Fraser 2010, Recurring Ethnic Violence in Kenya Without Civil War

Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen
Sommersemester 2008
Seminar: Analyse von Bürgerkriegen
Recurring Ethnic Violence without Civil War:

The captivating case of Kenya.
An historical analysis of the role of ethnicity in the violence
around the Kenyan elections of 1992, 1997 and 2007.
Iain Fraser
M.A Friedensforschung
und Internationale Politik
Term Paper for Analyses of Civil Wars Seminar, University of Tübingen
Iain Fraser 2010
Contents
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………1
2. Historical Background……………………………….…………………………………..2
2.1 Kenya in the Wider African Context ……………………………………………..2
2.2 Independence ……………………………………………………………………..4
2.3 Kenyatta and Kikuyu Dominance ……………………………………….…….....5
2.4 Moi and the One-Party State….…….…………………………………………….7
3. Theoretical Considerations of Ethnicity……...…….…………………………………..9

3.1 Macro-Level Approaches……………………………………………………..…..9
3.2 Specific Questions for Case Study of Ethnicity………………………………......9
3.3 Micro-Level Approaches……………………...……………………..……..……14
4. Ethnic Violence in Kenya (1992, 1997 and 2007/08)…………………………….……19
4.1 Cultural Demographic Indicators in Kenya……………………………………..19

4.2 Description of the Ethnic Violence in 1992, 1997 and 2007/8………………….20
5. Explanations for the Recent Conflicts in Kenya……………………………….…..…26
5.1 Macro Level of Analysis; Quantitative Explanation………...……………….….….26

5.2 An Historical, Qualitative Explanation of the Ethnic Violence…………...……….27
5.2.1 Historical context and discourse of ethnicity in Kenya 28
5.2.2 Ethnicity’s place within political structures and boundaries 29
5.2.3 Is the State Ethnically Based or Defined? 29
5.2.4 Influence of Democratic State Structures and
Legitimacy Upon Ethnic Pluralism 30
5.2.5 Ethnicity and Class 31
5.2.6 Role of emotions in ethnic violence 32
5.3 Intergenerational Effects upon Ethnicity……………………………………………33
6. Conclusions……………………….…..………………………………….…..………….35
7. References……………………………………………………………………………….36
Iain Fraser 2010
1. Introduction
The Republic of Kenya is a fascinating subject for a political case study for
numerous reasons. For many years Kenya was one of a few exceptional African states
that was broadly considered an outpost of stability and progress. This perception was
and is reinforced and perhaps embodied in the city of Nairobi, a city that not only is a
very influential centre in the politics of East Africa, but furthermore the home to many
international organisations (including various United Nations bodies and programmes).
Not only has Kenya’s stability been of importance to its own internal processes and
developments; Kenya has also always been the point of contact between central- and
eastern Africa and the rest of the world. This stability is more so remarkable when one
considers the neighbourhood in which Kenya finds itself. Bordering on Somalia,
Ethiopia and Sudan, all countries well known for their share of conflicts, and
geographically close to Rwanda and the Congo, it is indeed remarkable that Kenya has
been able to maintain the stability, for which it has a reputation. However, in the years
1992, 1997 and 2007, around the time of each of the respective elections, significant
outbreaks of ethnic violence and conflict occurred. This violence occurred, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, along ethnic cleavages.
This paper has two primary focuses. First, a macro level analysis will be
conducted to explain why the recurring conflicts did not develop in to a civil war.
Secondly, the role ethnicity played, as a salient identity, in the aforementioned outbreaks
of violence. This paper begins with a thorough analysis of historic ethnic developments
in Kenya. This is necessary in order to highlight the fundamental effect of colonialism
on current ethnic relations, and the intertwining of politics, economics and ethnicity in
Kenya. This is followed by an introduction of ethnicity as the main subject (in the
Kenyan context) of this enquiry. Ethnicity is then defined and a review of the literature
on the salience of ethnicity as an explanatory variable is provided, with a further
distinction between macro and micro-levels. This theoretical section is followed by a
brief portrayal of the ethnic violence under examination. Subsequently I will explain the
importance of ethnicity as a highly salient identity for Kenyans that was first
strengthened, exacerbated and instrumentalised by the colonial authorities, and has
since been manipulated by political elites, resulting in the ethnic violence of the
stipulated periods. Despite the deep inter-ethnic and historical grievances, it will be
argued that due to its high level of fractionalisation, Kenya has not experienced a civil
war. It is further argued, that the corrupt, centralist, nepotistic and ethnically favoured
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policies of Kenya’s post-independence politicians, contributed to the hardening of
ethnic identities and the increased willingness of Kenyans’ frustration and grievances,
which manifested in the violence of the 1990s and late 2000s.
2. Historical Background 
 
2.1 Setting the Scene: The birth of Kenya in the African context.  
It is important to begin with a brief overview of historical developments in
(today's) Kenya, dating back to the mid eighteenth century, but mostly concentrating on
the independence/post-colonial period. After gaining independence in 1963, and
becoming a Republic in December 1964, much had occurred throughout the British
colonial period in Kenya, that were to have effects on ethnic developments after
independence. Meredith (2006) mentions numerous cases where missionaries and
administrative colonial functionaries all across Africa were on occasion active in
creating new ethnicities or ethnic categories, at other times grouping non-associated
peoples into existing ethnic groups. This took place at a time when the African continent
was being arbitrarily divided up among the European powers, with absolutely no
consideration for the existing political or ethnic realities on the ground. This is most
obviously evidenced by the disturbing number of geometric lines to be found on the
political map of modern Africa. The result of this arbitrary division was that “the new
boundaries [of African territories] cut through some 190 culture groups. In other cases
Europe’s new colonial territories enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups,
with no common history, culture language or religion” (Meredith 2006, pp.1-2). This
disconnect with the reality of life for the peoples of the African continent continued
until independence. As Meredith (2006, p.2) estimates, “by the time the Scramble for
Africa was over, some 10,000 African polities had been amalgamated into forty
European colonies and protectorates.” With varying accounts as to the large number of
ethnicities residing in Kenya today (Osamba 2001, p.42, places this number at over 40),
it is useful to remember that there was nothing obvious leading to the formation of
Kenya’s borders, and the inhabitants that reside within them – who had to become
Kenyans.
A number of tribes can be identified in historical accounts that are still connected
with the territory of present-day Kenya. The two most powerful were the Maasai and
the Kikuyu. The Maasai had been carrying out raids of expansion throughout the 18th
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and 19th centuries, and the Kikuyu, who were established pastoralists by that time, had
cleared forests and established a stronghold from which they expanded in to present-day
central province (Britannica, 2008). World War I brought significant hardships to the
area, because of the southern border with (present day) Tanzania, a German territory.
Most able-bodied men were conscripted, leaving their traditional regions and farms
behind them. This of course caused problems when returning soldiers were promised
new lands as part of reintegration schemes. In 1920, after the War’s end, the East Africa
protectorate was turned into the new colony of Kenya, its name based on the territory’s
highest mountain (Britannica Online, 2008). In the 1920s the Young Kikuyu Association
was founded, which did not receive support from Chiefs and older, more traditional
Kenyans, but marked the beginning of more active participation in the political process.
However, the organisation’s “attempts to win the support of other ethnic groups failed
because of their unwillingness to accept Kikuyu leadership” (Britannica Online 2008).
Increasing white settlement, and the corresponding disenfranchisement of
thousands of Kenyans, led to increased hostility, which was combined with the problem
of the many white farmers in the Rift Valley creating demand for farm-labourers (who
were mostly Kikuyu). The Rift Valley had traditionally been Maasai territory, whose
pastoralists had been cleared for occupation and development by white farmers. “By the
mid-1940s, the populations of Kikuyu squatters and their families had risen to about
250,000, one-quarter of the Kikuyu people” (Meredith, p.82). Firstly, this caused
animosity between the people who had traditionally inhabited the valley, and the new
Kikuyu population. Furthermore, as the white farmers expanded their landholdings and
operations, Kikuyu, some of whom had been in the valley for a generation or two, were
thrown off the land, forced to migrate to the slums in the cities – principally Nairobi.
Although Kenya was the first of the eastern African territories to get a ‘native’
representative in the national legislature in 1944 (this number increased to 8 by 1951),
these political concessions came far too late, and were not enough to quell the growing
demands for political equality (Kenya, 2008).
Whilst movements for independence were underway by the start of the 1940s, it
was not until after the Second World War, that the nationalist cause really gained
momentum. The Kenya African Union (KAU) was founded in 1944, and as Jomo
Kenyatta returned from Europe, he took over the leadership of this organisation. While
the goal of the organisation was to work towards a nationalist movement, the
overwhelming majority of its membership and its leadership came from the Kikuyu
tribe (Meredith 2006). Indeed it was among the Kikuyu that anti-colonial sentiment was
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at its peak. In the years following the War, the pace of change in Kenya had increased.
The African population of the capital, Nairobi doubled throughout this period, and now
Kikuyu constituted over half of the inhabitants of Nairobi (Meredith 2006, p. 84).
Concurrently, and particularly after the return of Kenyans who had fought in the
Second World War, there was a rising tide of militancy in opposition to the status quo in
Kenya. Meredith (2006, pp.80-86) argues that whilst the British considered Mau Mau to
be a secret society, it is better considered an insipient Kikuyu revolt. Associated with
Mau Mau membership were intimidating rituals and oaths of allegiance to the Kikuyu
people. By 1952 most of the Kikuyu (whether they supported it or not) were caught up
in an armed rebellion. In the fighting that ensued however, only relatively few whites
were killed. Indeed over 2,000 moderate Kikuyu were killed throughout the period.
Other accounts hold that although Kenyatta had publicly denounced Mau Mau, the
British arrested him and declared a state of emergency. The violence and brutality had
shocked both Whites and Kikuyu alike and was seen as an imperative to pursue more
democratic means for working towards independence.
In 1957 eight Africans were elected to the legislative council during the first
African elections in Kenya, including a young minority Kalenjin leader, Daniel arap
Moi. Parity with the white representatives was achieved shortly thereafter, when in
1958, the number of African representatives was doubled. Throughout this time, and
now coming from within the establishment, pressure was increased for the release of
Kenyatta. Whilst still in prison, Kenyatta was elected to the post of president of the
Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 1960. African political organisations had not
been allowed throughout the last decade due to the Mau Mau rebellion. KANU had
been formed around the personality of Kenyatta and promoted the idea of strong
centralised government. However, in June of the same year two of the founding
members, Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi, left KANU to found another new African
organisation, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU favoured
decentralisation as the best way to address the needs of the Kenyan state; and were also
concerned about Kikukyu domination in KANU (and in general). Despite their
differences, after the 1961 election both parties maintained their pressure for the release
of Kenyatta, who was released in August that year. In 1962 a coalition government
between the KADU and KANU was formed, and in 1963 Kenyatta became Prime
Minister, under a constitution, in which Kenya achieved self-government (Kenya 2008).
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2.2 Independent Kenya: Birth of the modern, stable but one‐party state.  
 
