AFRICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

27TH AAPAM ANNUAL ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE,

ZAMBEZI SUN HOTEL, LIVINGSTONE, ZAMBIA
5TH – 9TH DECEMBER 2005

THEME: HARNESSING THE PARTNERSHIP OF THE

PUBLIC AND NON-STATE SECTORS FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA:
PROBLEMS AND THE WAY FORWARD

TOPIC: CAPACITY FOR PUBLIC POLICY MAKING: THE ROLE OF

THE LEGISLATURE IN ZAMBIA

By: Dr. W. N. Mafuleka, University of Zambia

Introduction

The process of public policy making occurs in a broad policy environment

comprising non- official and official players. Non-Official players have their

membership in organized civil society groups such as labour unions, women’s

lobbies, church organizations or business associations. Official players occupy

formal state positions prescribed by the political community and derive guidance

about the exercise of that authority from the country’s constitution. They ‘include

members of the executive, the Judiciary and the legislature.”1 This paper focuses

on the role of Zambia’s legislature in influencing policy formulation and its ability to

perform that task satisfactorily. The paper provides a condensed history of the

evolution of the country’s legislature, conceptually explains the meaning of

capacity for policy making, discusses factors affecting policy making capacity and

suggests recommendations for improved performance.

The Legislature in Zambia: Its historical origin

The historical development of the Legislature in Zambia dates back to the advent

of colonial rule spearheaded by the British South African Company (BSAC)

between 1890 and 1924, and from 1924 to the present situation. During company

rule demands for the Advisory Council to govern Northern Rhodesia led to its

establishment in 1918.When Northern Rhodesia was handed over to the British

Government in 1924, the European settlers agitated for more political control over

the territory. The British Government conceded and replaced the Advisory Council

with the Legislative Council. After Northern Rhodesia attained self- rule on 24th

October 1964, the Legislative Council was renamed the National Assembly of

Zambia with full legislative powers.

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The Current Legislature in Zambia

Between 1964 and 2005, the Zambian legislature has gone through stages of

transformation as regards membership size. The current Legislature comprises

one hundred and fifty (150) elected and not more than eight nominated members

and the Speaker as provided for under Articles 62- 71 of the Constitution of

Zambia. The National Assembly, known as Parliament when presided over by the

President, is reconstituted every five years after Presidential and General

Elections. It is a unicameral legislature, comprising only one chamber.

Legislature’s capacity in Policy- making conceptual explanation

Capacity in policy- making in this paper refers to the institutional sustainable ability

to perform satisfactorily the decision- making process. The decision making

process involves the activity of policy players to detect faulty reasoning and identify

the worthiness of policy inputs presented by other stakeholders. Screening policy

inputs and the ability to foresee their prospective desirable and undesirable

outcomes are important aspects of capacity in policy making. Along these lines,

capacity in policy making is reflected by the ability of local institutions to have

“effective direction and control over their polices”.2 It means to have the requisite

human resources, the physical infrastructure, the financial muscle and the national

political determination to motivate and inspire the whole process from the stage of

conceptualisation, adoption, implementation, monitoring, as well as evaluation of

policies. Where it involves one institution in interaction with others, capacity will be

judged not only by the ability of the single institution to identify errors in other

institutions’ policy inputs, but also by the ability to suggest plausible policy

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alternatives. The existence of such capacity depends on several factors to which

the paper now turns its attention in specific reference to Zambia.

Factors for the Legislature’s capacity in policy making.

Composition of the legislature.

The composition of the legislature can determine the courage and frankness of its

members to debate freely and detect irrational ideas in the policies that fall under

its scrutiny. During the period of the single party system (1973- 1991) the Zambian

legislature was composed “of one hundred and twenty five elected members”.3

And the President was empowered to nominate up to ten persons- bringing the

total to one hundred and thirty five representatives. All of them were members of

the single political party- the United National Independence Party (UNIP). During

the early part of the 2nd Republic, checking the correctness of government policy

ideas before they could be issued in the form of Parliamentary Acts was done by a

mechanism provided by the Commonwealth procedures of passing Bills through

various stages, for instance the decentralized Parliamentary committees. Also

during Question Time the role of Back Benchers in screening policy ideas from the

Front Bench was crucially important. Initially backed and protected by the National

