Berba vs.
Josephine Pablo and Heirs of WON the Agreement entered into by Berba and
Palanca
Facts:
Estela Berba, a resident of Malate, Manila was
the owner of a parcel of land and a house
thereon was leased to Josephine Pablo and the
Heirs of Palanca.
Then after, the lessees failed to pay the rentals
due. So, Berba filed a complaint for eviction
and collection of unpaid rentals only against
Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay, to
which they executed an Agreement that
contained Pablo’s promise to pay the rentals
due. This Agreement was approved by the
pangkat.
However, Pablo and the lessees failed to pay
the balance of the rentals upon demand made
by Berba.
Hence, Berba filed a complaint against Pablo
and the Heirs of Palanca for unlawful detainer
before the MTC.
Berba, however failed to attached to her
complaint a certification from the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or
settlement had been reached.
Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca, in their answer
to complaint, declared that Berba had no cause
of action against them as she failed to secure a
Certificate to File an Action from the Lupon.
And that Berba’s action was premature as the
dispute did not go through the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa before filing the complaint in
court.
Berba, on the other hand, alleged that there
was no more need for her to secure a
Certificate to File Action as they were residing
in different barangays and that the Agreement
which she attached to her position paper
constituted as a substantial compliance to the
requirement of the LGC.
ISSUES:
Pablo constitutes as a substantial compliance
of the requirement of the LGC. NO.
WON there was a need for Berba to secure a
Certificate to File Action from the Lupon. YES.
Ruling:
1. No, the Agreement entered into by Berba
and Pablo does not constitute as a substantial
compliance of the requirement under the LGC.
Sec. 417 of the LGC grants a period of six
months to enforce the amicable settlement by
the Lupon through the Punog Barangay before
the such party may resort to filing an action
before the court to enforce the settlement.
In the present case, it can be construed that
Berba had the right to enforce the Agreement
against Pablo for failure to comply with her
obligations stated in the Agreement. However,
Berba, instead filing an action for execution of
the Agreement (after six month) before the
Lupon, she filed an action in the MTC.
Also, the Court ruled that the complaint against
the Heirs of Palanca was premature as they
were impleaded by Berba as parties before the
Lupon. And that they were not privy to the said
agreement, thus, they are not bound by it.
2. Yes, Berba is required to secure a Certificate
to File an Action from the Lupon because under
Section 412 of the LGC, a certification by the
lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as
attested to by the lupon chairman that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached
between the parties is a pre-condition to the
filing of a complaint in court.
Moreover, under Sec. 408 of the same Code
states that parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality, although in different
barangays are bound to submit their disputes
to the Lupon for conciliation or amicable
settlement.
Hence, the Berba should have filed first before
the Lupon for mandatory conciliation instead of
filing directly an action before the MTC against
Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca.
Foster-Gallego vs. Spouses Galang
Facts:
Vive Realty Corporation (VRC) acquired parcels
of land at a public auction, which one of these
properties was later sold to Spouse Galang.
So, Spouses Galang took possession of the
property and had it declared in their name.
Later, the Spouses discovered that the property
was fenced by Gallego, so they brought the
matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible
settlement. However, no settlement took place.
The Spouses, then, filed a complaint for
quieting of title before the RTC.
Gallego, in his Answer with Counterclaim,
alleged that the true and lawful owner of the
property was his brother Bernabe Foster-
Gallego and that the Spouses should not
disturb his possession as caretaker of the
Property.
Foster-Gallego filed a motion for intervention
with an attached answer-in-intervention to
which the RTC denied the motion but admitted
the answer-in intervention.
Subsequently, the RTC ruled against Gallego. It
denied the motion to admit Foster-Gallego as
intervenor and the Answer in Intervention was
ordered to be sticken off the record.
ISSUES:
WON the lower courts were correct in
disallowing Foster-Gallego’ intervention. YES.
WON Foster-Gallego was an indispensable
party to the action for quieting of title. NO.
RULINGS:
1. YES, the RTC and the CA are correct in
disallowing Foster-Gallego’s intervention.
A motion for intervention is appealable when
the denial of the motion by the lower court
amounts to a final order.
However, in this case, Foster-Gallego did not
interpose his own appeal; instead he merely
joined Gallego’s appeal from the RTC.
Not being a party to the case, a person whose
intervention the court has denied has no
standing to question the decision of the court.
Therefore, Foster-Gallego had no legal
personality to join Gallego in questioning the
decision of the RTC.
He could only question the order of the trial
court in denying his intervention and the
striking off from the records of this answer-in-
intervention and NOT the decision itself.
2. No, Foster-Gallego is not an indispensable
party to the Action for Quieting of Title.
An indispensable party is a party who has such
an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting his
interest.
In this case, the decision made by the RTC in
favor of the Spouses has no appreciable effect
on Foster-Gallego’s title.
Moreover, the assailed decision does not bind
Foster-Gallego as it is a rule on quieting of title
that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall
not prejudice persons who are not parties to
the action.
Since the RTC denied Foster-Gallego’s
intervention and struck it off from the records,
he is not a party to the case.
The declaration of Gallego in default did not
make Foster-Gallego the ipso facto defendant
in the case because he failed to move to
substitute Gallego during the proceedings
before the trial court.