Kenya gained its independence on December 12, 1963, amid a swell of African
colonies, in the 1960s. Kenyatta became the president of the new Republic one year
later, with Oginga Odinga as his vice president. Already in 1964 Kenyatta had
persuaded opposition politicians from KADU to cross the floor and take up prominent
posts in the government (Meredith 2006, p.165), which resulted in most KADU
members transferring their allegiance to KANU.
“We are determined to have independence in peace, and we shall not allow
hooligans to rule Kenya” (Kenyatta 1962 cited in: Meredith 2006, p.90)
While a thorough description of early post-colonial developments or in-depth

analysis thereof are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present paper, it is worth
mentioning a number of historical events and trends, particularly through the lens of
ethnicity, that were to have an impact on the election violence that is the focus of this
paper. Before arriving at the events surrounding the violent 1992 election, there are two
politicians that demand closer attention, for these two men dominated Kenyan politics
for over 30 years: Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi.
2.3 Kenyatta, KANU and the Kikuyu Dominated New Republic 
Arguably, the Kikuyu felt the brunt of colonialism more than any other tribe in Kenya
due to their historical geographic base around Nairobi and the large number of Kikuyu
who had migrated to the Rift Valley, but then had to leave it, due to the presence of
white settlers. This exposure to the urbanisation of Nairobi and heightened interactions
with the British and with new forms of political action, organisation and participation
were to differentiate the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu further gained recognition through the
rather extraordinary personality of Jomo Kenyatta. In summing up Kenyatta’s record
after his death Meredith (2006, p.264) notes:
In the fifteen years that he presided over Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta enjoyed massive
authority. Even critics of his government accorded him due respect. In his old age
he ruled not so much by exercising direct control over the government as by
holding court with a circle of loyal ministers and officials, predominantly Kikuyu
from home district of Kiamb, whom he entrusted with the administration of
country.
It was also relatively early during Kenyatta’s reign that Kenya’s tradition of one
party rule and excessive centralist power was established. In 1964 Kenyatta was able to
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persuade the leader of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) to disband and to
join the KANU party, thereby forming a single chambered national assembly. Added to
this consolidation of power, by this time most white settlers, who were opposed to
African rule had left, allowing Kenyatta to focus on internal integration (Jomo
Kenyatta, 2004). In addition, through a number of successive constitutional
amendments, Kenyatta significantly strengthened central power, and thereby his
authority. In this manner he was able to arrest and hold political opponents as soon as
they were considered to constitute a threat to public order. Although definitely
benefiting the Kikuyu, Kenyatta occasionally selected individuals from differing ethnic
backgrounds in order to hinder strong tribal-based opposition (Rowe, 2009). In general,
and particularly in foreign diplomatic circles of the time Kenyatta was attributed with
having achieved a remarkable level of stability. In the year 1969, Kenyatta made a
choice to align himself with the West, which was in contradiction to his previous vice-
president, Jaramogi Odinga, who had looked to Russia and China. Odinga was a strong
representative of Luo interests, and was arrested in the same year. This split followed
the controversy surrounding the assassination of the popular Luo poltician Tom Mboya,
whose death many suspected was arranged by powerful Kikuyu wanting to reduce the
Luo influence in power. Riots in Kisumu (in the Luo Nyanza Province) resulted, which
were so severe that Kenyatta’s motorcade was forced to flee, and the president shunned
the region for the next ten years. This region, Odginga’s homeland, would continue to
be marginalised throughout Moi’s entire presidency (Kimani, 2008).
Having decided to become a western allied foothold in Africa, Kenyatta’s general
economic record was regarded as impressive. Gross domestic product rose on average
by 6 and 6.5 per cent throughout the 1960s and 70s respectively. This period of
prosperity, which is one of the foundations of the Kenyan exception stereotype, was
particularly reflected in the development of the city of Nairobi, which became a hub for
international economic and political conferences. However, these figures must be
considered in the sobering light of Kenya’s population growth at the time. Just before
independence, Kenya’s population was at 8 million; by the year of Kenyatta’s death,
1978, it had all but doubled to 15 million, representing one the fastest rates of growth in
the world (Meredith 2006, pp.265-266). Despite his early communist beginnings and
early contacts with Moscow, once in power Kenyatta rejected the trend towards
socialism among the new African Republics. The term ‘Herambee’ (in English: ‘pulling
together’) which is still the motto of the Republic of Kenya, was used by Kenyatta as a
slogan. Kenyatta favoured individual enterprise and entrepreneurship to the national-
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isation programmes that were particularly popular throughout the continent at the time
(Rowe, 2009).
Kenyatta’s capitalist politic aroused dissent, even within the constraints of the one
party system and was accordingly seriously challenged a number of times throughout
his career. First by Bildad Kaggia (a former Mau Mau leader), followed by Oginga
Odinga his vice-president, and finally by a young Kikuyu politician, and then J.M.
Kariuki in the 1970s. As mentioned above, Odinga, a prominent Luo politician (and a
surname that features once again in Kenyan politics), had criticised Kenyatta’s
government for siding with the West. Odinga advocated nationalisation programmes and
a new alignment with the Eastern Bloc. Odinga founded a new party, but this fledgling
party was harassed and repressed at every turn, Finally, Kenyatta had Odinga arrested
and the Party was officially banned (Meredith 2006 ; Rowe 2009). Kariuki, also a
Kikuyu (the same ethnic background as Kenyatta) did not use ethnicity, but rather relied
upon the growing discontent with the corruption and increasingly extreme inequality
under Kenyatta’s rule, as his political base. Kariuki aimed to replace Kenyatta after his
death and became the champion of the landless and the poor. Whilst Kenyatta remained
widely popular until his death, his direct family members and associates had blatantly
profited through corruption. Kenyatta’s daughter and wife had business connections and
investments in almost every major industry in Kenya, and were often referred to as ‘the
royal family’ (Meredith, 2006). By the time of his death, Kenyatta had mostly retreated
from politics, leaving government to family and trusted ministers. Coupled with an
appreciation of the stability that had been achieved in Kenya, Kenyatta had maintained
a West-friendly policy course, which Moi, Kenyatta’s successor, was to try and continue
(Rowe, 2009).
2.4 Moi: One Party Rule for Kenya and the political emergence of Kalenjin 
“I would like ministers, assistant ministers and others to sing like a parrot after
me. That is how we can progress.” Moi, 1984 (Mr. Moi’s Parrots, 1987).
Daniel Arap Moi was able to secure power after Kenyatta’s death in 1978. Moi
had long been involved in central politics in Kenya: he travelled to London to discuss
the options for independence, but it was only after Kenyatta that he decided to make a
mark for himself. While Moi continued in Kenyatta’s tradition of a one-party KANU-
state, and carried on many of the prevailing policies, Moi could also be described as a
‘tribalist’ (Meredith, 2006; Wrong, 2009). He intended to undermine the long-
established power base of the Kikuyu in Kenya, and instead sought to benefit members
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of his own Kalenjin tribe. Although Moi ruled with an iron grip in Nairobi, he had
originally been in favour of a transfer of power from the centre to the periphery, referred
to as Majimboism in Kenya, which would thereby lessen Kikuyu influence.
The term Kalenjin is one telling example of the lingering colonial impacts upon
ethnic identity in Kenya. A short description of the Kalenjin also shows how the
political history of Kenya continues to play a role in current ethnic politics. The
Kalenjin people are estimated to constitute around 13 percent of the population of
Kenya. However, the term Kalenjin did not come into existence until the 1950s. Until
this point, the Kalenjin were referred to as ‘Nanji-speaking peoples.’ Kalenjin are
actually an ethnic grouping of eight culturally and linguistically related but distinct
tribes: the Kipsigis, Nandi, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Pokot, Sabaot, and the Terik.
Their present-day homeland is Kenya's western highlands and the Rift Valley (Kalenjin,
2009). As mentioned above, the KADU party (led by Masinde Muliro, Daniel arap Moi,
and Ronald Ngala) represented smaller and less advantaged ethnic groups of the Great
Rift Valley and coastal areas, including the Kalenjin tribes. KADU was an advocate of
‘Majimboism’ (translated as ‘regionalism’ in Swahili), which would create ethnic-
based, semi-autonomous political regions in Kenya (Chronology for Kalenjin in Kenya,
2007). However, Kenyatta’s centralism prevailed over this position. Whilst Moi was
then able to enjoy the almost-royal powers of the presidency that Kenyatta had
established, the problem was that his own tribal constituency supported regionalist
policies. The huge excesses of corruption and repression employed by Moi, in order to
‘maintain order’ in Kenya cannot be overstated. Moi managed to stay in power for
twenty-four years, and, as Kenyatta before, ensured that his family and close associated
massively profited from their time in office. Moi’s term is often compared, in ethnic
terms, to those of Kenyatta; whereas under Moi it was the ‘Kalenjin’s turn to eat’
(Wrong, 2009).
In 1992, the 14th year of Moi’s presidency, and ten years after Moi officially
declared Kenya to be a one-party state, multi-party elections were held after a year of
significant violence occurring in various parts of the country. Before analysing the three
electoral years of 1992, 1997, and 2007/8, I will next discuss the theoretical approaches
to understanding civil wars, and their applicability in the case of Kenya1.
1
This paper is part of Seminar on Analyses of Civil Wars in Africa. Two colleagues also worked with me on the case of
Kenya. Thus, in this essay I continually restrict myself to a focus on ethnicity as a factor, because my two colleagues
each dealt with political and economical explanations respectively.
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3. Theoretical Foundations 
3.1 Cultural Explanations of Civil Wars: the role of ethnicity 
Cultural explanations are one of three major approaches to understanding civil wars,
with the main focus being on religion and ethnicity. Whilst there are some small
religious fault-lines in Kenya, these played no significant role in the violence between
1992 and 2008; thus the focus of this essay is primarily on ethnicity. Important to
mention at this juncture is that all across the globe, complex constellations of varying
ethnicities mostly have managed to, and continue to, live in relative harmony and
certainly in peace with each other. In this regard it must be questioned: what causes
some ethnic groupings to occasionally exercise violence against certain other ethnic
groups? Furthermore, to what extent can ethnicity be considered the main, or most
important, causal factor or main attributive element in explaining the outbreak and
occurrence of civil wars and conflict?
Ethnicity is a loaded term in everyday use and can serve as a quick label to
distinguish people or groups from one another. This term also invokes associations of
homogeneity, historical and customary allegiances. Another mental connection that is
often made with ethnicity is that it something ‘essential’ or primordial; something we
are born with (Cramer, 2008). This simple understanding of group identity is often
supported by the news media that, when reporting on a complex conflict, seeks to
simplify the situation by describing many conflicts as being ethnic conflicts. In order to
better understand the theoretical complexities associated with the concept and reality of
ethnicity, this paper distinguishes between macro- and micro-level approaches and
analyses, whilst noting that these two levels can have an affect on one another.
3.2 Macro‐Level Approaches to Ethnicity: Groups within State 
 