Assembly Powers and Privileges Act Cap 17 of the Laws of Zambia, Back

Benchers were free to criticise the Government or vote the way they wanted. On

many occasions, Government Bills, which were seen to be inimical to the interests

of the majority of Zambians, were rejected. For this reason, Parliament was seen

by the UNIP Central Committee as a forum for an opposition group within the

single party system. The Government consequently worked out a plan, which

eventually eroded policy scrutiny in the legislature. President Kaunda appointed

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three quarters of legislators as District Governors, Ministers of State, Cabinet

Ministers and Members of Central Committee (See statistics below)

Front Bench and Back Bench MPs – 1974- 1991

Selected years Front Bench MPs Back Bench MPs

1974 42 87
1977 45 86
1979 41 75
1985 39 64
1991 77 46

Source: National Assembly Parliamentary Debates 1974- 1991.

The above figures show that there was progressively a steady reduction of Back

Bench representatives between 1974 and 1991. Thus by July 1991, 77 Front

Bench representatives outnumbered almost by half the 46 who remained in the

Back Bench. These could not defeat the Government on any motion. Even those

representatives appointed to state positions outside the cabinet felt bound by the

doctrine of collective responsibility to support the Government on any issue

brought up in the legislature for discussion and approval. Thus in several instances

the Executive ignored the views of the fewer Back Bench representatives and went

ahead to make its own decisions. For instance in 1980 the Local Government Bill

was vehemently objected by Back Bench representations. Similarly, in the Private

member’s motion, which urged the State to reduce the price of fertilizers, the

government over- ruled the minority Back Benchers.

The Legislature’s Composition in the Third Republic- 1991- 2001

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The 1991 Republican Constitution which abolished the single- party system and re-

introduced political pluralism raised the number of seats in the Zambian legislature

from 135 to 150. The president was allowed to nominate up to (8) members. After

the polls of 1991, individual party representation in the legislature was as follows:

Party Number of seats

UNIP 26
MMD 124
Other Parties 0
Independents 0
Summation 150

Source: Electoral Commission: 1991 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.

Five years later in 1996 the picture became even stronger for MMD in the

legislature. Largely because of UNIP’s boycott of elections, MMD increased its

legislature’s representation as shown in the following table.

Party Number of seats

MMD 131
NP 5
AZ 2
ZDC 2
Independents 20

Summation 150

Source: Electoral Commission: 1996 Elections.

Following the birth of the United Party for National Development (NPND) and

several by- elections held in the country, by January 2001, the political parties’

representation in the legislature was as shown below:

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Party Representation in the Legislature - 2001

Party Number of seats

MMD 128
NP 5
AZ 1
UNIP 2
UNDP 6
Independents 8
Summation 150

Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia Jan: 2001

The preceding figures indicate the overwhelming MMD majority in the national

legislature between 1991 and 2001. The MMD could therefore legislate on

anything within their interest. Scrutiny of their actions became seriously stifled by a

small presence of opposition parties in the legislature. For instance the opposition

parties were against the Government policy about the pace and whole-sale

privatisation of the parastatals. They also raised questions relating to the eligibility

for contesting the Republican Presidency, and the policy on the Electoral Process

which involved a foreign Israel company NIKUV.

In addition “Parliament enacted the much criticised Constitution of Zambia

(Amendment) Act, 1996”,4 that prevented Kaunda’s Deputy, Chief Inyambo Yeta

from contesting any state position unless he first resigned his position as chief. The

legislature also passed the Electoral (Amendment) Act 1996, which brought forth

the Electoral Commission whose members were perceived to be MMD members.”

In the same year the Public Order Act was also enacted. It was considered to have

been discriminatory against non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and other

interest groups, including opposition parties.

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Other pieces of legislation enacted by the overwhelmingly MMD representation in

the legislature were the Land Act of 1995 which evoked an outcry from traditional

rulers, NGOs and opposition parties. The Act was perceived as one that had given

the Head of State too much power over land. Added to these unpopular pieces of

legislation were the press- censorship laws such as the State Security Act,

Defamation and Licensing of Public Assembling and Speech, and the

Parliamentary Privilege Act which gives the Speaker judicial powers to imprison

journalists.

Fusion of institutions and their effect on policy-making capacity.

Strict separation of power or functions between major institutions has never been

in practice in Zambia since the advent of self-rule in 1964. This largely has been

the result of inheriting the British Parliamentary system, which was modified into

the presidential system after the attainment of independence. During the second

Republic, state and party organs were fused. The Cabinet, a state organ, held joint

meetings with the Central Committee members. Cabinet members were also

members of the legislature. The fusion was extended to provinces in 1976 when

president Kaunda appointed Provincial members of Central Committee. Prior to

that in 1969 he had appointed Provincial Cabinet Ministers and in 1974 he

appointed Provincial Political Secretaries.

