killing of Jesus.

Guro's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Guro asserts that the RTC erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of
Jefferson and Joemarie as their testimonies were allegedly inconsistent and improbable,
and that Joemarie is a biased witness. In a number of cases, the Court held that when
the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect.11 This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they
are telling the truth. 12 Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn
the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the
case.13 The foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application where the findings
of the RTC are sustained by the CA.14
In the present case, both the RTC and C A found the testimonies of the victims
straightforward and worthy of belief. Jefferson and Joemarie clearly and convincingly
testified regarding what they witnessed when Guro jumped on Jesus, stabbed him twice
on the back, and ran away. These testimonies were sufficient to establish an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, i.e., it was Guro who inflicted
the injuries on Jesus which caused his death. To be certain, the witnesses were in
unison in identifying Guro as the offender.

Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA's findings that the alleged inconsistencies in the
witnesses' testimonies referred merely to minor and inconsequential details, which did
not at all affect the substance of their testimonies, much less impair their credibility.
Discordance in the testimonies of witnesses on minor matters heighten their credibility
and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed, especially where there
is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailant.15

There is also no merit to Guro's allegation that Joemarie was a biased witness. A
witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that
he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his statements, or to suppress
or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. 16 While Guro claimed that the prior
disagreement between Joemarie and Yayi's group could have given rise to an improper
motive on the part of Joemarie to testify against him, it must be stressed that the
persons identified by Joemarie with whom he had a previous encounter were Yayi, Niki
and Lucky.17 In fact, Joemarie did not mention Guro as one of the persons he had
previously encountered prior to the incident. 18

As to Guro's allegation that the illumination and condition of visibility on the area, the
distance of the eyewitnesses to the victim, and the suddenness of the attack, as well as
the immediate flight of the assailant, cast doubt on the alleged positive identification of
witnesses, it must be stressed that these circumstances were raised for the first time
on appeal. Guro had all the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses as
to these circumstances during trial, but this he did not do. Objection to evidence cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. 19 Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. 20

Furthermore, Guro merely interposed the defense of denial. He denied that it was him
who had stabbed Jesus, and adverted to a certain Peping, as the assailant. However,
aside from such bare allegation, Guro did not adduce any evidence to corroborate such
claim and establish that a certain Peping actually stabbed Jesus. 21 Meanwhile, as stated
earlier, prosecution witnesses Jefferson and Joemarie positively identified Guro in open
court as the person who stabbed Jesus.22

Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving weight in law. 23 It is established in jurisprudence that
denial cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive identification of the accused; more so
where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was physically impossible
for accused to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the its
commission.24 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 25

In the case at bar, it was clearly established that Guro was in the area when the victim
was stabbed. Further, his admission that he went into hiding in San Mateo, Rizal
despite having knowledge that people were looking for him because he was the one
who killed the victim is also an indication of guilt. 26 Generally, flight, in the absence of a
credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt might be
established, for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available
opportunity to defend himself and assert his innocence.27 Guro, despite having
knowledge that the authorities were already looking for him and that a case had
already been filed against him, still chose to hide. 28 If it were true that a certain Peping
stabbed the victim, Guro could have easily appeared before the police to clear his name
and pinpoint the purported true offender, but this he did not do. 29

The prosecution failed to prove treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.30 To appreciate treachery as a qualifying offense,
the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or
forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. 31 The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its
commission without risk of himself.32

The RTC and CA erred when they ruled that treachery was present. The prosecution
was unable to prove that Guro intentionally sought the victim for the purpose of killing
him. Well settled is the rule that the circumstances which would qualify a killing to
murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. 33 There must be a showing,
first and foremost, that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure
such execution, without risk to himself.34

As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, only the following were established:
(a) a commotion was caused when Yayi pushed Jefferson; (b) Jesus was being mauled
by a group of persons; and (c) Guro stabbed Jesus twice at the back. Considering the
foregoing, it was not proven that Guro deliberately and consciously employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Jesus could not
defend himself. Indeed, it does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and
unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with
treachery.35 The stabbing, based on the evidence, appears to be the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse of the moment arising from the commotion between the two groups,
rather than from a deliberated act of the will. As a matter of fact, it must be
emphasized that the target of Guro's group was Joemarie and not Jesus. It was just
unfortunate that it was Jesus whom the group ganged up on. Based on the foregoing, it
is not possible to appreciate treachery against Guro.
As the Court held in People v. Santos,36 "[t]reachery, just like any other element of the
crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence
sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed
or taken for granted from a mere statement that 'the attack was sudden;' there must
be a clear showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be
'sudden.'"37 Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold
that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the appellants does not
positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the
accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from
the defense that the victim might offer.38 Specifically, it must clearly appear that the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to
accomplishing the act without risk to the aggressor. 39

Therefore, with the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is
Homicide and not Murder. Under Article 249 of the RPC, any person found guilty of
Homicide shall be meted the penalty of reclusion temporal, a penalty which contains
three (3) periods.40 Thus, the appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.41

Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,42 the damages awarded in the
questioned Decision are hereby modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and
temperate damages of P50,000.00 each.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The Court DECLARES accused-appellant ANGEL GURO y COMBO
GUILTY of HOMICIDE, for which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
further ordered to pay the heirs of Jesus Sangcap, Jr. the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages. All monetary
awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181184               January 25, 2012

MEL DIMAT, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of "fencing" that the accused knew or ought to
have known that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.

The Facts and the Case

The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law before the
1 

Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.

Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused
Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave
the vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted
the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After
stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-
119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan Safari on
their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that
it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which
he mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25,
1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in
good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle
to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which
the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same
vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him
to an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. The court also ordered him to pay ₱850,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.

On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794 the RTC decision but
2 

modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as
maximum, thus, the present appeal.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat
knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from
Mantequilla.

The Ruling of the Court

The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no
part in the robbery or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes,
or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft;
(3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. 3

Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in
December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari
he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis
number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. The
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on
the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the
Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a
special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of
criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known
4 

that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and
that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. 1âwphi1

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan
Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of
registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of
registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat
insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt.
But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no
documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new
documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still,
Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering
her purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand
accused in the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CR 29794.

SO ORDERED.