Approaches to ethnicity as a subject matter vary within the social sciences and can be
broadly divided into three categories: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist.
Samuel Huntington’s over-cited (but also often over-simplified) Clash of Civilisations is
a classic example of the primordial approach to ethnicity and religion. This perspective
sees ethnicity and religion as natural categories, which can be taken at face value and
analysed as such. Cultural differences thus lead to the formation of alliances and
groupings and conflicts occur along ‘cultural frontlines’. Political leaders are then seen
as representing the dogmatic differences between the groups and are able to channel the
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mistrust of the ‘other’ whilst building upon a sense of solidarity within the ‘natural’
groupings. Mistrust of the other can then quickly lead to a willingness among members
of the same group to set about pursuing their political goals by military/violent means.
Huntington’s thesis particularly, and the ‘primordial’ position in general have been
seriously and widely questioned and criticised by numerous authors2 and will
accordingly not be employed in the analysis that follows.
I prefer a more constructivist definition of ethnicity offered by Kasfir (1976: 77)
that accounts for the constructed elements of identity, whilst noting concrete factors that
enable classification and analysis:
Ethnicity contains objective characteristics associated with common
ancestry, such as language, territory, cultural practices and the like. These
are perceived by both insiders and outsiders as important indicators of
identity so that they become the bases mobilizing social solidarity and
which in certain situations result in political activity (emphasis added).
Whilst noting elements such as language and common heritage (ancestry), this
definition also recognises the importance of the perception of such factors. An example
of the changing perceptions of the importance of culture and ethnicity can be seen when
contrasting the nationalist Europe of the early 1900s, which then experienced two
catastrophic world wars, and the increasingly transnational, regional EU at the
beginning of the twenty first century.
More convincing than primordial arguments are the instrumentalist and
constructivist approaches to understanding ethnicity in the context of conflict. Simply
stated, primordial approaches attribute causality to ethnicity (and/or religion); whereas
these other approaches perceive ethnicity to be a constructed identity and a factor that
can be exploited in order to further political, social or economic aims. As the Carnegie
Commission (1997: 30) stated:
Mass violence results when leaders see it as the only way to achieve their
political objectives, and they are able to mobilize groups to carry out their
strategy. Without determined leaders, groups may riot but they do not start
systematic, sustained campaigns of violence to achieve their goals; and
without mobilized groups, leaders are unable to organize a fight.
Instrumentalists see socio-economic factors as being the main underlying causes of

conflicts that at first appear to be ethnic.
This does not, however, mean that ethnicity is of no importance, but rather that
2
See for example Amartya Sen’s recent publication: Identity and Violence: the illusion of destiny in German: die
Identitätsfalle: warum es keinen Krieg der Kulturen gibt. Horowitz also shows the limits of a primordialist
understanding of ethnicity when examining inter-ethnic violence (1985; 2003).
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ethnicity can be employed as a mobilising factor. Without such identities it is possible
that conflicts would not take place in the form that they do, and most probably, those
who serve to gain from such mobilisations would have a much harder time garnering
support for their military designs. Cramer (2006: 102) argues that “various forms of
collective identity play important organisational roles in the production of violent
conflict. By calling on historical memory (mythical or otherwise) and on cultural
markers of loyalty and values they lend depth to political experience.” This collective
identity, ethnicity, can then be useful in abstracting individuals from their personal
biographies; making them a part of something bigger, more important or heroic.
Accordingly, emphasising, politicising and mobilising this identity can be a useful
method for leaders, elites or ‘entrepreneurs.’ Kreuzer (2005) and Posner (2004) both
demonstrate that elites can play an important role in the construction and spreading of
ethnic and religious identities, and more disturbingly, that in some cases these identities
first begin to gain salience for the parties involved only once violence and/or escalation
takes place.
Some authors also point to the existence of status hierarchies between ethnic
groups within a state (Horowitz, 1985 & 2003; Petersen, 2002). Depending on the
perceived legitimacy of this ‘ranking’ and the relevant status position a group occupies
within the hierarchy, this can lead to inter-group discrimination that attempts to degrade
the other competing groups relative status3. Once again, it is the perception, the extent
to which the actors concerned (in this case the members of the groups, and the groups as
agents as a whole) perceive the relative imbalance or inequality among groups and
determine this to be unjust, that is important. In turn, this perception is not a wholly
organic process; it too, is open to myth making and can be affected by the designs of
influential individuals and be instrumentalised. In this regard a socially constructed
approach to understanding the formation, retention, development and salience of ethnic
groups is important, whilst at the same time recognising the plasticity of ethnicity, and
the extent to which ethnic groups can be instrumentalised.
When analysing ethnicity from a quantitative perspective, there are a number of
possible ethnic political constellations, which can explain the chances of, and have
differing effects on, the outbreak of civil war. An ethnically fractionalised (or
pluralistic) society is where there are many smaller ethnic groups and no one ethnicity
3
This line of reasoning follows from Tajfel and Turners Social Identity Theory (1979; 1986) which
is discussed in much further detail, along with the application of this theory by Horowitz and
Petersen, in the following section 3.2.
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makes up a significant enough proportion of the population. A polarised society (as
discussed by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005) entails a society comprised of two
major ethnic groups of relatively equal size. In a dominant or majority constellation
there is one ethnic group that makes up between 45 and 90 percent of the population. A
further schema has been put forward by Cederman and Girardin (2007), where the
presence of a smaller ethnic minority in power is proposed to increase the chances of a
civil war. However, this finding has been severely and empirically called into question
by Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007). These various approaches attempt to construe a
causal correlation in which the numbers of people of a certain ethnicity, and the number
of differing ethnicities within a given state have an effect on the likelihood of conflict
breaking out.
However, as Posner notes, “by not capturing the depth of the divisions between
ethnic communities, indices of ethnic fractionalization leave out a potentially important
part of the explanation for the variation we observe in economic performance in cases
of ‘ethnic’ fractionalization for 190 countries” (Posner, 2004: 852). Thus the interaction
between ethnicity and economy is left out. Furthermore, it is very problematic and
difficult to summarize the ethnic landscape of a country with a single measure as
countries contain multiple dimensions of ethnic cleavage. Thus the ethnic fraction-
alisation of a country has been analysed in concurrency with variables like the influence
of horizontal social inequality along ethnic cleavages (Østby, 2008). Accordingly,
neither inequality, nor ethnic heterogeneity as a variable is significant in explaining the
outbreak of civil war by itself. Whilst numerous studies demonstrate empirical progress
made on the role of ethnicity in civil war, the difficulties in operationalising this
complex variable are considerable.
As constructivists will point out, ethnicity is not the only identity that an
individual possesses. Societies are complex constellations of individuals with
overlapping constructed identities. These simultaneous identities wax and wane in terms
of relevance and salience. It is often the case that only once a situation or process has
begun to escalate that polarising structures begin to develop (Chandra/Wilkinson 2008;
Posner 2004, cited in Hasenclever 2009: 8) As Østby (2008) argues, this ethnic identity
may only first gain salience when combined with common economic grievances that
afflict other members of the same delineable group. In this regard, the identity of
repressed, cheated, exploited is combined with that of a certain ‘cultural’ (be it
language, custom, ethnicity, religion) identity, which then serves as a source of people
ripe for mobilisation. These identities can sometimes conflict with other identities such
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as class or national belonging. In summing up the complexity of determining the cause
(or better, causes) of civil war, Malone and Nitzschke (2005:5) abridge the findings of
numerous case studies by stating that
the onset of violent conflict was triggered by the interaction of economic
motives with long-standing grievances over the mismanagement or
inequitable distribution of resource wealth, exclusionary and repressive
political systems, inter-group disputes, and security dilemmas exacerbated
by unaccountable and ineffective states. (cited in Gottwald 2009: 78)
Thus, one can note that the degree of ethnic homogeneity is not the only factor affecting
the likelihood of civil war and violence. The political institutions of the state, and the
extent to which they accommodate the ethnic make-up of the populations living and
participating in the state, can also determine the propensity for ethnicity to feature as a
factor in mobilising violence (Wolff, 2007). The specific historical circumstances
affecting the state and ethno-political relations within it also have a large effect. For
example, the United States of America has a history spanning multiple centuries of
liberal-democratic institutions that (theoretically) had to accommodate waves upon
waves of settlers and immigrants with hugely varying ethnic backgrounds. The majority
of ex-colony states have had, in contrast, only half a century to consolidate mechanisms
and state institutions that redistribute wealth and services among the various ethnic
communities (see for example Esman, 2004).
Recently the interaction between variables such as cultural cleavages, political or
economic discrimination against particular ethnic (or religious) groups, and the
necessary perception of such discrimination have been identified as increasing the
likelihood of the outbreak of civil war (see for example Gottwald 2009). More critically,
the capacity of elites (if they are present) to be able to manipulate, instrumentalise and
thus utilize ethnic belonging and/or identity to achieve their goals through violence
must also be analysed, in order to understand the role ethnicity plays in the outbreak of
civil war.
Reiterating Gottwald’s (2009) sentiment that quantitative studies, dealing with the
influence of (the factor) grievance(s) on the occurrence and outbreak of civil wars, have
suffered due to the inadequacy and limitedness of the indicators employed, I wish to
now discuss qualitative approaches to the question of identity.
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3.2 Qualitative Questions for a Specific Case Study Analysis of Ethnicity  
 