The preceding fusion in some cases strengthened the capacity of the legislature to

conduct rational scrutiny of policies before they could be implemented. Members of

the legislature in the cabinet learned something from members of the Central

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Committee. The Cabinet- Central Committee Interface portrayed the image akin to

the bicameral legislature where the mistakes made by one chamber were identified

and corrected by the second chamber. The government policy of support and

commitment to the political liberation of the rest of Africa and Southern Africa in

particular is regarded to have been carefully conceived and judiciously

implemented as a result of inputs that came from the fused structure. Also the

policy to establish the National Service Scheme that taught all school leavers

military skills and skills for production after high school went through the scrutiny of

the fused structure. Although compulsory military training was removed from the

National Service curriculum, both the Chiluba and Mwanawasa governments

upheld the component of skills training particularly in the field of agriculture. This

testifies even today that the policy was rationally conceived.

The fusion of the Executive and the Legislature during the Chiluba government

also gave rise to a number of policies that did not reflect rational capacity. The

executive members of the legislature, under oath to observe collective

responsibility of the decisions or actions they took, did not criticise the policy about

the sale of Government Houses. The president was ardently interested in the

policy and any member of his party in power- whether in Front Bench or Back

Bench, could offend the President by criticising his policy opinions. The policy on

Privatisation of Parastatals was also criticised as having not been carefully

conceived by the fused state institutions. Similarly, the hiring of an Israel company,

NIKUV, to register voters for the 1996 elections was a policy decision which some

members of the legislature and the executive (Cabinet) could not criticise for fear

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of negative sanctions which would have been imposed by the Chief Executive, the

President. The same observation goes for declaring Zambia a Christian Nation.

The fusion of state and part organs policy in the second Republic, as already

observe, titled towards the interests of the United National Independence Party

(UNIP) because of the application of the concept of the Supremacy of the Party in

the single party political system. In the Third Republic practising the plural political

culture, particularly under the Mwanawasa Presidency when MMD has had a week

representation in the legislature, the power policy equation has skewed towards

the Executive. The Executive appears to have become so strong that policy inputs

from the legislature seem to have little effect to change the position of the

Executive Illustrative in this case was the decision to establish the Constitutional

Review Commission. This was the initiative of the Executive. Opposition members

in the legislature had rejected the idea, pointing at the huge financial cost that the

programme would attract. But the Executive still went ahead and appointed the

Mung’omba Commission. This time, the mode of adoption of the recommendations

in the Report and the time for implementing the new constitution are policy issues

where it looks the Executive is likely to prove to be stronger than the Legislature.

Physical infrastructure

The need for relevant information to enable the legislators make reasoned

contributions to parliamentary debates requires logistical support. This relates to

the existence of office accommodation for legislators, data banks for collation,

storage and perusal of researched facts. The current situation in Zambia is that

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legislators have no official office accommodation in Lusaka or in their respective

constituencies. Planning and other aspects of preparation for parliamentary

debates have to be done from their homes or hotel rooms during the period of

parliamentary sessions.

The preceding problem is compounded by “inadequate information and data

generation centres”5, particularly in rural constituencies. For instance of the six

museums established in the country, five are along the line of rail and only one is

located in the rural environment as shown below:

Museum Location

Livingstone Museum Livingstone- Mosi-O-Tunya Road

Lusaka National Museum Lusaka- 74 Independence Avenue

Military and Police Museum Lusaka- 74 Independence Avenue

Copper belt Museum Ndola

Eastern Cataract Field Museum Livingstone

Motor- motor Museum Mbala

A similar picture accounts for the national archives shown below:

Archive Location

Principal Centre Lusaka, near Ridgeway campus

Branch Centre Kabwe

Branch Centre Mufulira

Branch Centre Livingstone

Although the National Assembly has a library, it can be used optimally by all

legislators when the National Assembly Sessions are on. When off session, the

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Lusaka based legislators do have easier access to the facility, not those

representatives from rural constituencies where libraries are virtually non-existent.