As mentioned at various junctures above, the complexity of ethnicity as a variable
demands serious analytical attention. Some particular considerations concerning this
are: 1) the specific historical context and discourse of a particular ethnicity, 2) the
political structures that a particular ethnicity moves within (or transcends) – for example
is the ethnicity in question confined within a set of national boundaries, 3) whether the
state has an ethno-cultural base like Saudi Arabia, Northern Ireland, Israel, Malaysia, or
if it is multi-ethnic/pluralist like the United States of America or the Republic of Kenya,
4) how well established the state structures are, and to what extent pluralism (ethnic
heterogeneity) has been incorporated into the political process, 5) the interaction
between ethnicity and class and 6) whether there are specific ethnically-based dominant
emotions, such as grievances/greed/fear. Finally the intergenerational effect of the
reproduction of ethnicity must be considered.
Whilst noting the importance of understanding how ethnicity as an element
factors into the phenomenon of civil wars, macro-level focussed analyses tell us very
little about what ethnicity means for an individual and his/her behaviour that
corresponds to this identity. For at the end of the day, civil wars fought between ethnic
groups are composed of individuals that are in violent conflict with one another, despite
being ‘citizens’ in the same country. What separates those many individuals who belong
to different ethnicities that live non-violently together around the world from those who
become involved in the conduct of mass organised violence against members of other
ethnicities? In furthering the qualitative analysis of ethnicity, the next section examines
micro-level processes that describe an individual’s behaviour, with particular reference
to ethnicity.
3.3 Micro‐Level Approaches to Ethnicity: the Individual and the Group 
An analysis of the individual and their relation to, and interaction with, a group must
begin with and acknowledge the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979) who expanded upon
the body of work of Sherif (inter alia 1961 and 1969) in social psychology. Tajfel and
Turner particularly analysed and refined Sherif’s realistic conflict theory (RCT). In
summarising this theory they write:
The R.C.T states that opposing claims to scarce resources, such as power,
prestige, or wealth, generate ethnocentricism and antagonism between
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groups. Therefore, low status should intensify out-group hostility in groups
that are politically economically, or socially subordinate.
Tajfel and Turner discussed the interaction between the group and the individual, not
only in terms of the differences between how groups and individuals behave, interact
and react, but in terms of how ‘belonging to the group’, in of itself, has a social-
psychological effect on the individual. They also questioned the objective nature of ‘in-
compatible group interests’ (implicit in the RCT) and argued that not only were such
incompatibilities not always sufficient to generate conflict; they were not even always
necessary (Tajfel & Turner 1979: 38). Their arguments are based upon a body of
experiments they conducted throughout the 1970s, which demonstrated the readiness of
individuals allotted into groups to discriminate positively towards their ‘group-mates’
and negatively against those not belonging to the group. They argue that this polarised
perception towards the ‘in-group’ and against the ‘out-group’ contributes to the
individual’s sense of self-worth (page 40). Thus, negative evaluation of the out-group
also contributes to a positive sense of self-identity, which is then reinforced through
membership in the group. Due to the close connection of self-identity and self-esteem, it
follows that the individual attempts to feel good about themselves. However, Tajfel and
Turner also point out that such intergroup comparisons are not always positive in terms
of relative self-evaluations. If the comparison with the out-group leads to a negative
evaluation on the in-group, then the individual, as well as the group will attempt to
redress this. How this is done and whether discrimination occurs depends on a number
of factors: 1) whether the status of the group within the larger hierarchy is perceived as
legitimate or not; 2) the permeability of the group and how demarcated the group is; and
3) the instability of the general society/system (Tajfel and Turner, cited in Gottwald
2009: 79).
The direct ramifications of this in-group out-group dynamic for civil conflict are
noted Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 44) in reference to social competition, in which
the group members may seek positive distinctiveness through direct
competition with the out-group [and] may try to reverse the relative
positions of the in-group and the out-group on salient dimensions. … We
can hypothesise, … that this strategy will generate conflict and antagonism
between subordinate and dominant groups insofar as it focuses on the
distribution of scarce resources.
Tajfel and Turner went on to refine these arguments in the formulation of their
Social Identity Theory (SIT), based on the psychological advances made in the 1970s.
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In later works they also mention conditions and specifications that impinge upon the
likelihood of the group identity leading to conflict.
In the field of social psychology the phenomenon of in-group, out-group
dynamics has since been heavily researched and documented. Indeed the social element
present in each of us means that even when it comes to the most mundane indicators,
subjects will generate in-group feelings, and react to a perceived out-group
accordingly.4 The debate on the exact nature of the individual, if indeed there exists
such a thing, is far and beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say, it is no wonder
that cultural indicators and cultural identities, which are often cultivated and developed
and retained over hundreds or thousands of years, can serve as deep points of difference
by which a group defines itself. Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the majority of
groups across the world, despite clearly defining themselves relative to other groups,
live in peace5 with one another.
Around the same time of the articulation of the SIT, Donald Horowitz (1985)
produced an impressive analysis of how ethnic groups operate in conflict. Horowitz
worked with Tajfel and Turner’s analysis of intergroup interactions and transferred this
to the realm of inter-ethnic group relations. As Gottwald notes, while ethnicities can be
differentiated on the base of race, skin colour, language, religion or other criteria;
Horowitz denotes permanence as the most important indicator of ethnic identity. This
permanence ensures that individuals will not come and go from this ethnic group
(Horowitz, 1985, cited in Gottwald, 2009: 79).
Horowitz begins his examination of ethnicity by looking at the contributions of
social psychology to understandings of group belonging. By examining vast amounts of
data stemming from the decolonisation period of the 1960s Horowitz demonstrates how
colonial administrations, time and again, deliberately selected out and differentiated
ethnicities, often favouring a specific group in the running of the administration of the
colony. Recalling the effect this is likely to have according to Tajfel and Turner, it
follows that this led to negative feelings amongst the out-group(s) and begins to explain
4
During my undergraduate degree in social psychology, I was involved in experiments that
demonstrated that in-group out-group distinctions can be made by individuals, randomly selected,
who define themselves as preferring a certain type of art (e.g “Us Kadinsky Fans” vs. “those
Picasso admirers”). More extensive testing was carried out in camp scenarios where people were
simply divided into two teams, who then demonstrated alarming levels of cultivated hostility based
solely upon this first arbitrary distinction.
5
As any student of Peace and Conflict studies knows, defining the word peace is an important
process. Whilst I subscribe to a more Galtungesque understanding of peace, for the purposes of this
paper, peace here can be understood as referring to the absence of war and violent conflict.
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the serious grievances that these ethnicities have. This in turn led to the use of violence
as an instrument with which to redress the perceived injustice. Horowitz reminds us of
the mobilising strength of a group upon an individual when he writes: “The
improvement of the groups condition… may be a more powerful motivation for
participation in collective action than is improvement of the participating individual’s
condition.” Furthermore, just like members of any group, members of an ethnic group
exhibit typical characteristics of in-group out-group bias. Additionally, however, “they
appear frequently to engender more loyalty from their members than competing group-
types do and to engage in severe conflict with other ethnic groups” (Horowitz, 2003:
47).
Thus, the ethnic group can be considered like any other social group, but often
entails very powerful feelings of affiliation, which are particularly strengthened by the
intergenerational nature of ethnic identity. Ethnicity is reproduced and reinforced
through a mixture of socialisation and genetic similarity (Horowitz, 2003: 47-50).
Whilst noting the significant role the family plays in the reproduction and socialisation
of ethnicity, Horowitz does not rule out the space for the social construction of ethnicity.
Just as Tajfel and Turner were able to construct and/or redraw the identity boundaries of
arbitrary research groups, so too can the boundaries of groups in real life be changed.
This also holds for Ethnic groups.
At this juncture the primordialist approach can be recalled. An oversimplified
primordialist approach to ethnicity at the level of analysis of the individual would see
ethnicity as something that an individual is born with and that remains a (highly
significant, if not defining) factor in the individual’s life. At the other side of the debate
is a pure constructivist position, that sees ethnicity as a very malleable attribute, that is
not only instrumentalised but even sometimes conjured, defined and made salient by
elites and other individuals that can profit from this constructed identity. Here I agree
with Horowitz in attempting to find a golden middle between the two positions. One
must not belittle the deep attachments to ethnicity as one of the cultural cornerstones of
a person’s identity. Nonetheless, ethnicities change over time, die out, are born, expand,
merge with other ethnicities, and are ultimately just one of a number of identities that an
individual possesses. Thus it is fair to say that elites are limited in their scope as to what
they can achieve when invoking ethnic allegiances. Whilst “those with interests [can]
seek to harness [these] passions, … constraints of the field in which group interactions
occur limit what elites can do and what interests they can pursue.” Ultimately, “the
freedom of elites to foment conflict and violence is limited by their followers’ definition
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of the situation and by what they would be willing to fight over” (Horowitz, 2003: 50).
In other words, elites neither conjure up ethnic identities nor do they coerce individuals
into displaying in-group bias towards other ethnic in-group members, whilst
discriminating against ethnically ‘different’ out-group members. The ‘objective’ ethnic
difference is however not the point, if in fact one can point to such a measure, but rather
the perception thereof. Alone the dynamics of inter-group relations determine that
differences will be inflated, and different attributes apportioned as part of the self-
identity building process. But how should one account for the (often seemingly
unexpected) changes in an individual that allow this person to exact violence upon his
neighbour or fellow citizen of a different ethnicity. Leaving aside for now the
multifarious (and previously mentioned) macro-factors, one must consider the process
and motivations that enable individuals to take part in ethnic violence.
Roger Petersen concerned himself with exactly this question in his work,
Understanding Ethnic Violence, in which he examines emotion as a mechanism that ex-
plains shifts in motivation and in turn mediates between cognition and desire (2003:
20). Whereas Horowitz focussed on the historical groundings of ethnicity (i.e
colonisation) and particularly stressed the severity of cases involving disputes over the
original occupants of territory; Petersen maintains that ethnic conflict simply results
from discrimination against one ethnic group, chiefly when through structural changes
they become aware of the discrimination. With a particular focus on the three emotions
Fear, Hatred and Resentment, Petersen demonstrates what effects (in terms of ethnic
conflict) these mechanisms can have on an individual’s actions. These emotional
processes/mechanisms help explain why individuals (in a certain discriminated ethnic
group) seemingly suddenly become disposed towards violence in times of structural
change (Petersen, 2003: 21). Petersen agrees with Horowitz’s position that both
discrimination and the degree of justification play a decisive role in determining the
chance of ethnic conflict occurring, but adds that a certain mobilising potential must be
present, as well.
In concluding this section covering theoretical approaches to the factor ethnicity, I
would like to draw attention to Cramer (2006: 104-108) who urges caution in handling
the ‘effect’ of ethnicity. Whilst there is no doubt that there ethnicity can be of
significance in violent conflict; there is nothing automatic about it (p.104). Ethnicity is
often treated as an independent variable that has an effect upon the dependent variable
outbreak or occurrence of conflict/civil war. Many analytical approaches attempt to
attribute a degree of causality to ethnicity. “However, ethnicity is not a discrete social
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category with internal consistency and predictable, mechanistic functions and imp-
lications. It is not independent as a political variable” (Cramer, 2006: 106). It is often
treated as a factor that can be treated across time and space in varying contexts. I am
sceptical of this simplification, and thus wish to demonstrate the importance of
understanding the specifics of the historic context, in which ethnicity is both a
constructed subject and object, influenced by key political economic developments. In
the following section the ethnic violence as it occurred in Kenya in the stipulated time
period will be described. This will be followed by explanations for the occurrence of the
violence, and its very visible ethnic qualities.
 
4. Ethnic Violence in Kenya (1992, 1997 and 2007/08) 
 
Before describing the major tendencies of violence that occurred around each of
the three aforementioned elections, it is important to examine the demographic make-up
of Kenyan society.
4.1 Cultural Demographic Indicators in Kenya 
Even the question of statistics raises questions about the importance of ethnicity to
understanding politics in Kenya. In 1999, the results on the ethnic composition of
Kenya were deemed too sensitive and were thus not released (BBC, “Contentious
Census,” 2009). Kenya has 42 recognised tribes, which can be categorised into three
ethn0-linguistic groups, namely: the Bantus, the Cushites and the Nilotes (Cf. Oucho,
2002). The Bantu ethnic group comprises approximately 70 percent of the country's
population, whilst occupying less than 30 percent of the land. Kenya’s Bantu people
mostly occupy the coastal, central, western and eastern provinces of the country. Tribes
belonging to the Bantu ethnicity include: the Kikuyu (Kenya's largest single ethnic
group; the Embu and Meru tribes (closely related to the Kikuyu); the Luhya, who live in
Western Kenya; the Kamba people of Eastern Kenya; the Kisii tribe from the Rift Valley
region, and the Swahili, Taita and Mijikenda people from Kenya's coastal regions (Dee,
2008).
The Cushites are the smallest of these three groups and are live in the north-
eastern and eastern parts of Kenya and include the Somali, Rendile, Borana and Oromo
tribes. After the 2009 Census, the publishing of the results has been suspended
indefinitely, because of alleged inconsistencies. The Somali population, according to the
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results, is reported to have grown 140 percent, a finding that is heavily questioned, and
has been declared to represent manipulation by local leaders (Teyie, 2010).
The third group, the Nilotes (derived from the upper Nile River Valley) primarily
reside in Rift Valley and Lake Victoria regions of Kenya. Kenyan Nilotes include the
Luo (River Lake Nilotes); the Maasai, Samburu and Turkana (Plain Nilotes); and the
Kalenjin (Highland Nilotes), who traditionally inhabit the Western Highlands. The
Nilotes, whilst sharing some common linguistic traits, traditionally exhibited very
varied forms of societal organisation, ranging from nomadic pastoralists, fisher folk, to
well established agriculturalists (Dee, 2008).
The largest ethnic groups in Kenya (as a percentage of the total population) are as
follows: Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%), Kamba (11%), Kisii
(6%) and Meru (6%), Mijikenda (5%) and Maasai (2%)6. Although dated, Nellis’ (1974,
cited in Elischer, 2008: 11) account of the concentration of ethnicities in Kenya’s
provinces is revealing. For example, whilst Kalenjin only constituted 51 percent of the
population in the Rift Valley Province; this represented 95 percent of all Kalenjins.
Furthermore, 97 percent of the Maasai lived in the Rift Valley. 87 percent of all Luo
resided in Nyanza province, where they made up 63 percent of the total population of
the province. However, 95 percent of all Kisii live in Nyanza, whilst only constituting
31 percent of the population of the province. The Eastern Province is dominated by the
Kamba and Meru/Embu tribes, where 87 percent and 97 percent of the their respective
tribes resided. Due to continued population growth (Kenya’s population has doubled
since 1985) and urbanisation, in part caused by the poor economic conditions in the
latter Moi years, many Kenyans were forced to leave their ‘tribal homelands’ in search
of work in the cities. The growth of Kenya’s increasingly infamous slums in recent
years visibly points to this trend. Current estimates put the Kenyan population at around
the 40 million mark. According to UNICEF statistics, 54 percent of Kenyas were under
the age of 20 in 2008. Moreover, around 8 and half million Kenyans were aged between
10 to 20 years old. This is the generation that was born into the Kenya of hundreds of
thousands of IDPs, and significant numbers of this generation were either born in slums
or temporary camps. These generational considerations will be built upon in the next
section that looks to explain the role ethnicity played in the violence of the 1990s and
2007/8. But first the main trends of ethnic violence that occurred around the three
elections following the introduction of multi-party politics will be described.
6
The other/smaller tribes and communities make up approximately 10% of Kenya’s population. Cf:
CIA World Factbook, 2010; Elischer
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4.2 Description of the Ethnic Violence in 1992, 1997 and 2007/8.
In 1992, directly after the exposure of the Goldenberg scandal, aptly described as “the
Moi presidency’s crowning disgrace,” in which the extent of the ‘feeding7’ that had
taken place under Moi’s regime was revealed; Kenya had its first multiparty elections.
Nonetheless, it was to take another ten years before the ‘big man’ Moi and the KANU
party would truly suffer defeat in the 2002 election. Moi had come under increasing
pressure to reform governance and because of the ailing state of the Kenyan economy,
international capital was a necessity. Moi continued to justify upholding the one-party
system and warned that the introduction of multi-party politics would lead to instability
and chaos. In 1992, despite the fact that Moi did not even achieve 50 per cent of the
vote, due to the (mostly) ethnic fragmentation among the opposition he was able to stay
in power. As Wrong (2009: 140) observed: “the clashes [in 1992] seemed desgined to
prove [Moi’s] thesis correct. Osamba (2001: 38) notes that throughout the 1990s there
was an “upsurge in cases of conflict and violence in Kenya since the re-introduction of
political pluralism.” What started off as more ‘sporadic outbreaks of violence’ led to the
massive movement of peoples and the creation of hundreds of thousand of internally
displaced persons (IDPss), an entrenchment of the tit-for-tat resentment between
ethnicities, and culminated in severe violence, small-scale ethnic cleansing and
widespread atrocities that by the end of 2007 had shocked the world. Finally the long-
held view of Kenya as an ‘African Exception, a stable place where one could do
business, was laid bare and buried.
Whilst incidences of violence carried on throughout the period, particularly in
rural areas, three noticeable peaks in conflict occur around the elections of 1992, 1997,
and 2007. Going into explicit detail of all the cases of violence in each year is beyond
the scope of this paper. In the sections that follow, I will briefly outline the violence
around the election, the main perpetrators, who the victims were, and where and under
what circumstances the violence took place. Given the length of the period being
considered (fifteen years), the amount of deaths hardly amount to a sustained civil war.8
7
Feeding is a typical Kenyan reference to eating up the state’s resources. This theme for corruption
led Wrong (2009) to accordingly title her book on corruption in Kenya: “It’s our turn to eat.” It is
alleged that at least 600 million dollars was involved in this single case, equivalent to more than 10
per cent of Kenya’s GDP (see Meredith, 2006 and Wrong, 2009).
8
Kenya certainly does not meet the quantitative requirements of the 1,000 deaths per year of
conflict definition. Nonetheless, in the three months following the 2007 election debacle, over 1,000
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However, the repetitive nature (in terms of geographic hot-spots), the obvious ethnic
cleavages, and the increasing brutality are certainly cause for alarm. For more detailed
and categorical accounts of the violence see Kmenyi and Ndung’u (2005: 128-138) for
violence in the 1990s and International Crisis Group (2008) for a thorough description
of the more recent violence.
Beginning in September 1991, bands of Kalenjin ‘warriors’ conducted attacks
and arson primarily against Luo, Kikuyu, Luhyia and Kisii throughout the Rift Valley.
Whilst these attacks began as small-scale skirmishes, the scale increased in the year
1992, covering areas in which over fifty per cent of Kenya’s population was affected by
the violence. (Osamba, 2001: Kimenyi & Ndung’u, 2005). Resulting from this violence
approximately 1,000 Kenyans lost their lives, mostly Kikuyus, and over 100,000 were
forced to flee the region. As mentioned in the historical section of this paper, the Rift
Valley was ‘settled’ by many Kenyans from other regions as a result of the ‘White
Highlands’ land policy under colonial rule. These were predominantly Kikuyus (but
also Luo) who were seen as non-indigenous ‘immigrants’, and were thus terrorised in
order to force them to leave the province/region. In this time, led by Kalenjin ministers
prominent in the region, the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (sometimes this
tribal alliance is shortened to “Kamatusa9” in the literature) tribes were told that they
should consider the entire rift valley ‘their’ exclusive zone (Meredith, 2006).
Whilst Moi had initially responded to the founding of the FORD group (Forum
for the Restoration of Democracy) by declaring it an ‘illegal organisation’ whose
supporters would be ‘crushed liked rats’ (cited in Meredith, 2006: 402), he was forced
to change his tune due to international pressure. Even so, Moi’ regime was able to tip
the scales in its favour, by manipulating the voting boundaries and adjusting the
weightings of the electorates – making it more than twice as difficult to win a seat in a
non-KANU electorate. Added to this, there is ample evidence of financial and logistical
assistance to those carrying out violence aimed at clearing non-sympathetic ethnicities
out of crucial electorates. Furthermore, the police, who were mostly supporters of
KANU and Moi, repeatedly demonstrated absolute partisanship by not stopping
violence; even in cases joining in!
Many commentators on the 1992 elections note that irrespective of the degree to
deaths (according to International Crisis Group, 2009) have resulted from the violence.
9
Together these four ethnic groups represent 15 percent of the population, whereas the Kalenjin
alone, only rank as the fourth largest ethnic group in Kenya.
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which Moi was involved10, the violence helped skew electorate numbers ethnically in
his favour and helped instil doubt in the mind of people considering the plausibility of
multi-party elections. Meredith (2006:403) states that Moi “made full use of his control
of government machinery to obtain funds, harass the opposition and manipulate the
results.” Furthermore, this violence, which in fact could be considered confined ethnic
cleansing was to have a very detrimental polemic effect on many otherwise non-tribal
Kenyans, and their approach to Kenyan politics. These events sparked calls to revitalize
the Gikuyu11-Embu-Meru Association (GEMA)and led to the establishment of defence
militias (Wrong, 2009). John Githongo, a Kenyan journalist, later to become one of the
most renowned whistleblowers in Kenya, commented in 1992: “Kenyans are now
keenly aware of their ethnicity in a negative, destrucitive sense… we voted largely
along tribal lines [in 1992]. We sowed the wind; I earnestly hope we shall not soon be
reaping the whirlwind” (cited in Wrong, 2009: 140). Meanwhile, the Ford opposition
had split into two factions: a Kikuyu-based faction, ‘Ford Asili’ and a Luo faction,
‘Ford Kenya,’ led by Oginga Odinga (Raila’s father).
Two years after the election in 1992, approximately 500 kilometres to the west of
Nairobi, Rwanda experienced a terrible genocide, where the vicious dangers of
corruption and ethnic tension were plain for all to see. Kenyans were reportedly
‘baffled’ by these horrific events, but did not often see the ramifications and parallels to
what was occurring in the Rift Valley (Wrong, 2009). Many authors noted that from
1992 onward, conflict lingered and continued in the rift valley. Three years later, Kenya
was to experience violence that, unfortunately once again, occurred along ethnic lines.
This time the theatre of focus expanded and included violence in the coastal region, and
many more cases of blatant police repression against political opponents of Moi’s
regime. Unfortunately, the KANU leadership were once again to exploit ethnic violence
to remain in power in the 1997 elections. Klopp and Kamungi (2008: 14) note that
gerrymandering had become commonplace policy, and was often violent, as a means to
‘cleanse’ key constituencies of unwanted Kikuyu and Luo voters. In this context the
KANU policy of Majimboism, not only referred to constitutional reforms toward a
stronger federated state, but rather more to the forced removal of ethnicities to their
original ‘homelands.’
In 1997 ethnic violence reared its head in the coastal region in the districts of
10
Prunier (2008) describes the two elections in the 1990s as “occasions for carefully state-managed
ethnic violence.”
11
Kikuyu is sometimes alternatively spelt Gikuyu; thus the acronym GEMA.
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Mombasa and Kwale. In this case, the Digo (one of the Mijikenda tribes) targeted
ethnicities that had migrated from outside the coastal region, which were mostly
Kikuyu, Luhya and Luo (kimenyi & Ndung’u, 2005). On 13 August 1997, violence
erupted in Likoni, as houses of potential supporters of the opposition were targeted and
destroyed or burnt. Armed groups of bandits terrorised in a very targeted manner,
specific ethnic minorities so as to drive them from the region. Many businesses were
burnt, plundered or destroyed; making the economic survival of the other ethnicities
impossible. In interviews with perpetrators involved in the violence in 1997, Human
Rights Watch (2002) found that KANU politicians had been involved in the preparation
of such plans since 1992. Once again, those who had become internally displaced
persons were not able to vote, which helped Moi ensure continued political dominance
in the Coastal province. Furthermore, cases of police complacency and complicity were
even more pronounced in the lead-up to the 1997 elections12. Osamba estimates, that by
1999, the violence had claimed over 2,500 lives and had led to the displacement of
around 400,00 people (2001: 47-48). Although two electoral commissions correctly
recognised the orchestrated nature of much of the ongoing and spreading violence,
along with damning reports by international and national human rights groups, in which
the guilty parties were clearly identified; those who sponsored the violence evaded
prosecution (Klopp and Kamungi, 2008). In general, whilst the violence around the
1992 election was confined to the provinces of Western, Rift Valley, and Nyanza; by the
election of 1997 most provinces were experiencing some form of violence, along mostly
ethnic lines.
As numerous authors point out, pockets of ethnic violence did occur in 2001 and
2002, including the disturbing emergence of gangs (so-called “private armies”) in the
slums of Kenya’s capital city. (see for example: Kimenyi and Ndung’u, 2005:126).
Nonetheless, having learnt from the electoral losses in 1992 and 1997, the opposition
finally managed to form an alliance that led to a resounding defeat of Moi’s KANU.
Also, following the election, and the high hopes among the wider population for reform,
ethnic violence lulled. Kibaki and the NARC coalition had promised to tackle the
endemic and debilitating problem of corruption, that had been a hallmark of Kenyan
governance since independence. Particularly in Nairobi, there was a tangible
12
It is, however, not so simple, because the police forces also consist of various ethnic fractions.
Whilst Moi had seen to it that the army and police were weighed in his favour; in many localities,
the police often demonstrated their ethnic belonging when it came to dealing with both perpetrators
and victims.
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atmosphere of excitement among Kenyans and in broader international circles alike (cf.
Wrong, 2006). Nonetheless, by 2005, Kibaki had reneged on almost all of his pre-
election promises, and most importantly failed to bring about a power sharing
agreement stipulated in a memorandum of understanding with Odinga (Wrong, 2009).
This would have significantly increased the executive power of the office of the prime
minister (Odinga). In the same year the government had sponsored a draft-constitution,
which was then put to a referendum. The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) was
thus thrust into the forefront amid the organisation of the ‘no vote’ against the draft
consititution.
In 2007, in contrast to previous years, most violence occurred after the election.
This represented the disappointment of the electorate at the obviously rigged election
results. Although Luo and Kikuyu had often been common victims of Kalenjin/
KAMATUSA violence in the previous decade, in 2007/2008 they were the main
opponents. The Luo had mostly supported Odinga for President, whereas many Kikuyu
had voted for Kibaki, both of these presidential candidates belonged to the two
respective ethnic groups. Adding to the usual land claim-based traditional conflicts in
the Rift Valley, were brutal violent clashes in the slums of Kenya’s major cities, in
Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret and Mombasa. As the International Crisis Group (2008:1)
reported:
Protests and confrontations with the police rapidly turned into revenge
killings targeting representatives of the political opponent’s ethniv base.
Kikuyu, Embu and Meru [GEMA] were violently evicted from Luo and
Luhya dominated areas, while Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin were chased from
Kikuyu-dominated settlements or sought refuge at police stations.
By early February of 2008, over 1,000 Kenyans had died13 in the clashes and over
300,000 people had become IDPs. Whilst this conflict often mirrored or repeated
previous violent outbreaks (in terms of geography and ethnicities involved), revenge
killings were far more frequent in prominence. Once again, numerous cases of violence
did appear to be well organised, funded and intentionally planned. However, there were
also an alarmingly high number of seemingly spontaneous outbreaks of violence. This
violence was carried out by groups of young Kenyans, that often clashed with one
another. 2007/2008 saw the re-emergence of the notorious Mungiki, a Kikuyu based
politico-religious criminal syndicate. There were other slum-based ethnic gangs; the
Taliban (a Luo gang) also playing a significant role in the violence of 2007/8.
13
Various BBC reports on Kenya since 2008 have put the death toll at over 1,300
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The violence tailed off almost as quickly as it had begun, as political leaders
began to reign in their ethnic support bases; particularly in light of the international
pressure to restore order. Already in February 2008, Kibaki and Odinga had agreed to
enter negotiations during a Kofi Annan led African Union mediation attempt
(International Crisis Group).
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5. Explanation of the Recent Conflict in Kenya 
As obvious as it sounds, the violent conflicts that arose in Kenya’s recent electoral
history are the tragic results of combination of numerous factors that expressed
themselves through violence along ethnic lines of differentiation. This section will first
analyse the factor ethnicity at the macro/quantitative level, before moving onto the
historical, qualitative, and social-psychological level of analysis,
 