National Assembly debates requiring scientific evidence do have the services of

the National Institute for Scientific Research (NISIR). The University of Zambia and

Copper belt University can provide similar research support services. But the two

institutions are located in urban areas, although the NISIR is decentralised to

Mount Makulu and International Airport, both suburbs of Lusaka and Kitwe

respectively. Even if the preceding data banks were available for the rural based

legislators, there would still be need for easier mobility. But the current national

road net-work is largely undeveloped.

It covers up to 30, 285 km, part of which comprises trunk roads such as the Great

East Road and Great North Road. A bigger part of the main road network was

constructed between 1965 and 1975 when the economy was performing very well.

From 1984 till today, the condition of the road infrastructure in rural areas has

worsened, making mobility for consultation and data collection for parliamentary

debates by rural- based legislators very difficult. This situation has been the same

for both the second and Third Republics.

Legal Constraints against the development of human resources in the

Legislature.

The legal barrier to capacity building in Zambia’s legislature is enshrined in the

Republican Constitution. Article 64 of the constitution which spells out

qualifications for any one intending to contest elections to the National Assembly is

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silent on level of formal education. All it says is that a candidate should be literate

and conversant with the official language used in the legislature. Education and

training cannot be ignored as pre- requisites for developing capacity in rational

debate and decision making. “Formal education and training increase an

individual’s store of knowledge, extends his repertoire of competence and skills

and deepen his insights on values.”6

These skills reduce error making and make legislators more productive in their

legislative performance. Thus failure by the constitution to incorporate specific

levels of formal education is seen as failure to encourage the development of

broadly read and hence adequately informed legislators who should be able to

screen public policy issues affecting their electorate and other stakeholders in the

policy environment.

It is further observed that the constitution demands that workers in state and quasi

state institutions have to resign their positions if they decide to join active politics

and become legislators. That constitutional provision prevents educated citizens to

seek membership of the legislature. As a result the legislature in Zambia has, for a

very long time, been attracting candidates from the business sector, some of them

not well grounded educationally. Many submissions to the current and previous

constitutional review commission have suggested removal of that provision and

have it replaced by one which recognises legislative functions as part-time

activities which a civil servant or university lecturer can perform along with his

normal duties. After all National Assembly meetings do not take place every day or

every week.

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Enhancing Legislative capacity through the Committee System

Those who favour the existing provision in the constitution argue that

Parliamentary Committees are miniature parliaments. They constitute components

of the decentralized structure of the National Assembly. Specialised committees

consider policy issues of specific nature. Where a committee feels inadequate to

thoroughly consider an issue, chapters 12 14 (3) of the constitution empowers

such committees to invite any member of the citizenry considered knowledgeable

on a specific topic to address them. The facts brought out in that address are used

for informed debate in the National Assembly. The author of this paper on 2nd

August 2005 addressed one such committee dealing with National decentralisation

and Chiefs’ Affairs.

In the Second Republic the expected performance of the Parliamentary

Committees was reduced by the concept of collective responsibility. The legislature

comprised members from only one political party, UNIP. Though building

consensus was easier among committee members from the same party, rigorous

scrutiny of ideas through spirited debate was minimal.

The picture in the Third Republic, particularly after the 1996 elections was almost

similar to the situation in the Second Republic.

Delegated Legislation and Capacity in policy Formulation

Delegated legislation involves the use of certain statutory instruments where the

legislature authorises “Ministers and their top bureaucrats, Permanent Secretaries

for example, to make laws without necessarily going back to parliament”.7 In

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countries where many legislators are generalists and their levels of formal

education are low, improved performance in legislative functions is enhanced

through the mechanism of delegated legislation. This is particularly important

when, as observed in the preceding part of the paper on the legal constraints to

learning, the Zambian constitution does not expressly encourage high formal

educational levels among its legislators. But Katotobwe, one of the legislators at

that time, in his report to the National Assembly Speaker in October 1998,

complained that in the Second Republic legislators had lost their legislative

function to the bureaucrats through delegated legislation . He felt that “civil

servants were both legislators and executors. They developed an arrogant attitude

toward politicians who were the elected legislators, but with no real legislative

power’8. In the Third Republic, he observed, the situation had not changed.

Bureaucrats have two principal advantages over political players. Their recruitment

into the civil service is based on educational and professional attainments. Their

tenure in office is often longer than that of the political bosses. This allows them to

acquire more relevant knowledge and experience about their ministries. They must

therefore have for a long time been assisting the less knowledgeable and less

skilful legislative representatives in the process of policy formulation.