5.1 Macro Level of Analysis; Quantitative Explanations 
 
Kenya clearly represents a highly ethnically fractionalised society, with over 42
tribes coexisting in the same state. The largest single ethnic group, the Kikuyu, still only
constitute a fifth of the population, which requires them to seek alliances in multi-party
politics. Not only is Kenya highly ethnically fractionalised, but the tribes are also
geographically fractionalised across the state’s territory. Tribes compete with each other
for access to the states resources, but also over scarce land (the country’s major
resource), and attempt to use state control to generate benefits for members of the tribe.
Thus, fractionalisation can be seen to result in changing patterns of ethnically delineated
conflict, with changing fronts, due to the shifting of power and repositioning of ethnic
interests. However, because the ethnicities are so fractionalised, the chance of civil war
braking out, despite the recurrence of violent clashes and conflict is low, because no one
ethnicity is able to dominate. The state is always viewed as the vehicle for advancing
the interests of the ethnic group, which is why each ethnicity favours government posts
(preferably a favourable president, and/or high cabinet positions) rather than opting for
civil war. The fact that ethnicities that were previously common victims of violence
carried out by a certain ethnicity (e.g Luo and Kikuyu during the Kalenjin instigated
violence of the 1990s) became the main enemies within the space of 10 years,
demonstrates the propensity for leaders to realign themselves and rechannel ethnic
support in new attempts to get into power.
However, whilst these macro-level factors go some way to explain the bi-polar
effect of a highly ethnically heterogeneous/fractionalised state, insofar as it increases the
occurrence of ethnic clashes but reduces the likelihood of civil war, it does not tell us
why ethnicity should be a significant factor. Thus, in the following, a historical,
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qualitative analysis will be applied to the case of Kenya to better understand why
ethnicity should be a salient identity, that time and again proves to be a mobilising point
for intergroup violence.
5.2 An Historical, Qualitative Explanation of the Ethnic Violence
The following analysis draws upon the six qualitative questions that I previously
posed in section 3.2 of this paper. Numerous authors writing about the ethnic violence
in Kenya noted that people were shocked and even surprised at the violence.
Unfortunately, neither the violence, nor the ethnic lines of division, along which the
violence occurred are surprising. A closer appraisal of the historical context of ethnicity
in the politics of Kenya reads like a tragedy; in fact, the reader should be expecting the
whole system to erupt into violence more often than it has.
5.2.1 The specific historical context and discourse of ethnicity in Kenya.

Understanding the complexity of ethnic difference, and why different ethnic groups in
Kenya repeatedly carry out violence against one another must begin with an analysis of
the construction of ethnic categories under colonialism. Wrong (2009) argues, that
whilst the peoples living in the territories that were to be declared ‘Kenya’ were no
doubt aware of their ethnic differences, and had on occasion clashed over cattle, land
and women, on the whole there was significant coordination and interaction among
tribes, due to intermarriage, trade and economic interdependence. This was because of
the division of economic structure that commonly existed, with some tribes remaining
on the land and becoming agriculturalist (e.g Kikuyu), and others living more nomadic,
mobile, pastoralist lifestyles (i.e Maasai) (Wrong, 2009). There is no simple way in
which to qualify or quantify the incredibly destructive and fundamental impact of
colonialism. One must caution against using colonialism as a catch-all explanation in
place of a more exact observation of the historical reality; nonetheless, the severity of its
impact and the recurring negative after-affects upon the African Continent must not be
overlooked.
The traditional systems of inter-ethnic interaction in Kenya were violently and
irrevocably changed under colonialism. The British, pre-empting president Moi by half
a century, perfected the art of divide et impera, by reinforcing, and more-often creating,
ethnic categories and exacerbating differences (Meredith, 2006). This was certainly the
case in Kenya. Already in the 1920s, the British had begun to divide up Kenya into 24
ethnic-based administrative districts, native reserves, that would then form the basis of
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the present province system. These reserves were, however, overcrowded because the
British had confiscated large tracts (almost all) of the fertile farmland in the Rift Valley,
i.e the “White Highlands,” where Africans could not own land. African Kenyans were
only allowed to leave their administrative reserve if they wore the highly unpopular
ethnic identity card. The British, as in other colonial and imperial forms throughout
history were set on not allowing anything like a national sentiment to grow that would
challenge their hegemony.
Thus, tribes responded to the set structures that were placed on them, and had to
learn to ‘play the game.’ The ethnicity Luhya14, first coined as an overarching term, was
born in the 1930s, combining over 20 different sub-groups. Similarly the ethnic
grouping ‘Kalenjin15’ was born out of the Second World War, where a radio broadcast,
aimed at 8 Nandi speaking sub-groups, was used to recruit them for the British war
effort. More frighteningly, because competition among the reserves for scarce resources
was so high, those from other reserves came to be referred to as ‘foreigners.’ The
missionaries also played a role in the concretisation of ethnic groups by solidifying
languages and ascribing names to certain sub-groupings (Wrong, 2009: 48-51). On top
of this, the British tended to enlist certain tribes for certain jobs16. Thus, the Maasai
would be used as mercenaries or rangers, Kambas as porters and kitchen staff, Kikuyus
worked on the land, while Luos work around the household (Wrong, 2009: 49).
Astonishingly, many of the stereotypes that Kenyans associate with one another’s ethnic
group can only be traced back as far as the late colonial period, where ethnic
differentiation was engrained. Hence, one can speak of a proactive, ascribed, and multi-
faceted identity building process under Colonialism in Kenya. The emotion Resentment,
that Petersen describes, can in part be attributed to the fact that political organisation
could only take place at the local, ethnic level, which stunted the development of
nationalist sentiment. In this regard, as the strains of empire began to show after the
Second World War, Kenyan political leaders’ agency had been determined by the
historical political developments imposed upon them. Ethnicity in Kenya had become
an ingrained and salient feature of political organisation.
14
Luhya means: ‘those of the same hearth’
15
Kalenjin was the name of the broadcast, literally meaning: ‘I say to you.’
16
As Meredith (2006) makes very clear, this was by no mean a specifically British tactic. Other
European colonial powers also specifically employed certain ethnicities in certain jobs, reinforcing
the divisions between them.
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5.2.2 Ethnicity’s place within political structures and boundaries.
The end of colonialism in Kenya coincided with the ascendance of a new generation of
young Kenyans who recognised the historic moment as it occurred, and worked to
inherit the state, not to overthrow it. In the lead-up to independence the dominant
discourse was one of Kenyans versus their colonial oppressors. This discourse (mostly)
overlooked the inherently divisive ethnic structures that the British had implemented,
cultivated, and maintained, and rather sought to gain independence and take over the
state and it mechanisms, which the British had created. With the exception of cross
border raids from Somalia, the ethnic violence in Kenya and Ethnic difference is viewed
wholly in national terms. This is interesting because many of the cultural-linguistic
ethnicities present in Kenya extend across the arbitrary national colonial borders. This
tells us that the colonial process of nation building should be a starting point for an
analysis of ethnicity and ethnic violence in Kenya.
Not only did colonialism have lasting negative effects upon Kenyans in terms of
entrenched ethnic divisiveness and inter-ethnic competition; Kenya also inherited a
system of often unjustly apportioned land and unequal social and infrastructural
investment. Whereas in pre-colonial times the relation of varying tribes to the land had
been at times the source of conflict, it appears to have mostly been fairly symbiotic. An
interesting balance between agriculturalist and pastoralist peoples. Horowitz’s (1985,
2001) arguments about the importance of disputes over land, and question of who were
the original inhabitants of the land, are particularly enlightening in the case of Kenya.
Thus the longest standing ‘ethnic’ conflicts continually occur in the Rift Valley Province
due to the internal migration of ethnicities to this province under colonialism. This led
to a sense of injustice among tribes that had traditionally occupied much of the land in
this area. Accordingly in-group identification (for example amongst the Kalenjin, and
Maasai), then led to more negative appraisals of the out-groups, the foreigners, and
because the ‘original inhabitants’ perceived this to be unjust, there is continual
willingness to redress this imbalance through violence (as Peterson, 2002 and Horowitz,
2001 argue).
5.2.3 Is the State Ethnically Based or Defined?

The legal and automatic response to this question in the case of Kenya is a resounding
‘no.’ When compared to Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Japan17, or other states that attempt to
17
Esman, 2004 cites these among other examples of cultural/ethnically dominated states, compared
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preserve a sense of a single culture, Kenya is much closer to the USA, in so far as the
constitution makes no reference to ethnicity, and that every ethnic individual is free by
law to live where they please, and practise whatever customs they wish. Nonetheless,
as Meredith reminds us: “Africa’s post-colonial states [were] successors to profoundly
anti-democratic colonial forms of governing” (Meredith, 2006: 4). This was particularly
the case in Kenya, where, after independence, the ruling KANU party made little
attempt to redress specific ethnic historical grievances or institute inclusive measure that
would grant more democratic participation to all ethnicities. Moreover, the British had
conditioned a generation of young Kenyans to ‘play their cards right’ in order to gain
access to (and thus rewards from) the resources of the central state. After Independence
the land from the departing British settlers (in the Rift Valley) was sold on the basis of
willing seller and buyer. This naturally benefitted the ethnicities with more economic
resources at their disposal – in this case the Kikuyu. Although Kenyatta originally
included leaders of almost all major ethnic groups in his Government, the Kikuyu
steadily began to establish themselves as the dominant ethnicity in Kenyan politics.
Having denied the concept of federalism/majimboism, many Kikuyu elites were able to
exploit the strong centralist structure of post-independence Kenya. Furthermore, the
Kikuyu benefitted from the fact that government spending (in the form of physical and
social infrastructure) was invested into the central province and Nairobi, where the
majority of Kikuyu live. It was at this time, that the term ‘Mt. Kenya Mafia’ came into
existence. This is a clear example of group identity building that would be used by other
ethnicities in Kenya to explain injustice and inequality by referring to Kikuyu
hegemony. Thus, the theoretically neutral, liberal, pluralist state was infiltrated and
repeatedly understood as a tool through which ethnic interests could be advanced, rather
than an instrument for developing the nation as a whole. This continued under Moi, for
the Kalenjin, and is generally expressed by references in Kenya to ‘eating,’ meaning
exploiting the centralised state resources to benefit the ethnic group.
5.2.4 Influence of Democratic State Structures and Legitimacy Upon Ethnic Pluralism.
One of the largest tragedies in Kenya that has not often been related to the outbreak of
violence is the persistence and existence of graft and corruption. Bribery had become an
everyday fact of life for most Kenyans by the end of Moi’s presidency. As one
commentator noted, “why pay for a lawyer when you buy yourself a judge?” (cited in
to pluralist/liberal states.
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Meredith, 2006). In the 1990s scandal after scandal came to the fore, prompting donors
to freeze aid and investment. Often the sums involved amounted to more money than
the aid for that year, representing daunting percentages of GDP (cf. Meredith, 2006;
Wrong, 2009). Under one-party rule, legitimacy was not a question, because KANU
was unstoppable; all opposition was crushed or assimilated. If one sought favours with
the Government, one needed a contact on the inside. Once the cold war was over, there
was little reason for western governments to blindly support the thoroughly
undemocratic position of the Kenyan government. Thus in the 1990s many internal
activists and a number of key external stakeholders began to pressure for the
liberalisation of Kenyan politics.
At this moment opposition politicians had the opportunity to rise above the
ethnocentrist approach to politics by building a genuine democratic reform based
opposition. However, as discussed above, this was not to be the case. Instead Ford split
into competing ethnic fractions, and neither in 1992, nor in 1997, could Moi’s KANU
party be defeated. This served as yet another incentive for Kenyans to revert to
tribal/ethnic political structures in terms of obtaining resources. Furthermore, as
Elischer (2008) argues, Moi and his party were able to win these elections because they
understood the logic of ethnic arithmetic. When politics is reduced to this, and
opposition simply entails fragile, temporary alliances of convenience (as Horowitz
described them), the state and democracy both lose their sense of national legitimacy.
5.2.5 Ethnicity and Class

Although there were eventually trade union movements and strikes in the 1950s,
Kenyatta effectively stalled the development of socio-economic class politics, through
his Harambee18 approach of Kenyans against the colonists, and then the pretence of
liberal equality in spite of the growing economic inequality. A lack of perceived
legitimacy will often result in the search for alternatives. In the case of Kenya, where
the state and its politicians constantly failed Kenyans as whole, it is conceivable that
citizens were compelled to take ethnicity seriously. A just and democratic distribution of
resources after colonialism may well have contributed to a stronger common identity, or
at least the development of socio-economic based parties rather than ethnic coalitions.
Furthermore, the fact that Kenya’s growing slum populations were consistently
overlooked, and that no (ethnic) party sought to address this trans-ethnic problem meant
18
“Let’s all pull/work together” in Swahili.
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that the frustration and disillusionment in the system grew particularly.
5.2.6 Role of emotions in ethnic violence