Capacity in the Zambian Legislature and the International Environment

The perceptions of the legislature in the modern world are shaped not only by the

ideas of its elected players but also by the influence coming from the external

environment. For instance issues such as disarmament, environmental pollution

and drug trafficking have an international magnitude. To achieve desirable results

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in the fight against drug- trafficking or cross- border trade, whether legal or illegal,

requires that certain countries should have consensus to enact appropriate laws in

their respective legislatures. But prior to the passage of such laws representatives

of the concerned countries can meet to debate topical issues. For this reason “the

Zambian Parliament belongs to a number of international parliamentary

organisations such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), the

Inter- Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Joint Community Parliamentary Forum

(JCPF).

For purposes of improving its legislative skills the Zambian parliament has

enormously benefited from its membership in these organisations. For instance the

IPU in the past assisted Zambia in “training offered to its parliamentary officers.(7)

Zambia has participated in debating issues such as the Front Line States against

apartheid, the hunger situation in Southern Africa and economic aid for Southern

Africa. These discussions have taken place at international conferences involving

delegates from some of the preceding associations. The exchange of ideas on the

international scene and the continuing international interaction makes Zambia’s

legislators improve their thinking ability as they debate issues which culminate into

policies for the country and those that affect the region and the rest of the world.

Conclusion

The issues raised in this paper have shown that Zambia’s legislature has gone

through a process of transformation from the time of its birth in the colonial period

up to the present day. As an effective institution to help shape the country’s

policies, its capacity has been plagued by several obstacles. These range from

inappropriate power relations between and among state and party organs,

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 inadequate physical infrastructure to support policy administration, inadequate data

centres to generate and provide policy relevant information, absence of clear

legislation to encourage learning among current and prospective legislators,

inappropriate party representation in the decentralised parliamentary committee

system to foster multiple decision making centres, and resentment by some

representatives to use delegated legislation as an alternative to lack of expertise

among many generalist legislators.

Recommendations

In order to address some of the observed barriers to the development and

strengthening of capacity for the legislature in Zambia, the following could be

considered as possible solutions.

CONSTRAINTS TO CAPACITY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Unclear constitutional provision to encourage • Article 64 of the Republican
appropriate level of literacy among National Constitution, which spells out
Assembly representatives. qualifications for election to the
legislature, should include specific level
of formal education for intending
candidates. This provision should be
extended to Article 34(3) for the
qualification of presidential candidates
Absence of orientation and continuing training of • Introduce intensive orientation
new and veteran legislators. programme for all new members to the
legislature. Carefully develop the
curriculum for the orientation
programme.
• Mount continuing educational
programmes to inculcate into
legislators information search skills
such as computer operation skills.
• Training in fields such as policy
analysis, budget analysis should not be
confined only to professional officials.
This should be extended to legislators
as well.

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Lack of expertise among many legislators.
Inadequate data banks for generation, storage and
perusal of relevant policy information for
legislators.
• Presidential appointments from the
legislature to the cabinet should take
account of previous training and
educational background in order to
foster knowledge specialization.
• Existing national libraries, archives,
museums and research centres should
be strengthened through staff training,
improved selection and expansion of
reading materials and laboratory
equipment, as well as incentives for
staff motivation.
• Extend data banks to rural areas.
• Introduce transparent and wider radio,
television and print media national
debates to attract inputs from a much
larger policy environment.

Inadequate physical administrative and • Provide office accommodation for

communication infrastructure. legislators both in Lusaka and in their
various constituencies.
• Communication network can be
improved by the provision of mobile
phones and land phones connected to
offices.
• Establish a business centre at the
National Assembly Motel.

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END NOTES

1
. Richard Barke, Science and Technology Policy (1988) Congressional Quarterly

Inc., USA p.9

2
. Louis A Pichard, Policy Reform for Sustainable Development in Africa (1994)

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc 1800th Street, Boulder Colorado, USA, p. 5

3
. Zambian Constitution (1973) Article 63.
4
. CCC, “Presidential and Parliamentary Elections”. Report (1996), p. 33
5
. Saasa, O Political will and Commitment to Capacity Building for Economic

Development in Zambia (1997) IESR, p. 11

6
. Lungu, G Problems of Administrative Discretion in Post- Colonial States:

Lessons from Zambia(1982) CDU, p. 343

7
. Ng’ona Chibesakunda, The Zambian Parliament (2000) Lusaka, p. 108.

8. Katotobwe A.B.C, Report on the Needs Assessment of the Zambian Parliament,

October, 1998, p. 8.

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