Whilst Kenyans repeatedly demonstrated their desire for democracy, and many
individuals risked their lives to reform the corrupt and undemocratic state, the violence
can be seen as representing some very legitimate negative long-held emotions.
Petersen’s (2002) four emotions; fear, hatred, resentment and rage, were certainly
observable in the violence of the last two decades. Fear as a motivating factor
exacerbated animosity among the many IDPs as well as those perceived to be on the
defensive, such as the resort to armed Kikuyu, Embu, and Mera defense squads.
Violence was incited and carried out by Kalenjin throughout the 1990s in the fear that
they would stand to lose the most if Moi lost the elections. In accordance with Petersen
(2002), the Kikuyu have repeatedly been considered a political threat, which helps
explain why other ethnic leaders are able to mobilise violence against them. Hatred (or
‘ancient hatred’ explains the opportunistic violence that occurred during the ‘chaos’
around each of the elections. Old rivalries or disputes are opened up in the face of a lack
of enforcement. Ethnic groups thus exact violence upon groups that they have
traditionally clashed with throughout history. This certainly contributes to an
understanding of the recurring clashes in the Rift Valley in the face of limited
constraints at times of change (such as at election time).
Of the three instrumental emotions postulated by Petersen (2002), resentment is
the most pertinent to the violence in Kenya. Here the group hierarchy is challenged,
changed, or stressed through systemic changes, i.e achievement of Independence, the
death of Kenyatta, the introduction of multi-party politics and contested elections. This
emotion also contributes to an understanding of the violence specifically enacted against
Kikuyu ‘settlers’ in the Rift Valley and other provinces, as well as violence carried out
against successful minorities in regions such as Nyanza, Western and Coast provinces
by the majority ethnic group. Thus ethnicities that were larger and had expanded out of
their traditional ‘heartlands’ were punished, in the absence of central authority, by other
ethnicities that sought to subordinate the ethnicities perceived to be in a higher position
in the ethnic hierarchy. Whilst the violence was a measure used to force ethnicities to
leave provinces and destroy their economic base, this mostly occurred in the context of
elections. In this regard, the violence can be regarded as subordinate to the democratic
process. Nonetheless, it is a sign of mistrust, disappointment and disillusionment in the
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ability of democracy to bring about results that satisfy ethnic voters.
Finally, Petersen (2002) identifies a non-instrumental emotion, namely rage.
Rather than pursuing political, economic or rational goals, and working as part of a
larger instrumental, planned process; individuals experiencing rage seek an outlet for
their frustration and are looking to take it out on someone, or perhaps anyone (Petersen,
2002: 30). This finding is helpful when attempting to understand the terrifying violence
that broke out in numerous slums. Whilst there is some evidence that some politicians/
organisers had connections to some gangs involved in the violence; much of the
violence continued after the politicians began openly talking about a compromise. In
fact both leaders of the 2007/8 divide began imploring the populace to stop the violence.
As Wrong (2008) reports, although many poor Kikuyu (and people from the other PNU
aligned ethnicities) actually voted for Odinga’s ODM, they were simply killed or
attacked by their fellow slum-dwellers. Although these communities were the repetitive
‘losers’ of corrupt politics that had done nothing to redress the growing inequality, they
got caught up in the ethnically charged atmosphere of violence. Thus, those that had
voted across so-called ethnic lines were reminded of the dangerous salience of ethnicity.
5.3 Intergenerational Effects upon Ethnicity. 
One final qualitative consideration, to better understand how it came to such widespread
(and repeating) ethnically divided violence, is to look at intergenerational developments.
As established above, ethnicity is neither fixed, wholly biologically determined, and
static, nor wholly fictional, fluid, and unimportant. An historical constructivist approach
to ethnicity enables an understanding of the importance of politics, power and
economics on the retention, expansion and redefinition of the salience of ethnicity.
Consider the following: the vast majority of those carrying out the violence in
question were born after independence. In contrast, many of those in power (certainly in
the 1990s) were alive at the time of independence. Those who have been in office, or
working throughout the majority of Kenya’s independence had a thoroughly different
understanding of exploiting a central authority. Indeed, they appear to have learnt well
from their old colonial masters, by continuing the tradition of divide and rule. No doubt,
the euphoria that followed the attainment of independence must have certainly
contributed to a culture of not wanting to rock the boat in the decade that followed.
Unfortunately, rather than recognising the incredibly diverse ethnic landscape that now
occupied the Republic of Kenya, the new leaders centralised constitutional power and
authority, repressed genuine opposition and critique; effectively taking the wind out of
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the belief that Kenyan democracy had the answer to ethnic conflict.
Fast forward to the end of 2007. Over 50 per cent of the Kenyan population was
born in or after 198919. Kenya’s population growth, described in the history background
section above, is not to be overseen when searching for explanations of the chaotic
developments in recent years. Ethnicity must be passed on from generation to
generation. It follows, that depending on how the state has accommodated ethnicity,
parents will comprehensibly pass on this sentiment. As many Kenyans realised
throughout the 1970s and onwards, the way to become wealthy and do good business
normally entailed knowing someone in government, and failing that, to rely upon on
ethnic contacts and extended relatives to achieve upward mobility. Nonetheless, as the
research of Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) into voting preferences shows, “Kenyans resist
defining themselves in ethnic terms.” Investment in education, a sense of pride in their
country’s stability, the leading role played in achieving freedom from colonialism, the
internationalisation in Nairobi through the presence of International Organisations,
NGOs and the UN, among many other factors have contributed to a sense of Kenyan-
ness. A quick survey of many Kenyan blogs reveals, there are certainly a significant
number of Kenyans that reject the regression to purely ethnic identities. Neither must a
strong identification with one’s ethnic group lead to violence.
Even so, it does not take much imagination, to realise what affect the massive
displacement of Kenyans (along ethnic cleavages), beginning in the 1990s, must have
had on younger generations’ perceptions of ethnicity and inter-ethnic relations. Added
to this was the disappointing continuation of ethnic arithmetic and inter-tribal disputes
among the opposition once multi-party elections became possible. After a close reading
of Wrong’s (2009) painstaking detailing of the incredible excesses of pervasive and
crippling corruption in Kenya (both under Moi and afterwards), it is understandable that
disaffected Kenyans no longer respected the state or it’s projected national identity. In
conclusion, generations of Kenyan leaders had failed to address the divisive and
competitive effect that colonialism had had on its various ethnic communities. Latent
ethnic animosity gained momentum, which was reproduced across generations that were
confronted with disinterested, self-serving and increasingly authoritarian, nepotistic
“presidents” and administrations. The children of Kenyans who first saw dispersed
ethnic violence in 1992, were at least 15 years old by the time of the 2007 election. The
largest generation in Kenya has only known a period of confined ethnic
19
My own calculation, based on UNICEF (2007) data, where in 2007, 19,633,520 Kenyans were
aged 0-20 years old.
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cleansing/displacement and politicised ethnic alliances that have legitimised controlled
violence as a means to electoral victory. Michela Wrong remembers the question, with
regard to ever increasing population of youngsters, of what would happen to all the
“jobless, prospectless youngsters” (2009: 303). In 2007/8 this questioned was partly
answered. Whilst “mobs don’t do nuance” (Wrong: 307), they do clearly represent
systematic and wide-spread frustration and grievances.
6. Conclusions 
This paper went back into the historical narrative of Kenya to trace the contextual
developments in which ethnic identities developed. By demonstrating the politically
motivated, divisive colonial policies and approaches towards keeping Kenyans from
uniting in opposition, the British were to have lasting affects upon the ensuing inter-
ethnic competing for political power and the corresponding state’s resources. A
quantitative analysis, which recognised the demographic ethnic fractionalisation in
Kenya, was employed to explain why no civil war has broken out in Kenya. It was then
however argued that a further, historically qualitative analysis was necessary to
understand why it came to recurring, and increasingly widespread instances of violence
around the elections of 1992, 1997, and 2007.
The qualitative analysis drew upon numerous theoretical approaches grounded in
social psychology and a constructivist approach to ethnicity. The paper looked at the
interaction between ethnicity and political and economic developments, arguing that
ethnicity as a salient identity responded to such developments. Under the one-party
state, the government in power managed to repress, dissuade or incorporate ethnic
leaders. The Kenyan state, and thus Kenyan democracy, increasing lost legitimacy,
which decreased a sense of national identity, whilst leading to disadvantaged groups
seeking ethnic solutions to their problems. Corruption and a population boom then
contributed to the already growing economic disparities in the country. Once Moi was
forced to allow multi-party elections in 1992, political and ethnic elites reneged their
opportunity to redress ethnic cleavages, and instead sought to better their own positions.
Finally the inter-generational effects and causes of the latent conflict in Kenya
was considered. Indeed, if further outbreaks of even more serious ethnic violence are to
be hindered, then serious and immediate measures must be undertaken that redress the
historic causes of ethnic grievances, and that restore faith in the governments ability to
distribute state resources in a just and neutral manner. Furthermore, the constitutional
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question of federalism (majimboism) should be handled in an intellectual manner, that
doesn’t simply attempt to create mono-ethnic provinces.
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7. References 
Bratton, Michael, Kimenyi, Mwangi, S. (2008): “Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in

Perspective.” Department of Economics Working Paper Series. University of Conneticut
Bussmann, Margit, Hasenclever, Andreas, and Schneider, Gerald (2009): “Identitat, Institutionen
und Okonomie: Ursachen und Scheinursachen innenpolitischer Gewalt.” Working Paper.
University of Konstanz
Cederman, Lars Eric, Girardin, Luc (2007): “Beyond Fractionalisation: Mapping Ethnicity into
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“Chronology for Kalenjin in Kenya” (2007): Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project, University of
Maryland. Retrieved 15 December 2009 from:
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=50109
Cramer, Christopher (2006): Civil War is not a stupid thing. London: C. Hurst & Co.
Chandra, Kanchan, Wilkinson, Steven (2008): “Measuring the Effect of `Ethnicity’.”

Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, 515-563.
Dee, Rose (2010): Kenya Information Guide. Last accessed 15 January 2010 at:
http://www.kenya-information-guide.com
Esman, Milton J. (2004): An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict. Polity Press: Cambridge.
Elischer, Stephen (2008): “Ethnic Coalitions of Convenience and Commitment: Political Parties and
Party Systems in Kenya.” GIGA Working Paper 68/2008, Hamburg.
Fearon, James D. (2003): “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity by Country.” Journal of
Economic Growth 8, 195-222.
Gottwald, Eva (2009): “Horowitz ernst nehmen: Der Einfluss von Leidensdruck auf den Ausbruch
von Bürgerkriegen,” in: Bussmann, Margit, Hasenclever, Andreas & Schneider, Gerald (eds):
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Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen

Recurring Ethnic Violence without Civil War:

3. Theoretical Considerations of Ethnicity……...…….…………………………………..9

4. Ethnic Violence in Kenya (1992, 1997 and 2007/08)…………………………….……19

4.1 Cultural Demographic Indicators in Kenya……………………………………..19

5. Explanations for the Recent Conflicts in Kenya……………………………….…..…26

5.1 Macro Level of Analysis; Quantitative Explanation………...……………….….….26

While a thorough description of early post-colonial developments or in-depth

Instrumentalists see socio-economic factors as being the main underlying causes of

5.2.1 The specific historical context and discourse of ethnicity in Kenya.

5.2.3 Is the State Ethnically Based or Defined?

5.2.5 Ethnicity and Class

5.2.6 Role of emotions in ethnic violence

Bratton, Michael, Kimenyi, Mwangi, S. (2008): “Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in

Chandra, Kanchan, Wilkinson, Steven (2008): “Measuring the Effect of `Ethnicity’.”

Esman, Milton J. (2004): An Introduction to Ethnic Conflict. Polity Press: Cambridge.

Hasenclever, Andreas & De Juan, Alexander (2007): “Religionen in Konflikten – eine

“Kalenjin” (2009): Everyculture.com. Retrieved 18 November 2009 from

"Jomo Kenyatta" (2004): Encyclopaedia of World Biography. [online] HighBeam Research.

Posner, Daniel N. (2004): “Measuring Ethnic Fractionalization in Africa.” American Journal of

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